Monday, November 14, 2011

Trans-Pacific Partnership: Key to Free Trade Island

Trans-Pacific Partnership: Key to Free Trade Island
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 14, 2011

Summary: A crisis is an opportunity. But a crisis also creates opportunities. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) was once unknown. Only economic and trade experts had heard of it. But today many nations are in crisis. This has forced the TPP onto the international stage. Taipei is an important participant in the Asian-Pacific regional economy. But it has been unable to join the club, and is in danger of marginalization. The TPP offers Taipei an excellent opportunity to join. The government should make a concerted effort do so.

Full Text Below:

A crisis is an opportunity. But a crisis also creates opportunities. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) was once unknown. Only economic and trade experts had heard of it. But today many nations are in crisis. This has forced the TPP onto the international stage. This has transformed the TPP into an Asian-Pacific trade and economic battlefield for Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. The TPP has yet to be established. Taipei is an important participant in the Asian-Pacific regional economy. But it has been unable to join the club, and is in danger of marginalization. The TPP offers Taipei an excellent opportunity to join. The government should make a concerted effort do so. It should expand without and change within. It should resolve to create a free trade island.

The TPP was jointly promoted by four members of APEC: Singapore, Chile, Brunei and New Zealand. They felt APEC was too disorganized and too passive. They felt it stood in the way of a well thought out free trade agreement. In 2009, following the Asian financial crisis, Washington began taking part in the negotiations. Washington focused on the benefits of economic development and the threat of a rising Mainland China. Washington attracted new members, and led negotiations. This year's APEC leaders meeting is about to convene. Tokyo has long resisted free trade. But South Korea, the European Union, and the United States have signed FTAs. Japan's domestic industrial base is being hollowed out. These internal pressures have forced Japan to join. The world's first largest and third largest economies have simultaneously joined, and given the TPP a tremendous boost.

With powerful encouragement from the United States and Japan, the TPP now has 10 members. This will accelerate the development of the TPP, which now comprises one-third of the world's economy. U.S. President Barack Obama says he hopes an agreement can be reached next year. This is bound to encourage Asian-Pacific countries to join. Under the circumstances, the TPP is not merely a bully pulpit for the United States. It may also become a mini-WTO inside APEC. It may become a Free Trade Area in the Asian-Pacific (FTAAP). Beijing is the leader of ASEAN plus one (Mainland China), ASEAN + Three (Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea), and ASEAN plus Six (Mainland China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, India). This means the Asian-Pacific trading system will have two leaders, Mainland China and the United States. Will they check and balance each other? Or will they become one? These trends will affect the Asian-Pacific region. Mainland China does not oppose the TPP. But it stresses the importance of multilateralism. This means it has more to say on the matter. More importantly, under United States leadership, the TPP will probably become a platform for new generation international trade rules. Traditionally FTAs have emphasized the liberalization of trade in goods. New generation international trade rules emphasize the environment, labor, intellectual property rights, and other criteria, Obama has stated that the TPP has the potential to become a model for all future trade agreements, and not merely the Asian-Pacific region,

The TPP is taking a certain direction. This tells us that joining the TPP is essential for Taiwan, due to its high dependence on trade. It is essential for three reasons. First, it is essential to expanded trade, lowered tariffs, liberalized markets, and other measures conducive to Taiwan's exports, and reduce the cost of imports. Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-hsiang bluntly declared that if members protect each other and open themselves up to each other but exclude Taiwan, we will find the going very hard. This was originally one of Taiwan's economic strategies. President Ma set up groups to promote an FTA. But little progress was made toward recognizing the Republic of China's sovereignty, due to harsh international realities. This is the second reason we must join the TPP.

The TPP is an agreement whose members were primarily supposed to come from APEC. Taipei has a moral and legal right to join. It is not entirely free from interference by sovereign states. Other governments have negotiated FTAs individually. By comparision, Taipei's status has led to different kinds of complexities and difficulties. Taipei and Beijing disagree about Taipei's participation in international trade organizations. But they have a shared framework, that enables Taipei's participation in TPP negotiations. They can consult with its ten member governments. This is an efficient and feasible way to prevent Taiwan's marginalization, therefore should not be taken lightly.

The third is the urgent need for industrial restructuring on Taiwan. Joining the TPP is the same as promoting FTAs. The hope is that others will open their markets to Taiwan, and that others will want Taiwan to open its markets to them. In sum, it is all about opening one's markets, and restructuring one's industries. The only difference is some FTAs are more open than others, The TPP is more open than most FTAs. It is considered a high quality, high threshold FTA. Will Taipei be able to join? This does not depend entirely on others. It depends more on ourselves. As Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi asked Taipei: "Do you really want to join?" He hit the nail squarely on the head.

The government has promoted FTAs for years. But it has never made the necessary changes to our industry. We have made little real progress in FTAs. Slow industrial restructuring is hardly the only reason. Another reason is idle industrial capacity. Therefore the government must not just talk about joining the TPP. It must gather its wits and marshal its forces. It must formulate a comprehensive plan to accelerate industrial restructuring, It must turn Taiwan into a true free trade island.

加入TPP:打造經貿自由島的關鍵一役
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.14

危機是轉機,危機也創造轉機。一個原本沒沒無聞,只有經貿專家聽過的「跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定(Trans-Pacific Partnership,TPP)」,就在各國因應各自危機的考量下,一躍而上國際舞台,成為美國、日本及中國大陸互爭亞太經貿盟主的新戰場。尚未成形的TPP,對同是亞太重要一員,卻苦無入門之徑而有邊緣化危機的台灣,無疑提供了一個絕佳機會,政府應以最大決心爭取加入,讓向外拓展、對內調整、打造經貿自由島畢其功於一役。

TPP是由APEC的四個成員新加坡、智利、汶萊及紐西蘭發起,一開始或是有感於APEC的鬆散與無為,而擬訂立一個具規範性的自由貿易協定(FTA);二○○九年,著眼於金融海嘯後亞洲經濟發展利益及中國崛起的威脅,美國加入了談判,吸引了新成員,並主導了談判;今年APEC領袖會議舉行前夕,向來對自由貿易保守以對的日本,眼看韓國分與歐盟、美國簽署FTA及內部產業空洞化壓力,也宣布加入,使TPP因同時擁有全球第一、第三大經濟體而聲勢大增。

在美、日兩強推動下,已有十個成員、經濟規模占全球三分之一的TPP將加速發展,美國總統歐巴馬已表示,希望明年完成協議,勢將刺激亞太各國思考加入必要性。在此一情勢下,TPP不只是美國重新取得亞太經貿發言權的平台,更可能成為APEC區域內的小型世貿組織,向亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)邁進;它也使得亞太貿易發展體系,由現今中國大陸主導的「東協加一(中)」、「東協+三(中日韓)」、「東協加六(中日韓紐澳印度)」單核心,形成中、美分庭抗禮的雙軸心,未來是彼此制衡或融為一體,將影響亞太整合趨勢,目前中方雖不反對TPP,但也強調多邊性,顯示尚有後話;更重要的是,在美國主導下,TPP更可能成為新世代國際貿易規則的制定平台,從傳統FTA聚焦的貨品貿易自由化,跨向環保、勞工及智慧財產權等規範,歐巴馬即明言,TPP不僅有潛力成為亞太地區模式,更能成為未來貿易協定模式。

由TPP的發展趨向可知,加入TPP對貿易依存度甚高的台灣經濟至關重要,其必要性主要顯現於三方面。第一是要擴張貿易,降低關稅、開放市場等自由化措施有利於台灣的產品出口,而可相對降低進口成本;經濟部長施顏祥即不諱言,因為成員間互相保護又相互開放,如果不能加入TPP,台灣會很辛苦。這原是台灣經貿戰略之一環,馬總統還成立FTA小組推動,但受限於台灣主權認定的國際現實而少有進展,而此一限制正是必須加入TPP的第二個原因。

依初始規劃,TPP是一以APEC成員為主體的開放性協定,使台灣擁有申請加入的正當性與合法性,儘管仍無法完全免除主權國家的干擾,但相較於逐一與各國洽商FTA、建立不同模式的複雜度與困難度,以及兩岸間對台灣參與國際經貿組織的共識不足,台灣參與TPP有既定的共同談判框架可循,並可同步開啟與十國的協商,效率高,可行性也高,實是突破台灣邊緣化困境的關鍵一役,不可輕縱。

第三個必要性則是台灣內部產業調整的急迫性。其實,加入TPP與推動FTA一樣,既希望他國對台灣開放市場,他國也會要台灣開放市場,其本質都是市場開放、產業調整的過程,所不同者在於不同的FTA有不同的開放程度,TPP的開放程度因高於一般FTA,而被視為高品質、高門檻的FTA,因而台灣能否加入,不完全受制於人,更是操之在己,一如大陸國台辦主任王毅對台灣想加入TPP的質疑:「你們真的要加入?」這一問正問到了關鍵。

政府推動FTA多年,但並沒有相應的產業調整計畫及行動,FTA缺乏實質進展,豈僅是產業調整緩慢的結果,它更是產業發展怠速的原因。因此,政府加入TPP不能再流於空談,而應藉此集智集力,全盤規劃一個加速推動產業結構的計畫,打造台灣成為真正的經貿自由島。

Thursday, November 10, 2011

Three Little Pigs Cannot Elbow Aside 1992 Consensus

Three Little Pigs Cannot Elbow Aside 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2011

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has made clear that if she is elected president, she will refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. This will immediately precipitate a showdown with Beijing. When that happens, who will be forced to back down? Who will be forced to eat crow? Will it be Beijing? Or will it be Tsai Ing-wen?

