Actual Selling Price Property Taxation Will Ensure Justice in Housing
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 14, 2011
Summary: President Ma Ying-jeou recently issued a mobilization order concerning five "Justice in Housing" bills which were finally passed by the Legislative Yuan yesterday. These bills deserve our applause. But the five Justice in Housing bills are merely the first step. We still have a long way to go before "Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting" and "Actual Selling Price Property Taxes" become a reality. Only the implementation of Actual Selling Price Property Taxes can ensure Justice in Housing. Therefore the ruling and opposition parties still have much work to do.
Full Text Below:
President Ma Ying-jeou recently issued a mobilization order concerning five "Justice in Housing" bills which were finally passed by the Legislative Yuan yesterday. These bills deserve our applause. But the five Justice in Housing bills are merely the first step. We still have a long way to go before "Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting" and "Actual Selling Price Property Taxes" become a reality. Only the implementation of Actual Selling Price Property Taxes can ensure Justice in Housing. Therefore the ruling and opposition parties still have much work to do.
The five Justice in Housing bills include Real Estate Brokerage Management Regulations, Land Laws, Equalization of Land Rights Regulations, Land Acquisition Regulations, and the Housing Act. The first three bills pertain to Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting. They require actual selling prices to be reported within 30 days after real estate transactions. The amended Land Acquisition Regulations pertain to land acquisition at Actual Selling Price Property Values rather than listed prices. The Housing Act draft law states that a certain percentage of social housing must be rental and not for sale, to ensure sufficient housing for disadvantaged members of society.
In order to achieve Justice in Housing, President Ma has incorporated this plank into his Golden Decade campaign platform. Real estate transaction amounts must be accurately reported. Property taxes must reflect actual selling prices. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has incorporated this item into her Platform for the Coming Decade. Property taxes for residential property not occupied by the owner will be taxed in stages, based on selling prices. Land taxes and housing transaction taxes will be combined into a single real estate transaction tax. The five bills virtually ground to a halt in the legislature. Private sector organizations wondered whether the ruling and opposition parties were serious.
Today however, under President Ma's leadership, the five bills passed, one day before the legislature adjourned. They came through on their promise to voters. The Housing Act states that social housing must constitute at least 10% of all rental housing for low-income households, for those over 65 years old, and for the handicapped. Finally, disadvantaged members of society enjoy basic protections. The more controversial Land Acquisition Regulations amendment still needs to clear the Executive Yuan. Input from farm groups was included in the final result. But farm groups still cannot accept certain aspects of the amended regulations pertaining to the abuse of eminent domain.
Fortunately all five bills passed. That however, does not mean that Justice in Housing will immediately become a reality. The Real Estate Brokerage Management Regulations and three other laws must also be amended. This is merely the first step toward Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting. At this stage Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting is not the same as Actual Selling Price Value Disclosure. According to the version passed by the Legislative Yuan, licensed real estate brokers, consignment sellers, and local governments must remove the house number, lot number, building number, sign the contract, transfer ownership, and register the transaction with the responsible government agencies within 30 days. When the average price of real estate in the district is announced, the disclosed price for individual housing units will no longer reflect selling prices. They will have departed significantly from the selling prices.
For years, real estate taxes have not been levied on the basis of selling prices. Opportunists and real estate speculators have paid little in taxes. This contributes to soaring housing prices. It also contributes to the widening gap between rich and poor. According to a Control Yuan survey, the super rich can buy and sell luxury condos, making profits amounting to 173 million dollars. Consider their own residences. Land taxes and housing transaction income taxes may amount to one million dollars. But the tax burden is merely 1%, How can the public countenance such an unfair tax system? Change is inevitable. The Legislative Yuan has just passed a bill taking the first step toward Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting.
The ruling party has made a genuine effort to curb soaring housing prices. But it must do more. Consider the Luxury Tax implemented on June 1. At the end of November the Ministry of the Interior announced its "Survey of Third Quarter Trends in Housing Demand." The ratio between real estate prices and incomes on Taiwan is now 9.2 to one, higher than last quarter. In Taipei the ratio is 14 to one. To be able to afford a house, people have to give up eating and drinking for 14 years. These numbers show that the Luxury Tax has yet to significantly reduce housing costs. Now that the Luxury Tax is being levied, more people are giving gifts. Many speculators are using gift giving to transfer property to others to sell it. This enables them take advantage of lower gift tax rates, and avoid higher luxury taxes. No wonder the Luxury Tax has been ineffective.
Any reform will inevitably be met by a backlash from vested interests. If one backs down merely because one encounters a backlash, people will soon see right through you. When President Ma issued his mobilization order, the five Justice in Housing bills finally passed. This demonstrated the ruling party's commitment to reform. Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting is the basis for Actual Selling Price Property Taxation. If the former fails to pass, one can forget about the latter. The next step after Actual Selling Price Property Value Reporting is Actually Selling Price Property Taxation. It is certain to meet with even greater resistance. We hope whoever wins the election will show greater determination and courage in promoting Actual Selling Price Property Taxation. We hope he or she will establish a just system for property taxation, and a just system for housing provision.
推動實價課稅 落實居住正義
2011-12-14中國時報
馬英九總統日前下達動員令，攸關「居住正義」的五大法案昨日終於經立法院三讀通過，值得肯定。不過，這五大法案過關只是邁向「居住正義」的第一步，因為不動產「實價登錄」距離「實價課稅」仍有漫長的路要走，唯有落實「實價課稅」才能真正實現「居住正義」，因此朝野仍須努力。
攸關「居住正義」的五大法案包括《不動產經紀業管理條例》、《地政士法》、《平均地權條例》、《土地徵收條例》、《住宅法》等，前三項法案主要與不動產實價登錄有關，規範不動產交易完畢後三十日內要以實際成交價格登錄；《土地徵收條例》修法重點是土地徵收以市價取代公告地價；《住宅法》草案重點則是明定一定比率的社會住宅，只租不售，以保障弱勢者的住居權。
為落實「居住正義」，馬總統在「黃金十年」願景中指出，不動產交易將實價登錄，並逐步推動實價課稅；民進黨主席蔡英文在「十年政綱」中宣示將針對非自用住宅分階段實價課稅，推動土地、房屋交易所得合一之不動產交易所得稅。不過，五大法案的立法進度幾乎停擺，民間團體一度質疑朝野「玩假的」。
如今在馬總統號召下，五大法案趕在休會前一天通過，算是給了選民一個交代。依《住宅法》規定，社會住宅應至少提供十％以上比例出租給低收入戶、六十五歲以上老人及身心障礙者，弱勢者的居住權總算有了最基本保障。爭議較大的《土地徵收條例》修正案最後依行政院版過關，雖然最後也採納部分農民團體的意見，不過，對徵收農地的聽證程序設下諸多條件，農民團體認為無法杜絕浮濫徵收的問題。
事實上，五大法案幸運全數過關，並不代表「居住正義」立刻實現，因為《不動產經紀業管理條例》等三法完成修正，只是不動產「實價登錄」的第一步，而現階段的「實價登錄」不等同於「實價揭露」。依立法院通過的版本，規範經營仲介、代銷業者、地政士在簽訂買賣契約書並辦竣所有權移轉登記後卅日內，向中央主管機關以區段化、去除門牌、地號、建號的成交案件實際資訊。屆時是以區段平均價公告之，並非每戶交易價格「實價揭露」，效果已大打折扣。
長久以來，不動產稅制由於未依「實價課稅」，投機客炒房獲取巨大利益卻只繳很少的稅，不僅助長了房價飆漲，也成為擴大貧富差距的幫兇。依監察院調查，富豪買賣帝寶豪宅，獲利達一點七三億元，若以自用住宅計，土增稅與房屋交易所得稅共須繳一百多萬元，負擔的稅率只有百分之一，這樣的租稅制度，民眾能麼看得下去？如此不公不義的租稅制度，已到了非改不可的關鍵時刻，如今立法院通過相關法案，只是踏出「實價登錄」的第一步。
為了抑制房價飆漲，執政黨其實做了努力，但是還不夠。讓我們檢視一下六月一日起實施的奢侈稅。內政部十一月底公布「第三季住宅需求動向調查」，台灣地區房價所得比高達九點二倍，比上季上揚；其中，台北市房價所得比為十四倍，市民必須不吃不喝十四年才買得起房子。這項統計顯示，奢侈稅的效應迄今不明顯，民眾購屋負擔並未大幅減輕。奢侈稅開徵後，各地贈與案件有增加趨勢，許多投機客改以贈與方式轉手再賣，可適用較低的贈與稅率，又可以歸避高額奢侈稅，難怪奢侈稅的成效不彰。
任何改革都免不了遭遇既得利益者的反彈，如果遭遇反彈就退縮，很快就被看破手腳。這次在馬總統下達動員令之後，「居住正義」五大法案終於過關，確實展現了執政黨推動改革的決心。不動產「實價登錄」是「實價課稅」的基礎，這一步若跨不出去，就甭提「實價課稅」了；可以想見，實價登錄之後，未來要進一步落實「實價課稅」，勢必遭遇更大的阻力。我們期盼，未來新當選的領導人，能展現更大的決心與魄力推動「實價課稅」，建立公平的不動產稅制，真正落實「居住正義」。
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Can Someone Incapable of Avoiding Conflicts of Interest Be President?
Can Someone Incapable of Avoiding Conflicts of Interest Be President?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 13, 2011
Summary: The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal has erupted yet again. The DPP is either attempting to dismiss the scandal as KMT mud-slinging, or to make light of it, and deliberately downplay it as nothing new. But the facts speak for themselves. The Executive Yuan has declassified key documents. These prove that Tsai Ing-wen was preparing to become the Chairman of the Board of the TaiMed Group when she was still Vice Premier. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to provide details regarding the scandal. She cannot escape suspicion that she took the position in order to line her pockets.
Full Text Below:
The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal has erupted yet again. The DPP is either attempting to dismiss the scandal as KMT mud-slinging, or to make light of it, and deliberately downplay it as nothing new. But the facts speak for themselves. The Executive Yuan has declassified key documents. These prove that Tsai Ing-wen was preparing to become the Chairman of the Board of the TaiMed Group when she was still Vice Premier. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to provide details regarding the scandal. She cannot escape suspicion that she took the position in order to line her pockets.
Yesterday CEPD Chairperson Christina Liu declassified two documents and provided copies to the Legislative Yuan. The TaiMed Group's name came up for the first time. According to Christina Liu, one of the documents set conditions requiring the company to provide signing bonuses. During the development process it required the payment of fees, royalties on sales, and research reports. Ho Mei-yueh, then Chairman of the Council for Economic Development and Planning (CEDP), was also the Convener of the National Development Fund (NDF). She signed the document and presented it to Tsai Ing-wen on March 21. Tsai Ing-wen signed the document on March 22. But the document was never signed by then Premier Su Tseng-chang.
Christina Liu says that Ho Mei-yueh, Convener of the National Development Fund, and the Academia Sinica cosigned a letter on March 31, 2007. According to the letter they would hold briefings urging TaiMed to establish a biotechnology company. Investors would be invited to the meeting, According to English language documents made available during the meeting, Tsai Ing-wen would become a key member of the company staff.
Blue Camp legislators have voiced grave concerns. Tsai Ing-wen was Vice Premier at the time. If the company was already in existence, it was effectively "approved for Tsai Ing-wen, by Tsai Ing-wen." This amounts to a serious conflict of interest.
The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal is definitely snowballing. Tsai Ing-wen is finding it increasingly difficult to rationalize away her conduct. Last week the CEPD report to the Legislative Yuan revealed that Tsai Ing-wen stepped down as vice premier in May 2007. She then became the TaiMed Group representative for biotech venture capital investments. Before the Yu Chang Technology Company was officially established, she twice wrote to the National Development Fund. She ordered funds wired to the Yu Chang Technology Company administrative offices. Minister of Economic Affairs That very day, Ho Mei-yueh approved the wire transfer, On September 3, the National Development Fund wired the Yu Chang Technology Company 40 million dollars.
The DPP has been evasive regarding conflict of interest charges. It says the biotech industry burns money, It says Tsai Ing-wen was a first time investor. She was providing "angel funds." She was fighting fires. But the DPP's response is evasive. It totally ignores Tsai Ing-wen's direct involvement while she was still vice premier. Tsai Ing-wen knew the government was interested in setting up the Yu Chang Technology Company. She knew the details of its plan to support the biotech industry.
The government planned to support the biotech industry. Thefore investing in the Yu Chang Technology Company was a sure thing. When Tsai Ing-wen was chairman of the TaiMed Group and the Yu Chang Technology Company. the National Development Fund wired these companies a total of 26.4 billion dollars in three installments.
Tsai Ing-wen had the advantage of advanced knowledge. How can her involvement be passed off as "angel investing?" In the marketplace, such behavior is known as insider trading. Tsai Ing-wen was a high-ranking official. She knew perfectly well that this constituted a conflict of interest.
Had the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal gone no further, Tsai Ing-wen would be guilty only of revolving door violations. According to Ministry of Civil Service Civil Service Laws, and Ministry of Economic Affairs Biotech Drug Industry Regulations, revolving door violations must be "directly related to one's job." Tsai Ing-wen was responsible for biotechnology industry decision-making. But because she was not directly administering the industry, she got a pass. Legally speaking, Tsai Ing-wen squeaked by. But politically and ethically, she was clearly guilty.
The DPP is desperately trying to rationalize away Tsai Ing-wen's effort to line her pockets. It argues that the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal broke only after Tsai Ing-wen left office. For example, DPP spokesman Chen Chi-mai said that Su Tseng-chang entered the presidential primaries that year. He resigned temporarily as premier because he lost the nomination. How could Tsai Ing-wen have anticipated Su's resignation as premier? How could she have used her authority to approve biotech regulations or the National Development Fund investment case? DPP apologists argue that Tsai Ing-wen requested biotechnology funds only after stepping down. The chairman of the Yu Chang Technology Company then took over. Therefore, they argue, this was not a case of abusing the power of one's office for profit.
But the declassified documents released by the Council for Economic Planning yesterday prove otherwise. On March 22, Tsai Ing-wen signed the document. On March 31, TaiMed began setting up a biotechnology company. If what Christina Liu says is true, Tsai Ing-wen was a key individual in the company. Her claim that she was "never involved in setting up the Yu Chang Technology Company" is a lie. The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal is a case of "approved for Tsai Ing-wen by Tsai Ing-wen." The scandal is not merely a conflict of interest. The scandal is a case of abusing one's power to line one's pockets.
Tsai has yet to offer a satisfactory explanation, On the contrary. she has accused the KMT of character assassination, She is an embarrassment to our democracy. But if she becomes our head of state, she will be an even bigger embarrassment to our democracy. Tsai Ing-wen has lashed out at the KMT. She would do better to face the music. Tsai Ing-wen seeks high office. If she is this cavalier about conflicts of interest, how can voters permit her to govern the nation?
不守利益迴避原則 可當總統嗎?
