Tsai Ing-wen Not Even Secure as Party Chairman: How Can She Run for President?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2011
The roster of DPP nominees for legislator without portfolio has touched off a firestorm. Given the heat on Tsai Ing-wen at the moment, she is not even secure in her role as DPP chairman. In which case, how can she possibly take on the role of Republic of China president?
Tsai Ing-wen is in a pickle. Her television ad shows her ambling serenely through the streets of London, soaking in the atmosphere. It is totally at odds with her current plight. Her comrades in the party apparently consider her proclamation that "I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen" a tired cliche. A naked power struggle has erupted within the party, ignited by the roster of DPP nominees for legislator without portfolio.
Taiwan independence hardliners vehemently object to the current roster of DPP nominees. These hardliners include Wang Hsing-nan, Trong Chai, Tsai Yu-chuan, and Chen Shui-bian, who recently joined the fray. Tsai Ing-wen placed Wang Hsing-nan and Trong Chai at the bottom of the list, because they are aging Taiwan independence hardliners. Wang Hsing-nan was the chief suspect in the Hsieh Tung-min letter bomb case. Trong Chai is the perennial "Referendum Chai." Chai quite naturally thinks Tsai is attempting to burn his Taiwan independence bridges even before he has had a chance to cross them. These hardliners have criticized this roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio on numerous grounds. They say Cheng Shu-hua is a "counterfeit labor representative." They say Ker Chen-ming is guilty of misconduct. They say Hsiao Bi-khim and Cheng Li-chung are the chairman's obedient minions. They say the young and middle aged elites nominated have done nothing to deserve their inclusion on the roster. Tsai Yu-chuan even complained about people "sleeping with other men's wives." In other words, they consider the roster of nominees completely unjust. They feel it has elbowed aside these epoch-making Taiwan independence elders. Therefore they cannot possibly tolerate this outrage. Chen Shui-bian, who is new to the fray, pointed out the problem. He characterized the current roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio as "factions divvying up the spoils." He said "the chairman's minions should not be grabbing seats for themselves." He said Tsai Ing-wen should explicitly express opposition to ECFA. Otherwise, the TSU may draw away 5% of the party's vote.
Therefore, the controversy over the roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio, has become a knotted mess involving squabbling over spoils and disputes over the party's direction. Often what appears to be squabbling over spoils, turns out to be disputes over the party's direction. Conversely, what appears to be disputes over the party's direction, often turns out to be squabbling over spoils. Party members originally assumed that such squabbles and disputes could be postponed until after Tsai Ing-wen was elected. But the roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio provoked unexpected discontent. This open gun battle may subside temporarily as election fever mounts. But once the election is over, it will erupt once again. If Tsai wins her bid for the presidency, she faces more serious squabbles and disputes. If Tsai loses her bid for the presidency, the prospects are even more daunting.
What led to this situation? Tsai Ing-wen and many DPP insiders assumed they could set aside factional squabbles and disputes over the party's direction until after the election. But when Tsai Ing-wen was handed total control of the nomination process, she revealed her nepotist proclivities. She elbowed aside "aging hardliners." She brought back the Machievellian Ker Chien-ming. These were all precursors of post-election internecine struggles. On the one hand, Tsai Ing-wen attempted to rally Taiwan independence hardliners with her ringing proclamation that "I am Taiwanese." On the other hand, she purged Taiwan independence hardliners from the roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio. In the eyes of "aging hardliners" Wang Hsing-nan, Trong Chai, and Tsai Yu-chuan, this was intolerable. This was comparable to her acceptance of the 18% preferential interest rate for civil service employees, even as she denounced it.
Tsai Ing-wen wants first to be elected president, then to come back and resolve the power struggle and ideological struggle within the party. But the roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio turned out to be a Pandora's Box. For the good of the nation and the good of society, Tsai Ing-wen should first resolve the power struggle within the DPP. She should first unify the DPP, and broker an agreement on the party's direction. Only then should she run for President of the Republic of China. Otherwise, Tsai Ing-wen will be cradling a time bomb in her arms, one that could explode at any moment, while she runs for the nation's highest office. The entire nation would be dragged into DPP's messy power struggle. How can moderate voters possible tolerate that?
Ker Chien-ming held a press conference. He criticized Wang Hsing-nan and Trong Chai, saying that "Even the CCP's Central China Television Network would never attack their own comrades in such a manner." Wang Hsing-nan meanwhile demanded that the party leadership "keep dirty secrets" and "undermine the foundations of the party." One side railed against abscesses. The other side railed against filth. Both sides drew blood. Tsai Ing-wen must broker a peace within the party prior to the election. She must resolve the power struggle within the DPP. She must unify the DPP and broker an agreement on the party's direction. If no resolution is reached before the election, it will make no difference whether she wins or loses. The situation will become intolerable. For example, Chen Shui-bian has already stepped forward and taken a stand against ECFA. Can Tsai Ing-wen wait until after the election to respond?
Tsai Ing-wen's strategy is to deceive both sides, to deceive both moderate voters and DPP members regarding the party's direction. The roster of nominees for legislator without portfolio testifies to that. Tsai Ing-wen may be able to deceive moderate voters. But given her modest political momentum, she cannot possibly deceive the DPP about the party's direction. Nor can she hope to deceive Taiwan independence hardliners. She cannot benefit from the 18% preferential interest rate, even as she denounces it. If Tsai Ing-wen cannot even broker a peace within her own party over the allocation of power and the party's direction, how can she possibly become President of the Republic of China?
Tsai Ing-wen, are you really prepared?
黨主席鎮不住，蔡英文如何做總統？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.14
民進黨不分區立委名單引爆的超級風暴顯示：以蔡英文現在的政治火候，連做民進黨主席都鎮不住陣腳，她如何能出任領導全民的中華民國總統？
蔡英文今日的處境，與競選電視廣告上那種抱著瓶裝水在倫敦逛大街的氛圍，已是形同天壤雲泥；黨內似乎皆將「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」視作陳腔濫調，一場赤裸裸的黨內權力及路線鬥爭，則因不分區立委名單的公布而引爆。
對這一份名單持強烈異議者皆是獨派，包括王幸男、蔡同榮、蔡有全，及剛加入戰局的陳水扁。蔡英文把王幸男、蔡同榮等排出及殿後不分區名單，是因二人「老又獨」；而王幸男是謝東閔郵包炸彈案的主角，蔡同榮更是「永遠的蔡公投」，自然認為蔡竟然還未過河就想先拆掉他們這幾張台獨橋板。他們對不分區名單的批評是：鄭素華是「假勞工」、柯建銘無行失德，蕭美琴及鄭麗君則是國王人馬，另有青壯菁英因怯戰而欲不勞而獲不分區席次，蔡有全甚至指名單上有「睡人妻者」；換句話說，他們認為，以這張他們看來完全不公不義的名單，竟要擠掉他們幾個為民進黨開天闢地的台獨元勳，豈能令人甘服？新加入戰局的陳水扁更點出了問題的關鍵，他將這次不分區提名定調為「派系分贓」；一方面說「主席人馬不應跟著搶」，另一方面更指蔡英文應明白表態反對ＥＣＦＡ，否則台聯可能藉題搶走五%政黨票。
所以，這次不分區名單的爭議，順理成章地將「權力分贓」與「路線鬥爭」幾股麻線交纏成一條巨繩，難分難解。表面看似權力分贓，底子卻是路線鬥爭；又或表面看似路線鬥爭，底子卻是權力分贓。原本以為，這種「權力分贓」與「路線鬥爭」的火拼場面，可以延後到蔡英文若當選才引爆，但這張不分區名單卻使引信提前著火。這個火拼場面雖然稍後或許會因選情升高而隱伏一陣子，但已可預見在選後必將再度大爆發。蔡若當選總統，必將面對更嚴峻的「權力分贓」與「路線鬥爭」的壓力；蔡若落選，則場面將更不堪想像。
為何形成今日局面？主要原因是蔡英文與民進黨內各種勢力原本認為：先對外打贏選戰，至於黨內的權力及路線鬥爭，留待選後再說。但是，蔡英文在她擁有百分之百提名權的不分區名單中，提前暴露了分封身邊親私，排除「老又獨」，及重用以「政治技術」見長的柯建銘，此中皆見為選後黨內鬥爭預作鋪墊的痕跡。然而，蔡英文一面張舉「我是台灣人」的獨派號召，另一面卻在不分區名單上「掃獨」的動作，看在王幸男、蔡同榮及蔡有全等「老又獨」的眼中，是可忍，孰不可忍？這不是形同拿十八%，又猛打十八%？
蔡英文當然想「先當選總統，再來收拾黨內的權力及路線鬥爭」，這張不分區名單卻提前打開了潘朵拉魔盒。但為國家社會計，蔡英文自然應當先擺平了民進黨內的權力爭奪，及先整合了民進黨內的路線鬥爭，進而再競選中華民國總統；不然，蔡英文若要抱著民進黨這一顆權力及路線鬥爭的不定時炸彈出任中華民國總統，屆時將整個國家捲入民進黨的腥臭內鬥之中，中間選民豈能同意？
目前的情勢是，柯建銘開記者會，指王幸男蔡同榮等「中共中央電視台也不可能這樣鬥爭自己同志」；王幸男則挑著扁擔，指黨中央「不要藏汙納垢」，「動搖黨本」。這廂要擠掉膿瘡，那廂說齷齪至極；刀刀見骨，斧斧斷筋。蔡英文若在選前不把民進黨的權力及路線鬥爭擺平，拖到選後，不論她當選或落選，皆將是一個不堪收拾的可怕局面。例如，陳水扁已出面要蔡英文表態反對ＥＣＦＡ，蔡英文難道能拖到選後再回答？
蔡英文如今的策略可謂是「兩邊騙」，一邊騙中間選民，一邊騙權力路線駁雜的民進黨。但不分區名單引發的風暴顯示：蔡英文欲騙中間選民尚有可能；但以她這一點點的政治火候，不可能騙倒權力路線駁雜的民進黨，更勿妄想以「拿十八%，打十八%」的手法玩弄獨派。而蔡英文若連民進黨內的權力及路線鬥爭都鎮不住，她如何出任中華民國總統？
蔡英文，妳準備好了嗎？
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Impose Restrictions on the Sale of Public Housing
Impose Restrictions on the Sale of Public Housing
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2011
The Executive Yuan Council for Economic Planning recently proposed a draft law for contemporary housing. Its most distinctive feature has nothing to do with new government construction or low cost construction. It does not establish rules for surface rights in new construction. Instead, it imposes restrictions on buyers, specifying that contemporary housing may not be freely traded. This provision is being promoted as a national initiative. But public acceptance remains to be seen. We feel it is a step in the right direction. We consider it applicable to other forms of public housing, such as affordable housing.
The CEPD's draft law for contemporary housing currently applies to building sites near the Tucheng and Shanhsia MRT stations. Public land will be subject to a 70 year surface rights clause. Developers will transfer the land to a public trust.
The land will then be sold at 50 to 60% of the market price. Home buyers must have incomes below a certain level. They may not have any housing units in their name. Home buyers are not permitted to resell the units. If they do sell, they may only sell them back to the trustee. Or else they must sell the property to other qualified home buyers.
Consider the history of government housing. Buyers of government housing were allowed to sell their units after a specified number of years. This is the main reason government housing policy was unsustainable. The government obtained the land, built the housing, then sold it to the public at below market prices. Members of the public would then resell them at market prices to others. The result was private individuals profiting at public expense. Once the low cost housing units were sold, the government no longer possessed the means to provide low cost housing. All it could do was look for more land and build more housing. This approach was unfair. Worse, it rendered the policy for government housing unsustainable.
Therefore, the contemporary housing units provided by the Council for Economic Planning are subject to special restrictions. They may not be resold without restrictions. We approve. Only this will enable the government to retain the resources necessary for the construction of government housing. Only this will enable society to provide long term solutions to housing problems. The workings of the system however, must be simple and functional. They must not result in the creation of new bureaucracies. Sellers must be allowed to sell their units only to buyers who meet the requirements. One. Sellers lack information about prospective buyers. It is not within their power to conduct private evaluations. Two. More importantly, the provision affects the selling price. Resellers could profit from the resale of housing units. The profits would then end up in private hands. Therefore the government must remain the sole trustee of the housing units.
Also, how should the trustee determine the appropriate selling price for the original buyers of contemporary housing units? This has yet to be finalized. But it may be essential to the system's success or failure. A number of ways can be considered. If one's premise is that any appreciation should accrue to the government, then the units should be bought back at their original selling price. At most, one would add the interest, or account for inflation. But if one's premise is that the buyers and the government are sharing the upside profits as well as the downside risks, then the difference between the selling price and the original purchase price should be shared by the government and the original home buyer alike, according to a specified ratio. If however one is considering depreciation and the benefits derived from the housing unit's use, then the units should be bought back at a depreciated price. Regardless of which method is used, a repurchase price mechanism must be established and included as part of the contract.
The CEDP should establish a governmental or governmental trust repurchase mechanism for contemporary housing units. The government and the public agree. This is a fair, reasonable, and sustainable system. Therefore we have no reason not to make wider use of such a system, for affordable housing, young peoples housing, and other forms of government housing. Government housing sold at low prices to the public can be included in this system. For example, the government has officially contracted to build affordable housing near the Airport MRT station A7. The price will be set at 50 to 70% of the market price. Potential buyers are already rubbing their hands, noting that "get one and you're ahead of the game." Such practices, which enrich private individuals, are highly undesirable. The Ministry of Interior Construction and Planning Agency should establish mechanisms by which the government can buy back units, while increasing the proportion of rental housing.
Some people may criticize such a mechanism for limiting the resale of units, as a complete contradiction of free market principles. They may criticize it as socialist. But the construction of public housing by the government, using society's resources, then selling them at low prices to the economically disadvantaged, is inherently socialist. It matters not whether one refers to them as affordable housing, contemporary housing, or government housing. The government is attempting to solve the housing problem for the people. It is definitely not doing so merely to provide private individuals with windfall profits.