Full Text Below:

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi is currently in Hawaii attending an APEC meeting. Wang said that the basis of the Chiang-Chen meeting is the 1992 consensus. Will next year's Chiang-Chen meeting be held as usual? That depends on how the situation unfolds after the ROC presidential election on Taiwan. Wang said that the foundation for cross-Strait consultations is the 1992 consensus. "This is beyond dispute."

A reporter asked Wang Yi whether the cross-Strait insurance agreement might be signed during next spring's Chiang-Chen meeting. Wang replied, "If the Chiang-Chen meeting can be held, then the agreement can be signed." The implication was that "If the meeting cannot be held, then the agreement cannot be signed."

Beijing has reiterated that "If the foundation crumbles, then the building must fall." Wang even said "The 16 agreements signed by the two sides are the building erected upon the consensus." This means ECFA is included.

The main point of contention in the ongoing Blue vs. Green tug of war has been whether to recognize the 1992 consensus. It has suddenly been sidelined by such issues as "The Three Little Pigs." But the key to the general election is still the 1992 consensus. This is not something anyone can wish away. The Three Little Pigs cannot wish away the 1992 consensus.

For Taipei, the 1992 consensus is the basis for national identity and cross-Strait interaction, as laid out in the Constitution of the Republic of China. For Taipei it means "one China, different interpretations," and "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use force." For Beijing it means "seeking common ground while acknowledging differences." In short, the 1992 consensus has become the premise and foundation for cross-Strait peaceful development.

So far Tsai Ing-wen has refused to recognize the 1992 consensus, But her cross-Strait rhetoric is clearly subject to powerful constraints imposed upon her by the 1992 consensus. For example, she once opposed ECFA because she opposed the 1992 consensus. Now she approves of ECFA. But she cannot do without the support of the 1992 consensus. She once alleged that "The Republic of China is a government in exile," again because she opposed the 1992 consensus. But now she has changed her tune. She now says "The Republic of China is not a foreign regime." She cannot do without the support of "one China, different interpretations." She once opposed President Ma's peace agreement. But now she champions her "three principles of peace." She cannot do without the support of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force."

Tsai has vocally opposed the 1992 consensus. But every policy she has ever advanced on constitutional allegiance ir cross-Strait interaction, cannot do without the support of the 1992 consensus. Without the support of the 1992 consensus, her policies are simply infeasible. She wants to maintain ECFA. But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? She wants to equate the Republic of China with Taiwan, and Taiwan with the Republic of China, But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations?" She wants to sell voters on her "three principles of peace." But can she do so without the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations?"

Tsai Ing-wen has long refused to recognize the 1992 consensus. Her refusal underwent three stages. First she alleged that the 1992 consensus did not exist. Then she alleged that the 1992 consensus was synonymous with "one China." In other words, the 1992 consensus existed, but it meant "one China," and not "one China, different interpretations." Finally, she boasted that even if she refused to recognize the 1992 consensus after becoming president, Beijing would not dare shun her. She boasted that Beijing would blink, that it would let the matter of the 1992 consensus slide. In other words, the 1992 consensus would remain, but Beijing would back down.

In sum, Tsai Ing-wen's assumptions are absurd and dangerous. She clearly realizes that cross-Strait peaceful development depends upon the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpetations." But she repeatedly flip-flops. First the denies that the 1992 consensus exists. Then she equates the 1992 consensus with Beijing's interpretation of "one China." She is even paranoid enough to imagine that she can repudiate the 1992 consensus and maintain ECFA, rule over the Republic of China, and implementation her "three principles of peace."

Tsai Ing-wen has made clear that if she is elected president, she will refuse to recognize the 1992 consensus. This will immediately precipitate a showdown with Beijing. When that happens, who will be forced to back down? Who will be forced to eat crow? Will it be Beijing? Or will it be Tsai Ing-wen?

Tsai and the DPP may think they can simply wait until they have won. They may think they can then invoke weasel words such as "the spirit of the 1992 talks" and deftly turn the situation around. But if Tsai Ing-wen does this, she will be surrendering to Beijing, Listen to what Wang Yi said. Listen to the tone in which he said it. When the time comes, Beijing will insist on hearing Tsai Ing-wen say the words: "1992 consensus." Nothing more, and nothing less. Beijing will not tolerate the slightest deviation. That is because the 1992 consensus is the policy position that Beijing officials charged with Taiwan affairs have relentlessly hammered upon since 2005. The Mainland cannot take it back, and Tsai Ing-wen cannot force the Mainland to take it back.

This is the bizarre paradox in this election. In the event Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will immediately collide head on with Beijing. She has no qualms about inflicting political and economic disaster upon Taiwan, merely to further her election campaign. Public attention has been led astray. It is now focused on jokes about "Three Little Pigs." The DPP is exploiting populist sentiment over the "Three Little Pigs." It hopes to elect a Republic of China president who will repudiate the 1992 consensus and clash head on with Beijing. Tsai Ing-wen is clearly even more paranoid, radical, and foolish than Chen Shui-bian.

If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be caught in a dilemma. She can repudiate the 1992 Consensus, or change her tune and recognize it. But either way, she will inflict political and economic disaster upon Taiwan. Furthermore, if she changes her tune and accepts the 1992 consensus, it will mean she is also accepting Beijing's interpretation of "one China." After all, that was her own understanding of the 1992 consensus. After all, she was the one who insisted that the 1992 consensus was the same as Beijing's interpretation of "one China." She was the one who insisted that the 1992 consensus was not the same as "one China, different interpretations."

「三隻小豬」吃不掉「九二共識」
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.11

刻在夏威夷參加APEC年會的北京國台辦主任王毅說:江陳會召開的基礎就是九二共識,明春江陳會是否能繼續召開,要看台灣大選後的情勢演變。他說,兩岸兩會協商的基礎就是九二共識,「這是不能被挑戰的」。

記者問王毅,明春江陳會有無可能簽署「兩岸投保協議」?王毅答:「江陳會若能開得成,就簽得成。」此話的潛台詞被認為是「若開不成,就簽不成」。

北京一再重申「基礎不保/樓層必倒」的論點。王毅日前甚至明指「兩會簽署的十六項協議就是在九二共識上新建的樓層」,即意謂ECFA亦包含其中。

藍綠攻防的主要議題「是否承認九二共識」彷彿突然消失,被「三隻小豬」等話題所取代。但此次大選的關鍵仍在「九二共識」,這不可能隨任何人的意志為轉移。「三隻小豬」也吃不掉「九二共識」。

「九二共識」,對台灣而言,就是以「中華民國憲法」為國家認同及兩岸運作的準據;對兩岸互動而言,則在台灣是「一中各表」及「不統/不獨/不武」,在北京則是「求同存異」。總而言之,「九二共識」已成為兩岸「和平發展」的前提與基礎。

蔡英文迄今否定九二共識,但她的兩岸論述卻顯受「九二共識」的強力制約。例如,她曾反ECFA,是緣於反九二共識;但如今她贊同ECFA,卻不能沒有「九二共識」的支撐。再如,她曾說「中華民國是流亡政府」,也是緣於反九二共識;但如今又改稱「中華民國不是外來政權」,亦不能沒有「一中各表」的支撐。又如,她反對馬總統的《和平協議》,卻又主張「和平三原則」,即不能沒有「不統/不獨/不武」的支撐。

可以這麼說,蔡英文口口聲聲反對「九二共識」,但是她所提出的國憲認同與兩岸運作的重大政策,每一件其實皆不能沒有「九二共識」支撐,否則就絕不可行。試問:要延續ECFA,無「九二共識/一中各表」行嗎?主張「中華民國就是台灣/台灣就是中華民國」,無「九二共識/一中各表」行嗎?主張「和平三原則」,無「九二共識/一中各表」行嗎?