2011-12-13中國時報
宇昌生技案再爆爭議，民進黨不是痛擊這是國民黨的選舉奧步，不然就輕描淡寫、刻意淡化是了無新意的舊案；但是，資料會說話，行政院火速解密的極機密文件，顯示蔡英文擔任董事長的台懋公司，早在她擔任副院長時就已籌畫設立，如果蔡英文對相關細節無法完整澄清，只怕難逃藉職務自肥之嫌。
經建會主委劉憶如昨日在立法院公布兩份解密公文，值得注意的是，在第二份解密文件中，第一次出現台懋公司（TaiMed Group），劉憶如表示，這一份文件，針對這家公司設立進度條件、需要支付的簽約金、在開發歷程裡要支付的費用、銷售權利金、開發實驗進度等，由當時的經建會主委何美玥也是國發基金召集人，在三月二十一日專簽呈給蔡英文，蔡英文三月二十二日簽署，但沒有時任行政院長的蘇貞昌簽名。
更值得注意的是，根據劉憶如的說法，二○○七年三月三十一日由經建會主委何美玥與中研院院士何大一署名發函，舉行推動TaiMed生技公司設立說明會，邀請了可能投資人來與會，現場英文資料裡，就明確記載蔡英文將是公司的主要核心人員。
藍委質疑，蔡英文當時還是副閣揆，如果當時公司已存在，這形同是「蔡英文核准給蔡英文」，嚴重的違反利益迴避原則。
確實，宇昌生技案雪球愈滾愈大，蔡英文也愈來愈難自圓其說。經建會上周在立法院進行的專案報告中揭露，蔡英文在二○○七年五月卸任副閣揆、轉任家族投資的台懋生技創投代表人後，在宇昌正式成立前，即兩度發函給國發基金，要求撥款到宇昌生技公司籌備處，經建會主委何美玥當天核准，國發基金立即在九月三日撥款四千萬元。
對於可能的利益衝突，民進黨的回應是，生技業是燒錢產業，蔡英文第一時間投資、提供「天使資金」，扮演的是救火隊的角色。但這樣的回應避重就輕，完全未提及蔡英文擔任副閣揆時，就已直接參與，並且了解國家有意藉成立宇昌公司、扶植生技業的相關細節。
也就是說，在國家保證支持的前提下，投入宇昌生技可說是穩賺不賠的生意，事實上，蔡英文擔任台懋、宇昌董事長任內，國發基金共撥三次款、總計二．六四億元。
蔡英文既已佔了事先知情的便宜，她的投入怎能稱為救急的天使基金；在市場上，這樣的行為稱為「內線交易」；蔡英文既然曾任高官，當然應該知道這有相當明顯的利益衝突問題。
如果宇昌案只發展到此，蔡英文的問題在於她繞過旋轉門條款的規定；因為，依銓敘部對《公務員服務法》的解釋，《生技新藥產業發展條例》的主管機關經濟部，才必須因「職務直接相關」，接受旋轉門條款的規範，蔡英文雖然實質上主導生技產業決策，但反而因為非主管業務，而不必受規範；但這只是在法律上脫身，蔡英文還是有明顯的政治道德瑕疵。
民進黨反駁蔡英文自肥的一個說辭是，蔡英文卸任後，才有宇昌案。例如，民進黨發言人陳其邁表示，當年蘇貞昌參加民進黨總統初選失利才臨時請辭行政院長，蔡英文怎麼可能事先預見內閣總辭，並且利用職權通過生技條例或核定國發基金的投資案，亦即，蔡英文是卸任後才因生技大老請求，接下宇昌董事長，並非藉職務圖利。
但是，經建會昨日解密的資料卻顯示，就在蔡英文三月二十二日簽署公文不久，三月三十一日台懋生技公司就已開始籌備設立，如果劉憶如所言屬實，蔡英文當時也列名公司核心人士名單中，則她不只不是自稱的「從未參與宇昌公司籌設」，更是「由蔡英文核准給蔡英文」，這已經不只是未利益迴避而已，確實難逃自肥之嫌。
到目前為止，蔡英文完全未交代是否有利益衝突的爭議，反而指控國民黨是人格謀殺，選舉選到這樣是民主之恥；但是，更大的民主之恥，牽涉到的是國家領導人的操守，蔡英文與其反擊國民黨，還不如嚴肅面對相關爭議；否則，有心挑戰大位的蔡英文，如果這樣的輕忽利益迴避原則，選民還敢將治國的重任交給她嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 13, 2011
Summary: The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal has erupted yet again. The DPP is either attempting to dismiss the scandal as KMT mud-slinging, or to make light of it, and deliberately downplay it as nothing new. But the facts speak for themselves. The Executive Yuan has declassified key documents. These prove that Tsai Ing-wen was preparing to become the Chairman of the Board of the TaiMed Group when she was still Vice Premier. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to provide details regarding the scandal. She cannot escape suspicion that she took the position in order to line her pockets.
Full Text Below:
The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal has erupted yet again. The DPP is either attempting to dismiss the scandal as KMT mud-slinging, or to make light of it, and deliberately downplay it as nothing new. But the facts speak for themselves. The Executive Yuan has declassified key documents. These prove that Tsai Ing-wen was preparing to become the Chairman of the Board of the TaiMed Group when she was still Vice Premier. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to provide details regarding the scandal. She cannot escape suspicion that she took the position in order to line her pockets.
Yesterday CEPD Chairperson Christina Liu declassified two documents and provided copies to the Legislative Yuan. The TaiMed Group's name came up for the first time. According to Christina Liu, one of the documents set conditions requiring the company to provide signing bonuses. During the development process it required the payment of fees, royalties on sales, and research reports. Ho Mei-yueh, then Chairman of the Council for Economic Development and Planning (CEDP), was also the Convener of the National Development Fund (NDF). She signed the document and presented it to Tsai Ing-wen on March 21. Tsai Ing-wen signed the document on March 22. But the document was never signed by then Premier Su Tseng-chang.
Christina Liu says that Ho Mei-yueh, Convener of the National Development Fund, and the Academia Sinica cosigned a letter on March 31, 2007. According to the letter they would hold briefings urging TaiMed to establish a biotechnology company. Investors would be invited to the meeting, According to English language documents made available during the meeting, Tsai Ing-wen would become a key member of the company staff.
Blue Camp legislators have voiced grave concerns. Tsai Ing-wen was Vice Premier at the time. If the company was already in existence, it was effectively "approved for Tsai Ing-wen, by Tsai Ing-wen." This amounts to a serious conflict of interest.
The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal is definitely snowballing. Tsai Ing-wen is finding it increasingly difficult to rationalize away her conduct. Last week the CEPD report to the Legislative Yuan revealed that Tsai Ing-wen stepped down as vice premier in May 2007. She then became the TaiMed Group representative for biotech venture capital investments. Before the Yu Chang Technology Company was officially established, she twice wrote to the National Development Fund. She ordered funds wired to the Yu Chang Technology Company administrative offices. Minister of Economic Affairs That very day, Ho Mei-yueh approved the wire transfer, On September 3, the National Development Fund wired the Yu Chang Technology Company 40 million dollars.
The DPP has been evasive regarding conflict of interest charges. It says the biotech industry burns money, It says Tsai Ing-wen was a first time investor. She was providing "angel funds." She was fighting fires. But the DPP's response is evasive. It totally ignores Tsai Ing-wen's direct involvement while she was still vice premier. Tsai Ing-wen knew the government was interested in setting up the Yu Chang Technology Company. She knew the details of its plan to support the biotech industry.
The government planned to support the biotech industry. Thefore investing in the Yu Chang Technology Company was a sure thing. When Tsai Ing-wen was chairman of the TaiMed Group and the Yu Chang Technology Company. the National Development Fund wired these companies a total of 26.4 billion dollars in three installments.
Tsai Ing-wen had the advantage of advanced knowledge. How can her involvement be passed off as "angel investing?" In the marketplace, such behavior is known as insider trading. Tsai Ing-wen was a high-ranking official. She knew perfectly well that this constituted a conflict of interest.
Had the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal gone no further, Tsai Ing-wen would be guilty only of revolving door violations. According to Ministry of Civil Service Civil Service Laws, and Ministry of Economic Affairs Biotech Drug Industry Regulations, revolving door violations must be "directly related to one's job." Tsai Ing-wen was responsible for biotechnology industry decision-making. But because she was not directly administering the industry, she got a pass. Legally speaking, Tsai Ing-wen squeaked by. But politically and ethically, she was clearly guilty.
The DPP is desperately trying to rationalize away Tsai Ing-wen's effort to line her pockets. It argues that the Yu Chang Technology Company scandal broke only after Tsai Ing-wen left office. For example, DPP spokesman Chen Chi-mai said that Su Tseng-chang entered the presidential primaries that year. He resigned temporarily as premier because he lost the nomination. How could Tsai Ing-wen have anticipated Su's resignation as premier? How could she have used her authority to approve biotech regulations or the National Development Fund investment case? DPP apologists argue that Tsai Ing-wen requested biotechnology funds only after stepping down. The chairman of the Yu Chang Technology Company then took over. Therefore, they argue, this was not a case of abusing the power of one's office for profit.
But the declassified documents released by the Council for Economic Planning yesterday prove otherwise. On March 22, Tsai Ing-wen signed the document. On March 31, TaiMed began setting up a biotechnology company. If what Christina Liu says is true, Tsai Ing-wen was a key individual in the company. Her claim that she was "never involved in setting up the Yu Chang Technology Company" is a lie. The Yu Chang Technology Company scandal is a case of "approved for Tsai Ing-wen by Tsai Ing-wen." The scandal is not merely a conflict of interest. The scandal is a case of abusing one's power to line one's pockets.
Tsai has yet to offer a satisfactory explanation, On the contrary. she has accused the KMT of character assassination, She is an embarrassment to our democracy. But if she becomes our head of state, she will be an even bigger embarrassment to our democracy. Tsai Ing-wen has lashed out at the KMT. She would do better to face the music. Tsai Ing-wen seeks high office. If she is this cavalier about conflicts of interest, how can voters permit her to govern the nation?
不守利益迴避原則 可當總統嗎?
2011-12-13中國時報
宇昌生技案再爆爭議，民進黨不是痛擊這是國民黨的選舉奧步，不然就輕描淡寫、刻意淡化是了無新意的舊案；但是，資料會說話，行政院火速解密的極機密文件，顯示蔡英文擔任董事長的台懋公司，早在她擔任副院長時就已籌畫設立，如果蔡英文對相關細節無法完整澄清，只怕難逃藉職務自肥之嫌。
經建會主委劉憶如昨日在立法院公布兩份解密公文，值得注意的是，在第二份解密文件中，第一次出現台懋公司（TaiMed Group），劉憶如表示，這一份文件，針對這家公司設立進度條件、需要支付的簽約金、在開發歷程裡要支付的費用、銷售權利金、開發實驗進度等，由當時的經建會主委何美玥也是國發基金召集人，在三月二十一日專簽呈給蔡英文，蔡英文三月二十二日簽署，但沒有時任行政院長的蘇貞昌簽名。
更值得注意的是，根據劉憶如的說法，二○○七年三月三十一日由經建會主委何美玥與中研院院士何大一署名發函，舉行推動TaiMed生技公司設立說明會，邀請了可能投資人來與會，現場英文資料裡，就明確記載蔡英文將是公司的主要核心人員。
藍委質疑，蔡英文當時還是副閣揆，如果當時公司已存在，這形同是「蔡英文核准給蔡英文」，嚴重的違反利益迴避原則。
確實，宇昌生技案雪球愈滾愈大，蔡英文也愈來愈難自圓其說。經建會上周在立法院進行的專案報告中揭露，蔡英文在二○○七年五月卸任副閣揆、轉任家族投資的台懋生技創投代表人後，在宇昌正式成立前，即兩度發函給國發基金，要求撥款到宇昌生技公司籌備處，經建會主委何美玥當天核准，國發基金立即在九月三日撥款四千萬元。
對於可能的利益衝突，民進黨的回應是，生技業是燒錢產業，蔡英文第一時間投資、提供「天使資金」，扮演的是救火隊的角色。但這樣的回應避重就輕，完全未提及蔡英文擔任副閣揆時，就已直接參與，並且了解國家有意藉成立宇昌公司、扶植生技業的相關細節。
也就是說，在國家保證支持的前提下，投入宇昌生技可說是穩賺不賠的生意，事實上，蔡英文擔任台懋、宇昌董事長任內，國發基金共撥三次款、總計二．六四億元。
蔡英文既已佔了事先知情的便宜，她的投入怎能稱為救急的天使基金；在市場上，這樣的行為稱為「內線交易」；蔡英文既然曾任高官，當然應該知道這有相當明顯的利益衝突問題。
如果宇昌案只發展到此，蔡英文的問題在於她繞過旋轉門條款的規定；因為，依銓敘部對《公務員服務法》的解釋，《生技新藥產業發展條例》的主管機關經濟部，才必須因「職務直接相關」，接受旋轉門條款的規範，蔡英文雖然實質上主導生技產業決策，但反而因為非主管業務，而不必受規範；但這只是在法律上脫身，蔡英文還是有明顯的政治道德瑕疵。
民進黨反駁蔡英文自肥的一個說辭是，蔡英文卸任後，才有宇昌案。例如，民進黨發言人陳其邁表示，當年蘇貞昌參加民進黨總統初選失利才臨時請辭行政院長，蔡英文怎麼可能事先預見內閣總辭，並且利用職權通過生技條例或核定國發基金的投資案，亦即，蔡英文是卸任後才因生技大老請求，接下宇昌董事長，並非藉職務圖利。
但是，經建會昨日解密的資料卻顯示，就在蔡英文三月二十二日簽署公文不久，三月三十一日台懋生技公司就已開始籌備設立，如果劉憶如所言屬實，蔡英文當時也列名公司核心人士名單中，則她不只不是自稱的「從未參與宇昌公司籌設」，更是「由蔡英文核准給蔡英文」，這已經不只是未利益迴避而已，確實難逃自肥之嫌。
到目前為止，蔡英文完全未交代是否有利益衝突的爭議，反而指控國民黨是人格謀殺，選舉選到這樣是民主之恥；但是，更大的民主之恥，牽涉到的是國家領導人的操守，蔡英文與其反擊國民黨，還不如嚴肅面對相關爭議；否則，有心挑戰大位的蔡英文，如果這樣的輕忽利益迴避原則，選民還敢將治國的重任交給她嗎？
Monday, December 12, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen's Three Illusions
Tsai Ing-wen's Three Illusions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2011
Summary: Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group." This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.
Full Text Below:
Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group."
Take the 1992 Consensus. The Ma administration and the Beijing regime consider the 1992 Consensus the basis for cross-Strait relations. The Ma administration refers to the "1992 Consensus, one China, different interpretations." The Hu regime refers to the "1992 Consensus, seeking agreement while setting aside differences." The two sides' positions overlap. They hold different interpretations about the meaning of one China. But they concur with the wording used in the 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation. In other words, the 1992 Consensus means the Republic of China must return to Republic of China as defined in the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must return to "one China, different interpretations." But Taiwan independence forces have taken Tsai Ing-wen hostage. She refuses to accept the Constitition of the Republic of China and "one China, different interpretations." She refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. President Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly asked Tsai Ing-wen why she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. After all, the "one China" in the 1992 Consensus is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen's unspoken answer was how can the Taiwan independence movement possibly accept it?
The 1992 Consensus is a term used by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait almost every day. Yet Tsai Ing-wen stubbornly insists that it "does not exist." Instead, she would replace the 1992 Consensus with the clearly non-existent "Taiwan consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen says the "Taiwan consensus" is a "democratic process." In other words, the "Taiwan consensus" has yet to be debated and studied, let alone turned into law. It is currently nothing more than an empty suggestion.
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" has two problems. One. Suppose the "Taiwan consensus" actually does "start over from a blank slate?" Suppose it actually is a "democratic process?" If it is, then Tsai Ing-wen must repudiate it for the same reason she repudiates the 1992 Consensus. She must officially forsake the "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation." After all, these Taiwan independence programs have never been approved by the "democratic process." In fact the 1992 Consensus was the cornerstone of Ma Ying-jeou's National Policy Platform during the 2008 presidential election. How can Tsai claim it has not been subjected to the "democratic process?" Two. Tsai must first explain her own position on a number of matters. Doesn't the Constitution of the Republic of China represent the constitutional and legal consensus on Taiwan? If it does, then why refuse to accept "one China, different interpretations?" If it does not, then why not openly repudiate the Republic of China? Why not openly champion Taiwan independence?
Now let us address the matter of the SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a "cross-Strait dialogue working group." She has done so because she realizes that if she is elected, the SEF and ARATS dialogue mechanism will disintegrate. This is why she feels compelled to establish a "cross-Strait dialogue working group."
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy framework has two problems. One. She stubbornly insists on denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus, which already exists and has worked perfectly for years, and replacing it with her so-called "Taiwan Consensus." Two. She stubbornly insists on nullifying the SEF and ARATS, two long-established, smoothly-operating cross-Strait groups, and replacing them with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." But both Tsai's "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strait dialogue working group" are empty shells. Nobody has any idea what they actually mean.
Beijing has already warned Tsai Ing-wen not to harbor "three illusions." Beijing says the DPP harbors "three illusions." One. The Democratic Progressive Party will return to power, sooner or later, The Mainland must face this fact. Actually the first question the Mainland must ask is "Does the DPP accept the 1992 consensus?" Two. Beijing says if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power it may try to persuade the Mainland to reach an "alternative consensus." It may try to persuade Beijing to accept Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus." Three. Beijing says the DPP intends to steal credit for any number of agreements reached over the past three years as the result of cross-Strait rapproachment. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think she can successfully steal credit for ECFA, direct flights, and Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan?
