Tsai Ing-wen: Why Has Nothing Worked Out As She Planned?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen finds herself in a quandary. She finds herself bound hand and foot by the Green Camp, by the public on Taiwan, by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. No matter which way she turns, nothing seems to work out as she planned. What Tsai Ing-wen is saying and doing today, is clearly different from what she was saying and doing in April 2008. Destiny invariably trumps the will of the individual. Tsai Ing-wen cannot go back. But if she simply hardens her heart, and continues along her current path, where in the world will she find herself?
Full Text below:
In May 2008, Tsai Ing-wen was elected DPP chairman. In April this year, a mere three years later, she bacame the DPP's presidential nominee. Tsai Ing-wen seems like an overnight success. She seems to be leading a charmed life. But people are discovering that Tsai Ing-wen's bubbles have been burst, time and time again. The contrast between her swift rise and her current frustration is truly fascinating.
Rampant Chen regime corruption and rash moves toward Taiwan independence brought the DPP to its nadir. That was Tsai Ing-wen's cue to step forward. Her mission was to rescue the DPP from the clutches of the old order, and to formulate a sensible and workable cross-Strait policy. Her words and deeds led people to expect great things from her. She probably expected the same things from herself. But as she ascended the ladder to the presidency, her words, her deeds, and her image began to undergo change. Apparently her mission changed too. Is Tsai Ing-wen saying the same thing today that she said in April 2008?
In 2008, when Tsai Ing-wen first became party chairman, she attempted to sever relations with Chen Shui-bian. But today she finds herself stuck to him like a tar baby. She is forced to answer questions about whether if elected president she will pardon Chen Shui-bian. This has become a real problem for her. In 2008, Tsai Ing-wen hoped to sever relations with Chen Shui-bian, She hoped to take advantage of unfolding events to transform the Taiwan independence movement. Now however, she finds it impossible to rid herself of Chen Shui-bian. Worse still, Taiwan independence forces have become her main support. Think back to when Chen Shui-bian first ran for president. Esteemed "Consultants on National Policy" were still willing to lend their reputations to the regime. Now however, Tsai Ing-wen finds herself surrounded by the likes of Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min, and other Taiwan independence zealots. Behind Tsai Ing-wen, one finds hordes of controversial figures. Perng Hui-nan turned her down. One cannot find a single new face around her. Was this really what she had in mind? Why has nothing worked out as she planned?
Nothing has worked out as she planned. Tsai Ing-wen would like to jettison Su Tseng-chang. But she can't. She does not want Su Chia-chuan as her vice presidential running mate. But she must settle for him regardless. Tsai Ing-wen's first choice for running mate was Perng Hui-nan or Lin Hsing-yi. But Perng Hui-nan and others were not eager to be drawn into the maelstrom. They had no desire to denounce the 1992 Consensus even as they reaffirmed ECFA. Perng Hui-nan might have consented to being another Tang Fei. But any change he could make would be more symbol than substance. Tsai Ing-wen came back to Su Tseng-chang as her running mate. But she was obviously doing everything possible to jettison him. On August 23, Tsai Ing-wen announced her "Taiwan Next: Platform for the Coming Decade." As a gesture, she invoked Su Tseng-chang's catchphrase, "Taiwanese consensus." On September 5, she floated the possibility of a "Tsai/Su meeting." She hoped media attention would force Su to accept her invitation. Nevertheless he refused. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen could neither jettison Su Tseng-chang nor recruit him. As we can see, Su Chia-chuan was not her first choice. But in the end, she was stuck with him. Here we must ask, why have none of Tsai Ing-wen's choices for running mate -- Perng Hui-nan, Su Tseng-chang, and Su Chia-chuan -- worked out as planned?
Tsai Ing-wen initially repudiated ECFA. Now she has no choice but to accept it. For her, this constitutes a major setback. For the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen catastrophically misjudged ECFA. She revealed her political myopia and blindness. She revealed her cross-Strait policy dilemma. Here again we must ask, Tsai Ing-wen hoped to repudiate ECFA. So why has nothing worked out as she planned?
Consider an even more important question. Tsai Ing-wen currently denounces the 1992 Consensus in no uncertain terms. Will this too fail to work out as she planned? Tsai Ing-wen can hardly rewind the clock, back to the beginning of the campaign, and recognize the 1992 Consensus. The question will have to wait until after the election. Will Tsai Ing-wen want to maintain cross-strait peaceful development? Will she want to maintain ECFA based cross-strait economic and trade exchanges? Beijing will use these to hold her hostage. Will she continue to insist that "The 1992 Consensus does not exist?"
When Tsai Ing-wen became DPP chairman in 2008, she declared that the Democratic Progressive Party was "an opposition political party with experience in governance," and that she would lead it accordingly. What she meant was that the DPP had been in power for eight years. Therefore it was aware of the trade-offs that have to made along the way. Therefore it would no longer make the same mistakes it did in the past. But in the three years since, Tsai Ing-wen has steadily ascended the ladder to the presidency. At the same time, she has been steadily regressing to where the DPP was eight years earlier. Not only has she not introduced anything new, she has made matters worse. Politically she has been unable to rid herself of the spectre of Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min, and other Taiwan independence zealots. In cross-strait policy, by repudiating the 1992 Consensus, she has painted herself into a corner. Tsai Ing-wen never expected to paint herself into such a corner. So why has she repeatedly done just that?
Tsai Ing-wen finds herself in a quandary. She finds herself bound hand and foot by the Green Camp, by the public on Taiwan, and by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. No matter which way she turns, nothing seems to work out as she planned. What Tsai Ing-wen is saying and doing today, is clearly different from what she was saying and doing in April 2008. Destiny invariably trumps the will of the individual. Tsai Ing-wen cannot go back. But if she simply hardens her heart, and continues along her current path, where in the world will she find herself?
蔡英文何以總是心想事不成？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.14
蔡英文自二○○八年五月當選民進黨主席，至今年四月短短三年即成為民進黨提名的總統候選人。這使得蔡英文看似扶搖直上，但在一路走來奇蹟儼然逐漸呈現之時，國人卻也一次又一次地發現，蔡英文的初始心願已一個接著一個破滅。對比鮮明，頗可玩味。
蔡英文是在扁朝奇貪巨腐及操弄台獨所造成的民進黨政治谷底出線，她的主要使命是在帶領民進黨跳脫老舊勢力，並在兩岸政策上尋找一條合理可行的道路。當年，她在外觀言行形象上使國人對她產生此種想像，這也應是她自我期許的初始心願。但是，當她攀登上總統參選人的頂峰之此時，她的言行形象卻幾乎完全脫形走樣，恐怕距她自己的初始心願亦已是天壤之別。此時蔡英文的所言所行，還是二○○八年四月間的蔡英文嗎？
二○○八年蔡英文始任黨主席時，可以看出她欲與陳水扁切割的種種努力；但如今她不只與扁難分難捨，且「當選後是否特赦陳水扁」，已成為她必須面對的難題。在二○○八年，蔡英文原想切割陳水扁，並順勢改造台獨勢力；但如今她非但甩不掉陳水扁，台獨勢力亦仍是她背後的主要支持者。回顧陳水扁首次競選總統時，尚有「國政顧問團」的清流助陣；但是，蔡英文今日，卻仍陷在「扁李謝辜獨」的包圍之中。在蔡英文背後，扁朝的爭議性人物一個也沒有少；又因彭淮南拒絕了她，在她身旁竟連「一張」新面孔也看不到。這豈是蔡英文的初始心願，問題是：她何以未能心想事成？
事與願違，也出現在蔡英文想甩掉蘇貞昌卻甩不掉，後來則不想用蘇嘉全卻又不能不退而求其次。蔡英文對副手的優先選擇，應是彭淮南、林信義等；但可為彭淮南等慶幸者是，他們畢竟仍知不能一頭栽進「否認九二共識，維持ＥＣＦＡ」的漩渦中。何況，即使「彭淮南」作了蔡英文的「唐飛」，恐怕也是治標難治本。至於蔡英文回過頭來爭取蘇貞昌做副手，則顯示她百般想要甩掉蘇貞昌卻甩不掉；八月二十三日，蔡英文宣布《十年政綱》兩岸篇，用了蘇貞昌的旗號〈台灣共識〉，已是向蘇表態交心；再至洩漏九月五日「蔡蘇會」，則是想藉新聞造成事實，以勉強蘇貞昌接受，但仍遭拒絕。如此這般，蔡想甩掉蘇貞昌卻甩不掉，想挽回蘇貞昌又挽不回；亦可見蘇嘉全當然不是蔡的優先選擇，最後又不能不退而求其次。此處可問：為何蔡英文對彭淮南、蘇貞昌及蘇嘉全，皆是心想事不成？
蔡英文起初想要全盤否定ＥＣＦＡ，如今竟至不能不接受，這對她更是事與願違的重大挫折。蔡英文在兩年之間，對ＥＣＦＡ出現天差地別的錯誤判斷，不只顯示她在政治認知上的短視與盲點，也完全暴露出她在兩岸政策上已是進退失據。此處亦可問：何以蔡英文想否定ＥＣＦＡ，卻心想事不成？
接下來，更重大的問題是：蔡英文如今嚴詞否認「九二共識」，會不會又是難如其願？依當下情勢看來，蔡英文已無可能在選前回過頭來接受「九二共識」；這個問題將留待蔡英文若當選才會被迫面對，屆時蔡英文若想維持兩岸「和平發展」，維持以ＥＣＦＡ為主體的兩岸經貿交流，她會不會在北京的挾持下，又無以堅持「否認九二共識」？
蔡英文在二○○八年初任黨主席時，宣示她將帶領民進黨「作一個有執政經驗的反對黨」；其意是指，既曾執政八年，即知興替得失之道，不會再蹈覆轍。但是，三年來的蔡英文，一方面一步步登上總統參選人的政治高峰，卻竟而也一步一步走回民進黨執政八年的覆轍，非但了無新意，甚且是變本加厲。她在政治支持上甩不掉「扁李謝辜獨」的「背後靈」，在兩岸政策上亦將自己用油漆刷進「否認九二共識」的牆角。此種處境，應當皆非蔡英文的初始心願，但何以一而再、再而三的事與願違，以致事事皆弄得身不由己，進退失據？
此際的蔡英文，在綠營內部、台灣社會及兩岸之間，處處面對心想事不成的困境；此時的蔡英文，其所言所行，顯然已迥異二○○八年四月間的蔡英文。形勢比人強，蔡英文回不去了；但倘若就此橫了心，不斷事與願違地走下去，將伊於胡底？
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Ing/Chia Ticket Formed: Factional Struggles Coming
Ing/Chia Ticket Formed: Factional Struggles Coming
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2011
Summary: No need to wait until Wikileaks blows the whistle. People know perfectly well they cannot believe what politicians say. Take for example DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's choice of running mate. Originally her goal was to expand the base of voter support. But less than a month later, her goal was to form a "Ing/Chia ticket" to consolidate support within party, and win over swing voters and middle-aged voters. The election climate did not change that much during this time. So why the 189 degree about face? Ultimately what goals are the most important?
Full Text below:
No need to wait until Wikileaks blows the whistle. People know perfectly well they cannot believe what politicians say. Take for example DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's choice of running mate. Originally her goal was to expand the base of voter support. But less than a month later, her goal was to form a "Ing/Chia ticket" to consolidate support within party, and win over swing voters and middle-aged voters. The election climate did not change that much during this time. So why the 189 degree about face? Ultimately what goals are the most important?
Su Chia-chuan was born in the 1950s. If he becomes Tsai Ing-wen's vice presidential running mate, does that constitute generational change? If so, what would it have meant if Su Tseng-chang had become her vice presidential running mate? Is this really the time to trumpet generational change? Is this not a good time to go after voters in central Taiwan? Political rhetoric is tossed about much too casually. Voters cannot take it too seriously.
So much politically expedient rhetoric has been tossed about while Tsai Ing-wen was choosing her running mate. The main reason is that Tsai Ing-wen misjudged the situation from Day One. Tsai and the DPP's first choice for vice presidential running mate was of course Central Bank President Perng Huai-nan. The DPP lacks people with financial and economics expertise. He could have filled that gap. He could have provided "adult supervision," the reassuring presence of an experienced veteran, watching over the nation. These were all qualities that would have attracted swing voters to the DPP. But would Perng Hui-nan assent? That, as it turned out, was something the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen could not control. They misjudged the situation. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen's choice of vice presidential running mate was delayed nearly two months.
Had Perng given the nod, he would have solved all the DPP's problems. But when Perng didn't, he opened up a can of worms. Because Perng Hui-nan was the only candidate for which the DPP was in agreement. Even Tsai Ing-wen herself remains controversial among party elders.
Take Su Tseng-chang for example. According to polls he has the most momentum. Most DPP members and factions consider him their first choice for Tsai's vice presidential running mate. Tsai Ing-wen asked Su Tseng-chang to be her vice presidential running mate on September 2. She obviously did so in response to collective sentiment. She characterized it as a "bold gesture." On September 8, Su Tseng-chang held a press conference, during which he turned her down. The very next day, Tsai Ing-wen announced that Su Chia-chuan would be her running mate. As the sequence of events shows, Tsai Ing-wen had already settled on Su Chia-chuan. She asked Su Tseng-chang merely as a pro forma gesture.
It was just as well that Su Tseng-change turned down the vice presidential spot. He said many times in the past that he would not serve as vice president. Had he not turned it down, he would have lost credibility, and have had little positive impact on the election. But within the DPP, being true to one's word is meaningless. Think back to last year's Five Cities Elections. The consensus within the DPP was that whoever wanted a shot at the presidency would have to negotiate the gauntlet of the Five Cities Elections. Does this reasoning show any respect for the voters' feelings?
Despite high-minded rhetoric, the DPP has never transcended factionalism. DPP factions are not working with each other to win the election. On the contrary, DPP elders have their own axes to grind, Su Tseng-chang wants to build momentum for a run at the presidency in 2016. Rival Frank Hsieh is not about to let Su have his way. Su Chia-chuan's candidacy is being spun as generational change. In fact his candidacy is backed by Frank Hsieh. This hardly constitutes passing the torch. The New Tide Faction has the most middle-aged party leaders. But they fully support party elder Su Tseng-chang, They show no signs of wanting generational change.
