A Relentless Quest for Breathing Space
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2011
The World Health Organization recently sent a private message to its member states. President Ma Ying-jeou held a press conference, loudly protesting its contents. He criticized Beijing, using uncommonly harsh language. President Ma's anger echoed public sentiment on Taiwan. Beijing has recently made a number of concessions to Taipei, including allowing it to attend the WHO conference. But the goodwill gained by this gesture has probably taken a serious hit.
Since President Ma took office, he has made a concerted effort to promote cross-Strait reconciliation. An implicit "diplomatic truce" is now in place. The two sides no longer try to lure away each other's allies. They no longer engage in a tug of war within international organizations. They no longer engage in checkbook diplomacy. Beijing sought to demonstrate its understanding of public opinion on Taiwan. It allowed Taipei to enjoy observer status at the World Health Assembly, under the name "Chinese Taipei." Our own Director of Health, who led the delegation, was addressed as "Minister," and was allowed to address the General Assembly. From Taipei's perspective, these were extremely encouraging developments. They were the Ma administration's most significant diplomatic achievement.
Given this positive precedent, the government hoped to strengthen contacts and exchanges with other member states. It hoped to replicate this model in other organizations. It hoped to participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization and the United Nations Climate Change Convention, also as an observer. It had already gained the support of the U.S. Congress and State Department. Taipei was all set to return to the world stage. The World Health Assembly was an important starting point.
But the leaked WHO documents show that Beijing's generosity toward Taipei remains limited. Basically, Beijing has no intention of giving way. The September 2009 letter, sent to member states by the WHO Secretariat read, "WHO Administrative Regulations pertaining to China's Taiwan Province." It specified that if WHO member states receive documents from Taipei, they should not contact Taipei directly, but should contact the WHO Secretariat. It specified that all WHO documents should use the term, "China's Taiwan Province." All information relating to Taiwan must be classified under "China." Taiwan must not be considered a separate state.
In terms of international law, the WHO is one of the UN's subsidiary organizations. Therefore its China policy must adhere to the position of the United Nations. This is no surprise. The United Nations recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China, and Taiwan as part of China. But after Beijing's demonstration of goodwill, the WHO granted Taipei a number of concessions that transcend the United Nation's principles of recognition and acceptance. For example, it invited Taipei to its annual meeting. It allowed Taipei to use the name "Chinese Taipei." It did not classify the Taipei delegation as part of the Beijing delegation. It allowed Taipei's representatives to be addressed as "ministers." These could be seen as "exceptions." But they could also be seen as "precedents."
Judging from the contents of the letter, Beijing granted Taipei much face, but little substance. It refused to allow Taipei's attendance at the WHA become a precedent. It stipulated that Taipei's attendence was a "temporary exception" limited to the General Assembly session. It stipulated that no change whatsoever was allowed regarding the WHO's position on Taiwan per se. It hoped that member states would not misunderstand. It forbade member states from direct contacts and exchanges with Taipei.
Put more directly, Taipei hoped to take advantage of the WHO General Assembly model. It hoped to increase its participation in the international community. It hoped to actively develop relations with other countries, and gain greater support and sympathy. But Beijing is unwilling to see Taipei use such opportunities to become ever closer with other nations, and perhaps even breaking out of its isolation. Therefore it wants to prevent exchanges between other member states and Taipei. It has the same attitudes, and uses the same methods it did in the past, when it maintained a diplomatic blockade.
But the Secretary-General of WHO has no power to regulate the behavior of member states. Will member states play along? That remains to be seen. Taipei seeks international breathing space. It must rely on its own efforts, on its own strength. Taipei is an integral part of the global health system. It cooperates with the nations of the world in medical treatment, disease prevention, and health maintenance. Before Director of Health Chiu Wen-ta attended the WHO General Assembly in Geneva, he first visited the UK. Our own national health and disease control agencies also remain in close communication with other nations. The WHO missive may interfere with Taipei's efforts to communicate and cooperate with other nations. But it will never make us shrink or despair.
The two sides of the Strait have fundamental disputes over sovereignty. Exchanges allow the two sides to seek common ground, But when reconciliation reaches a certain stage, it will inevitably reveal contradictions over key issues. As Beijing sees it, allowing Taipei to attend the WHA was a major concession. If Taipei wants even more, it may need to offer something more substantial in exchange. These bargaining chips are in Beijing's hands. It is not about to relinquish them willingly. That may depend on political developments on Taiwan
As Taipei sees it, this adverse international situation is not surprising. We are not unduly naive. We do not engage in wishful thinking, We now have an opportunity to attend the WHA. Taipei must cherish this rare opportunity. We must not forsake it lightly. Our survival and dignity require strength and wisdom. Cross-Strait relations may be moving in a more positive direction. But we still need more international breathing space.
持續不懈爭取國際生存空間
2011-05-12 中國時報
針對世界衛生組織私下致會員國的函件，馬英九總統舉行記者會高分貝提出抗議，並以罕見的重話批評中共。馬總統的憤怒正是台灣人民共同的心聲，而大陸在台灣出席世衛大會上向台灣人民展現的善意形象，恐怕也因為這事件而大打折扣。
馬總統上任後努力推動兩岸和解，並在「外交休兵」默契下，兩岸不再挖邦交國或在國際組織中角力，也不再搞支票外交。而中國大陸為了展現對台灣民意的體諒，也破天荒願意讓台灣以「觀察員」身分、「中華台北」的名稱，獲邀出席世衛大會，率團的衛生署長被稱為「部長」，還能在大會上致詞。這些對台灣來說，都是極為振奮的成果，也是馬政府最重大的外交佳績。
有了這個好的模式，我國不但希望能藉此加強與其他會員國的接觸交流，更希望能在其他組織複製這個參與模式，尋求以觀察員身分進入國際民航組織與聯合國氣候變化公約，並且也已經獲得美國國會與國務院的表態支持。對台灣重返國際社會來說，世衛大會這個新舞台，是一個非常重要的起點。
但是，從流出的世衛內部文件看來，北京當局對台灣的慷慨實在相當有限，基本防線也沒有絲毫退讓的打算。這封二○○九年九月世衛祕書處發給各國世衛代表的《世衛條例對中國台灣省之執行作業準則》中，要求各國世衛單位不得與台北直接聯絡，若收到來自台北的公文訊息，也不能作任何回應，而是必須轉交世衛祕書處。所有世衛文件都必須使用「中國台灣省」，所有關於台灣的訊息資料都必須歸類在中國之下，不得視為另外的國家。
就國際法來說，世衛組織是聯合國的附屬機構，因此其中國政策遵循聯合國立場，並不讓人意外，而聯合國承認中華人民共和國是中國唯一合法代表、台灣屬於中國。在中共展現和解善意後，世衛在許多方面給了台灣一些超越聯合國原則的認可與接納，例如邀請出席年會、使用「中華台北」名稱、不列入中國代表團、稱呼「部長」等，這些可以被解讀為「特例」，但未來也可能成為「先例」。
根據函件內容，中共面子做給了台灣，不過裡子可是守得嚴密，堅決不讓台灣出席世衛大會成為「先例」，而且還只限於是在大會期間的「暫時性特例」。世衛本身對台灣的定位，不容許有絲毫改變，希望會員國也不要產生誤解，也不准許會員國直接與台灣接觸交流。
更直接講，台灣很希望藉著世衛大會模式，一方面強化自己參與國際社會的正當性，一方面積極與各國發展關係，爭取更多支持與同情。但中共卻不樂見台灣真的趁機和其他國家愈走愈近，甚至逐漸打破孤立處境，因此阻止其他會員國與台灣交往，這種心態和作法，與之前的外交封殺相差無幾。
然而，世衛祕書長有沒有權力限制會員國的行為、各會員國是不是都肯買帳，其實還很難說。台灣爭取國際空間，靠的是努力與實力，無論在醫療、防疫、健康、國際合作等各方面，台灣都是全球衛生體系不可或缺的一環。衛生署長邱文達出席日內瓦世衛大會之前，就先到英國訪問，而我國衛生疾管單位也和許多國家維持密切聯絡管道，世衛的通令，也許會對台灣尋求交流合作的努力造成干擾，卻絕不會讓我們有一絲一毫的氣餒退縮。
兩岸有根本性的主權爭議，交流時可以求同存異，但和解推動到了一個階段，終究可能在若干關鍵議題上露出矛盾。在北京看來，讓台灣出席世衛大會已是相當重大的讓步，如果要得更多，恐怕就得看台灣要拿什麼來換了。更實質的東西，是中共手上的談判籌碼，不會輕易鬆手，何況也要看台灣政局的發展走向。
對台灣來說，惡劣的國際局勢並不讓人意外，我們也不會過度天真或一廂情願，現在有機會出席世衛大會，台灣還是應該好好珍惜這個難得的舞台，不能輕言放棄。生存與尊嚴必須用實力與智慧去爭取，無論兩岸關係如何朝向更正面的發展，我們仍應為持續爭取國際生存的空間而努力。
Thursday, May 12, 2011
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
1992 Consensus: Seeking Common Ground Requires One China, Different Interpretations
1992 Consensus: Seeking Common Ground Requires One China, Different Interpretations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2011
Since the beginning of this year, Beijing officials in charge of Taiwan affairs have repeatedly stressed the 1992 Consensus. They have done so on every occasion pertaining to cross-Strait relations. They have made subtle but highly significant alterations to the meaning of the 1992 Consensus. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, for example, said that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground."
The 1992 Consensus enables both Taipei and Beijing to assert their own position. Taipei speaks of "One China, Different Interpretations." Beijing speaks of "Different Interpretations of One China." Beijing stresses "seeking common ground." Taipei stresses "honoring the differences." Over the past three years, when referring to 1992 Consensus, the Beijing authorities have often emphasized the One China Principle. They have mentioned the 1992 Consensus in connection with "seeking common ground, while honoring the differences." But until recently they have never said that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground." Now however, they are. Now Beijing is saying that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground." Since Taipei has long maintained that the 1992 Consensus means One China, Different Interpretations, the two sides have narrowed the the gap separating them considerably.
Beijing's move has important implications. If the DPP wins the presidential election, it may well repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing might be making a preemptive move. On the other hand, Beijing might be fine-tuning its position. It might be making a subtle shift, from "seeking common ground," to "honoring the differences." It might be making a subtle shift, from the One China Principle, to One China, Different Interpretations. Beijing's shift might make the 1992 Consensus more balanced and stable. It might make the 1992 Consensus more acceptable to the majority on Taiwan. This in turn, might establish a more secure framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, one that the Democratic Progressive Party would find more difficult to overturn.
On January 13 of this year, ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin said, "If one day opposition to Taiwan independence evaporates, if the 1992 Consensus evaporates, we might have to rethink everything." This was the first time Beijing handed the DPP an ultimatum. Chen Yunlin's remarks have since become the central theme of Beijing's Taiwan policy. On March 25, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Relations between the two sides are good. This is a reflection of the One China Principle within the 1992 Consensus. The two sides may have different interpretations of the meaning of One China. Nevertheless we can seek common common ground. This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." At one time, Beijing maintained that the essence of the 1992 Consensus was the One China Principle. Today, Beijing maintains that the essence of the 1992 Consensus is "the search for common ground." This shift may be subtle, but it is highly significant.
Wang Yi's remarks were published on March 26, the third anniversary of the Bush/Hu hotline conversation in 2008. Five days after Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, President Hu Jintao called President George W. Bush on the hotline. Hu said that "Mainland China and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. This means that both sides will acknowledge that there is only one China. But they will agree to define it their own way." In fact, Hu's remarks constituted an example of "seeking common ground." They constituted an example of "One China, Different Interpretations." At at the time, they appeared only in the Xinhua News Agency's English language edition, and not the Chinese language edition. Today, Wang Yi is merely restating Hu Jintao's position during the Bush/Hu hotline conversation. In effect, the Chinese language edition has been published after a three year delay.
At a deeper level, Wang Yi's remarks tell us that Beijing has already accepted Taipei's take on the 1992 Consensus. Beijing has already accepted Taipei's One China, Different Interpretations position. Many years ago, Taipei maintained that "The two sides of the Strait adhere to the principle of One China. But they differ on the meaning of that One China." This was the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations. Beijing said it "adhered to the One China Principle" and "refrained from discussing the political meaning of One China." This was the meaning of Different Interpretations of One China. Wang Yi's remarks on March 25 show that Beijing has already accepted Taipei's take on the 1992 Consensus, which the Ma administration adheres to even today. Wang Yi's remarks stress "the seeking of common ground." The subtext is "One China, Different Interpretations." Wang Yi spoke on March 25. Since then, high-ranking officials in Beijing have addressed the 1992 Consensus on several occasions. They have all mentioned "seeking common ground." The most recent example was Chairman Jia Qinglin of the CPPCC National Committee. During the KMT/CCP Forum he said that as long as we have "opposition to Taiwan independence," and the "1992 Consensus" as a political base, can we shelve disputes and seek common ground.
When cross-Strait relations reach a certain stage, the two sides must "honor the differences." Otherwise they cannot "seek common ground." In the past, Beijing repudiated the Republic of China. This made it impossible for the two sides to "honor the differences." But if the Republic of China cannot be upheld and affirmed even on Taiwan, how can we expect the public on Taiwan and the Mainland to "seek common ground?" If this editorial has anything to contribute, it is the following. The Beijing authorities have already shifted from the One China Principle to "seeking common ground." They have already shifted from "seeking common ground" to "One China, Different Interpretations." They have done so because they must honor the differences implied by One China, Different Interpretations. Unless they do so, they cannot seek the common ground implied by the One China Principle. Unless they do so, it will be difficult to improve cross-Strait relations by reasonable means. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate this newspaper's "glass theory."
