Moral Posturing Frustrates Real World Implementation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 15, 2012
Summary: When political posturing takes precedence over decision-making, officials charged with implementation frequently end up merely going through the motions. Over the past six years, DPP and KMT administrations banned beta-adrenergic agonists. But they failed utterly to prevent them from reaching the market. As a result, the six counties and municipalities ruled by the DPP opposed only US beef imports. They need to look in the mirror. They need to clean house. They need to look at how pig farms in counties under their rule continued using illegal beta-adrenergic agonists with total impunity. They need to look at market shelves filled with beef products containing beta-adrenergic agonists, imported from other countries. When they persist in sanctimoniously waving the "No American Beef!" banner, aren't they underestimating the problem?
Full Text below:
The war over beta-adrenergic agonists such as clenbuterol and ractopamine has escalated beyond control. It has shaped the perception of the livestock and meat industry on Taiwan. The public initially assumed that beta-adrenergic agonist residues were a problem confined to U.S. beef imports. Who knew that Australian and New Zealand beef imports contained the even more toxic qipateluo? The public initially assumed that domestic livestock growers refused to use beta-adrenergic agonists. Who knew pig farmers on Taiwan have been using the illegal zilpaterol? The situation is out of control. Many well-known restaurants and food manufacturers have been caught in the net. The public is the ultimate victim.
The reality is so far removed from the rhetoric. This is what happens when opportunistic political posturing takes precedence over rational decision-making. By now people realize the magnitude of the challenge. This is more than a diplomatic and trade tussle over U.S. beef imports. This is a domestic disconnect between administrative efficiency and political commitment.
In 2006 the Chen administration trumpeted its total ban on beta-adrenergic agonists. People mistakenly assumed they were safe and secure. But the Chen administration's moral posturing was deflated by harsh reality. In 2009 the Ma administration responded to mad cow disease in the US. It established "three controls and five gateways." But who knew that beta-adrenergic agonists would slip through the net? Who knew that controls imposed at the source, at the border, and in the marketplace would all fail? The administration stopped mad cow disease, but allowed beta-adrenergic agonists to slip through the net. Preoccupied with U.S. beef, it let down its guard against beta-adrenergic agonists from New Zealand, Australian, and from here at home. What is the crux of the problem? Did political posturing or failed implementation lead to the policy debacle? Maybe both?
Take the "three controls, five gateways." The three contols, five gateways were established in response to mad cow disease in the US. Oversights during implementation were inevitable. The five gateways tested for "38 veterinary drugs, heavy metals and E. coli." But it allowed beta-adrenergic agonists to make their way onto market shelves, Its controls failed. On this point, the Ma administration cannot avoid blame. The government boasted that it would track down violations, one by one. But it failed to provide customs and inspection agencies with the necessary manpower and materiel. This led to less than 10% of the samples being tested. Can the central government really can blame lower echelon officials for inadequate implementation?
Now take industry responsibility for the irregularities. Since last year, the Department of Health and Customs tested over 200 batches of imported beef. About 20% failed to pass muster. The product was returned, removed from market shelves, or destroyed. But no fines were imposed on any industry. The government's net had a gaping hole: The importer or dealer was not considered the "perpetrator." He was not the one who added the beta-adrenergic agonists. Therefore according to the Food Sanitation Management Act, he cannot be punished. Ruling and opposition legislators have harshly condemned such violations. But they failed to pass the appropriate legislation. They failed to provide enforcement officials with the necessary authority. Opportunistic businessmen often take advantage of the situation. They have no fear of the government's "three controls, five gateways." On this point, the legislative branch can hardly shirk responsibilit y. It too was negligent.
A policy must be developed, then promoted. Verification, tracking, interpretation, and implementation is a long process. It is easy to lose one's way. It is easy to deviate from one's original goal. Take the penalties for non-compliance. The Department of Health does not consider the importers "perpetrators." Therefore it does not punish them. But Pingtung pig farms were caught using salbutamol. They used highly toxic, illegal beta-adrenergic agonists. Worse still, they were repeat offenders. Yet neither the central or local governments imposed any fines whatsoever. This was not merely hypocritical, it amounted to aiding and abetting. The government openly boasts that is the "champion of public health." But whenever industry ignores the law. it immediately becomes a "champion of industry." Is aiding and abetting law-breaking really compatible with ensuring food safety?
Former Department of Agriculture Epidemic Prevention Bureau Chief Hsu Tian was forced to step down for covering up the avian flu epidemic. He said he hid the truth for fear "the bottom would drop out of the chicken market." This was his excuse. Alas, it was probably what he was actually thinking. Lest we forget, Hsu Tian was the same person who formulated and implemented the "three controls, five gateways" policy, He occupied this important post -- guardian of public health. Yet in his heart he always put "management" and "chicken prices" above public health. How can the public expect individuals like this to implement public health policy?
When political posturing takes precedence over decision-making, officials charged with implementation frequently end up merely going through the motions. Over the past six years, DPP and KMT administrations banned beta-adrenergic agonists. But they failed utterly to prevent them from reaching the market. As a result, the six counties and municipalities ruled by the DPP opposed only US beef imports. They need to look in the mirror. They need to clean house. They need to look at how pig farms in counties under their rule continued using illegal beta-adrenergic agonists with total impunity. They need to look at market shelves filled with beef products containing beta-adrenergic agonists, imported from other countries. When they persist in sanctimoniously waving the "No American Beef!" banner, aren't they underestimating the problem?
別讓道德高調掉進執行鴻溝
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.15 03:09 am
美牛瘦肉精之爭像一把野火，燒出了台灣畜牧及肉品業的原形。人們原以為瘦肉精問題是美國牛肉所獨有，豈料在澳洲、紐西蘭進口牛肉驗出了毒性更強的齊帕特羅；原以為國內畜牧業者早就不使用瘦肉精，卻查出有養豬場一直在違規使用禁藥沙丁胺醇。環環失控下，許多知名餐廳及食品業者同遭此劫，廣大民眾更同蒙其殃。
這種現實與目標悖離的現象，反映了決策的政治高調在行政執行中被架空的窘境。至此，民眾應該了解，我們當下面對的挑戰，其實已不只是一場美牛的外交貿易戰，而是更嚴酷的內部行政效能與政治承諾的脫節問題。
扁政府自二○○六年高調宣布全面管制瘦肉精，讓民眾誤以為自己身處安全無虞的環境；最後這項道德神話卻是被「未檢驗」的冷酷事實所戳破。而馬政府二○○九年針對美國狂牛設下了「三管五卡」的重重防線，不料卻讓瘦肉精成了漏網之魚，源頭、邊境、市場三道關卡均告失守。守狂牛，就漏了瘦肉精；專攻美牛，就讓紐、澳及國內防線唱空城。其中癥結，是行政失效或政治膨脹導致決策失靈，或兩者兼而有之？
先談「三管五卡」的問題。三管五卡是針對美國狂牛而設，在執行上不免有偏廢之失；然而，「五卡」中既訂出了針對「卅八項動物用藥、重金屬及大腸桿菌」的檢驗項目，讓含瘦肉精的美牛流入市面，就是行政把關不力。這點，馬政府難辭其咎。問題是，政府在誇下「逐批檢驗」的海口時，若未考量海關及檢驗機構的人力與設備能量，導致「逐批檢驗」最後被稀釋成不到一成的「抽樣檢驗」，中央能將責任都推給基層人員執行不力嗎？
再談違規業者的責任問題。去年至今，衛生署在海關及賣場抽驗了兩百多批進口牛肉，不合格率約達兩成，但最後都僅以退運、下架、銷毀等方式處理，未曾對任何業者處以罰金。其中關鍵缺口，就在這些進口商或販賣商並非添加瘦肉精的「行為人」，無法依照「食品衛生管理法」給予懲處。也就是說，儘管朝野立委都嚴詞譴責違規事件，他們卻未能訂出適當的法令，授予行政人員足夠的執法寶劍。如果心存僥倖的業者，投機倒耙往往能夠得逞，他們對政府的三令五申會有何忌憚？這點，難道不是立法部門的疏怠？
一項政策從制定到推動，在漫長的查核、追蹤、釋法及執行的過程中，往往會不斷流失、耗損，乃至遠離了根本的目標。以違規的懲處為例，衛生署認為進口業者不是「行為人」，所以無法處分；但是，被查獲使用沙丁胺醇的屏東養豬場，不僅是違規添加了強毒性的瘦肉精，而且是累犯，但地方和中央至今均未對其開罰。這樣的行政處理，已不只是鄉愿，而根本是放縱。政府口口聲聲以「國民健康」為念，但遇到不法業者，馬上變成以「業者的生計」為念；請問，在縱容非法與執行食品安全之間，豈有兩全之計？
因隱匿禽流感疫情而去職的前農委會防疫局長許天來說，他之所以隱瞞真相，是因為怕「雞價崩盤」；這雖是他的託詞，或恐也有部份真實。別忘了，許天來也正是美牛「三管五卡」政策的主要擬訂者與執行者，但如果坐在這麼重要職位上的把關者，心中卻總是把「老闆」、「雞價」放在上位，人們如何指望那些看似天衣無縫的決策在執行時能獲得貫徹？
浮誇的決策，往往導致執行的虛應故事；六年來，從藍綠政府禁止瘦肉精的起伏虛實，已說明了一切。也因此，在民進黨執政六縣市聲言組成「反美牛」的聯合陣線之際，他們如果看看自己失火的後院，看著縣內養豬場連續使用禁藥卻毫無作為，看著市場攤架上各國牛肉陸續淪陷，他們不覺得自己還在搖著「反美牛」的旗幟，真的太低估了問題嗎？
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
Tuesday, March 13, 2012
Bipartisan: The One Word Taiwan Most Desperately Needs
Bipartisan: The One Word Taiwan Most Desperately Needs
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2012
Summary: Bipartisanship is essential on major policy issues. Without it, Taiwan will remain forever divided, forever at loggerheads, forever spinning its wheels. President Ma has extended an invitation to the DPP, TSU, and PFP, inviting them to participate in a ruling and opposition party leader summit. We hope the opposition parties will participate. We hope they will reach a consensus on US beef imports, a free economic zone, TIFA, TPP, and other major issues. We hope they will achieve bipartisanship. That is the one thing Taiwan most desperately needs.