蔡英文之「否定九二共識」,有三部曲:一、指九二共識根本不存在;二、指九二共識就是「一個中國」(「九二共識」存在了,但「一中各表」不見了);三、揚言即使她否認九二共識而當選總統,北京也不敢與她翻臉,必會將「九二共識」吞回去。(九二共識存在了,但屆時北京會龜縮)。

綜上所論,蔡英文的荒謬及可怕在於,她明知兩岸的「和平發展」,繫於「九二共識/一中各表」;但她一下子根本否定「九二共識」的存在,一下子又將「九二共識」釘死在「一個中國」之上;而她又竟然妄想可以推翻「九二共識」卻仍延續ECFA、統治「中華民國」,及實現其「和平三原則」!

蔡英文如今的姿態,擺明了就是若當選後必會否定「九二共識」,立即與北京攤牌對撞。屆時,就看誰會龜縮?誰會把話吞回去?是北京?或蔡英文?

蔡英文與民進黨也許心中盤算,待若勝選後,再用「九二年會談精神」等修辭來轉彎;且莫說即使如此蔡英文亦形同向北京投降,何況聽王毅的口氣,北京屆時要從蔡英文口裡聽到的,應當是不折不扣、原原本本的「九二共識」四字,一個字也不能少,一個字也不能改。因為,「九二共識」是北京涉台人士自二○○五年以來強調過千百次的政策命題,大陸內部不容他們吞回去,蔡英文也不可能教他們吞回去。

這正是這場大選的奇詭弔詭。蔡英文其實是以當選後立即與北京攤牌對撞,且不惜為台灣掀起一場政經災難作為其競選的主要號召;但是,整個選情卻陷溺在「三隻小豬」的戲謔之中,欲用小豬的民粹熱情去拱出一位以「否定九二共識」與北京攤牌對撞的中華民國總統,這儼然比當年的陳水扁更偏執、激進、愚妄。

可以斷言,蔡英文若當選,必是「頭過,身不過。」屆時,她不論繼續否認或改口承認「九二共識」,皆將造成台灣的政經浩劫。何況,她若到時候接受了「九二共識」,即是表示她接受了「一個中國」,這正是她自己為「九二共識」釘死的定義,因為她不承認「一中各表」!

Ministry Blunders Undermine Re-election Campaign

Ministry Blunders Undermine Re-election Campaign
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 10, 2011

Summary: During an election campaign, one need not gain ground. But one must never mindlessly lose ground. Recently the Executive Yuan committed one blunder after another. Premier Wu Den-yih is apoplectic. While he puts out fires in the front, more fires break out in the rear. How can he possibly run a successful re-election campaign under such circumstances? Wu is a vice presidential candidate. Making sure that all the hatches are battened down is his responsibility. After Wu's anger dies down the first thing he must do is identify the problem. Why have so many ministries committed so many blunders? Why has the cabinet been unable to put a cap on all these blunders? If this continues, the DPP will win without lifting a finger. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's bid for re-election will be sabotaged by his own people.

Full Text Below:

During an election campaign, one need not gain ground. But one must never mindlessly lose ground. Recently the Executive Yuan committed one blunder after another. Premier Wu Den-yih is apoplectic. While he puts out fires in the front, more fires break out in the rear. How can he possibly run a successful re-election campaign under such circumstances? Wu is a vice presidential candidate. Making sure that all the hatches are battened down is his responsibility. After Wu's anger dies down the first thing he must do is identify the problem. Why have so many ministries committed so many blunders? Why has the cabinet been unable to put a cap on all these blunders? If this continues, the DPP will win without lifting a finger. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's bid for re-election will be sabotaged by his own people.

Some civil servants are troublesome. Some Executive Yuan officials have doubts about them. Just how many of these troublesome civil servants are opposition "moles?" Their suspicions are not entirely without justification. The Council of Agriculture recently canceled milk subsidies to poor children. But less than 24 hours later, it reversed its policy. Council of Agriculture Chairman Preston Chen said the subsidies were never canceled in the first place. Official documents were leaked even before they were submitted to the Livestock Production Section for approval. Deputy Chairman Hu Hsing-hua said the auditors considered this a social welfare measure that should be dealt with by social welfare agencies. But until an agreement can be reached, the COA is handling the matter.

The explanations offered by the chairman and deputy chairman left people baffled. First of all, the subsidies have been in place for some time. The auditors never objected to them before. Why reassign responsibility suddenly, just before the general election? Secondly, the documents were not even submitted to the chairman. Would a section chief really have the authority to make a public announcement? Would the chairman sit idly by and not intervene? One can scrimp everywhere. The only place one cannot scrimp is on little children, especially when they are underprivileged children. Does any civil servant in the Council of Agriculture not understand this? Once the matter blew up, the Council of Agriculture rushed to provide free milk to children, only to invite ridicule for its policy flip-flop. Why would it invite such abuse upon itself? What was the real motive?

The Council of Agriculture was not alone. The Ministry of Education prohibited romantic relationships between teachers and students. It prohibited cram schools from recruiting children under six. It prohibited smokers from becoming school principals. It made three blunders in a row, every one of them mindless. Strictly speaking, the Ministry of Education did not prohibit romantic relations between teachers and students. What it prohibited was teachers preying on students. Teachers who prey on students are investigated and prosecuted promptly under existing laws. Did the Ministry of Education really need this additional provision? A piece of paper did nothing to prosecute teachers who prey on students. It merely impugned the dignity of the teaching profession as a whole.

Children under six should not be prematurely subjected to the cram school environment. They should not be subjected to inordinate academic pressure. But this is the parents' business. Why must the Ministry of Education intervene? Why provoke parents who want their children to become movers and shakers? Why provoke the cram school industry? What was the real motive?

Not permitting smokers to become school principals is even more absurd. Anti-smoking measures on Taiwan are strict. Most schools have smoke-free campuses. No matter how addicted a school principle might be to tobacco, he is not about to defy the law by smoking where he shouldn't. If he did, he would photographed violating the smoking ban and reported by students or other teachers. The Ministry of Education would not even need to investigate. The principal would not have the cheek to stay on. One aspect of the provision is especially pointless. The prohibition against smokers becoming school principals was instituted in May. So why was it announced six months before the election? Was someone deliberately making trouble for Minister of Education Wu Ching-ji? Or more to the point, was someone deliberately making trouble for the KMT and the Ma/Wu ticket?

In addition to the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education, we have the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA). The CCA deftly organized over 300 events for the Republic of China centennial celebration, without so much as a hiccup. Yet it created serious problems for the National Day "Dreamer" musical production. The arts community blasted it. Netizens initiated an online petition drive demanding a refund. Whether the Dreamer was a good or bad production is one thing. Whether corruption was involved is another. The CCA was charged with producing the Republic of China centennial activities. It must respect the creators of cultural and creative content. It must not permit officials to write their own script. Doing so would lead to "painting by the numbers."

The budget for this National Day musical was substantial. Culture and creativity are priceless. From this perspective, one cannot say that the production was not worth the price tag. The problem was that the 200 million dollar budget was spent largely on stage props. Two days later, these stage props were burned. This was a bitter pill for the arts community to swallow.

The CCA wanted a musical production different from any in the past. That was understandable. The musical production was one of the two highlights of the centennial celebration. It is hard to find fault with the theater group contract awards. The New Year's Eve fireworks contract was awarded to Lin Hwai-min of the the Cloud Gate Dance Theater. Eleven other contracts were awarded. The CCA used open bidding and contract awarding procedures. Accusations of corruption are probably baseless. But was it really wise to hold a musical or theatrical performance outdoors? The venue consisted of nothing more than bare concrete. Was that really appropriate? That must be considered. CCA Chairman Emile Sheng feels aggrieved. But perhaps he should apologize for his lack of professionalism regarding the performing arts.