The glass theory states that the Republic of China is a glass. Taiwan is the water within the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water can go nowhere. Once the glass is shattered, the water will be scattered everywhere.
九二共識要求同存異就要一中各表
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.11
自今年初以來，北京當局的各階層涉台官員，在重要場合，每論及兩岸關係，幾乎皆會強調九二共識，且最近又對九二共識的內涵有了微妙且重大的調整，顯示在國台辦主任王毅稱「求同存異是九二共識的精髓所在」。
九二共識各說各話。台北「一中各表」，北京「各表一中」；北京強調「求同」，台北強調「存異」。在過去三年，北京當局在提及九二共識時，往往只是強調其「一個中國的原則」；雖偶亦將「求同存異」與「九二共識」連結，但未曾強調九二共識的「精髓所在」即是「求同存異」。如今，北京說「九二共識，求同存異」，台北說「九二共識，一中各表」，雙方的距離拉近了不少。
北京的動作，一方面是對民進黨若贏得總統大選可能否棄九二共識而預先攤牌，另一方面則可視為是從「求同」微調，轉向「存異」，亦即從「一中原則」微調，轉向「一中各表」，可使九二共識成為更平衡、更穩固，且更可能被多數台灣人民接受及支持的兩岸和平發展框架，亦即更難被民進黨推翻。
今年一月十三日，海協會會長陳雲林說：「如果有一天反對台獨沒了，九二共識沒了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」這是北京首次對民進黨預作攤牌，而陳雲林的談話隨即成為北京涉台論述主調。至三月二十五日，北京國台辦主任王毅又稱：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」其實，在此以前，北京認為九二共識的「精髓」應是「一中原則」；如今稱「求同存異」為「九二共識的精髓所在」，這樣的調整當然是微妙且重大。
王毅的這段談話在三月二十六日見報，正是布胡熱線論及同一話題的三周年。2008年三月二十六日，馬英九當選總統五天後，胡錦濤主席在熱線中對小布希總統說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」胡錦濤的談話，其實就是「求同存異」，也就是「一中各表」。但當時只見諸新華社的英文稿，未見諸中文稿；如今，王毅的談話其實是複誦布胡熱線的胡錦濤談話，可以視為延遲在三年後公布的中文稿。
王毅談話的更深一層意義，是在顯示北京已經接受台北方面在1992年當年對「一中各表」的立場。當年，台北方面主張：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。」此即「一中各表」。北京方面則稱：「堅持一個中國原則，不討論『一個中國』的政治涵義。」此即「各表一中」。顯然，三月二十五日王毅的談話，已經接受了台北方面在1992年所表達而至今馬政府仍然持守的觀點；主旨在「求同存異」，潛台詞則是「一中各表」。自王毅三月二十五日談話後，北京重要官員在重要場合談及九二共識，必與「求同存異」連結。最近的例證是全國政協主席賈慶林在「國共論壇」上說：有了「反台獨」和「九二共識」兩項政治基礎，才能擱置爭議，求同存異。
兩岸關係，在相當階段中，若不能「存異」，即不可能「求同」。北京過去否定「中華民國」，使兩岸雙方不能「存異」；然若台灣內部連「中華民國」也不能維持及鞏固，豈能奢望台灣人民與對岸的「中國」去「求同」？倘若本文的分析尚有可供思索之處，北京當局既已從「一中原則」移向「求同存異」，且再試從「求同存異」邁向「一中各表」。因為，不存「一中各表」之「異」，即無可能求「一中原則」之「同」，兩岸關係亦難以經合理的過程到改善之目的。最後，再重申本報所主張的兩岸思維「杯子理論」。
杯子理論說：中華民國是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2011
Since the beginning of this year, Beijing officials in charge of Taiwan affairs have repeatedly stressed the 1992 Consensus. They have done so on every occasion pertaining to cross-Strait relations. They have made subtle but highly significant alterations to the meaning of the 1992 Consensus. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, for example, said that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground."
The 1992 Consensus enables both Taipei and Beijing to assert their own position. Taipei speaks of "One China, Different Interpretations." Beijing speaks of "Different Interpretations of One China." Beijing stresses "seeking common ground." Taipei stresses "honoring the differences." Over the past three years, when referring to 1992 Consensus, the Beijing authorities have often emphasized the One China Principle. They have mentioned the 1992 Consensus in connection with "seeking common ground, while honoring the differences." But until recently they have never said that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground." Now however, they are. Now Beijing is saying that "The essence of the 1992 Consensus is the search for common ground." Since Taipei has long maintained that the 1992 Consensus means One China, Different Interpretations, the two sides have narrowed the the gap separating them considerably.
Beijing's move has important implications. If the DPP wins the presidential election, it may well repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing might be making a preemptive move. On the other hand, Beijing might be fine-tuning its position. It might be making a subtle shift, from "seeking common ground," to "honoring the differences." It might be making a subtle shift, from the One China Principle, to One China, Different Interpretations. Beijing's shift might make the 1992 Consensus more balanced and stable. It might make the 1992 Consensus more acceptable to the majority on Taiwan. This in turn, might establish a more secure framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, one that the Democratic Progressive Party would find more difficult to overturn.
On January 13 of this year, ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin said, "If one day opposition to Taiwan independence evaporates, if the 1992 Consensus evaporates, we might have to rethink everything." This was the first time Beijing handed the DPP an ultimatum. Chen Yunlin's remarks have since become the central theme of Beijing's Taiwan policy. On March 25, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Relations between the two sides are good. This is a reflection of the One China Principle within the 1992 Consensus. The two sides may have different interpretations of the meaning of One China. Nevertheless we can seek common common ground. This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." At one time, Beijing maintained that the essence of the 1992 Consensus was the One China Principle. Today, Beijing maintains that the essence of the 1992 Consensus is "the search for common ground." This shift may be subtle, but it is highly significant.
Wang Yi's remarks were published on March 26, the third anniversary of the Bush/Hu hotline conversation in 2008. Five days after Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, President Hu Jintao called President George W. Bush on the hotline. Hu said that "Mainland China and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. This means that both sides will acknowledge that there is only one China. But they will agree to define it their own way." In fact, Hu's remarks constituted an example of "seeking common ground." They constituted an example of "One China, Different Interpretations." At at the time, they appeared only in the Xinhua News Agency's English language edition, and not the Chinese language edition. Today, Wang Yi is merely restating Hu Jintao's position during the Bush/Hu hotline conversation. In effect, the Chinese language edition has been published after a three year delay.
At a deeper level, Wang Yi's remarks tell us that Beijing has already accepted Taipei's take on the 1992 Consensus. Beijing has already accepted Taipei's One China, Different Interpretations position. Many years ago, Taipei maintained that "The two sides of the Strait adhere to the principle of One China. But they differ on the meaning of that One China." This was the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations. Beijing said it "adhered to the One China Principle" and "refrained from discussing the political meaning of One China." This was the meaning of Different Interpretations of One China. Wang Yi's remarks on March 25 show that Beijing has already accepted Taipei's take on the 1992 Consensus, which the Ma administration adheres to even today. Wang Yi's remarks stress "the seeking of common ground." The subtext is "One China, Different Interpretations." Wang Yi spoke on March 25. Since then, high-ranking officials in Beijing have addressed the 1992 Consensus on several occasions. They have all mentioned "seeking common ground." The most recent example was Chairman Jia Qinglin of the CPPCC National Committee. During the KMT/CCP Forum he said that as long as we have "opposition to Taiwan independence," and the "1992 Consensus" as a political base, can we shelve disputes and seek common ground.
When cross-Strait relations reach a certain stage, the two sides must "honor the differences." Otherwise they cannot "seek common ground." In the past, Beijing repudiated the Republic of China. This made it impossible for the two sides to "honor the differences." But if the Republic of China cannot be upheld and affirmed even on Taiwan, how can we expect the public on Taiwan and the Mainland to "seek common ground?" If this editorial has anything to contribute, it is the following. The Beijing authorities have already shifted from the One China Principle to "seeking common ground." They have already shifted from "seeking common ground" to "One China, Different Interpretations." They have done so because they must honor the differences implied by One China, Different Interpretations. Unless they do so, they cannot seek the common ground implied by the One China Principle. Unless they do so, it will be difficult to improve cross-Strait relations by reasonable means. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate this newspaper's "glass theory."
The glass theory states that the Republic of China is a glass. Taiwan is the water within the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water can go nowhere. Once the glass is shattered, the water will be scattered everywhere.
九二共識要求同存異就要一中各表
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.11
自今年初以來，北京當局的各階層涉台官員，在重要場合，每論及兩岸關係，幾乎皆會強調九二共識，且最近又對九二共識的內涵有了微妙且重大的調整，顯示在國台辦主任王毅稱「求同存異是九二共識的精髓所在」。
九二共識各說各話。台北「一中各表」，北京「各表一中」；北京強調「求同」，台北強調「存異」。在過去三年，北京當局在提及九二共識時，往往只是強調其「一個中國的原則」；雖偶亦將「求同存異」與「九二共識」連結，但未曾強調九二共識的「精髓所在」即是「求同存異」。如今，北京說「九二共識，求同存異」，台北說「九二共識，一中各表」，雙方的距離拉近了不少。
北京的動作，一方面是對民進黨若贏得總統大選可能否棄九二共識而預先攤牌，另一方面則可視為是從「求同」微調，轉向「存異」，亦即從「一中原則」微調，轉向「一中各表」，可使九二共識成為更平衡、更穩固，且更可能被多數台灣人民接受及支持的兩岸和平發展框架，亦即更難被民進黨推翻。
今年一月十三日，海協會會長陳雲林說：「如果有一天反對台獨沒了，九二共識沒了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」這是北京首次對民進黨預作攤牌，而陳雲林的談話隨即成為北京涉台論述主調。至三月二十五日，北京國台辦主任王毅又稱：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」其實，在此以前，北京認為九二共識的「精髓」應是「一中原則」；如今稱「求同存異」為「九二共識的精髓所在」，這樣的調整當然是微妙且重大。
王毅的這段談話在三月二十六日見報，正是布胡熱線論及同一話題的三周年。2008年三月二十六日，馬英九當選總統五天後，胡錦濤主席在熱線中對小布希總統說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」胡錦濤的談話，其實就是「求同存異」，也就是「一中各表」。但當時只見諸新華社的英文稿，未見諸中文稿；如今，王毅的談話其實是複誦布胡熱線的胡錦濤談話，可以視為延遲在三年後公布的中文稿。
王毅談話的更深一層意義，是在顯示北京已經接受台北方面在1992年當年對「一中各表」的立場。當年，台北方面主張：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。」此即「一中各表」。北京方面則稱：「堅持一個中國原則，不討論『一個中國』的政治涵義。」此即「各表一中」。顯然，三月二十五日王毅的談話，已經接受了台北方面在1992年所表達而至今馬政府仍然持守的觀點；主旨在「求同存異」，潛台詞則是「一中各表」。自王毅三月二十五日談話後，北京重要官員在重要場合談及九二共識，必與「求同存異」連結。最近的例證是全國政協主席賈慶林在「國共論壇」上說：有了「反台獨」和「九二共識」兩項政治基礎，才能擱置爭議，求同存異。
兩岸關係，在相當階段中，若不能「存異」，即不可能「求同」。北京過去否定「中華民國」，使兩岸雙方不能「存異」；然若台灣內部連「中華民國」也不能維持及鞏固，豈能奢望台灣人民與對岸的「中國」去「求同」？倘若本文的分析尚有可供思索之處，北京當局既已從「一中原則」移向「求同存異」，且再試從「求同存異」邁向「一中各表」。因為，不存「一中各表」之「異」，即無可能求「一中原則」之「同」，兩岸關係亦難以經合理的過程到改善之目的。最後，再重申本報所主張的兩岸思維「杯子理論」。
杯子理論說：中華民國是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Joseph Wu Waylays Tsai Ing-wen
Joseph Wu Waylays Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2011
During the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primary, Joseph Wu said "Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy must not be made too explicit. If it is made too explicit, its many problems will be exposed, People will attack it as infeasible. The real point will be lost in the shuffle."
Who knew that Joseph Wu, during his visit to the US, would be the person who makes the DPP's cross-Strait policy "too explicit." Who knew that his remarks would be the ones that invited attacks? Who knew that his attackers would include DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen?
While he was in Washington Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, she would not accept the 1992 Consensus. He said however, that if negotiations between the SEF and ARATS were interrupted, Tsai Ing-wen could fall back on the Macau model. Tsai Ing-wen said that Joseph Wu's too explicit remarks did not represent the views of the DPP.
Actually Joseph Wu shares Tsai Ing-wen's views on at least one issue. On one issue at least, Wu speaks for Tsai Ing-wen. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. On this point at least, Tsai Ing-wen has long been consistent.
Joseph Wu said that if Tsai assumes office she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. In that case, Beijing might break off consultations between SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen must concede this point. She can hardly argue otherwise. In fact, if Tsai refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, not only could consultations between SEF and ARATS run aground, so could ECFA. A cross-Strait diplomatic war could break out. Mainland tourists could stop coming. Mutual legal assistance could end. Direct cross-Strait flights could be grounded. These are all possibilities. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen cannot refute Joseph Wu's prediction. Consultations between the SEF and ARATS could be terminated. Nor can Tsai Ing-wen deny that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus will unavoidably have political and economic consequences. Her statement that Joseph Wu does not speak on her behalf is mere subterfuge. Joseph Wu pointed out that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus could provoke a major change in the cross-Strait situation. On these points, he differs not with Tsai Ing-wen. She cannot say this does not represent the DPP's position.