Full Text below:
The two major parties disagree on U.S. beef imports. The KMT advocates "conditional opening." The DPP leadership insists it has "never wavered in its opposition to clenbuterol and ractopamine."
The two parties are at loggerheads. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) has linked U.S. beef imports to TIFA. It has said the Ma administration "never made any promises" to the United States regarding beef imports. Just the opposite. It made clear that the DPP under Chen Shui-bian was the administration that made promises to the US regarding beef imports, that wrote the World Trade Organization (WTO) promising to allow beef imports and establish standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content in US pork and beef products.
It was a situation rife with irony. The United States longs to market beef to consumers on Taiwan. But the target of its pressure is not the Ma administration. It is the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It paradoxically defends the Ma administration, saying that it "never made any promises."
The AIT wants to know why the DPP agreed to beef imports when it was in office, but rejects them now that it is in the opposition. The AIT is essentially backing the DPP leadership into a corner. It is forcing the DPP to lie, espouse anti-Americanism, and oppose TIFA. It has already left the DPP without a leg to stand on. What the AIT has not said, is that when the KMT was in the opposition, it too opposed the importation of meats treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. The KMT performed an about face and conditionally agreed to permit US beef imports only because it is now the ruling party. What this shows is that when it comes to clenbuterol and ractopamine, the DPP and the KMT are textbook cases of Miles' Law, which says "Where you stand depends on where you sit." It is also a living, breathing example of why bipartisanship is so difficult to achieve on Taiwan.
The term "bipartisan" is found in such terms as "bipartisan agreement," "bipartisanship," and "bipartisan support." The concept of bipartisanship evolved from party politics in the United States. Partisan political wrangling became "opposition for the sake of opposition" and tore the nation apart. This led to the gradual realization that regarding important matters such as foreign policy, political parties require consistency. Hence the birth of bipartisanship. Hence the appearance of such phenomenon as a congressional "bipartisan committee" passing a "bipartisan resolution," a "bipartisan deficit reduction committee," a "bipartisan Katrina Hurricane Investigation Committee," or a private sector think tank such as the "Bipartisan Policy Center."
Bipartisanship is virtually non-existent in party politics on Taiwan. Between the two parties, one finds only "opposition for the sake of opposition." The lack of bipartisanship begins with allegiance to the nation and to its constitution. On this, there is no bipartisanship. One party operates under the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of China. The other party is determined to "de-Sinicize." Cross-strait policy is no exception, One-party supports the 1992 Consensus. The other party refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. One party promoted ECFA. The other party insists that ECFA "panders to [Mainland] China and sells out Taiwan." Such confrontation seldom represents principled dissent. Instead it often represents partisan political maneuvering. For example, when Chen Shui-bian was in the opposition, he advocated Taiwan independence. When he came into office, he advocated the "Five Noes." When he found himself in a crisis of governance he advocated the "rectification of names." When he once again found himself out of power, he reverted to "one nation on each side." As newly appointed Party Chairman, Tsai Ing-wen denounced ECFA as "humiliating." But when she became a presidential candidate, she said she would "accept it unconditionally."
Such policy flip-flopping fails more than the test for bipartisanship. It fails even the test for partisan consistency and individual consistency. Such examples abound. Take the two major parties' policy on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The two parties disagreed with each other. But the two parties have also flip-flopped, repeatedly. The same is true of subsidies for elderly farmers. Has the situation ever been otherwise? Needless to say, there is no bipartisanship on U.S. beef imports. Even worse, both parties are faithful adherents to Miles' Law." Where they stand depends on where they sit.
The AIT pulled no punches. It underscored the lack of bipartisanship on the US beef imports issue. U.S. beef is not a trivial issue, It is vital to national health. It is a trade issue that affects TIFA, FTAs, and Taipei/Washington relations. It could even undermine Taipei's chances of joining the TPP. Can we really oppose something merely for the sake of opposing it on such issues? Shouldn't we establish bipartisanship?
The DPP has flip-flopped on clenbuterol and ractopamine. The rival political parties must seek common ground on national and constitutional allegiance, cross-Strait policy, industrial policy, nuclear energy policy, agricultural policy, tax policy, and other major policies. They must establish a bipartisanship policy framework, beginning with clenbuterol and ractopamine.
Bipartisanship is essential on major policy issues. Without it, Taiwan will remain forever divided, forever at loggerheads, forever spinning its wheels. President Ma has extended an invitation to the DPP, TSU, and PFP, inviting them to participate in a ruling and opposition party leader summit. We hope the opposition parties will participate. We hope they will reach a consensus on US beef imports, a free economic zone, TIFA, TPP, and other major issues. We hope they will achieve bipartisanship. That is the one thing Taiwan most desperately needs.
Bipartisan 台灣最需要的一個字
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.14 01:54 am
關於美牛進口問題，國民黨主張「有條件開放」，民進黨中央則稱「反瘦肉精立場絕不動搖」。
在兩黨相持不下之際，美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）一方面將美牛與ＴＩＦＡ掛勾，另一方面更調轉槍口稱，馬政府對美牛「沒有做任何承諾」，反而是民進黨扁政府曾對美牛進口做出「承諾」，並曾致函世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）表態，謂將對豬肉牛肉的萊克多巴胺建立殘留量標準。
這真是一個充滿諷刺性的場景。美國要推銷牛肉，主要的施壓目標不在馬政府，卻是針對在野的民進黨而發，且反而為馬政府辯護稱「沒有做任何承諾」。
ＡＩＴ的質疑是：民進黨何以在執政時同意，卻於在野後就反對？ＡＩＴ不啻是將民進黨中央逼到了「失信」、「反美」與「反ＴＩＦＡ」的角落，已使民進黨陷於進退失據之境。不過，ＡＩＴ沒有說的是，國民黨在野時，也是持反對瘦肉精的立場，只是如今執政又轉過身來同意有條件開放。這幅圖像顯示：民進黨及國民黨在瘦肉精的議題上，皆陷於「麥爾斯法則」，即「位子決定立場／屁股決定腦袋」，這也正是台灣政治難以達成「兩黨一致路徑」（Bipartisan Approach）的鮮活寫照。
Bipartisan，可譯為「兩黨一致的」，也有譯為「兩黨連立的」，或逕譯為「兩黨支持的」。Bipartisan這個概念，演化自美國的政黨政治；由於政黨之間「為反對而反對」的制衡角力，演成了國家社會的撕裂；因此逐漸領悟到，各政黨須在有些重要政策（如外交政策）上，持一致立場，遂有Bipartisanship這個概念產生。於是，美國國會時有「兩黨委員會」（Bipartisan Committee），並通過「兩黨決議」（Bipartisan Resolution），如「兩黨刪減赤字委員會」，或「兩黨卡翠納颶風事件調查委員會」，另民間亦有智庫稱「兩黨政策中心」（Bipartisan Policy Center）。
台灣的政黨政治則幾乎沒有Bipartisanship的存在，兩黨之間只有「為反對而反對」。從國憲認同的源頭處，即無「兩黨一致」；一黨「在中華民國憲法架構下」，另一黨要「去中國化」。兩岸政策亦然，一黨支持九二共識，另一黨否定九二共識；一黨推倡ＥＣＦＡ，另一黨稱ＥＣＦＡ是傾中賣台。而且，這類的對立，其實往往不是在原則立場上的真實歧異，而是完全出自政黨鬥爭的權謀反覆而已。例如，陳水扁在野時主張「台獨建國」，執政初期則主張「四不一沒有」，至執政出現危機又操作「正名制憲」，失去政權又回到「一邊一國」；再如，初任黨主席的蔡英文指ＥＣＦＡ喪權辱國，至成為總統候選人又改口說要「概括承受」。
也就是說，這種政策立場的搖擺反覆，不但沒有「兩黨一致」，甚至在同一黨也前後反覆，在同一人也先後搖擺。諸如此類，不勝枚舉。例如，核四政策，兩黨不一致，同一黨也反覆搖擺；國光石化，亦是異曲同工；老農津貼，何嘗不然？當然，美牛事件又是一個沒有Bipartisanship、且兩黨皆演出「麥爾斯法則」的顯例。
由於ＡＩＴ說了重話，使得台灣在美牛問題的「沒有兩黨一致」顯得特別突出。其實，美牛議題不是一個小問題，這是一個攸關國民健康的議題，也是一個貿易問題，牽動到ＴＩＦＡ、ＦＴＡ，影響到台美外交，甚至可牽涉到台灣未來能否融入ＴＰＰ的問題；而這樣的議題，能不能「為反對而反對」？應不應建立一條「兩黨一致的路徑」？
因而，在民進黨出爾反爾的瘦肉精政策困境中，各政黨可共同思考，在國憲認同、兩岸政策、產業選題、核能問題、農業政策、租稅方案等重大國政上，力求共同建立Bipartisanship的政策架構，且就從瘦肉精做起！
在重大政策上沒有Bipartisanship這個概念，台灣將永遠陷於撕裂、反覆、內耗、空轉。馬總統正透過幕僚，邀請民進黨、台聯及親民黨參加朝野政黨領袖高峰會議；我們希望各在野黨能共襄盛舉，使此會能對美牛、自由經濟示範區、ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ等重大議題，獲致共識，為Bipartisanship建立里程碑，因為，台灣最需要這一個字。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2012
Summary: Bipartisanship is essential on major policy issues. Without it, Taiwan will remain forever divided, forever at loggerheads, forever spinning its wheels. President Ma has extended an invitation to the DPP, TSU, and PFP, inviting them to participate in a ruling and opposition party leader summit. We hope the opposition parties will participate. We hope they will reach a consensus on US beef imports, a free economic zone, TIFA, TPP, and other major issues. We hope they will achieve bipartisanship. That is the one thing Taiwan most desperately needs.