Soon after Tsai Ing-wen took over as party chairman. she boasted that the era of the party princes was over. But two years later, not a single party prince has surrendered his claim to the throne. Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, Yu Shyi-kun all maintain their own standing armies. On the surface, the factions defer to Tsai Ing-wen. But beneath the surface, they continue expanding their power. DPP factions have become "10,000 year factions."
Over the past two years, the DPP has ostensibly been reborn, like a phoenix rising from the ashes. But in fact it is the same old DPP. This means that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected president in 2012, she will face the same DPP that Chen Shui-bian faced in 2008. DPP factions are adept at advancing their own interests. Will they cooperate with the party chairman and adopt the path of moderation whiled dealing with the affairs of state? That remains to be seen.
Conversely, if Tsai Ing-wen loses in 2012, she will be a classic example of a fleeting phenomenon. Her tenure and whatever she accomplished as party chairman during her tenure, will be like a ship passing through the water. No trace will remain behind. A naked factional power struggle is about to erupt within the party. No faction is powerful enough to swallow up its rivals. Therefore at best they will arrive at a balance of terror. At worst, they will engage in a never-ending power struggle.
Tsai Ing-wen was too cavalier about the backlash from within her own party when she compiled her list of nominees for legislator wihout portfolio. Factional leaders have even begun questioning Tsai Ing-wen's ability to govern. Her inexperience showed during her vice presidential running mate selection process. Party princes began wondering whether the Tsai Ing-wen era had arrived a little too early. A presidential candidate's choice of vice presidential running mate is not that important. But the selection process must be handled properly. If not, Tsai Ing-wen could suffer serious political damage.
英嘉配成形 派系角力蠢蠢欲動
2011-09-12 中國時報
不必等到維基解密爆料，政客公開講話能信幾分，民眾其實心知肚明；就以民進黨總統參選人蔡英文挑選副手為例，原來目標還是擴大社會基礎，不到一個月時間，為了配合「英嘉配」成形，蔡挑副手的原則一轉成為鞏固黨內、力搶中間票、中生代接班。在這段時間，選情並未有太大變化，為何前後出現一百八十度轉折，到底哪個原則才真的重要？
假如找四年級生的蘇嘉全擔任副手，就算是中生代接班，那麼，如果蘇貞昌肯擔任副手、另一組蔡蘇配成形時，又代表什麼意義？這時候還能大力鼓吹世代交替嗎？此時難道就不利搶攻中部票源。可見，政治語言是隨便人說的，選民真的不能太當真。
蔡英文挑副手，會出現這麼多的權宜性語言，最主要的根源在於：蔡英文一開始就錯估情勢。蔡及民進黨心目中第一目標人選，當然是央行總裁彭淮南，一來可以彌補民進黨財政專業不足的缺口，另外也有老臣謀國的意涵，都有利於民進黨爭取中間選票，但是彭淮南會不會點頭，卻不是民進黨或蔡英文可以操之在己的變數。一個錯誤的情勢研判，就讓蔡英文的副手，慢了將近兩個月無法出爐。
彭淮南若點頭，可以解決民進黨所有的問題，但當彭淮南只能拒絕，就掀開了民進黨的潘朵拉盒子，因為在彭淮南之外的其他人選，則不但民進黨內沒有共識，甚至蔡英文和黨內大老之間，只怕也有異見。
就以當前民調聲勢最高的蘇貞昌為例，他應當是多數民進黨人士及派系認可的人選，蔡英文顯然是出於尊重集體決策的考量，才於九月二日首度邀請蘇貞昌出任副手，並且自稱是「斗膽一試」，蘇貞昌九月八日舉行記者會拒絕後，蔡英文也立即在隔日宣布蘇嘉全為副手人選。這些過程在在都可以顯示，蔡英文已經內定蘇嘉全，她之邀請蘇貞昌，象徵大於實質意義。
蘇貞昌婉拒接受副手時說得好：過去他已多次講過不出任副手，現在如果沒有誠信，對選戰加分效果有限。只是，對民進黨而言，誠信原則並沒有太大的意義，還記得去年五都選舉，民進黨的集體聲音是，誰想爭取總統大位，就要先過五都這一關，這樣的邏輯，哪有將五都選民的誠信放在心中。
所以，在這些美麗詞藻背後所揭露出的民進黨，並非打破派系、同心協力打選戰；相反的，民進黨大老在助選時各懷鬼胎，蘇貞昌想的是挾高聲勢準備衝向二○一六，但是他的死對頭謝長廷卻不可能讓他稱心如意；事實上，蘇嘉全擔任副手、號稱是中生代接班，但在他背後，則有大老謝長廷支持，這很難謂之為交棒；同樣的，新潮流有最多的中生代，但他們全力支持大老蘇貞昌，看不出樂見世代交替。
蔡英文接任黨主席不久，就揚言天王的時代已經過去，但二年多下來，沒有一位天王退位，謝長廷、蘇貞昌、游錫?都還是各擁重兵；同樣的，各派系表面上尊重蔡英文，但是私底下力圖擴充實力，派系反而有成為萬年派閥的趨勢。
可以說，這兩年來，民進黨表面上浴火重生，但骨子裡還是原來的老民進黨，透露出的意涵是，如果蔡英文當選二○一二年總統，她面對的仍是陳水扁二千年時面對的民進黨。擅長計算利害的民進黨各派系，能不能和同黨總統同步、以中道處理國政，仍有待觀察。
相反的，如果蔡英文二○一二年落敗，她將是典型的過客，黨主席任內所作所為，可能是船過水無痕，赤裸裸的派系角力會立即上場，由於沒有任何一方有併吞對方的超強實力，因此最好的狀況是彼此恐怖平衡，最壞的狀況可能是沒完沒了的黨內權力鬥爭。
事實上，由於蔡英文在處理不分區立委名單時，對黨內反彈太過輕率，黨內各山頭已經開始懷疑蔡英文的能力；而這次挑選副手過程的生嫩，可能提醒天王們，後蔡英文時代提前出現的可能性；可以說，副手人選其實無甚大用，但挑選副手的過程處理不當，確實對蔡英文有很大的殺傷力。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2011
Summary: No need to wait until Wikileaks blows the whistle. People know perfectly well they cannot believe what politicians say. Take for example DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's choice of running mate. Originally her goal was to expand the base of voter support. But less than a month later, her goal was to form a "Ing/Chia ticket" to consolidate support within party, and win over swing voters and middle-aged voters. The election climate did not change that much during this time. So why the 189 degree about face? Ultimately what goals are the most important?
Full Text below:
No need to wait until Wikileaks blows the whistle. People know perfectly well they cannot believe what politicians say. Take for example DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's choice of running mate. Originally her goal was to expand the base of voter support. But less than a month later, her goal was to form a "Ing/Chia ticket" to consolidate support within party, and win over swing voters and middle-aged voters. The election climate did not change that much during this time. So why the 189 degree about face? Ultimately what goals are the most important?
Su Chia-chuan was born in the 1950s. If he becomes Tsai Ing-wen's vice presidential running mate, does that constitute generational change? If so, what would it have meant if Su Tseng-chang had become her vice presidential running mate? Is this really the time to trumpet generational change? Is this not a good time to go after voters in central Taiwan? Political rhetoric is tossed about much too casually. Voters cannot take it too seriously.
So much politically expedient rhetoric has been tossed about while Tsai Ing-wen was choosing her running mate. The main reason is that Tsai Ing-wen misjudged the situation from Day One. Tsai and the DPP's first choice for vice presidential running mate was of course Central Bank President Perng Huai-nan. The DPP lacks people with financial and economics expertise. He could have filled that gap. He could have provided "adult supervision," the reassuring presence of an experienced veteran, watching over the nation. These were all qualities that would have attracted swing voters to the DPP. But would Perng Hui-nan assent? That, as it turned out, was something the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen could not control. They misjudged the situation. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen's choice of vice presidential running mate was delayed nearly two months.
Had Perng given the nod, he would have solved all the DPP's problems. But when Perng didn't, he opened up a can of worms. Because Perng Hui-nan was the only candidate for which the DPP was in agreement. Even Tsai Ing-wen herself remains controversial among party elders.
Take Su Tseng-chang for example. According to polls he has the most momentum. Most DPP members and factions consider him their first choice for Tsai's vice presidential running mate. Tsai Ing-wen asked Su Tseng-chang to be her vice presidential running mate on September 2. She obviously did so in response to collective sentiment. She characterized it as a "bold gesture." On September 8, Su Tseng-chang held a press conference, during which he turned her down. The very next day, Tsai Ing-wen announced that Su Chia-chuan would be her running mate. As the sequence of events shows, Tsai Ing-wen had already settled on Su Chia-chuan. She asked Su Tseng-chang merely as a pro forma gesture.
It was just as well that Su Tseng-change turned down the vice presidential spot. He said many times in the past that he would not serve as vice president. Had he not turned it down, he would have lost credibility, and have had little positive impact on the election. But within the DPP, being true to one's word is meaningless. Think back to last year's Five Cities Elections. The consensus within the DPP was that whoever wanted a shot at the presidency would have to negotiate the gauntlet of the Five Cities Elections. Does this reasoning show any respect for the voters' feelings?
Despite high-minded rhetoric, the DPP has never transcended factionalism. DPP factions are not working with each other to win the election. On the contrary, DPP elders have their own axes to grind, Su Tseng-chang wants to build momentum for a run at the presidency in 2016. Rival Frank Hsieh is not about to let Su have his way. Su Chia-chuan's candidacy is being spun as generational change. In fact his candidacy is backed by Frank Hsieh. This hardly constitutes passing the torch. The New Tide Faction has the most middle-aged party leaders. But they fully support party elder Su Tseng-chang, They show no signs of wanting generational change.
Soon after Tsai Ing-wen took over as party chairman. she boasted that the era of the party princes was over. But two years later, not a single party prince has surrendered his claim to the throne. Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, Yu Shyi-kun all maintain their own standing armies. On the surface, the factions defer to Tsai Ing-wen. But beneath the surface, they continue expanding their power. DPP factions have become "10,000 year factions."
Over the past two years, the DPP has ostensibly been reborn, like a phoenix rising from the ashes. But in fact it is the same old DPP. This means that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected president in 2012, she will face the same DPP that Chen Shui-bian faced in 2008. DPP factions are adept at advancing their own interests. Will they cooperate with the party chairman and adopt the path of moderation whiled dealing with the affairs of state? That remains to be seen.
Conversely, if Tsai Ing-wen loses in 2012, she will be a classic example of a fleeting phenomenon. Her tenure and whatever she accomplished as party chairman during her tenure, will be like a ship passing through the water. No trace will remain behind. A naked factional power struggle is about to erupt within the party. No faction is powerful enough to swallow up its rivals. Therefore at best they will arrive at a balance of terror. At worst, they will engage in a never-ending power struggle.
Tsai Ing-wen was too cavalier about the backlash from within her own party when she compiled her list of nominees for legislator wihout portfolio. Factional leaders have even begun questioning Tsai Ing-wen's ability to govern. Her inexperience showed during her vice presidential running mate selection process. Party princes began wondering whether the Tsai Ing-wen era had arrived a little too early. A presidential candidate's choice of vice presidential running mate is not that important. But the selection process must be handled properly. If not, Tsai Ing-wen could suffer serious political damage.
英嘉配成形 派系角力蠢蠢欲動
2011-09-12 中國時報
不必等到維基解密爆料，政客公開講話能信幾分，民眾其實心知肚明；就以民進黨總統參選人蔡英文挑選副手為例，原來目標還是擴大社會基礎，不到一個月時間，為了配合「英嘉配」成形，蔡挑副手的原則一轉成為鞏固黨內、力搶中間票、中生代接班。在這段時間，選情並未有太大變化，為何前後出現一百八十度轉折，到底哪個原則才真的重要？
假如找四年級生的蘇嘉全擔任副手，就算是中生代接班，那麼，如果蘇貞昌肯擔任副手、另一組蔡蘇配成形時，又代表什麼意義？這時候還能大力鼓吹世代交替嗎？此時難道就不利搶攻中部票源。可見，政治語言是隨便人說的，選民真的不能太當真。
蔡英文挑副手，會出現這麼多的權宜性語言，最主要的根源在於：蔡英文一開始就錯估情勢。蔡及民進黨心目中第一目標人選，當然是央行總裁彭淮南，一來可以彌補民進黨財政專業不足的缺口，另外也有老臣謀國的意涵，都有利於民進黨爭取中間選票，但是彭淮南會不會點頭，卻不是民進黨或蔡英文可以操之在己的變數。一個錯誤的情勢研判，就讓蔡英文的副手，慢了將近兩個月無法出爐。
彭淮南若點頭，可以解決民進黨所有的問題，但當彭淮南只能拒絕，就掀開了民進黨的潘朵拉盒子，因為在彭淮南之外的其他人選，則不但民進黨內沒有共識，甚至蔡英文和黨內大老之間，只怕也有異見。
就以當前民調聲勢最高的蘇貞昌為例，他應當是多數民進黨人士及派系認可的人選，蔡英文顯然是出於尊重集體決策的考量，才於九月二日首度邀請蘇貞昌出任副手，並且自稱是「斗膽一試」，蘇貞昌九月八日舉行記者會拒絕後，蔡英文也立即在隔日宣布蘇嘉全為副手人選。這些過程在在都可以顯示，蔡英文已經內定蘇嘉全，她之邀請蘇貞昌，象徵大於實質意義。
蘇貞昌婉拒接受副手時說得好：過去他已多次講過不出任副手，現在如果沒有誠信，對選戰加分效果有限。只是，對民進黨而言，誠信原則並沒有太大的意義，還記得去年五都選舉，民進黨的集體聲音是，誰想爭取總統大位，就要先過五都這一關，這樣的邏輯，哪有將五都選民的誠信放在心中。
所以，在這些美麗詞藻背後所揭露出的民進黨，並非打破派系、同心協力打選戰；相反的，民進黨大老在助選時各懷鬼胎，蘇貞昌想的是挾高聲勢準備衝向二○一六，但是他的死對頭謝長廷卻不可能讓他稱心如意；事實上，蘇嘉全擔任副手、號稱是中生代接班，但在他背後，則有大老謝長廷支持，這很難謂之為交棒；同樣的，新潮流有最多的中生代，但他們全力支持大老蘇貞昌，看不出樂見世代交替。
蔡英文接任黨主席不久，就揚言天王的時代已經過去，但二年多下來，沒有一位天王退位，謝長廷、蘇貞昌、游錫?都還是各擁重兵；同樣的，各派系表面上尊重蔡英文，但是私底下力圖擴充實力，派系反而有成為萬年派閥的趨勢。
可以說，這兩年來，民進黨表面上浴火重生，但骨子裡還是原來的老民進黨，透露出的意涵是，如果蔡英文當選二○一二年總統，她面對的仍是陳水扁二千年時面對的民進黨。擅長計算利害的民進黨各派系，能不能和同黨總統同步、以中道處理國政，仍有待觀察。
相反的，如果蔡英文二○一二年落敗，她將是典型的過客，黨主席任內所作所為，可能是船過水無痕，赤裸裸的派系角力會立即上場，由於沒有任何一方有併吞對方的超強實力，因此最好的狀況是彼此恐怖平衡，最壞的狀況可能是沒完沒了的黨內權力鬥爭。
事實上，由於蔡英文在處理不分區立委名單時，對黨內反彈太過輕率，黨內各山頭已經開始懷疑蔡英文的能力；而這次挑選副手過程的生嫩，可能提醒天王們，後蔡英文時代提前出現的可能性；可以說，副手人選其實無甚大用，但挑選副手的過程處理不當，確實對蔡英文有很大的殺傷力。
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Even the Best Policies Must be Properly Implemented
Even the Best Policies Must be Properly Implemented
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 9, 2011
Summary: Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
Full Text below:
Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has become an insoluble nighmare for Taipei City and Xinbei City. But closer examination reveals that this Single Guideline, Single Text educational policy was well-intended. It tried to alleviate the burden on students and parents imposed by the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. The Single Guideline, Single Text policy was supported by most county and municipal leaders. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination adopted the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. It conserved Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City educational resources. Past joint examinations on Taiwan used a regionally based joint examination approach. When Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City adopted something other than the nationally based Basic Competency Tests approach, it was nothing new, Candidates and parents accepted it without complaint.