Tsai and Wu differ only on one point. Joseph Wu proposed using the Macau model as an alternative. Once the 1992 Consensus has been repudiated, he suggested "association to association" and "industry to industry" negotiations. He suggested using these associations and industries as buffers. Joseph Wu attempts to be realistic. One cannot say that when the time comes one will actually break off cross-Strait negotiations. One must always have a viable alternative. Wu believes that viable alternative is the Macau model. But falling back on the Macau model would be akin to plucking cross-Strait negotiations out of the Internet era, from the level of cloud computing, and dropping it back into the era of the Semaphore and Morse code.
Sure enough, Joseph Wu's explicit Macau model made its many problems equally explicit. The most serious problem made explicit, is that the DPP lacks a proposal of its own. It has no solutions to offer. Besides, how can Tsai Ing-wen admit that when the DPP was in power, its coping mechanism was the Macau model? Would Beijing accept the Macau model? Tsai Ing-wen knows that is wishful thinking. Beijing would accuse her of bad faith, and disown responsibility for the consequences.
Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must come forward and attack Joseph Wu. She must declare that Wu did not take part in DPP deliberations over [Mainland] China policy. She must declare that his remarks did not represent the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen essentially admitted that alternatives to the Macau model are infeasible. Joseph Wu's prophecy, quoted in the first paragraph of this article, has already been fulfilled. The only surprise was that those who stepped forward to attack Joseph Wu's too explicit rhetoric, were DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen herself.
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen must concede that Joseph Wu is right on two points. The first is that if elected president, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. The second is that if she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, she will provoke major changes in the political and economic situation. Therefore, Tsai and Wu differ on only one point. Wu proposes the Macau model as a response. Tsai Ing-wen however, disagrees. The next question should be obvious. If Tsai Ing-wen believes that the Macau model is infeasible, what tricks does she have up her sleeve?
Tsai Ing-wen must offer a more explicit cross-Strait policy. Joseph Wu's little interlude has made that clear. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer bob and weave. She can no longer refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus. She can no longer refuse to face the consequences of a change in the cross-Strait political and economic situation. She can no longer refuse to offer a response. Refusal to offer a response is not the action of a rational and responsible presidential candidate.
The cross-Strait peace and development framework of the past three years is predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. The DPP argues that this is merely the KMT and CCP's one-sided perception. Tsai Ing-wen says that if she wins next year's presidential election, she will maintain an open and pragmatic attitude toward cross-Strait exchanges. But she will not accept the 1992 Consensus, and she disdains the Macau model. Furthermore, she has joined Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan independence chorus. What is this, other than "President Tsai's" own one-sided [Mainland] China policy?
吳釗燮「具體逼問」蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.10
在民進黨總統初選階段，吳釗燮說：「蔡英文的兩岸論述不能太具體，若太具體，很多問題就會暴露，必有人跳出來攻擊說不可行，容易失焦。」
不料，吳釗燮訪美，自己竟然將民進黨的兩岸論述說得如此「具體」；他的談話所引致的「攻擊」，則包括來自民進黨中央及蔡英文本人。
吳釗燮在華府說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會接受九二共識，倘因此使海基、海協兩會協商中斷，可用「澳門模式」補救。對於吳釗燮如此「具體」的說法，蔡英文稱他不能代表民進黨的主張。
其實，吳釗燮至少有一個觀點，與蔡英文完全相同，可以代表蔡英文的立場。那就是吳釗燮說，蔡英文若執政不會接受「九二共識」，這一點無疑是蔡英文迄今始終一貫的主張。
至於吳釗燮說，蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，北京可能中斷兩會協商；蔡英文對這一點恐亦必須同意，難持異議。實則蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，非但兩會可能中斷協商機制，ECFA亦可能擱淺，兩岸外交烽火再起，陸客不來，司法互助停擺，直航停飛，這些皆是不無可能之事。因而，蔡英文若不能否定吳釗燮對「兩會中斷」的預言，亦即不能否認若執政而不接受「九二共識」所必將引發的政經後果，則所謂吳釗燮不能代表她云云，應只是遁詞而已。也就是說，其實吳釗燮在「不接受九二共識」，及「因此可能引爆兩岸重大變局」這兩點看法上，應與蔡英文無異，不可謂「不能代表民進黨」。
蔡吳二人的唯一可能差異，是在吳釗燮舉「澳門模式」為替代方案；亦即主張在否棄九二共識後，改以「協會對協會／行業對行業」的「雙層白手套」來建立兩岸協商。吳釗燮的說法，毋寧是實事求是，總不能說屆時真的就關閉一切兩岸協商機制，總需有個對策，他認為那就是「澳門模式」。但此一主張，好比要將兩岸協商從雲端網路時代，倒退到旗語或摩斯電碼的時代。
至此，吳釗燮「具體」的「澳門模式」，果然使「很多問題就會暴露」，最嚴重的是在「暴露」了民進黨其實根本無計可施、無路可走；然而，蔡英文如何能承認民進黨屆時的因應對策竟是難登大雅的「澳門模式」？當然，蔡英文心裡更明白，等到北京以「是妳無情，莫怪我無義」與她翻臉之日，欲求「澳門模式」恐亦不可得。
於是，蔡英文就必須出面「攻擊」吳釗燮，謂吳未參與此際民進黨中國政策的研議，不能代表民進黨；究其根本，蔡英文不啻就是「跳出來說澳門模式不可行」。如此一來，本文首段所引吳釗燮的「預言」，已告完整實現；只是未料「跳出來攻擊」吳釗燮的「具體」論述者，竟是民進黨中央及蔡英文自己。
總括前論，蔡英文必須承認吳釗燮的兩點看法：一、她若當選總統，不會接受「九二共識」；二、她若不接受九二共識，屆時必將引爆兩岸重大政經變局。因此，蔡吳二人唯一的異見只是在於：吳主張屆時可用「澳門模式」因應變局，但蔡英文似乎不以為然。接下來的問題則是：蔡英文若認為「澳門模式」端不上檯面，她的錦囊妙計又將是什麼？
吳釗燮演出的這一段插曲，更加顯得蔡英文必須端出一套「具體」的兩岸政策，不能再閃躲迴避。她不能一方面不接受九二共識，另一方面又不願面對必將引爆的兩岸政經變局，再一方面更完全不提出（提不出？）屆時因應變局的對策。這豈是一個「理性」的總統候選人的負責態度？
三年來的兩岸「和平發展框架」，是以「九二共識」為前提及基礎；但民進黨稱，這只是國共兩黨所作「片面詮釋」。蔡英文說，她在明年贏得總統大選後，將仍持開放務實的態度進行兩岸交流；但她不接受九二共識，又不屑澳門模式，更與扁李等人唱和台獨論述，且看「蔡總統」將如何「片面詮釋」她的「中國政策」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2011
During the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primary, Joseph Wu said "Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy must not be made too explicit. If it is made too explicit, its many problems will be exposed, People will attack it as infeasible. The real point will be lost in the shuffle."
Who knew that Joseph Wu, during his visit to the US, would be the person who makes the DPP's cross-Strait policy "too explicit." Who knew that his remarks would be the ones that invited attacks? Who knew that his attackers would include DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen?
While he was in Washington Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, she would not accept the 1992 Consensus. He said however, that if negotiations between the SEF and ARATS were interrupted, Tsai Ing-wen could fall back on the Macau model. Tsai Ing-wen said that Joseph Wu's too explicit remarks did not represent the views of the DPP.
Actually Joseph Wu shares Tsai Ing-wen's views on at least one issue. On one issue at least, Wu speaks for Tsai Ing-wen. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. On this point at least, Tsai Ing-wen has long been consistent.
Joseph Wu said that if Tsai assumes office she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. In that case, Beijing might break off consultations between SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen must concede this point. She can hardly argue otherwise. In fact, if Tsai refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, not only could consultations between SEF and ARATS run aground, so could ECFA. A cross-Strait diplomatic war could break out. Mainland tourists could stop coming. Mutual legal assistance could end. Direct cross-Strait flights could be grounded. These are all possibilities. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen cannot refute Joseph Wu's prediction. Consultations between the SEF and ARATS could be terminated. Nor can Tsai Ing-wen deny that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus will unavoidably have political and economic consequences. Her statement that Joseph Wu does not speak on her behalf is mere subterfuge. Joseph Wu pointed out that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus could provoke a major change in the cross-Strait situation. On these points, he differs not with Tsai Ing-wen. She cannot say this does not represent the DPP's position.
Tsai and Wu differ only on one point. Joseph Wu proposed using the Macau model as an alternative. Once the 1992 Consensus has been repudiated, he suggested "association to association" and "industry to industry" negotiations. He suggested using these associations and industries as buffers. Joseph Wu attempts to be realistic. One cannot say that when the time comes one will actually break off cross-Strait negotiations. One must always have a viable alternative. Wu believes that viable alternative is the Macau model. But falling back on the Macau model would be akin to plucking cross-Strait negotiations out of the Internet era, from the level of cloud computing, and dropping it back into the era of the Semaphore and Morse code.
Sure enough, Joseph Wu's explicit Macau model made its many problems equally explicit. The most serious problem made explicit, is that the DPP lacks a proposal of its own. It has no solutions to offer. Besides, how can Tsai Ing-wen admit that when the DPP was in power, its coping mechanism was the Macau model? Would Beijing accept the Macau model? Tsai Ing-wen knows that is wishful thinking. Beijing would accuse her of bad faith, and disown responsibility for the consequences.
Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must come forward and attack Joseph Wu. She must declare that Wu did not take part in DPP deliberations over [Mainland] China policy. She must declare that his remarks did not represent the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen essentially admitted that alternatives to the Macau model are infeasible. Joseph Wu's prophecy, quoted in the first paragraph of this article, has already been fulfilled. The only surprise was that those who stepped forward to attack Joseph Wu's too explicit rhetoric, were DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen herself.
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen must concede that Joseph Wu is right on two points. The first is that if elected president, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. The second is that if she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, she will provoke major changes in the political and economic situation. Therefore, Tsai and Wu differ on only one point. Wu proposes the Macau model as a response. Tsai Ing-wen however, disagrees. The next question should be obvious. If Tsai Ing-wen believes that the Macau model is infeasible, what tricks does she have up her sleeve?
Tsai Ing-wen must offer a more explicit cross-Strait policy. Joseph Wu's little interlude has made that clear. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer bob and weave. She can no longer refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus. She can no longer refuse to face the consequences of a change in the cross-Strait political and economic situation. She can no longer refuse to offer a response. Refusal to offer a response is not the action of a rational and responsible presidential candidate.
The cross-Strait peace and development framework of the past three years is predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. The DPP argues that this is merely the KMT and CCP's one-sided perception. Tsai Ing-wen says that if she wins next year's presidential election, she will maintain an open and pragmatic attitude toward cross-Strait exchanges. But she will not accept the 1992 Consensus, and she disdains the Macau model. Furthermore, she has joined Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan independence chorus. What is this, other than "President Tsai's" own one-sided [Mainland] China policy?
吳釗燮「具體逼問」蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.10
在民進黨總統初選階段，吳釗燮說：「蔡英文的兩岸論述不能太具體，若太具體，很多問題就會暴露，必有人跳出來攻擊說不可行，容易失焦。」
不料，吳釗燮訪美，自己竟然將民進黨的兩岸論述說得如此「具體」；他的談話所引致的「攻擊」，則包括來自民進黨中央及蔡英文本人。
吳釗燮在華府說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會接受九二共識，倘因此使海基、海協兩會協商中斷，可用「澳門模式」補救。對於吳釗燮如此「具體」的說法，蔡英文稱他不能代表民進黨的主張。
其實，吳釗燮至少有一個觀點，與蔡英文完全相同，可以代表蔡英文的立場。那就是吳釗燮說，蔡英文若執政不會接受「九二共識」，這一點無疑是蔡英文迄今始終一貫的主張。
至於吳釗燮說，蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，北京可能中斷兩會協商；蔡英文對這一點恐亦必須同意，難持異議。實則蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，非但兩會可能中斷協商機制，ECFA亦可能擱淺，兩岸外交烽火再起，陸客不來，司法互助停擺，直航停飛，這些皆是不無可能之事。因而，蔡英文若不能否定吳釗燮對「兩會中斷」的預言，亦即不能否認若執政而不接受「九二共識」所必將引發的政經後果，則所謂吳釗燮不能代表她云云，應只是遁詞而已。也就是說，其實吳釗燮在「不接受九二共識」，及「因此可能引爆兩岸重大變局」這兩點看法上，應與蔡英文無異，不可謂「不能代表民進黨」。
蔡吳二人的唯一可能差異，是在吳釗燮舉「澳門模式」為替代方案；亦即主張在否棄九二共識後，改以「協會對協會／行業對行業」的「雙層白手套」來建立兩岸協商。吳釗燮的說法，毋寧是實事求是，總不能說屆時真的就關閉一切兩岸協商機制，總需有個對策，他認為那就是「澳門模式」。但此一主張，好比要將兩岸協商從雲端網路時代，倒退到旗語或摩斯電碼的時代。
至此，吳釗燮「具體」的「澳門模式」，果然使「很多問題就會暴露」，最嚴重的是在「暴露」了民進黨其實根本無計可施、無路可走；然而，蔡英文如何能承認民進黨屆時的因應對策竟是難登大雅的「澳門模式」？當然，蔡英文心裡更明白，等到北京以「是妳無情，莫怪我無義」與她翻臉之日，欲求「澳門模式」恐亦不可得。
於是，蔡英文就必須出面「攻擊」吳釗燮，謂吳未參與此際民進黨中國政策的研議，不能代表民進黨；究其根本，蔡英文不啻就是「跳出來說澳門模式不可行」。如此一來，本文首段所引吳釗燮的「預言」，已告完整實現；只是未料「跳出來攻擊」吳釗燮的「具體」論述者，竟是民進黨中央及蔡英文自己。
總括前論，蔡英文必須承認吳釗燮的兩點看法：一、她若當選總統，不會接受「九二共識」；二、她若不接受九二共識，屆時必將引爆兩岸重大政經變局。因此，蔡吳二人唯一的異見只是在於：吳主張屆時可用「澳門模式」因應變局，但蔡英文似乎不以為然。接下來的問題則是：蔡英文若認為「澳門模式」端不上檯面，她的錦囊妙計又將是什麼？
吳釗燮演出的這一段插曲，更加顯得蔡英文必須端出一套「具體」的兩岸政策，不能再閃躲迴避。她不能一方面不接受九二共識，另一方面又不願面對必將引爆的兩岸政經變局，再一方面更完全不提出（提不出？）屆時因應變局的對策。這豈是一個「理性」的總統候選人的負責態度？
三年來的兩岸「和平發展框架」，是以「九二共識」為前提及基礎；但民進黨稱，這只是國共兩黨所作「片面詮釋」。蔡英文說，她在明年贏得總統大選後，將仍持開放務實的態度進行兩岸交流；但她不接受九二共識，又不屑澳門模式，更與扁李等人唱和台獨論述，且看「蔡總統」將如何「片面詮釋」她的「中國政策」？
Sunday, May 8, 2011
Two Questions Tsai Ing-wen Must Answer Before the Election
Two Questions Tsai Ing-wen Must Answer Before the Election
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen must answer two questions before the election. The first is, if elected, will she pardon Chen Shui-bian? The second is, if elected, will she recognize the 1992 Consensus?