Full Text below:
The two major parties disagree on U.S. beef imports. The KMT advocates "conditional opening." The DPP leadership insists it has "never wavered in its opposition to clenbuterol and ractopamine."
The two parties are at loggerheads. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) has linked U.S. beef imports to TIFA. It has said the Ma administration "never made any promises" to the United States regarding beef imports. Just the opposite. It made clear that the DPP under Chen Shui-bian was the administration that made promises to the US regarding beef imports, that wrote the World Trade Organization (WTO) promising to allow beef imports and establish standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content in US pork and beef products.
It was a situation rife with irony. The United States longs to market beef to consumers on Taiwan. But the target of its pressure is not the Ma administration. It is the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It paradoxically defends the Ma administration, saying that it "never made any promises."
The AIT wants to know why the DPP agreed to beef imports when it was in office, but rejects them now that it is in the opposition. The AIT is essentially backing the DPP leadership into a corner. It is forcing the DPP to lie, espouse anti-Americanism, and oppose TIFA. It has already left the DPP without a leg to stand on. What the AIT has not said, is that when the KMT was in the opposition, it too opposed the importation of meats treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. The KMT performed an about face and conditionally agreed to permit US beef imports only because it is now the ruling party. What this shows is that when it comes to clenbuterol and ractopamine, the DPP and the KMT are textbook cases of Miles' Law, which says "Where you stand depends on where you sit." It is also a living, breathing example of why bipartisanship is so difficult to achieve on Taiwan.
The term "bipartisan" is found in such terms as "bipartisan agreement," "bipartisanship," and "bipartisan support." The concept of bipartisanship evolved from party politics in the United States. Partisan political wrangling became "opposition for the sake of opposition" and tore the nation apart. This led to the gradual realization that regarding important matters such as foreign policy, political parties require consistency. Hence the birth of bipartisanship. Hence the appearance of such phenomenon as a congressional "bipartisan committee" passing a "bipartisan resolution," a "bipartisan deficit reduction committee," a "bipartisan Katrina Hurricane Investigation Committee," or a private sector think tank such as the "Bipartisan Policy Center."
Bipartisanship is virtually non-existent in party politics on Taiwan. Between the two parties, one finds only "opposition for the sake of opposition." The lack of bipartisanship begins with allegiance to the nation and to its constitution. On this, there is no bipartisanship. One party operates under the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of China. The other party is determined to "de-Sinicize." Cross-strait policy is no exception, One-party supports the 1992 Consensus. The other party refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. One party promoted ECFA. The other party insists that ECFA "panders to [Mainland] China and sells out Taiwan." Such confrontation seldom represents principled dissent. Instead it often represents partisan political maneuvering. For example, when Chen Shui-bian was in the opposition, he advocated Taiwan independence. When he came into office, he advocated the "Five Noes." When he found himself in a crisis of governance he advocated the "rectification of names." When he once again found himself out of power, he reverted to "one nation on each side." As newly appointed Party Chairman, Tsai Ing-wen denounced ECFA as "humiliating." But when she became a presidential candidate, she said she would "accept it unconditionally."
Such policy flip-flopping fails more than the test for bipartisanship. It fails even the test for partisan consistency and individual consistency. Such examples abound. Take the two major parties' policy on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. The two parties disagreed with each other. But the two parties have also flip-flopped, repeatedly. The same is true of subsidies for elderly farmers. Has the situation ever been otherwise? Needless to say, there is no bipartisanship on U.S. beef imports. Even worse, both parties are faithful adherents to Miles' Law." Where they stand depends on where they sit.
The AIT pulled no punches. It underscored the lack of bipartisanship on the US beef imports issue. U.S. beef is not a trivial issue, It is vital to national health. It is a trade issue that affects TIFA, FTAs, and Taipei/Washington relations. It could even undermine Taipei's chances of joining the TPP. Can we really oppose something merely for the sake of opposing it on such issues? Shouldn't we establish bipartisanship?
The DPP has flip-flopped on clenbuterol and ractopamine. The rival political parties must seek common ground on national and constitutional allegiance, cross-Strait policy, industrial policy, nuclear energy policy, agricultural policy, tax policy, and other major policies. They must establish a bipartisanship policy framework, beginning with clenbuterol and ractopamine.
Bipartisanship is essential on major policy issues. Without it, Taiwan will remain forever divided, forever at loggerheads, forever spinning its wheels. President Ma has extended an invitation to the DPP, TSU, and PFP, inviting them to participate in a ruling and opposition party leader summit. We hope the opposition parties will participate. We hope they will reach a consensus on US beef imports, a free economic zone, TIFA, TPP, and other major issues. We hope they will achieve bipartisanship. That is the one thing Taiwan most desperately needs.
Bipartisan 台灣最需要的一個字
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.14 01:54 am
關於美牛進口問題，國民黨主張「有條件開放」，民進黨中央則稱「反瘦肉精立場絕不動搖」。
在兩黨相持不下之際，美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）一方面將美牛與ＴＩＦＡ掛勾，另一方面更調轉槍口稱，馬政府對美牛「沒有做任何承諾」，反而是民進黨扁政府曾對美牛進口做出「承諾」，並曾致函世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）表態，謂將對豬肉牛肉的萊克多巴胺建立殘留量標準。
這真是一個充滿諷刺性的場景。美國要推銷牛肉，主要的施壓目標不在馬政府，卻是針對在野的民進黨而發，且反而為馬政府辯護稱「沒有做任何承諾」。
ＡＩＴ的質疑是：民進黨何以在執政時同意，卻於在野後就反對？ＡＩＴ不啻是將民進黨中央逼到了「失信」、「反美」與「反ＴＩＦＡ」的角落，已使民進黨陷於進退失據之境。不過，ＡＩＴ沒有說的是，國民黨在野時，也是持反對瘦肉精的立場，只是如今執政又轉過身來同意有條件開放。這幅圖像顯示：民進黨及國民黨在瘦肉精的議題上，皆陷於「麥爾斯法則」，即「位子決定立場／屁股決定腦袋」，這也正是台灣政治難以達成「兩黨一致路徑」（Bipartisan Approach）的鮮活寫照。
Bipartisan，可譯為「兩黨一致的」，也有譯為「兩黨連立的」，或逕譯為「兩黨支持的」。Bipartisan這個概念，演化自美國的政黨政治；由於政黨之間「為反對而反對」的制衡角力，演成了國家社會的撕裂；因此逐漸領悟到，各政黨須在有些重要政策（如外交政策）上，持一致立場，遂有Bipartisanship這個概念產生。於是，美國國會時有「兩黨委員會」（Bipartisan Committee），並通過「兩黨決議」（Bipartisan Resolution），如「兩黨刪減赤字委員會」，或「兩黨卡翠納颶風事件調查委員會」，另民間亦有智庫稱「兩黨政策中心」（Bipartisan Policy Center）。
台灣的政黨政治則幾乎沒有Bipartisanship的存在，兩黨之間只有「為反對而反對」。從國憲認同的源頭處，即無「兩黨一致」；一黨「在中華民國憲法架構下」，另一黨要「去中國化」。兩岸政策亦然，一黨支持九二共識，另一黨否定九二共識；一黨推倡ＥＣＦＡ，另一黨稱ＥＣＦＡ是傾中賣台。而且，這類的對立，其實往往不是在原則立場上的真實歧異，而是完全出自政黨鬥爭的權謀反覆而已。例如，陳水扁在野時主張「台獨建國」，執政初期則主張「四不一沒有」，至執政出現危機又操作「正名制憲」，失去政權又回到「一邊一國」；再如，初任黨主席的蔡英文指ＥＣＦＡ喪權辱國，至成為總統候選人又改口說要「概括承受」。
也就是說，這種政策立場的搖擺反覆，不但沒有「兩黨一致」，甚至在同一黨也前後反覆，在同一人也先後搖擺。諸如此類，不勝枚舉。例如，核四政策，兩黨不一致，同一黨也反覆搖擺；國光石化，亦是異曲同工；老農津貼，何嘗不然？當然，美牛事件又是一個沒有Bipartisanship、且兩黨皆演出「麥爾斯法則」的顯例。
由於ＡＩＴ說了重話，使得台灣在美牛問題的「沒有兩黨一致」顯得特別突出。其實，美牛議題不是一個小問題，這是一個攸關國民健康的議題，也是一個貿易問題，牽動到ＴＩＦＡ、ＦＴＡ，影響到台美外交，甚至可牽涉到台灣未來能否融入ＴＰＰ的問題；而這樣的議題，能不能「為反對而反對」？應不應建立一條「兩黨一致的路徑」？
因而，在民進黨出爾反爾的瘦肉精政策困境中，各政黨可共同思考，在國憲認同、兩岸政策、產業選題、核能問題、農業政策、租稅方案等重大國政上，力求共同建立Bipartisanship的政策架構，且就從瘦肉精做起！
在重大政策上沒有Bipartisanship這個概念，台灣將永遠陷於撕裂、反覆、內耗、空轉。馬總統正透過幕僚，邀請民進黨、台聯及親民黨參加朝野政黨領袖高峰會議；我們希望各在野黨能共襄盛舉，使此會能對美牛、自由經濟示範區、ＴＩＦＡ、ＴＰＰ等重大議題，獲致共識，為Bipartisanship建立里程碑，因為，台灣最需要這一個字。
Clenbuterol: The Chen Administration's Dirty Little Secret
Clenbuterol: The Chen Administration's Dirty Little Secret
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2012
Summary: Some people insist on "zero clenbuterol and ractopamine." They see the Democratic Progressive Party say one thing while doing another. They think about all the meat they have eaten, and shudder. Some DPP leaders are still lambasting the Ma administration, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan." They need to take a hard look at the Chen administration's duplicity and capriciousness, then offer the public an explanation.