Many advanced nations have free market economies. But the government still intervenes in the housing market. It provides government housing for sale or for rent. The government's housing sales or lease provisions attempt to ensure fairness. They attempt to avoid or at least limit profiteering. The government housing system once lacked such restrictions. The result was that when the units appreciated, they enriched private individuals. Anyone allotted a low or medium priced government housing unit was virtually a lottery winner. This resulted in another kind of unfairness. Restrictions on the resale of government housing units
will not harm the free market. They will not deprive people of their property rights. The CEPD's restrictions on resale are entirely appropriate. Government housing policy was once unjust and unsustainable. This will change all that. The government should make government housing universal. It should swiftly incorporate affordable housing into the system. This will establish a sustainable new government housing system.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.13
社論－限制公屋自由轉售應該推廣
本報訊
行政院經建會日前公布現代住宅規畫草案，草案中最特別者並非政府興建、價格便宜，甚至也不是以設定地上權方式興建；而是對購買者轉手的限制，規定不得自由買賣。這個規定堪稱是國內的創舉，雖然民眾接受度仍待觀察，但我們認為是一個正確的方向，也值得其它公有住宅─如合宜住宅等引用。
經建會的現代住宅規畫案，目前選定土城、三峽兩地的捷運站附近，計畫以當地的公有地設定七十年的地上權，交由建商開發信託後，再以當地平均市價的五到六成價格出售。購買民眾的資格是一定所得以下、名下無房屋者。購屋者不能自由轉賣，如要出售必須售回給信託業者，或將使用權轉售給符合限定資料的他人。
我們回頭看過去國宅的例子可發現，承購國宅者在過了一定年限後，即可自由轉賣，是導致國宅政策難以為繼的主因。政府找地、建屋、再以遠較市價低廉的價格賣給民眾後，民眾轉手時卻是以市價轉賣。結果是利潤歸於私人，政府毫無收穫。更兼房屋已賣出，政府手上再無籌碼，只能不斷繼續找地、建屋。這種作法，不僅有違公平原則，更讓國宅政策難以永續經營。
因此，對這次經建會規畫的現代住宅，特別訂出不能自由轉賣的規定，我們深表贊同，只有如此，才能讓政府與社會投注許多資源興建的公有住宅，永續的成為社會解決居住問題的籌碼。不過，為了讓制度運作單純且可行，不該多開一個管道，讓出售房屋者能將使用權轉售給符合限定資料的他人。一來牽涉到出售者缺乏欲購買者的資訊，甚至完全不可能「自行審查」；二來，更重要的是這項規定仍牽涉到價格問題，轉售者仍可透過轉賣獲取利潤，利益仍歸私。政府仍應以信託單位為唯一的承購單位。
另外，信託單位承購原購屋者出售之現代住宅的價格，應該如何訂定，尚未定案，但卻可能是制度成敗的關鍵。能考量的方式，如以房價上漲的利潤完全歸公思考，當然是以原賣出價格購回，頂多加上利率成數、或通膨率。但如考慮由購屋者與政府共同承擔房屋漲跌的風險，則是以同樣房屋再出售的價格為購回基礎，此價格與原購買價格間的差距，不論漲跌，由政府與民眾各分擔一定比例。不過如果考慮房屋折舊與民眾已使用房子的效益，反而是應該以折舊購回。但不論用那種方式，對購回價格的機制必須先建立，並載諸於合約中。
如果，經建會透過現代住宅，可以建立起由政府（或代理政府的信託單位）購回的機制，而且政府與各界都認可這是一個「公平、合理、且更可長可久」的制度，那麼，就沒有理由不把此制度推而廣之，把合宜住宅、青年住宅…等由政府興建、並以低價出售給民眾的公有住宅，都納入此制度中。例如，政府已正式發包的機場捷運Ａ７站合宜住宅，價格號稱是市價的五到七成，市場人士已喊出「買到就賺到」；類似這種利益歸私的作法非常不可取。內政部營建署也應建立由政府購回的機制，同時增加出租房屋的比例。
或許有人批評這種限制自由轉賣的機制，完全違背自由市場機制，太過於「社會主義」了。那麼，我們必須強調，由政府以國家、社會的力量，興建住宅，再以低廉價格賣給經濟較弱勢民眾的「公屋制度」─不論它叫合宜住宅或現代住宅，甚至國民住宅，其本身就是一個「很社會主義」的制度。政府要為民眾解決居住問題，但絕對不是為民眾創造「享受資產增值」的空間。
國外許多先進國家，雖然其經濟體制是自由市場機制，但政府仍介入住宅市場，以公屋提供民眾購買或租用。而所有政府對公屋出售或出租的規定，一定會力求公平，儘量限制並避免「利益歸私」。過去的國宅制，就是少了這麼一個限制，結果是導致漲價歸私，抽中低價國宅者如中樂透，反而創造另一種不公平。對限制公屋的自由轉售，我們認為不會有破壞市場機制、剝奪民眾財產權等之疑慮。經建會提出的限制自由轉售規定，確實是切中時弊，可以一改過去國宅造成的不公與難以為繼原因，政府是該將其變成公屋的普遍制度，並把已發包的合宜住宅立即納入此制度中，藉此建立更能永續經營的公屋新體制。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2011
The Executive Yuan Council for Economic Planning recently proposed a draft law for contemporary housing. Its most distinctive feature has nothing to do with new government construction or low cost construction. It does not establish rules for surface rights in new construction. Instead, it imposes restrictions on buyers, specifying that contemporary housing may not be freely traded. This provision is being promoted as a national initiative. But public acceptance remains to be seen. We feel it is a step in the right direction. We consider it applicable to other forms of public housing, such as affordable housing.
The CEPD's draft law for contemporary housing currently applies to building sites near the Tucheng and Shanhsia MRT stations. Public land will be subject to a 70 year surface rights clause. Developers will transfer the land to a public trust.
The land will then be sold at 50 to 60% of the market price. Home buyers must have incomes below a certain level. They may not have any housing units in their name. Home buyers are not permitted to resell the units. If they do sell, they may only sell them back to the trustee. Or else they must sell the property to other qualified home buyers.
Consider the history of government housing. Buyers of government housing were allowed to sell their units after a specified number of years. This is the main reason government housing policy was unsustainable. The government obtained the land, built the housing, then sold it to the public at below market prices. Members of the public would then resell them at market prices to others. The result was private individuals profiting at public expense. Once the low cost housing units were sold, the government no longer possessed the means to provide low cost housing. All it could do was look for more land and build more housing. This approach was unfair. Worse, it rendered the policy for government housing unsustainable.
Therefore, the contemporary housing units provided by the Council for Economic Planning are subject to special restrictions. They may not be resold without restrictions. We approve. Only this will enable the government to retain the resources necessary for the construction of government housing. Only this will enable society to provide long term solutions to housing problems. The workings of the system however, must be simple and functional. They must not result in the creation of new bureaucracies. Sellers must be allowed to sell their units only to buyers who meet the requirements. One. Sellers lack information about prospective buyers. It is not within their power to conduct private evaluations. Two. More importantly, the provision affects the selling price. Resellers could profit from the resale of housing units. The profits would then end up in private hands. Therefore the government must remain the sole trustee of the housing units.
Also, how should the trustee determine the appropriate selling price for the original buyers of contemporary housing units? This has yet to be finalized. But it may be essential to the system's success or failure. A number of ways can be considered. If one's premise is that any appreciation should accrue to the government, then the units should be bought back at their original selling price. At most, one would add the interest, or account for inflation. But if one's premise is that the buyers and the government are sharing the upside profits as well as the downside risks, then the difference between the selling price and the original purchase price should be shared by the government and the original home buyer alike, according to a specified ratio. If however one is considering depreciation and the benefits derived from the housing unit's use, then the units should be bought back at a depreciated price. Regardless of which method is used, a repurchase price mechanism must be established and included as part of the contract.
The CEDP should establish a governmental or governmental trust repurchase mechanism for contemporary housing units. The government and the public agree. This is a fair, reasonable, and sustainable system. Therefore we have no reason not to make wider use of such a system, for affordable housing, young peoples housing, and other forms of government housing. Government housing sold at low prices to the public can be included in this system. For example, the government has officially contracted to build affordable housing near the Airport MRT station A7. The price will be set at 50 to 70% of the market price. Potential buyers are already rubbing their hands, noting that "get one and you're ahead of the game." Such practices, which enrich private individuals, are highly undesirable. The Ministry of Interior Construction and Planning Agency should establish mechanisms by which the government can buy back units, while increasing the proportion of rental housing.
Some people may criticize such a mechanism for limiting the resale of units, as a complete contradiction of free market principles. They may criticize it as socialist. But the construction of public housing by the government, using society's resources, then selling them at low prices to the economically disadvantaged, is inherently socialist. It matters not whether one refers to them as affordable housing, contemporary housing, or government housing. The government is attempting to solve the housing problem for the people. It is definitely not doing so merely to provide private individuals with windfall profits.
Many advanced nations have free market economies. But the government still intervenes in the housing market. It provides government housing for sale or for rent. The government's housing sales or lease provisions attempt to ensure fairness. They attempt to avoid or at least limit profiteering. The government housing system once lacked such restrictions. The result was that when the units appreciated, they enriched private individuals. Anyone allotted a low or medium priced government housing unit was virtually a lottery winner. This resulted in another kind of unfairness. Restrictions on the resale of government housing units
will not harm the free market. They will not deprive people of their property rights. The CEPD's restrictions on resale are entirely appropriate. Government housing policy was once unjust and unsustainable. This will change all that. The government should make government housing universal. It should swiftly incorporate affordable housing into the system. This will establish a sustainable new government housing system.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.07.13
社論－限制公屋自由轉售應該推廣
本報訊
行政院經建會日前公布現代住宅規畫草案，草案中最特別者並非政府興建、價格便宜，甚至也不是以設定地上權方式興建；而是對購買者轉手的限制，規定不得自由買賣。這個規定堪稱是國內的創舉，雖然民眾接受度仍待觀察，但我們認為是一個正確的方向，也值得其它公有住宅─如合宜住宅等引用。
經建會的現代住宅規畫案，目前選定土城、三峽兩地的捷運站附近，計畫以當地的公有地設定七十年的地上權，交由建商開發信託後，再以當地平均市價的五到六成價格出售。購買民眾的資格是一定所得以下、名下無房屋者。購屋者不能自由轉賣，如要出售必須售回給信託業者，或將使用權轉售給符合限定資料的他人。
我們回頭看過去國宅的例子可發現，承購國宅者在過了一定年限後，即可自由轉賣，是導致國宅政策難以為繼的主因。政府找地、建屋、再以遠較市價低廉的價格賣給民眾後，民眾轉手時卻是以市價轉賣。結果是利潤歸於私人，政府毫無收穫。更兼房屋已賣出，政府手上再無籌碼，只能不斷繼續找地、建屋。這種作法，不僅有違公平原則，更讓國宅政策難以永續經營。
因此，對這次經建會規畫的現代住宅，特別訂出不能自由轉賣的規定，我們深表贊同，只有如此，才能讓政府與社會投注許多資源興建的公有住宅，永續的成為社會解決居住問題的籌碼。不過，為了讓制度運作單純且可行，不該多開一個管道，讓出售房屋者能將使用權轉售給符合限定資料的他人。一來牽涉到出售者缺乏欲購買者的資訊，甚至完全不可能「自行審查」；二來，更重要的是這項規定仍牽涉到價格問題，轉售者仍可透過轉賣獲取利潤，利益仍歸私。政府仍應以信託單位為唯一的承購單位。
另外，信託單位承購原購屋者出售之現代住宅的價格，應該如何訂定，尚未定案，但卻可能是制度成敗的關鍵。能考量的方式，如以房價上漲的利潤完全歸公思考，當然是以原賣出價格購回，頂多加上利率成數、或通膨率。但如考慮由購屋者與政府共同承擔房屋漲跌的風險，則是以同樣房屋再出售的價格為購回基礎，此價格與原購買價格間的差距，不論漲跌，由政府與民眾各分擔一定比例。不過如果考慮房屋折舊與民眾已使用房子的效益，反而是應該以折舊購回。但不論用那種方式，對購回價格的機制必須先建立，並載諸於合約中。
如果，經建會透過現代住宅，可以建立起由政府（或代理政府的信託單位）購回的機制，而且政府與各界都認可這是一個「公平、合理、且更可長可久」的制度，那麼，就沒有理由不把此制度推而廣之，把合宜住宅、青年住宅…等由政府興建、並以低價出售給民眾的公有住宅，都納入此制度中。例如，政府已正式發包的機場捷運Ａ７站合宜住宅，價格號稱是市價的五到七成，市場人士已喊出「買到就賺到」；類似這種利益歸私的作法非常不可取。內政部營建署也應建立由政府購回的機制，同時增加出租房屋的比例。
或許有人批評這種限制自由轉賣的機制，完全違背自由市場機制，太過於「社會主義」了。那麼，我們必須強調，由政府以國家、社會的力量，興建住宅，再以低廉價格賣給經濟較弱勢民眾的「公屋制度」─不論它叫合宜住宅或現代住宅，甚至國民住宅，其本身就是一個「很社會主義」的制度。政府要為民眾解決居住問題，但絕對不是為民眾創造「享受資產增值」的空間。
國外許多先進國家，雖然其經濟體制是自由市場機制，但政府仍介入住宅市場，以公屋提供民眾購買或租用。而所有政府對公屋出售或出租的規定，一定會力求公平，儘量限制並避免「利益歸私」。過去的國宅制，就是少了這麼一個限制，結果是導致漲價歸私，抽中低價國宅者如中樂透，反而創造另一種不公平。對限制公屋的自由轉售，我們認為不會有破壞市場機制、剝奪民眾財產權等之疑慮。經建會提出的限制自由轉售規定，確實是切中時弊，可以一改過去國宅造成的不公與難以為繼原因，政府是該將其變成公屋的普遍制度，並把已發包的合宜住宅立即納入此制度中，藉此建立更能永續經營的公屋新體制。
Monday, July 11, 2011
Blue vs. Green Electioneering: Eschew "Taiwanese" Identity Politics
Blue vs. Green Electioneering:
Eschew "Taiwanese" Identity Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 12, 2011
It may be hard to believe, but the Republic of China is now holding its fifth direct presidential election. Yet the issue of "who is Taiwanese" has become the main election issue. Even now, questions about "who is Taiwanese" and "who loves Taiwan" remain bones of contention. During the past decade or so, four presidential terms have elapsed, during which three presidents were directly elected. Does that count for nothing?
Recently Tsai Ing-wen ran a campaign commercial. In it she stressed that "I am Taiwanese," inciting social frictions. She later engaged in damage control, saying that "Anyone living on Taiwan whose allegiance is to Taiwan, is Taiwanese. To loudly proclaim that I am Taiwanese, is an affirmation of our democratic society and its progressive values. This represents new heights that the Democratic Progressive Party seeks to attain in 2012. Economics, politics, democracy, and human rights protection, will all experience a rebirth." She said the suspicions voiced about her declaration were the result of "misinterpretations."
Responding to Tsai Ing-wen, President Ma Ying-jeou said that he and others drew no such distinctions. He expressed solidarity with everyone who dedicates himself to Taiwan. We loudly proclaim in the international arena that "We are Taiwanese. We are also Republic of China citizens."
Given Ma and Tsai's remarks, do their definitions of "Taiwanese" really differ? Frankly, both Ma and Tsai are talking nonsense. Whether one is born here or grows up here, who has not sacrificed for Taiwan? Who is not Taiwanese?
Tsai Ing-wen said that "To loudly proclaim that I am Taiwanese, is an affirmation of our democratic society and its progressive values." Must we remind Tsai Ing-wen that Chiang Ching-kuo long ago affirmed that "I am also Taiwanese?" President Lee Teng-hui seized Ma Ying-jeou's wrist, raised Ma's hand, and announced that "He is a New Taiwanese." Distinctions between those born on Taiwan and those born in other provinces no longer have any meaning. To cast aspersions on an opponent's provincial origins, at this late date, or to insinuate that he is "afraid to proclaim that he is Taiwanese," is not progress. On the contrary, such campaign tactics represent a backward step.
Ma Ying-jeou added "I am also a Republic of China citizen." Tsai Ing-wen may consider his addendum superfluous. Tsai Ing-wen, who is running for Republic of China president, refuses to recognize the Republic of China. Was Ma's addendum a reference to Tsai's hypocrisy? If so, Ma Ying-jeou is also guilty of electioneering.
Given Ma and Tsai's political rhetoric, can we still consider democracy on Taiwan mature? The president is elected by the people as a whole. The Blue and Green camps seem incapable of offering any concrete policy proposals. Instead they engage in meaningless shouting matches. The Green Camp questions the Blue Camp's "love of Taiwan." The Blue Camp questions the Green Camp's allegiance to the Republic of China. Both the Blue and Green camps are competing for high office, But does either care a whit for the public? in their pursuit of votes, they stoop to meaningless and outrageous political rhetoric. What are they doing, but treating 23 million Republic of China citizens as idiots?
Tsai Ing-wen argues that if we wish to connect with the international community, we must loudly proclaim "I am Taiwanese." We must make sure that the international community is aware of Taiwan's economic prosperity and progressive democracy. She argues that this will enhance Taiwan's visibility. Tsai's argument is nonsense. When people from Taiwan go abroad, they refer to themselves as Taiwanese. They even refer to themselves as Taiwanese when they visit the Chinese mainland. This is not the way to differentiate us from our rivals.