These are major questions affecting the nation. Tsai Ing-wen must confront these questions in the event she is elected. If she refuses to answer these questions frankly, with simple yes or no answers before the election, her election bid will lack legitimacy. If elected, her refusal to answer these questions would lead to an unimaginable crisis of governance. Therefore she must provide voters with answers before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has thrown her weight behind Chen supporters and Taiwan independence hardliners. The public is wondering whether she will return the favor by granting Chen Shui-bian a pardon, in the event she is elected. This is a question she can not evade. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, the Green Camp will surely demand a pardon for Chen Shui-bian. It will demand "transitional justice." It may even take to the streets in protest. How will "President Tsai" respond to such "expressions of public opinion?" The Green Camp is not about to let this matter go. They will give her no peace. On the other hand, if she grants Chen Shui-bian a pardon, she will provoke anger among those who disagree, leading to political instability. This question will affect on the legitimacy of "President Tsai's" rule. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must provide voters with clear yes or no answers before the election. She cannot evade these questions by promising merely that she will give them "serious consideration."
The 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for cross-Strait peace and development. If "President Tsai" accepts the 1992 Consensus, she can talk of "continuing the previous administration's cross-Strait policy" if elected. If "President Tsai" refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the current cross-Strait peace and development framework will be deprived of its foundation. When that happens, how will "President Tsai" deal with cross-Strait relations? She must answer these questions. We cannot wait until the election is over before they are answered. They must be answered before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has clear positions on several national policy issues. For example, she proposes a nuclear-free homeland by 2025. She opposes the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project. She opposes "growth oriented" economic policies, This shows that she does not duck every issue. She only bobs and weaves when confronted with certain issues, such as whether she would pardon Chen Shui-bian, and whether she would accept the 1992 Consensus. But these are the two most important issues facing the candidates. If she persists in prevaricating, how can she persuade voters that her election bid is rational and legitimate?
Tsai Ying-wen can not duck these questions. For example, she originally repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She said that "You cannot expect me to acknowledge something that does not exist." Now however, she has changed her tune. She now refers to the 1992 Consensus an "historical framework," and as a "political premise." She no longer says that the 1992 Consensus "simply does not exist." As for pardoning Chen Shui-bian, she said only that she would give it "serious consideration." She refused to assume responsibility by providing a clear answer.
During the upcoming presidential election, these two issues will be the most divisive. They will have the greatest impact on public sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen is a candidate for president. She cannot refuse to state her position on these questions. Tsai Ing-wen is often reluctant to say whether she would demand the "rectification of names" and the authoring of a new constitution. She ducks such questions by saying they should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." But the presidential election is precisely when these questions should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen must clearly state their positions on these two questions. The electorate can then express its feelings during the election. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to provide answers before the election, she is in effect refusing to take part in the election.
Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to appeal to both the Green Camp and to swing voters. Does she intend to pardon Chen Shui-bian and accept the 1992 Consensus? Those are the most divisive issues for Green Camp and swing voters. Tsai Ing-wen hopes to win over both groups by refusing to answer. But in the event she is elected, she will have to. No matter how "President Tsai" answers, one of the two groups will feel betrayed and disappointed. She will no longer be able to stonewall. For example, if she pardons Chen Shui-bian, will swing voters find it intolerable? If she refuses to pardon Chen Shui-bian, will the Green Camp forgive her? And if Chen Shui-bian, who advocates "one nation on each side," is released from prison, will he permit "President Tsai" a single moment's peace? The 1992 Consensus has far reaching consequences. Therefore, she must state her position before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen must answer both these questions in the event she is elected. Therefore she must answer both these questions prior to the election. If voters agree with her positions, her rule will acquire some degree of legitimacy. If she evades these questions, she will not receive public endorsement during the election. If she attempts to flip-flop following the election, based on which way the wind is blowing, her rule will lack legitimacy. The nation will be torn apart. Relations with the Mainland will weakened. The consequences will be disastrous.
Tsai Ing-wen must provide clear answers to both these questions, before the presidential election, That alone is rational and responsible. The public must not permit her to continue obfuscating.
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.08
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題：一、若當選是否特赦陳水扁？二、若當選是否接受九二共識？
這兩個攸關國家治理的重大問題，蔡英文若當選，必將面對。她倘在選前不能對此作出「是」或「否」的回答，即不易建立她參選的正當性，且若當選亦將釀成不堪設想的治理危機。所以，她應在選前作出答案。
蔡英文獲扁系及獨派的力挺，民眾皆在猜測蔡英文若當選會否以特赦陳水扁作為回報，這已是她不能迴避的問題。想像中，蔡英文若當選，綠營必會出現特赦陳水扁的呼聲，要求實現「轉型正義」，甚至上街示威遊行；「蔡總統」若不順應這樣的「民意」，綠營必不會善罷甘休，使她難安其位；反之，她若就此特赦陳水扁，恐亦將引爆持異議者的憤怒，導致政局動盪。由於這個問題將與「蔡總統」的統治正當性密切相關，因此蔡英文必須在選前即作出「是／否」的答覆，而不能僅以「嚴肅考慮」四字敷衍過去。
至於「九二共識」，已是兩岸「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎。「蔡總統」若接納「九二共識」，始可言「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；但「蔡總統」若不接受「九二共識」，則兩岸現今的「和平發展框架」即失依托，「蔡總統」屆時將以何種替代方策來處理兩岸關係，即應作出交代。這個問題也不能待若選上再回答，應在選前給國人答案。
蔡英文在許多國政上皆有鮮明主張，例如倡議二○二五非核家園、反國光石化、反對「成長掛帥」的經濟政策等，顯示其並不迴避表現其政策立場；然她在是否特赦陳水扁及接受九二共識這兩個問題上，卻顯得閃爍迴避。但這兩個問題卻可謂是她此次參選所面對的最重要的兩個問題，若始終支吾其詞，如何建立其參選的合理性與正當性？
其實，蔡英文亦知不能迴避這兩個問題。例如，她原來根本否認有「九二共識」，而謂「不能教我承認根本不存在的東西」；如今她已改口稱「九二共識」是「歷史框架」、「政治前提」，亦即不再說「九二共識」是「根本不存在」。至於特赦陳水扁，她也只說「嚴肅考慮」，並未說她沒有必須作出答案的責任。
在此次統總大選中，這兩個議題是社會歧見最大、且對國情民心影響最深的議題；蔡英文作為總統職位的競逐者，不能不對此作出明確表態。蔡英文常將她不願作答的題目（如，是否正名制憲），諉稱可交付民主討論；唯總統大選的過程，正是民主討論的過程，只要馬英九及蔡英文均對這兩個問題表態，即可經由大選得到民意的答案。蔡英文若在選前不給回答，即是對大選民意見證機制的否定。
蔡英文經營的選票架構是「綠營」加「中間選民」。而是否特赦陳水扁及是否接受九二共識，卻可能是在綠營與中間選民之間歧見最大的議題；蔡英文想以拒絕回答來維持平衡，但她若當選，即不再可能模稜兩可，而「蔡總統」屆時所作的任何決定，必將使她一部分的支持者感到失落與受騙。例如，她若特赦陳水扁，中間選民能接受嗎？反之，她若不特赦陳水扁，綠營又能饒過她嗎？且「一邊一國」的陳水扁出獄後，會讓「蔡總統」清靜嗎？九二共識的牽動亦類乎此。因此，她必須在選前說清楚。
這兩個問題，既是蔡英文若當選必將面對的問題，因而她應當在選前即作出答案。如果選票贊同她的主張，她至少可藉民意建立她若當選後的治理正當性；但若她迴避這兩個問題，不在大選中徵得民意背書，而欲在若當選後再見風轉舵，那不但將難以維持其統治正當性，也可預見整個國家及兩岸皆將面臨一場撕裂、震盪的浩劫。
蔡英文必須在這兩個問題上有了清楚的答案才進入總統大選，這始是理性及負責的態度，且國人亦不容許她繼續不清不楚下去。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen must answer two questions before the election. The first is, if elected, will she pardon Chen Shui-bian? The second is, if elected, will she recognize the 1992 Consensus?
These are major questions affecting the nation. Tsai Ing-wen must confront these questions in the event she is elected. If she refuses to answer these questions frankly, with simple yes or no answers before the election, her election bid will lack legitimacy. If elected, her refusal to answer these questions would lead to an unimaginable crisis of governance. Therefore she must provide voters with answers before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has thrown her weight behind Chen supporters and Taiwan independence hardliners. The public is wondering whether she will return the favor by granting Chen Shui-bian a pardon, in the event she is elected. This is a question she can not evade. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, the Green Camp will surely demand a pardon for Chen Shui-bian. It will demand "transitional justice." It may even take to the streets in protest. How will "President Tsai" respond to such "expressions of public opinion?" The Green Camp is not about to let this matter go. They will give her no peace. On the other hand, if she grants Chen Shui-bian a pardon, she will provoke anger among those who disagree, leading to political instability. This question will affect on the legitimacy of "President Tsai's" rule. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must provide voters with clear yes or no answers before the election. She cannot evade these questions by promising merely that she will give them "serious consideration."
The 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for cross-Strait peace and development. If "President Tsai" accepts the 1992 Consensus, she can talk of "continuing the previous administration's cross-Strait policy" if elected. If "President Tsai" refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the current cross-Strait peace and development framework will be deprived of its foundation. When that happens, how will "President Tsai" deal with cross-Strait relations? She must answer these questions. We cannot wait until the election is over before they are answered. They must be answered before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has clear positions on several national policy issues. For example, she proposes a nuclear-free homeland by 2025. She opposes the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project. She opposes "growth oriented" economic policies, This shows that she does not duck every issue. She only bobs and weaves when confronted with certain issues, such as whether she would pardon Chen Shui-bian, and whether she would accept the 1992 Consensus. But these are the two most important issues facing the candidates. If she persists in prevaricating, how can she persuade voters that her election bid is rational and legitimate?
Tsai Ying-wen can not duck these questions. For example, she originally repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She said that "You cannot expect me to acknowledge something that does not exist." Now however, she has changed her tune. She now refers to the 1992 Consensus an "historical framework," and as a "political premise." She no longer says that the 1992 Consensus "simply does not exist." As for pardoning Chen Shui-bian, she said only that she would give it "serious consideration." She refused to assume responsibility by providing a clear answer.
During the upcoming presidential election, these two issues will be the most divisive. They will have the greatest impact on public sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen is a candidate for president. She cannot refuse to state her position on these questions. Tsai Ing-wen is often reluctant to say whether she would demand the "rectification of names" and the authoring of a new constitution. She ducks such questions by saying they should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." But the presidential election is precisely when these questions should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen must clearly state their positions on these two questions. The electorate can then express its feelings during the election. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to provide answers before the election, she is in effect refusing to take part in the election.
Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to appeal to both the Green Camp and to swing voters. Does she intend to pardon Chen Shui-bian and accept the 1992 Consensus? Those are the most divisive issues for Green Camp and swing voters. Tsai Ing-wen hopes to win over both groups by refusing to answer. But in the event she is elected, she will have to. No matter how "President Tsai" answers, one of the two groups will feel betrayed and disappointed. She will no longer be able to stonewall. For example, if she pardons Chen Shui-bian, will swing voters find it intolerable? If she refuses to pardon Chen Shui-bian, will the Green Camp forgive her? And if Chen Shui-bian, who advocates "one nation on each side," is released from prison, will he permit "President Tsai" a single moment's peace? The 1992 Consensus has far reaching consequences. Therefore, she must state her position before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen must answer both these questions in the event she is elected. Therefore she must answer both these questions prior to the election. If voters agree with her positions, her rule will acquire some degree of legitimacy. If she evades these questions, she will not receive public endorsement during the election. If she attempts to flip-flop following the election, based on which way the wind is blowing, her rule will lack legitimacy. The nation will be torn apart. Relations with the Mainland will weakened. The consequences will be disastrous.
Tsai Ing-wen must provide clear answers to both these questions, before the presidential election, That alone is rational and responsible. The public must not permit her to continue obfuscating.