But in 2011 the first Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination was held. Controversy erupted over "high scores, low achievement" and "increased admissions." Students and parents complained. A backlash developed. When the controversy first erupted, Taipei City insisted it would continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach during the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. But the opposition was too intense, The Ministry of Education explicity called for a halt to the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination, and a return to the nationally based Basic Competency Tests.
But problems have arisen. Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have nearly 100,000 students under the Single Guideline, Single Text policy. Other cities and counties have students under the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. Many Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keeling City students and their parents are worried. Next year's Basic Competency Tests are only a few months away. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have read only one text. How will they compete against students who have read multiple texts, and who are taking the nationally based Basic Competency Tests? In order to reassure concerned parents, Taipei City held briefings. Mayor Hau Lung-bin and educational authorities personally briefed junior high school teachers and parents. Other counties and municipalities talk about the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts approach. But in reality most of them have settled on a single text. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City need not worry that other students are reading multiple texts, while they are reading only one text. The nationally based Basic Competency Tests have been held for many years. In principle, they test the guidelines, not the texts. In other words, regardless of which version candidates are using, they can participate in the Basic Competency Tests.
Taipei City and educational authorities have issued repeated assurances. They hope students and parents will not worry excessively. But Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City did exceed their brief. Officials may issue assurances. But the results remain to be seen. Taipei City took the lead in adopting the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. Sad to say, Taipei City is already a casualty, The examination and distribution system experienced technical difficulties. It is now uncertain whether they will continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. Apparently everything is up for grabs. Suppose one day, even the Single Guideline, Single Text policy is set aside. Everything returns to where it was years ago, Local government leaders' political prestige will not be the only thing to take a hit. The hard-won educational policies achieved over the years will collapse, Each year hundreds of thousands of students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City will be affected. Their educational system will face dramatic change. Educational policy has a significant long term impact on students, parents, and educational institutions that must not be overlooked. Before any policy is implemented, it must be carefully tested for leaks. Clearly Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City failed to do so on behalf of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations.
Let this experience be a reminder to those in power. One's policies may be well-intentioned, But if they are not implemented properly, the public will not understand or support them. Once the government loses the public trust, remedial measures will be perceived as ad-libbing, as evidence of insufficient long-term planning, The government will naturally find it hard to regain the public trust .
Parents of students taking examinations have concerns and sensitivities that exceed many politician's expectations. This incident proves they must not be ignored. It matters not whether we are talking about Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City. Twelve year national compulsory education will be officially implemented in 2012 and December 2013. How will examinations be held in 2014? How will school admissions be administered? How will Basic Competency Tests, school performance, Educational Examinations, written tests and skill tests be administered? Who will be exempt from testing? How will applications be processed? How will special talents be determined? Many parents and students are still confused. Central and local government educational authorities must take time to explain. They must not allow a replay of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations fiasco.
政策立意再好也必須妥善執行
2011-09-09 中國時報
《遠見雜誌》最新發布的縣市長滿意度調查顯示，台北市市長郝龍斌排名較前次調查退步，落居倒數第三，而新北市和基隆市的滿意度也殿後，綠營批評「北北基生活圈」已成為台灣後段班。然而，弔詭的卻是，在同一份調查中，台北市卻又拿下「經濟與就業、環保、交通、醫療衛生、政府財源」這五項指標的第一名，新北市也高居第二名；城市競爭力高，民眾滿意度奇低，這到底是怎麼一回事？北市自己的解釋是因為民調的時間點剛好是在「北北基聯測爭議期」，民眾觀感不佳，造成民調大跌。
北北基聯測似乎已成了雙北揮之難去的夢魘，但細究起來，這項從「一綱一本」開始的教育政策其實是本於善念出發的。當初之所以這麼做，為的是減輕學生「一綱多本」的壓力和家長的負擔，推動「一綱一本」教學，此舉並得到多個縣市的認同，之後進一步推動基於一綱一本的北北基聯測，從某個角度來說，這麼做也是保護和保障北北基學生的教學資源。過往台灣舉行聯考之初，曾經歷過分區聯招的做法，因此北北基舉行有別於全國基測的區域聯測，並非創舉，考生和家長也都還能接受。
然而，二○一一年北北基第一次聯測後，卻發生諸如「高分低就」、「增額錄取」等爭議，引起考生與家長的抱怨、甚至反彈。儘管事件剛發生時，台北市仍堅持明年會繼續就一綱一本舉辦北北基的聯測，然因反對聲浪過大，教育部已於日前明確要求北北基聯測停辦，回歸全國基測。
但是，問題來了，北北基近十萬名學生讀的是一綱中的「一本」，其他縣市的學生讀的是一綱「多本」，許多北北基的考生和家長不禁擔心，距離明年基測就只有幾個月的時間了，只讀一本的北北基學生要怎麼拚讀多本的全國考生？為了讓關心教育和考試的家長安心，台北市舉辦了說明會，市長郝龍斌和教育主管機關親自跟國中老師和家長解釋，其實其他縣市雖然講是講一綱多本，但大部分也都是選擇一本；而北北基學生不用擔心「別人多本、自己卻只有一本」的另一個理由是，全國基測考試已經實施了多年，命題原則是考綱不考本，也就是說，不論考生用的是哪一個版本，都可以參加基測考試。
然而，即使台北市和教育主管一再保證，希望家長及考生不用太擔心，不過，畢竟今年的北北基的確就是出了包，官方保證效果如何，實在有待觀察。令人唏噓的是，不但由台北市帶頭的北北基聯測已經陣亡，由於考試與分發技術出了問題，現在甚至於連要不要繼續實施一綱一本，似乎都已經出現了很大的討論空間，如果有一天，連一綱一本也作廢了，一切又回到多年前的原點，那就不只是地方首長的政治聲望受到打擊、堅持多年爭取的新教育政策瓦解，每年北北基的十萬考生的學習方式和教育生態也將面臨改變。教育政策有長期效果，對學生與家長、教育機構的權益會造成重大影響，輕忽不得，任何政策在實施之前都必須詳考再三，務必做到「滴水不漏」，但顯然這次北北基聯測做的還不夠到位。
這個經驗也提醒了執政者，即使在基本面上立意良善的政策，若在技術面上出現疏失，可能也就得不到民眾的體諒與支持，一旦政府失去人民的信任，而後不論提出什麼樣的補救措施，往往被認為是臨時起意，缺乏長遠規畫，當然也就不容易贏得信任。
這個事件顯示，台灣家長對學生考試、入學的關注與敏感程度可能超過許多為政者的預期，實在不可輕忽。不論是北北基還是非北北基，一○一年和一○二年十二年國教正式實施前和一○三年實施後要怎麼考，有什麼入學方式，「基測」和「在校成績」、「教育會考」和「學科、術科測驗」到底如何進行，「免試」、「申請」和「特色」招生，等等，錯綜複雜，很多家長和學生仍一頭霧水─拜託中央及地方教育主管當局務必不厭其煩，說清楚、講明白，不要讓「北北基大亂鬥」再出現了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 9, 2011
Summary: Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
Full Text below:
Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has become an insoluble nighmare for Taipei City and Xinbei City. But closer examination reveals that this Single Guideline, Single Text educational policy was well-intended. It tried to alleviate the burden on students and parents imposed by the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. The Single Guideline, Single Text policy was supported by most county and municipal leaders. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination adopted the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. It conserved Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City educational resources. Past joint examinations on Taiwan used a regionally based joint examination approach. When Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City adopted something other than the nationally based Basic Competency Tests approach, it was nothing new, Candidates and parents accepted it without complaint.
But in 2011 the first Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination was held. Controversy erupted over "high scores, low achievement" and "increased admissions." Students and parents complained. A backlash developed. When the controversy first erupted, Taipei City insisted it would continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach during the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. But the opposition was too intense, The Ministry of Education explicity called for a halt to the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination, and a return to the nationally based Basic Competency Tests.
But problems have arisen. Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have nearly 100,000 students under the Single Guideline, Single Text policy. Other cities and counties have students under the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. Many Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keeling City students and their parents are worried. Next year's Basic Competency Tests are only a few months away. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have read only one text. How will they compete against students who have read multiple texts, and who are taking the nationally based Basic Competency Tests? In order to reassure concerned parents, Taipei City held briefings. Mayor Hau Lung-bin and educational authorities personally briefed junior high school teachers and parents. Other counties and municipalities talk about the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts approach. But in reality most of them have settled on a single text. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City need not worry that other students are reading multiple texts, while they are reading only one text. The nationally based Basic Competency Tests have been held for many years. In principle, they test the guidelines, not the texts. In other words, regardless of which version candidates are using, they can participate in the Basic Competency Tests.
Taipei City and educational authorities have issued repeated assurances. They hope students and parents will not worry excessively. But Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City did exceed their brief. Officials may issue assurances. But the results remain to be seen. Taipei City took the lead in adopting the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. Sad to say, Taipei City is already a casualty, The examination and distribution system experienced technical difficulties. It is now uncertain whether they will continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. Apparently everything is up for grabs. Suppose one day, even the Single Guideline, Single Text policy is set aside. Everything returns to where it was years ago, Local government leaders' political prestige will not be the only thing to take a hit. The hard-won educational policies achieved over the years will collapse, Each year hundreds of thousands of students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City will be affected. Their educational system will face dramatic change. Educational policy has a significant long term impact on students, parents, and educational institutions that must not be overlooked. Before any policy is implemented, it must be carefully tested for leaks. Clearly Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City failed to do so on behalf of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations.
Let this experience be a reminder to those in power. One's policies may be well-intentioned, But if they are not implemented properly, the public will not understand or support them. Once the government loses the public trust, remedial measures will be perceived as ad-libbing, as evidence of insufficient long-term planning, The government will naturally find it hard to regain the public trust .
Parents of students taking examinations have concerns and sensitivities that exceed many politician's expectations. This incident proves they must not be ignored. It matters not whether we are talking about Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City. Twelve year national compulsory education will be officially implemented in 2012 and December 2013. How will examinations be held in 2014? How will school admissions be administered? How will Basic Competency Tests, school performance, Educational Examinations, written tests and skill tests be administered? Who will be exempt from testing? How will applications be processed? How will special talents be determined? Many parents and students are still confused. Central and local government educational authorities must take time to explain. They must not allow a replay of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations fiasco.