Mainland policy advisor Zhou Zhihuai is a spokesperson for the Beijing authorities. Zhou warned the DPP not to harbor "three illusions." He warned the DPP to forsake Taiwan independence, forsake its "three illusions," and to affirm the 1992 Consensus, He said "There is no alternative." Without the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait peaceful development will run aground. Zhou Zhihuai said the 1992 Consensus is Beijing's bottom line. The DPP must face this fact.
Prior to this, Hu Jintao made it clear that the 1992 consensus is a prerequisite for cross-Strait dialogue and consultation. Would Tsai Ing-wen's "cross-Strait dialogue working group" adhere to this premise? Hu also made it clear that the 1992 Consensus is an important basis for peaceful development Would this be part of Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus?" Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi also said "The 1992 Consensus cannot be denied."
The President of the Republic of China must abide by the 1992 Consensus. One China, different interpretations is consistent with the Constitution. For the Beijing authorities, the 1992 Consensus allows "seeking commonalities while shelving disagreements," while opposing Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. To the public on Taiwan, she has cast doubts about her allegiance to the Constitution. To the Beijing authorities, she has marked herself as a champion of Taiwan independence. Her reckless unilateralism has provoked clashes on Taiwan and in Beijing. Even assuming her demagogic "Three Little Pigs" election ploy wins her the election, the nation will be in turmoil, within and without. She will be hoisted on her own petard.
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group."
This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.
蔡英文的三個幻想
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.10
上周末辯論後，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構所呈現的樣態是：一：在綱領上，以「台灣共識」否定「九二共識」；二、在機制上，以「兩岸對話工作小組」，取代兩岸兩會。
先談綱領。如今，馬政府與北京政權皆以「九二共識」為兩岸關係的基本綱領；馬政府稱「九二共識／一中共表」，胡政權則謂「九二共識／求同存異」；雙方的交集是「對一個中國的涵義認知不同，但同意對其各自表述」（二○○八布胡熱線語）。也就是說，「九二共識」的準則與底線是，「中華民國應是回到『一中各表』的中華民國憲法的中華民國」；但蔡英文被台獨勢力挾持，拒絕接受「一中各表」的中華民國憲法，因而否定「九二共識」。所以，馬英九總統屢次問蔡英文：「一中」就是「中華民國」，為何妳不接受？蔡英文未說出的答案則是：台獨豈能接受？
「九二共識」一詞，幾乎每日皆出自海峽兩岸執政當局之口，但蔡英文卻偏偏謂其「不存在」；她反而欲以明明才是「不存在」的「台灣共識」，來取代「九二共識」。
蔡英文說，「台灣共識」是一個「民主程序」；也就是說，「台灣共識」尚待辯論、研議，甚至立法，現在還只是一個空殼子而已。
此說至少有兩點可議：一、倘若「台灣共識」真的是一種「歸零思考」的「民主程序」，則蔡英文就應當像否定「九二共識」一樣，先一併正式否棄《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》，因為這些台獨綱領，無一經由「民主程序」而形成。何況，「九二共識」是馬英九自二○○八年大選即提出的國政綱領，豈能謂「未經民主程序」？二、蔡英文必須先說明，「中華民國憲法」是否即是法制上的「最高台灣共識」？倘若是，為何不接受「一中各表」？倘若不是，則何以不公開否定「中華民國」？或公開倡議「台獨」？
再論機制。蔡英文提出「兩岸對話工作小組」之議，顯已感知，她若當選，兩岸兩會的協議對話機制必告中止，因此必須另設「兩岸對話工作小組」。
總括前論，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構樣態是：一、偏偏要否定已經存在並運行平順的「九二共識」，而另提「台灣共識」；二、又偏偏要停廢已經存在並運作平順的兩岸兩會，而另提「兩岸對話工作小組」。問題是：「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」，都只是一個放了幾把空心菜的空殼子，根本不知究竟為何物？
北京已經勸告蔡英文不必存有「三個幻想」。北京認為，民進黨的「三個幻想」是：一、民進黨早晚會執政，大陸必須面對（其實，大陸必須面對的第一個問題就是：「民進黨是否接受九二共識？」）。二、民進黨一旦執政，一定會與大陸談出「其他共識」（是要北京接受蔡英文的「台灣共識」嗎？）。三、民進黨打算收割過去三年多兩岸多項協議的成果（蔡英文難道要「收割」ＥＣＦＡ、直航及陸客來台等等？）。
為「勿存三個幻想」傳話的大陸智囊周志懷說：民進黨不要異想天開，必須丟掉這「三個幻想」；亦即要放棄台獨，堅持九二共識，「捨此之外，無路可走」；否則，兩岸和平發展必將面臨挑戰。周志懷說：「九二共識」是北京的政策底線，民進黨必須面對。
在此之前，胡錦濤已明言：「九二共識」是對話協商的必要前提（「兩岸對話工作小組」要不要這個「前提」？），也是和平發展的重要基礎（「台灣共識」要不要這個「基礎」？）。國台辦主任王毅更說：「九二共識不容否定。」
其實，「九二共識」，對中華民國總統而言，就是遵守「一中各表」的憲法準則；對北京當局而言，就是可以「求同存異」，但反對台獨。蔡英文否定「九二共識」，對內產生國憲認同的疑義，在北京則指其為台獨；這是內外都擺不平的盲動政策及單邊主義，即使她憑「三隻小豬」的民粹氛圍而當選，屆時也必是內外交煎，頭過身不過！
總括而論，蔡英文的兩岸政見是：上任後要立即撕毀「九二共識」，並掀翻兩岸兩會的對話協商桌子！要北京等她端出「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」再說！
這不只是幻想，已是非愚即妄，更不啻是自殺。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2011
Summary: Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group." This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.
Full Text Below:
Following last weekend's presidential debate, Tsai Ing-wen presented her cross-Strait policy platform. One. She would repudiate the 1992 Consensus and replace it with her so-called "Taiwan consensus." Two. She would replace SEF and ARATS with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group."
Take the 1992 Consensus. The Ma administration and the Beijing regime consider the 1992 Consensus the basis for cross-Strait relations. The Ma administration refers to the "1992 Consensus, one China, different interpretations." The Hu regime refers to the "1992 Consensus, seeking agreement while setting aside differences." The two sides' positions overlap. They hold different interpretations about the meaning of one China. But they concur with the wording used in the 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation. In other words, the 1992 Consensus means the Republic of China must return to Republic of China as defined in the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must return to "one China, different interpretations." But Taiwan independence forces have taken Tsai Ing-wen hostage. She refuses to accept the Constitition of the Republic of China and "one China, different interpretations." She refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. President Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly asked Tsai Ing-wen why she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. After all, the "one China" in the 1992 Consensus is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen's unspoken answer was how can the Taiwan independence movement possibly accept it?
The 1992 Consensus is a term used by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait almost every day. Yet Tsai Ing-wen stubbornly insists that it "does not exist." Instead, she would replace the 1992 Consensus with the clearly non-existent "Taiwan consensus."
Tsai Ing-wen says the "Taiwan consensus" is a "democratic process." In other words, the "Taiwan consensus" has yet to be debated and studied, let alone turned into law. It is currently nothing more than an empty suggestion.
Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "Taiwan consensus" has two problems. One. Suppose the "Taiwan consensus" actually does "start over from a blank slate?" Suppose it actually is a "democratic process?" If it is, then Tsai Ing-wen must repudiate it for the same reason she repudiates the 1992 Consensus. She must officially forsake the "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" and the "Resolution for a Normal Nation." After all, these Taiwan independence programs have never been approved by the "democratic process." In fact the 1992 Consensus was the cornerstone of Ma Ying-jeou's National Policy Platform during the 2008 presidential election. How can Tsai claim it has not been subjected to the "democratic process?" Two. Tsai must first explain her own position on a number of matters. Doesn't the Constitution of the Republic of China represent the constitutional and legal consensus on Taiwan? If it does, then why refuse to accept "one China, different interpretations?" If it does not, then why not openly repudiate the Republic of China? Why not openly champion Taiwan independence?
Now let us address the matter of the SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a "cross-Strait dialogue working group." She has done so because she realizes that if she is elected, the SEF and ARATS dialogue mechanism will disintegrate. This is why she feels compelled to establish a "cross-Strait dialogue working group."
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy framework has two problems. One. She stubbornly insists on denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus, which already exists and has worked perfectly for years, and replacing it with her so-called "Taiwan Consensus." Two. She stubbornly insists on nullifying the SEF and ARATS, two long-established, smoothly-operating cross-Strait groups, and replacing them with her so-called "cross-Strait dialogue working group." But both Tsai's "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strait dialogue working group" are empty shells. Nobody has any idea what they actually mean.
Beijing has already warned Tsai Ing-wen not to harbor "three illusions." Beijing says the DPP harbors "three illusions." One. The Democratic Progressive Party will return to power, sooner or later, The Mainland must face this fact. Actually the first question the Mainland must ask is "Does the DPP accept the 1992 consensus?" Two. Beijing says if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power it may try to persuade the Mainland to reach an "alternative consensus." It may try to persuade Beijing to accept Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus." Three. Beijing says the DPP intends to steal credit for any number of agreements reached over the past three years as the result of cross-Strait rapproachment. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think she can successfully steal credit for ECFA, direct flights, and Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan?
Mainland policy advisor Zhou Zhihuai is a spokesperson for the Beijing authorities. Zhou warned the DPP not to harbor "three illusions." He warned the DPP to forsake Taiwan independence, forsake its "three illusions," and to affirm the 1992 Consensus, He said "There is no alternative." Without the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait peaceful development will run aground. Zhou Zhihuai said the 1992 Consensus is Beijing's bottom line. The DPP must face this fact.
Prior to this, Hu Jintao made it clear that the 1992 consensus is a prerequisite for cross-Strait dialogue and consultation. Would Tsai Ing-wen's "cross-Strait dialogue working group" adhere to this premise? Hu also made it clear that the 1992 Consensus is an important basis for peaceful development Would this be part of Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus?" Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi also said "The 1992 Consensus cannot be denied."
The President of the Republic of China must abide by the 1992 Consensus. One China, different interpretations is consistent with the Constitution. For the Beijing authorities, the 1992 Consensus allows "seeking commonalities while shelving disagreements," while opposing Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. To the public on Taiwan, she has cast doubts about her allegiance to the Constitution. To the Beijing authorities, she has marked herself as a champion of Taiwan independence. Her reckless unilateralism has provoked clashes on Taiwan and in Beijing. Even assuming her demagogic "Three Little Pigs" election ploy wins her the election, the nation will be in turmoil, within and without. She will be hoisted on her own petard.
In sum, Tsai Ing-wen intends to shred the 1992 Consensus immediately upon taking office. She intends to overturn the cross-Strait dialogue and consultation table. She expects Beijing to wait passively until she trots out her "Taiwan consensus" and "cross-Strai dialogue working group."
This is not mere fantasy. This is delusion. This is nothing short of suicide.
蔡英文的三個幻想
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.12.10
上周末辯論後，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構所呈現的樣態是：一：在綱領上，以「台灣共識」否定「九二共識」；二、在機制上，以「兩岸對話工作小組」，取代兩岸兩會。
先談綱領。如今，馬政府與北京政權皆以「九二共識」為兩岸關係的基本綱領；馬政府稱「九二共識／一中共表」，胡政權則謂「九二共識／求同存異」；雙方的交集是「對一個中國的涵義認知不同，但同意對其各自表述」（二○○八布胡熱線語）。也就是說，「九二共識」的準則與底線是，「中華民國應是回到『一中各表』的中華民國憲法的中華民國」；但蔡英文被台獨勢力挾持，拒絕接受「一中各表」的中華民國憲法，因而否定「九二共識」。所以，馬英九總統屢次問蔡英文：「一中」就是「中華民國」，為何妳不接受？蔡英文未說出的答案則是：台獨豈能接受？
「九二共識」一詞，幾乎每日皆出自海峽兩岸執政當局之口，但蔡英文卻偏偏謂其「不存在」；她反而欲以明明才是「不存在」的「台灣共識」，來取代「九二共識」。
蔡英文說，「台灣共識」是一個「民主程序」；也就是說，「台灣共識」尚待辯論、研議，甚至立法，現在還只是一個空殼子而已。
此說至少有兩點可議：一、倘若「台灣共識」真的是一種「歸零思考」的「民主程序」，則蔡英文就應當像否定「九二共識」一樣，先一併正式否棄《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》，因為這些台獨綱領，無一經由「民主程序」而形成。何況，「九二共識」是馬英九自二○○八年大選即提出的國政綱領，豈能謂「未經民主程序」？二、蔡英文必須先說明，「中華民國憲法」是否即是法制上的「最高台灣共識」？倘若是，為何不接受「一中各表」？倘若不是，則何以不公開否定「中華民國」？或公開倡議「台獨」？
再論機制。蔡英文提出「兩岸對話工作小組」之議，顯已感知，她若當選，兩岸兩會的協議對話機制必告中止，因此必須另設「兩岸對話工作小組」。
總括前論，蔡英文的兩岸政策架構樣態是：一、偏偏要否定已經存在並運行平順的「九二共識」，而另提「台灣共識」；二、又偏偏要停廢已經存在並運作平順的兩岸兩會，而另提「兩岸對話工作小組」。問題是：「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」，都只是一個放了幾把空心菜的空殼子，根本不知究竟為何物？
北京已經勸告蔡英文不必存有「三個幻想」。北京認為，民進黨的「三個幻想」是：一、民進黨早晚會執政，大陸必須面對（其實，大陸必須面對的第一個問題就是：「民進黨是否接受九二共識？」）。二、民進黨一旦執政，一定會與大陸談出「其他共識」（是要北京接受蔡英文的「台灣共識」嗎？）。三、民進黨打算收割過去三年多兩岸多項協議的成果（蔡英文難道要「收割」ＥＣＦＡ、直航及陸客來台等等？）。
為「勿存三個幻想」傳話的大陸智囊周志懷說：民進黨不要異想天開，必須丟掉這「三個幻想」；亦即要放棄台獨，堅持九二共識，「捨此之外，無路可走」；否則，兩岸和平發展必將面臨挑戰。周志懷說：「九二共識」是北京的政策底線，民進黨必須面對。
在此之前，胡錦濤已明言：「九二共識」是對話協商的必要前提（「兩岸對話工作小組」要不要這個「前提」？），也是和平發展的重要基礎（「台灣共識」要不要這個「基礎」？）。國台辦主任王毅更說：「九二共識不容否定。」
其實，「九二共識」，對中華民國總統而言，就是遵守「一中各表」的憲法準則；對北京當局而言，就是可以「求同存異」，但反對台獨。蔡英文否定「九二共識」，對內產生國憲認同的疑義，在北京則指其為台獨；這是內外都擺不平的盲動政策及單邊主義，即使她憑「三隻小豬」的民粹氛圍而當選，屆時也必是內外交煎，頭過身不過！
總括而論，蔡英文的兩岸政見是：上任後要立即撕毀「九二共識」，並掀翻兩岸兩會的對話協商桌子！要北京等她端出「台灣共識」及「兩岸對話工作小組」再說！
這不只是幻想，已是非愚即妄，更不啻是自殺。
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Does the Public on Taiwan Really Want a New First Lady?
Does the Public on Taiwan Really Want a New First Lady?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2011
Summary: Mrs. Su Jia-chyuan-chyuan, aka Hung Heng-chu, attended a wild blowout featuring male strippers. When footage of the lewd performance was televised, the scene was described as "a den of iniquity." By contrast, First Lady Chou Mei-ching has been visiting small towns in central and southern Taiwan, seeking support from rural voters. Her dress was plain and simple. Her manner was unostentatious and low-key. The contrast between the two wives could not be clearer.
Full Text Below:
Mrs. Su Jia-chyuan-chyuan, aka Hung Heng-chu, attended a wild blowout featuring male strippers. When footage of the lewd performance was televised, the scene was described as "a den of iniquity." By contrast, First Lady Chou Mei-ching has been visiting small towns in central and southern Taiwan, seeking support from rural voters. Her dress was plain and simple. Her manner was unostentatious and low-key. The contrast between the two wives could not be clearer.