Full Text below:
The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) recently revealed that the Chen administration made a commitment to the U.S. government to establish standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content, not the Ma administration. On August 16, 2007, the Chen administration informed the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it would announce its standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content, effective August 22. So why did the Chen administration renege on its commitment only a few days later?
The answer lies in the events of August 21. On that day, during Chen Shui-bian's visit to diplomatic allies, he transited the US. But Washington allowed him into the US for only 90 minutes, and only in far-flung Alaska. His humiliation turned to apoplexy. Not one member of his entourage deplaned.
Insiders say this was Chen Shui-bian's ninth visit during his term of office. Yet Washington still refused him permission to transit the continental United States. Then suddenly, just days before his trip, he agreed to allow US beef imports containing clenbuterol and ractopamine. His condition was that the US would permit him to transit major cities in the continental United States. But Washington only allowed him to transit Alaska, and limited his time to 50 to 90 minutes. At first Chen Shui-bian tried to laugh this humiliating treatment off. But his humiliation soon turned to apoplexy. This led to the Alaskan mini-drama of refusing to deplane, as a gesture of protest. Needless to say, Chen reneged on his commitment to the WTO regarding clenbuterol and ractopamine.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been lambasting the Ma administration for the past several days, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan" and "selling out our citizens' health." But recall how the Chen Shui-bian administration dealt with U.S. beef imports. Recall its crude opportunism and unprincipled flip-flopping. That is why the current administration finds itself in such an embarrassing quandary regarding U.S. beef imports. So many of the current administration's problems are messes left over by its predecessor, the Chen administration. Chen Shui-bian's decision to allow the importation of US beef containing clenbuterol or ractopamine depended solely on whether Washington would extend him the diplomatic courtesy of transiting the continental United States -- one time. Then, when Chen's personal whims were frustrated, he could shred a commitment to the WTO overnight. Under the circumstances, what right does the DPP have talk about integrity and legitimacy?
The DPP's dirty little secret does not end there. Why did Taipei impose a total ban on clenbuterol and ractopamine? In 2006 people on the Mainland died as a result of ingesting food containing clenbuterol and ractopamine. The Chen regime wanted to show that Taiwan's food safety standards were superior to the Mainland's. It vowed to apply "the most stringent standards ever." Therefore in October of that year, Council of Agriculture Chairman Su Jia-chyuan issued an order banning all such additives. The source of the problem on the Mainland was the more toxic clenbuterol. But the Chen regime was already on its high horse. The less toxic ractopamine, the only additive permitted in the US, was also banned.
In other words, between 2006 and 2008, under Chen administration rule, the public was eating clenbutuerol and ractopamine treated beef. The irony is that although the Chen administration made a big to do of totally banning clenbuterol and ractopamine, its bark was worse than its bite. In response to pressure from the U.S. government, it refrained from subjecting meat imports to rigorous inspection, In July 2007, Kaohsiung Customs seized a large quantity of US pork containing ractopamine. This led to a public outcry. Only then did the government tighten inspections and conduct investigations. Only then did the Chen administration reveal that it was merely going through the motions.
Chen Shui-bian traded clenbuterol imports for transit privileges. Chen administration officials yielded to diplomatic pressure. it looked the other way when inspecting US meat imports. It used the U.S. beef imports issue as a bargaining chip in a political game. Yet the DPP still boasts that it is "looking after the public health." It still pointedly avoids talking about how it conducted inspections of US meat imports.
Even more staggering is how Chen Shui-bian unilaterally shredded his commitment to the United States and the WTO. He boasted that by banning clenbuterol and ractopamine, he was "loving the people, caring for the people." To cope with both internal and external pressures, he renewed his commitment to the United States, then secretly deceived the Taiwan public by going through the motions while inspecting US meats. According to former Health Department Director Yaung Chi-liang, this charade continued until 2010. Under the Ma administration the responsibility for meat inspection was transferred to a different agency. The government began checking for Illegal use of clenbuterol by domestic pig farmers. Only then did customs agents resume testing of US beef for clenbuterol and ractopamine. A few years ago, no one on Taiwan knew U.S. beef contained clenbuterol or ractopamine. Only when the events of last year unfolded in swift succession, did the public become aware of the Chen administration's dirty little secret,
In other words, under DPP rule, prior to the 2006 Chen Shui-bian administration ban, the public was ingesting meat treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. Following the 2006 ban, the Chen administration never actually inspected US meats for clenbuterol and ractopamine. It merely went through the motions. While the Chen Shui-bian administration twiddled its thumbs, the people of Taiwan were ingesting clenbuterol and ractopamine treated beef and pork, in amounts hard to estimate. The Chen administration prohibited the import of meat treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. Then when the time came to inspect meat imports for clenbuterol and ractopamine, the Chen administration merely went through the motions. The Chen administration was intentionally negligent and duplicitous. It treated clenbuterol and ractopamine as a bargaining chip a game of political intrigue.
Some people insist on "zero clenbuterol and ractopamine." They see the Democratic Progressive Party say one thing while doing another. They think about all the meat they have eaten, and shudder. Some DPP leaders are still lambasting the Ma administration, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan." They need to take a hard look at the Chen administration's duplicity and capriciousness, then offer the public an explanation.
扁政府藏在瘦肉精裡的祕密
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.13 03:01 am
美國在台協會日前揭露，是扁政府向美承諾訂定瘦肉精殘留標準，而非馬政府。扁政府在二○○七年八月十六日通報世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）要公告萊克多巴胺容許量，載明生效日期為八月廿二日；但為何扁政府竟在短短幾天內出爾反爾，吞掉了這項承諾？
答案就藏在八月廿一日。那天，陳水扁出訪過境美國，僅獲准在遙遠的阿拉斯加過境九十分鐘，他惱羞成怒，全體團員都未下飛機。
此事的內幕是：陳水扁任內的第九次出訪，欲過境美國本土卻遲遲無法獲得美方同意，遂在行前數日以同意開放美牛瘦肉精為條件，希交換美方同意他過境美國本土重要城市。但後來華府仍僅同意他過境阿拉斯加，時間則由五十分鐘增為九十分鐘。陳水扁對此屈辱待遇「見笑轉生氣」，遂在阿拉斯加上演了「拒下飛機」的抗議戲碼，當然也把給ＷＴＯ的承諾一併撕毀。
正當民進黨連日嚴厲批評馬政府「賣台」、「出賣國民健康」之際，回頭看看扁政府時代處理美牛問題的粗暴、投機和反覆，即可知今天台灣面對美牛的難堪處境，許多是扁政府留下的禍根。其實，陳水扁決定開放瘦肉精與否，只為交換一次外交禮遇；而通報ＷＴＯ的公文可因私欲未遂而一夕撕毀，民進黨還談什麼誠信與正當？
民進黨藏在瘦肉精裡的祕密，還不僅如此。台灣之所以全面禁用瘦肉精，是因為二○○六年中國大陸發生民眾食用含強毒瘦肉精豬肉致死案件，扁政府為展現台灣的食品安全優於大陸，誓言要用「最嚴格的標準」把關。因此，在農委會主委蘇嘉全主導下，在當年十月下令將所有瘦肉精列為禁止項目。當時大陸惹禍的瘦肉精，是毒性較強的「克倫特羅」；但在扁政府的高調下，毒性較弱、也是美國唯一准用的瘦肉精「萊克多巴胺」也被列為禁藥。
也就是說，在扁政府執政前期的二○○○年至二○○六年，國人其實一直在吃「合法」的「含萊牛肉」；但吊詭的是，扁政府雖然擺出全面封殺瘦肉精的姿態，實際卻是色厲內荏，未對進口肉品真正實施檢驗，以回應美國政府的壓力。直到二○○七年七月，高雄海關查獲大批美國「豬肉」含有萊劑，引起外界譁然，政府始表示要加強檢驗查緝，也才露出了扁政府「光說不練」的馬腳。
很明顯的，無論陳水扁要用開放瘦肉精來換取過境禮遇，或行政部門用檢驗放水來減緩外交壓力，均是將美牛問題當作政治權謀來操作。但至今民進黨卻還在以「照顧國民健康」來居功，對行政放水則避而不談。
更令人咋舌的是，陳水扁雖片面撕毀了對美及對世貿組織的承諾，對內仍在炫耀禁用瘦肉精的「愛民、顧民」立場；但為了應付內外壓力，後來仍對美承諾，暗中繼續採取「不檢驗」的欺民作法。根據衛生署前署長楊志良的說法，直到二○一○年，馬政府因為進口肉品檢驗職責移轉，加以國內查獲豬農違法使用瘦肉精，海關才又開始恢復檢驗美牛瘦肉精。前些年，台灣一直未聞美牛含瘦肉精的問題，直到去年才連續發生，祕密正在於此。
換句話說，在二○○六年扁政府立禁之前，國人在民進黨執政下一直吃瘦肉精；而在二○○六年扁政府全面禁用瘦肉精以來，其實也從未認真執行檢驗，亦即在扁政府打混期間，台灣民眾吃下肚的瘦肉精，包括牛、豬在內，已難以計數。禁止也是扁政府，放水也是扁政府。如此刻意的行政疏怠和欺瞞，其實就等於在用瘦肉精玩弄政治權謀而已。
那些堅決要求「零瘦肉精」的人，看看民進黨的說一套、做一套，想想自己吃下的肉類，一定會感到不寒而慄。那些還在疾言厲色譴責馬政府賣台的民進黨人，回首一瞥扁政府的表裡不一及反覆無常，能否給國人一個交代？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2012
Summary: Some people insist on "zero clenbuterol and ractopamine." They see the Democratic Progressive Party say one thing while doing another. They think about all the meat they have eaten, and shudder. Some DPP leaders are still lambasting the Ma administration, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan." They need to take a hard look at the Chen administration's duplicity and capriciousness, then offer the public an explanation.