Political appointees have been blasted. The civil servants charged with the production may not have the proper attitude. But ministry heads cannot shirk responsibility. They could not even control their own subordinates. What right do they have to talk about management and leadership ability? Once a policy has been announced, the ministry head must assume responsibility. Beside, these ministry heads have been in office for over three years. They are familiar with the system of seniority. Yet they were led around by the nose by their subordinates. They can hardly blame "moles." They can only blame themselves.

部會頻凸槌,這仗怎麼打?

2011-11-10 中國時報

打選戰不怕沒加分,只怕沒頭沒腦失分,最近行政院各部會頻頻凸槌,行政院長吳敦義氣到爆,前線打仗後院失火,這仗怎麼打啊?身為副總統參選人,栓緊內閣螺絲正是吳揆的責任。在盛怒之後,最重要的是搞清楚問題所在,為什麼各部會輪流出包,頗有禁之不絕之勢?長此以往,不勞民進黨費力,國民黨總統參選人馬英九的連任之途,就被自己人給搞垮了。

政院流傳一種說法:公務員難纏,只差沒問各部會到底有多少「臥底」的?這個說法也不是沒有邏輯可循,以農委會最近爆出貧童鮮奶補助取消爭議,廿四小時政策大轉彎,農委會主委陳武雄說根本沒有取消的問題,這紙公文還沒上呈就被承辦的「家畜生產科」給先公布了。副主委胡興華的說法是審計單位認為這是社會福利措施,應由社福單位處理,但在未達共識前,仍由農委會想辦法支應。

正副主委的說法都讓人百思不得其解,第一,此一補助事項實施也有一段時間了,過去審計單位沒意見,怎麼突如其來在大選前要變更預算支出單位?第二,連公文都未上呈主委,承辦科哪來這麼大權限先對外公布?難不成主委只會當官不會管嗎?什麼錢都能省,就是不能省到小孩的錢,何況接受補助者多是弱勢兒童,農委會任何公務員連這點常識都沒有嗎?事情鬧大之後,農委會緊急加碼幼童鮮奶福利,還是惹來政策急轉彎之譏,何苦來哉?

不只農委會,教育部從禁止師生戀、禁止補習班收六歲以下兒童,到抽菸不能當校長,更是連三錯!而且錯的沒頭沒腦。嚴格來說,教育部禁止的不是師生戀而是狼師條款,但是,校園有狼師依現行法令得立刻究辦,需要教育部多此一舉嗎?一紙公文沒辦到狼師,卻讓多數正派老師感覺尊嚴受損。

六歲以下幼童確實不宜太早進入補習的世界,承擔過重的學習壓力,但是,這理應是家長該管的事,教育部何須插手?無端惹惱望子女成龍鳳的父母,和廣大的補教業,不是無聊嗎?

校長禁菸令就更絕了,台灣菸害防治相當嚴格,遑論多數學校都已實施校園禁菸,校長菸癮再大,大概也沒這麼大膽子敢在全校師生面前試法,一個鬧不好,被師生偷拍檢舉,不必教育部查辦,校長大概都沒臉面做下去;最莫名其妙的是,這紙禁菸公文早在五月發出,早不曝光、晚不曝光,偏偏在將近半年後的大選前曝光,很難不讓人懷疑這到底是找教育部長吳清基的麻煩?還是找國民黨「馬吳配」的麻煩?

農委會、教育部之外,原本籌辦三百多項民國一百年活動一帆風順的文建會,竟在國慶晚會《夢想家》上栽了個大跟頭,不但藝文界批評聲浪洶湧,網路更有人發起連署還錢活動。《夢想家》好不好看是一回事,有沒有弊案又是一回事,對執行民國百年活動的文建會而言,文創內容必須尊重創作者,總不能由官方自訂劇本,這不成了樣板戲?

這齣國慶音樂劇金額相對龐大,從文創無價的角度,好戲也不能說不值這個價碼,問題是兩億多預算多半擺在舞台相關的硬體設施,演出兩天加上排演場一次燒完,叫藝文界不心痛也難。

文建會想要做一個不同於以往的晚會可以理解,晚會又是民國一百年系列活動中兩大重點之一,以資格標指定劇團,亦難謂不妥當,就像跨年煙火表演指定的是雲門林懷民一般,除此之外的其他十一個舞台硬體標案,文建會皆以公開競標與評選程序處理,要說有弊案,大概不至於,但是,音樂劇或舞台劇適不適合室外演出?尤其在除了水泥之外什麼設備都沒有的圓滿劇場是否允當?卻不能不考慮。文建會主委盛治仁滿腹委屈之餘,或者還真不能不為自己缺乏藝文表演的專業說句「抱歉」。

政務官被爭議問題罵到滿頭包,就算承辦公務員心態可議,部會首長都沒有卸責的理由,連自己屬下都壓不住陣腳,談什麼管理和領導能力?公文出門首長就要負責,何況首長們都是已經就任三年多、甚至在行政系統歷練已久的老資格了,還會被自己的屬下整得團團轉,不能怪「臥底」,只能怪自己。

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

What Exactly Does James Soong Want?

What Exactly Does James Soong Want?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2011

Summary: Many people are asking what exactly is James Soong thinking? What exactly does he want? What James Soong must do now, is settle down. He must re-evaluate his own legacy, and seek a lasting place for himself in history. One Green Camp talking head has already characterized him as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, and a Green Camp Wu San-gui." Is James Soong deluded enough to imagine that Tsai Ing-wen will work some sort of political miracle on his behalf?

Full Text Below:

Many people are asking what exactly is James Soong thinking? What exactly does he want?

Consider some possibilities. One. He wants to be president. Two. He wants to form a People First Party caucus in the Legislative Yuan. Three. He wants to be appointed Premier or SEF Chairman. Four. He wants to bring down Ma Ying-jeou and help Tsai Ing-wen get elected.

One. James Soong cannot possibly be elected president. Consider current election sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen commands at least 45% of the vote. Therefore if James Soong wants to be elected, it is not enough that he win more votes than Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou cannot win more than 10% of the votes. Only then can Soong surpass the 45% of the vote commanded by Tsai Ing-wen. Soong knows this is impossible, Therefore his goal is not be be elected president.

The Soong Camp began mobilizing in June. Its stated goal was to win three seats in the legislature in order to form a PFP legislative caucus. But if this is James Soong's real goal, why did he adopt such extreme rhetoric as "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan?" After all, most of the Soong Camp's support comes from the Blue Camp. In single candidate voting districts, the "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan" battle cry adopted by the "Orange Army" (PFP) is unlikely to win any votes. What's worse, the Soong Camp is deliberately fielding PFP candidates in voting districts where the Blue Camp is under threat from the Green Camp. The PFP is obviously not attempting to get its own candidates elected. It is merely attempting to undermine KMT candidates in order to help DPP candidates. it is merely attempting to reduce the number of seats held by the KMT in the legislature. It is merely attempting to create an election upset. Will James Soong's "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan" strategy have a coat tails effect? Or will those riding Soong's coat tails get trampled to death? That remains to be seen. Fairminded observers have concluded that if Soong merely wanted to form a PFP party caucus, he could have used any number of other means. He had no need to march in lockstep with the Green Camp and shout "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan." By adopting this strategy, PFP legislative candidates will probably run headlong into a brick wall.

Is Soong seeking an appointment to SEF Chairman or Premier following the election? The odds against any such appointment are astronomical. Even assuming such an appointment was in the offing initially, Soong's actions over the past few months have scotched any possibility of such an appointment today. Whether the Kuomintang wins or the Democratic Progressive Party wins makes no difference. Soong has so thoroughly discredited himself no one is going to appoint him to any position. Even if they were to appoint him to an important position, Soong is so far gone he would not be able to hold on to it. There is no need to conduct a poll to determine whether the public supports James Soong as Premier. The public will not tolerate James Soong as Premier. If the KMT prevails, it cannot possibly appoint Soong as Premier. By the same token, the "Bian/Soong Meeting" was unacceptable to the Green Camp in 2005. Soong has since discredited himself even further. How can the Green Camp possibly accept him now? Besides, given James Soong's character and image, how can Beijing possibly tolerate someone of Soong's ilk as "SEF Chairman?"