Hung Heng-chu was the Director of the Pingtung Household Registration Office, as well as the wife of the mayor when she attended this public peformance with male strippers and transexuals. Actually, either a public or private performance would have been highly inappropriate. To the general public such wild parties represent atypical behavior by a nouveau riches subculture in northern Taiwan. Who knew that nine years ago such behavior had already manifested itself in southern Taiwan "high society," with the wife of county chief? The DPP has been boasting about its desire to close the "North-South gap," It appears to have done just that, with truly impressive results.
The DPP often ridicules the KMT as a "bourgeois" political party. It casts itself as the "spokeman for the disenfranchised." But when the political curtain is pulled back, we are regaled by the sight of male strippers. That the wife of the Pingtung County Chief was actually part of such a spectacle, that she actually took part in such a bacchanal, is ironic indeed.
Recently the DPP launched its "record breaking" propaganda campaign, attacking the Ma administration, It relentlessly bashed the Ma administration for the "wealth gap" on Taiwan. But given Hung Heng-chu's part in such a Dionysian spectacle, how can the DPP point its finger at others? What was that "den of iniquity" but cinema verite footage of Green Camp decadence?
The DPP can pretend not to see Su Jia-chyuan's luxury "farmhouse." It can pretend to not see Hung Heng-chu suddenly and inexplicably promoted from ordinary policewoman to deputy director of the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park. But can it pretend to not see the political scandals Hung Heng-chu could precipitate if she becomes First Lady of the Republic of China? Wu Shu-chen was wheelchair bound. Yet she could still turn the presidential palace into a smoke-filled backroom for deal-making with conglomerates and wives of wealthy political patrons. Given Hung Heng-chu's endless string of scandals, what will happen if Su Jia-chyuan is elected vice president? What sort of shenanigans will take place in his official residence?
When Ma Ying-jeou moved into Chen Shui-bian's "Jade Mountain Official Residence" he renamed it the "Chung Hsing Apartment." People virtually forgot all about it. Actually, that was a shame, Had President Ma and the First Lady Chou Mei-ching taken the time and energy to establish a new official residence, they might have established a new image for the First Family. They might have purged the presidency of the vestiges of the Chen family's corruption, extravagance, and abuse of public authority for private advantage. They might have established a new image of integrity. dignity, austerity, and decorum. Perhaps Ma's wife and daughters were too independent minded, too reluctant to bear the burden of the "First Family." They are acutely aware of their proximity to power, They are wary of the once honorific title, "First Family."
Closer examination however reveals that it is not often in politics that those close to power deliberately insulate themselves from power. Take Chou Mei-ching for example, It is hard to find the right word to describe her current activities. One could say she is "stumping." But actually she is merely greeting ordinary people in rural regions, in her capacity as a private citizen. All she does is bow deeply and smile aimiably. She has clearly established an ineffable emotional connection between herself and the public.
Chou Mei-ching's unique style is rooted in her independence and self-sufficiency. It does not emanate from her halo as "First Lady." Chou Mei-ching has made many public appearances lately. The excitement people feel when they see her is palpable. They sense her extraordinary charisma. This the result of energy accumulated during the hundreds of times she did not appear in public beginning three years ago. She regularly and quietly participates in many charitable activiites. She has no desire to make headlines. She is happy to live in the hearts of those whom she has been able to help. She has no need for an extravagant wardrobe to show off her status. Her austerity and sincerity are her greatest assets.
When Su Jia-chyuan's wife scandalized society yet again, Su Jia-chyuan said her conduct "failed to meet society's expectations." But as soon as he finished his statement, he said he hoped for a "high-minded election campaign that returns to policy debate and that lets everyone to know: where's the beef?" What kind of apology is this? What kind of soul-searching is this? Su Jia-chyuan and his wife have repeatedly exposed their corruption and decadence, How can their conduct possibly "meet society's expectations?" Are we to understand that they meet the DPP's expectations? Are we to understand that they meet Tsai Ing-wen's expectations? Never mind that Su Jia-chyuan has no idea where the beef is. Do voters really expect only beef? Do they really not expect their candidate to demonstrate character and conscience?
Chou Mei-ching often wears a slight frown. She appears to be thinking hard while saying litlle. Compare her demeanor to Hung Heng-chu's drunken laughter during the male strippers' performance. This truly is a case of "one Taiwan, two different worlds." The poet Yu Kuang-chung asked: "Does the public on Taiwan really want a new First Lady?" If so, whom? Do they really want Hung Heng-chu instead of Chou Mei-ching?
「台灣人民要換第一夫人嗎？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.09 02:33 am
蘇嘉全夫人洪恆珠參加有猛男助興的宴會，猥褻艷舞之影片曝光，被形容為如「酒池肉林」。反觀正在中南部走鄉拜鎮的第一夫人周美青，一身便衣輕車簡行，樸素低調。兩相比較，兩人的形象構成了對比分明的反差。
那場宴會舉辦時，洪恆珠是屏東戶政事務所主任，更是縣長夫人；她參與這種猛男及第三性公關助興狂歡的場合，於公於私恐怕都極不合宜。在一般民眾的印象，也許以為這類放浪形骸的宴會，只是近年來一些北部暴發戶及另類社交場合的「非典型」餘興；誰料，竟然早在九年前就出現在台灣尾縣長夫人現身的「上流社會」之中。民進黨一直高唱縮小「南北差距」，還真是成果斐然。
民進黨常譏稱國民黨是「資產階級」政黨，並自詡為「弱勢代言人」；但在政治黑幕背後，這場「猛男脫褲趴」顯示，屏東縣長夫人的交遊居然呈現這般駭人的場景，玩的是如此靡爛的遊戲，真是何其諷刺！
民進黨近日推出的「破紀錄」打馬文宣，猛批馬政府任內「貧富差距」的現象；但從洪恆珠之猛男宴中的聲色光影看來，我們不知道民進黨還有何顏面指責他人？那個酒池肉林，不正是綠色官場蛇鼠一窩的寫實嗎？
民進黨可以裝作看不見蘇嘉全的豪宅，可以裝作看不見洪恆珠從警官搖身變成屏東農業生技園區副主任的詭異升遷；但是，它還能裝作看不見洪恆珠即將成為中華民國第一夫人的政治悲劇可能上演嗎？一個坐輪椅的吳淑珍，都能把總統官邸變成財團、貴婦絡繹於途的獻金基地；那麼，以洪恆珠連珠炮一般爆開的醜行惡跡，一旦蘇嘉全當選副總統，他的官邸將引發國人怎樣的想像？
陳水扁的「玉山官邸」，在馬英九更名為「中興寓所」入駐之後，幾乎讓人忘了它的存在。這其實是件憾事，如果馬總統夫婦願費心營造，應可賦與中興寓所一種新的「第一家庭」形象，洗去陳水扁家族的貪腐豪奢、假公濟私，塑造正派、不庸俗、高而不貴的另類神采；但是，或許馬家妻女都太過自主，不願負荷「第一家族」的沉重頭銜，再加上她們極端有意識地與權力保持距離，使得這張原本絕佳的「第一家庭牌」未能善用。
但深一層看，接近權力而刻意保持「絕緣」，其實是難得的政治境界。以周美青為例，我們很難找到適當的詞句形容她正在進行活動；說她是「助選」，她其實只是以「個人身分」在鄉間向市井百姓問候；能把拜會活動化約到只剩鞠躬、微笑的地步，可見她與民眾之間已經建立了一種一切盡在不言中的相知與相惜。
這種奇特的「周式風格」，最重要的支撐力量應是她個人的「自主」和「自足」，而非來自「總統夫人」的光環加持。周美青這幾天露面，從見到她的民眾那種雀躍與興奮的表情，可以感到她確有不平常的感染力；這其實是她三年來幾百次「未曝光」的行程累積出來的動能。她經常不動聲色地參與種種關懷社會的活動，她不要登上報紙，卻願意活在與她互動者的心深處。她不用華服寶石來堆砌自己的威儀，樸素和誠懇就是她最大的能量。
夫人再次出包，蘇嘉全稱「不符社會期待」而道歉，但言畢卻立即轉向，竟謂「要有一場高格調的選戰，應回歸政策辯論，讓大家知道政策牛肉在哪裡」。這是什麼道歉？這是什麼反省？蘇嘉全夫婦這一陣子出的醜，豈僅是「不符社會期待」，難道能「符合」民進黨的「期待」？「符合」蔡英文的「期待」？何況，莫說蘇嘉全的政策牛肉不知何在，但難道只要牛肉，而不要品德與廉恥？
周美青經常輕鎖眉心，顯得思深而惜言；這與洪恆珠在猛男秀上笑得花枝亂顫的模樣，真是「一個台灣／兩個世界」。詩人余光中問：「台灣人民要換第一夫人嗎？」誰換誰？是要將周美青換洪恆珠嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2011
Summary: Mrs. Su Jia-chyuan-chyuan, aka Hung Heng-chu, attended a wild blowout featuring male strippers. When footage of the lewd performance was televised, the scene was described as "a den of iniquity." By contrast, First Lady Chou Mei-ching has been visiting small towns in central and southern Taiwan, seeking support from rural voters. Her dress was plain and simple. Her manner was unostentatious and low-key. The contrast between the two wives could not be clearer.
Full Text Below:
Mrs. Su Jia-chyuan-chyuan, aka Hung Heng-chu, attended a wild blowout featuring male strippers. When footage of the lewd performance was televised, the scene was described as "a den of iniquity." By contrast, First Lady Chou Mei-ching has been visiting small towns in central and southern Taiwan, seeking support from rural voters. Her dress was plain and simple. Her manner was unostentatious and low-key. The contrast between the two wives could not be clearer.
Hung Heng-chu was the Director of the Pingtung Household Registration Office, as well as the wife of the mayor when she attended this public peformance with male strippers and transexuals. Actually, either a public or private performance would have been highly inappropriate. To the general public such wild parties represent atypical behavior by a nouveau riches subculture in northern Taiwan. Who knew that nine years ago such behavior had already manifested itself in southern Taiwan "high society," with the wife of county chief? The DPP has been boasting about its desire to close the "North-South gap," It appears to have done just that, with truly impressive results.
The DPP often ridicules the KMT as a "bourgeois" political party. It casts itself as the "spokeman for the disenfranchised." But when the political curtain is pulled back, we are regaled by the sight of male strippers. That the wife of the Pingtung County Chief was actually part of such a spectacle, that she actually took part in such a bacchanal, is ironic indeed.
Recently the DPP launched its "record breaking" propaganda campaign, attacking the Ma administration, It relentlessly bashed the Ma administration for the "wealth gap" on Taiwan. But given Hung Heng-chu's part in such a Dionysian spectacle, how can the DPP point its finger at others? What was that "den of iniquity" but cinema verite footage of Green Camp decadence?
The DPP can pretend not to see Su Jia-chyuan's luxury "farmhouse." It can pretend to not see Hung Heng-chu suddenly and inexplicably promoted from ordinary policewoman to deputy director of the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park. But can it pretend to not see the political scandals Hung Heng-chu could precipitate if she becomes First Lady of the Republic of China? Wu Shu-chen was wheelchair bound. Yet she could still turn the presidential palace into a smoke-filled backroom for deal-making with conglomerates and wives of wealthy political patrons. Given Hung Heng-chu's endless string of scandals, what will happen if Su Jia-chyuan is elected vice president? What sort of shenanigans will take place in his official residence?
When Ma Ying-jeou moved into Chen Shui-bian's "Jade Mountain Official Residence" he renamed it the "Chung Hsing Apartment." People virtually forgot all about it. Actually, that was a shame, Had President Ma and the First Lady Chou Mei-ching taken the time and energy to establish a new official residence, they might have established a new image for the First Family. They might have purged the presidency of the vestiges of the Chen family's corruption, extravagance, and abuse of public authority for private advantage. They might have established a new image of integrity. dignity, austerity, and decorum. Perhaps Ma's wife and daughters were too independent minded, too reluctant to bear the burden of the "First Family." They are acutely aware of their proximity to power, They are wary of the once honorific title, "First Family."
Closer examination however reveals that it is not often in politics that those close to power deliberately insulate themselves from power. Take Chou Mei-ching for example, It is hard to find the right word to describe her current activities. One could say she is "stumping." But actually she is merely greeting ordinary people in rural regions, in her capacity as a private citizen. All she does is bow deeply and smile aimiably. She has clearly established an ineffable emotional connection between herself and the public.
Chou Mei-ching's unique style is rooted in her independence and self-sufficiency. It does not emanate from her halo as "First Lady." Chou Mei-ching has made many public appearances lately. The excitement people feel when they see her is palpable. They sense her extraordinary charisma. This the result of energy accumulated during the hundreds of times she did not appear in public beginning three years ago. She regularly and quietly participates in many charitable activiites. She has no desire to make headlines. She is happy to live in the hearts of those whom she has been able to help. She has no need for an extravagant wardrobe to show off her status. Her austerity and sincerity are her greatest assets.
When Su Jia-chyuan's wife scandalized society yet again, Su Jia-chyuan said her conduct "failed to meet society's expectations." But as soon as he finished his statement, he said he hoped for a "high-minded election campaign that returns to policy debate and that lets everyone to know: where's the beef?" What kind of apology is this? What kind of soul-searching is this? Su Jia-chyuan and his wife have repeatedly exposed their corruption and decadence, How can their conduct possibly "meet society's expectations?" Are we to understand that they meet the DPP's expectations? Are we to understand that they meet Tsai Ing-wen's expectations? Never mind that Su Jia-chyuan has no idea where the beef is. Do voters really expect only beef? Do they really not expect their candidate to demonstrate character and conscience?
Chou Mei-ching often wears a slight frown. She appears to be thinking hard while saying litlle. Compare her demeanor to Hung Heng-chu's drunken laughter during the male strippers' performance. This truly is a case of "one Taiwan, two different worlds." The poet Yu Kuang-chung asked: "Does the public on Taiwan really want a new First Lady?" If so, whom? Do they really want Hung Heng-chu instead of Chou Mei-ching?