Taiwan needs international visibility. But that international visibility was not achieved by politicians engaging in shouting matches. It was achieved by Wang Yung-ching of Formosa Plastics, of Morris Chang of TSMC, of Cher Wang of HTC, of golf champion Tseng Ya-ni, of baseball champion Wang Chien-ming, of chess champion Chang Hsu, of Ultra Marathoner Kevin Lin, of fashion mogul Johan Ku, who built his own brand. It was achieved by a wide variety of young people who have excelled in the international arena. When American singer Lady Gaga met with fans on Taiwan, she generated greater international visibility for Taiwan than any politician shouting "I am Taiwanese!" The impact was far greater. What right do Tsai Ing-wen and other Green Camp leaders have to doubt whether other people are "Taiwanese?" Does their behavior increase "Taiwan's international visibility?" Perhaps. Perhaps it makes Taiwan a laughing stock. Perhaps it shows the international community just how primitive electoral politics on Taiwan is.
Two ruling party changes have already taken place. Soon it will be three, four, even five. Every political party seeks to rule. With every ruling party change, every political party seeks to scale new heights in politics, economics, democracy, and human rights. But reactionary conservative political rhetoric cannot bring about a new political order. It can only undermine the quality of democracy. It can only lead to endless bickering between communal groups.
Hsu Cho-yun of the Academia Sinica is concerned about the vicious struggles between the two major parties. In particular he is concerned about 2012. He says the two major parties need a framework which will allow heated debate but ensure a united front against Beijing. He feels the two major parties must work together for the future of Taiwan, and arrive at the best solutions in cross-Strait policy.
The Blue and Green camps remain at loggerheads on cross-Strait policy. For the Green camp, a person's stance on cross-Strait policy determines whether he is a bona fide "Taiwanese." This is absurd. The Democratic Progressive Party has opposed every cross-Strait policy measure ever proposed, from allowing tourists from the Chinese mainland on to Taiwan, to the signing of ECFA. Chiang Ching-kuo allowed veterans to visit the Chinese mainland. Lee Teng-hui allowed cross-Strait trade and investment. Even Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office did not halt cross-Strait exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou allowed tourists from the Chinese mainland to visit Taiwan, and students from the Chinese mainland to study on Taiwan. He has repeatedly stressed his policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." Who doesn't put Taiwan first? Who dares to accuse others of not being Taiwanese?
藍綠選舉 別在台灣人上噴口水
2011-07-12 中國時報
不可思議，台灣總統民選進入第五任，「台灣人」還能成為選戰主議題，此刻還在爭議誰是台灣人，誰愛台灣？前面四任十多年來，包括三位民選總統和全體台灣人，豈不是白過了？
蔡英文對「我是台灣人」廣告所引發的挑撥族群聯想解釋說，「任何住在台灣、認同台灣的，都是台灣人；大聲說出我是台灣人，代表著一個民主的社會和進步的價值。這也是民進黨在二○一二年要再次創造進步的高峰，不論經濟、政治、民主到人權保護，都要做一個全新局面的開始。」她認為，外界的質疑是「錯誤解讀」。
對蔡英文的論點，馬英九總統說，包括他自己和所有不分彼此、團結一致，共同為台灣奉獻的朋友，大家都會在國際上大聲說出「我們是台灣人，也是中華民國的國民」。
從馬、蔡的說法，實在看不出兩人對台灣人的界定有何差異？坦白講，馬蔡兩人講的都是廢話！生於斯、長於斯，誰不為台灣奉獻？誰不是台灣人？
蔡英文說，大聲講出我是台灣人，代表民主的社會和進步的價值。那麼我們必須再次提醒蔡英文：這個價值在蔣經國說出「他也是台灣人」之後已經確立，在李登輝總統舉起馬英九的手說出「他是新台灣人」之後，已經沒有本、外省的疑義，此刻一再質疑競選對手，甚至暗示對手「不敢大聲說出我是台灣人」，不但不是進步，相反的，這是一種選舉操作的退步。
蔡英文或許還要質疑，馬英九為什麼畫蛇添足加一句「我也是中華民國的國民」？這句多餘之言，是否暗示競選中華民國總統的蔡英文不認同中華民國？果若如此，那麼馬英九的語言同樣是選舉操作。
看穿馬、蔡的政治語言，我們還能說台灣的民主是進步的嗎？全民票選總統，藍綠提不出具體政見也罷，竟都在空洞浮泛的詞彙上噴口水，綠營質疑藍營不愛台灣，藍營質疑綠營不認同中華民國，請問：競逐大位的藍綠政治領袖，你們眼中還有人民嗎？用如此無聊加離譜的政治語彙企圖爭奪選票，豈不是拿中華民國二千三百萬台灣人當白痴！
蔡英文強調，走到國際社會，都要大聲說出「我是台灣人」，讓台灣的經濟社會繁榮和民主的進步，告知國際社會知道，也提升台灣的能見度。這還是廢話，台灣人不要說走在國際，連到大陸說自己是台灣人，這有什麼可以拿來區隔自己比對手更強的？
台灣需要國際能見度，台灣已經創造了國際能見度，靠的卻不是政客們的口水，而是台塑的王永慶、台積電的張忠謀、宏達電的王雪紅、打高球的曾雅妮、打棒球的王建民、下棋的張栩、超馬的林義傑、甚至創造時尚品牌的古又文、參加國際比賽得到各種獎章的台灣年輕人…，連美國人女神卡卡到台灣一場歌友會，創造的國際能見度，都比任何政客一番「我是台灣人」的廣告效益大得多，蔡英文或綠營人士有什麼資格，藉著質疑他人不是台灣人來創造台灣的能見度？如果真能因此創造台灣的國際能見度，也只是創造了笑話而已：讓國際間看到台灣的選舉多麼粗糙。
政黨輪替在台灣已經兩次，在可預見的未來，必然還會有三次、五次，對所有競爭政黨而言，每一次選舉的政黨輪替，都要期許自己為台灣再造政治、經濟、民主、人權的高峰，然而，退步保守的政治語言，開展不了任何新局面，只會讓台灣民主的品質，反覆陷入族群分歧的惡性循環，無以自拔。
中研院院士許倬雲對兩黨惡鬥憂心，特別撰文〈為二○一二進言〉，認為兩黨必須要有一個協議機制，「在機制中激烈辯論，但和對岸交涉時只能有一個立場」，同心合力共同為台灣的前途，尋找兩岸關係的最佳選擇。
如果兩岸關係是藍綠界定台灣人的核心爭議，這個爭議也是莫名其妙，從陸客觀光到兩岸簽定ＥＣＦＡ，都是民進黨中央反對而地方爭取，更別提蔣經國開放老兵探親，李登輝開放兩岸經貿投資，即使陳水扁任內八年兩岸交流腳步也沒停過，馬英九即使開放陸客來台觀光、陸生來台就學，同樣反覆強調「不統、不獨、不武」。誰不以台灣利益為優先？是那些懷疑他人不是台灣人的人！
Eschew "Taiwanese" Identity Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 12, 2011
It may be hard to believe, but the Republic of China is now holding its fifth direct presidential election. Yet the issue of "who is Taiwanese" has become the main election issue. Even now, questions about "who is Taiwanese" and "who loves Taiwan" remain bones of contention. During the past decade or so, four presidential terms have elapsed, during which three presidents were directly elected. Does that count for nothing?
Recently Tsai Ing-wen ran a campaign commercial. In it she stressed that "I am Taiwanese," inciting social frictions. She later engaged in damage control, saying that "Anyone living on Taiwan whose allegiance is to Taiwan, is Taiwanese. To loudly proclaim that I am Taiwanese, is an affirmation of our democratic society and its progressive values. This represents new heights that the Democratic Progressive Party seeks to attain in 2012. Economics, politics, democracy, and human rights protection, will all experience a rebirth." She said the suspicions voiced about her declaration were the result of "misinterpretations."
Responding to Tsai Ing-wen, President Ma Ying-jeou said that he and others drew no such distinctions. He expressed solidarity with everyone who dedicates himself to Taiwan. We loudly proclaim in the international arena that "We are Taiwanese. We are also Republic of China citizens."
Given Ma and Tsai's remarks, do their definitions of "Taiwanese" really differ? Frankly, both Ma and Tsai are talking nonsense. Whether one is born here or grows up here, who has not sacrificed for Taiwan? Who is not Taiwanese?
Tsai Ing-wen said that "To loudly proclaim that I am Taiwanese, is an affirmation of our democratic society and its progressive values." Must we remind Tsai Ing-wen that Chiang Ching-kuo long ago affirmed that "I am also Taiwanese?" President Lee Teng-hui seized Ma Ying-jeou's wrist, raised Ma's hand, and announced that "He is a New Taiwanese." Distinctions between those born on Taiwan and those born in other provinces no longer have any meaning. To cast aspersions on an opponent's provincial origins, at this late date, or to insinuate that he is "afraid to proclaim that he is Taiwanese," is not progress. On the contrary, such campaign tactics represent a backward step.
Ma Ying-jeou added "I am also a Republic of China citizen." Tsai Ing-wen may consider his addendum superfluous. Tsai Ing-wen, who is running for Republic of China president, refuses to recognize the Republic of China. Was Ma's addendum a reference to Tsai's hypocrisy? If so, Ma Ying-jeou is also guilty of electioneering.
Given Ma and Tsai's political rhetoric, can we still consider democracy on Taiwan mature? The president is elected by the people as a whole. The Blue and Green camps seem incapable of offering any concrete policy proposals. Instead they engage in meaningless shouting matches. The Green Camp questions the Blue Camp's "love of Taiwan." The Blue Camp questions the Green Camp's allegiance to the Republic of China. Both the Blue and Green camps are competing for high office, But does either care a whit for the public? in their pursuit of votes, they stoop to meaningless and outrageous political rhetoric. What are they doing, but treating 23 million Republic of China citizens as idiots?
Tsai Ing-wen argues that if we wish to connect with the international community, we must loudly proclaim "I am Taiwanese." We must make sure that the international community is aware of Taiwan's economic prosperity and progressive democracy. She argues that this will enhance Taiwan's visibility. Tsai's argument is nonsense. When people from Taiwan go abroad, they refer to themselves as Taiwanese. They even refer to themselves as Taiwanese when they visit the Chinese mainland. This is not the way to differentiate us from our rivals.
Taiwan needs international visibility. But that international visibility was not achieved by politicians engaging in shouting matches. It was achieved by Wang Yung-ching of Formosa Plastics, of Morris Chang of TSMC, of Cher Wang of HTC, of golf champion Tseng Ya-ni, of baseball champion Wang Chien-ming, of chess champion Chang Hsu, of Ultra Marathoner Kevin Lin, of fashion mogul Johan Ku, who built his own brand. It was achieved by a wide variety of young people who have excelled in the international arena. When American singer Lady Gaga met with fans on Taiwan, she generated greater international visibility for Taiwan than any politician shouting "I am Taiwanese!" The impact was far greater. What right do Tsai Ing-wen and other Green Camp leaders have to doubt whether other people are "Taiwanese?" Does their behavior increase "Taiwan's international visibility?" Perhaps. Perhaps it makes Taiwan a laughing stock. Perhaps it shows the international community just how primitive electoral politics on Taiwan is.
Two ruling party changes have already taken place. Soon it will be three, four, even five. Every political party seeks to rule. With every ruling party change, every political party seeks to scale new heights in politics, economics, democracy, and human rights. But reactionary conservative political rhetoric cannot bring about a new political order. It can only undermine the quality of democracy. It can only lead to endless bickering between communal groups.
Hsu Cho-yun of the Academia Sinica is concerned about the vicious struggles between the two major parties. In particular he is concerned about 2012. He says the two major parties need a framework which will allow heated debate but ensure a united front against Beijing. He feels the two major parties must work together for the future of Taiwan, and arrive at the best solutions in cross-Strait policy.
The Blue and Green camps remain at loggerheads on cross-Strait policy. For the Green camp, a person's stance on cross-Strait policy determines whether he is a bona fide "Taiwanese." This is absurd. The Democratic Progressive Party has opposed every cross-Strait policy measure ever proposed, from allowing tourists from the Chinese mainland on to Taiwan, to the signing of ECFA. Chiang Ching-kuo allowed veterans to visit the Chinese mainland. Lee Teng-hui allowed cross-Strait trade and investment. Even Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office did not halt cross-Strait exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou allowed tourists from the Chinese mainland to visit Taiwan, and students from the Chinese mainland to study on Taiwan. He has repeatedly stressed his policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." Who doesn't put Taiwan first? Who dares to accuse others of not being Taiwanese?
藍綠選舉 別在台灣人上噴口水
2011-07-12 中國時報
不可思議，台灣總統民選進入第五任，「台灣人」還能成為選戰主議題，此刻還在爭議誰是台灣人，誰愛台灣？前面四任十多年來，包括三位民選總統和全體台灣人，豈不是白過了？
蔡英文對「我是台灣人」廣告所引發的挑撥族群聯想解釋說，「任何住在台灣、認同台灣的，都是台灣人；大聲說出我是台灣人，代表著一個民主的社會和進步的價值。這也是民進黨在二○一二年要再次創造進步的高峰，不論經濟、政治、民主到人權保護，都要做一個全新局面的開始。」她認為，外界的質疑是「錯誤解讀」。
對蔡英文的論點，馬英九總統說，包括他自己和所有不分彼此、團結一致，共同為台灣奉獻的朋友，大家都會在國際上大聲說出「我們是台灣人，也是中華民國的國民」。
從馬、蔡的說法，實在看不出兩人對台灣人的界定有何差異？坦白講，馬蔡兩人講的都是廢話！生於斯、長於斯，誰不為台灣奉獻？誰不是台灣人？
蔡英文說，大聲講出我是台灣人，代表民主的社會和進步的價值。那麼我們必須再次提醒蔡英文：這個價值在蔣經國說出「他也是台灣人」之後已經確立，在李登輝總統舉起馬英九的手說出「他是新台灣人」之後，已經沒有本、外省的疑義，此刻一再質疑競選對手，甚至暗示對手「不敢大聲說出我是台灣人」，不但不是進步，相反的，這是一種選舉操作的退步。
蔡英文或許還要質疑，馬英九為什麼畫蛇添足加一句「我也是中華民國的國民」？這句多餘之言，是否暗示競選中華民國總統的蔡英文不認同中華民國？果若如此，那麼馬英九的語言同樣是選舉操作。
看穿馬、蔡的政治語言，我們還能說台灣的民主是進步的嗎？全民票選總統，藍綠提不出具體政見也罷，竟都在空洞浮泛的詞彙上噴口水，綠營質疑藍營不愛台灣，藍營質疑綠營不認同中華民國，請問：競逐大位的藍綠政治領袖，你們眼中還有人民嗎？用如此無聊加離譜的政治語彙企圖爭奪選票，豈不是拿中華民國二千三百萬台灣人當白痴！
蔡英文強調，走到國際社會，都要大聲說出「我是台灣人」，讓台灣的經濟社會繁榮和民主的進步，告知國際社會知道，也提升台灣的能見度。這還是廢話，台灣人不要說走在國際，連到大陸說自己是台灣人，這有什麼可以拿來區隔自己比對手更強的？
台灣需要國際能見度，台灣已經創造了國際能見度，靠的卻不是政客們的口水，而是台塑的王永慶、台積電的張忠謀、宏達電的王雪紅、打高球的曾雅妮、打棒球的王建民、下棋的張栩、超馬的林義傑、甚至創造時尚品牌的古又文、參加國際比賽得到各種獎章的台灣年輕人…，連美國人女神卡卡到台灣一場歌友會，創造的國際能見度，都比任何政客一番「我是台灣人」的廣告效益大得多，蔡英文或綠營人士有什麼資格，藉著質疑他人不是台灣人來創造台灣的能見度？如果真能因此創造台灣的國際能見度，也只是創造了笑話而已：讓國際間看到台灣的選舉多麼粗糙。
政黨輪替在台灣已經兩次，在可預見的未來，必然還會有三次、五次，對所有競爭政黨而言，每一次選舉的政黨輪替，都要期許自己為台灣再造政治、經濟、民主、人權的高峰，然而，退步保守的政治語言，開展不了任何新局面，只會讓台灣民主的品質，反覆陷入族群分歧的惡性循環，無以自拔。
中研院院士許倬雲對兩黨惡鬥憂心，特別撰文〈為二○一二進言〉，認為兩黨必須要有一個協議機制，「在機制中激烈辯論，但和對岸交涉時只能有一個立場」，同心合力共同為台灣的前途，尋找兩岸關係的最佳選擇。
如果兩岸關係是藍綠界定台灣人的核心爭議，這個爭議也是莫名其妙，從陸客觀光到兩岸簽定ＥＣＦＡ，都是民進黨中央反對而地方爭取，更別提蔣經國開放老兵探親，李登輝開放兩岸經貿投資，即使陳水扁任內八年兩岸交流腳步也沒停過，馬英九即使開放陸客來台觀光、陸生來台就學，同樣反覆強調「不統、不獨、不武」。誰不以台灣利益為優先？是那些懷疑他人不是台灣人的人！
Sunday, July 10, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's "Coffee Commercial"
Tsai Ing-wen's "Coffee Commercial"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 11, 2011
Tsai's Ing-wen has aired her first campaign commerical: "I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen." At first glance, the television spot comes across as rather moving. It adroitly bypasses reason, and appeals directly to the emotions. But if one pauses and actively thinks about what the ad said, instead of passively reacting to how the ad madeone feel, one is left with an uneasy feeling in one's gut.