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.08
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題：一、若當選是否特赦陳水扁？二、若當選是否接受九二共識？
這兩個攸關國家治理的重大問題，蔡英文若當選，必將面對。她倘在選前不能對此作出「是」或「否」的回答，即不易建立她參選的正當性，且若當選亦將釀成不堪設想的治理危機。所以，她應在選前作出答案。
蔡英文獲扁系及獨派的力挺，民眾皆在猜測蔡英文若當選會否以特赦陳水扁作為回報，這已是她不能迴避的問題。想像中，蔡英文若當選，綠營必會出現特赦陳水扁的呼聲，要求實現「轉型正義」，甚至上街示威遊行；「蔡總統」若不順應這樣的「民意」，綠營必不會善罷甘休，使她難安其位；反之，她若就此特赦陳水扁，恐亦將引爆持異議者的憤怒，導致政局動盪。由於這個問題將與「蔡總統」的統治正當性密切相關，因此蔡英文必須在選前即作出「是／否」的答覆，而不能僅以「嚴肅考慮」四字敷衍過去。
至於「九二共識」，已是兩岸「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎。「蔡總統」若接納「九二共識」，始可言「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；但「蔡總統」若不接受「九二共識」，則兩岸現今的「和平發展框架」即失依托，「蔡總統」屆時將以何種替代方策來處理兩岸關係，即應作出交代。這個問題也不能待若選上再回答，應在選前給國人答案。
蔡英文在許多國政上皆有鮮明主張，例如倡議二○二五非核家園、反國光石化、反對「成長掛帥」的經濟政策等，顯示其並不迴避表現其政策立場；然她在是否特赦陳水扁及接受九二共識這兩個問題上，卻顯得閃爍迴避。但這兩個問題卻可謂是她此次參選所面對的最重要的兩個問題，若始終支吾其詞，如何建立其參選的合理性與正當性？
其實，蔡英文亦知不能迴避這兩個問題。例如，她原來根本否認有「九二共識」，而謂「不能教我承認根本不存在的東西」；如今她已改口稱「九二共識」是「歷史框架」、「政治前提」，亦即不再說「九二共識」是「根本不存在」。至於特赦陳水扁，她也只說「嚴肅考慮」，並未說她沒有必須作出答案的責任。
在此次統總大選中，這兩個議題是社會歧見最大、且對國情民心影響最深的議題；蔡英文作為總統職位的競逐者，不能不對此作出明確表態。蔡英文常將她不願作答的題目（如，是否正名制憲），諉稱可交付民主討論；唯總統大選的過程，正是民主討論的過程，只要馬英九及蔡英文均對這兩個問題表態，即可經由大選得到民意的答案。蔡英文若在選前不給回答，即是對大選民意見證機制的否定。
蔡英文經營的選票架構是「綠營」加「中間選民」。而是否特赦陳水扁及是否接受九二共識，卻可能是在綠營與中間選民之間歧見最大的議題；蔡英文想以拒絕回答來維持平衡，但她若當選，即不再可能模稜兩可，而「蔡總統」屆時所作的任何決定，必將使她一部分的支持者感到失落與受騙。例如，她若特赦陳水扁，中間選民能接受嗎？反之，她若不特赦陳水扁，綠營又能饒過她嗎？且「一邊一國」的陳水扁出獄後，會讓「蔡總統」清靜嗎？九二共識的牽動亦類乎此。因此，她必須在選前說清楚。
這兩個問題，既是蔡英文若當選必將面對的問題，因而她應當在選前即作出答案。如果選票贊同她的主張，她至少可藉民意建立她若當選後的治理正當性；但若她迴避這兩個問題，不在大選中徵得民意背書，而欲在若當選後再見風轉舵，那不但將難以維持其統治正當性，也可預見整個國家及兩岸皆將面臨一場撕裂、震盪的浩劫。
蔡英文必須在這兩個問題上有了清楚的答案才進入總統大選，這始是理性及負責的態度，且國人亦不容許她繼續不清不楚下去。
Friday, May 6, 2011
Would Tsai Ing-wen Have Cross-Strait Relations Revert to the Macau Model?
Would Tsai Ing-wen Have Cross-Strait Relations Revert to the Macau Model?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2011
Joseph Wu was Representative from the ROC to Washington, and Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council under the Chen administration. Recently Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will not overturn ECFA and other cross-Strait agreements. She will however, refuse to accept such political premises as the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. He said that if the DPP returns to power, "The door that has been opened will not be closed." He said however, that the other side might break off talks between the SEF and ARATS.
Joseph Wu's logic is worth noting. He clearly knows that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, Beijing may break off cross-Strait negotiations. Nevertheless he thinks "President Tsai" will refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus.
Joseph Wu offered a solution. He said that if Tsai Ing-wen wins next year's presidential election, cross-Strait communication channels may not require the 1992 Consensus. They could revert to the "Macau model." When the so-called Macau model was being used during the Chen administration, the two sides were at loggerheads with each other. The SEF and ARATS negotiation mechanism had been disrupted. The two sides resorted to "industry to industry" and "organization to organization" channels to communicate with each other. These industries and organizations acted as surrogates or buffers. This mechanism allowed the two sides to reach consensus over Spring Festival charter flights and other matters. Joseph Wu's rhetoric is revealing. The Democratic Progressive Party knows that if it refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the two sides will find it diffult to continue using current cross-strait negotiation mechanisms. It knows that existing consultation mechanisms may well disintegrate, and revert to the Macau model. Neverthelss the DPP intends to stick to its position, regardless of the consequences.
In fact, Joseph Wu's expectations strike one as wishful thinking. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, no one can forsee how far cross-Strait relations will be set back. On what basis can Joseph Wu say they will merely revert to the Macau model? Why wouldn't they degenerate to a level even lower than the Macau model? Besides, cross-Strait consultations and exchanges have already progressed to where they are today. Reversion to the Macau model is inconceivable.
During the Chen era, the Macau model may not have required the 1992 Consensus. But if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, the absence of the 1992 Consensus will mean that even the Macau model would be difficult to achieve. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will not overturn ECFA. He said that "The door that has been opened will not be closed." But the 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for current cross-Strait peace and development. Without the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen may choose "not to close the door." But can she command Beijing "not to close the door?" This is the blind spot in Joseph Wu's rhetoric.
In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian was all set to recognize One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus. But he was stopped dead in his tracks by Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. After which, Beijing said it would "listen to what he said, and watch what he did." It broke off two negotiations, leaving the Chen administration mired in an eight year long domestic and international dilemma. Today, Tsai has repeatedly touted her commitment to "rationality." But she knows perfectly well that if she repudiates the 1992 Consensus, "the door will close," the two sides will once again find themselves at loggerheads. A diplomatic war will erupt. Society will be ripped in two. Nevertheless she still refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. What manner of "rationality" is this?
The DPP equates the 1992 Consensus with Beijing's One China Principle ("China = PRC"). But by doing so, it is painting itself into a corner. It is handing Beijing a lever. The ROC's position is that the 1992 Consensus means One China, Different Interpretations ("China = ROC"). We absolutely refuse to go along with Beijing's assertion that the 1992 Consensus equals Beijing's One China Principle. Besides, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi recently said that "Relations between the two sides are good. The two sides may differ about the meaning of "One China" in the 1992 Consensus. But we can seek common ground. This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." We should seek common ground on the premise of One China, Different Interpretations. If the DPP insists on repudiating and abandoning even One China, Different Interpretations, Then it may as well take a clear stand. it may as well proclaim its determination to achieve Taiwan independence and found a new nation. Why bother bringing up the Macau model?
Joseph Wu said that "The door which has been opened will not be closed." He said that we can simply revert to the Macau model. As we can see, the DPP knows that the door between the two sides must not be shut. The DPP knows the two sides must not be without a consultation mechanism. Nevertheless if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will repudiate the 1992 Consensus. She will walk into a trap. Beijing will say, "You are the one who was faithless. Don't blame me for what I do next." Once Beijing closes the door, will Tsai Ing-wen really be able to knock on the door by citing the Macau model?
Is this what Tsai Ing-wen considers "rational?"
蔡英文要將兩岸帶回澳門模式？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.06
刻在華府訪問的扁政府駐美代表及陸委會主委吳釗燮說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ等兩岸協議，但也不會接受「九二共識」及「一中原則」等政治前提；他說，民進黨若再執政，「門開了就不會關上」，但他認為對岸可能會中斷海基會、海協會的協商機制。
吳釗燮論述邏輯值得重視處在於：他明知如果民進黨再執政而不接受「九二共識」，北京可能中斷兩岸協商交流；但他認為，即使如此，「蔡總統」也不會接受「九二共識」。
吳釗燮甚至提出了解決方案。他說：如果蔡英文贏得明年總統大選，兩岸溝通管道可能是「無需九二共識」的「澳門模式」。所謂「澳門模式」，是在扁政府時代兩岸交惡，海基、海協兩會協商機制中斷，兩岸在澳門透過「行業對行業／團體對團體」的「複委託」或「兩層白手套」所進行的交涉機制，曾經達成春節包機等共識。吳釗燮的論調顯示：民進黨明知若執政不接受「九二共識」，兩岸現行協商機制即難維持；但即使現行協商機制解構，倒退至「澳門模式」，民進黨仍將堅持立場，不惜代價。
其實，吳釗燮的預期似乎太過一廂情願。因為，若民進黨再執政而不承認九二共識，兩岸關係之倒退程度當非任何人所能逆料；吳釗燮憑何而言可以倒退至「澳門模式」？有否可能連「澳門模式」亦不可得？何況，兩岸協商交流已臻至今日境地，若真倒退至「澳門模式」，豈堪想像？
在扁政府時代，「澳門模式」雖然「不需九二共識」；但至蔡英文若執政，倘無「九二共識」，應可斷言必連「澳門模式」亦難成立。吳釗燮說：蔡英文若執政，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ，「門開了就不會關上」；但「九二共識」是兩岸現行「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎，既無「九二共識」，則即使蔡英文「不關門」，難道她也能教北京「不關門」？吳釗燮的論述之盲點正在此。
二○○○年，總統陳水扁一度承認「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文所阻擋；此後，北京以一句「聽其言，觀其行」，中斷了兩會協商，使扁政府八年陷於內外交迫的境地。如今，蔡英文口口聲聲以「理性」自詡，但若明知否棄「九二共識」，將面臨「門會關上」，兩岸交惡、烽火外交、社會撕裂之慘重境地，卻仍偏偏不接受「九二共識」，這算是什麼「理性」？
民進黨將「九二共識」說成「一中原則」，這非但是作繭自縛，且形同是授北京以柄；因為，在我方立場，「九二共識」即是「一中各表」，絕不能隨北京唱和而謂「九二共識」是「一中原則」。何況，北京方面國台辦主任王毅最近亦稱：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」這應即是「求同存異」的「一中各表」的空間。而民進黨如果連「一中各表」都要否定、都要棄守，則何不乾脆旗幟鮮明地標榜台獨建國，則連「澳門模式」亦可不屑一顧。
吳釗燮說「門開了就不會關上」，又說可以退回「澳門模式」；可見，民進黨亦知兩岸之門不可關，亦不可沒有協商機制。但是，蔡英文若執政而否認「九二共識」，必將落入北京「是妳無情，休怪我無義」的套索之中，一旦北京關上了門，莫非蔡英文真的要用「澳門模式」去敲開？
這難道就是蔡英文所說的「理性」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2011
Joseph Wu was Representative from the ROC to Washington, and Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council under the Chen administration. Recently Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will not overturn ECFA and other cross-Strait agreements. She will however, refuse to accept such political premises as the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. He said that if the DPP returns to power, "The door that has been opened will not be closed." He said however, that the other side might break off talks between the SEF and ARATS.
Joseph Wu's logic is worth noting. He clearly knows that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, Beijing may break off cross-Strait negotiations. Nevertheless he thinks "President Tsai" will refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus.
Joseph Wu offered a solution. He said that if Tsai Ing-wen wins next year's presidential election, cross-Strait communication channels may not require the 1992 Consensus. They could revert to the "Macau model." When the so-called Macau model was being used during the Chen administration, the two sides were at loggerheads with each other. The SEF and ARATS negotiation mechanism had been disrupted. The two sides resorted to "industry to industry" and "organization to organization" channels to communicate with each other. These industries and organizations acted as surrogates or buffers. This mechanism allowed the two sides to reach consensus over Spring Festival charter flights and other matters. Joseph Wu's rhetoric is revealing. The Democratic Progressive Party knows that if it refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the two sides will find it diffult to continue using current cross-strait negotiation mechanisms. It knows that existing consultation mechanisms may well disintegrate, and revert to the Macau model. Neverthelss the DPP intends to stick to its position, regardless of the consequences.
In fact, Joseph Wu's expectations strike one as wishful thinking. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, no one can forsee how far cross-Strait relations will be set back. On what basis can Joseph Wu say they will merely revert to the Macau model? Why wouldn't they degenerate to a level even lower than the Macau model? Besides, cross-Strait consultations and exchanges have already progressed to where they are today. Reversion to the Macau model is inconceivable.
During the Chen era, the Macau model may not have required the 1992 Consensus. But if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, the absence of the 1992 Consensus will mean that even the Macau model would be difficult to achieve. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will not overturn ECFA. He said that "The door that has been opened will not be closed." But the 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for current cross-Strait peace and development. Without the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen may choose "not to close the door." But can she command Beijing "not to close the door?" This is the blind spot in Joseph Wu's rhetoric.
In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian was all set to recognize One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus. But he was stopped dead in his tracks by Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. After which, Beijing said it would "listen to what he said, and watch what he did." It broke off two negotiations, leaving the Chen administration mired in an eight year long domestic and international dilemma. Today, Tsai has repeatedly touted her commitment to "rationality." But she knows perfectly well that if she repudiates the 1992 Consensus, "the door will close," the two sides will once again find themselves at loggerheads. A diplomatic war will erupt. Society will be ripped in two. Nevertheless she still refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. What manner of "rationality" is this?