「台灣人民要換第一夫人嗎？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.09 02:33 am
蘇嘉全夫人洪恆珠參加有猛男助興的宴會，猥褻艷舞之影片曝光，被形容為如「酒池肉林」。反觀正在中南部走鄉拜鎮的第一夫人周美青，一身便衣輕車簡行，樸素低調。兩相比較，兩人的形象構成了對比分明的反差。
那場宴會舉辦時，洪恆珠是屏東戶政事務所主任，更是縣長夫人；她參與這種猛男及第三性公關助興狂歡的場合，於公於私恐怕都極不合宜。在一般民眾的印象，也許以為這類放浪形骸的宴會，只是近年來一些北部暴發戶及另類社交場合的「非典型」餘興；誰料，竟然早在九年前就出現在台灣尾縣長夫人現身的「上流社會」之中。民進黨一直高唱縮小「南北差距」，還真是成果斐然。
民進黨常譏稱國民黨是「資產階級」政黨，並自詡為「弱勢代言人」；但在政治黑幕背後，這場「猛男脫褲趴」顯示，屏東縣長夫人的交遊居然呈現這般駭人的場景，玩的是如此靡爛的遊戲，真是何其諷刺！
民進黨近日推出的「破紀錄」打馬文宣，猛批馬政府任內「貧富差距」的現象；但從洪恆珠之猛男宴中的聲色光影看來，我們不知道民進黨還有何顏面指責他人？那個酒池肉林，不正是綠色官場蛇鼠一窩的寫實嗎？
民進黨可以裝作看不見蘇嘉全的豪宅，可以裝作看不見洪恆珠從警官搖身變成屏東農業生技園區副主任的詭異升遷；但是，它還能裝作看不見洪恆珠即將成為中華民國第一夫人的政治悲劇可能上演嗎？一個坐輪椅的吳淑珍，都能把總統官邸變成財團、貴婦絡繹於途的獻金基地；那麼，以洪恆珠連珠炮一般爆開的醜行惡跡，一旦蘇嘉全當選副總統，他的官邸將引發國人怎樣的想像？
陳水扁的「玉山官邸」，在馬英九更名為「中興寓所」入駐之後，幾乎讓人忘了它的存在。這其實是件憾事，如果馬總統夫婦願費心營造，應可賦與中興寓所一種新的「第一家庭」形象，洗去陳水扁家族的貪腐豪奢、假公濟私，塑造正派、不庸俗、高而不貴的另類神采；但是，或許馬家妻女都太過自主，不願負荷「第一家族」的沉重頭銜，再加上她們極端有意識地與權力保持距離，使得這張原本絕佳的「第一家庭牌」未能善用。
但深一層看，接近權力而刻意保持「絕緣」，其實是難得的政治境界。以周美青為例，我們很難找到適當的詞句形容她正在進行活動；說她是「助選」，她其實只是以「個人身分」在鄉間向市井百姓問候；能把拜會活動化約到只剩鞠躬、微笑的地步，可見她與民眾之間已經建立了一種一切盡在不言中的相知與相惜。
這種奇特的「周式風格」，最重要的支撐力量應是她個人的「自主」和「自足」，而非來自「總統夫人」的光環加持。周美青這幾天露面，從見到她的民眾那種雀躍與興奮的表情，可以感到她確有不平常的感染力；這其實是她三年來幾百次「未曝光」的行程累積出來的動能。她經常不動聲色地參與種種關懷社會的活動，她不要登上報紙，卻願意活在與她互動者的心深處。她不用華服寶石來堆砌自己的威儀，樸素和誠懇就是她最大的能量。
夫人再次出包，蘇嘉全稱「不符社會期待」而道歉，但言畢卻立即轉向，竟謂「要有一場高格調的選戰，應回歸政策辯論，讓大家知道政策牛肉在哪裡」。這是什麼道歉？這是什麼反省？蘇嘉全夫婦這一陣子出的醜，豈僅是「不符社會期待」，難道能「符合」民進黨的「期待」？「符合」蔡英文的「期待」？何況，莫說蘇嘉全的政策牛肉不知何在，但難道只要牛肉，而不要品德與廉恥？
周美青經常輕鎖眉心，顯得思深而惜言；這與洪恆珠在猛男秀上笑得花枝亂顫的模樣，真是「一個台灣／兩個世界」。詩人余光中問：「台灣人民要換第一夫人嗎？」誰換誰？是要將周美青換洪恆珠嗎？
James Soong Cannot Escape the Clutches of Lee Teng-hui
James Soong Cannot Escape the Clutches of Lee Teng-hui
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2011
Summary: Thirteen years ago, during the "Lee/Soong showdown," James Soong's battle cry was opposition to Taiwan independence and opposition to black gold. He forced Lee to suffer a major defeat. Thirteen years later, James Soong has returned. This time he is helping Lee Teng-hui "Topple Ma and protect Taiwan" in the name of Taiwan independence, Lee Teng-hui meanwhile, is making sure that James Soong will find himself without a place in either side of the Blue/Green divide, without a role on either side of the Taiwan Strait. He is making sure that James Soong will be remembered as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, a Green Camp Wu Shan-kui." Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui said "James Soong cannot escape from the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Today his boast has been fulfilled.
Full Text Below:
In 1998, James Soong and Lee Teng-hui split over the freezing of the Taiwan Provinicial Government. Lee said, "Soong cannot escape form the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Predictably, when James Soong split from the KMT in 2000 and ran for the presidency as an independent, Lee Teng-hui used his influence to topple the ruling KMT.
That election, in 2000, is known as the "Lee Teng-hui vs. James Soong showdown." The Soong/Chang ticket did not win. But nevertheless it received more votes than the Lee Teng-hui backed Lien/Siew ticket. Actually the loss was not a loss for the Lien/Siew ticket. It was a loss for Lee Teng-hui The Lien/Siew ticket's eventual come back within the Blue Camp proves that. Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui was summarily ejected from the KMT.
During the 2000 general election, James Soong became part of the Pan Blue Camp. At the time the term "Pan Blue" had yet to be coined. The Soong/Chang ticket scored a major victory over the Lien/Siew ticket. It received 36.84% of the votes, versus 23.1% for the Lien/Siew ticket. This was followed by the rise of the People First Party in the Legislative Yuan, the formation of the Lien/Soong ticket, the secret Bian/Soong meeting, and Soong's visit to the Mainland as Ah-Bian's "special envoy." These show that although Soong lost in 2000, he retained considerable influence. But this was all based on a precondition. During the process Soong was part of the Blue Camp. This was certainly true for the Lien/Soong ticket. Even the "Bian/Soong meeting" was presumed to be something arranged for the sake of cross-Strait relations.
Now take Lee Teng-hui. During the 2000 general election, he did not care whether Lien Chan or Chen Shui-bian won. A Lien Chan win was Lee's first choice, But he was also eager to increase Chen Shui-bian's influence. As long as James Soong lost, either result was acceptable. Lee Teng-hui was unable to ensure a victory by Lien Chan. But he was able to use the Chung Hsing Bills' scandal to ensure a defeat for James Soong. He was able to ensure a victory for Chen Shui-bian, Superficially Lee lost. He was expelled from the KMT. But upon closer scrutiny, he transformed himself into the leader and standard bearer for the Green Camp, His gains far outweighed his losses.
James Soong appears to be duplicating Lee Teng-hui's actions. But Soong's actions are yielding very different results. Lee used the Deep Green Taiwan Solidarity Union to hijack Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. James Soong has tried to use Deep Blues to hijack the KMT. But Lee was always part of the Green Camp. He supported DPP candidates Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh, Tsai Ing-wen during three presidential elections. Functionally and symbolically, his mission was always to unite the Green Camp, It was always to help the DPP, either openly, in the legislature, or covertly, behind the scenes, That is why Lee has been able to remain a Green Camp leader and a Taiwan Independence standard-bearer. On the other hand, ever since James Soong ran for Taipei mayor in 2006 and entered the 2012 presidential race, he has departed from Lee Teng-hui's precedent. Lee Teng-hui remained an integral part of the Green Camp, He remained a major contributor to unity within the Green Camp. He neatly undermined Ma Ying-jeou by dividing the Blue Camp. Lee's path and Soong's path may appear similar. But they are in fact quite different. They are in fact poles apart.
That is why Soong's fate will be very different from Lee's fate. Lee was expelled from the KMT. But he found a place within the Green Camp and the Taiwan Independence movement. James Soong's gambit during this election, on the other hand, has no chance of success. He has no chance of being elected. No matter how many votes he receives, he will never receive enough to be elected president. He can only receive enough to ensure that Ma Ying-jeou is defeated. The problem for Soong is that if Ma Ying-jeou is elected, Soong's plans will be frustrated. On the other hand, if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, Soong's plans will not necessarily be fulfilled.
If Tsai is elected, Taiwan will be buffeted from within and without by the global economic crisis, an onslaught from Beijing, and internal social divisions. The nation will find itself in a state of crisis. If Tsai Ing-wen joins forces with James Soong, how will Beijing react? How will the Blue Camp react? How will the public react? As AIT Chairman Stephen M. Young noted, given how low James Soong has sunk in his pursuit of personal advantage, there is probably no room for him within the Green Camp either. Would Tsai Ing-wen dare use Soong to unite the political parties, mollify the general public, and mediate between Taipei and Bejing?
That is why James Soong's fate will be very different from Lee Teng-hui's. Lee found a home within the Green Camp, But when the current election is over, James Soong will be persona non grata within the Blue Camp. He will be unable to become a leader within the Green Camp. He has written his own death sentence. He has no chance of survival.
Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui froze the Taiwan Provincial Government. He forced James Soong's hand. Soong lashed back. Lee lost power within the KMT. Thirteen years later, Lee Teng-hui praised James Soong, calling him "the finest political administrator ever." He said that "forcing him to run for the legislature was too demeaning." He fired the opening shot in Soong's presidential campaign. .
Thirteen years ago, during the "Lee/Soong showdown," James Soong's battle cry was opposition to Taiwan independence and opposition to black gold. He forced Lee to suffer a major defeat. Thirteen years later, James Soong has returned. This time he is helping Lee Teng-hui "Topple Ma and protect Taiwan" in the name of Taiwan independence, Lee Teng-hui meanwhile, is making sure that James Soong will find himself without a place in either side of the Blue/Green divide, without a role on either side of the Taiwan Strait. He is making sure that James Soong will be remembered as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, a Green Camp Wu Shan-kui."
Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui said "James Soong cannot escape from the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Today his boast has been fulfilled.
宋楚瑜畢竟跳不出李登輝手掌心
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.08 01:49 am
一九九八年，宋楚瑜與李登輝因「凍省」決裂，李登輝說，「宋跳不出我的手掌心」；詎料，宋楚瑜在二○○○年脫黨競選總統，竟使李登輝將國民黨政權從他的「手掌心」喪失。
二○○○年的那場大選，被稱作「李登輝vs.宋楚瑜」的大對決。選舉結果，「宋張配」雖未勝選，卻大勝李登輝力挺的「連蕭配」；唯此役其實未必是「連蕭配」的失敗，而當然是李登輝的重挫，這從連蕭二人後來又在藍營崛起即可證明，而李登輝卻就此被踢出了國民黨。
宋楚瑜在二○○○年大選期間，儼然成為泛藍主流（當時尚無「泛藍」一詞），這從「宋張配」大勝「連蕭配」即知（三十六‧八四％比二十三‧一％）。後來，親民黨在立院崛起，到「連宋配」的形成，甚至演變至「扁宋會」，及宋以扁的「特使」身分自居往訪大陸，皆顯示宋在二○○○年大選之役雖敗猶強，餘威仍在。不過，這一切其實皆有一個前提：宋在這些過程中，皆是在「泛藍」的大範疇內，「連宋配」固然是如此，連「扁宋會」時也是被看上他在泛藍及兩岸間的可能效用。
回頭說李登輝。他在二○○○年大選的態勢是，連戰贏或陳水扁贏，對他皆可。連戰贏當然是李登輝的第一志願，但陳水扁贏對他亦有操作空間，只要宋楚瑜輸即可。所以，此役李登輝雖未能使連戰贏，但能用「興票案」擊垮宋楚瑜，而使陳水扁當選，於是李登輝其實也可說是似輸未輸。李雖就此被逐出國民黨，但經過一番算計與操作，如今卻成了綠營教主及台獨旗手，可謂是失之東隅，收之桑榆。
對比之下，宋楚瑜如今的操作，看似與李登輝如出一轍，卻可能是畫虎類犬。李用「極綠」的台聯，挾制陳水扁，迄今仍挾持蔡英文；相對而言，宋楚瑜的手法則似想用「極藍」來挾制國民黨。但李畢竟始終是綠營的側翼，並支持「陳水扁／謝長廷／蔡英文」的民進黨三屆總統選舉；在功能及形象上，他皆以綠營的大整合者自命，始終只在立院層次或幕後與民進黨折衝，這正是李至今仍能維持其綠營教主、台獨旗手地位的原因。然而，宋楚瑜自從在二○○六年跳出來參選台北市長，至此次投入總統大選，他不像李登輝作綠營的側翼，也不像李登輝作綠營的大整合者，卻儼然是要直接扳倒馬英九，作為藍營的大撕裂者。所以，李宋的路數看似相似，實際上卻是大相逕庭、南轅北轍。
因此，李宋二人的下場亦將不同。李登輝被國民黨逐出，卻在綠營及台獨找到了政治歸宿。但宋楚瑜這盤棋走下去，他絕無當選的可能；而他若得票愈高，也絕不可能高到可以當選的程度，卻必可高到使馬英九落選。問題是：馬英九若當選，宋自是所圖不逞，而蔡英文若當選，宋楚瑜也未必能有所圖。
已可預見，蔡若當選，面對全球經濟風暴、北京相逼、社會撕裂，可謂必是內外交煎的困境；在那種焦頭爛額的情勢下，她若欲與宋楚瑜聯手，北京如何反應？藍營何能接受？社會何能信服？何況，以宋的人格扭曲與巧詐至此（楊甦棣語），恐怕連綠營也容不下他；蔡英文敢用宋作為她整合政壇、安撫社會、協調兩岸的仲介嗎？
所以，宋楚瑜與李登輝的下場不同。李在綠營找到了歸宿，但宋楚瑜經過此役，他不可能見容於藍營的主流，亦無可能成為綠營的政治股東。既是自作孽，必是不可活。
十三年前，李登輝以「凍省」，將宋楚瑜逼反，最後李因此丟掉國民黨政權；十三年後，李登輝卻以一句「宋是最佳行政人才」、「選立委太委屈了」的讚語，不啻放了宋競選總統的第一聲起身砲。
十三年前的「李宋對決」中，宋楚瑜以反台獨反黑金的號召，教李登輝吃了大敗仗；但是，十三年後，宋楚瑜回過頭來大力襄助李登輝「棄馬保台」的台獨大業，而李登輝最後則將賞給宋楚瑜一個到頭來「藍綠兩頭落空／兩岸無處立足」的下場，叫宋吃下「藍營汪精衛／綠營吳三桂」的歷史定論。
十三年前，李登輝說「宋跳不出我的手掌心」；此言今日應驗。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2011
Summary: Thirteen years ago, during the "Lee/Soong showdown," James Soong's battle cry was opposition to Taiwan independence and opposition to black gold. He forced Lee to suffer a major defeat. Thirteen years later, James Soong has returned. This time he is helping Lee Teng-hui "Topple Ma and protect Taiwan" in the name of Taiwan independence, Lee Teng-hui meanwhile, is making sure that James Soong will find himself without a place in either side of the Blue/Green divide, without a role on either side of the Taiwan Strait. He is making sure that James Soong will be remembered as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, a Green Camp Wu Shan-kui." Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui said "James Soong cannot escape from the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Today his boast has been fulfilled.
Full Text Below:
In 1998, James Soong and Lee Teng-hui split over the freezing of the Taiwan Provinicial Government. Lee said, "Soong cannot escape form the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Predictably, when James Soong split from the KMT in 2000 and ran for the presidency as an independent, Lee Teng-hui used his influence to topple the ruling KMT.
That election, in 2000, is known as the "Lee Teng-hui vs. James Soong showdown." The Soong/Chang ticket did not win. But nevertheless it received more votes than the Lee Teng-hui backed Lien/Siew ticket. Actually the loss was not a loss for the Lien/Siew ticket. It was a loss for Lee Teng-hui The Lien/Siew ticket's eventual come back within the Blue Camp proves that. Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui was summarily ejected from the KMT.
During the 2000 general election, James Soong became part of the Pan Blue Camp. At the time the term "Pan Blue" had yet to be coined. The Soong/Chang ticket scored a major victory over the Lien/Siew ticket. It received 36.84% of the votes, versus 23.1% for the Lien/Siew ticket. This was followed by the rise of the People First Party in the Legislative Yuan, the formation of the Lien/Soong ticket, the secret Bian/Soong meeting, and Soong's visit to the Mainland as Ah-Bian's "special envoy." These show that although Soong lost in 2000, he retained considerable influence. But this was all based on a precondition. During the process Soong was part of the Blue Camp. This was certainly true for the Lien/Soong ticket. Even the "Bian/Soong meeting" was presumed to be something arranged for the sake of cross-Strait relations.
Now take Lee Teng-hui. During the 2000 general election, he did not care whether Lien Chan or Chen Shui-bian won. A Lien Chan win was Lee's first choice, But he was also eager to increase Chen Shui-bian's influence. As long as James Soong lost, either result was acceptable. Lee Teng-hui was unable to ensure a victory by Lien Chan. But he was able to use the Chung Hsing Bills' scandal to ensure a defeat for James Soong. He was able to ensure a victory for Chen Shui-bian, Superficially Lee lost. He was expelled from the KMT. But upon closer scrutiny, he transformed himself into the leader and standard bearer for the Green Camp, His gains far outweighed his losses.
James Soong appears to be duplicating Lee Teng-hui's actions. But Soong's actions are yielding very different results. Lee used the Deep Green Taiwan Solidarity Union to hijack Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. James Soong has tried to use Deep Blues to hijack the KMT. But Lee was always part of the Green Camp. He supported DPP candidates Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh, Tsai Ing-wen during three presidential elections. Functionally and symbolically, his mission was always to unite the Green Camp, It was always to help the DPP, either openly, in the legislature, or covertly, behind the scenes, That is why Lee has been able to remain a Green Camp leader and a Taiwan Independence standard-bearer. On the other hand, ever since James Soong ran for Taipei mayor in 2006 and entered the 2012 presidential race, he has departed from Lee Teng-hui's precedent. Lee Teng-hui remained an integral part of the Green Camp, He remained a major contributor to unity within the Green Camp. He neatly undermined Ma Ying-jeou by dividing the Blue Camp. Lee's path and Soong's path may appear similar. But they are in fact quite different. They are in fact poles apart.