In sum, James Soong cannot possibly be elected president. If he merely wants to establish a PFP legislative caucus, he does not need to adopt such a radical stance. Over recent months he has thoroughly discredited himself. He has ruled out the possibility of anyone appointing him to a position of importance in the wake of the election. Therefore if James Soong persists in running for president to the bitter end, his only possible motive would be to "Topple Ma, and prop up Tsai Ing-wen." Given current election sentiment, as long as James Soong wins three to five percent of the vote, he may be able to ensure a Tsai Ing-wen victory.

James Soong truly has overplayed his hand. On the one hand, by shouting "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan," he persuaded the DPP to help his petition drive. On the other hand, he draped himself in the flag in order to win votes from the Blue Camp. His was a stunning display of deceit and viciousness. Soong probably thinks he outsmarted everyone. But most Blue Camp and Green Camp supporters will merely view him with contempt. He has forfeited any role on Taiwan or in cross-Strait relations. He has shredded any vestige of credibility he might once have commanded. Rumors have emerged about possible KMT/PFP "consultations." But given James Soong's habit of deceit, who would dare risk "consulting" with him? Who would dare risk negotiating with him in good faith, only to be stabbed in the back?

Wu Poh-hsiung put it succinctly. The only possible outcome of the current election is the election of Ma Ying-jeou or Tsai Ing-wen. There is no third possible outcome. Most people understand this. James Soong understands this as well. If Soong remains in the running to the bitter end, it could lead to a Tsai Ing-wen victory. If that happens, what will he say to all those young people wearing shirts emblazoned with the ROC flag? If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, how can she possibly form a coalition government with James Soong, who said that "If Beijing's missiles attack Taiwan, it will be in defense of China's territory?" He has resorted to every trick in the book. Let us hope he has not put all our lives at risk.

What James Soong must do now, is settle down. He must re-evaluate his own legacy, and seek a lasting place for himself in history. One Green Camp talking head has already characterized him as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, and a Green Camp Wu San-gui." Is James Soong deluded enough to imagine that Tsai Ing-wen will work some sort of political miracle on his behalf?

宋楚瑜意欲何為
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.09

許多人都在問:宋楚瑜到底在想什麼?他到底要什麼?

能夠想像的選項是:一、他想當總統。二、想在立法院成立親民黨黨團。三、想當行政院長或海基會董事長。四、想拉下馬英九,助蔡英文當選。

首先,宋楚瑜絕無可能當選總統。以目前選情來看,蔡英文至少應有超越四十五%選票的實力;因此,宋楚瑜若要當選,非但要超越馬英九,且要將馬的得票壓低至十%以下,他始有可能超越蔡英文的至少四十五%而當選。這是宋楚瑜亦自知絕無可能之事,所以他的目標絕非當選總統。

六月間宋營開始動作之初,是以「當選三席立委/組成立院黨團」為目標;如果這就是宋楚瑜要的,則他當不必採「棄馬保台」如此偏激的路線。因為,宋營的主要票源畢竟是在泛藍,而在單一選區中,橘軍欲在「棄馬保台」的旗幟下勝出,恐非易事。再者,宋營特意挑幾處藍綠緊繃的選區提名,其意顯然不在自己人當選,而是要拉下國民黨的候選人,助民進黨候選人當選,以降低國民黨在立院的席次,便利選後操作。因而,宋的「棄馬保台」路線,究竟是「母雞帶小雞」或「母雞踩死小雞」,恐怕亦是尚待觀察。平允的評論是:如果宋要的只是「成立黨團」而已,他其實有其他許多路可走,不必非要與綠營同走「棄馬保台」之路;如今走上這條路,反而使立委參選人四處碰壁。

那麼,宋要的是在選後出掌海基會或任行政院長嗎?即使這種想像原本或有萬分之一成真的可能性,如今亦已因宋幾個月來的操作而化作泡影。因為,不論國民黨或民進黨勝選執政,皆不可能任用人格形象扭曲至此地步的宋楚瑜;而即使任用,人格扭曲至此的宋楚瑜也難安其位,不要看今日民調或有支持他出任閣揆者,但屆時民意絕不可能容他。莫說國民黨若勝選,已不可能任用宋;綠營在二○○五年不能接受「扁宋會」,難道如今能接受人格形象更加扭曲的宋楚瑜?再者,以宋楚瑜如此人格形象,北京又豈能以平常心面對這位「海基會董事長」?

綜上所論,宋楚瑜絕無可能當選總統;他若只是想組成立院黨團,則不必採如此偏激的路線;而他在這段期間將自己的人格形象扭曲至此地步,實可謂已經自我否定了選後主政者受其挾制而任用他出掌要職的可能;那麼,宋楚瑜如果執意參選到底,他唯一最可能實現之目的,就是「拉下馬英九/扶上蔡英文」。因為,照目前緊繃的選情來看,宋楚瑜只要獲得三至五%的選票,即可能保送蔡英文勝選。

宋楚瑜確實玩得太過頭了。他一手用「棄馬保台」拉民進黨為他連署;另一手想用背後兩排國旗裝去挖藍營的選票。這或許是令人瞠目結舌的權謀演示,卻也是一個猙獰人格的公開展演;宋也許自以為得計,卻必被藍綠雙方多數民眾所輕蔑,亦失去了未來在台灣及兩岸扮演任何重要角色的信任度。至於傳出國親兩黨仍待「協商」,但以宋楚瑜的詭詐反覆,誰敢冒著被他反噬的風險與他「協商」?

吳伯雄說得對,這次大選只有馬英九當選或蔡英文當選兩種可能,不會有第三種結果;這應是多數國人的共同見解,亦當是宋楚瑜所心知肚明。宋如果參選到底而造成蔡英文當選,他如何面對那些穿國旗裝的年輕人?而蔡英文若當選,她又如何能與曾經主張「北京飛彈襲台/是為捍衛中國領土」的宋楚瑜組「聯合政府」?這真是機關算盡,莫要誤了卿卿的性命!

宋楚瑜現在應當做的是好好沉澱下來,重新為自己的歷史評價找尋可大可久的定位。且聽綠營名嘴已將他稱作「藍營的汪精衛/綠營的吳三桂」,宋楚瑜還能妄想蔡英文若當選能為他帶來什麼政治奇蹟?

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Why Con Artists were Ecstatic About Being Extradited to Taiwan

Why Con Artists were Ecstatic About Being Extradited to Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2011

Summary: A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."

Full Text Below:

A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."

Early this year, authorities from Taiwan and the Mainland fought over the right to prosecute a dozen or so con artists. Invoking high-minded concepts such as "sovereignty" and "national dignity," our side precipitated an embarrassing diplomatic crisis with the Philippines. We haggled for months with the Mainland authorities. Only then did we gain custody of the prisoners, who had been extradited to the Mainland. Only then were they transferred to Taiwan. Contrast the controversy then, with the outcome today. Fierce arguments were advanced in a jurisdictional dispute. The only issue appeared to be the lenient treatment of criminals on Taiwan. What kind of impression has our "judicial sovereignty" left on the world?

Fraud on Taiwan is rampant. This fact is well known, both at home and abroad. The justice system on Taiwan condones fraud. This is common knowledge to every member in a confidence ring. Our government applied diplomatic pressure to gain custody over a large number of suspected con artists. The impression we left however, was that we had distorted values. The ruling and opposition parties turned the tug of war into a matter of national dignity. Had they not done this, authorities on the two sides could have used the opportunity to increase cross-Strait cooperation on crime fighting. They could have made sure that con artists would be frightened hence deterred by the harsh penalties meted out by the Mainland authorities. But ideological concerns prevailed. Taiwan remained mired in arguments about sovereignty. The result was a travesty of justice, utterly unacceptable to the citizens of the nation.

To ensure justice, the legal system must keep pace with the times. Con artists do not use physical violence. But they use deceit to deprive people of their life savings. Their victims lose hope. Families are destroyed. Some of their victims may even commit suicide. Can we really dismiss their physical and emotional suffering as trivial? Take the confidence ring uncovered recently for example. It was an organized crime ring. Many of its members were chronic and habitual offenders, with long criminal records. Most of the victims were from the Mainland. But they took their victims for hundreds of millions of RMB. The judges were unable to question the victims. Therefore the perpetrators got off with a slap on the wrist. What sort of narrow-minded, absurd notion of justice is this?