The DPP equates the 1992 Consensus with Beijing's One China Principle ("China = PRC"). But by doing so, it is painting itself into a corner. It is handing Beijing a lever. The ROC's position is that the 1992 Consensus means One China, Different Interpretations ("China = ROC"). We absolutely refuse to go along with Beijing's assertion that the 1992 Consensus equals Beijing's One China Principle. Besides, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi recently said that "Relations between the two sides are good. The two sides may differ about the meaning of "One China" in the 1992 Consensus. But we can seek common ground. This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." We should seek common ground on the premise of One China, Different Interpretations. If the DPP insists on repudiating and abandoning even One China, Different Interpretations, Then it may as well take a clear stand. it may as well proclaim its determination to achieve Taiwan independence and found a new nation. Why bother bringing up the Macau model?
Joseph Wu said that "The door which has been opened will not be closed." He said that we can simply revert to the Macau model. As we can see, the DPP knows that the door between the two sides must not be shut. The DPP knows the two sides must not be without a consultation mechanism. Nevertheless if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will repudiate the 1992 Consensus. She will walk into a trap. Beijing will say, "You are the one who was faithless. Don't blame me for what I do next." Once Beijing closes the door, will Tsai Ing-wen really be able to knock on the door by citing the Macau model?
Is this what Tsai Ing-wen considers "rational?"
蔡英文要將兩岸帶回澳門模式？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.06
刻在華府訪問的扁政府駐美代表及陸委會主委吳釗燮說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ等兩岸協議，但也不會接受「九二共識」及「一中原則」等政治前提；他說，民進黨若再執政，「門開了就不會關上」，但他認為對岸可能會中斷海基會、海協會的協商機制。
吳釗燮論述邏輯值得重視處在於：他明知如果民進黨再執政而不接受「九二共識」，北京可能中斷兩岸協商交流；但他認為，即使如此，「蔡總統」也不會接受「九二共識」。
吳釗燮甚至提出了解決方案。他說：如果蔡英文贏得明年總統大選，兩岸溝通管道可能是「無需九二共識」的「澳門模式」。所謂「澳門模式」，是在扁政府時代兩岸交惡，海基、海協兩會協商機制中斷，兩岸在澳門透過「行業對行業／團體對團體」的「複委託」或「兩層白手套」所進行的交涉機制，曾經達成春節包機等共識。吳釗燮的論調顯示：民進黨明知若執政不接受「九二共識」，兩岸現行協商機制即難維持；但即使現行協商機制解構，倒退至「澳門模式」，民進黨仍將堅持立場，不惜代價。
其實，吳釗燮的預期似乎太過一廂情願。因為，若民進黨再執政而不承認九二共識，兩岸關係之倒退程度當非任何人所能逆料；吳釗燮憑何而言可以倒退至「澳門模式」？有否可能連「澳門模式」亦不可得？何況，兩岸協商交流已臻至今日境地，若真倒退至「澳門模式」，豈堪想像？
在扁政府時代，「澳門模式」雖然「不需九二共識」；但至蔡英文若執政，倘無「九二共識」，應可斷言必連「澳門模式」亦難成立。吳釗燮說：蔡英文若執政，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ，「門開了就不會關上」；但「九二共識」是兩岸現行「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎，既無「九二共識」，則即使蔡英文「不關門」，難道她也能教北京「不關門」？吳釗燮的論述之盲點正在此。
二○○○年，總統陳水扁一度承認「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文所阻擋；此後，北京以一句「聽其言，觀其行」，中斷了兩會協商，使扁政府八年陷於內外交迫的境地。如今，蔡英文口口聲聲以「理性」自詡，但若明知否棄「九二共識」，將面臨「門會關上」，兩岸交惡、烽火外交、社會撕裂之慘重境地，卻仍偏偏不接受「九二共識」，這算是什麼「理性」？
民進黨將「九二共識」說成「一中原則」，這非但是作繭自縛，且形同是授北京以柄；因為，在我方立場，「九二共識」即是「一中各表」，絕不能隨北京唱和而謂「九二共識」是「一中原則」。何況，北京方面國台辦主任王毅最近亦稱：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」這應即是「求同存異」的「一中各表」的空間。而民進黨如果連「一中各表」都要否定、都要棄守，則何不乾脆旗幟鮮明地標榜台獨建國，則連「澳門模式」亦可不屑一顧。
吳釗燮說「門開了就不會關上」，又說可以退回「澳門模式」；可見，民進黨亦知兩岸之門不可關，亦不可沒有協商機制。但是，蔡英文若執政而否認「九二共識」，必將落入北京「是妳無情，休怪我無義」的套索之中，一旦北京關上了門，莫非蔡英文真的要用「澳門模式」去敲開？
這難道就是蔡英文所說的「理性」？
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Nuclear Safety, Economic Prosperity, and Plentiful Energy
Nuclear Safety, Economic Prosperity, and Plentiful Energy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2011
The day before the April 30 anti-nuclear rally, protestors coordinated their activities all across Taiwan, from north to south, and from east to west. A million people took to the streets. The march ended peacefully. Protestors demanded that the Ma administration heed the calls of the anti-nuclear movement. They chanted "No to Nuclear Plant Number Four. Tear Down Nuclear Plants Number One, Two, and Three. Zero Fears of Nuclear Disaster." Their chants were of course a response to the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, the earthquake, the tsunami, and the radiation leaks. The scene was stirring. In many peoples' minds, the biggest question has become, "Does Taiwan still want nuclear power?" Many took to the streets to express their concern over the safety of nuclear power generation.
According to newspaper reports, President Ma Ying-jeou was concerned about the demonstrations staged by the environmental groups, and by their demands. A spokesman for Ma said, "You have spoken, and the government has heard you." Government agencies have solicited reactions from a variety of organizations. These agencies must conduct a thorough investigation, They must propose a concrete and practical nuclear energy policy that will allow people to feel safe. The Executive Yuan Atomic Energy Commission said that last year the annex to Nuclear Power Plant Number One was put on hold. Fuel rods will not be installed in Nuclear Power Plant Number Four before the end of the year. Final disposal sites for low-radiation nuclear waste will be subject to local referenda. Licenses will be issued only after a second round of environmental impact assessments.
Based on the government's response to the demands of the anti-nuclear protestors, the two sides are still talking past each other, They really haven't communicated. Opponents and proponents of nuclear power generation are still on different pages.
A number of anti-nuclear protests were held on Ketagalan Boulevard. Thousands of citizens held a sit-in protest. They simulated casualties in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster. Anti-nuclear groups demanded that the government scrap its policy of nuclear power generation, They stressed that as long as the nuclear threat remained, anti-nuclear protests would continue. They said that Taiwan cannot withstand a nuclear disaster similar to the one at Fukushima. But the government's response was merely a vague "We will conduct a thorough review."
The anti-nuclear protest march was a public response to catastrophic events at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima. The Fukushima nuclear power plant incident provoked public fears and second thoughts about nuclear power generation. Could a similar incident occur with nuclear power plants on Taiwan? This is a question that can be answered only by science, not protest marches.
Could a nuclear power plant accident happen? That is a hypothetical question. What if we gather experts from all fields and consulted them? What if we conduct thorough nuclear safety inspections? What if we demand the highest standards in risk management? The likelihood of an accident will be minimized. In the event of a natural disaster, we will be able to limit the scope of the damage as much as possible. But if we remain mired in populist political struggles, we will only lose sight of our real concerns.
Anti-nuclear groups have stressed the horrors of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. They have claimed that Taiwan could not withstand such a nuclear accident. The alarming scenes of the Fukushima nuclear plant radiation leak instilled doubt in the minds of middle class citizens. It inspired them to raise the banner of a nuclear-free homeland. It inspired them to take to the streets. But by adopting such an approach, anti-nuclear activists exaggerated people's fear of the unknown. They claimed that an accident would make Taiwan utterly uninhabitable. But is that true? Consider Nagasaki and Hiroshima, worst case scenarios. During World War II, atomic bombs were dropped on these cities. But today, Nagasaki and Hiroshima are hardly "utterly unihabitable."
Consider also the question of whether construction should be halted on the Nuclear Plant Number Four, and whether it should be put into commercial operation. This too has become a political football. Nuclear Plant Number Four has entered the final stages of completion. In 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, it halted construction in the name of a nuclear-free homeland. Eventually however, public pressure forced it to resume construction. Public opinion has been consulted, and the all necesary legal procedures have been followed. There truly is no reason at this late date to call a halt to construction.
In order to develop our economy, we must have electricity. If we continue to resort to fossil fuel power generation, we will increase carbon dioxide emissions that cause global warming. Current renewable energy technology is not sufficiently mature. The cost of power generation is too high. These are harsh realities the public must face.
Elections are around the corner. Every time elections roll around, it becomes impossible to engage in objective discussion of public issues. For the sake of votes, the ruling authorities apparently hope to muddle through and worry about the problems later. Should we develop nuclear power? How can we ensure nuclear power plant safety? How can we achieve a "nuclear-free homeland?" These questions have remained open to discussion, They are questions that must be discussed. They should be part of our overall energy policy debate, But we must not go around and around in circles. The government must make available accurate information. It must offer a national energy policy consistent with public expectations and the needs of economic development. It should then allow the people decide. It should let the people to bear the consequences of their decision. Only then can society break the current deadlock over nuclear power generation.
兼顧核安、經濟 能源政策要雙贏
2011-05-05 中國時報
四三○反核大遊行日前在北中南東全台串連，號召上萬民眾走上街頭，過程和平落幕。他們要求馬政府正視反核的心聲，訴求「不要核四、三座核電廠除役、零核災零恐懼」。這個訴求，當然是緣於日本福島核災事故，地震、海嘯、輻射外洩的畫面，一幕幕驚心動魄，「台灣是否還要核電」成為許多民眾心中最大的疑慮，不少民眾因此走上街頭，表達對核能安全的關切。
據報載總統馬英九關心環保團體的遊行與訴求，透過發言人表示，「這些聲音，政府都聽到了」。行政部門已在廣徵各界意見，通盤研究檢討，一定要提出具體可行並且讓民眾安心的核能政策。行政院原子能委員會表示，核能一廠的延役審查已在去年底暫停，核四廠確定今年底前不會裝填燃料棒。至於低放射核廢料最終處置場址，也須經過地方性公投、二階環評通過後，才會核發使用執照。
從政府的回應與反核民眾的訴求來看，雙方仍是各說各話，並沒有交集，反核與擁核依舊是兩條平行線。
在反核活動現場凱達格蘭大道上，數千位民眾集體躺下，模仿大型核災爆發時的死傷狀況。反核團體要求政府提出具體廢核政策與承諾，強調核能威脅不中止，廢核行動就不會有停止的一天。他們說，台灣絕對禁不起一次類似日本福島的核災。但是政府的回應卻只有空泛的「我們會通盤檢討」。
這場反核遊行，可以說是民眾受到日本福島核電廠災變事件影響的結果，也是日本福島核安事件引發國人對核電的恐慌與反省。不過，台灣的核電廠是否會發生類似的事件，應該是一個科學的問題，不是遊行活動就能解決的。
畢竟，核電廠會不會發生意外，是一個未知與假設的問題，如果我們現在就集結所有各個領域的專家會診，好好落實核安檢查工作，用最高的標準做好風險管理，意外發生的機會就自然減少，碰到天然災變也就能將損害控制在最小範圍內；反之，如果一直停留在政爭與民粹式的爭辯中，只會讓真正該關注的問題焦點被模糊。
反核團體強調福島核災的恐怖，宣稱台灣禁不起核電意外，將一幕幕驚心動魄日本福島核災事故中輻射外洩的畫面，引導民眾心中產生疑慮，因此拿起非核家園大旗，走上街頭。反核人士這樣的做法，似乎誇大了一個未知的恐懼，甚至還讓這些恐懼一直無限上綱到可能淪為萬劫不復的境地。但這樣的狀況真的會發生嗎？事實上，即使情況最壞的日本長崎與廣島，在二次大戰期間被丟了兩顆原子彈，現在的長崎與廣島也沒有到這樣的萬劫不復地步。
此外，核四應否停工興建與商業運轉的問題，也炒作成為選舉語言，因為目前核四廠已經進入最後完工階段，在二千年民進黨執政時期，也曾經為了建立非核家園而一度停工，但最後在社會的壓力下不得不復工。因此無論就政治或是民意的角度來看，既然所有民主程序都已經走完，現在實在沒有理由半途喊停。
台灣要發展經濟就必須要有用電，如果繼續使用石化燃料發電，就會有二氧化碳排放所引發全球暖化的問題，而目前再生能源技術也確實未臻成熟，發電成本過高，這些都是全民所必須面對的課題。
選舉即將來臨，一到了選舉，台灣似乎就沒有客觀討論公共議題的機會，為了選票，執政當局目前似乎只想先混過去再說。其實要不要發展核電？核四該提出怎樣的安全保證？該如何在未來時日實現真正的「非核家園」？本來就是可以討論，也是應該要討論的課題，而且應該在台灣整體能源政策中提出論證，而非在某些個案上一直打轉爭辯，政府唯有公開所有正確的資訊，提出一個符合社會潮流與經濟發展需求的國家能源政策，讓民眾有正確的判斷選擇的機會，並且承擔最後選擇的後果，社會才能往前走出核電爭議的困境。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2011
The day before the April 30 anti-nuclear rally, protestors coordinated their activities all across Taiwan, from north to south, and from east to west. A million people took to the streets. The march ended peacefully. Protestors demanded that the Ma administration heed the calls of the anti-nuclear movement. They chanted "No to Nuclear Plant Number Four. Tear Down Nuclear Plants Number One, Two, and Three. Zero Fears of Nuclear Disaster." Their chants were of course a response to the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, the earthquake, the tsunami, and the radiation leaks. The scene was stirring. In many peoples' minds, the biggest question has become, "Does Taiwan still want nuclear power?" Many took to the streets to express their concern over the safety of nuclear power generation.