That is why Soong's fate will be very different from Lee's fate. Lee was expelled from the KMT. But he found a place within the Green Camp and the Taiwan Independence movement. James Soong's gambit during this election, on the other hand, has no chance of success. He has no chance of being elected. No matter how many votes he receives, he will never receive enough to be elected president. He can only receive enough to ensure that Ma Ying-jeou is defeated. The problem for Soong is that if Ma Ying-jeou is elected, Soong's plans will be frustrated. On the other hand, if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, Soong's plans will not necessarily be fulfilled.
If Tsai is elected, Taiwan will be buffeted from within and without by the global economic crisis, an onslaught from Beijing, and internal social divisions. The nation will find itself in a state of crisis. If Tsai Ing-wen joins forces with James Soong, how will Beijing react? How will the Blue Camp react? How will the public react? As AIT Chairman Stephen M. Young noted, given how low James Soong has sunk in his pursuit of personal advantage, there is probably no room for him within the Green Camp either. Would Tsai Ing-wen dare use Soong to unite the political parties, mollify the general public, and mediate between Taipei and Bejing?
That is why James Soong's fate will be very different from Lee Teng-hui's. Lee found a home within the Green Camp, But when the current election is over, James Soong will be persona non grata within the Blue Camp. He will be unable to become a leader within the Green Camp. He has written his own death sentence. He has no chance of survival.
Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui froze the Taiwan Provincial Government. He forced James Soong's hand. Soong lashed back. Lee lost power within the KMT. Thirteen years later, Lee Teng-hui praised James Soong, calling him "the finest political administrator ever." He said that "forcing him to run for the legislature was too demeaning." He fired the opening shot in Soong's presidential campaign. .
Thirteen years ago, during the "Lee/Soong showdown," James Soong's battle cry was opposition to Taiwan independence and opposition to black gold. He forced Lee to suffer a major defeat. Thirteen years later, James Soong has returned. This time he is helping Lee Teng-hui "Topple Ma and protect Taiwan" in the name of Taiwan independence, Lee Teng-hui meanwhile, is making sure that James Soong will find himself without a place in either side of the Blue/Green divide, without a role on either side of the Taiwan Strait. He is making sure that James Soong will be remembered as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, a Green Camp Wu Shan-kui."
Thirteen years ago, Lee Teng-hui said "James Soong cannot escape from the clutches of Lee Teng-hui." Today his boast has been fulfilled.
宋楚瑜畢竟跳不出李登輝手掌心
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.12.08 01:49 am
一九九八年，宋楚瑜與李登輝因「凍省」決裂，李登輝說，「宋跳不出我的手掌心」；詎料，宋楚瑜在二○○○年脫黨競選總統，竟使李登輝將國民黨政權從他的「手掌心」喪失。
二○○○年的那場大選，被稱作「李登輝vs.宋楚瑜」的大對決。選舉結果，「宋張配」雖未勝選，卻大勝李登輝力挺的「連蕭配」；唯此役其實未必是「連蕭配」的失敗，而當然是李登輝的重挫，這從連蕭二人後來又在藍營崛起即可證明，而李登輝卻就此被踢出了國民黨。
宋楚瑜在二○○○年大選期間，儼然成為泛藍主流（當時尚無「泛藍」一詞），這從「宋張配」大勝「連蕭配」即知（三十六‧八四％比二十三‧一％）。後來，親民黨在立院崛起，到「連宋配」的形成，甚至演變至「扁宋會」，及宋以扁的「特使」身分自居往訪大陸，皆顯示宋在二○○○年大選之役雖敗猶強，餘威仍在。不過，這一切其實皆有一個前提：宋在這些過程中，皆是在「泛藍」的大範疇內，「連宋配」固然是如此，連「扁宋會」時也是被看上他在泛藍及兩岸間的可能效用。
回頭說李登輝。他在二○○○年大選的態勢是，連戰贏或陳水扁贏，對他皆可。連戰贏當然是李登輝的第一志願，但陳水扁贏對他亦有操作空間，只要宋楚瑜輸即可。所以，此役李登輝雖未能使連戰贏，但能用「興票案」擊垮宋楚瑜，而使陳水扁當選，於是李登輝其實也可說是似輸未輸。李雖就此被逐出國民黨，但經過一番算計與操作，如今卻成了綠營教主及台獨旗手，可謂是失之東隅，收之桑榆。
對比之下，宋楚瑜如今的操作，看似與李登輝如出一轍，卻可能是畫虎類犬。李用「極綠」的台聯，挾制陳水扁，迄今仍挾持蔡英文；相對而言，宋楚瑜的手法則似想用「極藍」來挾制國民黨。但李畢竟始終是綠營的側翼，並支持「陳水扁／謝長廷／蔡英文」的民進黨三屆總統選舉；在功能及形象上，他皆以綠營的大整合者自命，始終只在立院層次或幕後與民進黨折衝，這正是李至今仍能維持其綠營教主、台獨旗手地位的原因。然而，宋楚瑜自從在二○○六年跳出來參選台北市長，至此次投入總統大選，他不像李登輝作綠營的側翼，也不像李登輝作綠營的大整合者，卻儼然是要直接扳倒馬英九，作為藍營的大撕裂者。所以，李宋的路數看似相似，實際上卻是大相逕庭、南轅北轍。
因此，李宋二人的下場亦將不同。李登輝被國民黨逐出，卻在綠營及台獨找到了政治歸宿。但宋楚瑜這盤棋走下去，他絕無當選的可能；而他若得票愈高，也絕不可能高到可以當選的程度，卻必可高到使馬英九落選。問題是：馬英九若當選，宋自是所圖不逞，而蔡英文若當選，宋楚瑜也未必能有所圖。
已可預見，蔡若當選，面對全球經濟風暴、北京相逼、社會撕裂，可謂必是內外交煎的困境；在那種焦頭爛額的情勢下，她若欲與宋楚瑜聯手，北京如何反應？藍營何能接受？社會何能信服？何況，以宋的人格扭曲與巧詐至此（楊甦棣語），恐怕連綠營也容不下他；蔡英文敢用宋作為她整合政壇、安撫社會、協調兩岸的仲介嗎？
所以，宋楚瑜與李登輝的下場不同。李在綠營找到了歸宿，但宋楚瑜經過此役，他不可能見容於藍營的主流，亦無可能成為綠營的政治股東。既是自作孽，必是不可活。
十三年前，李登輝以「凍省」，將宋楚瑜逼反，最後李因此丟掉國民黨政權；十三年後，李登輝卻以一句「宋是最佳行政人才」、「選立委太委屈了」的讚語，不啻放了宋競選總統的第一聲起身砲。
十三年前的「李宋對決」中，宋楚瑜以反台獨反黑金的號召，教李登輝吃了大敗仗；但是，十三年後，宋楚瑜回過頭來大力襄助李登輝「棄馬保台」的台獨大業，而李登輝最後則將賞給宋楚瑜一個到頭來「藍綠兩頭落空／兩岸無處立足」的下場，叫宋吃下「藍營汪精衛／綠營吳三桂」的歷史定論。
十三年前，李登輝說「宋跳不出我的手掌心」；此言今日應驗。
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen is the One Repudiating the Taiwan Consensus
Tsai Ing-wen is the One Repudiating the Taiwan Consensus
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 7, 2011
Summary: Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus can still be achieved through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of just such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.
Full Text Below:
Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. For the 23 million Republic of China citizens who live on Taiwan, the "Taiwan consensus" ought to be an uncontroversial topic. We are all Taiwanese. We all love Taiwan. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus is still possible through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.
Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen persists in obfuscation. The Taiwan consensus is not the Democratic Progressive Party consensus. Voters on Taiwan will decide. The ruling and opposition parties, which compete for power, must accept their decision. The Taiwan consensus is not a unilateral laying down of the law.
Tsai Ing-wen argues that when voters on Taiwan arrive at a consensus, cross-Strait relations will actually be more stable, and the Mainland will actually be happier. The Mainland will no longer have to worry about ruling party changes under Taiwan's democracy. The Mainland will realize that government policy will not change merely because the ruling party has changed. Tsai argues that "When the government holds consultations, rooted in the will of the people, and expressed through a democratic and transparent process, the rights of our citizens will be assured." Tsai promises that if she is elected, she will establish a "dialogue group" and consult with opponents Ma Ying-jeou and James Soong.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric is unassailable. Since the 1996 presidential election, the Republic of China has undergone two ruling party changes. During this period, cross-Strait policy underwent little change. The only difference was the pace of change. The Mainland is unconcerned about which party rules on Taiwan. But cross-Strait relations must not regress. This is also consistent with the interests and expectations of the public on Taiwan.
President Chiang Ching-kuo opened the doors to cross-Strait communications. Veterans could visit their birthplace. Contacts were no longer forbidden. Chiang's reasoning was simple. People on both sides are friends and relatives. What right did the government have to keep friends and relatives apart? President Lee Teng-hui expanded these exchanges. We went from individual contacts to economic and trade exchanges. The scope may have been limited. But Taiwan businessmen are now our friends and neighbors. Later Lee's "avoid haste, be patient" policy limited the pace of these exchanges. But Lee was unable to prevent Taiwan businessmen from moving to the Mainland.
President Chen Shui-bian invoked "New Centrist Path" rhetoric, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party to attain power. But he could not overturn the foundation for cross-Strait exchanges laid down by the KMT. Chen Shui-bian was in office for eight years. His scorched earth diplomacy led to a cross-Strait freeze. But private sector exchanges never ceased. Cultural and creative exchanges enabled talent from Taiwan to shine on the Mainland.
When Chen Shui-bian was elected, he spoke of an "inter-party cross-Strait policy group." The group was to be headed by former Academia Sinica Chairman Lee Yuan-tse. But this idea was blocked by the National Security Organization, then headed by Chiu Yi-jen and Tsai Ing-wen, and died a natural death. When Chen Shui-bian was "re-elected" in 2004, he spoke of an "inter-party peace and stability committee." Before taking office he even sought out SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, Lee Yuan-tse, TSMC chairman Morris Chang, PTV chairman Wu Feng-shan, Taiwan Thinktank chairman Chen Po-chih, hoping to establish a consultation team. Chen Shui-bian expressed a desire to chair the team. He invited representatives from the community to participate. Together they studied the possibility of a cross-Strait peace development program. Unfortunately nothing came of these proposals.
Tsai Ing-wen was involved in every one of these projects. She cannot possibly be unaware of what was going on. Cross-Strait policy is central to DPP policy. Chen Shui-bian did nothing for eight years. The obstacle was not the Mainland. The obstacle was not a lack of consensus on Taiwan. The obstacle was the DPP. The DPP was unable to break free from constraints imposed upon it by Taiwan independence fundamentalists.
Tsai Ing-wen clearly understood the importance of dialogue to her own election bid. So why did she refuse to dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou following his election to president in 2008? Lest we forget, when Chen Shui-bian was elected in 2000, KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong personally visited the Presidential Palace to dialogue with Chen Shui-bian. In 2005 James Soong secretly met with Chen Shui-bian and was denounced for his treachery.
Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged the existence of "1992 talks," but denied the existence of a "1992 consensus." She cast the 1992 consensus as a "KMT/CCP consensus," and proposed a "Taiwan consensus" in its stead. But she forgot that the 1992 talks were proposed by President Lee Teng-hui, in order to shelve cross-Strait confrontation. Negotiators did not used the words "1992 consensus." But they reached the conclusion that "there is only one China, but each side has its own interpretation." This tacit understanding between the two sides was reaffirmed in 2005, during the "Lien/Hu Summit." It became the primary plank in Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 political platform. It was vigorously reaffirmed. It received seven million votes. This is how the democratic process on Taiwan established a Taiwan consensus. This consensus was the basis for 17 cross-Strait agreements in three years, all of which were submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. This is the democratic process. It conforms strictly to Tsai Ing-wen's own logic. She cannot deny it.
Democracy and cross-Strait peace are the Republic of China's most cherished achievements. Just over a month from now, voters on Taiwan will once again participate in the democratic process. Tsai Ing-wen says "The nation is of greater significance than any political party." She must demonstrate her allegiance to this principle through her actions, and not just words. Only then can she convince the public to return the DPP to power.
否定台灣共識的恰是蔡英文自己
2011-12-07中國時報
很多人搞不清楚民進黨主席、總統候選人蔡英文強烈主張的「台灣共識」到底內涵是什麼？蔡英文一句話簡單說明，「台灣共識就是台灣民主化的過程。」蔡英文的說法沒有錯，對身處台灣的二千三百萬人民而言，「台灣共識」理應是一個沒有疑義的概念，我們都是台灣人，我們都愛台灣，即使內部有著不同的政黨立場、統獨主張，都可以透過民主程序取得多數共識，總統直選就是最明確的民主程序，就是最清楚的台灣共識。
遺憾的是，蔡英文自己到現在還沒搞清楚，台灣共識不是民進黨的共識，對於台灣人民的選擇，競逐權力的朝野政黨都必須接受，而非片面否定。
蔡英文說，有了台灣人民共同立場的時候，對中國來講其實是更穩定的兩岸關係，不需要憂心當台灣在民主機制下，有政黨輪替的時候，政策會不會發生變化，「我們的人民也可以得到保證，政府在協商時候是以整體人民的立場，而且是透過民主、透明的程序來進行」。她強調，當選後要組成「兩岸對話小組」，邀請她的對手馬英九和宋楚瑜共同協商。
蔡英文的說法無庸置疑，自從一九九六年總統直選以來，台灣已經兩次政黨輪替，在這個過程中，兩岸政策的大方向並沒有巨大改變，只是速度與密度有異。中國大陸並不擔心台灣的政黨輪替，但對兩岸關係則有不容倒退的期待，這樣的期待其實也符合台灣人民的利益和期待。
兩岸關係自蔣經國總統拍板開放交流，從老兵可以返鄉探親的那一刻開始，交流之門就不能再禁絕，原因很簡單，兩岸既是友更是親，親友之情豈是政治力所能隔絕？李登輝繼任總統更擴大交流，從人倫之常一步就走到了經貿交流，即使範圍不是那麼大，但「台商」已經成為我們的左鄰右舍，即使後期「戒急用忍」限縮交流的節奏和步伐，卻無法阻絕台商登陸之勢。
同樣的，靠著「新中間路線」取得執政的陳水扁總統和民進黨，也不可能翻轉國民黨執政時期奠下的兩岸交流基礎。陳水扁八年任內，因為烽火外交讓兩岸關係停滯，但民間交流卻從未間斷，文化交流讓台灣演藝文創在大陸發光發熱。
陳水扁甫當選就要組「跨黨派兩岸政策小組」，由主張開放的前中研院長李遠哲領軍；這個構想卻在邱義仁、蔡英文主導的國安團隊阻撓下無疾而終。二○○四年陳水扁連任，再次想組成「跨黨派和平穩定委員會」，甚至在就職前就找了海基會董事長辜振甫、李遠哲、台積電董事長張忠謀、公視董事長吳豐山、台灣智庫董事長陳博志等人會商籌組架構小組；陳水扁意欲親任主委，邀請具有代表性的社會人士參與，共同研議兩岸和平發展綱領，可惜還是沒有下文。
這些發展歷程蔡英文幾乎全參與，她不可能不明白，兩岸政策同樣是民進黨執政的核心政策；陳水扁八年無功，其阻力既非來自大陸，亦非缺乏台灣共識，而是民進黨無法擺脫基本教義派的束縛。
蔡英文明白自己當選後朝野對話的重要，為什麼二○○八年馬英九當選總統後卻三番兩次拒絕對話呢？不要忘了，二○○○年陳水扁當選，國親兩黨主席連戰和宋楚瑜親赴總統府與扁對話；二○○五年宋楚瑜更冒罵名與扁再會。
蔡英文承認「九二會談」卻否定「九二共識」，質疑九二共識只是「國共共識」，因而提出「台灣共識」。她忘了，九二會談是李登輝總統任內兩岸兩會對擱置爭議提出的一個方案，即使沒有「九二共識」的名詞，卻有「一個中國，各自表述」的結論或默契。這個默契在二○○五年國共兩黨「連胡會」進一步確認，也成為馬英九競選二○○八年時提出的政見主張，且獲得七百多萬選票的高度肯定，這就是經過民主程序認可的台灣多數共識，在這個共識基礎下，兩岸兩會在這三多年來簽署十七項協議，都送立法院備查或審查，這也是民主程序。依照蔡英文的邏輯，有什麼道理否定之？
台灣民主、兩岸和平是最值得珍惜的成果，一個多月之後，台灣將再次經過民主的洗禮，蔡英文必須以實際行動展現她口中所聲稱「國家的意義大過政黨」，才能爭取民眾對民進黨重返執政的信心。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 7, 2011
Summary: Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus can still be achieved through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of just such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.