Punishments meted out by the authorities on the Mainland are draconian. By contrast, authorities on Taiwan have greater respect for the rule of law. Human rights are better protected. But in recent years, many trial judges on Taiwan have become corrupt. Their judgments have left the public aghast. They feel the legal system on Taiwan is moving backwards. It is obstructing justice and impeding progress. On Mainland China, acts of fraud involving 200,000 RMB or more are considered felonies, punishable by sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. Actually on Taiwan, fraud is also punishable by sentences up to five years. But judges usually hand down suspended sentences or impose light fines. No wonder even con artists with PRC status attempt to pass themselves off as Taiwanese. No wonder they want to be tried on Taiwan. The chasm between the justice systems on the two sides is simply too wide.

Con artists tried on Taiwan were let off with a slap on the wrist. Meanwhile several children of Taiwan businessmen who committed robberies in Kunshan, received stiff ten year sentences. These children of Taiwan businessmen were still in school. But on weekends they would arm themselves with knives and rob passers-by. The amount they robbed was only a few hundred RMB. But they were repeat offenders. Therefore their offenses are classified as felonies. The Taiwanese students who committed these robberies did not appear to lack money. What they lacked was respect for the law. They thought of themselves as "Taiwanese students,' superior to local residents. They got drunk and "asked for money" from passersby, "just for kicks." On Taiwan students guilty of similar crimes would probably not be sent to prison. On Mainland China Taiwanese students are accorded special treatment. But because three of the students were 18 years old, they received heavy sentences.

Con artists from Taiwan who defraud their victims of hundreds of millions of RMB received a slap on the wrist. Reckless Taiwanese youths who committed robberies on the Mainland received heavy sentences. This illustrates the chasm between the legal systems on the two sides of the Strait. This illustrates the chasm in their perception of what constutites justice. This chasm should be bridged by means of exchanges, and by learning from each others' strengths. This will enable the two sides to arrive at a happy medium. This will prevent differences in their legal systems from creating a haven for criminals. It will prevent demagogues from using politics to disguise our social problems.

Several hundred con artists cheered when they learned they were being extradited to Taiwan. This shows that the legal system on Taiwan is a toothless tiger. The government may strive for diplomatic face. But it cannot provide people with the justice they demand. So-called "dinosaur judges" cavalierly invoke "judicial sovereignty." They leave people appalled and speechless. Does our justice system have nothing to say about the Taiwanese students who received heavy sentences on the Mainland?

當詐騙犯歡呼遣返的謎底揭曉
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.08

我國警方數月前從東南亞押解數百名詐欺犯回台,許多嫌犯看到長榮專機來接都喜出望外,大聲歡呼。他們料定:以兩岸司法對待詐欺犯的差異,回台形同「減刑」的保證。果然,台中地院最近審結一批人犯,廿六人之中僅一人判刑一年,其餘不是緩刑就是易科罰金。台灣果然是「詐欺犯的天堂」。

回顧年初,我國為了和大陸爭奪十幾名詐欺犯,在「主權」和「國格」的高調下,與菲律賓鬧出一場難堪的外交風波;後來和中共交涉數月,才將一干遭遣送大陸人犯全數接回。對比今天的結局,爭得面紅耳赤的管轄權風波,似乎只是追求台灣司法對罪犯輕縱而已,這樣的「司法主權」給社會留下何種觀感?

台灣詐欺犯行徑囂張惡劣,是國內外皆知的事實;而台灣司法寬縱詐欺犯,則是詐欺集團無人不曉的「常識」。正因如此,政府不惜用外交爭議來換取大批詐欺犯的輕縱,恐怕只留下「價值錯亂」的印象。當時,若不是在野黨將此事上綱成國格問題,兩岸可能有機會在合作「打擊犯罪」上取得更多進展,讓詐欺犯懾於大陸的嚴刑重罰,而知所收斂。但由於意識形態作祟,台灣陷入主權的口水爭議,結果卻得到了國民情感上難以接受的司法表現,讓人扼腕。

我們必須嚴肅面對的是,司法應當如何與時俱進以維護社會正義的問題。詐欺犯雖非使用暴力,卻以詐術騙得對方的畢生積蓄,使受害者灰心喪志甚至家破人亡;如此,對人們的身心戕害能說不嚴重嗎?以這次破獲的詐欺集團為例,不僅是集團犯罪,許多人更是前科累累的慣犯;雖然受害者多為大陸民眾,但金額高達數億。法官若因無法訊問被害人,即輕率對嫌犯網開一面,這體現的又是什麼樣狹隘且荒謬的正義呢?

與嚴刑峻罰的大陸比較,台灣法治相對健全,對人權的保護也更周密。然而,近年台灣不少法官在審判中體現的錯亂價值,卻一再讓人覺得荒謬與倒退,已成了扭曲社會公義、阻滯社會進步的因素。在中國大陸,只要詐騙之不法所得超過廿萬人民幣,就屬十年以上重罪,甚至可高達無期徒刑;其實,在台灣詐欺亦可判至五年徒刑,但法官卻選擇了緩刑或易科罰金。難怪連詐欺集團內的大陸公民都想冒充台灣人,希望來台受審,因為兩岸司法天平太過傾斜、太不成比例。

值得注意的是,正當台灣詐欺犯全獲輕判之際,大陸傳出數名台商子弟在昆山犯下搶劫罪而遭求處十年重刑的消息,令人震驚。這些台商子弟都還是在校學生,卻在周末出外遊樂時持刀行搶路人,得款不過數百人民幣,卻因連續犯罪被當成重案辦理。這些台生集體行搶,看來並非缺錢,而不過是缺乏法治觀念;或者平日仗恃著「台生」的身分,自以為高當地居民一等,因而在酒後為了「好玩」向路人「要錢」。若在台灣,學生犯了類似的罪行,或許不致送進監牢;但在大陸,就算台生特別受到禮遇,因其中三人已滿十八歲,和解後仍遭公訴重判。

從詐騙了數億元的罪犯在台僅受輕判,對比台商子弟輕率行搶而遭大陸司法機關重懲,凸顯的不僅是兩岸司法體制的巨大傾斜,也是兩岸人民對法治認知的巨大差異。這樣的差異,應當透過交流互相截長補短,找尋自己社會最佳的平衡點,而不是利用身分把司法變成罪犯的避風港,或用政治來迴避、扭曲真實的社會問題。

數百名詐欺犯歡呼遣台的謎底揭曉,證實台灣司法是無牙的老虎,也顯示政府拚命爭取的外交顏面,結果卻無法維護民眾期待的正義。恐龍法官們如此漫不經心地行使「司法主權」,豈不令人瞠目結舌?試問:相對於那些被判重刑的台商子弟,我們的司法有什麼話要說嗎?

Monday, November 7, 2011

Balancing Corporate Reality and Labor Protection

Balancing Corporate Reality and Labor Protection
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2011

Summary: Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.

Full Text Below:

Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.

Unpaid leaves are a response to reduced orders. When utilization falls below capacity, businesses give unpaid leave to reduce costs and reduce losses. For businesses more flexible manpower usage enables companies to immediately lower costs. Immediately giving employees unpaid leave reduces capital costs. Businesses do not have to bear huge severance costs. The immediate reduction in income often impacts the lives of workers whose salaries were not high to begin with. But on the other hand, the alternative to unpaid leave may well be lay offs. Unpaid leave means workers still have some work, They still have some income. They are at least not completely unemployed.

During the financial tsunami, over 800 domestic companies gave over 200,000 unpaid leaves. The government had a laissez-faire policy. It imposed no legal standards. Once the economic recovery gradually reduced the number of workers on unpaid leave, no one gave it any more thought. But the recent wave of economic decline was unexpectedly rapid. We experience a new downturn even before we experienced a recovery. Unpaid leaves returned, with a vengeance. The government hardly wants to see an increase in the number of unpaid leaves, especially before a general election. Officials resorted to moral suasion. They also imposed legal constraints. Everlight Electronics announced the cancellation of unpaid leaves. It even added that it was "cooperating with government policy." Its statement had unspoken implications.

But based on their statements, government officials have yet to get the point. They remain out of touch with reality. For example, CLA Chairman Jennifer Wang told the Legislative Yuan that the Council of Labor Affairs will draft amendments "enabling employers and employees to reduce working hours." The labor agreement would include provisions for a "corporate commitment to profit sharing." Workers meanwhile would agree to unpaid leave. Employers might "be required to use future profits to make up for lost salaries."