政策立意再好也必須妥善執行
2011-09-09 中國時報
《遠見雜誌》最新發布的縣市長滿意度調查顯示，台北市市長郝龍斌排名較前次調查退步，落居倒數第三，而新北市和基隆市的滿意度也殿後，綠營批評「北北基生活圈」已成為台灣後段班。然而，弔詭的卻是，在同一份調查中，台北市卻又拿下「經濟與就業、環保、交通、醫療衛生、政府財源」這五項指標的第一名，新北市也高居第二名；城市競爭力高，民眾滿意度奇低，這到底是怎麼一回事？北市自己的解釋是因為民調的時間點剛好是在「北北基聯測爭議期」，民眾觀感不佳，造成民調大跌。
北北基聯測似乎已成了雙北揮之難去的夢魘，但細究起來，這項從「一綱一本」開始的教育政策其實是本於善念出發的。當初之所以這麼做，為的是減輕學生「一綱多本」的壓力和家長的負擔，推動「一綱一本」教學，此舉並得到多個縣市的認同，之後進一步推動基於一綱一本的北北基聯測，從某個角度來說，這麼做也是保護和保障北北基學生的教學資源。過往台灣舉行聯考之初，曾經歷過分區聯招的做法，因此北北基舉行有別於全國基測的區域聯測，並非創舉，考生和家長也都還能接受。
然而，二○一一年北北基第一次聯測後，卻發生諸如「高分低就」、「增額錄取」等爭議，引起考生與家長的抱怨、甚至反彈。儘管事件剛發生時，台北市仍堅持明年會繼續就一綱一本舉辦北北基的聯測，然因反對聲浪過大，教育部已於日前明確要求北北基聯測停辦，回歸全國基測。
但是，問題來了，北北基近十萬名學生讀的是一綱中的「一本」，其他縣市的學生讀的是一綱「多本」，許多北北基的考生和家長不禁擔心，距離明年基測就只有幾個月的時間了，只讀一本的北北基學生要怎麼拚讀多本的全國考生？為了讓關心教育和考試的家長安心，台北市舉辦了說明會，市長郝龍斌和教育主管機關親自跟國中老師和家長解釋，其實其他縣市雖然講是講一綱多本，但大部分也都是選擇一本；而北北基學生不用擔心「別人多本、自己卻只有一本」的另一個理由是，全國基測考試已經實施了多年，命題原則是考綱不考本，也就是說，不論考生用的是哪一個版本，都可以參加基測考試。
然而，即使台北市和教育主管一再保證，希望家長及考生不用太擔心，不過，畢竟今年的北北基的確就是出了包，官方保證效果如何，實在有待觀察。令人唏噓的是，不但由台北市帶頭的北北基聯測已經陣亡，由於考試與分發技術出了問題，現在甚至於連要不要繼續實施一綱一本，似乎都已經出現了很大的討論空間，如果有一天，連一綱一本也作廢了，一切又回到多年前的原點，那就不只是地方首長的政治聲望受到打擊、堅持多年爭取的新教育政策瓦解，每年北北基的十萬考生的學習方式和教育生態也將面臨改變。教育政策有長期效果，對學生與家長、教育機構的權益會造成重大影響，輕忽不得，任何政策在實施之前都必須詳考再三，務必做到「滴水不漏」，但顯然這次北北基聯測做的還不夠到位。
這個經驗也提醒了執政者，即使在基本面上立意良善的政策，若在技術面上出現疏失，可能也就得不到民眾的體諒與支持，一旦政府失去人民的信任，而後不論提出什麼樣的補救措施，往往被認為是臨時起意，缺乏長遠規畫，當然也就不容易贏得信任。
這個事件顯示，台灣家長對學生考試、入學的關注與敏感程度可能超過許多為政者的預期，實在不可輕忽。不論是北北基還是非北北基，一○一年和一○二年十二年國教正式實施前和一○三年實施後要怎麼考，有什麼入學方式，「基測」和「在校成績」、「教育會考」和「學科、術科測驗」到底如何進行，「免試」、「申請」和「特色」招生，等等，錯綜複雜，很多家長和學生仍一頭霧水─拜託中央及地方教育主管當局務必不厭其煩，說清楚、講明白，不要讓「北北基大亂鬥」再出現了。
Tsai: We Want Taiwan Independence, Therefore We Refuse to Recognize the 1992 Consensus
Tsai: We Want Taiwan Independence, Therefore We Refuse to Recognize the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 8, 2011
Summary: Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
Full Text below:
Yesterday we asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou support the 1992 Consensus. Today we ask, why does Tsai Ing-wen oppose the 1992 Consensus?
Beijing has declared that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus is the same as advocating Taiwan independence. Beijing considers the 1992 Consensus the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. If it is removed, then the superstructure of cross-Strait relations will collapse. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She has in effect refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has not expressed opposition to Taiwan independence. Nevertheless she wants to maintain ECFA. She wants to maintain economic and trade relations with the Chinese mainland. Most of all. she wants to maintain peaceful development with the Chinese mainland.
Now, just before the presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen is pumping up the volume. She is full of bluff and bluster. But if she is elected president, Beijing will demand to know whether she still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. President Tsai will be in absolutely no position to thumb her nose at Beijing. At least not if she still wants peaceful development. So the question is, will President Tsai blink? If she does, the result will not just be a personal and political disaster for President Tsai. It will be a major political and economic disaster for everyone on Taiwan.
But Tsai Ing-wen has left herself an escape clause. So far, she has only said "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she has yet to touch upon the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. If she can stonewall until after the election, she can then say that what she meant was that the actual term "The 1992 Consensus" did not exist. She can qualify her position, and say that the "Spirit of '92" does exist, or that the "Tacit Agreement Reached during the 1992 Talks in Hong Kong" does exist. She can change her colors like a chameleon, without missing a beat. Chen Shui-bian used this gimmick as well. But if Tsai Ing-wen harbors such intentions, then she is too shallow and frightening for words. If she fails in her attempt to deceive voters, she will destroy whatever legitimacy her presidential term might have had.
If Tsai is elected president, Beijing is sure to hold peaceful development over her head. It will demand that she accept the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford to lose peaceful development with the Chinese mainland. In the end, she will have no choice. She will have to recognize the 1992 Consensus, or at least a variant. She will have to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She will have to express opposition to Taiwan independence. This is inevitable. This is common sense.
Tsai Ing-wen's campaign committee has relentlessly floated rumors, alleging that after the election she will hold talks with Beijing. Years ago, Chen Shui-bian wanted Washington to dismiss his pronouncements as nothing more than election rhetoric. Years later, Tsai Ing-wen is hoping Beijing will do the same. But Tsai Ing-wen may have difficulty stonewalling until after the election. The focus of the debate is no longer whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Instead, Tsai is being asked directly whether she supports One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. She is being asked directly whether she believes the Republic of China is a government in exile. She is being asked directly whether she supports Taiwan independence. She cannot revert to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But neither can she declare that the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are null and void. If she intends to fall back on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, she may as well affirm the Constitution of the Republic of China, and its provision for One China, Different Interpretations.
Ultimately, Tsai will be forced to make a public declaration. Is she attempting to advance Taiwan independence by means of "backdoor listing?" Or does she truly intend to act as a President of the Republic of China? Does she truly intend to assume the privileges and responsibilities provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China?
Tsai Ing-wen has a dilemma. She cannot say that she opposes Taiwan independence. But neither can she say that she advocates Taiwan independence. No matter what Tsai Ing-wen says, she cannot divest herself of the spectre of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and other Taiwan independence elements. She cannot change a simple fact. The DPP is political party whose gatherings include hundreds of thousands of people, but never a single Republic of China flag.
Tsai Ing-wen can say, "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she can not say, "The Constitution of the Republic of China does not exist." She cannot say that "The Republic of China Constitution and the welfare of the Republic of China do not exist." She cannot reject backdoor listing. Nor can she say that "Taiwan independence does not exist."
Set aside whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Ask instead whether Taiwan independence exists. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer evade the question. Does Taiwan independence exist? Shouldn't the question of whether Taiwan independence exists be taken seriously? Taiwan had two decades of bitter experience with Taiwan independence. Does Taiwan independence really "love Taiwan," or does it harm Taiwan?
Consider two statements quoted in the papers over the past few days. First, the Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union called the Republic of China a ficttion, a "phantom." He called the Republic of China a walking zombie that lives off the flesh and blood of the Taiwanese people. Second, during a campaign speech on Saturday, Yu Shyi-kun, Chairman of Tsai Ing-wen's Campaign Committee, called the Republic of China a fiction. Tsai Ing-wen cannot say these statements do not represent her position. She cannot deny that her most important supporters are advocates of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that the "spirit" of Taiwan independence "does not exist.
Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus as equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
The answer has emerged. Why does Tsai Ing-wen insist that the 1992 Consensus does not exist? Because she knows that Taiwan independence exists, and that she cannot escape the clutches of this "phantom."
因為台獨存在，所以九二共識不存在
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.08 01:24 am
昨天談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；今天談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
北京將否定九二共識指為主張台獨，並稱九二共識的屋基若毀，一切兩岸交流的樓層即失憑藉；蔡英文則一方面否定「九二共識」，亦即否定「一中各表」，更未表態「不獨」，另一方面卻欲維持ECFA，且欲維持與中國的經貿交流，更欲維持與中國的「和平發展」。
此刻，在總統大選揭曉以前，蔡英文儘可催盡油門，虛張聲勢；但在她若當選總統後，一方面北京必然要她交代究竟是否仍然否定「九二共識」，而「蔡總統」又絕無與北京決裂的本錢，即仍欲維持兩岸「和平發展」，試問：屆時「蔡總統」仍能撐持得住嗎？若是撐不住，那將不只是「蔡總統」個人的政治大禍，台灣亦必將墜入一場不堪設想的政經大災難之中。
蔡英文其實留有一個一廂情願的伏筆。她迄今只說「九二共識不存在」，但幾乎未觸碰及否定「一中各表」或「不統／不獨／不武」的內涵問題。如果此一策略可以讓她拖到當選後，則屆時她或許可宣稱，「九二共識這四個字當年不存在」，但並不是不能用「九二精神」或「九二香港會談默契」等變體及化身加以銜接（陳水扁用過此法）。然而，大位不以詐取，蔡英文若心存此種僥倖，未免太淺薄也太可怕，更必將全盤解構「蔡總統」的統治正當性。
蔡若當選總統，北京必然會以是否維持「和平發展」，來挾持她，要她接受「九二共識」；而蔡英文由於絕對承當不起失去「和平發展」的後果，以致最後必然會回過頭來接受「一中各表／反台獨」的「九二共識」內涵（或許出以變體及化身）。這是必然的結果，也是常識的結論。
蔡英文方面不斷放話，謂選後可與北京談；這就好像陳水扁當年要美國將他的話視為「選舉語言」，蔡英文此刻亦如此寄望於北京當局。但是，蔡英文似乎很難把問題拖到選後。因為，辯論的焦點已不在「九二共識存不存在」，而是直接問蔡英文：是否支持「一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」？中華民國是否流亡政府？是否支持「不獨」？她雖又回到《台灣前途決議文》，但能否宣示《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》失效？且若回到《台灣前途決議文》，為何不支持中華民國憲法「一中各表」的兩岸憲政戰略？
這些問題歸結到底，就是要蔡表態：究竟是主張「台獨」、欲「借殼上市」？或是要當真正的中華民國總統，而將中華民國憲法的利益與責任一律概括承受？
蔡英文的問題在於：她不敢說、不能說「反對台獨」，但又不敢說、不能說「主張台獨」。且不論蔡英文怎麼說，她皆不可能擺脫她的「背後靈」李登輝與陳水扁等台獨勢力，也絕對改變不了民進黨是一個數十萬人集會看不到一面國旗的另類政黨。
蔡英文可以說「九二共識不存在」，但她不能說「中華民國憲法不存在」，或「承當中華民國憲法利益及責任的中華民國不存在」（不是借殼上市）；另一方面，她更不能說「台獨不存在」！
因而，當大家放下「九二共識存不存在」的問題，改問「台獨存不存在」時，蔡英文已無可迴避。台獨不存在嗎？台獨不應「嚴肅面對」嗎？台灣二十年來的沉痛經歷，台獨究竟是愛台灣或害台灣？
且看這兩段幾天前才見報的言論：一、中華民國是一個虛構的「幽靈」，中華民國根本是為吸食台灣人民血肉而存在的「活殭屍」……。這是台聯主席的最新見解。二、中華民國是虛構的……。這是蔡英文競選總督導游錫?上周六的發言。蔡英文不能說這些皆不代表她的立場，她不能否認台獨是她最主要的支持者，她也不能說台獨這個「背後靈」不存在。
北京指否認「九二共識」就是台獨；台獨則說接受「九二共識」就是背叛台獨。蔡英文必須接受二者之一，不能說二者皆「不存在」。
答案出來了。蔡英文為何說「九二共識不存在」？因為她知道「台獨是存在的」，而她根本擺脫不了這個「背後靈」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 8, 2011
Summary: Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
Full Text below:
Yesterday we asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou support the 1992 Consensus. Today we ask, why does Tsai Ing-wen oppose the 1992 Consensus?
Beijing has declared that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus is the same as advocating Taiwan independence. Beijing considers the 1992 Consensus the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. If it is removed, then the superstructure of cross-Strait relations will collapse. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She has in effect refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has not expressed opposition to Taiwan independence. Nevertheless she wants to maintain ECFA. She wants to maintain economic and trade relations with the Chinese mainland. Most of all. she wants to maintain peaceful development with the Chinese mainland.
Now, just before the presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen is pumping up the volume. She is full of bluff and bluster. But if she is elected president, Beijing will demand to know whether she still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. President Tsai will be in absolutely no position to thumb her nose at Beijing. At least not if she still wants peaceful development. So the question is, will President Tsai blink? If she does, the result will not just be a personal and political disaster for President Tsai. It will be a major political and economic disaster for everyone on Taiwan.
But Tsai Ing-wen has left herself an escape clause. So far, she has only said "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she has yet to touch upon the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. If she can stonewall until after the election, she can then say that what she meant was that the actual term "The 1992 Consensus" did not exist. She can qualify her position, and say that the "Spirit of '92" does exist, or that the "Tacit Agreement Reached during the 1992 Talks in Hong Kong" does exist. She can change her colors like a chameleon, without missing a beat. Chen Shui-bian used this gimmick as well. But if Tsai Ing-wen harbors such intentions, then she is too shallow and frightening for words. If she fails in her attempt to deceive voters, she will destroy whatever legitimacy her presidential term might have had.
If Tsai is elected president, Beijing is sure to hold peaceful development over her head. It will demand that she accept the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford to lose peaceful development with the Chinese mainland. In the end, she will have no choice. She will have to recognize the 1992 Consensus, or at least a variant. She will have to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She will have to express opposition to Taiwan independence. This is inevitable. This is common sense.
Tsai Ing-wen's campaign committee has relentlessly floated rumors, alleging that after the election she will hold talks with Beijing. Years ago, Chen Shui-bian wanted Washington to dismiss his pronouncements as nothing more than election rhetoric. Years later, Tsai Ing-wen is hoping Beijing will do the same. But Tsai Ing-wen may have difficulty stonewalling until after the election. The focus of the debate is no longer whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Instead, Tsai is being asked directly whether she supports One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. She is being asked directly whether she believes the Republic of China is a government in exile. She is being asked directly whether she supports Taiwan independence. She cannot revert to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But neither can she declare that the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are null and void. If she intends to fall back on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, she may as well affirm the Constitution of the Republic of China, and its provision for One China, Different Interpretations.