Political rhetoric, including political advertising, must not be overdone. If it is too elaborate, or too slick, it loses sincerity. It may even come across as deceitful. The ad in question appeals entirely to the voter's feelings. It bypasses the voter's intellect and thinking. In short, it attempts to persuade the voter to vote for Tsai Ing-wen based on the voter's feelings, without stopping to think or to reason the choices out.
This ad is clearly aimed at younger voters. It opens with a series of questions in English: "Taiwan, What do you want? Taiwan, Where are you? Taiwan, Where are you going?" Tsai received a doctorate from the London School of Economics. These questions, in English, lead in to Tsai Ing-wen's academic credentials, and imply that she is a leader with a global vision. The ad asks "Taiwan, Where are you going?" in English, thereby invoking the old Taiwan independence slogan. The ad renders an old Hoklo political slogan into English. Tsai Ing-wen hopes that doing so will tickle the fancy of concerned and frustrated younger voters. But the ad provides no answers. The DPP has no answers to the questions in the Hoklo dialect. Tsai Ing-wen hopes that by posing the same old questions in English, she will touch the hearts of voters. But she provides no answers either. . If Tsai Ing-wen were to come right out and say, "I reject the 1992 Consensus," would the audience still react as positvely as it has?
This ad merely underscores the fact that Tsai Ing-wen's campaign ad asks a lot of questions, but never provides a single answer. The ad underscores her obscurantist tactic of "encouraging to feel, but never to think." The ad is chock full of the language of longing, but never offers any answers. Who does not favor "a society that takes the path of reason?" Who does not favor "a government that takes responsibility?" Who does not favor "the creation of a sustainable society?" Who does not favor "Taiwan connecting with the world?" These are all common values shared by us all. But it is followed by a question in Chinese: "What then?" In English the question would be "How?" But the ad merely teases the viewer with touchy-feely allusions about the future. The only answer Tsai Ing-wen actually gives, is "I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen." !
Naturally, the ad provoked a powerful backlash. Some have asked: "Tsai says she is Taiwanese. But who on this island is not?" Some have asked: "The vision may be inspiring. But can it be realized merely because Tsai Ing-wen thumps her chest about being Taiwanese?"
Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly asks "Taiwan, where are you going?" But some voters don't believe in "feel good" slogans. They insist on thinking for themselves. They would like to ask Tsai: "Miss Tsai, Where are you? What do you want? Where are you going? Instead of asking where Taiwan is going, why not ask Tsai Ing-wen where she is going. Do you accept the 1992 Consensus, or don't you? Do you really intend to "create a nation with an equitable distribution of wealth" by implementing a "no growth economic policy," a "non export-oriented economy, and a "local economy?" Wouldn't it be easier to demand that Tsai Ing-wen answer these questions, than to demand that "Taiwan" answer these questions?
Some have noted how closely this ad resembles a coffee commercial. They have noted how campaign ads tend to be far too slick. Tsai Ing-wen asked "Taiwan, where are you going?" in English. She used it in place of the same old Taiwan independence slogans. She used the declaration, "I am Taiwanese," to insinuate that her rival is "not Taiwanese." But this is not a coffee commercial. This is an extremely subtle way to incite social division. The ad uses English to give the incitement of "ethnic" (social group) divisions a slick polish. This is a campaign ad that appeals to superficial feelings, that attempts to bypass reason and thought, and is aimed at younger voters, Doesn't this give you the creeps?
Tsai Ing-wen uses English to give Taiwan independence a slick finish. But she dares not explicitly champion independence. She insinuates that Ma Ying-jeou is "not Taiwanese." She repeatedly uses English to underscore the fact that Taiwan has no way out. But shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP first ask themselves a whole array of questions? Is the Republic of China a government in exile, or isn't it? Do they recognize the 1992 Consensus, or don't they? Do they still advocate Taiwan independence, nation-building, the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution, or don't they? If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have the answers to these questions, must they go through the motions of asking: "Taiwan, where are you going?"
The DPP is known for its slogan, "Dare to hope, follow your dream.”Tsai Ing-wen speaks only of visions for the future. She never offers solutions. She asks only, "Taiwan, where are you going? She doesn't ask, "The DPP, where are you going? She never asks "Tsai Ing-wen, where are you going? She wants voters only to wallow in feel-good sentiment. She attempts to bypass the voter's reason and thought. The ad may be slick. But Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are not selling coffee. Therefore they must speak plainly. Where do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP want to take Taiwan? How do they intend to "found a nation with an equitable distribution of wealth?"
Tsai Ing-wen, unlike Kwai Lun-mei, is not selling coffee. Kwai Lun-mei merely wants the TV audience to feel good. But Tsai Ing-wen aspires to be president. Therefore she must offer sound policy prescriptions, and appeal to reason.
看蔡英文的咖啡廣告
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.11
蔡英文的首支電視廣告「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」，乍看之下，也許會很有Fu；但當閱聽人的「思想」取代了「感覺」，或許就會對這支廣告用於剝奪理智的精妙技巧感到毛骨悚然。
政治語言，包括政治廣告，不能過度加工，過度的精緻或過度的包裝，就會失去真誠，乃至流於詐騙。這是一支完全訴諸「感覺」的競選廣告，試圖剝奪閱聽人的理智與思想；也就是希望選民用「感覺」來選擇蔡英文，而不要用「思想」與「理智」。
這支廣告顯然是針對年輕選民。一開場，就是一連串的英語問句：Taiwan, What do you want? Taiwan, Where are you? Taiwan, Where are you going?這是用英語來襯托蔡英文倫敦政經學院博士的學歷及「國際觀」；同時也是用英語Taiwan, Where are you going?來道出過去台獨所說的：「台灣，你嘜叼位去？」但是，將台語問句換成了英語問句，蔡英文也許勾出了年輕選民心中的疑慮與憤懣，卻仍然沒有提出答案；正如民進黨對這個問題的台語問句亦迄無答案。蔡英文要的是英語問句所造成的Fu，但她不提答案；假如，蔡英文直接說出「我不接受九二共識」的答案，閱聽人還有那種Fu嗎？
這支廣告完全凸顯了蔡英文「只有問句，不提答案」的競選技巧，也暴露了她「只要感覺，不要思考」的愚民策略。廣告詞充滿了憧憬語言，卻沒有答案。誰不贊成「社會中有一條理性的道路」？誰反對「有一個扛起責任的政府」、「打造一個均富永續的社會」？誰不主張「台灣要走向世界」？這些皆是國人的共同憧憬，但是接下來若用中文來問是「然後呢？」用英文來問則是"How?"但在這一長串挑逗「感覺」的憧憬語言之後，蔡英文所給的答案竟然是：我是台灣人，我是蔡英文！
引發強烈反彈是理所當然的。有人問：蔡英文是台灣人，請妳說出這塊土地上誰不是台灣人？有人說：那些華麗的憧憬語言，只憑「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」這十個字就能實現嗎？
蔡英文口口聲聲問「台灣」何去何從，然而，不相信「感覺」而相信「思想」的選民卻要問蔡英文：Miss Tsai, Where are you? What do you want? Where are you going?問台灣何去何從，不如問蔡英文，妳接不接受九二共識？妳難道想用「反對成長掛帥」、「反對出口導向」的「在地經濟」，去「打造一個均富永續的國家」？要蔡英文回答這些問題，總比要「Taiwan」來回答容易得多吧？
有人說，這支廣告有咖啡廣告的氛圍，用於政治廣告就流於過度加工。蔡英文只是用英語Taiwan, Where are you going?道出了「台灣，你嘜叼位去？」的台獨老梗；更是要用「我是台灣人」，把別人打成「不是台灣人」。但這畢竟不是咖啡廣告，而是高度精緻化的撕裂社會的手法，及用英語來包裝的族群鬥爭。這是一支訴諸膚淺「感覺」，而剝奪「理智」與「思想」的政治廣告，針對年輕選民，怎不令人毛骨悚然？
蔡英文用英語來包裝台獨的暗示，卻又不敢旗幟鮮明地標舉台獨；她影射馬英九「不是台灣人」，又反覆用英語描繪台灣之沒有出路。但是，為何蔡英文不先問自己及民進黨：中華民國是不是流亡政府？承不承認九二共識？是不是仍主張台獨建國、正名制憲？蔡英文及民進黨對這些問題其實皆有既成的答案，又何必再假惺惺地問：Taiwan, Where are you going?
有夢最美，希望相隨；只提憧憬，不提方案。只問台灣何處去？不問民進黨何處去？不問蔡英文何處去？只想訴諸選民的「感覺」，故意蒙蔽選民的「思想」與「理智」。操作手法固然精妙，但民進黨及蔡英文畢竟不是在賣咖啡，故而要說清楚：蔡英文及民進黨要帶台灣往何處去？如何「打造一個均富永續的國家」？
蔡英文不是賣咖啡的桂綸鎂；桂綸鎂只要Fu，要選總統的蔡英文則必須訴諸政策與理智。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 11, 2011
Tsai's Ing-wen has aired her first campaign commerical: "I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen." At first glance, the television spot comes across as rather moving. It adroitly bypasses reason, and appeals directly to the emotions. But if one pauses and actively thinks about what the ad said, instead of passively reacting to how the ad madeone feel, one is left with an uneasy feeling in one's gut.
Political rhetoric, including political advertising, must not be overdone. If it is too elaborate, or too slick, it loses sincerity. It may even come across as deceitful. The ad in question appeals entirely to the voter's feelings. It bypasses the voter's intellect and thinking. In short, it attempts to persuade the voter to vote for Tsai Ing-wen based on the voter's feelings, without stopping to think or to reason the choices out.
This ad is clearly aimed at younger voters. It opens with a series of questions in English: "Taiwan, What do you want? Taiwan, Where are you? Taiwan, Where are you going?" Tsai received a doctorate from the London School of Economics. These questions, in English, lead in to Tsai Ing-wen's academic credentials, and imply that she is a leader with a global vision. The ad asks "Taiwan, Where are you going?" in English, thereby invoking the old Taiwan independence slogan. The ad renders an old Hoklo political slogan into English. Tsai Ing-wen hopes that doing so will tickle the fancy of concerned and frustrated younger voters. But the ad provides no answers. The DPP has no answers to the questions in the Hoklo dialect. Tsai Ing-wen hopes that by posing the same old questions in English, she will touch the hearts of voters. But she provides no answers either. . If Tsai Ing-wen were to come right out and say, "I reject the 1992 Consensus," would the audience still react as positvely as it has?
This ad merely underscores the fact that Tsai Ing-wen's campaign ad asks a lot of questions, but never provides a single answer. The ad underscores her obscurantist tactic of "encouraging to feel, but never to think." The ad is chock full of the language of longing, but never offers any answers. Who does not favor "a society that takes the path of reason?" Who does not favor "a government that takes responsibility?" Who does not favor "the creation of a sustainable society?" Who does not favor "Taiwan connecting with the world?" These are all common values shared by us all. But it is followed by a question in Chinese: "What then?" In English the question would be "How?" But the ad merely teases the viewer with touchy-feely allusions about the future. The only answer Tsai Ing-wen actually gives, is "I am Taiwanese, I am Tsai Ing-wen." !
Naturally, the ad provoked a powerful backlash. Some have asked: "Tsai says she is Taiwanese. But who on this island is not?" Some have asked: "The vision may be inspiring. But can it be realized merely because Tsai Ing-wen thumps her chest about being Taiwanese?"
Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly asks "Taiwan, where are you going?" But some voters don't believe in "feel good" slogans. They insist on thinking for themselves. They would like to ask Tsai: "Miss Tsai, Where are you? What do you want? Where are you going? Instead of asking where Taiwan is going, why not ask Tsai Ing-wen where she is going. Do you accept the 1992 Consensus, or don't you? Do you really intend to "create a nation with an equitable distribution of wealth" by implementing a "no growth economic policy," a "non export-oriented economy, and a "local economy?" Wouldn't it be easier to demand that Tsai Ing-wen answer these questions, than to demand that "Taiwan" answer these questions?
Some have noted how closely this ad resembles a coffee commercial. They have noted how campaign ads tend to be far too slick. Tsai Ing-wen asked "Taiwan, where are you going?" in English. She used it in place of the same old Taiwan independence slogans. She used the declaration, "I am Taiwanese," to insinuate that her rival is "not Taiwanese." But this is not a coffee commercial. This is an extremely subtle way to incite social division. The ad uses English to give the incitement of "ethnic" (social group) divisions a slick polish. This is a campaign ad that appeals to superficial feelings, that attempts to bypass reason and thought, and is aimed at younger voters, Doesn't this give you the creeps?
Tsai Ing-wen uses English to give Taiwan independence a slick finish. But she dares not explicitly champion independence. She insinuates that Ma Ying-jeou is "not Taiwanese." She repeatedly uses English to underscore the fact that Taiwan has no way out. But shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP first ask themselves a whole array of questions? Is the Republic of China a government in exile, or isn't it? Do they recognize the 1992 Consensus, or don't they? Do they still advocate Taiwan independence, nation-building, the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution, or don't they? If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have the answers to these questions, must they go through the motions of asking: "Taiwan, where are you going?"
The DPP is known for its slogan, "Dare to hope, follow your dream.”Tsai Ing-wen speaks only of visions for the future. She never offers solutions. She asks only, "Taiwan, where are you going? She doesn't ask, "The DPP, where are you going? She never asks "Tsai Ing-wen, where are you going? She wants voters only to wallow in feel-good sentiment. She attempts to bypass the voter's reason and thought. The ad may be slick. But Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are not selling coffee. Therefore they must speak plainly. Where do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP want to take Taiwan? How do they intend to "found a nation with an equitable distribution of wealth?"
Tsai Ing-wen, unlike Kwai Lun-mei, is not selling coffee. Kwai Lun-mei merely wants the TV audience to feel good. But Tsai Ing-wen aspires to be president. Therefore she must offer sound policy prescriptions, and appeal to reason.