Full Text below:
The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) recently revealed that the Chen administration made a commitment to the U.S. government to establish standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content, not the Ma administration. On August 16, 2007, the Chen administration informed the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it would announce its standards for clenbuterol and ractopamine content, effective August 22. So why did the Chen administration renege on its commitment only a few days later?
The answer lies in the events of August 21. On that day, during Chen Shui-bian's visit to diplomatic allies, he transited the US. But Washington allowed him into the US for only 90 minutes, and only in far-flung Alaska. His humiliation turned to apoplexy. Not one member of his entourage deplaned.
Insiders say this was Chen Shui-bian's ninth visit during his term of office. Yet Washington still refused him permission to transit the continental United States. Then suddenly, just days before his trip, he agreed to allow US beef imports containing clenbuterol and ractopamine. His condition was that the US would permit him to transit major cities in the continental United States. But Washington only allowed him to transit Alaska, and limited his time to 50 to 90 minutes. At first Chen Shui-bian tried to laugh this humiliating treatment off. But his humiliation soon turned to apoplexy. This led to the Alaskan mini-drama of refusing to deplane, as a gesture of protest. Needless to say, Chen reneged on his commitment to the WTO regarding clenbuterol and ractopamine.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been lambasting the Ma administration for the past several days, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan" and "selling out our citizens' health." But recall how the Chen Shui-bian administration dealt with U.S. beef imports. Recall its crude opportunism and unprincipled flip-flopping. That is why the current administration finds itself in such an embarrassing quandary regarding U.S. beef imports. So many of the current administration's problems are messes left over by its predecessor, the Chen administration. Chen Shui-bian's decision to allow the importation of US beef containing clenbuterol or ractopamine depended solely on whether Washington would extend him the diplomatic courtesy of transiting the continental United States -- one time. Then, when Chen's personal whims were frustrated, he could shred a commitment to the WTO overnight. Under the circumstances, what right does the DPP have talk about integrity and legitimacy?
The DPP's dirty little secret does not end there. Why did Taipei impose a total ban on clenbuterol and ractopamine? In 2006 people on the Mainland died as a result of ingesting food containing clenbuterol and ractopamine. The Chen regime wanted to show that Taiwan's food safety standards were superior to the Mainland's. It vowed to apply "the most stringent standards ever." Therefore in October of that year, Council of Agriculture Chairman Su Jia-chyuan issued an order banning all such additives. The source of the problem on the Mainland was the more toxic clenbuterol. But the Chen regime was already on its high horse. The less toxic ractopamine, the only additive permitted in the US, was also banned.
In other words, between 2006 and 2008, under Chen administration rule, the public was eating clenbutuerol and ractopamine treated beef. The irony is that although the Chen administration made a big to do of totally banning clenbuterol and ractopamine, its bark was worse than its bite. In response to pressure from the U.S. government, it refrained from subjecting meat imports to rigorous inspection, In July 2007, Kaohsiung Customs seized a large quantity of US pork containing ractopamine. This led to a public outcry. Only then did the government tighten inspections and conduct investigations. Only then did the Chen administration reveal that it was merely going through the motions.
Chen Shui-bian traded clenbuterol imports for transit privileges. Chen administration officials yielded to diplomatic pressure. it looked the other way when inspecting US meat imports. It used the U.S. beef imports issue as a bargaining chip in a political game. Yet the DPP still boasts that it is "looking after the public health." It still pointedly avoids talking about how it conducted inspections of US meat imports.
Even more staggering is how Chen Shui-bian unilaterally shredded his commitment to the United States and the WTO. He boasted that by banning clenbuterol and ractopamine, he was "loving the people, caring for the people." To cope with both internal and external pressures, he renewed his commitment to the United States, then secretly deceived the Taiwan public by going through the motions while inspecting US meats. According to former Health Department Director Yaung Chi-liang, this charade continued until 2010. Under the Ma administration the responsibility for meat inspection was transferred to a different agency. The government began checking for Illegal use of clenbuterol by domestic pig farmers. Only then did customs agents resume testing of US beef for clenbuterol and ractopamine. A few years ago, no one on Taiwan knew U.S. beef contained clenbuterol or ractopamine. Only when the events of last year unfolded in swift succession, did the public become aware of the Chen administration's dirty little secret,
In other words, under DPP rule, prior to the 2006 Chen Shui-bian administration ban, the public was ingesting meat treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. Following the 2006 ban, the Chen administration never actually inspected US meats for clenbuterol and ractopamine. It merely went through the motions. While the Chen Shui-bian administration twiddled its thumbs, the people of Taiwan were ingesting clenbuterol and ractopamine treated beef and pork, in amounts hard to estimate. The Chen administration prohibited the import of meat treated with clenbuterol and ractopamine. Then when the time came to inspect meat imports for clenbuterol and ractopamine, the Chen administration merely went through the motions. The Chen administration was intentionally negligent and duplicitous. It treated clenbuterol and ractopamine as a bargaining chip a game of political intrigue.
Some people insist on "zero clenbuterol and ractopamine." They see the Democratic Progressive Party say one thing while doing another. They think about all the meat they have eaten, and shudder. Some DPP leaders are still lambasting the Ma administration, accusing it of "selling out Taiwan." They need to take a hard look at the Chen administration's duplicity and capriciousness, then offer the public an explanation.