Ultimately, Tsai will be forced to make a public declaration. Is she attempting to advance Taiwan independence by means of "backdoor listing?" Or does she truly intend to act as a President of the Republic of China? Does she truly intend to assume the privileges and responsibilities provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China?
Tsai Ing-wen has a dilemma. She cannot say that she opposes Taiwan independence. But neither can she say that she advocates Taiwan independence. No matter what Tsai Ing-wen says, she cannot divest herself of the spectre of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and other Taiwan independence elements. She cannot change a simple fact. The DPP is political party whose gatherings include hundreds of thousands of people, but never a single Republic of China flag.
Tsai Ing-wen can say, "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she can not say, "The Constitution of the Republic of China does not exist." She cannot say that "The Republic of China Constitution and the welfare of the Republic of China do not exist." She cannot reject backdoor listing. Nor can she say that "Taiwan independence does not exist."
Set aside whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Ask instead whether Taiwan independence exists. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer evade the question. Does Taiwan independence exist? Shouldn't the question of whether Taiwan independence exists be taken seriously? Taiwan had two decades of bitter experience with Taiwan independence. Does Taiwan independence really "love Taiwan," or does it harm Taiwan?
Consider two statements quoted in the papers over the past few days. First, the Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union called the Republic of China a ficttion, a "phantom." He called the Republic of China a walking zombie that lives off the flesh and blood of the Taiwanese people. Second, during a campaign speech on Saturday, Yu Shyi-kun, Chairman of Tsai Ing-wen's Campaign Committee, called the Republic of China a fiction. Tsai Ing-wen cannot say these statements do not represent her position. She cannot deny that her most important supporters are advocates of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that the "spirit" of Taiwan independence "does not exist.
Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus as equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
The answer has emerged. Why does Tsai Ing-wen insist that the 1992 Consensus does not exist? Because she knows that Taiwan independence exists, and that she cannot escape the clutches of this "phantom."
因為台獨存在，所以九二共識不存在
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.08 01:24 am
昨天談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；今天談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
北京將否定九二共識指為主張台獨，並稱九二共識的屋基若毀，一切兩岸交流的樓層即失憑藉；蔡英文則一方面否定「九二共識」，亦即否定「一中各表」，更未表態「不獨」，另一方面卻欲維持ECFA，且欲維持與中國的經貿交流，更欲維持與中國的「和平發展」。
此刻，在總統大選揭曉以前，蔡英文儘可催盡油門，虛張聲勢；但在她若當選總統後，一方面北京必然要她交代究竟是否仍然否定「九二共識」，而「蔡總統」又絕無與北京決裂的本錢，即仍欲維持兩岸「和平發展」，試問：屆時「蔡總統」仍能撐持得住嗎？若是撐不住，那將不只是「蔡總統」個人的政治大禍，台灣亦必將墜入一場不堪設想的政經大災難之中。
蔡英文其實留有一個一廂情願的伏筆。她迄今只說「九二共識不存在」，但幾乎未觸碰及否定「一中各表」或「不統／不獨／不武」的內涵問題。如果此一策略可以讓她拖到當選後，則屆時她或許可宣稱，「九二共識這四個字當年不存在」，但並不是不能用「九二精神」或「九二香港會談默契」等變體及化身加以銜接（陳水扁用過此法）。然而，大位不以詐取，蔡英文若心存此種僥倖，未免太淺薄也太可怕，更必將全盤解構「蔡總統」的統治正當性。
蔡若當選總統，北京必然會以是否維持「和平發展」，來挾持她，要她接受「九二共識」；而蔡英文由於絕對承當不起失去「和平發展」的後果，以致最後必然會回過頭來接受「一中各表／反台獨」的「九二共識」內涵（或許出以變體及化身）。這是必然的結果，也是常識的結論。
蔡英文方面不斷放話，謂選後可與北京談；這就好像陳水扁當年要美國將他的話視為「選舉語言」，蔡英文此刻亦如此寄望於北京當局。但是，蔡英文似乎很難把問題拖到選後。因為，辯論的焦點已不在「九二共識存不存在」，而是直接問蔡英文：是否支持「一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」？中華民國是否流亡政府？是否支持「不獨」？她雖又回到《台灣前途決議文》，但能否宣示《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》失效？且若回到《台灣前途決議文》，為何不支持中華民國憲法「一中各表」的兩岸憲政戰略？
這些問題歸結到底，就是要蔡表態：究竟是主張「台獨」、欲「借殼上市」？或是要當真正的中華民國總統，而將中華民國憲法的利益與責任一律概括承受？
蔡英文的問題在於：她不敢說、不能說「反對台獨」，但又不敢說、不能說「主張台獨」。且不論蔡英文怎麼說，她皆不可能擺脫她的「背後靈」李登輝與陳水扁等台獨勢力，也絕對改變不了民進黨是一個數十萬人集會看不到一面國旗的另類政黨。
蔡英文可以說「九二共識不存在」，但她不能說「中華民國憲法不存在」，或「承當中華民國憲法利益及責任的中華民國不存在」（不是借殼上市）；另一方面，她更不能說「台獨不存在」！
因而，當大家放下「九二共識存不存在」的問題，改問「台獨存不存在」時，蔡英文已無可迴避。台獨不存在嗎？台獨不應「嚴肅面對」嗎？台灣二十年來的沉痛經歷，台獨究竟是愛台灣或害台灣？
且看這兩段幾天前才見報的言論：一、中華民國是一個虛構的「幽靈」，中華民國根本是為吸食台灣人民血肉而存在的「活殭屍」……。這是台聯主席的最新見解。二、中華民國是虛構的……。這是蔡英文競選總督導游錫?上周六的發言。蔡英文不能說這些皆不代表她的立場，她不能否認台獨是她最主要的支持者，她也不能說台獨這個「背後靈」不存在。
北京指否認「九二共識」就是台獨；台獨則說接受「九二共識」就是背叛台獨。蔡英文必須接受二者之一，不能說二者皆「不存在」。
答案出來了。蔡英文為何說「九二共識不存在」？因為她知道「台獨是存在的」，而她根本擺脫不了這個「背後靈」。
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force
One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2011
Summary: The 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
Full Text below:
Today's editorial asks why Ma Ying-jeou supports the 1992 Consensus. Tomorrow's editorial asks why Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
The capsule is not important. The medicine inside is. The 1992 Consensus is merely the wrapping paper. Inside the wrapping paper is One China, Different Interpretations. The recent debate between Ma and Tsai has gradually moved away from the wrapping paper, and towards the contents.
Consider the cross-Strait status quo, One China means "no independence." Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification." Therefore, One China, Different Interpretations is the practical manifestation of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It means maintaining the status quo.
Consider the Ma administration's position. Upholding One China, Different Interpretations safeguards the Republic of China. It adheres to the Constitution of the Republic of China. The One China stipulated within the Republic of China Constitution means "no independence." It also means maintaining the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It means no [immediate] reunification. That is why President Ma says "Supporting the 1992 Consensus means supporting the Republic of China." By implication One China, Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This is the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy.
Consider Beijing's position. Originally Beijing took the 1992 Consensus to mean "Different Interpretations of One China." It opposed "One China, Different Interpretations." But in 2008 a new opportunity arose. Beijing warmed up to "One China, Different Interpretations." March 26 was the third anniversary of the Bush-Hu "One China, Different Interpretations" hotline conversation. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Cross-Strait relations are good. The two sides have different understandings of One China. But we can seek common ground while setting aside differences. That is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." Wang Yi's "seeking common ground and setting aside differences," is One China, Different Interpretations.
For Beijing, the most important aspect of the 1992 Consensus is its opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore it must be mentioned in the same breath as opposition to Taiwan independence and commitment to the 1992 Consensus, When Beijing speaks out against Taiwan independence, it speaks out against the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." It speaks out against de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is clearly not de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China seeks common ground and sets aside differences, under the premise of One China. The Beijing authorities, ironically, are doing their utmost to maintain the status quo. Beijing knows that the Republic of China's policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" Is a manifestation of the cross-Strait status quo -- one that has no substitute.
Consider the 1992 Consensus. To the Ma administration, the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation. Therefore it does not advocate Taiwan independence. It opposes Taiwan independence. It upholds the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It opposes [immediate] reunification. To Bejing, the important point about the 1992 Consensus is that it opposes Taiwan independence. Beijing accepts the status quo, in which the Republic of China opposes [immediate] reunification. The 1992 Consensus implies One China, Different Interpretations.It implies seeking common ground and setting aside differences under the aegis of One China. It implies no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. It may not be the ultimate solution. It may not be the perfect solution. But it is the best solution in 60 years. It is the only way, because it enables the two sides to adopt a rational process leading to clearer solutions.
Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. But talk is cheap. She can say "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But if she goes further, and repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, she will be repudiating the Republic of China and its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of China, including its amendments, acknowledges that the two sides are temporarily divided and separately administered. This has resulted in a constitution that accommodates One China, Different Interpretations. This is the same constitution former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman and Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen swore an oath to uphold when she assumed office. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "The Republic of China is a government in exile." She wants to play word games. She wants to exploit the name "Republic of China." She want to use it as a backdoor listing for a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Of course she has to repudiate the One China, Different Interpretations elements in the Republic of China Constitution. But if she repudiates the Republic of China Constitution, how can she possibly run for Republic of China President? Furthermore, if Tsai Ing-wen repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can she advocate "no reunification?" Does she intend to openly advocate Taiwan independence, even while she demands "no use of force?"
The 1992 Consensus was merely a way to put One China, Different Interpretations into a gel capsule. Now however, controversy has arisen over whether the 1992 Consensus exists. The controversy has drowned out rational discussion of One China, Different Interpretations. People should be asking themselves what will happen if there is no One China, Different Interpretations Constitution? What will happen if the "no independence" principle is nullified? What will happen, internally and externally? What will happen if the "temporarily divided, separately administered" elements within the Constitution no longer apply? What will happen to the framework for cross-Strait peaceful development? What will happen to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?"
一中各表就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.07
今天社論談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；明天社論談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
其實，使用「九二共識」這個概念，只是要使「一個中國／各自表述」這八個字進一步「膠囊化」，以便流通使用。所以，辯論九二共識是否存在，形同只是辯論那個膠囊存不存在；但膠囊無關藥理、藥性及藥效，問題的實質在於膠囊裡面的藥粉，亦即：馬蔡藍綠各自是否主張以「一個中國，各自表述」為兩岸角力的基本戰略？
膠囊不重要，重要的是裡面的藥粉。因此，馬蔡雙方近日的辯論焦點，其實已漸漸脫離「九二共識」這張包裝紙，而進入了「一個中國，各自表述」的內容物，亦即「一中各表」。
就兩岸現狀言，「一中」就是「不獨」，「各表」就是「不統」。因此，一中各表，就是不統、不獨、不武的憑藉與實踐，亦即通稱的「維持現狀」。
就馬政府言，「一中各表」就是維護中華民國，堅持中華民國憲法。因為，中華民國憲法主張「憲法一中」，就是「不獨」；並維持兩岸分裂分治的現狀，即是「不統」。因此，馬總統說「支持九二共識，就是支持中華民國」，其潛台詞則是：「支持一中各表，就是支持不統不獨不武的兩岸政策。」
就北京言，原本對九二共識的認定，傾向於「各表一中」，而諱言「一中各表」；但在二○○八年出現「新機遇」後，已向「一中各表」靠攏。北京國台辦主任王毅今年三月二十六日（布胡「一中各表」熱線三周年）指出：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅所稱「一個中國，求同存異」，就是「一個中國，各自表述」。
對北京來說，「九二共識」的重中之重是「反對台獨」，因此必以「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」並稱；而北京今日言反對台獨，是反對「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」，至於中華民國顯非「法理台獨」，而是「一個中國，求同存異」，反而是北京當局全力維持的「現狀」。因為，北京亦知，中華民國的「不統／不獨／不武」，是維持兩岸「現狀」的無可取代的憑藉與實踐。
九二共識，對馬政府言，在主張「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，因此「不主張台獨」（不獨），而維持兩岸分裂分治的「不統」；就北京言，則九二共識的重點在「反對台獨」，但也因而接受了中華民國「不統」的現狀。所以說，「九二共識」無論是指「一個中國／各自表述」，或指「一個中國／求同存異」，皆是「不統／不獨／不武」的憑藉與實踐。這雖未必是終極方案，亦容非完美的方案，卻是六十年來相對最佳的方案，更是可使兩岸關係「由合理的過程到改善之目的」的唯一途徑。
因此，蔡英文反對「九二共識」雖言之輕易，只消一句「九二共識不存在」即可；但她若進一步要否定「一中各表」，即形同也否定了中華民國與中華民國憲法；因為，中華民國憲法（從增修條文看）即是一部承認兩岸現狀分裂分治的「一中各表」的憲法，這也是曾任陸委會主委及行政院副院長的蔡英文當年宣誓就職的基礎。蔡英文現今若主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，要玩「借殼上市」，自然就要否定「一中各表」的中華民國憲法；但她若否定中華民國憲法，何以參選中華民國總統？進一步言，蔡英文若否定「一中各表」，將如何主張「不統」？更難道要公開主張「台獨」？卻又如何主張「不武」？
當年是為了包裝「一中各表」，而採用「九二共識」這個膠囊；現在，由於對「九二共識」存不存在的爭議，反而掩蓋了對「一中各表」的理性探討。如今國人應思考的是：如果沒有「一中各表」，憲法「不獨」的原則若遭毀棄，將如何因應內外？而憲法「分裂分治」（不統）的憑藉若告失據，又將如何因應內外？更將如何維持「不統／不獨／不武」的兩岸「和平發展」架構？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2011
Summary: The 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
Full Text below:
Today's editorial asks why Ma Ying-jeou supports the 1992 Consensus. Tomorrow's editorial asks why Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
The capsule is not important. The medicine inside is. The 1992 Consensus is merely the wrapping paper. Inside the wrapping paper is One China, Different Interpretations. The recent debate between Ma and Tsai has gradually moved away from the wrapping paper, and towards the contents.
Consider the cross-Strait status quo, One China means "no independence." Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification." Therefore, One China, Different Interpretations is the practical manifestation of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It means maintaining the status quo.