Full Text Below:
Many people do not understand DPP chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen. What does she mean when she holds forth on her "Taiwan consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen says "The Taiwan consensus is simply the process of Taiwan's democratization." Tsai Ing-wen's explanation is not wrong. For the 23 million Republic of China citizens who live on Taiwan, the "Taiwan consensus" ought to be an uncontroversial topic. We are all Taiwanese. We all love Taiwan. Political parties may hold different positions on reunification and independence. But a consensus is still possible through the democratic process. A direct presidential election is the clearest example of such a democratic process. The outcome of such a democratic election is the clearest example of a Taiwan consensus.
Unfortunately Tsai Ing-wen persists in obfuscation. The Taiwan consensus is not the Democratic Progressive Party consensus. Voters on Taiwan will decide. The ruling and opposition parties, which compete for power, must accept their decision. The Taiwan consensus is not a unilateral laying down of the law.
Tsai Ing-wen argues that when voters on Taiwan arrive at a consensus, cross-Strait relations will actually be more stable, and the Mainland will actually be happier. The Mainland will no longer have to worry about ruling party changes under Taiwan's democracy. The Mainland will realize that government policy will not change merely because the ruling party has changed. Tsai argues that "When the government holds consultations, rooted in the will of the people, and expressed through a democratic and transparent process, the rights of our citizens will be assured." Tsai promises that if she is elected, she will establish a "dialogue group" and consult with opponents Ma Ying-jeou and James Soong.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric is unassailable. Since the 1996 presidential election, the Republic of China has undergone two ruling party changes. During this period, cross-Strait policy underwent little change. The only difference was the pace of change. The Mainland is unconcerned about which party rules on Taiwan. But cross-Strait relations must not regress. This is also consistent with the interests and expectations of the public on Taiwan.
President Chiang Ching-kuo opened the doors to cross-Strait communications. Veterans could visit their birthplace. Contacts were no longer forbidden. Chiang's reasoning was simple. People on both sides are friends and relatives. What right did the government have to keep friends and relatives apart? President Lee Teng-hui expanded these exchanges. We went from individual contacts to economic and trade exchanges. The scope may have been limited. But Taiwan businessmen are now our friends and neighbors. Later Lee's "avoid haste, be patient" policy limited the pace of these exchanges. But Lee was unable to prevent Taiwan businessmen from moving to the Mainland.
President Chen Shui-bian invoked "New Centrist Path" rhetoric, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party to attain power. But he could not overturn the foundation for cross-Strait exchanges laid down by the KMT. Chen Shui-bian was in office for eight years. His scorched earth diplomacy led to a cross-Strait freeze. But private sector exchanges never ceased. Cultural and creative exchanges enabled talent from Taiwan to shine on the Mainland.
When Chen Shui-bian was elected, he spoke of an "inter-party cross-Strait policy group." The group was to be headed by former Academia Sinica Chairman Lee Yuan-tse. But this idea was blocked by the National Security Organization, then headed by Chiu Yi-jen and Tsai Ing-wen, and died a natural death. When Chen Shui-bian was "re-elected" in 2004, he spoke of an "inter-party peace and stability committee." Before taking office he even sought out SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, Lee Yuan-tse, TSMC chairman Morris Chang, PTV chairman Wu Feng-shan, Taiwan Thinktank chairman Chen Po-chih, hoping to establish a consultation team. Chen Shui-bian expressed a desire to chair the team. He invited representatives from the community to participate. Together they studied the possibility of a cross-Strait peace development program. Unfortunately nothing came of these proposals.
Tsai Ing-wen was involved in every one of these projects. She cannot possibly be unaware of what was going on. Cross-Strait policy is central to DPP policy. Chen Shui-bian did nothing for eight years. The obstacle was not the Mainland. The obstacle was not a lack of consensus on Taiwan. The obstacle was the DPP. The DPP was unable to break free from constraints imposed upon it by Taiwan independence fundamentalists.
Tsai Ing-wen clearly understood the importance of dialogue to her own election bid. So why did she refuse to dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou following his election to president in 2008? Lest we forget, when Chen Shui-bian was elected in 2000, KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong personally visited the Presidential Palace to dialogue with Chen Shui-bian. In 2005 James Soong secretly met with Chen Shui-bian and was denounced for his treachery.
Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged the existence of "1992 talks," but denied the existence of a "1992 consensus." She cast the 1992 consensus as a "KMT/CCP consensus," and proposed a "Taiwan consensus" in its stead. But she forgot that the 1992 talks were proposed by President Lee Teng-hui, in order to shelve cross-Strait confrontation. Negotiators did not used the words "1992 consensus." But they reached the conclusion that "there is only one China, but each side has its own interpretation." This tacit understanding between the two sides was reaffirmed in 2005, during the "Lien/Hu Summit." It became the primary plank in Ma Ying-jeou's 2008 political platform. It was vigorously reaffirmed. It received seven million votes. This is how the democratic process on Taiwan established a Taiwan consensus. This consensus was the basis for 17 cross-Strait agreements in three years, all of which were submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. This is the democratic process. It conforms strictly to Tsai Ing-wen's own logic. She cannot deny it.
Democracy and cross-Strait peace are the Republic of China's most cherished achievements. Just over a month from now, voters on Taiwan will once again participate in the democratic process. Tsai Ing-wen says "The nation is of greater significance than any political party." She must demonstrate her allegiance to this principle through her actions, and not just words. Only then can she convince the public to return the DPP to power.
否定台灣共識的恰是蔡英文自己
2011-12-07中國時報
很多人搞不清楚民進黨主席、總統候選人蔡英文強烈主張的「台灣共識」到底內涵是什麼？蔡英文一句話簡單說明，「台灣共識就是台灣民主化的過程。」蔡英文的說法沒有錯，對身處台灣的二千三百萬人民而言，「台灣共識」理應是一個沒有疑義的概念，我們都是台灣人，我們都愛台灣，即使內部有著不同的政黨立場、統獨主張，都可以透過民主程序取得多數共識，總統直選就是最明確的民主程序，就是最清楚的台灣共識。
遺憾的是，蔡英文自己到現在還沒搞清楚，台灣共識不是民進黨的共識，對於台灣人民的選擇，競逐權力的朝野政黨都必須接受，而非片面否定。
蔡英文說，有了台灣人民共同立場的時候，對中國來講其實是更穩定的兩岸關係，不需要憂心當台灣在民主機制下，有政黨輪替的時候，政策會不會發生變化，「我們的人民也可以得到保證，政府在協商時候是以整體人民的立場，而且是透過民主、透明的程序來進行」。她強調，當選後要組成「兩岸對話小組」，邀請她的對手馬英九和宋楚瑜共同協商。
蔡英文的說法無庸置疑，自從一九九六年總統直選以來，台灣已經兩次政黨輪替，在這個過程中，兩岸政策的大方向並沒有巨大改變，只是速度與密度有異。中國大陸並不擔心台灣的政黨輪替，但對兩岸關係則有不容倒退的期待，這樣的期待其實也符合台灣人民的利益和期待。
兩岸關係自蔣經國總統拍板開放交流，從老兵可以返鄉探親的那一刻開始，交流之門就不能再禁絕，原因很簡單，兩岸既是友更是親，親友之情豈是政治力所能隔絕？李登輝繼任總統更擴大交流，從人倫之常一步就走到了經貿交流，即使範圍不是那麼大，但「台商」已經成為我們的左鄰右舍，即使後期「戒急用忍」限縮交流的節奏和步伐，卻無法阻絕台商登陸之勢。
同樣的，靠著「新中間路線」取得執政的陳水扁總統和民進黨，也不可能翻轉國民黨執政時期奠下的兩岸交流基礎。陳水扁八年任內，因為烽火外交讓兩岸關係停滯，但民間交流卻從未間斷，文化交流讓台灣演藝文創在大陸發光發熱。
陳水扁甫當選就要組「跨黨派兩岸政策小組」，由主張開放的前中研院長李遠哲領軍；這個構想卻在邱義仁、蔡英文主導的國安團隊阻撓下無疾而終。二○○四年陳水扁連任，再次想組成「跨黨派和平穩定委員會」，甚至在就職前就找了海基會董事長辜振甫、李遠哲、台積電董事長張忠謀、公視董事長吳豐山、台灣智庫董事長陳博志等人會商籌組架構小組；陳水扁意欲親任主委，邀請具有代表性的社會人士參與，共同研議兩岸和平發展綱領，可惜還是沒有下文。
這些發展歷程蔡英文幾乎全參與，她不可能不明白，兩岸政策同樣是民進黨執政的核心政策；陳水扁八年無功，其阻力既非來自大陸，亦非缺乏台灣共識，而是民進黨無法擺脫基本教義派的束縛。
蔡英文明白自己當選後朝野對話的重要，為什麼二○○八年馬英九當選總統後卻三番兩次拒絕對話呢？不要忘了，二○○○年陳水扁當選，國親兩黨主席連戰和宋楚瑜親赴總統府與扁對話；二○○五年宋楚瑜更冒罵名與扁再會。
蔡英文承認「九二會談」卻否定「九二共識」，質疑九二共識只是「國共共識」，因而提出「台灣共識」。她忘了，九二會談是李登輝總統任內兩岸兩會對擱置爭議提出的一個方案，即使沒有「九二共識」的名詞，卻有「一個中國，各自表述」的結論或默契。這個默契在二○○五年國共兩黨「連胡會」進一步確認，也成為馬英九競選二○○八年時提出的政見主張，且獲得七百多萬選票的高度肯定，這就是經過民主程序認可的台灣多數共識，在這個共識基礎下，兩岸兩會在這三多年來簽署十七項協議，都送立法院備查或審查，這也是民主程序。依照蔡英文的邏輯，有什麼道理否定之？
台灣民主、兩岸和平是最值得珍惜的成果，一個多月之後，台灣將再次經過民主的洗禮，蔡英文必須以實際行動展現她口中所聲稱「國家的意義大過政黨」，才能爭取民眾對民進黨重返執政的信心。
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus Will Set Back Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relations
Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus Will Set Back Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 6, 2011
Summary: On Thursday, Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou threw his support behind Ma Ying-jeou. He is worried that next year's general election could be an upset. He even said that "many companies have two different strategies planned, just in case." The next day, Delta Electronics chairman Bruce Cheng joined the ranks of Taiwanese entrepreneurs backing Ma Ying-jeou. Guo and Cheng are not what would traditionally be referred to as "Blue-oriented Enterprises." Yet they spontaneously expressed identical sentiments. Therefore attention should be paid.
Full Text Below:
On Thursday, Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou threw his support behind Ma Ying-jeou. He is worried that next year's general election could be an upset. He even said that "many companies have two different strategies planned, just in case." The next day, Delta Electronics chairman Bruce Cheng joined the ranks of Taiwanese entrepreneurs backing Ma Ying-jeou. Guo and Cheng are not what would traditionally be referred to as "Blue-oriented Enterprises." Yet they spontaneously expressed identical sentiments. Therefore attention should be paid.
Terry Gou said that next year, when another tsunami strikes, Taiwan's economy will face 10 meter waves, not one meter waves. Turbulent times requires a skilled helmsman. What businesses fear the most is uncertainty. If President Ma wins a second term, businesses can plan for the future. But if a change in ruling parties takes place, businesses may need to wait until May of next year before taking action. "This will result in a deadly window." Companies have responded to the two possible outcomes of next year's presidential election by mapping out two different business strategies. Bruce Cheng said he feared a change in ruling parties would make it impossible for him to respond to changes in the international situation. That was why he supported President Ma's reelection.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Even if the DPP returns to power, it will continue to support business and economic development. So why are domestic enterprises worried? Actually, everyone knows why, but nobody is willing to say so out loud. The problem is the DPP's cross-Strait policy, particulary its refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. The DPP's cross-Strait policy could completely sabotage 16 cross-Strait agreements reached over the past three years, including ECFA, overnight.
Contrast this with the 2000 general election. The global economy was sound. Taiwan's economy and stock market were sound. Few people worried about the downside risk. The Mainland had an economy worth only 1.1 trillion. Taiwan had an economy one fourth the size of the Mainland's. The Mainland was of much less economic significant to Taiwan than it is today. Back then, it was merely a manufacturing base. Back then, there were no "Mainland tourists."
Today however, the Mainland has an economy worth 5.8 trillion, It is the second largest economy in the world. Today Taiwan's economy is only 7% the size of the Mainland's. The Mainland is not merely the world's factory, its is also the world's fastest growing consumer market. It is the world's largest market for automobiles, LCD TVs, and PCs. Exports from Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong increased from 20% to 40%. During the financial tsunami, purchases made by Mainland purchasing groups enabled Taiwan companies to emerge from the shadow of the recession. Millions of Mainland tourists visit Taiwan each year. The finance industry has high hopes for a "green passage." It is conducting follow-up consultations, preparing to increase the number of items on the ECFA checklist.
As we can see, Taiwan's economic and industrial relationship to the Mainland is very different from what it was 12 years ago. Taiwan is much more economically dependent upon the Mainland than it was in the past. This is why the business community is so worried. A global economic downturn next year is inevitable. Economic forecasts for next year have been revised downward. Europe will experience nearly zero growth. The US will experience one to two percent growth. Mainland China meanwhile, will experience 8 to 8.5% growth. Taiwan faces harsh economic challenges next year. If cross-Strait relations change, Taiwan's economy may tank. The DPP's cross-Strait policy will surely force changes upon cross-Strait relations.
DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She relentlessly trumpets her "Taiwan consensus." But three years of warming cross-Strait relations, including various agreements and ECFA, are all rooted in the 1992 Consensus. The Mainland has made clear that "rejection of the 1992 Consensus will destroy the foundation for all subsequent agreements." The DPP's "Taiwan consensus" is sheer solipsism. It could set cross-Strait relations back decades. Once cross-Strait relations have been set back, Mainland capital will swiftly evaporate, and Taiwan's future will be jeopardized. This is why the business community is worried.
These concerns have gradually had an impact. First when Ma and Tsai's poll numbers were deadlocked. Taiwanese stocks plummeted to a new low, below 6800. The decline exceeded those in neighboring countries. Market players were concerned that Tsai might be elected. The cross-Strait economy was discounted. The world's six major central banks joined forces to rescue the market. This meant another global financial crisis was gaining momentum. This meant the economic situation was unlikely to improve next year. Business leaders then proceeded to make their views known. They said if Tsai Ing-wen was elected, she might harm Taiwan's economy. Tsai Ing-wen held an emergency press conference the day before the debate. She declared that "anything can be discussed between the two sides." She promised she would not abruptly terminate any previously signed cross-Strait agreements. She tried to reassure the public that a change in ruling parties would not undermine cross-Strait relations.
The main concern of outside observers was that Tsai Ing-wen would terminate ECFA and its accompanying agreements. They were afraid. The Mainland might not explicitly terminate the agreements. But it might refuse to implement them. The agreement would amount to nothing more than a piece of paper. The Mainland would refuse to honor the remaining items on the ECFA checklist. The number of tourists would diminish. Purchasing groups would cease arriving. The green channel eagerly anticipated by the financial sector would vanish. Tsai Ing-wen's only response to these business and market concerns was wishful thinking and hollow assurances of "consultation and dialogue."
The debate was an ideal opportunity to reassure doubts about the DPP. But Tsai Ing-wen offered nothing but platitudes. She reiterated her intention "to promote equitable economic and trade relations, under the aegis of multilateral organizations." This is sheer chutzpah. Since when has Taiwan had the wherewithal to dictate terms to these multilateral organizations? Besides, multilateral organizations such as the WTO are gradually being replaced by bilateral frameworks such as FTAs. Yet the DPP insists that "although there may have been 1992 talks, there was no 1992 consensus." The DPP insists that "the 1992 consensus was merely a consensus between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party." The DPP continues to issue statements denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus. No wonder Terry Gou said many businesses have prepared two sets of responses. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen -- are you listening?