According to newspaper reports, President Ma Ying-jeou was concerned about the demonstrations staged by the environmental groups, and by their demands. A spokesman for Ma said, "You have spoken, and the government has heard you." Government agencies have solicited reactions from a variety of organizations. These agencies must conduct a thorough investigation, They must propose a concrete and practical nuclear energy policy that will allow people to feel safe. The Executive Yuan Atomic Energy Commission said that last year the annex to Nuclear Power Plant Number One was put on hold. Fuel rods will not be installed in Nuclear Power Plant Number Four before the end of the year. Final disposal sites for low-radiation nuclear waste will be subject to local referenda. Licenses will be issued only after a second round of environmental impact assessments.
Based on the government's response to the demands of the anti-nuclear protestors, the two sides are still talking past each other, They really haven't communicated. Opponents and proponents of nuclear power generation are still on different pages.
A number of anti-nuclear protests were held on Ketagalan Boulevard. Thousands of citizens held a sit-in protest. They simulated casualties in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster. Anti-nuclear groups demanded that the government scrap its policy of nuclear power generation, They stressed that as long as the nuclear threat remained, anti-nuclear protests would continue. They said that Taiwan cannot withstand a nuclear disaster similar to the one at Fukushima. But the government's response was merely a vague "We will conduct a thorough review."
The anti-nuclear protest march was a public response to catastrophic events at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima. The Fukushima nuclear power plant incident provoked public fears and second thoughts about nuclear power generation. Could a similar incident occur with nuclear power plants on Taiwan? This is a question that can be answered only by science, not protest marches.
Could a nuclear power plant accident happen? That is a hypothetical question. What if we gather experts from all fields and consulted them? What if we conduct thorough nuclear safety inspections? What if we demand the highest standards in risk management? The likelihood of an accident will be minimized. In the event of a natural disaster, we will be able to limit the scope of the damage as much as possible. But if we remain mired in populist political struggles, we will only lose sight of our real concerns.
Anti-nuclear groups have stressed the horrors of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. They have claimed that Taiwan could not withstand such a nuclear accident. The alarming scenes of the Fukushima nuclear plant radiation leak instilled doubt in the minds of middle class citizens. It inspired them to raise the banner of a nuclear-free homeland. It inspired them to take to the streets. But by adopting such an approach, anti-nuclear activists exaggerated people's fear of the unknown. They claimed that an accident would make Taiwan utterly uninhabitable. But is that true? Consider Nagasaki and Hiroshima, worst case scenarios. During World War II, atomic bombs were dropped on these cities. But today, Nagasaki and Hiroshima are hardly "utterly unihabitable."
Consider also the question of whether construction should be halted on the Nuclear Plant Number Four, and whether it should be put into commercial operation. This too has become a political football. Nuclear Plant Number Four has entered the final stages of completion. In 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, it halted construction in the name of a nuclear-free homeland. Eventually however, public pressure forced it to resume construction. Public opinion has been consulted, and the all necesary legal procedures have been followed. There truly is no reason at this late date to call a halt to construction.
In order to develop our economy, we must have electricity. If we continue to resort to fossil fuel power generation, we will increase carbon dioxide emissions that cause global warming. Current renewable energy technology is not sufficiently mature. The cost of power generation is too high. These are harsh realities the public must face.
Elections are around the corner. Every time elections roll around, it becomes impossible to engage in objective discussion of public issues. For the sake of votes, the ruling authorities apparently hope to muddle through and worry about the problems later. Should we develop nuclear power? How can we ensure nuclear power plant safety? How can we achieve a "nuclear-free homeland?" These questions have remained open to discussion, They are questions that must be discussed. They should be part of our overall energy policy debate, But we must not go around and around in circles. The government must make available accurate information. It must offer a national energy policy consistent with public expectations and the needs of economic development. It should then allow the people decide. It should let the people to bear the consequences of their decision. Only then can society break the current deadlock over nuclear power generation.
兼顧核安、經濟 能源政策要雙贏
2011-05-05 中國時報
四三○反核大遊行日前在北中南東全台串連，號召上萬民眾走上街頭，過程和平落幕。他們要求馬政府正視反核的心聲，訴求「不要核四、三座核電廠除役、零核災零恐懼」。這個訴求，當然是緣於日本福島核災事故，地震、海嘯、輻射外洩的畫面，一幕幕驚心動魄，「台灣是否還要核電」成為許多民眾心中最大的疑慮，不少民眾因此走上街頭，表達對核能安全的關切。
據報載總統馬英九關心環保團體的遊行與訴求，透過發言人表示，「這些聲音，政府都聽到了」。行政部門已在廣徵各界意見，通盤研究檢討，一定要提出具體可行並且讓民眾安心的核能政策。行政院原子能委員會表示，核能一廠的延役審查已在去年底暫停，核四廠確定今年底前不會裝填燃料棒。至於低放射核廢料最終處置場址，也須經過地方性公投、二階環評通過後，才會核發使用執照。
從政府的回應與反核民眾的訴求來看，雙方仍是各說各話，並沒有交集，反核與擁核依舊是兩條平行線。
在反核活動現場凱達格蘭大道上，數千位民眾集體躺下，模仿大型核災爆發時的死傷狀況。反核團體要求政府提出具體廢核政策與承諾，強調核能威脅不中止，廢核行動就不會有停止的一天。他們說，台灣絕對禁不起一次類似日本福島的核災。但是政府的回應卻只有空泛的「我們會通盤檢討」。
這場反核遊行，可以說是民眾受到日本福島核電廠災變事件影響的結果，也是日本福島核安事件引發國人對核電的恐慌與反省。不過，台灣的核電廠是否會發生類似的事件，應該是一個科學的問題，不是遊行活動就能解決的。
畢竟，核電廠會不會發生意外，是一個未知與假設的問題，如果我們現在就集結所有各個領域的專家會診，好好落實核安檢查工作，用最高的標準做好風險管理，意外發生的機會就自然減少，碰到天然災變也就能將損害控制在最小範圍內；反之，如果一直停留在政爭與民粹式的爭辯中，只會讓真正該關注的問題焦點被模糊。
反核團體強調福島核災的恐怖，宣稱台灣禁不起核電意外，將一幕幕驚心動魄日本福島核災事故中輻射外洩的畫面，引導民眾心中產生疑慮，因此拿起非核家園大旗，走上街頭。反核人士這樣的做法，似乎誇大了一個未知的恐懼，甚至還讓這些恐懼一直無限上綱到可能淪為萬劫不復的境地。但這樣的狀況真的會發生嗎？事實上，即使情況最壞的日本長崎與廣島，在二次大戰期間被丟了兩顆原子彈，現在的長崎與廣島也沒有到這樣的萬劫不復地步。
此外，核四應否停工興建與商業運轉的問題，也炒作成為選舉語言，因為目前核四廠已經進入最後完工階段，在二千年民進黨執政時期，也曾經為了建立非核家園而一度停工，但最後在社會的壓力下不得不復工。因此無論就政治或是民意的角度來看，既然所有民主程序都已經走完，現在實在沒有理由半途喊停。
台灣要發展經濟就必須要有用電，如果繼續使用石化燃料發電，就會有二氧化碳排放所引發全球暖化的問題，而目前再生能源技術也確實未臻成熟，發電成本過高，這些都是全民所必須面對的課題。
選舉即將來臨，一到了選舉，台灣似乎就沒有客觀討論公共議題的機會，為了選票，執政當局目前似乎只想先混過去再說。其實要不要發展核電？核四該提出怎樣的安全保證？該如何在未來時日實現真正的「非核家園」？本來就是可以討論，也是應該要討論的課題，而且應該在台灣整體能源政策中提出論證，而非在某些個案上一直打轉爭辯，政府唯有公開所有正確的資訊，提出一個符合社會潮流與經濟發展需求的國家能源政策，讓民眾有正確的判斷選擇的機會，並且承擔最後選擇的後果，社會才能往前走出核電爭議的困境。
1992 Consensus is the Key to a Tsai Ing-wen Pardon for Chen Shui-bian
1992 Consensus is the Key to a Tsai Ing-wen Pardon for Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2011
Legislator Chiu Yi says that Tsai Ing-wen has reached a secret accord with Chen Shui-bian. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will pardon Chen Shui-bian.
Chiu Yi's revelations contained hardly any direct evidence. But they also provoke little skepticism. The special meeting took place in the Guishan Penitentiary. The entire event was videotaped. This made it impossible for the two parties to openly make any flagrant quid pro quo deals. But on March 15, according to Chiu Yi, Chen Shui-bian said that "Both Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang should make clear their positions on a presidential pardon." "If they refuse to state their positions, how can I endorse their candidacies?" In early April, Tsai Ing-wen spokesman Cheng Wen-chan visited Guishan Penitentiary. Chiu Yi said Tsai was dropping Chen a hint. On April 12, Chen Shui-bian issued a statement entitled "Ten Reasons to Support Tsai Ing-wen." This sequence of events is worth pondering.
Were Chiu Yi's revelations true or false? That needs to be seen. But Chen Shui-bian hopes Tsai Ing-wen will pardon him. In the event she is elected, Tsai Ing-wen cannot avoid the question of whether to pardon Chen. On this we need have no doubt. Considering the situation the two are in, it is highly likely the two made a "I'll help you get elected if you grant me a pardon" political deal. The key is the 1992 Consensus.
Tsai Ing-wen has strong political momentum. But the 1992 Consensus remains her biggest Achilles Heel. Her past refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus remains an albatross around her neck. If she can rid herself of this albatross, she will be "a tiger who has sprouted wings." Her chances of being elected will skyrocket. Will Tsai Ing-wen be able to extricate herself from the 1992 Consensus? The answer lies with Chen Shui-bian. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. Just prior to his visit to the United States, he publicly declared that he considered One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus acceptable. But the next day, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen denied that Chen had made any such statement. She forced Chen Shui-bian to swallow his words. For the next eight years, from beginning to end, Chen was forced to consistently repudiate the 1992 Consensus. He never again returned to his "new centrist path." Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to recognize the 1992 Consensus today because she is afraid of what Chen Shui-bian might do. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, and Chen Shui-bian lashes out at her, Tsai Ing-wen will find herself in a pickle. That is how the 1992 Consensus became a political lever by which Chen Shui-bian is able to control Tsai Ing-wen.
If Chen Shui-bian wants Tsai Ing-wen to pardon him, he must first help Tsai Ing-wen get elected. Today the 1992 Consensus is virtually the sole obstacle standing in the way of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory. If Chen Shui-bian pulls his punches on the 1992 Consensus, in exchange for a pardon from Tsai Ing-wen, this would be the ultimate win/win political deal.
Consider the following scenario for the upcoming presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly accepts the 1992 Consensus, in toto, or in part. Perhaps she declares ambiguously that she no longer opposes the 1992 Consensus. Chen Shui-bian voices no objections. Perhaps he declares that "one nation on each side" is another form of "One China, Different Interpretations." Perhaps he declares that "times have changed, circumstances are different," and voices support and praise for Tsai Ing-wen's new position. Taiwan independence elements bite their tongues. The Green Camp reaches a tacit understanding, and allows Tsai Ing-wen to squeak by without objection. Suddenly, attitudes about the 1992 Consensus change, overnight. This is not inconceivable. The key lies with Chen Shui-bian. Would Chen Shui-bian be willing to swallow his resentment over Tsai Ing-wen's past stance on the 1992 Consensus? Would he be willing to grant Tsai Ing-wen more maneuveuring room on cross-Strait policy, in exchange for a pardon? This would be a partnership requiring him to put up no money. He would be only too happy to arrive at such a secret accord with Tsai Ing-wen.
We have long maintained that Tsai Ing-wen must accept the 1992 Consensus. But she may use a pardon for Chen Shui-bian as a bargaining chip, in exchange for recognizing the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, the DPP will be forced to change its strategic posture on the One China Constitution. It will be forced to forsake Taiwan independence and support "One China, Different Interpretations." Unless it makes this major shift, it cannot win the confidence of the public on Taiwan, the Mainland authorities, and the international community. Will Chen and Tsai accept the 1992 Consensus? Consider their stands on the 18% preferential interest rate, the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant, and nuclear power generation. They changed their positions at the slightest provocation. They treated these matters as nothing more than campaign promises -- made to be broken. A major issue affecting the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has devolved into a political deal benefitting two individuals. This is something the public would not tolerate. But the DPP has demonstrated its willingness to engage in all sorts of dirty tricks and dirty deals. What wouldn't they be willing to do? That is why the public is naturally concerned about whether Tsai and Chen have reached a "secret accord."
The more Chen Shui-bian expresses support for Tsai Ing-wen, the more the public wonders whether Tsai Ing-wen will pardon Chen Shui-bian if she is elected president. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected. Members of the Green Camp will surely demand that Chen Shui-bian be pardoned. They will demand that President Tsai implement "transitional justice." If she does not play ball, her presidency could be at risk. Tsai Ing-wen might cite other reasons for granting Chen a pardon. But she must not use the 1992 Consensus as a bargaining chip.
Such Machievellian transactions would not be the result of genuine reforms on cross-Strait policy within the Green Camp, They would be the result of a conspiracy by Chen and Tsai to dupe voters. Could dirty deals such as these ever bring peace and prosperity to a country? Could they ever escape the judgment of history?