Consider the Ma administration's position. Upholding One China, Different Interpretations safeguards the Republic of China. It adheres to the Constitution of the Republic of China. The One China stipulated within the Republic of China Constitution means "no independence." It also means maintaining the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It means no [immediate] reunification. That is why President Ma says "Supporting the 1992 Consensus means supporting the Republic of China." By implication One China, Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This is the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy.
Consider Beijing's position. Originally Beijing took the 1992 Consensus to mean "Different Interpretations of One China." It opposed "One China, Different Interpretations." But in 2008 a new opportunity arose. Beijing warmed up to "One China, Different Interpretations." March 26 was the third anniversary of the Bush-Hu "One China, Different Interpretations" hotline conversation. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Cross-Strait relations are good. The two sides have different understandings of One China. But we can seek common ground while setting aside differences. That is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." Wang Yi's "seeking common ground and setting aside differences," is One China, Different Interpretations.
For Beijing, the most important aspect of the 1992 Consensus is its opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore it must be mentioned in the same breath as opposition to Taiwan independence and commitment to the 1992 Consensus, When Beijing speaks out against Taiwan independence, it speaks out against the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." It speaks out against de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is clearly not de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China seeks common ground and sets aside differences, under the premise of One China. The Beijing authorities, ironically, are doing their utmost to maintain the status quo. Beijing knows that the Republic of China's policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" Is a manifestation of the cross-Strait status quo -- one that has no substitute.
Consider the 1992 Consensus. To the Ma administration, the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation. Therefore it does not advocate Taiwan independence. It opposes Taiwan independence. It upholds the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It opposes [immediate] reunification. To Bejing, the important point about the 1992 Consensus is that it opposes Taiwan independence. Beijing accepts the status quo, in which the Republic of China opposes [immediate] reunification. The 1992 Consensus implies One China, Different Interpretations.It implies seeking common ground and setting aside differences under the aegis of One China. It implies no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. It may not be the ultimate solution. It may not be the perfect solution. But it is the best solution in 60 years. It is the only way, because it enables the two sides to adopt a rational process leading to clearer solutions.
Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. But talk is cheap. She can say "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But if she goes further, and repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, she will be repudiating the Republic of China and its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of China, including its amendments, acknowledges that the two sides are temporarily divided and separately administered. This has resulted in a constitution that accommodates One China, Different Interpretations. This is the same constitution former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman and Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen swore an oath to uphold when she assumed office. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "The Republic of China is a government in exile." She wants to play word games. She wants to exploit the name "Republic of China." She want to use it as a backdoor listing for a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Of course she has to repudiate the One China, Different Interpretations elements in the Republic of China Constitution. But if she repudiates the Republic of China Constitution, how can she possibly run for Republic of China President? Furthermore, if Tsai Ing-wen repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can she advocate "no reunification?" Does she intend to openly advocate Taiwan independence, even while she demands "no use of force?"
The 1992 Consensus was merely a way to put One China, Different Interpretations into a gel capsule. Now however, controversy has arisen over whether the 1992 Consensus exists. The controversy has drowned out rational discussion of One China, Different Interpretations. People should be asking themselves what will happen if there is no One China, Different Interpretations Constitution? What will happen if the "no independence" principle is nullified? What will happen, internally and externally? What will happen if the "temporarily divided, separately administered" elements within the Constitution no longer apply? What will happen to the framework for cross-Strait peaceful development? What will happen to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?"
一中各表就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.07
今天社論談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；明天社論談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
其實，使用「九二共識」這個概念，只是要使「一個中國／各自表述」這八個字進一步「膠囊化」，以便流通使用。所以，辯論九二共識是否存在，形同只是辯論那個膠囊存不存在；但膠囊無關藥理、藥性及藥效，問題的實質在於膠囊裡面的藥粉，亦即：馬蔡藍綠各自是否主張以「一個中國，各自表述」為兩岸角力的基本戰略？
膠囊不重要，重要的是裡面的藥粉。因此，馬蔡雙方近日的辯論焦點，其實已漸漸脫離「九二共識」這張包裝紙，而進入了「一個中國，各自表述」的內容物，亦即「一中各表」。
就兩岸現狀言，「一中」就是「不獨」，「各表」就是「不統」。因此，一中各表，就是不統、不獨、不武的憑藉與實踐，亦即通稱的「維持現狀」。
就馬政府言，「一中各表」就是維護中華民國，堅持中華民國憲法。因為，中華民國憲法主張「憲法一中」，就是「不獨」；並維持兩岸分裂分治的現狀，即是「不統」。因此，馬總統說「支持九二共識，就是支持中華民國」，其潛台詞則是：「支持一中各表，就是支持不統不獨不武的兩岸政策。」
就北京言，原本對九二共識的認定，傾向於「各表一中」，而諱言「一中各表」；但在二○○八年出現「新機遇」後，已向「一中各表」靠攏。北京國台辦主任王毅今年三月二十六日（布胡「一中各表」熱線三周年）指出：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅所稱「一個中國，求同存異」，就是「一個中國，各自表述」。
對北京來說，「九二共識」的重中之重是「反對台獨」，因此必以「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」並稱；而北京今日言反對台獨，是反對「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」，至於中華民國顯非「法理台獨」，而是「一個中國，求同存異」，反而是北京當局全力維持的「現狀」。因為，北京亦知，中華民國的「不統／不獨／不武」，是維持兩岸「現狀」的無可取代的憑藉與實踐。
九二共識，對馬政府言，在主張「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，因此「不主張台獨」（不獨），而維持兩岸分裂分治的「不統」；就北京言，則九二共識的重點在「反對台獨」，但也因而接受了中華民國「不統」的現狀。所以說，「九二共識」無論是指「一個中國／各自表述」，或指「一個中國／求同存異」，皆是「不統／不獨／不武」的憑藉與實踐。這雖未必是終極方案，亦容非完美的方案，卻是六十年來相對最佳的方案，更是可使兩岸關係「由合理的過程到改善之目的」的唯一途徑。
因此，蔡英文反對「九二共識」雖言之輕易，只消一句「九二共識不存在」即可；但她若進一步要否定「一中各表」，即形同也否定了中華民國與中華民國憲法；因為，中華民國憲法（從增修條文看）即是一部承認兩岸現狀分裂分治的「一中各表」的憲法，這也是曾任陸委會主委及行政院副院長的蔡英文當年宣誓就職的基礎。蔡英文現今若主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，要玩「借殼上市」，自然就要否定「一中各表」的中華民國憲法；但她若否定中華民國憲法，何以參選中華民國總統？進一步言，蔡英文若否定「一中各表」，將如何主張「不統」？更難道要公開主張「台獨」？卻又如何主張「不武」？
當年是為了包裝「一中各表」，而採用「九二共識」這個膠囊；現在，由於對「九二共識」存不存在的爭議，反而掩蓋了對「一中各表」的理性探討。如今國人應思考的是：如果沒有「一中各表」，憲法「不獨」的原則若遭毀棄，將如何因應內外？而憲法「分裂分治」（不統）的憑藉若告失據，又將如何因應內外？更將如何維持「不統／不獨／不武」的兩岸「和平發展」架構？
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Candidates Return to Policy Debate
Candidates Return to Policy Debate
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2011
Summary: The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
Full Text below:
In the media age, visual and auditory impact is everything. Straightforward policy debate attracts scant attention. But political leaders are not show people or talking heads. It is not their job to entertain the public by staging media events or by slinging mud.
Pressures are mounting in the presidential election. The KMT presidential candidate is Ma Ying-jeou. The DPP candidate is Tsai Ing-wen. Ma refers to his platform as the "Golden Decade." Tsai calls hers the "Platform for the Coming Decade." When referring to rival platforms, supporters use virtually identical language. They say the rival candidate's platform is "full of flowery words and empty rhetoric." Conversely, when referring to their own candidate's platform, they say he or she has "the ability to implement his or her vision for the nation." To their credit, the Two Yings have published their platforms, leaving them open to public scrutiny.
Ma Ying-jeou's "Golden Decade" and Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Coming Decade" have ensured a comparatively normal presidential campaign. The upcoming presidential debate already has substantive issues to take on. Past election campaigns were "saliva wars." Candidates slung mud indiscriminately. They were lively affairs. But the public soon wearied. At the very least, the Two Yings have set a commendable precedent for future campaigns.
Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. Tsai Ing-wen is the challenger. Their positions are different. But both are political leaders. Both must offer a direction for the nation's future. Tsai Ing-wen has launched her "Platform for the Decade." It has been criticized for being full of "pretty but empty rhetoric." But she is at least making an effort to persuade people who do not support her. So far, her platform is no more than an outline. It will be followed by a more detailed White Paper, which will be subject to even closer scrutiny. Contrast this with 2008. Ma Ying-jeou published his White Paper. But DPP candidate Frank Hsieh assiduously ignored it, Instead, Hsieh harped on the Green Card non-issue. He resorted to all manner of negative campaigning. No substantive policy debate took place. Tsai Ing-wen deserves credit for insisting on a campaign rooted in rational debate.
The DPP is the opposition party. Not surprisingly, its "Platform for the Decade" is deliberately vague. After all, if one is in the opposition, one need assume no responsibility for day to day governance. But the DPP was in office for eight years. Excessive policy vagueness inevitably invites criticism. Does the DPP really not understand this? Have three years in the political wilderness induced amnesia? Has the DPP become so emotionally removed from policy implementation?
The KMT is the ruling party. Ma Ying-jeou has published his "Golden Decade" platform. He faces even harsher scrutiny than Tsai. Critics may not bother to characterize his platform as "full of pretty rhetoric." The reason is simple. Ma is already in a position of power. His policies must be implemented here and now. He must demonstrate a capacity for real world governance. From a management perspective the easiest way to make one's case is to cite numbers. Alas, numbers are the least effective way to win voters' hearts and minds.
The "Golden Decade" platform implies that administration policies have already been implemented, or about to be implemented. It implies that the ruling administration is capable of implementing its vision for the nation over the coming decade. Unnamed senior officials in the Ma administration have revealed that "There will be no earth-shattering announcements. Merely the continuation of existing policies." The Ma administration is confident its platform is more worthwhile and substantive than the DPP's.
Does the "Golden Decade" platform contain anything of substance? The public will decide. Public opinion is rooted more in perception than in numbers. The Ma administration's performance may be interpreted very differently by different parties. The Ma administration's record on taxation, fiscal policy, 12-year national education, and industrial policy may be perceived as either good or bad, depending upon whom one asks. At best, the "Golden Decade" will win the approval of a majority.
The "Golden Decade," and the "Platform for the Coming Decade" each have their own appeal. Regardless, the Two Yings are serious about their bid for high office. They have returned to the issues. People First Party Chairman James Soong has recently been the focus of public attention. Soong, by contrast, has yet to make his case. He is still waffling about whether to run. He is maintaining campaign momentum by raising hot button issues and staging photo ops. He clearly suspects he will lose. His glory days as provincial governor are hardly a topic for policy debate. After all, the public has far higher expectations from a national leader than a local leader.
Blue vs. Green polarization on Taiwan remains intense. Will policy debate be the deciding factor in the presidential race? That remains to be seen, The public is concerned about the direction politics has taken. Most people know what they love and hate, They evaluate the candidate's words and deeds based on it. But mob passions and partisan confrontation eventually lead to burnout. More and more people are indifferent to Blue vs. Green political confrontation. This is especially true among so-called "swing voters." More and more they demand practical, rational, policy debate. Only when the candidates return to debating policy, will democracy on Taiwan truly mature.
The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
大選回歸政策辯論 值得肯定
2011-09-06 中國時報
在現今講究聲光效果的媒體時代，單純的訴求「政策」議題確實很難吸引民眾關注，但身為政治領袖，終究不是藝人或名嘴，不能只以花稍的身段，辛辣的攻擊言詞取悅民意。
面對壓力愈來愈大的總統大選，國、民兩黨總統參選人馬英九與蔡英文，同步推出「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」，儘管支持者與反對者，幾乎用相同的語言批評對手「充斥美麗而空洞的詞藻」，肯定自己的主帥「有能力落實國家願景」，至少雙英還能不媚俗地推出政策牛肉，供各界檢視。
馬英九的「黃金十年」和蔡英文的「十年政綱」，已經為總統大選開啟一個相對正常的序幕，可預期未來的總統大選辯論，也已經有了一個可供實質辯論的題材。相對於過去大選政治口水亂射，熱鬧固然有餘，卻搞到全民精神疲勞，雙英至少創造了一個值得稱許的競選模式。
馬英九與蔡英文即使所處的朝野位置不一，但都是必須為國家前景提出方向的政治領袖。蔡英文推出「十年政綱」後，儘管被批評為「美麗而空泛」，但她至少願意用美麗的詞藻說服可能不支持她的人；此外，既為「政綱」即屬提綱挈領，因此，後續她將進一步以「政綱」為本，提出具體的政策白皮書，必然會遭到更嚴格的檢驗。但不論如何，對比二○○八年，馬英九提出競選政策白皮書後，民進黨參選人謝長廷相應不理，持續主打綠卡議題等負面選戰，讓實質的政策討論付諸闕如，蔡英文堅持理性論述的選舉風格，確實應予肯定。
做為在野政黨，民進黨的「十年政綱」難免空泛，畢竟在野者不負執行之責，但是因為民進黨有過八年執政經驗，過度空泛難免遭致非議，為什麼執政八年還不了解實務到這個地步？或者為什麼才在野三年多，對政府已經執行的政策卻疏離至此？
同樣的，做為執政者，馬英九推出的「黃金十年」可能遭遇的檢驗不會比「十年政綱」更少，可以預期「黃金十年」或許連「美麗的詞藻」都沒有。原因很簡單，既已處執政的位置，所有的政策都得是目前已經落實執行，而且，還得具體提出執行的績效，從管理的角度，呈現績效最簡單的方法就是數據，然而，數字偏偏是最難打動人心的。
此外，既為「黃金十年」就表示這些已經執行或準備執行的政策，可以有效落實至少十年的國家願景，馬政府不具名的高層人士透露，「不會有驚天動地的宣示，都是現有政策成果的延續。」但也信心滿滿表示，一定比「十年政綱」更有看頭、更扎實。
「黃金十年」是否更扎實？還是得由民意認可，民意很大部分倚賴的是「感覺」而非數字。換言之，所有馬政府推出的政績成果，都可能引發仁智之見的爭論，從稅制到國家財政，從十二年國教到產業規畫，其實都沒有一個必然好或不好的定論，「黃金十年」最多只能做到爭取多數人的認可。
「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」各有其市場定位的優劣勢，但不論如何，雙英皆嚴肅面對自己即將競逐的大位，已經成功將他們拉回主戰場，相對之下，最近同樣掀起民意關注的親民黨主席宋楚瑜迄未提出其主張，依舊擺盪在選與不選總統之間，企圖以懸疑的話題和動作維繫熱度，很明顯地又略輸一著，畢竟曾任省長的往日輝煌不可能成為政策內涵的辯論主題，國家領導人的高度，就是必須不同於地方父母官。
無可諱言，台灣當前藍綠對立的氛圍未解，政策戰到底能否成為決勝關鍵，不無疑問，關心政治趨勢和走向的民眾，多數心中或許早有好惡，也依據其好惡檢視候選人的政策內涵與言行表現，但是，激情的民意對峙終究也有疲乏的時刻，愈來愈多的民眾對藍綠惡鬥抱持冷漠的態度，特別是所謂的「中間選民」，愈來愈重視實際、理性的政策論述，只有當選舉回歸政策基本面，台灣民主才有真正成熟的可能。
距離大選投票還有四個半月，此刻的雙英政策牛肉戰或許可視為選戰過程中必要的戲碼，愈接近投票日影響選戰最大的可能還是政黨動員，甚至意識形態的對決，但觀諸雙英的人格特質和政治性格，我們還是樂觀期待，雙英有能力一以貫之地堅持以政策論述決勝，那麼台灣的選舉格調、政治文化即可再臻新境。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2011
Summary: The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
Full Text below:
In the media age, visual and auditory impact is everything. Straightforward policy debate attracts scant attention. But political leaders are not show people or talking heads. It is not their job to entertain the public by staging media events or by slinging mud.