看蔡英文的咖啡廣告
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.07.11
蔡英文的首支電視廣告「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」，乍看之下，也許會很有Fu；但當閱聽人的「思想」取代了「感覺」，或許就會對這支廣告用於剝奪理智的精妙技巧感到毛骨悚然。
政治語言，包括政治廣告，不能過度加工，過度的精緻或過度的包裝，就會失去真誠，乃至流於詐騙。這是一支完全訴諸「感覺」的競選廣告，試圖剝奪閱聽人的理智與思想；也就是希望選民用「感覺」來選擇蔡英文，而不要用「思想」與「理智」。
這支廣告顯然是針對年輕選民。一開場，就是一連串的英語問句：Taiwan, What do you want? Taiwan, Where are you? Taiwan, Where are you going?這是用英語來襯托蔡英文倫敦政經學院博士的學歷及「國際觀」；同時也是用英語Taiwan, Where are you going?來道出過去台獨所說的：「台灣，你嘜叼位去？」但是，將台語問句換成了英語問句，蔡英文也許勾出了年輕選民心中的疑慮與憤懣，卻仍然沒有提出答案；正如民進黨對這個問題的台語問句亦迄無答案。蔡英文要的是英語問句所造成的Fu，但她不提答案；假如，蔡英文直接說出「我不接受九二共識」的答案，閱聽人還有那種Fu嗎？
這支廣告完全凸顯了蔡英文「只有問句，不提答案」的競選技巧，也暴露了她「只要感覺，不要思考」的愚民策略。廣告詞充滿了憧憬語言，卻沒有答案。誰不贊成「社會中有一條理性的道路」？誰反對「有一個扛起責任的政府」、「打造一個均富永續的社會」？誰不主張「台灣要走向世界」？這些皆是國人的共同憧憬，但是接下來若用中文來問是「然後呢？」用英文來問則是"How?"但在這一長串挑逗「感覺」的憧憬語言之後，蔡英文所給的答案竟然是：我是台灣人，我是蔡英文！
引發強烈反彈是理所當然的。有人問：蔡英文是台灣人，請妳說出這塊土地上誰不是台灣人？有人說：那些華麗的憧憬語言，只憑「我是台灣人，我是蔡英文」這十個字就能實現嗎？
蔡英文口口聲聲問「台灣」何去何從，然而，不相信「感覺」而相信「思想」的選民卻要問蔡英文：Miss Tsai, Where are you? What do you want? Where are you going?問台灣何去何從，不如問蔡英文，妳接不接受九二共識？妳難道想用「反對成長掛帥」、「反對出口導向」的「在地經濟」，去「打造一個均富永續的國家」？要蔡英文回答這些問題，總比要「Taiwan」來回答容易得多吧？
有人說，這支廣告有咖啡廣告的氛圍，用於政治廣告就流於過度加工。蔡英文只是用英語Taiwan, Where are you going?道出了「台灣，你嘜叼位去？」的台獨老梗；更是要用「我是台灣人」，把別人打成「不是台灣人」。但這畢竟不是咖啡廣告，而是高度精緻化的撕裂社會的手法，及用英語來包裝的族群鬥爭。這是一支訴諸膚淺「感覺」，而剝奪「理智」與「思想」的政治廣告，針對年輕選民，怎不令人毛骨悚然？
蔡英文用英語來包裝台獨的暗示，卻又不敢旗幟鮮明地標舉台獨；她影射馬英九「不是台灣人」，又反覆用英語描繪台灣之沒有出路。但是，為何蔡英文不先問自己及民進黨：中華民國是不是流亡政府？承不承認九二共識？是不是仍主張台獨建國、正名制憲？蔡英文及民進黨對這些問題其實皆有既成的答案，又何必再假惺惺地問：Taiwan, Where are you going?
有夢最美，希望相隨；只提憧憬，不提方案。只問台灣何處去？不問民進黨何處去？不問蔡英文何處去？只想訴諸選民的「感覺」，故意蒙蔽選民的「思想」與「理智」。操作手法固然精妙，但民進黨及蔡英文畢竟不是在賣咖啡，故而要說清楚：蔡英文及民進黨要帶台灣往何處去？如何「打造一個均富永續的國家」？
蔡英文不是賣咖啡的桂綸鎂；桂綸鎂只要Fu，要選總統的蔡英文則必須訴諸政策與理智。
Thursday, July 7, 2011
South Korea Can, Can We?
South Korea Can, Can We?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2011
The Korea/EU free trade agreement (FTA) went into force on July 1. Since then, 94% of South Korea's products have enjoyed zero tariff treatment, South Korea has also granted zero tariff treatment for 81% of the EU's products. Meanwhile, reports have emerged from the U.S. Congress that the US may sign a Korea/US FTA before the end of the year.
In the international market, South Korea has always been Taiwan's most direct competitor, especially in high-tech and ICT products, Taiwan and South Korea have long run neck and neck in Europen and US market share. But a few years ago, South Korea succeed in its brand marketing strategy. This, plus the depreciation of the Won and other factors, enabled South Korea to leave Taiwan in the dust. Today, the benefits brought about by FTAs may further weaken Taiwan's competitiveness, Consequently the government and other segments of society have long been concerned about South Korean FTAs.
In the race for FTAs, one must keep an eye on the opponent. One must focus on three things. The first is the number of signatories, the second is the identity of the signatories, and the third is the content of the agreements. If the quantity is limited, if the economic and trade interests are insubstantial, and the degree of liberalization is not great, there is little to fear. But South Korea has successfully signed FTAs with heavyweights such as the United States and the European Union. The number of signatories has rapidly increased. FTAs signed with Singapore, Chile, and ASEAN have already had an impact. An FTA with India went in effect last year. This year South Korea signed an FTA with Peru. Negotiations with Australia are already complete. It is currently holding discussions with Japan, Canada, Mexico and the Chinese mainland.
Consider economic and trade interests. Currently 14.4% of South Korea's trade benefits from FTAs. But FTAs with the United States and Europe are about to go into force. That number is expected to approach 50%. South Korea's ultimate goal is to win preferential trade treatment for at least 80% of its goods. Consider the degree of liberalization vis a vis the content of the FTAs. The FTAs signed by South Korea, the United States, and the EU, are considered indicators of a high degree of liberalization.
The target of South Korea's FTA Policy is not Taiwan or Japan, but the Chinese mainland. It is attempting to resist the magnetic pull of a rising Chinese mainland. In recent years the Chinese mainland has signed numerous FTAs in rapid order. South Korea's train of thought is clear. Europe, the US, Australia and others, are major export markets, Asean, India, Mexico, and the Chinese mainland are partners in the industrial chain. South Korea is the only Asian nation with the same high degree of liberalization as the US and Europe, and has established FTA relationships, South Korean strategic thinking wants Korea to rise phoenix like out of the ashes. Other FTAs are expected to appear at twice the pace. More crucially, South Korea is finishing up FTA negotiations with the Chinese mainland. Once that has been done, South Korea can immediately neutralize the cross-Strait economic cooperation agreement (ECFA) and seize the lead. In other words, South Korea's FTAs may have a limited impact on Taiwan. But its strategy is to connect the dots, and to flesh out the bones. This is something we must reckon with. If we had an FTA monitoring mechanism, a red light would be flashing by now.
South Korea poses a challenge. The Ministry of Economic Affairs recently adopted a domestic market segmentation support mechanism. Internationally, it pushed for an FTA with Taiwan on the EU policy agenda. But the former pertains to downstream industries involved in product development, marketing orientation, even pricing adjustments. They are not timely enough. Will it be a better fit with long term industry needs and development? That remains to be seen. As for the latter, the US, Europe, and even the Chinese mainland may wonder, "Are you (Taiwan) really ready?
We have fewer potential signatories to choose from. Potential signatories are probably less eager to sign with us than they are with South Korea. The biggest factor remains the human factor. The agencies responsible for FTAs, ECFA, and cross-Strait liberalization waffle and procrastinate. Motivated by selfishness, they adopt overly conservative postures, at the expense of industry. They have become a major obstacle. The government is ostensibly committed to liberalization. But electoral considerations have made it hesitant and coy. Put simply, the biggest obstacles to FTAs originate from within.
At this moment, the government needs to gather its wits. It needs to consider its attributes and its needs. It needs to draw up a blueprint for FTAs and liberalization policies, and for short term and long-term goals. In this blueprint, follow-up consultations on ECFA will no longer remain a cross-Strait matter. They will also need to consider the progress of Korea's FTA with the Chinese mainland. They will also have to look beyond Korea. They will have to consider the pace at which the Chinese mainland is signing FTAs. Cross-Strait relations are improving significantly. , The room for cooperation is increasing. But this has not changed cross-Strait industry competition. Therefore, when considering FTAs, we must not look only at the world while ignoring the other side of the Strait.
We face many difficulties. The government has also undergone reorganization. The sole function of the MOEA Office of Trade Negotiations is negotiations. It will be replaced by the Economic and Trade Policy Division. The impact of this change remains to be seen. The ruling administration can try to chant "If South Korea can, so can we!" in response to public concerns. But given current conditions, the words might not come!
韓國能，我們也能嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.08 02:53 am
韓歐盟自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）已於七月一日生效。自該日起，韓國百分之九十四的產品在歐盟享有零關稅待遇，而韓國亦給予百分之八十一的歐盟產品零關稅。同時，美國國會傳出消息，可能在年底前批准早已簽署的韓美ＦＴＡ。
在國際市場中，韓國向來是台灣最直接的競爭對手。特別是高科技與資通訊產品，台韓過去在歐美主要市場的占有率一直很接近；但這幾年卻因為韓國的品牌行銷策略奏效、韓元貶值等因素，出現彼長我消的趨勢。如今，透過ＦＴＡ所帶來的優惠利益，可能進一步削弱台灣的競爭力，因此政府及各界對韓國ＦＴＡ發展一直很關心。
在ＦＴＡ賽局中，觀察對手動態的重點有三件事；一是數量，二是對象，三是內容。若是數量不多、經貿利益不大，且內容自由化程度不高，自然不足為懼。但韓國在成功與美、歐等重量級國家洽簽ＦＴＡ後，在數量上出現重力加速度的效應。除過去已經生效的新加坡、智利、東協ＦＴＡ外，與印度的ＦＴＡ於去年生效，今年則完成與秘魯的簽署，澳洲部分也即將完成談判。正在進行諮商者，則包括日本、加拿大、墨西哥，以及中國大陸。
在經貿利益上，目前韓國百分之十四點四的貿易量受惠於ＦＴＡ，但隨著其與美歐的ＦＴＡ生效，這個涵蓋率可望接近五成。終極目標，韓國計劃至少八成的貿易可享有ＦＴＡ優惠利益。而在顯現內容品質的自由化程度部分，韓國與美、歐盟的ＦＴＡ，普遍被認為是深度自由化的代表作。
韓國ＦＴＡ政策的假想敵不是台灣、日本，而是中國大陸。為突破中國大陸崛起的磁吸效應，以及其近年來在ＦＴＡ上的發展速度，韓國的推動脈絡很清楚：一方面是歐、美、澳洲等主要出口市場，他方面是東協、印度、墨西哥及大陸等產業鏈分工夥伴。作為亞洲地區唯一與美、歐等高度自由化國家同時建構ＦＴＡ關係的國家，韓國在「置之死地而後生」的策略思維下，其他ＦＴＡ預料將以倍增的速度出現。更關鍵的是，一旦韓國與中國大陸完成ＦＴＡ談判，將頓時抵銷台商透過兩岸經濟合作協議（ＥＣＦＡ）取得的領先優勢。換言之，韓國個別ＦＴＡ對台灣的影響或許有限，但這種「由線而面」的策略布局，委實已不容輕視；如果我們有ＦＴＡ的監測機制，此刻正是亮起紅燈之時。
面對韓國的挑戰，經濟部這幾天提出對內採取市場區隔、輔導機制，對外大力推動台歐盟ＦＴＡ排上歐盟政策議程等作法因應。但對於前者，涉及產業上下游的產品研發、行銷定位，甚至於定價策略的調整，恐怕不會是及時雨，與產業需求及長期發展方向是否契合，也有待觀察。至於後者，則要面對美歐，甚至是中國大陸「Are you ready?（準備好了嗎）」的質疑。
確實，在洽簽對象的選擇及意願上，我們的限制明顯高於韓國，且大半是操之在人的因素。更重要的是，若干部會對ＦＴＡ及兩岸ＥＣＦＡ自由化的搖擺觀望，卻是出於自私心態而罔顧產業利益的保守立場，儼然已成為重大阻礙；政府的自由化決心，似乎也因選舉考量而顯得猶豫扭捏。簡單地說，目前洽簽ＦＴＡ的障礙，很大一部分來自內部。
此時此刻，政府有必要靜下心來，認真地按照屬性與需求，畫出ＦＴＡ及自由化政策的藍圖，以及短中長期的目標。在這個藍圖中，ＥＣＦＡ後續協議的協商節奏，已經不是單純的兩岸問題，還須考慮韓中ＦＴＡ的進展；也需要在韓國之外，將中國大陸的ＦＴＡ速度列為評估參數。兩岸關係顯著改善，合作空間不斷擴展，但並未改變兩岸在產業競爭上的局面。因此，在ＦＴＡ布局思維上，千萬不可只看世界而忘記對岸。
面對種種困難，又逢政府組織再造，專司談判的經貿談判代表辦公室將被經貿政策司所取代，其影響尚無法評估。政府當局或許可用「韓國能，我們也能」的口頭禪回應國人的疑慮；但此情此境，這句話恐怕一時還說不出口吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2011
The Korea/EU free trade agreement (FTA) went into force on July 1. Since then, 94% of South Korea's products have enjoyed zero tariff treatment, South Korea has also granted zero tariff treatment for 81% of the EU's products. Meanwhile, reports have emerged from the U.S. Congress that the US may sign a Korea/US FTA before the end of the year.
In the international market, South Korea has always been Taiwan's most direct competitor, especially in high-tech and ICT products, Taiwan and South Korea have long run neck and neck in Europen and US market share. But a few years ago, South Korea succeed in its brand marketing strategy. This, plus the depreciation of the Won and other factors, enabled South Korea to leave Taiwan in the dust. Today, the benefits brought about by FTAs may further weaken Taiwan's competitiveness, Consequently the government and other segments of society have long been concerned about South Korean FTAs.
In the race for FTAs, one must keep an eye on the opponent. One must focus on three things. The first is the number of signatories, the second is the identity of the signatories, and the third is the content of the agreements. If the quantity is limited, if the economic and trade interests are insubstantial, and the degree of liberalization is not great, there is little to fear. But South Korea has successfully signed FTAs with heavyweights such as the United States and the European Union. The number of signatories has rapidly increased. FTAs signed with Singapore, Chile, and ASEAN have already had an impact. An FTA with India went in effect last year. This year South Korea signed an FTA with Peru. Negotiations with Australia are already complete. It is currently holding discussions with Japan, Canada, Mexico and the Chinese mainland.
Consider economic and trade interests. Currently 14.4% of South Korea's trade benefits from FTAs. But FTAs with the United States and Europe are about to go into force. That number is expected to approach 50%. South Korea's ultimate goal is to win preferential trade treatment for at least 80% of its goods. Consider the degree of liberalization vis a vis the content of the FTAs. The FTAs signed by South Korea, the United States, and the EU, are considered indicators of a high degree of liberalization.