蔡英文特赦陳水扁的關鍵在九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.02
立委邱毅透露，蔡英文已與陳水扁達成祕密期約：蔡英文若當選總統，就特赦陳水扁。
檢視邱毅爆料的內容，雖難謂有直接證據，卻也不無令人將信將疑之處。當然，龜山監獄的特別會見，全程皆有錄音錄影，雙方不可能明目張膽做成交易；但邱毅稱陳水扁在三月十五日特見時說「蔡英文、蘇貞昌應對特赦表態」，「不表態要我怎麼支持？」，至四月初，蔡辦發言人鄭文燦即赴龜山探監，邱毅指此為蔡對扁示意，四月十二日陳水扁即發表「支持蔡英文的十個理由」，這段情節確實頗堪玩味。
邱毅爆料的真偽如何，尚待撥雲見日。但陳水扁寄望蔡英文若當選能特赦他，而蔡英文若當選亦不能迴避是否特赦扁，這卻是毋庸贅論的當然之事。其實，就扁蔡二人的相對情勢而言，雙方極有可能達成「我幫妳當選／妳給我特赦」的政治交易，關鍵是在「九二共識」。
蔡英文聲勢洶洶，但「九二共識」卻是她最大的罩門；如果她能自「不承認九二共識」的枷鎖中解套，將是如虎添翼，當選的機率更大。而蔡英文能否自「九二共識」解套，關鍵卻在陳水扁。因為，二○○○年陳水扁初任總統時，曾在美國訪客前公開表示可以接受「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但次日即被任陸委會主委的蔡英文所否定，迫使陳水扁又吞回了那句話；此後，扁執政八年即一路否定「九二共識」到底，再也回不到他的「新中間路線」。因而，蔡英文之所以不能、不敢承認「九二共識」，主要是對陳水扁有顧忌；如果蔡接受了「九二共識」，而引爆扁的反彈，蔡就很難收拾那個攤子。亦因如此，「九二共識」也就成了陳水扁足以操控蔡英文的政治槓桿。
陳水扁想蔡英文特赦他，首須幫蔡英文當選；如今，「九二共識」幾乎成了阻擋蔡英文當選的「唯一障礙」，陳水扁倘對「九二共識」放水，以交換蔡英文若當選後對他特赦，誰說這不是一樁買賣雙贏的政治交易？
因而，或許可以想像總統大選下一個可能的場景：蔡英文突然接受了「九二共識」，或有條件地接受了「九二共識」，或以模稜兩可的口吻不再反對「九二共識」；而陳水扁方面或不表異議，或稱「一邊一國」即是另類的「一中各表」，甚或以「時空環境不同」而支持及讚譽蔡英文的新立場，獨派則一概噤聲不語。如此一來，整個綠營在「頭過身就過」的政治默契中，即有可能在一夕之間皆對「九二共識」的態度大轉彎。這不是不能想像之事，關鍵則在陳水扁；而陳水扁若能吞下「九二共識」，給蔡英文在兩岸政策上較大空間，以交易蔡英文若當選即給他特赦，這對他而言只是一宗無本生意而已，當然樂與蔡英文做成「祕密期約」。
我們一貫主張，蔡英文必須接受「九二共識」；但她不能以「特赦陳水扁」做為承認「九二共識」的交易籌碼。因為，蔡若接受「九二共識」，那就應觸動民進黨對「一中憲法」、「放棄台獨」、「一中各表」等整個國家戰略的大調整、大轉向，非此不能取信於國內、兩岸及國際；扁蔡二人若將接不接受「九二共識」，看成像十八趴、國光石化、核電一樣說變就變，只是當做「選舉詐術」來操弄，而竟將兩岸大政變成二人之間的政治交易，這將是天理民意所不容。然而，從過去的不良紀錄看，民進黨有什麼不可思議的權謀及交易不會做、不敢做？因而，蔡扁有否「祕密期約」，國人自應給予高度關注。
陳水扁越支持蔡英文，越使人想問蔡英文若當選會否特赦陳水扁。蔡英文若當選，綠營必會出現主張特赦陳水扁的呼聲，要求「蔡總統」實現「轉型正義」；她若不從，即難安其位。然而，蔡英文或許可用其他理由特赦陳水扁，但不可用「九二共識」做為交易籌碼。
因為，這種權謀交易，必非出自綠營對兩岸政策的真誠改革，而將只是扁蔡二人共謀欺騙選民的伎倆；這種猙獰汙穢的政治交易，如何能安邦定國？更如何能逃得過歷史的制裁？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2011
Legislator Chiu Yi says that Tsai Ing-wen has reached a secret accord with Chen Shui-bian. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will pardon Chen Shui-bian.
Chiu Yi's revelations contained hardly any direct evidence. But they also provoke little skepticism. The special meeting took place in the Guishan Penitentiary. The entire event was videotaped. This made it impossible for the two parties to openly make any flagrant quid pro quo deals. But on March 15, according to Chiu Yi, Chen Shui-bian said that "Both Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang should make clear their positions on a presidential pardon." "If they refuse to state their positions, how can I endorse their candidacies?" In early April, Tsai Ing-wen spokesman Cheng Wen-chan visited Guishan Penitentiary. Chiu Yi said Tsai was dropping Chen a hint. On April 12, Chen Shui-bian issued a statement entitled "Ten Reasons to Support Tsai Ing-wen." This sequence of events is worth pondering.
Were Chiu Yi's revelations true or false? That needs to be seen. But Chen Shui-bian hopes Tsai Ing-wen will pardon him. In the event she is elected, Tsai Ing-wen cannot avoid the question of whether to pardon Chen. On this we need have no doubt. Considering the situation the two are in, it is highly likely the two made a "I'll help you get elected if you grant me a pardon" political deal. The key is the 1992 Consensus.
Tsai Ing-wen has strong political momentum. But the 1992 Consensus remains her biggest Achilles Heel. Her past refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus remains an albatross around her neck. If she can rid herself of this albatross, she will be "a tiger who has sprouted wings." Her chances of being elected will skyrocket. Will Tsai Ing-wen be able to extricate herself from the 1992 Consensus? The answer lies with Chen Shui-bian. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. Just prior to his visit to the United States, he publicly declared that he considered One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus acceptable. But the next day, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen denied that Chen had made any such statement. She forced Chen Shui-bian to swallow his words. For the next eight years, from beginning to end, Chen was forced to consistently repudiate the 1992 Consensus. He never again returned to his "new centrist path." Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to recognize the 1992 Consensus today because she is afraid of what Chen Shui-bian might do. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, and Chen Shui-bian lashes out at her, Tsai Ing-wen will find herself in a pickle. That is how the 1992 Consensus became a political lever by which Chen Shui-bian is able to control Tsai Ing-wen.
If Chen Shui-bian wants Tsai Ing-wen to pardon him, he must first help Tsai Ing-wen get elected. Today the 1992 Consensus is virtually the sole obstacle standing in the way of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory. If Chen Shui-bian pulls his punches on the 1992 Consensus, in exchange for a pardon from Tsai Ing-wen, this would be the ultimate win/win political deal.
Consider the following scenario for the upcoming presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly accepts the 1992 Consensus, in toto, or in part. Perhaps she declares ambiguously that she no longer opposes the 1992 Consensus. Chen Shui-bian voices no objections. Perhaps he declares that "one nation on each side" is another form of "One China, Different Interpretations." Perhaps he declares that "times have changed, circumstances are different," and voices support and praise for Tsai Ing-wen's new position. Taiwan independence elements bite their tongues. The Green Camp reaches a tacit understanding, and allows Tsai Ing-wen to squeak by without objection. Suddenly, attitudes about the 1992 Consensus change, overnight. This is not inconceivable. The key lies with Chen Shui-bian. Would Chen Shui-bian be willing to swallow his resentment over Tsai Ing-wen's past stance on the 1992 Consensus? Would he be willing to grant Tsai Ing-wen more maneuveuring room on cross-Strait policy, in exchange for a pardon? This would be a partnership requiring him to put up no money. He would be only too happy to arrive at such a secret accord with Tsai Ing-wen.
We have long maintained that Tsai Ing-wen must accept the 1992 Consensus. But she may use a pardon for Chen Shui-bian as a bargaining chip, in exchange for recognizing the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, the DPP will be forced to change its strategic posture on the One China Constitution. It will be forced to forsake Taiwan independence and support "One China, Different Interpretations." Unless it makes this major shift, it cannot win the confidence of the public on Taiwan, the Mainland authorities, and the international community. Will Chen and Tsai accept the 1992 Consensus? Consider their stands on the 18% preferential interest rate, the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant, and nuclear power generation. They changed their positions at the slightest provocation. They treated these matters as nothing more than campaign promises -- made to be broken. A major issue affecting the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has devolved into a political deal benefitting two individuals. This is something the public would not tolerate. But the DPP has demonstrated its willingness to engage in all sorts of dirty tricks and dirty deals. What wouldn't they be willing to do? That is why the public is naturally concerned about whether Tsai and Chen have reached a "secret accord."
The more Chen Shui-bian expresses support for Tsai Ing-wen, the more the public wonders whether Tsai Ing-wen will pardon Chen Shui-bian if she is elected president. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected. Members of the Green Camp will surely demand that Chen Shui-bian be pardoned. They will demand that President Tsai implement "transitional justice." If she does not play ball, her presidency could be at risk. Tsai Ing-wen might cite other reasons for granting Chen a pardon. But she must not use the 1992 Consensus as a bargaining chip.
Such Machievellian transactions would not be the result of genuine reforms on cross-Strait policy within the Green Camp, They would be the result of a conspiracy by Chen and Tsai to dupe voters. Could dirty deals such as these ever bring peace and prosperity to a country? Could they ever escape the judgment of history?
蔡英文特赦陳水扁的關鍵在九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.02
立委邱毅透露，蔡英文已與陳水扁達成祕密期約：蔡英文若當選總統，就特赦陳水扁。
檢視邱毅爆料的內容，雖難謂有直接證據，卻也不無令人將信將疑之處。當然，龜山監獄的特別會見，全程皆有錄音錄影，雙方不可能明目張膽做成交易；但邱毅稱陳水扁在三月十五日特見時說「蔡英文、蘇貞昌應對特赦表態」，「不表態要我怎麼支持？」，至四月初，蔡辦發言人鄭文燦即赴龜山探監，邱毅指此為蔡對扁示意，四月十二日陳水扁即發表「支持蔡英文的十個理由」，這段情節確實頗堪玩味。
邱毅爆料的真偽如何，尚待撥雲見日。但陳水扁寄望蔡英文若當選能特赦他，而蔡英文若當選亦不能迴避是否特赦扁，這卻是毋庸贅論的當然之事。其實，就扁蔡二人的相對情勢而言，雙方極有可能達成「我幫妳當選／妳給我特赦」的政治交易，關鍵是在「九二共識」。
蔡英文聲勢洶洶，但「九二共識」卻是她最大的罩門；如果她能自「不承認九二共識」的枷鎖中解套，將是如虎添翼，當選的機率更大。而蔡英文能否自「九二共識」解套，關鍵卻在陳水扁。因為，二○○○年陳水扁初任總統時，曾在美國訪客前公開表示可以接受「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但次日即被任陸委會主委的蔡英文所否定，迫使陳水扁又吞回了那句話；此後，扁執政八年即一路否定「九二共識」到底，再也回不到他的「新中間路線」。因而，蔡英文之所以不能、不敢承認「九二共識」，主要是對陳水扁有顧忌；如果蔡接受了「九二共識」，而引爆扁的反彈，蔡就很難收拾那個攤子。亦因如此，「九二共識」也就成了陳水扁足以操控蔡英文的政治槓桿。
陳水扁想蔡英文特赦他，首須幫蔡英文當選；如今，「九二共識」幾乎成了阻擋蔡英文當選的「唯一障礙」，陳水扁倘對「九二共識」放水，以交換蔡英文若當選後對他特赦，誰說這不是一樁買賣雙贏的政治交易？
因而，或許可以想像總統大選下一個可能的場景：蔡英文突然接受了「九二共識」，或有條件地接受了「九二共識」，或以模稜兩可的口吻不再反對「九二共識」；而陳水扁方面或不表異議，或稱「一邊一國」即是另類的「一中各表」，甚或以「時空環境不同」而支持及讚譽蔡英文的新立場，獨派則一概噤聲不語。如此一來，整個綠營在「頭過身就過」的政治默契中，即有可能在一夕之間皆對「九二共識」的態度大轉彎。這不是不能想像之事，關鍵則在陳水扁；而陳水扁若能吞下「九二共識」，給蔡英文在兩岸政策上較大空間，以交易蔡英文若當選即給他特赦，這對他而言只是一宗無本生意而已，當然樂與蔡英文做成「祕密期約」。
我們一貫主張，蔡英文必須接受「九二共識」；但她不能以「特赦陳水扁」做為承認「九二共識」的交易籌碼。因為，蔡若接受「九二共識」，那就應觸動民進黨對「一中憲法」、「放棄台獨」、「一中各表」等整個國家戰略的大調整、大轉向，非此不能取信於國內、兩岸及國際；扁蔡二人若將接不接受「九二共識」，看成像十八趴、國光石化、核電一樣說變就變，只是當做「選舉詐術」來操弄，而竟將兩岸大政變成二人之間的政治交易，這將是天理民意所不容。然而，從過去的不良紀錄看，民進黨有什麼不可思議的權謀及交易不會做、不敢做？因而，蔡扁有否「祕密期約」，國人自應給予高度關注。
陳水扁越支持蔡英文，越使人想問蔡英文若當選會否特赦陳水扁。蔡英文若當選，綠營必會出現主張特赦陳水扁的呼聲，要求「蔡總統」實現「轉型正義」；她若不從，即難安其位。然而，蔡英文或許可用其他理由特赦陳水扁，但不可用「九二共識」做為交易籌碼。
因為，這種權謀交易，必非出自綠營對兩岸政策的真誠改革，而將只是扁蔡二人共謀欺騙選民的伎倆；這種猙獰汙穢的政治交易，如何能安邦定國？更如何能逃得過歷史的制裁？
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