扁政府藏在瘦肉精裡的祕密
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.13 03:01 am
美國在台協會日前揭露，是扁政府向美承諾訂定瘦肉精殘留標準，而非馬政府。扁政府在二○○七年八月十六日通報世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）要公告萊克多巴胺容許量，載明生效日期為八月廿二日；但為何扁政府竟在短短幾天內出爾反爾，吞掉了這項承諾？
答案就藏在八月廿一日。那天，陳水扁出訪過境美國，僅獲准在遙遠的阿拉斯加過境九十分鐘，他惱羞成怒，全體團員都未下飛機。
此事的內幕是：陳水扁任內的第九次出訪，欲過境美國本土卻遲遲無法獲得美方同意，遂在行前數日以同意開放美牛瘦肉精為條件，希交換美方同意他過境美國本土重要城市。但後來華府仍僅同意他過境阿拉斯加，時間則由五十分鐘增為九十分鐘。陳水扁對此屈辱待遇「見笑轉生氣」，遂在阿拉斯加上演了「拒下飛機」的抗議戲碼，當然也把給ＷＴＯ的承諾一併撕毀。
正當民進黨連日嚴厲批評馬政府「賣台」、「出賣國民健康」之際，回頭看看扁政府時代處理美牛問題的粗暴、投機和反覆，即可知今天台灣面對美牛的難堪處境，許多是扁政府留下的禍根。其實，陳水扁決定開放瘦肉精與否，只為交換一次外交禮遇；而通報ＷＴＯ的公文可因私欲未遂而一夕撕毀，民進黨還談什麼誠信與正當？
民進黨藏在瘦肉精裡的祕密，還不僅如此。台灣之所以全面禁用瘦肉精，是因為二○○六年中國大陸發生民眾食用含強毒瘦肉精豬肉致死案件，扁政府為展現台灣的食品安全優於大陸，誓言要用「最嚴格的標準」把關。因此，在農委會主委蘇嘉全主導下，在當年十月下令將所有瘦肉精列為禁止項目。當時大陸惹禍的瘦肉精，是毒性較強的「克倫特羅」；但在扁政府的高調下，毒性較弱、也是美國唯一准用的瘦肉精「萊克多巴胺」也被列為禁藥。
也就是說，在扁政府執政前期的二○○○年至二○○六年，國人其實一直在吃「合法」的「含萊牛肉」；但吊詭的是，扁政府雖然擺出全面封殺瘦肉精的姿態，實際卻是色厲內荏，未對進口肉品真正實施檢驗，以回應美國政府的壓力。直到二○○七年七月，高雄海關查獲大批美國「豬肉」含有萊劑，引起外界譁然，政府始表示要加強檢驗查緝，也才露出了扁政府「光說不練」的馬腳。
很明顯的，無論陳水扁要用開放瘦肉精來換取過境禮遇，或行政部門用檢驗放水來減緩外交壓力，均是將美牛問題當作政治權謀來操作。但至今民進黨卻還在以「照顧國民健康」來居功，對行政放水則避而不談。
更令人咋舌的是，陳水扁雖片面撕毀了對美及對世貿組織的承諾，對內仍在炫耀禁用瘦肉精的「愛民、顧民」立場；但為了應付內外壓力，後來仍對美承諾，暗中繼續採取「不檢驗」的欺民作法。根據衛生署前署長楊志良的說法，直到二○一○年，馬政府因為進口肉品檢驗職責移轉，加以國內查獲豬農違法使用瘦肉精，海關才又開始恢復檢驗美牛瘦肉精。前些年，台灣一直未聞美牛含瘦肉精的問題，直到去年才連續發生，祕密正在於此。
換句話說，在二○○六年扁政府立禁之前，國人在民進黨執政下一直吃瘦肉精；而在二○○六年扁政府全面禁用瘦肉精以來，其實也從未認真執行檢驗，亦即在扁政府打混期間，台灣民眾吃下肚的瘦肉精，包括牛、豬在內，已難以計數。禁止也是扁政府，放水也是扁政府。如此刻意的行政疏怠和欺瞞，其實就等於在用瘦肉精玩弄政治權謀而已。
那些堅決要求「零瘦肉精」的人，看看民進黨的說一套、做一套，想想自己吃下的肉類，一定會感到不寒而慄。那些還在疾言厲色譴責馬政府賣台的民進黨人，回首一瞥扁政府的表裡不一及反覆無常，能否給國人一個交代？
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relations: A Virtuous Circle
Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relations: A Virtuous Circle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2012
Summary: The presidential election was troubled and uncertain. Everything was put on on hold over the Chinese New Year. The pace slowed, even the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and liberalization. Only in March did it finally pick up again. We hope the two sides can now relate to each other with increased good faith. We hope this will lead to increased cross-Strait economic prosperity. Greater openness and freer exchanges will lead to greater cross-Strait economic synergy.
Full Text below:
The presidential election was troubled and uncertain. Everything was put on on hold over the Chinese New Year. The pace slowed, even the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and liberalization. Only in March did it finally pick up again. We hope the two sides can now relate to each other with increased good faith. We hope this will lead to increased cross-Strait economic prosperity. Greater openness and freer exchanges will lead to greater cross-Strait economic synergy.
The Mainland recently convened two conferences. Beijing's Minister of Commerce Chen Deming said, "This year the scope of ECFA early harvest tariff reductions will be expanded. More products from Taiwan, especially agricultural products, may be sold on the Mainland." He hopes that following ECFA, substantial progress can be made in trade in services and trade in goods. He also stressed the signing of the cross-Strait insurance agreement. "We are very happy to see more Mainland enterprises invest on Taiwan... and cross-Strait economic and trade relations make more progress. This is something we very much hope to see."
The FSC will enable banks from Taiwan to open branches on the Mainland ahead of schedule. It will enable banks from the Mainland to make limited investments in financial institutions on Taiwan. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is making plans for a third wave of Mainland investments. These include flat panels, semiconductors, and other "critical industries." The investment caps on Mainland capital will be raised. Assessments will soon be complete. An agreement will probably be announced this month.
This year the global economic situation remains volatile. In particular, the European economy has gone into recession. The U.S. economic recovery remains tentative and weak. The cross-Strait economic situation faces its own challenges. Mainland economic growth will slow this year. Can the Mainland really guarantee an 8% growth rate? Officials have voluntarily lowered the target to 7.5%. Mainland economic restructuring remains in its infancy. Asset bubbles are still being dealt with. Taiwan depends primarily on technology exports. The economies of Europe and the United States are weaker. This is exerting downward pressure on markets. South Korean companies are offering strong competition in DRAM, LCD, LED smart phones and other technology products. The financial sector on Taiwan has long been trapped within a narrow "Red Sea" market. It is under intense pressure to expand. The two sides must open up instead of guarding against everything under the sun. Opening up would enable closer cross-Strait economic and industry cooperation, and a more complementary division of labor. It would considerably enhance the quality of the cross-Strait economy and industry.
The LCD industry is a clear example. Taiwan's main competitor in the LCD industry is South Korea. Frankly, South Korea's Samsung, LG, and other manufacturers lead Taiwan brands in technology. They have stronger branding. At this stage they clearly have the upper hand. But companies from Taiwan are putting up a good fight with South Korean companies in the Mainland market. The main reason is cross-Strait cooperation. Mainland home appliance companies procured their flat panels from Taiwan. Mainland panel makers have gradually increased their own production capacity. But panel makers on Taiwan continue to hold the lead, both in technology and capacity. The two sides should cooperate, purchase each others' shares, invest in new factories, and adopt a more open attitude in general. Doing so would benefit both sides. Together they could resist South Korea. The 3/11 Earthquake reduced panel production on Japan. The South Korean media predicted that the future of the LCD industry would be a "contest between Greater China and South Korea."
The Ma administration took office in 2008. The cross-Strait economy became far more open than it was under Democratic Progressive Party rule. Nevertheless, the government was still fearful. This was true for most industries, including the financial sector. The government was overly cautious and restrictive regarding Mainland investments on Taiwan, and Taiwan investments on the Mainland. The result was one missed opportunity after another. For example, the Mainland authorities held open plant licenses for Taiwan companies. But the Ministry of Economic Affairs hemmed and hawed. As a result South Korea's Samsung and LG received approval first. The Ministry of Economic Affairs' policy of approving only obsolescent technology investments for the Mainland is totally wrong. It fails to take into account global competition and vendor concerns. It fails to take into account other countries' introduction of technology to the Mainland. Just what technology constitues core technology? Just what technology must be retained? Just what technology can we afford to let go of? Vendors know far better than the government. They have a greater sense of proportion. Improper government restrictions have stifled domestic competitiveness. Too often Taiwan companies have been forced to sit and watch as they lost market share. Examples include the petrochemical industry, automobile industry, semiconductor industry, LCD manufacturing industry, and financial industry. Ironically, the industries the government did not attach much importance to, such as the food industry, the furniture industry, affiliate marketing industry, were lucky enough to escape government restrictions. These bore fruit on the Mainland. Taiwan's small businesses aided the growth of the Mainland's big businesses.
We now look to the coming year. Cross-Strait relations affect cross-Strait insurance agreements and follow-up negotiations on the ECFA early harvest list. We hope these can be completed as soon as possible. They will enable deeper and more systematic cross-Strait economic relations, investments, industrial cooperation, and exchanges. They will enable more open-mindedness outside the system. We hope the two sides will be more open-minded about the technology industry, as well as traditional industries such as the petrochemical industry, naphtha cracking industry, and financial industry. Accelerate the magntitude and pace of liberalization. Allow the two sides to survive the global economic downturn together. Improve the health of the cross-Strait economic and industrial system.