The target of South Korea's FTA Policy is not Taiwan or Japan, but the Chinese mainland. It is attempting to resist the magnetic pull of a rising Chinese mainland. In recent years the Chinese mainland has signed numerous FTAs in rapid order. South Korea's train of thought is clear. Europe, the US, Australia and others, are major export markets, Asean, India, Mexico, and the Chinese mainland are partners in the industrial chain. South Korea is the only Asian nation with the same high degree of liberalization as the US and Europe, and has established FTA relationships, South Korean strategic thinking wants Korea to rise phoenix like out of the ashes. Other FTAs are expected to appear at twice the pace. More crucially, South Korea is finishing up FTA negotiations with the Chinese mainland. Once that has been done, South Korea can immediately neutralize the cross-Strait economic cooperation agreement (ECFA) and seize the lead. In other words, South Korea's FTAs may have a limited impact on Taiwan. But its strategy is to connect the dots, and to flesh out the bones. This is something we must reckon with. If we had an FTA monitoring mechanism, a red light would be flashing by now.
South Korea poses a challenge. The Ministry of Economic Affairs recently adopted a domestic market segmentation support mechanism. Internationally, it pushed for an FTA with Taiwan on the EU policy agenda. But the former pertains to downstream industries involved in product development, marketing orientation, even pricing adjustments. They are not timely enough. Will it be a better fit with long term industry needs and development? That remains to be seen. As for the latter, the US, Europe, and even the Chinese mainland may wonder, "Are you (Taiwan) really ready?
We have fewer potential signatories to choose from. Potential signatories are probably less eager to sign with us than they are with South Korea. The biggest factor remains the human factor. The agencies responsible for FTAs, ECFA, and cross-Strait liberalization waffle and procrastinate. Motivated by selfishness, they adopt overly conservative postures, at the expense of industry. They have become a major obstacle. The government is ostensibly committed to liberalization. But electoral considerations have made it hesitant and coy. Put simply, the biggest obstacles to FTAs originate from within.
At this moment, the government needs to gather its wits. It needs to consider its attributes and its needs. It needs to draw up a blueprint for FTAs and liberalization policies, and for short term and long-term goals. In this blueprint, follow-up consultations on ECFA will no longer remain a cross-Strait matter. They will also need to consider the progress of Korea's FTA with the Chinese mainland. They will also have to look beyond Korea. They will have to consider the pace at which the Chinese mainland is signing FTAs. Cross-Strait relations are improving significantly. , The room for cooperation is increasing. But this has not changed cross-Strait industry competition. Therefore, when considering FTAs, we must not look only at the world while ignoring the other side of the Strait.
We face many difficulties. The government has also undergone reorganization. The sole function of the MOEA Office of Trade Negotiations is negotiations. It will be replaced by the Economic and Trade Policy Division. The impact of this change remains to be seen. The ruling administration can try to chant "If South Korea can, so can we!" in response to public concerns. But given current conditions, the words might not come!
韓國能，我們也能嗎？
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.08 02:53 am
韓歐盟自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）已於七月一日生效。自該日起，韓國百分之九十四的產品在歐盟享有零關稅待遇，而韓國亦給予百分之八十一的歐盟產品零關稅。同時，美國國會傳出消息，可能在年底前批准早已簽署的韓美ＦＴＡ。
在國際市場中，韓國向來是台灣最直接的競爭對手。特別是高科技與資通訊產品，台韓過去在歐美主要市場的占有率一直很接近；但這幾年卻因為韓國的品牌行銷策略奏效、韓元貶值等因素，出現彼長我消的趨勢。如今，透過ＦＴＡ所帶來的優惠利益，可能進一步削弱台灣的競爭力，因此政府及各界對韓國ＦＴＡ發展一直很關心。
在ＦＴＡ賽局中，觀察對手動態的重點有三件事；一是數量，二是對象，三是內容。若是數量不多、經貿利益不大，且內容自由化程度不高，自然不足為懼。但韓國在成功與美、歐等重量級國家洽簽ＦＴＡ後，在數量上出現重力加速度的效應。除過去已經生效的新加坡、智利、東協ＦＴＡ外，與印度的ＦＴＡ於去年生效，今年則完成與秘魯的簽署，澳洲部分也即將完成談判。正在進行諮商者，則包括日本、加拿大、墨西哥，以及中國大陸。
在經貿利益上，目前韓國百分之十四點四的貿易量受惠於ＦＴＡ，但隨著其與美歐的ＦＴＡ生效，這個涵蓋率可望接近五成。終極目標，韓國計劃至少八成的貿易可享有ＦＴＡ優惠利益。而在顯現內容品質的自由化程度部分，韓國與美、歐盟的ＦＴＡ，普遍被認為是深度自由化的代表作。
韓國ＦＴＡ政策的假想敵不是台灣、日本，而是中國大陸。為突破中國大陸崛起的磁吸效應，以及其近年來在ＦＴＡ上的發展速度，韓國的推動脈絡很清楚：一方面是歐、美、澳洲等主要出口市場，他方面是東協、印度、墨西哥及大陸等產業鏈分工夥伴。作為亞洲地區唯一與美、歐等高度自由化國家同時建構ＦＴＡ關係的國家，韓國在「置之死地而後生」的策略思維下，其他ＦＴＡ預料將以倍增的速度出現。更關鍵的是，一旦韓國與中國大陸完成ＦＴＡ談判，將頓時抵銷台商透過兩岸經濟合作協議（ＥＣＦＡ）取得的領先優勢。換言之，韓國個別ＦＴＡ對台灣的影響或許有限，但這種「由線而面」的策略布局，委實已不容輕視；如果我們有ＦＴＡ的監測機制，此刻正是亮起紅燈之時。
面對韓國的挑戰，經濟部這幾天提出對內採取市場區隔、輔導機制，對外大力推動台歐盟ＦＴＡ排上歐盟政策議程等作法因應。但對於前者，涉及產業上下游的產品研發、行銷定位，甚至於定價策略的調整，恐怕不會是及時雨，與產業需求及長期發展方向是否契合，也有待觀察。至於後者，則要面對美歐，甚至是中國大陸「Are you ready?（準備好了嗎）」的質疑。
確實，在洽簽對象的選擇及意願上，我們的限制明顯高於韓國，且大半是操之在人的因素。更重要的是，若干部會對ＦＴＡ及兩岸ＥＣＦＡ自由化的搖擺觀望，卻是出於自私心態而罔顧產業利益的保守立場，儼然已成為重大阻礙；政府的自由化決心，似乎也因選舉考量而顯得猶豫扭捏。簡單地說，目前洽簽ＦＴＡ的障礙，很大一部分來自內部。
此時此刻，政府有必要靜下心來，認真地按照屬性與需求，畫出ＦＴＡ及自由化政策的藍圖，以及短中長期的目標。在這個藍圖中，ＥＣＦＡ後續協議的協商節奏，已經不是單純的兩岸問題，還須考慮韓中ＦＴＡ的進展；也需要在韓國之外，將中國大陸的ＦＴＡ速度列為評估參數。兩岸關係顯著改善，合作空間不斷擴展，但並未改變兩岸在產業競爭上的局面。因此，在ＦＴＡ布局思維上，千萬不可只看世界而忘記對岸。
面對種種困難，又逢政府組織再造，專司談判的經貿談判代表辦公室將被經貿政策司所取代，其影響尚無法評估。政府當局或許可用「韓國能，我們也能」的口頭禪回應國人的疑慮；但此情此境，這句話恐怕一時還說不出口吧！
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
ROC Office in Hong Kong and Macao Renamed: Major Breakthrough in Cross-Strait Relations
ROC Office in Hong Kong and Macao Renamed:
Major Breakthrough in Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2011
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has recently changed its name. It now uses the same name as other offices abroad, the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office." Its status has been upgraded. Its functionality has been substantially upgraded as well. Officials posted to Hong Kong and Macao will enjoy the same preferential treatment as those posted to foreign countries. The Hong Kong and Macao governments will also set up offices on Taiwan. This is the first time Taipei and Beijing have set up offices in each others' jurisdictions. For cross-Strait relations, this is a matter of landmark significance.
Over the past 45 years, the Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong was know as the "Chung Hwa Travel Service." This often led to misunderstandings. It also failed to reflect its status as the agent of an outside authority. Also, if the Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong wanted to contact agencies within the Hong Kong government, it had to go through specified channels. Now our government can directly contact the relevant departments. MAC officials feel the two sides are finally according each other the respect commensurate with official contacts.
The Republic of China is also authorizing the Hong Kong and Macao governments to establish a Hong Kong Economics, Trade and Cultural Office and a Macao Economic and Cultural Office on Taiwan. These will be manned by officials of the Hong Kong and Macao governments. In other words, buffers between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao will no longer be required. Such a breakthrough would have been unimaginable in the past.
Cross-strait interactions are peculiar. When Lee Teng-hui was in office, the MAC and ARATS served as buffers. This enabled the two sides to avoid each other. It allowed them to avoid defining the nature of their relationship. When Chen Shui-bian came into office, he ended consultations. Consultations were conducted through representatives of private industry, Some officials simultaneously served as "consultants." But they were authorized to deal only with certain matters.
After Ma Ying-jeou came into office, cross-Strait relations swiftly moved towards reconciliation. The atmosphere improved by leaps and bounds. Exchanges proliferated. Officials met with each other directly. Many departments engaged in direct cooperation and exchanges. High officials engaged in frequent exchanges. Local officials engaged in even more frequent exchanges. Add to this tourism, trade, investments, and student exchanges. In essence, the two sides have already established contacts on different levels. These include official contacts, business cooperation, and the recognition of each others' authority and jurisdiction. These have established an implicit recognition of each others' legal status, predicated upon equality, coexistence, and mutual respect.
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao can now go by the same name as its offices in foreign countries. Its personnel can receive the same level of treatment. This means the Republic of China government, the Hong Kong government, and the Macao government recognize each others' legal status. This recognition need not be explicit, but merely understood. Equality and mutual respect between officials will promote future cooperation and exchange.
The Republic of China government, the Hong Kong government, and the Macao government consulted several times and arrived at this decision. One reason they were able to do so, was a common concern for economic development. Another was Beijing's willingness to be flexible. The governments of the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR are special cases. They need not be considered precedents. But if cross-Strait relations continue to improve, the model could be replicated for other local governments on the Chinese mainland. Exchanges between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland could be comprehensive and extensive. Exchanges between the provinces and cities could become increasingly close. When the time is ripe, the governments on both sides could further investigate how to dispatch properly accredited representatives to each others jurisdictions.
President Ma recently attended the 20th anniversary celebration of the Straits Exchange Foundation. The government officially declared an end to the Period of Communist Rebellion and abolished the Temporary Provisions. It no longer refers to the authorities in Beijing as a "rebel group." But it still cannot recognize the Chinese mainland as a sovereign and independent state. According to the Republic of China Constitution, the Chinese mainland is part of the Republic of China. As a result, Taipei and Beijing have decided not to recognize each others sovereignty, but at the same time, not to deny each others jurisdiction. This has enabled the two sides to establish an equitable framework for cross-Strait peace and development, and an important foundation for other exchanges. Cross-Strait consultations must be conducted on the basis of equality, dignity, and reciprocity, to protect the interests of the people.
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has been renamed. Officials from the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR will set up offices on Taiwan. President Ma's proposals have been realized. Cross-Strait exchanges must be sustainable and long term. This means ensuring the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and attending to the interests of its citizens. This means a determination to seek common ground. At this stage, the two sides are refraining from denying each others legitimacy. The two sides are engaged in cooperation and exchange on issues of substance, Bit by bit, the two sides are laying a solid foundation for reconciliation and shared prosperity. This will eventually enable people on both sides to enjoy a better future.
Not long ago, former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu advocated replacing the 1992 Consensus with the Macao Model. But consider the cross-Strait status quo. The Macao Model is utterly inadequate. The Ma administration has made tremendous strides in cross-Strait relations. Any attempt to revert to the past would set the two sides back. The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has made enormous progress. The DPP really needs to adopt a more pragmatic approach, one that does not return cross-Strait policy to the past. The situation is clear. The two sides have made immense progress. Ma Ying-jeou has achieved astonishing results during his first term in office. Everyone on Taiwan is a beneficiary. Therefore whoever assumes office next, must maintain these policies.
港澳辦事處更名 兩岸關係大突破
2011-07-07
中國時報
我駐香港及澳門機構，最近均更名為和其他駐外館相同的「台北經濟文化辦事處」，不只地位、功能大幅提升，駐港澳人員也可享有駐外人員優遇；而港澳政府也將來台設立辦事機構。這是雙方首度互設官方性質的辦事處，對兩岸關係而言，具有指標性的重大意義。
過去四十五年來，我駐港機構一直稱為「中華旅行社」，不僅常常遭到誤解，也無法反映駐外機構的地位。而且以往我駐港機構與港府的聯繫，須透過港府的特定窗口，現在我方可以和港府相關部門直接聯繫。陸委會官員認為，這代表我方和港府彼此獲得「官方往來」的尊重和待遇。
此外，我國也核准香港和澳門，來台設立「香港經濟貿易文化辦事處」與「澳門經濟文化辦事處」，由港澳政府調派現職人員出任。換句話說，雙方都不需要再隔一層白手套，以台港澳往昔的隔閡，這是過去難以想像的突破。
兩岸的互動非常微妙，李登輝當政時由兩會擔任白手套，以避免面對及定位對方政府的難題。陳水扁執政時兩會協商停擺，由民間行業團體代表協商，雖然有官員擔任「顧問」同行，但只能處理部分交流事務。
馬英九上台後兩岸關係積極走向和解，氣氛大為改善，各項交流紛紛推動，不要說政府官員能夠直接參與兩會協商，甚至許多部門都已直接推動合作交流，高層級的官員頻頻互訪，地方政府首長來往更是熱絡，再加上旅遊、經貿、投資乃至留學。可以說，在實質上，雙方已經藉由不同層次的官方接觸、業務合作乃至承認對方的公權力與管轄權，隱約建立起一種對彼此法定地位的「對等、共存、相互尊重」模式。
如今駐港澳辦事處能夠改用與其他外館同樣的名稱、人員取得同樣的待遇，至少代表著港澳政府與台灣政府對彼此法定地位的某種認可；不必言明，但領會在心。並且在官方對等尊重的模式下，推動未來的合作交流。
港澳之所以在與台灣數度協商後作此決定，一方面是著眼於經濟利益的開發，但同時也反映出大陸中央願意展現的彈性空間。尤其港澳是特區政府，現在可以被視為特例，不作擴大解釋。但如果兩岸關係繼續朝良性發展，這樣的模式，將來或許可以複製在中國大陸其他的地方政府，因為台灣與大陸的交往全面而廣泛，各省市的互動愈來愈綿密。甚至在時機成熟後，兩岸政府可以進一步研究出彼此派駐適當代表機構的模式。
馬總統日前出席海基會廿周年慶祝大會時表示，政府終止動員戡亂時期、廢止臨時條款，不再將大陸視為「叛亂集團」，但仍無法承認大陸是一個主權獨立國家，因為大陸仍是憲法規定的「中華民國的固有疆域」，因此，「互不承認主權，互不否認治權」，是目前能夠解釋並實現兩岸和平發展、對等交流的重要基礎。兩岸任何協商必須秉持對等、尊嚴及互惠的原則，以保障人民利益。
台灣駐港澳辦事處的更名與港澳來台設處，便可以視為馬總統上述主張的實踐。兩岸互動要能蓬勃長久，必須能夠兼顧雙方的人民利益與主權尊嚴，並且致力於求同存異，現階段互不否認的官方平等往來，藉由許多實質事務上的合作交流，點點滴滴為兩岸和解共榮營造出堅實基礎，必然有助於將兩岸人民帶向更美好的未來。
雖然前陸委會主委吳釗燮不久前曾提出以「澳門模式」取代「九二共識」，但對照兩岸互動之現狀，「澳門模式」根本遠遠不及今天馬政府獲致的兩岸進展，再重提舊事只是讓進度倒退。當台港澳駐處取得如此進展時，民進黨方面真的應該好好思索出一個務實且不致讓關係倒退的兩岸政策。因為事實很明顯，兩岸關係的進展，已在馬英九任內達到了至今最大成果，獲益者是台灣全體，因此也是任何執政者應持續維護的。
Major Breakthrough in Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2011
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has recently changed its name. It now uses the same name as other offices abroad, the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office." Its status has been upgraded. Its functionality has been substantially upgraded as well. Officials posted to Hong Kong and Macao will enjoy the same preferential treatment as those posted to foreign countries. The Hong Kong and Macao governments will also set up offices on Taiwan. This is the first time Taipei and Beijing have set up offices in each others' jurisdictions. For cross-Strait relations, this is a matter of landmark significance.