This policy is riddled with problems. Should corporations issue dividends? Different industries have different business practices. They are internal standards. Most companies include them in their articles of incorporation. They are established by the shareholders, They have no relationship to whether employees are given unpaid leave, Businesses which show a profit may issue bonuses to employees. They may offer stock dividends. But these benefits need to be based on long-term growth. Corporations may need to re-invest their profits rather than issue dividends. On the other hand, even businesses which have not turned a profit may wish to encourage employees and boost morale by issuing year-end bonuses or dividends. The circumstances are often different. For the Council of Labor Affairs to artificially link unpaid leave to dividends and profit sharing is unreasonable and difficult to implement. It interferes with sound corporate governance.

Using future profits to "make up" income lost during unpaid leave is obviously infeasible. Unpaid leave represents time the employee did not work. One should not be paid for it in the first place, The Council of Labor Affairs argument about "making up" lost income attempts to look after labor. But it is obviously unreasonable. Businesses would find it unacceptable.

The solutions proposed by the recent forum in Hsinchu Science Park is probably more reasonable and more acceptable to both parties. Business leaders proposed greater flexibility in working hours. But employers and employees disagreed on how. Current law stipulates 48 standard working hours every two weeks. The business community proposed capping standard working hours on a yearly basis. Labor groups voiced strong opposition, They said it had too negative an impact on labor rights. But the standards could be capped on a monthly or bimonthly basis. They could take into consideration the general economic slowdown and reduced orders. More often than not one or two months is enough for a company to recover. This slight relaxation is probably acceptable to business leaders.

Corporations want employees to take unpaid leave only because they have no choice. If the economy is not in decline, if orders are not greatly reduced, businesses will naturally want to run at full capacity. When businesses give unpaid leave instead of laying workers off, it means the expected reduced orders is merely cyclical. But if orders fail to increase, if the long term remains negative, then businesses will lay people off without hesitation. To wit, Quanta and Inventec. If companies cannot survive the transition period via unpaid leave, or if the legal requirements for unpaid leave are too harsh, they will be forced to lay people off immediately. For workers, this is not necessarily a good thing.

On the othe hand, if conditions for unpaid leave are too lenient, workers will become even more vulnerable. If unpaid leave is made a legal requirement, but the conditions are too lenient, the result will be "moral hazard." In the past, when the number of orders fell, companies were still willing to give employees the same salary. But after the unpaid leave system is implemented, and the number of orders fall, businesses may force employees to take unpaid leave in order to save on costs. Labor rights may be even less secure. Therefore one must balance three factors: the protection of labor rights, the maintenance of labor market flexibility, and the requirements of business. One must seek a balance. This will test the government's wisdom and ability.

在企業現實與保障勞工間尋找平衡
2011-11-05 中國時報

從廣鎵、億光開第一槍開始,幾天內驀然發現科技業景氣下滑程度超乎意外,勞委會也終於承認「無薪假有增加趨勢」。馬總統並前往竹科園區與企業座談。面對此一關係著勞工權益與企業生計的大事,在企業現實與勞工權益間,政府宜審慎尋找平衡點,太偏向任何一方,最後都可能造成「三輸」─勞工、企業、社會全成輸家。

無薪假是企業在訂單減少、產能利用率低檔時,為了節省成本、減少虧損,讓勞工休不支薪的假。這種方式,對企業而言,人力更彈性的運用,能讓企業成本立即降低;與立即資遣員工相較,也不必在經營困難之時,猶要支付龐大的資遣費用。對勞工而言,收入立即減少,對許多原本薪資就不高的勞工而言,生活可能馬上受影響;但換個觀點看,如果不是無薪假,企業可能就要裁員;休無薪假,勞工至少仍有工作、也有一定的收入,不至於落入失業困境中。

金融海嘯期間,國內有八百多家企業、共廿多萬人休無薪假;當時,政府採「放任制」,並未訂定辦法規範,待景氣復甦、無薪假逐漸減少後,就更沒人提、沒人想了。只是沒想到這波景氣下滑得如此快速,尚未看到頂峰就已下行,無薪假重出江湖。特別是在大選前,政府當然不樂見無薪假擴大成風潮。官員道德勸說也有、祭出規範限制也有。億光在宣布取消無薪假時,特別說了一句「配合政府政策」,可說是意在言外。

不過,從官員發言來看,官員仍未抓住重點,更未能切合現實。例如,勞委會主委王如玄在立法院說,勞委會將草擬修正「勞雇雙方減少工時協議書範例」,在勞資協議時納入「企業承諾獲利時讓員工可分紅」條文;同時勞工在同意放無薪假時,也可以「將來獲利後資方應回補薪資」作為條件。

這個政策方向,問題不少。企業獲利是否分紅,不同產業、不同企業的作法都不一樣,屬於企業內部規範事宜,一般企業都訂在組織章程中,再由股東會決定,這與員工是否有休過無薪假,實在很難扯上關係。企業有獲利,可能會增發年終獎金給員工,也可能以股票分紅,但也可能基於企業長期發展,需要再投資而完全不分紅。但如企業無獲利,也可能為了鼓勵員工、提振士氣,仍會發出年終獎金或分紅。種種情況、不一而足,勞委會以休過無薪假,作為公司有獲利要分紅的條件,既不合理,亦難執行,更干預原本屬於企業治理的範疇。

至於說有獲利後要「回補」放無薪假時的薪資,更是明顯不通。因為,放無薪假代表的就是正常休假外有沒有上班的天數,原本就不該有薪資,勞委會的「回補」說法,雖然可說顧及勞工收入,但也明顯不合理,企業也難以接受。

較合理而能為勞資雙方接受者,應是日前竹科座談會中,企業提出的擴大工時制度彈性。不過,應該如何擴大彈性,勞資雙方又有得爭了。目前法令的規範是兩周四十八小時工時,對企業界所建議放寬為以「一年計」,勞工團體已表達強力反對立場,認為對勞工權益影響太大;但如僅放寬到一、兩個月,考量到一般景氣低迷、訂單減少,往往不是一、兩個月就能回春,這種小幅放寬,對企業而言,大概也是雞肋。

坦白說,企業要員工放無薪假,基本上是很無奈─要不是景氣下滑、訂單大減,企業當然希望是產能全開。而企業以無薪假而非裁員因應,代表預期現階段的訂單減少只是景氣循環。如果是訂單不再回來、長期看壞,企業大概是二話不說就裁員(如廣達、英業達)。如果這種過度期企業不能以無薪假因應,或是無薪假條件過於嚴苛,反而逼使企業在第一時間就以裁員手段因應,對勞工而言,未必是好事。

但問題是無薪假條件寬鬆,將使勞工更形弱勢;而且把無薪假「法制化」再加上條件寬鬆,更可能引發「道德風險」─過去訂單減少,企業企業還是願意給員工同樣薪資,但有無薪假的制度後,訂單稍減,企業就動輒要員工休無薪假以節省成本,勞工權益更無保障。因此,如何拿捏分寸,在保障勞工權益、保持勞工場彈性、及考量企業實際運作需求等三大面向上,尋求一個最佳的平衡點,將考驗政府的智慧與能力。

Thursday, November 3, 2011

Voters Must Not Allow Politicians to Repeatedly Manipulate Them

Voters Must Not Allow Politicians to Repeatedly Manipulate Them
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 4, 2011

Summary: People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.

Full Text Below:

People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.

Just exactly what does James Soong want? Why is he determined to stay in the race to the bitter end? The KMT has never understood this mystery. But the answer is actually quite simple. James Soong is motivated entirely by power, Power is his only motivation. Years ago, before he became Governor of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui gave Soong a choice of appointments, including ROC Representative to Washington and Minister of Defense. He unhesitatingly chose Governor of Taiwan. James Soong said that a "Mainlander" is currently unelectable. But if I serve as governor now, it will be easier to nominate a Mainlander candidate when elections are eventually held. Therefore he fought hard for the KMT nomination, Wu Poh-hsiung was assumed to be a shoo-in. Wu was determined to run even, if he won only in Alishan. But in the end Wu was forced to quietly withdraw.

After the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen, James Soong and Lee Teng-hui had a falling out. Reconciliation was possible, But James Soong rejected attempts at reconciliation, and went his own way. The reason was simple. He was a popularly elected governor. He had strong public backing. Other than premier, what position was worthy of him? But Lee Teng-hui had no intention of letting him run for president. For Lee, pushing out Vincent Siew to placate James Soong was not an option. Just before Lien Chan was officially nominated, Lee sent Soong a hand-written letter, inviting Soong to be Lien's vice presidential running mate. Soong did not even bother to read the letter, but sent it back unopened.