兩岸經貿大步走 互補互強
2012-03-12中國時報
度過紛擾不定的總統大選、萬事暫休的農曆年假後，一度低調的放緩腳步、甚至接近暫停的兩岸經貿交流與開放步伐，在三月終於重新啟動。這次，我們期望兩岸本於善意與兩岸經濟的繁榮，能有更大的開放與交流，發揮更多的兩岸經濟互補互強的利基。
大陸兩會召開期間，大陸商務部長陳德銘表示，今年要擴大ＥＣＦＡ的早期收穫降稅範圍，讓更多的台灣產品─特別是農產品，銷售到大陸；他期望在ＥＣＦＡ後續服務貿易、貨品貿易談判，能取得實質進展；同時，他也強調在兩岸簽署投保協議後，「我們非常樂意看到更多的大陸企業到台灣投資發展」，「兩岸經貿關係相信還會進一步發展，這也是我們非常希望看到的事」。
台灣方面，除了金管會加速核准國銀登陸，同時也確定放寬大陸銀行投資國內金融機構的比例外，經濟部也正進行第三波陸資開放的規劃，包括面板、半導體等被認為具「關鍵性產業」，將放寬陸資投資比例的限制。預計在完成評估後，本月即可望定案對外公布。
面對今年多變的全球經濟情勢，特別是歐洲經濟已進入衰退，美國經濟復甦火苗仍微弱不定的情況，兩岸經濟也各自有本身的挑戰與問題。大陸是今年將放緩經濟成長腳步，是否能「保八」在未定之數─甚至官方主動把經濟目標調降為七．五％；大陸經濟結構的調整仍在起步階段，資產泡沫問題在處理中。而以科技產品為出口大宗的台灣，則除了面臨歐美經濟走弱、市場下滑的壓力外，更有韓國企業由ＤＲＡＭ、ＬＣＤ到ＬＥＤ、智慧型手機等各項科技產品上的強力競爭；國內金融業也因長期困於「小又窄」的國內紅海市場，有迫切又強大「不得不走出去」的壓力。兩岸如果能開誠佈公、不要彼此「防這防那」，讓兩岸的經濟與產業做更密切的合作、分工、互補，則對兩岸經濟與產業體質的提升，都會有相當大的助益。
ＬＣＤ產業就是個明顯例子。台灣的ＬＣＤ產業主要競爭對手就是韓國；坦白說，對於技術領先台廠、本身又有強大品牌做出海口的韓國三星、樂金等廠商，台灣現階段是明顯居下風。但台廠在大陸市場卻有與韓國廠商一拚的架勢，主要就是兩岸合作，大陸家電業者來台採購面板。目前雖然大陸本土的面板廠亦逐漸開出產能，但台灣在技術與規模上仍居領先地位。如果兩岸此時能對產業合作、參股、投資新建廠等採更開放態度，兩岸就能在「合則兩利」下一起受惠，攜手「對抗韓流」。事實上，在日本面板廠在三一一震災減產後，韓國媒體就稱未來ＬＣＤ產業將是「華語圈與韓國的對抗」。
從二○○八馬政府執政後，雖然對兩岸經濟採取遠較民進黨執政時期更開放的態度，但不能否認的是，許多時候仍是「不乾不脆」─包括一般產業及金融業方面，都對陸資來台投資的限制、台商赴大陸投資的項目，做過份保守的限制，結果是廠商的商機一再錯失。例如當大陸把面板廠執照「虛位以待」給台廠時，經濟部卻瞻前顧後，結果是讓韓國三星與樂金先拿到建廠批文。坦白說，經濟部一直以「核准較落後技術赴大陸投資」的觀點完全錯誤，既未考慮到廠商的全球競爭與佈局，更未考慮到其它國家亦會把技術帶到大陸。更何況，哪些技術是核心技術，該保留在手上，哪些是可釋出，廠商會比政府更了解、更有分寸。政府不當的限制扼殺國內企業的競爭力、坐視失去市場的例子太多了，從早年的石化、汽車到半導體、ＬＣＤ、金融業…，反而是政府不重視的食品、家具、通路…，幸運的逃過政府限制，紛紛在大陸開花結果，由台灣的小型企業，壯大為大陸的大型企業。
展望今年，兩岸除了影響總體面的投保協議、ＥＣＦＡ後續清單等談判，希望能儘速完成，讓兩岸經濟、投資、產業的合作交流更深化、更有制度性外，更希望兩岸不論是對科技產業、傳統產業（如石化的輕油裂解等）、金融業等，都能以更寬闊的心胸、加大也加快開放的幅度與腳步，讓兩岸一起度過這波全球經濟低潮，共同提升兩岸的經濟與產業體質。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2012
Summary: The presidential election was troubled and uncertain. Everything was put on on hold over the Chinese New Year. The pace slowed, even the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and liberalization. Only in March did it finally pick up again. We hope the two sides can now relate to each other with increased good faith. We hope this will lead to increased cross-Strait economic prosperity. Greater openness and freer exchanges will lead to greater cross-Strait economic synergy.
Full Text below:
The presidential election was troubled and uncertain. Everything was put on on hold over the Chinese New Year. The pace slowed, even the pace of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and liberalization. Only in March did it finally pick up again. We hope the two sides can now relate to each other with increased good faith. We hope this will lead to increased cross-Strait economic prosperity. Greater openness and freer exchanges will lead to greater cross-Strait economic synergy.
The Mainland recently convened two conferences. Beijing's Minister of Commerce Chen Deming said, "This year the scope of ECFA early harvest tariff reductions will be expanded. More products from Taiwan, especially agricultural products, may be sold on the Mainland." He hopes that following ECFA, substantial progress can be made in trade in services and trade in goods. He also stressed the signing of the cross-Strait insurance agreement. "We are very happy to see more Mainland enterprises invest on Taiwan... and cross-Strait economic and trade relations make more progress. This is something we very much hope to see."
The FSC will enable banks from Taiwan to open branches on the Mainland ahead of schedule. It will enable banks from the Mainland to make limited investments in financial institutions on Taiwan. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is making plans for a third wave of Mainland investments. These include flat panels, semiconductors, and other "critical industries." The investment caps on Mainland capital will be raised. Assessments will soon be complete. An agreement will probably be announced this month.
This year the global economic situation remains volatile. In particular, the European economy has gone into recession. The U.S. economic recovery remains tentative and weak. The cross-Strait economic situation faces its own challenges. Mainland economic growth will slow this year. Can the Mainland really guarantee an 8% growth rate? Officials have voluntarily lowered the target to 7.5%. Mainland economic restructuring remains in its infancy. Asset bubbles are still being dealt with. Taiwan depends primarily on technology exports. The economies of Europe and the United States are weaker. This is exerting downward pressure on markets. South Korean companies are offering strong competition in DRAM, LCD, LED smart phones and other technology products. The financial sector on Taiwan has long been trapped within a narrow "Red Sea" market. It is under intense pressure to expand. The two sides must open up instead of guarding against everything under the sun. Opening up would enable closer cross-Strait economic and industry cooperation, and a more complementary division of labor. It would considerably enhance the quality of the cross-Strait economy and industry.
The LCD industry is a clear example. Taiwan's main competitor in the LCD industry is South Korea. Frankly, South Korea's Samsung, LG, and other manufacturers lead Taiwan brands in technology. They have stronger branding. At this stage they clearly have the upper hand. But companies from Taiwan are putting up a good fight with South Korean companies in the Mainland market. The main reason is cross-Strait cooperation. Mainland home appliance companies procured their flat panels from Taiwan. Mainland panel makers have gradually increased their own production capacity. But panel makers on Taiwan continue to hold the lead, both in technology and capacity. The two sides should cooperate, purchase each others' shares, invest in new factories, and adopt a more open attitude in general. Doing so would benefit both sides. Together they could resist South Korea. The 3/11 Earthquake reduced panel production on Japan. The South Korean media predicted that the future of the LCD industry would be a "contest between Greater China and South Korea."
The Ma administration took office in 2008. The cross-Strait economy became far more open than it was under Democratic Progressive Party rule. Nevertheless, the government was still fearful. This was true for most industries, including the financial sector. The government was overly cautious and restrictive regarding Mainland investments on Taiwan, and Taiwan investments on the Mainland. The result was one missed opportunity after another. For example, the Mainland authorities held open plant licenses for Taiwan companies. But the Ministry of Economic Affairs hemmed and hawed. As a result South Korea's Samsung and LG received approval first. The Ministry of Economic Affairs' policy of approving only obsolescent technology investments for the Mainland is totally wrong. It fails to take into account global competition and vendor concerns. It fails to take into account other countries' introduction of technology to the Mainland. Just what technology constitues core technology? Just what technology must be retained? Just what technology can we afford to let go of? Vendors know far better than the government. They have a greater sense of proportion. Improper government restrictions have stifled domestic competitiveness. Too often Taiwan companies have been forced to sit and watch as they lost market share. Examples include the petrochemical industry, automobile industry, semiconductor industry, LCD manufacturing industry, and financial industry. Ironically, the industries the government did not attach much importance to, such as the food industry, the furniture industry, affiliate marketing industry, were lucky enough to escape government restrictions. These bore fruit on the Mainland. Taiwan's small businesses aided the growth of the Mainland's big businesses.
We now look to the coming year. Cross-Strait relations affect cross-Strait insurance agreements and follow-up negotiations on the ECFA early harvest list. We hope these can be completed as soon as possible. They will enable deeper and more systematic cross-Strait economic relations, investments, industrial cooperation, and exchanges. They will enable more open-mindedness outside the system. We hope the two sides will be more open-minded about the technology industry, as well as traditional industries such as the petrochemical industry, naphtha cracking industry, and financial industry. Accelerate the magntitude and pace of liberalization. Allow the two sides to survive the global economic downturn together. Improve the health of the cross-Strait economic and industrial system.