否認九二共識 兩岸經貿恐倒退嚕
2011-12-06 中國時報
上周四，鴻海集團董事長郭台銘首度表態挺馬；因為擔心明年大選後變天，他甚至說「企業都準備兩套方案因應」。隔日，台達電董事長鄭崇華也加入挺馬行列，郭、鄭都不是傳統上定義的「藍色企業」，卻不約而同的發聲，所傳遞的訊息值得注意。
郭台銘說，台灣明年經濟面對的不是一公尺的海浪，而是「十公尺的海浪」，動盪時刻需要熟練的舵手。企業最怕的是不確定因素，如馬總統連任，現在就可規畫往後工作；但如政黨再輪替，可能拖延到明年五月之後才能應變，「這樣將會產生致命的空窗期」。為因應明年總統大選結果，企業心中都備妥Ａ、Ｂ兩套計畫。鄭崇華則說因為他擔心政權更替，無法應付未來的國際變局，因此支持馬總統連任。
從過去民進黨執政的八年來看，民進黨即使再上台，仍會大力支持企業及經濟發展，國內企業到底在擔心什麼？其實，大家意在言外、卻未明說者，就是民進黨的兩岸政策─特別是民進黨不承認「九二共識」，可能讓近三年多修好的兩岸關係及其十六項協議、ＥＣＦＡ…，在一夜間豬羊變色，全部傾覆。
與二○○○年大選時相較，當時全球景氣熱絡，台灣的經濟與股市還算是「熱烘烘」，沒太多人擔心經濟下行風險。而兩岸的經貿關係方面，大陸當時只是一個規模一．一兆美元的經濟體，台灣的經濟規模約大陸的四分之一；大陸對台灣的意義，只是重要的生產基地；當時，沒有所謂「大陸觀光客」。
但今日，大陸已是規模五．八兆美元的全球第二大經濟體，台灣只有大陸的七％；大陸不僅是世界工廠，更是全球成長最快的消費市場─不論是汽車、ＬＣＤ電視、ＰＣ…，都是全球最大市場。台灣對大陸及香港的出口占全體出口的比重，由二成上下增為四成左右；在金融海嘯時，大陸採購團的大手筆採購，讓台灣企業提早走出陰霾，還有每年上百萬的觀光客、發展中金融業寄予厚望的「綠色通道」、準備協商增加的ＥＣＦＡ後續清單…。
由此可以看出迥異於十二年前的兩岸經貿關係圖像，台灣經濟與產業與大陸的互動已不同於過往，台灣經濟依賴大陸活水的比重遠高於當年，企業界的憂心即由此而來。明年全球經濟下行已是難以挽回的趨勢，國際上所有預測單位都不斷下修明年的經濟預測值，歐洲甚至是接近零成長，美國只有一到二％的成長，大陸則下修到八到八．五％。台灣明年面對的經濟挑戰相當嚴苛，如此時再發生兩岸關係生變，台灣經濟將更墜入谷底─但民進黨的兩岸政策，卻明顯會讓兩岸關係生變。
民進黨總統候選人蔡英文不承認「九二共識」，改不斷強調「台灣共識」；但當三年來兩岸關係的和緩與各項協議及ＥＣＦＡ，都建基在九二共識上時，大陸方面也明白表達「棄九二共識則一切協議的基礎都不在」時，自拉自唱的台灣共識，當然就可能讓台灣陷入兩岸關係倒退的險境；兩岸關係一旦倒退，原本來自大陸方面的經濟活水，就可能逐漸乾涸，台灣經濟風險亦增高。企業界憂心者正是這點。
此一憂心近日逐漸發酵。先是在馬蔡選情呈膠著時，台股跌破六八○○點的低點，跌幅高於鄰近國家，市場認為這是擔心蔡當選、兩岸生變的「折價」；接著全球六大央行聯手救市，宣告另波的國際金融風暴正蓄勢待發，明年經濟難有好局面。再來是企業開始表態，說出對蔡當選後可能對台灣經濟的負面影響之憂慮。蔡英文雖然在辯論會前日，緊急召開記者會，宣告「兩岸間什麼都可以談」，並保證不會貿然終止過去兩岸簽署的各項協議，正是安撫各界對變天可能導致兩岸關係丕變的憂慮。
外界主要憂慮者，不是蔡英文會不會終止包括ＥＣＦＡ在內的各項協議，而是擔心對岸就算不明言終止這些協議，但也不確實執行。結果是協議形同具文，ＥＣＦＡ後續清單不再談，觀光客減少、採購團不來、金融業的綠色通道消失…。而蔡英文至今對企業界與市場的這些憂慮，仍只見一廂情願的「協商對話」。
原本應該是釐清外界疑慮最佳場合的辯論會上，還是只能看見蔡英文說「要推動均衡經貿關係，在多邊組織主導議題…」─台灣何德何能在多邊組織主導議題？更何況ＷＴＯ的多邊組織已逐漸被ＦＴＡ的雙邊架構替代；還有「九二年有九二會談，但沒有九二共識」、「九二共識是國民黨與共產黨的共識…」等持續否認九二共識的說法。難怪，郭台銘要說企業都準備兩套因應方案，民進黨與蔡英文，聽到了嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 6, 2011
Summary: On Thursday, Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou threw his support behind Ma Ying-jeou. He is worried that next year's general election could be an upset. He even said that "many companies have two different strategies planned, just in case." The next day, Delta Electronics chairman Bruce Cheng joined the ranks of Taiwanese entrepreneurs backing Ma Ying-jeou. Guo and Cheng are not what would traditionally be referred to as "Blue-oriented Enterprises." Yet they spontaneously expressed identical sentiments. Therefore attention should be paid.
Full Text Below:
On Thursday, Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou threw his support behind Ma Ying-jeou. He is worried that next year's general election could be an upset. He even said that "many companies have two different strategies planned, just in case." The next day, Delta Electronics chairman Bruce Cheng joined the ranks of Taiwanese entrepreneurs backing Ma Ying-jeou. Guo and Cheng are not what would traditionally be referred to as "Blue-oriented Enterprises." Yet they spontaneously expressed identical sentiments. Therefore attention should be paid.
Terry Gou said that next year, when another tsunami strikes, Taiwan's economy will face 10 meter waves, not one meter waves. Turbulent times requires a skilled helmsman. What businesses fear the most is uncertainty. If President Ma wins a second term, businesses can plan for the future. But if a change in ruling parties takes place, businesses may need to wait until May of next year before taking action. "This will result in a deadly window." Companies have responded to the two possible outcomes of next year's presidential election by mapping out two different business strategies. Bruce Cheng said he feared a change in ruling parties would make it impossible for him to respond to changes in the international situation. That was why he supported President Ma's reelection.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. Even if the DPP returns to power, it will continue to support business and economic development. So why are domestic enterprises worried? Actually, everyone knows why, but nobody is willing to say so out loud. The problem is the DPP's cross-Strait policy, particulary its refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. The DPP's cross-Strait policy could completely sabotage 16 cross-Strait agreements reached over the past three years, including ECFA, overnight.
Contrast this with the 2000 general election. The global economy was sound. Taiwan's economy and stock market were sound. Few people worried about the downside risk. The Mainland had an economy worth only 1.1 trillion. Taiwan had an economy one fourth the size of the Mainland's. The Mainland was of much less economic significant to Taiwan than it is today. Back then, it was merely a manufacturing base. Back then, there were no "Mainland tourists."
Today however, the Mainland has an economy worth 5.8 trillion, It is the second largest economy in the world. Today Taiwan's economy is only 7% the size of the Mainland's. The Mainland is not merely the world's factory, its is also the world's fastest growing consumer market. It is the world's largest market for automobiles, LCD TVs, and PCs. Exports from Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong increased from 20% to 40%. During the financial tsunami, purchases made by Mainland purchasing groups enabled Taiwan companies to emerge from the shadow of the recession. Millions of Mainland tourists visit Taiwan each year. The finance industry has high hopes for a "green passage." It is conducting follow-up consultations, preparing to increase the number of items on the ECFA checklist.
As we can see, Taiwan's economic and industrial relationship to the Mainland is very different from what it was 12 years ago. Taiwan is much more economically dependent upon the Mainland than it was in the past. This is why the business community is so worried. A global economic downturn next year is inevitable. Economic forecasts for next year have been revised downward. Europe will experience nearly zero growth. The US will experience one to two percent growth. Mainland China meanwhile, will experience 8 to 8.5% growth. Taiwan faces harsh economic challenges next year. If cross-Strait relations change, Taiwan's economy may tank. The DPP's cross-Strait policy will surely force changes upon cross-Strait relations.
DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She relentlessly trumpets her "Taiwan consensus." But three years of warming cross-Strait relations, including various agreements and ECFA, are all rooted in the 1992 Consensus. The Mainland has made clear that "rejection of the 1992 Consensus will destroy the foundation for all subsequent agreements." The DPP's "Taiwan consensus" is sheer solipsism. It could set cross-Strait relations back decades. Once cross-Strait relations have been set back, Mainland capital will swiftly evaporate, and Taiwan's future will be jeopardized. This is why the business community is worried.
These concerns have gradually had an impact. First when Ma and Tsai's poll numbers were deadlocked. Taiwanese stocks plummeted to a new low, below 6800. The decline exceeded those in neighboring countries. Market players were concerned that Tsai might be elected. The cross-Strait economy was discounted. The world's six major central banks joined forces to rescue the market. This meant another global financial crisis was gaining momentum. This meant the economic situation was unlikely to improve next year. Business leaders then proceeded to make their views known. They said if Tsai Ing-wen was elected, she might harm Taiwan's economy. Tsai Ing-wen held an emergency press conference the day before the debate. She declared that "anything can be discussed between the two sides." She promised she would not abruptly terminate any previously signed cross-Strait agreements. She tried to reassure the public that a change in ruling parties would not undermine cross-Strait relations.
The main concern of outside observers was that Tsai Ing-wen would terminate ECFA and its accompanying agreements. They were afraid. The Mainland might not explicitly terminate the agreements. But it might refuse to implement them. The agreement would amount to nothing more than a piece of paper. The Mainland would refuse to honor the remaining items on the ECFA checklist. The number of tourists would diminish. Purchasing groups would cease arriving. The green channel eagerly anticipated by the financial sector would vanish. Tsai Ing-wen's only response to these business and market concerns was wishful thinking and hollow assurances of "consultation and dialogue."
The debate was an ideal opportunity to reassure doubts about the DPP. But Tsai Ing-wen offered nothing but platitudes. She reiterated her intention "to promote equitable economic and trade relations, under the aegis of multilateral organizations." This is sheer chutzpah. Since when has Taiwan had the wherewithal to dictate terms to these multilateral organizations? Besides, multilateral organizations such as the WTO are gradually being replaced by bilateral frameworks such as FTAs. Yet the DPP insists that "although there may have been 1992 talks, there was no 1992 consensus." The DPP insists that "the 1992 consensus was merely a consensus between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party." The DPP continues to issue statements denying the existence of the 1992 Consensus. No wonder Terry Gou said many businesses have prepared two sets of responses. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen -- are you listening?
否認九二共識 兩岸經貿恐倒退嚕
2011-12-06 中國時報
上周四，鴻海集團董事長郭台銘首度表態挺馬；因為擔心明年大選後變天，他甚至說「企業都準備兩套方案因應」。隔日，台達電董事長鄭崇華也加入挺馬行列，郭、鄭都不是傳統上定義的「藍色企業」，卻不約而同的發聲，所傳遞的訊息值得注意。
郭台銘說，台灣明年經濟面對的不是一公尺的海浪，而是「十公尺的海浪」，動盪時刻需要熟練的舵手。企業最怕的是不確定因素，如馬總統連任，現在就可規畫往後工作；但如政黨再輪替，可能拖延到明年五月之後才能應變，「這樣將會產生致命的空窗期」。為因應明年總統大選結果，企業心中都備妥Ａ、Ｂ兩套計畫。鄭崇華則說因為他擔心政權更替，無法應付未來的國際變局，因此支持馬總統連任。
從過去民進黨執政的八年來看，民進黨即使再上台，仍會大力支持企業及經濟發展，國內企業到底在擔心什麼？其實，大家意在言外、卻未明說者，就是民進黨的兩岸政策─特別是民進黨不承認「九二共識」，可能讓近三年多修好的兩岸關係及其十六項協議、ＥＣＦＡ…，在一夜間豬羊變色，全部傾覆。
與二○○○年大選時相較，當時全球景氣熱絡，台灣的經濟與股市還算是「熱烘烘」，沒太多人擔心經濟下行風險。而兩岸的經貿關係方面，大陸當時只是一個規模一．一兆美元的經濟體，台灣的經濟規模約大陸的四分之一；大陸對台灣的意義，只是重要的生產基地；當時，沒有所謂「大陸觀光客」。
但今日，大陸已是規模五．八兆美元的全球第二大經濟體，台灣只有大陸的七％；大陸不僅是世界工廠，更是全球成長最快的消費市場─不論是汽車、ＬＣＤ電視、ＰＣ…，都是全球最大市場。台灣對大陸及香港的出口占全體出口的比重，由二成上下增為四成左右；在金融海嘯時，大陸採購團的大手筆採購，讓台灣企業提早走出陰霾，還有每年上百萬的觀光客、發展中金融業寄予厚望的「綠色通道」、準備協商增加的ＥＣＦＡ後續清單…。
由此可以看出迥異於十二年前的兩岸經貿關係圖像，台灣經濟與產業與大陸的互動已不同於過往，台灣經濟依賴大陸活水的比重遠高於當年，企業界的憂心即由此而來。明年全球經濟下行已是難以挽回的趨勢，國際上所有預測單位都不斷下修明年的經濟預測值，歐洲甚至是接近零成長，美國只有一到二％的成長，大陸則下修到八到八．五％。台灣明年面對的經濟挑戰相當嚴苛，如此時再發生兩岸關係生變，台灣經濟將更墜入谷底─但民進黨的兩岸政策，卻明顯會讓兩岸關係生變。
民進黨總統候選人蔡英文不承認「九二共識」，改不斷強調「台灣共識」；但當三年來兩岸關係的和緩與各項協議及ＥＣＦＡ，都建基在九二共識上時，大陸方面也明白表達「棄九二共識則一切協議的基礎都不在」時，自拉自唱的台灣共識，當然就可能讓台灣陷入兩岸關係倒退的險境；兩岸關係一旦倒退，原本來自大陸方面的經濟活水，就可能逐漸乾涸，台灣經濟風險亦增高。企業界憂心者正是這點。
此一憂心近日逐漸發酵。先是在馬蔡選情呈膠著時，台股跌破六八○○點的低點，跌幅高於鄰近國家，市場認為這是擔心蔡當選、兩岸生變的「折價」；接著全球六大央行聯手救市，宣告另波的國際金融風暴正蓄勢待發，明年經濟難有好局面。再來是企業開始表態，說出對蔡當選後可能對台灣經濟的負面影響之憂慮。蔡英文雖然在辯論會前日，緊急召開記者會，宣告「兩岸間什麼都可以談」，並保證不會貿然終止過去兩岸簽署的各項協議，正是安撫各界對變天可能導致兩岸關係丕變的憂慮。
外界主要憂慮者，不是蔡英文會不會終止包括ＥＣＦＡ在內的各項協議，而是擔心對岸就算不明言終止這些協議，但也不確實執行。結果是協議形同具文，ＥＣＦＡ後續清單不再談，觀光客減少、採購團不來、金融業的綠色通道消失…。而蔡英文至今對企業界與市場的這些憂慮，仍只見一廂情願的「協商對話」。
原本應該是釐清外界疑慮最佳場合的辯論會上，還是只能看見蔡英文說「要推動均衡經貿關係，在多邊組織主導議題…」─台灣何德何能在多邊組織主導議題？更何況ＷＴＯ的多邊組織已逐漸被ＦＴＡ的雙邊架構替代；還有「九二年有九二會談，但沒有九二共識」、「九二共識是國民黨與共產黨的共識…」等持續否認九二共識的說法。難怪，郭台銘要說企業都準備兩套因應方案，民進黨與蔡英文，聽到了嗎？
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