The 2004 Lien-Soong ticket was a major turning point. The KMT tasted the bitter fruit of losing power. More importantly, Chen Shui-bian cheated both Lien Chan and James Soong, They dissolved their ticket and did not return to power. Lien and Soong were once at odds with each other. During this period however, they development a reasonably good, highly cooperative relationship. Chen Shui-bian's "Two Bullets" miracle even nurtured a degree of "side by side in the trenches" camaraderie. Yet less than a year later, James Soong arranged a "Bian/Soong Meeting," leaving the KMT stunned and betrayed. KMT Chairman Lien Chan was about to embark on his historic ice-breaking trip to the Mainland. James Soong hope to preempt Lien by visiting the Mainland as "President Chen Shui-bian official envoy."

Soong used to insist that he was not someone who yearned for a position of power. He said he was not someone who made political deals. People motivated by power can do without a position of power. But they cannot do without public attention, The "Bian/Soong Meeting" was a good example. Soong merely wanted a role in cross-Strait relations. But this is not always the case, According to a China Times Weekly WikiLeaks report, in 2006 James Soong insisted on running for Mayor of Taipei. Soong told then AIT Taipei Office Chief Stephen M. Young that Ma Ying-jeou's consultant was considering asking Hau Lung-bin to withdraw from the race. In return, Ma would promise not to run for president in 2008. Soong said that running for mayor was the same as telling the KMT he was not running for president and would not serve as the DPP government's premier. The report said union organizer Liao Feng-teh told them Ma Ying-jeou had already denied this allegation.

After his defeat in the Taipei mayoral race, James Soong announced his withdrawal from the political arena. But the Ma Ying-jeou discretionary fund controversy handed the PFP a number of bargaining chips. WikiLeaks described the 2007 KMT/PFP joint nominations for the Legislative Yuan as something the PFP accepted "only because it had no choice." People First Party Legislator Huang Yi-chiao told Stephen M. Young that the People First Party met with the DPP in advance. The PFP told the DPP that the PFP would be absent from the Legislative Yuan Ways and Means Committee session, The "Exclude Ma Clause" would make anyone found guilty in a first instance trial ineligible as a candidate. The PFP's absence enabled the DPP to make the "Exclude Ma Clause" part of the agenda. This forced the KMT to yield seats to the PFP in the legislative election.

The KMT and the PFP have often been at odds with each other. But this joint nomination strategy enabled the KMT and PFP to achieve an unprecedented victory in the 2008 legislative elections. Ma Ying-jeou also won by a landslide in the presidential election. But the KMT was barely back in power before the People First Party began demanding even more political appointments. This included appointments to the Control Yuan, which calls for the independent exercise of power, and for which appointments of a partisan political character are inappropriate. James Soong complained that Wu Po-hsiung was forced to consent, and that Ma Ying-jeou was unwilling to nominate PFP candidates to the Control Yuan.

After meeting with James Soong, Stephen M. Young remarked, "James Soong is a wily, unprincipled politician. He controls a tiny faction within the legislature (21 seats out of 221 total). Yet on major issues he is able to exercise a decisive influence. Everyone is afraid of offending Soong. Probably because he knows many of the KMT's dirty secrets. But the question is, why should Ma Ying-jeou and other Blue Camp leaders allow "this old Blue Camp tail to wag the dog?"

Stephen M. Young wonders why. The Kuomintang probably wonders why as well. Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan provided a pertinent answer to this question. "We have no choice. We must ally with the PFP in order to achieve a majority in the legislature." This was true back then. It appears to be true now, But who is to blame? Is Soong too adept at political manipulation? Or is the KMT simply too inept? More importantly, how long will voters on Taiwan allow politicians to lead them around by the nose?

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2011.11.04
選民不應容忍政客一再操弄
本報訊

親民黨主席宋楚瑜向台北市選委會交出三十五萬五千五百八十九份連署書之後,宋楚瑜成為二○一二年總統獨立參選人已勢所必然。對國民黨而言,宋楚瑜已成為揮之不去的夢魘,這位眾人皆曰當選不了的參選人,卻成為總統選局的關鍵變數,再一次考驗台灣民主的成熟度。

宋楚瑜到底要什麼?為什麼非選到底不可?國民黨始終解不開這個謎,其實很簡單,宋楚瑜是一個徹底的權力人物,權力是他唯一的動力。當年出任省主席之前,李登輝給了他包括駐美代表、國防部長等選擇,他獨挑省主席,宋楚瑜曾說,一個外省人當省主席不可能選省長,有利於未來開放省長民選後的提名布局。結果,他強力爭取國民黨的提名,讓原以為十拿九穩,台灣只剩下阿里山也要選省長的吳伯雄黯然退讓。

凍省之後,宋楚瑜與李登輝翻臉,不是沒有機會和解,宋楚瑜拒絕安排決意走自己的路,原因也很簡單,在那個時候擁有強大民意後盾的民選省長,除行政院長還有什麼職務可以匹配?李登輝既無意讓他選總統,當時更不可能換掉蕭萬長以安撫宋楚瑜。即使如此,連戰在國民黨正式提名前,還是親筆手書信函,力邀宋楚瑜搭檔,這封信連拆都沒拆,就被宋楚瑜退回了。

二○○四年「連宋配」是一個重大轉機,國民黨痛嘗失去政權的苦果,更重要的,連戰、宋楚瑜都吃了陳水扁的虧,不合無以重返執政。在這段期間,曾經對立的連宋建立相當不錯的合作關係,甚至在兩顆子彈衝擊選情後,還有一定程度的革命感情。即使如此,一年不到宋楚瑜一場「扁宋會」,又讓國民黨錯愕不已,當時正是國民黨主席連戰準備赴大陸展開破冰之旅前夕,宋楚瑜要以「陳水扁總統授權」的身分搶得先機登陸。

宋楚瑜常說,他不是爭取職務的人,更不是談政治交易的人。權力人物可以不要位子,不能沒有角色,「扁宋會」可做如是觀,他要在兩岸關係中扮演角色。但是,也不全然如此,根據《時報周刊》報導,維基解密電文紀錄,二○○六年宋楚瑜堅持參選台北市長,他告訴時任AIT台北辦事處長楊甦棣,馬英九的顧問不排除勸退郝龍斌,以換取他保證二○○八年不會競選總統,宋楚瑜說參選市長就是告訴國民黨他既不會選總統,也不會出任民進黨政府的行政院長。AIT電文加註指出,組工會主任廖風德告訴他們馬英九已斷然否認這個可能。

台北市長敗選之後,宋楚瑜宣布退出政壇,但是,馬英九特別費案爆發,又讓親民黨掌握與國民黨談判的籌碼。維基解密電文用「只因不得不然」形容二○○七年五月國親立委聯合提名協議,親民黨立委黃義交坦白告訴楊甦棣,親民黨事前知會民進黨,他們會在立法院程序委員會缺席,讓一審有罪不得參選的「排馬條款」排入議程,逼迫國民黨最後同意讓出立委席次。

不論國親之間到底在多大的矛盾衝突下達成協議,這個聯合提名策略確實讓國親在二○○八年取得空前勝利,馬英九也在總統大選中高票當選。然而,國民黨才重返執政,親民黨在人事安排上又多所要求,包括獨立行使職權未必適合由政黨推薦的監委,宋楚瑜都抱怨使吳伯雄同意,馬英九都不肯提名親民黨人出任監委。

與宋楚瑜會談後的楊甦棣在電文中特別加了一段評論:「宋楚瑜是狡詐(wily)、沒有原則的政治人物,他操作小小的立院派系(總數二百二十一席中的二十一席),在重大議題中,取得關鍵影響力。人們似乎都很怕得罪宋,可能因為他懷抱著國民黨過去許多難堪的祕密。問題在於,馬英九和其他藍營領導人,到底要容許「這樣的藍營老尾巴搖狗」(this aging blue tail to wag the dog)到什麼時候?」

楊甦棣的疑問,或許也是國民黨人的疑問,這個問題國民黨榮譽主席連戰倒是很中肯的給了答案:「沒辦法,我們需要親民黨的結盟,以取得國會多數。」這個答案當年如此,此刻看來還是如此,該怪宋楚瑜太擅於權力操作?還是國民黨太拙於政治操作?更重要的,台灣選民會容忍政治人物權力操作到幾時?