Over the past 45 years, the Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong was know as the "Chung Hwa Travel Service." This often led to misunderstandings. It also failed to reflect its status as the agent of an outside authority. Also, if the Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong wanted to contact agencies within the Hong Kong government, it had to go through specified channels. Now our government can directly contact the relevant departments. MAC officials feel the two sides are finally according each other the respect commensurate with official contacts.
The Republic of China is also authorizing the Hong Kong and Macao governments to establish a Hong Kong Economics, Trade and Cultural Office and a Macao Economic and Cultural Office on Taiwan. These will be manned by officials of the Hong Kong and Macao governments. In other words, buffers between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao will no longer be required. Such a breakthrough would have been unimaginable in the past.
Cross-strait interactions are peculiar. When Lee Teng-hui was in office, the MAC and ARATS served as buffers. This enabled the two sides to avoid each other. It allowed them to avoid defining the nature of their relationship. When Chen Shui-bian came into office, he ended consultations. Consultations were conducted through representatives of private industry, Some officials simultaneously served as "consultants." But they were authorized to deal only with certain matters.
After Ma Ying-jeou came into office, cross-Strait relations swiftly moved towards reconciliation. The atmosphere improved by leaps and bounds. Exchanges proliferated. Officials met with each other directly. Many departments engaged in direct cooperation and exchanges. High officials engaged in frequent exchanges. Local officials engaged in even more frequent exchanges. Add to this tourism, trade, investments, and student exchanges. In essence, the two sides have already established contacts on different levels. These include official contacts, business cooperation, and the recognition of each others' authority and jurisdiction. These have established an implicit recognition of each others' legal status, predicated upon equality, coexistence, and mutual respect.
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao can now go by the same name as its offices in foreign countries. Its personnel can receive the same level of treatment. This means the Republic of China government, the Hong Kong government, and the Macao government recognize each others' legal status. This recognition need not be explicit, but merely understood. Equality and mutual respect between officials will promote future cooperation and exchange.
The Republic of China government, the Hong Kong government, and the Macao government consulted several times and arrived at this decision. One reason they were able to do so, was a common concern for economic development. Another was Beijing's willingness to be flexible. The governments of the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR are special cases. They need not be considered precedents. But if cross-Strait relations continue to improve, the model could be replicated for other local governments on the Chinese mainland. Exchanges between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland could be comprehensive and extensive. Exchanges between the provinces and cities could become increasingly close. When the time is ripe, the governments on both sides could further investigate how to dispatch properly accredited representatives to each others jurisdictions.
President Ma recently attended the 20th anniversary celebration of the Straits Exchange Foundation. The government officially declared an end to the Period of Communist Rebellion and abolished the Temporary Provisions. It no longer refers to the authorities in Beijing as a "rebel group." But it still cannot recognize the Chinese mainland as a sovereign and independent state. According to the Republic of China Constitution, the Chinese mainland is part of the Republic of China. As a result, Taipei and Beijing have decided not to recognize each others sovereignty, but at the same time, not to deny each others jurisdiction. This has enabled the two sides to establish an equitable framework for cross-Strait peace and development, and an important foundation for other exchanges. Cross-Strait consultations must be conducted on the basis of equality, dignity, and reciprocity, to protect the interests of the people.
The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has been renamed. Officials from the Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR will set up offices on Taiwan. President Ma's proposals have been realized. Cross-Strait exchanges must be sustainable and long term. This means ensuring the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and attending to the interests of its citizens. This means a determination to seek common ground. At this stage, the two sides are refraining from denying each others legitimacy. The two sides are engaged in cooperation and exchange on issues of substance, Bit by bit, the two sides are laying a solid foundation for reconciliation and shared prosperity. This will eventually enable people on both sides to enjoy a better future.
Not long ago, former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu advocated replacing the 1992 Consensus with the Macao Model. But consider the cross-Strait status quo. The Macao Model is utterly inadequate. The Ma administration has made tremendous strides in cross-Strait relations. Any attempt to revert to the past would set the two sides back. The Republic of China's representative office in Hong Kong and Macao has made enormous progress. The DPP really needs to adopt a more pragmatic approach, one that does not return cross-Strait policy to the past. The situation is clear. The two sides have made immense progress. Ma Ying-jeou has achieved astonishing results during his first term in office. Everyone on Taiwan is a beneficiary. Therefore whoever assumes office next, must maintain these policies.
港澳辦事處更名 兩岸關係大突破
2011-07-07
中國時報
我駐香港及澳門機構，最近均更名為和其他駐外館相同的「台北經濟文化辦事處」，不只地位、功能大幅提升，駐港澳人員也可享有駐外人員優遇；而港澳政府也將來台設立辦事機構。這是雙方首度互設官方性質的辦事處，對兩岸關係而言，具有指標性的重大意義。
過去四十五年來，我駐港機構一直稱為「中華旅行社」，不僅常常遭到誤解，也無法反映駐外機構的地位。而且以往我駐港機構與港府的聯繫，須透過港府的特定窗口，現在我方可以和港府相關部門直接聯繫。陸委會官員認為，這代表我方和港府彼此獲得「官方往來」的尊重和待遇。
此外，我國也核准香港和澳門，來台設立「香港經濟貿易文化辦事處」與「澳門經濟文化辦事處」，由港澳政府調派現職人員出任。換句話說，雙方都不需要再隔一層白手套，以台港澳往昔的隔閡，這是過去難以想像的突破。
兩岸的互動非常微妙，李登輝當政時由兩會擔任白手套，以避免面對及定位對方政府的難題。陳水扁執政時兩會協商停擺，由民間行業團體代表協商，雖然有官員擔任「顧問」同行，但只能處理部分交流事務。
馬英九上台後兩岸關係積極走向和解，氣氛大為改善，各項交流紛紛推動，不要說政府官員能夠直接參與兩會協商，甚至許多部門都已直接推動合作交流，高層級的官員頻頻互訪，地方政府首長來往更是熱絡，再加上旅遊、經貿、投資乃至留學。可以說，在實質上，雙方已經藉由不同層次的官方接觸、業務合作乃至承認對方的公權力與管轄權，隱約建立起一種對彼此法定地位的「對等、共存、相互尊重」模式。
如今駐港澳辦事處能夠改用與其他外館同樣的名稱、人員取得同樣的待遇，至少代表著港澳政府與台灣政府對彼此法定地位的某種認可；不必言明，但領會在心。並且在官方對等尊重的模式下，推動未來的合作交流。
港澳之所以在與台灣數度協商後作此決定，一方面是著眼於經濟利益的開發，但同時也反映出大陸中央願意展現的彈性空間。尤其港澳是特區政府，現在可以被視為特例，不作擴大解釋。但如果兩岸關係繼續朝良性發展，這樣的模式，將來或許可以複製在中國大陸其他的地方政府，因為台灣與大陸的交往全面而廣泛，各省市的互動愈來愈綿密。甚至在時機成熟後，兩岸政府可以進一步研究出彼此派駐適當代表機構的模式。
馬總統日前出席海基會廿周年慶祝大會時表示，政府終止動員戡亂時期、廢止臨時條款，不再將大陸視為「叛亂集團」，但仍無法承認大陸是一個主權獨立國家，因為大陸仍是憲法規定的「中華民國的固有疆域」，因此，「互不承認主權，互不否認治權」，是目前能夠解釋並實現兩岸和平發展、對等交流的重要基礎。兩岸任何協商必須秉持對等、尊嚴及互惠的原則，以保障人民利益。
台灣駐港澳辦事處的更名與港澳來台設處，便可以視為馬總統上述主張的實踐。兩岸互動要能蓬勃長久，必須能夠兼顧雙方的人民利益與主權尊嚴，並且致力於求同存異，現階段互不否認的官方平等往來，藉由許多實質事務上的合作交流，點點滴滴為兩岸和解共榮營造出堅實基礎，必然有助於將兩岸人民帶向更美好的未來。
雖然前陸委會主委吳釗燮不久前曾提出以「澳門模式」取代「九二共識」，但對照兩岸互動之現狀，「澳門模式」根本遠遠不及今天馬政府獲致的兩岸進展，再重提舊事只是讓進度倒退。當台港澳駐處取得如此進展時，民進黨方面真的應該好好思索出一個務實且不致讓關係倒退的兩岸政策。因為事實很明顯，兩岸關係的進展，已在馬英九任內達到了至今最大成果，獲益者是台灣全體，因此也是任何執政者應持續維護的。
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
Name Change in Hong Kong and Macao: The Chu Shulong Effect
Name Change in Hong Kong and Macao:
The Chu Shulong Effect
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2011
Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, recently put forth his "one country, two governments" concept. Taipei and Beijing both reacted with anticipation and dread. The Republic of China government's official representative in Hong Kong and Macao changed its name to the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office." This shows that cross-strait relations are gradually becoming more pragmatic, and that we can look forward to more such positive developments.
The DPP says that Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" concept is "one China in disguise." It even says that the CCP "set the ball" for the KMT to spike. They intimated that this was "Hong Kong-ization," "Macao-ization," and laid the groundwork for reunification with the Chinese mainland. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar," and neither rebutted it nor endorsed it. President Ma Ying-jeou said "I feel it is something we can talk about, that can be discussed." But Ma later qualified his remarks, saying he "was referring to an academic discussion."
Chu Shulong's concept remains sketchy. Later he claimed that he never used the expression "one country, two governments" per se. But the basic premise is that the two sides should recognize each other and accept each other as "the central government" within "one China." Leaders on the two sides should not address each other as "Mister." This can be seen as a way to cut the cross-Strait Gordian Knot. Presumably Chu's "one China" refers to a "third concept of China" above and beyond the ROC and the PRC, and amounts to a form of the "Big Roof" concept. It argues that the authorities on both sides should refer to each other as "President Ma" and "President Hu." Is this not one of the primary goals both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have longed for over the past 20 years? Beijing said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar." That was predictable. But should the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan duck the issue in the same manner? Chu Shulong paid lip service to the concept. But the concept put advocates on Taiwan on the horns of a dilemma.
As mentioned earlier, Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" has yet to be fleshed out. But "one country, two governments" should be the core concept both sides zero in on when seeking solutions. The problem is how to define "one country." The "one country" should not refer to either the ROC or the PRC. It should refer to a "third concept of China." Otherwise, how can one have two "central governments?" Such a "one country, two governments" or "one China, two governments" arrangement would resemble the European Union or a confederation. Why should we oppose an arrangement in which "the two sides recognize and accept each other as the central government?" Why should we oppose leaders from both sides addressing each other as "President?" Didn't people object vehemently when Chen Yunlin addressed Ma Ying-jeou as "Mister?"
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar." It refrained from rebutting these "views of an individual scholar." But on Taiwan apparently, no one was willing to consider these views for even one minute. The DPP denounced it as reunification, plain and simple. The KMT dismissed it as insensitive to the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Both parties inexplicably, summarily dismissed the concept out of hand. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan insist on adopting this absurd attitude towards "the views of an individual scholar" on the Chinese mainland. Do they expect Beijing to propose an arrangement akin to "one country, two governments" some day? If so, do they expect Beijing to woo them, after they have displayed so little willingness to consider such arrangements?
The "first economics, then politics; first the easy, then the difficult" strategy is correct. But the "first economics, then politics" strategy was never meant to be a way to duck political problems indefinitely. Politics is more difficult than economics. Economics must pave the way for politics, and and soften its blow. But economic and cultural exchanges give rise to such concepts as "one country, two governments." They may merely be "the views of an individual scholar." But they should nonetheless be cherished. After all, "one country, two governments" has already led to the current improved situation. The two sides would see each other as the central government. They would refer to each other's leader as President. Such radical approaches to improving the cross-Strait situation must not remain taboo. The two sides must toss ideas back and forth. That will enable "the views of an individual scholar" to eventually become mainstream thought. We do not want Beijing to discourage "the views of an individual scholar." We want the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to encourage and participate in such creative endeavors, We do not want them to indiscriminately and summarily slam the the door shut on such discussions. To do so is absurd. It also closes off one's own options.
Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges have already passed the point of no return. Cross-Strait economic and trade relations have become inseparably intertwined. Therefore a framework akin to "one country, two governments" is increasingly indispensable. A Peace Agreement would offer us an interim solution. It would legalize and institutionalize premises such as "Beijing will not impose reunification," "Taipei will not promote independence," and "neither side will resort to force." It is true that economics must precede politics. But one cannot delay until economic and social relations are set in stone. If one delays that long, one will lose political bargaining power. Beijing may be able to procrastinate. But Taipei cannot. In other words, when seeking a cross-Strait political solution, Taipei must accurately estimate its stop-loss and profit taking points. Today we may turn up our noses up at "one country, two governments." But some day soon we may beg for "one country, two governments," only to realize we held out too long. It is a case of "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may, old time is still a-flying. And this same flower that smiles to-day, tomorrow will be dying."
The response of the DPP, shows that ideas akin to "one country, two governments" are the most effective antidote to Taiwan independence. The Democratic Progressive Party opposes "one country, two governments." Does the Democratic Progressive Party oppose the two sides recognizing each other as the central government? Does it oppose the leaders of the two sides referring to each other as President? Does it oppose a cross-Strait arrangement that more closely resembles the European Union or a confederation, via the "one country, two governments" concept? If it does, then the DPP can characterize anything as "reunification in disguise," even the "China Travel Agency" being renamed the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office."
Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" concept is merely "the views of an individual scholar." Nevertheless we welcome such creative cross-Strait policy proposals, free from self-imposed taboos. We look forward to more creative solutions to cross-Strait problems. A more rational process will lead to clearer goals. Therefore we agree with President Ma's comments. Ma said that all proposals, whether "one this" or "two that" have advantages and disadvantages. "But I feel we can talk about them, we can discuss them." Later, a presidential office spokesman qualified Ma's remarks, saying Ma meant "we can discuss them in an academic context."
Now that the ROC representative to Hong Kong and Macao has changed its name, cross-Strait relations can become more flexible, more imaginative, and more pragmatic. We urge the three parties on the two sides of the Strait to reread this newspaper's editorial of June 23, entitled "A Peace Agreement is an Interim Solution."