Pressures are mounting in the presidential election. The KMT presidential candidate is Ma Ying-jeou. The DPP candidate is Tsai Ing-wen. Ma refers to his platform as the "Golden Decade." Tsai calls hers the "Platform for the Coming Decade." When referring to rival platforms, supporters use virtually identical language. They say the rival candidate's platform is "full of flowery words and empty rhetoric." Conversely, when referring to their own candidate's platform, they say he or she has "the ability to implement his or her vision for the nation." To their credit, the Two Yings have published their platforms, leaving them open to public scrutiny.
Ma Ying-jeou's "Golden Decade" and Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Coming Decade" have ensured a comparatively normal presidential campaign. The upcoming presidential debate already has substantive issues to take on. Past election campaigns were "saliva wars." Candidates slung mud indiscriminately. They were lively affairs. But the public soon wearied. At the very least, the Two Yings have set a commendable precedent for future campaigns.
Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. Tsai Ing-wen is the challenger. Their positions are different. But both are political leaders. Both must offer a direction for the nation's future. Tsai Ing-wen has launched her "Platform for the Decade." It has been criticized for being full of "pretty but empty rhetoric." But she is at least making an effort to persuade people who do not support her. So far, her platform is no more than an outline. It will be followed by a more detailed White Paper, which will be subject to even closer scrutiny. Contrast this with 2008. Ma Ying-jeou published his White Paper. But DPP candidate Frank Hsieh assiduously ignored it, Instead, Hsieh harped on the Green Card non-issue. He resorted to all manner of negative campaigning. No substantive policy debate took place. Tsai Ing-wen deserves credit for insisting on a campaign rooted in rational debate.
The DPP is the opposition party. Not surprisingly, its "Platform for the Decade" is deliberately vague. After all, if one is in the opposition, one need assume no responsibility for day to day governance. But the DPP was in office for eight years. Excessive policy vagueness inevitably invites criticism. Does the DPP really not understand this? Have three years in the political wilderness induced amnesia? Has the DPP become so emotionally removed from policy implementation?
The KMT is the ruling party. Ma Ying-jeou has published his "Golden Decade" platform. He faces even harsher scrutiny than Tsai. Critics may not bother to characterize his platform as "full of pretty rhetoric." The reason is simple. Ma is already in a position of power. His policies must be implemented here and now. He must demonstrate a capacity for real world governance. From a management perspective the easiest way to make one's case is to cite numbers. Alas, numbers are the least effective way to win voters' hearts and minds.
The "Golden Decade" platform implies that administration policies have already been implemented, or about to be implemented. It implies that the ruling administration is capable of implementing its vision for the nation over the coming decade. Unnamed senior officials in the Ma administration have revealed that "There will be no earth-shattering announcements. Merely the continuation of existing policies." The Ma administration is confident its platform is more worthwhile and substantive than the DPP's.
Does the "Golden Decade" platform contain anything of substance? The public will decide. Public opinion is rooted more in perception than in numbers. The Ma administration's performance may be interpreted very differently by different parties. The Ma administration's record on taxation, fiscal policy, 12-year national education, and industrial policy may be perceived as either good or bad, depending upon whom one asks. At best, the "Golden Decade" will win the approval of a majority.
The "Golden Decade," and the "Platform for the Coming Decade" each have their own appeal. Regardless, the Two Yings are serious about their bid for high office. They have returned to the issues. People First Party Chairman James Soong has recently been the focus of public attention. Soong, by contrast, has yet to make his case. He is still waffling about whether to run. He is maintaining campaign momentum by raising hot button issues and staging photo ops. He clearly suspects he will lose. His glory days as provincial governor are hardly a topic for policy debate. After all, the public has far higher expectations from a national leader than a local leader.
Blue vs. Green polarization on Taiwan remains intense. Will policy debate be the deciding factor in the presidential race? That remains to be seen, The public is concerned about the direction politics has taken. Most people know what they love and hate, They evaluate the candidate's words and deeds based on it. But mob passions and partisan confrontation eventually lead to burnout. More and more people are indifferent to Blue vs. Green political confrontation. This is especially true among so-called "swing voters." More and more they demand practical, rational, policy debate. Only when the candidates return to debating policy, will democracy on Taiwan truly mature.
The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
大選回歸政策辯論 值得肯定
2011-09-06 中國時報
在現今講究聲光效果的媒體時代，單純的訴求「政策」議題確實很難吸引民眾關注，但身為政治領袖，終究不是藝人或名嘴，不能只以花稍的身段，辛辣的攻擊言詞取悅民意。
面對壓力愈來愈大的總統大選，國、民兩黨總統參選人馬英九與蔡英文，同步推出「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」，儘管支持者與反對者，幾乎用相同的語言批評對手「充斥美麗而空洞的詞藻」，肯定自己的主帥「有能力落實國家願景」，至少雙英還能不媚俗地推出政策牛肉，供各界檢視。
馬英九的「黃金十年」和蔡英文的「十年政綱」，已經為總統大選開啟一個相對正常的序幕，可預期未來的總統大選辯論，也已經有了一個可供實質辯論的題材。相對於過去大選政治口水亂射，熱鬧固然有餘，卻搞到全民精神疲勞，雙英至少創造了一個值得稱許的競選模式。
馬英九與蔡英文即使所處的朝野位置不一，但都是必須為國家前景提出方向的政治領袖。蔡英文推出「十年政綱」後，儘管被批評為「美麗而空泛」，但她至少願意用美麗的詞藻說服可能不支持她的人；此外，既為「政綱」即屬提綱挈領，因此，後續她將進一步以「政綱」為本，提出具體的政策白皮書，必然會遭到更嚴格的檢驗。但不論如何，對比二○○八年，馬英九提出競選政策白皮書後，民進黨參選人謝長廷相應不理，持續主打綠卡議題等負面選戰，讓實質的政策討論付諸闕如，蔡英文堅持理性論述的選舉風格，確實應予肯定。
做為在野政黨，民進黨的「十年政綱」難免空泛，畢竟在野者不負執行之責，但是因為民進黨有過八年執政經驗，過度空泛難免遭致非議，為什麼執政八年還不了解實務到這個地步？或者為什麼才在野三年多，對政府已經執行的政策卻疏離至此？
同樣的，做為執政者，馬英九推出的「黃金十年」可能遭遇的檢驗不會比「十年政綱」更少，可以預期「黃金十年」或許連「美麗的詞藻」都沒有。原因很簡單，既已處執政的位置，所有的政策都得是目前已經落實執行，而且，還得具體提出執行的績效，從管理的角度，呈現績效最簡單的方法就是數據，然而，數字偏偏是最難打動人心的。
此外，既為「黃金十年」就表示這些已經執行或準備執行的政策，可以有效落實至少十年的國家願景，馬政府不具名的高層人士透露，「不會有驚天動地的宣示，都是現有政策成果的延續。」但也信心滿滿表示，一定比「十年政綱」更有看頭、更扎實。
「黃金十年」是否更扎實？還是得由民意認可，民意很大部分倚賴的是「感覺」而非數字。換言之，所有馬政府推出的政績成果，都可能引發仁智之見的爭論，從稅制到國家財政，從十二年國教到產業規畫，其實都沒有一個必然好或不好的定論，「黃金十年」最多只能做到爭取多數人的認可。
「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」各有其市場定位的優劣勢，但不論如何，雙英皆嚴肅面對自己即將競逐的大位，已經成功將他們拉回主戰場，相對之下，最近同樣掀起民意關注的親民黨主席宋楚瑜迄未提出其主張，依舊擺盪在選與不選總統之間，企圖以懸疑的話題和動作維繫熱度，很明顯地又略輸一著，畢竟曾任省長的往日輝煌不可能成為政策內涵的辯論主題，國家領導人的高度，就是必須不同於地方父母官。
無可諱言，台灣當前藍綠對立的氛圍未解，政策戰到底能否成為決勝關鍵，不無疑問，關心政治趨勢和走向的民眾，多數心中或許早有好惡，也依據其好惡檢視候選人的政策內涵與言行表現，但是，激情的民意對峙終究也有疲乏的時刻，愈來愈多的民眾對藍綠惡鬥抱持冷漠的態度，特別是所謂的「中間選民」，愈來愈重視實際、理性的政策論述，只有當選舉回歸政策基本面，台灣民主才有真正成熟的可能。
距離大選投票還有四個半月，此刻的雙英政策牛肉戰或許可視為選戰過程中必要的戲碼，愈接近投票日影響選戰最大的可能還是政黨動員，甚至意識形態的對決，但觀諸雙英的人格特質和政治性格，我們還是樂觀期待，雙英有能力一以貫之地堅持以政策論述決勝，那麼台灣的選舉格調、政治文化即可再臻新境。
Monday, September 5, 2011
Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill
Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2011
Summary: The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will? The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
Full Text below:
The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will?
In fact, no matter how cross-Strait relations evolve, mutual goodwill will alway be essential in any relationship. One day the two sides may even sign a peace agreement. Therefore, one must never look askance at another person's goodwill. Good will is essential, and should be assidously cultivated.
The two sides should work toward a number of goals. Abstract expressions of goodwill must become concrete expressions of goodwill. Trust must replace deceit. Momentary expressions of goodwill must become long-term expressions of goodwill. The two sides must allow time for solutions to present themselves. They must adopt a rational process. A rational process will lead to clearer solutions. But the common denominator throughout the process, must be goodwill.
Conversely, Beijing counts upon Taipei's goodwill. The Lee Teng-hui era National Unification Guidelines and the Chen Shui-bian era Five Noes were ostensibly expressions of goodwill. But Beijing failed to express goodwill when it refused to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. Lee and Chen failed to express goodwill when it promoted "creeping independence," right under Beijing's nose. In sum, two decades of failed cross-Strait relations can be chalked up to a lack of goodwill on boths sides.
A favorable political development in 2008 allowed cross-Strait goodwill to be based on the 1992 consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, and on "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force." This allowed peaceful development. Taipei promised no de jure Taiwan independence. In exchange, Beijing lowered the decibel level and "increased the peace." By promising no Taiwan independence, Taipei expressed goodwill. In exchange, Beijing agreed to no [immediate] reunification and no use of force. The 1992 consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. have promoted goodwill, by enabling the two sides to seek common ground under the One China Principle. cross-Strait relations can now evolve on the basis of peace and democracy. A rational process has facilitated the search for clearer solutions.
Today's cross-Strait opportunities were hard-won. The KMT lost the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. During its eight years in office, the Chen regime exhausted all vestiges of goodwill between Taipei and Beijing. These setbacks however, made possible the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit, and the peaceful development of cross-Stait coopetition. From beginning to end, Lien Chan took the high road. He and Hu Jintao change the course of history with their boldness of vision. They laid the foundation for cross-Strait goodwill. According to Tsai Ing-wen, Ma Ying-jeou has "quiet strength," and Hu Jintao is a "rational person." Beginning In 2008, the two sides implemented peaceful development. Goodwill was no longer empty rhetoric. Fifteen agreements, including ECFA, heralded the advent of explicit and institutionalized goodwill.
Goodwill is not a hollow shell. It is the basis of cross-Strait relations. On the Taipei side, both Lee and Chen promoted creeping independence during their time in office. This showed that not everyone who assumes office will evince goodwill. For Beijing and Washington, Lee and Chen were "troublemakers." For the Republic of China, the two evinced no goodwill whatsoever. Instead, they plotted to "rectify the name of the nation, and author a new constitution." On the Beijing side, not every ruler in Beijing is willing to engage in peaceful development. For Beijing, the cost of peaceful development may be higher than the cost of allowing Taiwan to destroy itself from within. Therefore today's cross-Strait goodwill, is not something we can take for granted, It was won at high cost, after hard lessons and repeated failures. The two sides must realize this and cherish whatever goodwill exists.