從駐港澳機構更名談楚樹龍的龍尾效應
聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.06 03:18 am
北京清華大學教授楚樹龍提出「一國兩府」的構想，使兩岸思維中「既期待又怕受傷害」的心態流露無遺。然而，我駐港澳機構更名為「台北經濟文化辦事處」，卻顯示兩岸對等關係的發展，確有逐步提升落實的空間，更應有可以期待的想像空間。
民進黨說，楚樹龍的「一國兩府」是「化妝後的統戰」，甚至認為這是中共「作球給國民黨」；但接著就指，這是香港化、澳門化，這就是準備與大陸統一。北京國台辦則稱：「這只是學者個人的意見。」未加批駁，也不予背書。馬英九總統則指，「我覺得可以談，可以討論」，後來又補正「是指可以學術討論」。
楚樹龍的論述未盡周延，後來他且自稱並未說出「一國兩府」四字，但其主要架構，如兩岸應相互承認並相互接受為「一個中國」之內的「中央政府」，及不應互稱對方領導人為「先生」等，卻可謂是打開了兩岸困局的死結；倘若他所說的「一個中國之內」，是指一個超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的「第三概念的中國」，或「屋頂理論」，且又認為應互稱兩岸當局為「馬總統」及「胡主席」，這豈不正是台灣朝野二十餘年來在兩岸競合關係中最重要的期待之一？面對這樣的提議，北京方面說「這只是學者個人的意見」尚可想像，但台灣朝野何以卻避之若浼？葉公好龍，楚樹龍的一條龍尾，竟使台灣的好龍者進退失據。
如前所述，楚樹龍所說的「一國兩府」雖尚待仔細析論，但「一國兩府」的毛坯概念，卻應當正是兩岸未來解決方案中最核心的基本元素；問題只在如何對「一國」定義，而此處所稱的「一國」，應不是指「中華民國」或「中華人民共和國」，而當是指「第三概念的中國」，否則怎會有兩個「中央政府」？倘係如此，這樣的「一國兩府」或「一中兩府」，與歐盟模式或邦聯已庶幾近之；則為何要反對「兩岸互相承認及接受為中央政府」？為何要反對兩岸互稱對方領導人為「總統」及「國家主席」？我們不是曾為陳雲林稱馬英九為「先生」而吵成一團嗎？
北京國台辦說「這只是學者個人的意見」，但台灣竟然對北京當局亦未加批駁的「學者個人的意見」，似乎連一分鐘也不想讓它活下去；民進黨人說這就是要統一，國民黨人說這沒有照顧台灣人民情感，如此這般莫名其妙的三言兩語就把這條龍尾給趕跑了。台灣朝野若竟用如此荒謬的態度對待大陸「學者個人的意見」，試想如何期待北京當局有朝一日也提出類如「一國兩府」的主張，難道要北京用熱臉來貼台灣的冷屁股？
兩岸互動「先經後政／先易後難」的策略是正確的；但「先經後政」，並非即可永遠迴避政治方案，而是因政比經難，須用經濟來緩化、柔化、轉化政治關係。然而，倘若當經濟文化交流孕生出如「一國兩府」這類的構想，即使「只是學者個人的意見」，也應珍惜；一方面是因「一國兩府」已對現狀有了翻覆性的改善（互視為中央政府，互稱總統及主席）；另一方面，只要這類翻覆性的改善構想能成為兩岸非禁忌的政策議題，相激相盪，就極有可能由「只是學者個人的意見」成為主流思維。因此，我們不希望北京自此遏制這類「學者個人意見」，更認為台灣朝野若非但不鼓勵及參與這類改善構想的創發，反而竟如此不分青紅皂白地立即關上了借題討論的大門，這非但是荒謬至極，且不啻是在自蹙生機。
兩岸的社會及經貿交流已過了不可折返點。而兩岸的社會及經貿愈分不開，就愈應及早建立一個類如「一國兩府」、「和平協議」的「中程方案」，俾使「大陸的不統」與「台灣的不獨」，及「兩岸的不武」，可有相當期間的法制化與穩固化。因此，雖然「先經後政」，但不能拖到經濟社會關係已經完全「套住」，屆時台灣即可能對政治方案失去了議價條件。大陸可以拖到那一天，台灣卻絕不可拖到那一天。也就是說，台灣必須準確拿捏兩岸政治方案的「停損點」與「停利點」；今日若對「一國兩府」嗤之以鼻，來日卻有可能對「一國兩府」求之而不可得。正是：有花堪折直須折，莫待無花空折枝。
由民進黨的反應，可見「一國兩府」之類的構想，正是化解台獨論述的最有效處方。民進黨反對「一國兩府」，試問：能不能說，民進黨反對兩岸互相承認為中央政府？反對兩岸互稱對方領導人為總統及國家主席？反對兩岸關係可經「一國兩府」趨近歐盟化及邦聯的可能性？倘係如此，民進黨亦可將「中華旅行社」更名「台北經濟文化辦事處」，稱作「化妝後的統戰」。
即使楚樹龍的「一國兩府」只是「學者個人的意見」，我們仍歡迎這類有突破性的創見能成為兩岸無禁忌的政策議題，更期望兩岸關係能經由這類創見的交互激盪，由「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。因而，我們比較同意馬總統對此一事件的評論。他說：不管「一什麼，二什麼」的主張，都有其優、缺點，「但我覺得可以談，可以討論」，後來總統府發言人補正為「可以學術討論」。
從台灣駐港澳機構更名作起，兩岸關係應有更靈動的想像與更務實的作為，在此建議兩岸三黨回頭再看一看本報六月二十三日的社論〈和平協議就是中程方案〉。
The Chu Shulong Effect
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2011
Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, recently put forth his "one country, two governments" concept. Taipei and Beijing both reacted with anticipation and dread. The Republic of China government's official representative in Hong Kong and Macao changed its name to the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office." This shows that cross-strait relations are gradually becoming more pragmatic, and that we can look forward to more such positive developments.
The DPP says that Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" concept is "one China in disguise." It even says that the CCP "set the ball" for the KMT to spike. They intimated that this was "Hong Kong-ization," "Macao-ization," and laid the groundwork for reunification with the Chinese mainland. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar," and neither rebutted it nor endorsed it. President Ma Ying-jeou said "I feel it is something we can talk about, that can be discussed." But Ma later qualified his remarks, saying he "was referring to an academic discussion."
Chu Shulong's concept remains sketchy. Later he claimed that he never used the expression "one country, two governments" per se. But the basic premise is that the two sides should recognize each other and accept each other as "the central government" within "one China." Leaders on the two sides should not address each other as "Mister." This can be seen as a way to cut the cross-Strait Gordian Knot. Presumably Chu's "one China" refers to a "third concept of China" above and beyond the ROC and the PRC, and amounts to a form of the "Big Roof" concept. It argues that the authorities on both sides should refer to each other as "President Ma" and "President Hu." Is this not one of the primary goals both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan have longed for over the past 20 years? Beijing said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar." That was predictable. But should the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan duck the issue in the same manner? Chu Shulong paid lip service to the concept. But the concept put advocates on Taiwan on the horns of a dilemma.
As mentioned earlier, Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" has yet to be fleshed out. But "one country, two governments" should be the core concept both sides zero in on when seeking solutions. The problem is how to define "one country." The "one country" should not refer to either the ROC or the PRC. It should refer to a "third concept of China." Otherwise, how can one have two "central governments?" Such a "one country, two governments" or "one China, two governments" arrangement would resemble the European Union or a confederation. Why should we oppose an arrangement in which "the two sides recognize and accept each other as the central government?" Why should we oppose leaders from both sides addressing each other as "President?" Didn't people object vehemently when Chen Yunlin addressed Ma Ying-jeou as "Mister?"
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office said "These are merely the views of an individual scholar." It refrained from rebutting these "views of an individual scholar." But on Taiwan apparently, no one was willing to consider these views for even one minute. The DPP denounced it as reunification, plain and simple. The KMT dismissed it as insensitive to the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Both parties inexplicably, summarily dismissed the concept out of hand. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan insist on adopting this absurd attitude towards "the views of an individual scholar" on the Chinese mainland. Do they expect Beijing to propose an arrangement akin to "one country, two governments" some day? If so, do they expect Beijing to woo them, after they have displayed so little willingness to consider such arrangements?
The "first economics, then politics; first the easy, then the difficult" strategy is correct. But the "first economics, then politics" strategy was never meant to be a way to duck political problems indefinitely. Politics is more difficult than economics. Economics must pave the way for politics, and and soften its blow. But economic and cultural exchanges give rise to such concepts as "one country, two governments." They may merely be "the views of an individual scholar." But they should nonetheless be cherished. After all, "one country, two governments" has already led to the current improved situation. The two sides would see each other as the central government. They would refer to each other's leader as President. Such radical approaches to improving the cross-Strait situation must not remain taboo. The two sides must toss ideas back and forth. That will enable "the views of an individual scholar" to eventually become mainstream thought. We do not want Beijing to discourage "the views of an individual scholar." We want the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to encourage and participate in such creative endeavors, We do not want them to indiscriminately and summarily slam the the door shut on such discussions. To do so is absurd. It also closes off one's own options.
Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges have already passed the point of no return. Cross-Strait economic and trade relations have become inseparably intertwined. Therefore a framework akin to "one country, two governments" is increasingly indispensable. A Peace Agreement would offer us an interim solution. It would legalize and institutionalize premises such as "Beijing will not impose reunification," "Taipei will not promote independence," and "neither side will resort to force." It is true that economics must precede politics. But one cannot delay until economic and social relations are set in stone. If one delays that long, one will lose political bargaining power. Beijing may be able to procrastinate. But Taipei cannot. In other words, when seeking a cross-Strait political solution, Taipei must accurately estimate its stop-loss and profit taking points. Today we may turn up our noses up at "one country, two governments." But some day soon we may beg for "one country, two governments," only to realize we held out too long. It is a case of "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may, old time is still a-flying. And this same flower that smiles to-day, tomorrow will be dying."
The response of the DPP, shows that ideas akin to "one country, two governments" are the most effective antidote to Taiwan independence. The Democratic Progressive Party opposes "one country, two governments." Does the Democratic Progressive Party oppose the two sides recognizing each other as the central government? Does it oppose the leaders of the two sides referring to each other as President? Does it oppose a cross-Strait arrangement that more closely resembles the European Union or a confederation, via the "one country, two governments" concept? If it does, then the DPP can characterize anything as "reunification in disguise," even the "China Travel Agency" being renamed the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office."
Chu Shulong's "one country, two governments" concept is merely "the views of an individual scholar." Nevertheless we welcome such creative cross-Strait policy proposals, free from self-imposed taboos. We look forward to more creative solutions to cross-Strait problems. A more rational process will lead to clearer goals. Therefore we agree with President Ma's comments. Ma said that all proposals, whether "one this" or "two that" have advantages and disadvantages. "But I feel we can talk about them, we can discuss them." Later, a presidential office spokesman qualified Ma's remarks, saying Ma meant "we can discuss them in an academic context."
Now that the ROC representative to Hong Kong and Macao has changed its name, cross-Strait relations can become more flexible, more imaginative, and more pragmatic. We urge the three parties on the two sides of the Strait to reread this newspaper's editorial of June 23, entitled "A Peace Agreement is an Interim Solution."
從駐港澳機構更名談楚樹龍的龍尾效應
聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.06 03:18 am
北京清華大學教授楚樹龍提出「一國兩府」的構想，使兩岸思維中「既期待又怕受傷害」的心態流露無遺。然而，我駐港澳機構更名為「台北經濟文化辦事處」，卻顯示兩岸對等關係的發展，確有逐步提升落實的空間，更應有可以期待的想像空間。
民進黨說，楚樹龍的「一國兩府」是「化妝後的統戰」，甚至認為這是中共「作球給國民黨」；但接著就指，這是香港化、澳門化，這就是準備與大陸統一。北京國台辦則稱：「這只是學者個人的意見。」未加批駁，也不予背書。馬英九總統則指，「我覺得可以談，可以討論」，後來又補正「是指可以學術討論」。
楚樹龍的論述未盡周延，後來他且自稱並未說出「一國兩府」四字，但其主要架構，如兩岸應相互承認並相互接受為「一個中國」之內的「中央政府」，及不應互稱對方領導人為「先生」等，卻可謂是打開了兩岸困局的死結；倘若他所說的「一個中國之內」，是指一個超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的「第三概念的中國」，或「屋頂理論」，且又認為應互稱兩岸當局為「馬總統」及「胡主席」，這豈不正是台灣朝野二十餘年來在兩岸競合關係中最重要的期待之一？面對這樣的提議，北京方面說「這只是學者個人的意見」尚可想像，但台灣朝野何以卻避之若浼？葉公好龍，楚樹龍的一條龍尾，竟使台灣的好龍者進退失據。
如前所述，楚樹龍所說的「一國兩府」雖尚待仔細析論，但「一國兩府」的毛坯概念，卻應當正是兩岸未來解決方案中最核心的基本元素；問題只在如何對「一國」定義，而此處所稱的「一國」，應不是指「中華民國」或「中華人民共和國」，而當是指「第三概念的中國」，否則怎會有兩個「中央政府」？倘係如此，這樣的「一國兩府」或「一中兩府」，與歐盟模式或邦聯已庶幾近之；則為何要反對「兩岸互相承認及接受為中央政府」？為何要反對兩岸互稱對方領導人為「總統」及「國家主席」？我們不是曾為陳雲林稱馬英九為「先生」而吵成一團嗎？
北京國台辦說「這只是學者個人的意見」，但台灣竟然對北京當局亦未加批駁的「學者個人的意見」，似乎連一分鐘也不想讓它活下去；民進黨人說這就是要統一，國民黨人說這沒有照顧台灣人民情感，如此這般莫名其妙的三言兩語就把這條龍尾給趕跑了。台灣朝野若竟用如此荒謬的態度對待大陸「學者個人的意見」，試想如何期待北京當局有朝一日也提出類如「一國兩府」的主張，難道要北京用熱臉來貼台灣的冷屁股？
兩岸互動「先經後政／先易後難」的策略是正確的；但「先經後政」，並非即可永遠迴避政治方案，而是因政比經難，須用經濟來緩化、柔化、轉化政治關係。然而，倘若當經濟文化交流孕生出如「一國兩府」這類的構想，即使「只是學者個人的意見」，也應珍惜；一方面是因「一國兩府」已對現狀有了翻覆性的改善（互視為中央政府，互稱總統及主席）；另一方面，只要這類翻覆性的改善構想能成為兩岸非禁忌的政策議題，相激相盪，就極有可能由「只是學者個人的意見」成為主流思維。因此，我們不希望北京自此遏制這類「學者個人意見」，更認為台灣朝野若非但不鼓勵及參與這類改善構想的創發，反而竟如此不分青紅皂白地立即關上了借題討論的大門，這非但是荒謬至極，且不啻是在自蹙生機。
兩岸的社會及經貿交流已過了不可折返點。而兩岸的社會及經貿愈分不開，就愈應及早建立一個類如「一國兩府」、「和平協議」的「中程方案」，俾使「大陸的不統」與「台灣的不獨」，及「兩岸的不武」，可有相當期間的法制化與穩固化。因此，雖然「先經後政」，但不能拖到經濟社會關係已經完全「套住」，屆時台灣即可能對政治方案失去了議價條件。大陸可以拖到那一天，台灣卻絕不可拖到那一天。也就是說，台灣必須準確拿捏兩岸政治方案的「停損點」與「停利點」；今日若對「一國兩府」嗤之以鼻，來日卻有可能對「一國兩府」求之而不可得。正是：有花堪折直須折，莫待無花空折枝。
由民進黨的反應，可見「一國兩府」之類的構想，正是化解台獨論述的最有效處方。民進黨反對「一國兩府」，試問：能不能說，民進黨反對兩岸互相承認為中央政府？反對兩岸互稱對方領導人為總統及國家主席？反對兩岸關係可經「一國兩府」趨近歐盟化及邦聯的可能性？倘係如此，民進黨亦可將「中華旅行社」更名「台北經濟文化辦事處」，稱作「化妝後的統戰」。
即使楚樹龍的「一國兩府」只是「學者個人的意見」，我們仍歡迎這類有突破性的創見能成為兩岸無禁忌的政策議題，更期望兩岸關係能經由這類創見的交互激盪，由「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。因而，我們比較同意馬總統對此一事件的評論。他說：不管「一什麼，二什麼」的主張，都有其優、缺點，「但我覺得可以談，可以討論」，後來總統府發言人補正為「可以學術討論」。
從台灣駐港澳機構更名作起，兩岸關係應有更靈動的想像與更務實的作為，在此建議兩岸三黨回頭再看一看本報六月二十三日的社論〈和平協議就是中程方案〉。
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