Today's cross-Strait goodwill is based on the two sides' overlapping strategic interests. Therefore, the objective must be to maintain these conditions long-term. Beijing's strategic objective is to prevent de jure Taiwan independence and to facilitate reunification. Short of using armed force to swallow up Taipei, Beijing must resort to peaceful and democratic means. It must persuade the public on Taiwan to accept the concept and framework of "China," in their hearts and minds. It must do so by demonstrating genuine goodwill long term. Conversely, unless Taipei is determined to declare independence, to found a "Nation of Taiwan," and to break with the Chinese mainland, its most sensible strategic objective is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must defend the Republic of China. It can delay and reduce the pressure for reunification. It can ensure that cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and democratic. It must adopt a rational process in order to facilitate the search for clearer solutions. Therefore, why not maintain this goodwill?
The diplomatic truce was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Visa-free treatment by 117 countries was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. ECFA was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Mutual legal assistance was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. The Free and Independent Travel Policy for Mainland tourists was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. But we can hardly negate these achievements merely because cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. On the contrary, we must use these achievements to encourage and strengthen cross-Strait goodwill. The two sides have been separated for 62 years. The first 59 years were a failure, because ill will prevailed over goodwill. The last three years of peace and democracy are the manifestation of goodwill. They are the resut of one's vision transcending one's limitations. They are the result of rational thinking leading to clearer solutions.
The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
兩岸應當珍惜彼此的善意
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.05
民進黨認為，兩岸關係建立在依賴北京當局的「善意」之上，這種關係太脆弱，太無保障。然而，可以反過來問：難道兩岸關係應當建立在彼此的「惡意」之上？若不依賴彼此的「善意」，另將何所憑藉？
其實，兩岸關係不論走到什麼階段，即使有朝一日簽署了「和平協議」，彼此的「善意」仍是維持良性關係最根本的憑靠。因此，不要否定善意，必須建立善意，應當鞏固善意。
兩岸應當努力的目標是：將彼此的善意，從表面變成本質，從權謀變成信仰，從暫時變成長久；以時間換取空間，從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」，其間貫徹始終者皆賴「善意」。
相對而言，北京其實也依賴台灣方面的「善意」。在李登輝時代的「國統綱領」，及陳水扁時代的「四不一沒有」，皆是「善意」的表示；但是，一方面北京未在「中華民國的存在問題」上回以善意，另一方面李扁操作台獨亦被北京視為不具善意。所以，總結那二十年的兩岸關係之失敗，主因應在雙方皆不知建立及維持善意。
「○八機遇」之後，兩岸關係的「善意」，是建立在「九二共識，一中各表」，及「不統，不獨，不武」之上，因此始有「和平發展」。究其實際，台北是以「不法理台獨」，換取北京的「放低統一分貝，提升和平發展」；亦即以「不獨」的善意，換取「不統，不武」的善意。再者「九二共識，一中各表」，亦使「一中原則」存有「求同存異」的善意。彼此有了此種善意，兩岸關係始有可能在「和平」與「民主」的主軸上，經「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
今日兩岸機遇得來不易。若不是國民黨在二○○○年及二○○四年兩次總統大選失敗，若不是扁政府執政八年與大陸朝野喪盡「善意」，即不可能有二○○五年的連胡會，更不可能建立「和平發展」的兩岸競合基調。連戰自始至終「為而不有」的胸襟，與胡錦濤扭轉大局的瞻矚，是建立兩岸善意的基礎。至二○○八後，由於馬英九的「沉默的魄力」與胡錦濤是「理性的人」（蔡英文對胡的評語），兩岸遂得以共同具體落實了「和平發展」的運作架構，使「善意」不再是空言；而ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議，即成為「明文化的善意」及「法制化的善意」。
「善意」不是虛無空洞之物，而是兩岸關係的根本憑藉。就台灣而言，畢竟經歷過李扁二任政府操作台獨，可見並非每一主政者皆能維持善意；李扁非但屢屢對北京及華府成為「麻煩製造者」，且二人根本對「中華民國」亦無「善意」，而欲「正名制憲」。再就北京而言，我們亦認為，亦非每一北京主政者皆能有「和平發展」的善意；因為，對北京來說，「和平發展」的運作成本，也許高於聽任台灣內耗而自取滅亡的成本。所以，兩岸今日的善意，並非理所當然，而是在獲得教訓及失敗後，以重大代價所建立，雙方皆應知所珍惜維護。
然而，今日兩岸的善意，亦與各自的戰略利益合轍，因此也有得以長久維繫的客觀條件。北京的戰略目標，低標是不容法理台獨，高標是促成統一；而在不採武力併吞的情勢下，必須以「和平」及「民主」的方法，使台灣人民在感情及理智上接受「中國」這個概念及體制，當然要憑藉長久與真誠的善意來經營。相對的，台北的戰略目標，除非是要台獨建國，欲與大陸決裂，則以「不統，不獨，不武」的戰略架構為最明智：一者在捍衛中華民國，另者可放緩降低統一的壓力，再者亦使兩岸關係得以維持「和平」及「民主」的善意基調，爭取「從合理的過程到改善之目的」；那麼，為何不維持這樣的善意？
外交休兵，因兩岸善意；一一七國免簽證，因兩岸善意；ＥＣＦＡ，因兩岸善意；司法互助，因兩岸善意；陸客自由行，因兩岸善意……。不能因兩岸善意未必靠得住，即否定及抵拒這些成就；反而要用這些成就，來鼓勵及鞏固兩岸的善意。兩岸關係六十二年，前五十九年的失敗，正是敗於惡意大於善意，近三年則是和平與民主的善意得以伸張，眼界提升了境界，思路開創了出路。
明年一月的總統大選，將是兩岸善意能否維繫的嚴峻考驗；即使善意不能完全憑靠，但更不能任性推翻。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2011
Summary: The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will? The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
Full Text below:
The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will?
In fact, no matter how cross-Strait relations evolve, mutual goodwill will alway be essential in any relationship. One day the two sides may even sign a peace agreement. Therefore, one must never look askance at another person's goodwill. Good will is essential, and should be assidously cultivated.
The two sides should work toward a number of goals. Abstract expressions of goodwill must become concrete expressions of goodwill. Trust must replace deceit. Momentary expressions of goodwill must become long-term expressions of goodwill. The two sides must allow time for solutions to present themselves. They must adopt a rational process. A rational process will lead to clearer solutions. But the common denominator throughout the process, must be goodwill.
Conversely, Beijing counts upon Taipei's goodwill. The Lee Teng-hui era National Unification Guidelines and the Chen Shui-bian era Five Noes were ostensibly expressions of goodwill. But Beijing failed to express goodwill when it refused to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. Lee and Chen failed to express goodwill when it promoted "creeping independence," right under Beijing's nose. In sum, two decades of failed cross-Strait relations can be chalked up to a lack of goodwill on boths sides.
A favorable political development in 2008 allowed cross-Strait goodwill to be based on the 1992 consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, and on "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force." This allowed peaceful development. Taipei promised no de jure Taiwan independence. In exchange, Beijing lowered the decibel level and "increased the peace." By promising no Taiwan independence, Taipei expressed goodwill. In exchange, Beijing agreed to no [immediate] reunification and no use of force. The 1992 consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. have promoted goodwill, by enabling the two sides to seek common ground under the One China Principle. cross-Strait relations can now evolve on the basis of peace and democracy. A rational process has facilitated the search for clearer solutions.
Today's cross-Strait opportunities were hard-won. The KMT lost the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. During its eight years in office, the Chen regime exhausted all vestiges of goodwill between Taipei and Beijing. These setbacks however, made possible the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit, and the peaceful development of cross-Stait coopetition. From beginning to end, Lien Chan took the high road. He and Hu Jintao change the course of history with their boldness of vision. They laid the foundation for cross-Strait goodwill. According to Tsai Ing-wen, Ma Ying-jeou has "quiet strength," and Hu Jintao is a "rational person." Beginning In 2008, the two sides implemented peaceful development. Goodwill was no longer empty rhetoric. Fifteen agreements, including ECFA, heralded the advent of explicit and institutionalized goodwill.
Goodwill is not a hollow shell. It is the basis of cross-Strait relations. On the Taipei side, both Lee and Chen promoted creeping independence during their time in office. This showed that not everyone who assumes office will evince goodwill. For Beijing and Washington, Lee and Chen were "troublemakers." For the Republic of China, the two evinced no goodwill whatsoever. Instead, they plotted to "rectify the name of the nation, and author a new constitution." On the Beijing side, not every ruler in Beijing is willing to engage in peaceful development. For Beijing, the cost of peaceful development may be higher than the cost of allowing Taiwan to destroy itself from within. Therefore today's cross-Strait goodwill, is not something we can take for granted, It was won at high cost, after hard lessons and repeated failures. The two sides must realize this and cherish whatever goodwill exists.
Today's cross-Strait goodwill is based on the two sides' overlapping strategic interests. Therefore, the objective must be to maintain these conditions long-term. Beijing's strategic objective is to prevent de jure Taiwan independence and to facilitate reunification. Short of using armed force to swallow up Taipei, Beijing must resort to peaceful and democratic means. It must persuade the public on Taiwan to accept the concept and framework of "China," in their hearts and minds. It must do so by demonstrating genuine goodwill long term. Conversely, unless Taipei is determined to declare independence, to found a "Nation of Taiwan," and to break with the Chinese mainland, its most sensible strategic objective is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must defend the Republic of China. It can delay and reduce the pressure for reunification. It can ensure that cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and democratic. It must adopt a rational process in order to facilitate the search for clearer solutions. Therefore, why not maintain this goodwill?
The diplomatic truce was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Visa-free treatment by 117 countries was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. ECFA was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Mutual legal assistance was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. The Free and Independent Travel Policy for Mainland tourists was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. But we can hardly negate these achievements merely because cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. On the contrary, we must use these achievements to encourage and strengthen cross-Strait goodwill. The two sides have been separated for 62 years. The first 59 years were a failure, because ill will prevailed over goodwill. The last three years of peace and democracy are the manifestation of goodwill. They are the resut of one's vision transcending one's limitations. They are the result of rational thinking leading to clearer solutions.
The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
兩岸應當珍惜彼此的善意
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.05
民進黨認為，兩岸關係建立在依賴北京當局的「善意」之上，這種關係太脆弱，太無保障。然而，可以反過來問：難道兩岸關係應當建立在彼此的「惡意」之上？若不依賴彼此的「善意」，另將何所憑藉？
其實，兩岸關係不論走到什麼階段，即使有朝一日簽署了「和平協議」，彼此的「善意」仍是維持良性關係最根本的憑靠。因此，不要否定善意，必須建立善意，應當鞏固善意。
兩岸應當努力的目標是：將彼此的善意，從表面變成本質，從權謀變成信仰，從暫時變成長久；以時間換取空間，從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」，其間貫徹始終者皆賴「善意」。
相對而言，北京其實也依賴台灣方面的「善意」。在李登輝時代的「國統綱領」，及陳水扁時代的「四不一沒有」，皆是「善意」的表示；但是，一方面北京未在「中華民國的存在問題」上回以善意，另一方面李扁操作台獨亦被北京視為不具善意。所以，總結那二十年的兩岸關係之失敗，主因應在雙方皆不知建立及維持善意。
「○八機遇」之後，兩岸關係的「善意」，是建立在「九二共識，一中各表」，及「不統，不獨，不武」之上，因此始有「和平發展」。究其實際，台北是以「不法理台獨」，換取北京的「放低統一分貝，提升和平發展」；亦即以「不獨」的善意，換取「不統，不武」的善意。再者「九二共識，一中各表」，亦使「一中原則」存有「求同存異」的善意。彼此有了此種善意，兩岸關係始有可能在「和平」與「民主」的主軸上，經「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
今日兩岸機遇得來不易。若不是國民黨在二○○○年及二○○四年兩次總統大選失敗，若不是扁政府執政八年與大陸朝野喪盡「善意」，即不可能有二○○五年的連胡會，更不可能建立「和平發展」的兩岸競合基調。連戰自始至終「為而不有」的胸襟，與胡錦濤扭轉大局的瞻矚，是建立兩岸善意的基礎。至二○○八後，由於馬英九的「沉默的魄力」與胡錦濤是「理性的人」（蔡英文對胡的評語），兩岸遂得以共同具體落實了「和平發展」的運作架構，使「善意」不再是空言；而ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議，即成為「明文化的善意」及「法制化的善意」。
「善意」不是虛無空洞之物，而是兩岸關係的根本憑藉。就台灣而言，畢竟經歷過李扁二任政府操作台獨，可見並非每一主政者皆能維持善意；李扁非但屢屢對北京及華府成為「麻煩製造者」，且二人根本對「中華民國」亦無「善意」，而欲「正名制憲」。再就北京而言，我們亦認為，亦非每一北京主政者皆能有「和平發展」的善意；因為，對北京來說，「和平發展」的運作成本，也許高於聽任台灣內耗而自取滅亡的成本。所以，兩岸今日的善意，並非理所當然，而是在獲得教訓及失敗後，以重大代價所建立，雙方皆應知所珍惜維護。
然而，今日兩岸的善意，亦與各自的戰略利益合轍，因此也有得以長久維繫的客觀條件。北京的戰略目標，低標是不容法理台獨，高標是促成統一；而在不採武力併吞的情勢下，必須以「和平」及「民主」的方法，使台灣人民在感情及理智上接受「中國」這個概念及體制，當然要憑藉長久與真誠的善意來經營。相對的，台北的戰略目標，除非是要台獨建國，欲與大陸決裂，則以「不統，不獨，不武」的戰略架構為最明智：一者在捍衛中華民國，另者可放緩降低統一的壓力，再者亦使兩岸關係得以維持「和平」及「民主」的善意基調，爭取「從合理的過程到改善之目的」；那麼，為何不維持這樣的善意？
外交休兵，因兩岸善意；一一七國免簽證，因兩岸善意；ＥＣＦＡ，因兩岸善意；司法互助，因兩岸善意；陸客自由行，因兩岸善意……。不能因兩岸善意未必靠得住，即否定及抵拒這些成就；反而要用這些成就，來鼓勵及鞏固兩岸的善意。兩岸關係六十二年，前五十九年的失敗，正是敗於惡意大於善意，近三年則是和平與民主的善意得以伸張，眼界提升了境界，思路開創了出路。
明年一月的總統大選，將是兩岸善意能否維繫的嚴峻考驗；即使善意不能完全憑靠，但更不能任性推翻。
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