兩岸經貿大步走 互補互強
2012-03-12中國時報
度過紛擾不定的總統大選、萬事暫休的農曆年假後，一度低調的放緩腳步、甚至接近暫停的兩岸經貿交流與開放步伐，在三月終於重新啟動。這次，我們期望兩岸本於善意與兩岸經濟的繁榮，能有更大的開放與交流，發揮更多的兩岸經濟互補互強的利基。
大陸兩會召開期間，大陸商務部長陳德銘表示，今年要擴大ＥＣＦＡ的早期收穫降稅範圍，讓更多的台灣產品─特別是農產品，銷售到大陸；他期望在ＥＣＦＡ後續服務貿易、貨品貿易談判，能取得實質進展；同時，他也強調在兩岸簽署投保協議後，「我們非常樂意看到更多的大陸企業到台灣投資發展」，「兩岸經貿關係相信還會進一步發展，這也是我們非常希望看到的事」。
台灣方面，除了金管會加速核准國銀登陸，同時也確定放寬大陸銀行投資國內金融機構的比例外，經濟部也正進行第三波陸資開放的規劃，包括面板、半導體等被認為具「關鍵性產業」，將放寬陸資投資比例的限制。預計在完成評估後，本月即可望定案對外公布。
面對今年多變的全球經濟情勢，特別是歐洲經濟已進入衰退，美國經濟復甦火苗仍微弱不定的情況，兩岸經濟也各自有本身的挑戰與問題。大陸是今年將放緩經濟成長腳步，是否能「保八」在未定之數─甚至官方主動把經濟目標調降為七．五％；大陸經濟結構的調整仍在起步階段，資產泡沫問題在處理中。而以科技產品為出口大宗的台灣，則除了面臨歐美經濟走弱、市場下滑的壓力外，更有韓國企業由ＤＲＡＭ、ＬＣＤ到ＬＥＤ、智慧型手機等各項科技產品上的強力競爭；國內金融業也因長期困於「小又窄」的國內紅海市場，有迫切又強大「不得不走出去」的壓力。兩岸如果能開誠佈公、不要彼此「防這防那」，讓兩岸的經濟與產業做更密切的合作、分工、互補，則對兩岸經濟與產業體質的提升，都會有相當大的助益。
ＬＣＤ產業就是個明顯例子。台灣的ＬＣＤ產業主要競爭對手就是韓國；坦白說，對於技術領先台廠、本身又有強大品牌做出海口的韓國三星、樂金等廠商，台灣現階段是明顯居下風。但台廠在大陸市場卻有與韓國廠商一拚的架勢，主要就是兩岸合作，大陸家電業者來台採購面板。目前雖然大陸本土的面板廠亦逐漸開出產能，但台灣在技術與規模上仍居領先地位。如果兩岸此時能對產業合作、參股、投資新建廠等採更開放態度，兩岸就能在「合則兩利」下一起受惠，攜手「對抗韓流」。事實上，在日本面板廠在三一一震災減產後，韓國媒體就稱未來ＬＣＤ產業將是「華語圈與韓國的對抗」。
從二○○八馬政府執政後，雖然對兩岸經濟採取遠較民進黨執政時期更開放的態度，但不能否認的是，許多時候仍是「不乾不脆」─包括一般產業及金融業方面，都對陸資來台投資的限制、台商赴大陸投資的項目，做過份保守的限制，結果是廠商的商機一再錯失。例如當大陸把面板廠執照「虛位以待」給台廠時，經濟部卻瞻前顧後，結果是讓韓國三星與樂金先拿到建廠批文。坦白說，經濟部一直以「核准較落後技術赴大陸投資」的觀點完全錯誤，既未考慮到廠商的全球競爭與佈局，更未考慮到其它國家亦會把技術帶到大陸。更何況，哪些技術是核心技術，該保留在手上，哪些是可釋出，廠商會比政府更了解、更有分寸。政府不當的限制扼殺國內企業的競爭力、坐視失去市場的例子太多了，從早年的石化、汽車到半導體、ＬＣＤ、金融業…，反而是政府不重視的食品、家具、通路…，幸運的逃過政府限制，紛紛在大陸開花結果，由台灣的小型企業，壯大為大陸的大型企業。
展望今年，兩岸除了影響總體面的投保協議、ＥＣＦＡ後續清單等談判，希望能儘速完成，讓兩岸經濟、投資、產業的合作交流更深化、更有制度性外，更希望兩岸不論是對科技產業、傳統產業（如石化的輕油裂解等）、金融業等，都能以更寬闊的心胸、加大也加快開放的幅度與腳步，讓兩岸一起度過這波全球經濟低潮，共同提升兩岸的經濟與產業體質。
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Beware of Turning Diplomacy Inside Out
Beware of Turning Diplomacy Inside Out
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2012
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have stabilized in recent years. Cross-Strait diplomatic confrontation abroad has also moderated. And yet our government has encountered obstacles in the appointment of representatives to several usually friendly nations. Our relationships with them have stagnated. What does this "inside out" turn of events mean? Has a problem arisen within our diplomatic hierarchy? The question is one President Ma must take seriously.
Full Text below:
Cross-Strait relations have stabilized in recent years. Cross-Strait diplomatic confrontation abroad has also moderated. And yet our government has encountered obstacles in the appointment of representatives to several usually friendly nations. Our relationships with them have stagnated. What does this "inside out" turn of events mean? Has a problem arisen within our diplomatic hierarchy? The question is one President Ma must take seriously.
ROC Representative to Singapore Vanessa Shih stepped on a landmine in Taipei/Singapore relations. As a result she was recalled. Only yesterday did Singapore finally approve the appointment of Hsieh Fa-ta as her successor. Prior to this, ROC Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu led a delegation to Singapore. Green Camp legislators, in contravention of bilateral confidentiality agreements, recklessly revealed this fact. Bilateral relations suffered yet another blow. At the same time, ROC Representative to Japan John Feng has retired. Successor Shen Ssu-tsun does not speak Japanese well and is not knowledgeable about Japan. This has also invited criticism.
Vanessa Shi was Ma Ying-jeou's personally appointed representative to Singapore. But she could not win the trust of the Singapore government. Does Singapore hold a grudge against President Ma? Perhaps not. But bilateral frictions have persisted for several months. Lien Chan was commissioned to attend the APEC Summit and act as go-between. The hope was that he could communicate with former National Security Council Secretary-General Ting Mou-shi before visiting Singapore. But he was turned down. From this we can see that Singapore's displeasure was hardly trivial. Our candidates for Representative to Singapore were belatedly approved. The Taipei/Singapore economic partnership agreement was delayed for nearly two years. There may well be a deeper reason. The Ma administration's response may well be tardy.
Vanessa Shi is a trusted diplomat born in the 1950's. Her recall was more than a personal setback. It was a setback for every diplomat of her generation. Consider the controversy over Shen Ssu-tsun. He may be a qualified career diplomat. But Japan is a country with special cultural characteristics. It is very different from the Czech Republic or Canada. A representative who lacks knowledge about Japan will inevitably appear inadequate. President Ma may underscore his support for Shen Ssu-tsun by offering a direct line to himself. But Vanessa Shi also had a direct line to Ma. Nevertheless she still stepped on a landmine. Clearly stable diplomatic relations depend more on day to day vigilance than on a diplomat's relationship to a president.
The administration could not find a knowledgeable Representative to Japan, This represents more than an inability to pick qualified talent. This represents the emptiness of the diplomatic talent pool. This includes Representative to the United States Jason Yuan, He is 70 years old and about to retire. Where will we find a qualified successor? This is another thorny issue for the Ma administration. Especially given the U.S. beef imports controversy, TIFA, arms sales, and other issues currently on hold. These increase the difficulty of choosing a representative. New personnel reluctantly assigned to these positions may not be up to the task. Inviting experienced veterans to return will only inspire resentment among those in line for promotion.
This gap in succession is a side effect of two changes in the nation's ruling party. So far no effective solution has been found. Simply put, the Chen Shui-bian regime refused to swear allegiance to the Republic of China during its eight year reign, This shock to the system marginalized professional diplomats. During these eight years, ignorant amateurs ordered about and interfered with knowledgeable professionals. They disrupted the promotion of professional diplomats. Their refusal to swear allegiance to the Republic of China created a rupture in the system, leading to a massive brain drain. The Ma administration was unable to remedy this situation during its first four-year term. Cross-Strait relations were being mended. Diplomatic relations were neglected. They changed from a state of confrontation to a state of truce. They fell apart, Some overseas stations were unable to formulate new operational principles. As a result morale plummeted and discipline was lost.
Consider the most obvious example. In recent years overseas stations experienced frequent lapses in discipline, and even scandals relating to personal conduct. These have inflicted serious damage to the Republic of China's national image. Last year the ROC Representative to Fiji, Chin Ji-hsing was involved in an illicit affair. He is also suspected of misusing public funds. Subsequently the ROC Representive to Kansas Liu Shan-shan was suspected of abusing her domestic staff. She was arrested in the United States and must stand trial. Recently, ROC Representative to South Africa, First Secretary Lu Ching-yang, alleged persecution by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the disbursement of public funds, She threatened to seek political asylum in South Africa. These incidents of illicit affairs, abuse of foreign domestic staff, and political asylum scandals, reveal Ministry of Foreign Affairs mismanagegment. They also reveal a personal ethical crisis among diplomats. This is an even more serious problem than the lack of diplomatic talent,
The relationship between Taipei and Singapore has changed. Faultlines have disrupted the personnel succession in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomats posted abroad have been repeatedly involved in scandals. These reveal the loose screws in the diplomatic machinery. They reveal a deeper crisis in national allegiance and personal ethics. We would like to offer President Ma a suggestion. Cross-Strait relations are undergoing a thaw. But multi-lateral diplomacy must not be ignored as a consequence. We have won visa-free entry to over a hundred different countries. But we cannot ignore the cultivation of long term diplomatic relations. This series of "inside out" events is a warning sign.
小心外交陣線外弛內張問題
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.09 01:52 am
近年兩岸關係穩定，兩岸在全球的外交交鋒也轉趨緩和；在此之際，我國派駐幾個傳統友好國家的代表卻同時傳出異動調整不順暢，乃至關係停滯的問題。這種「外弛內張」的現象，究竟外交體系出了什麼問題，馬總統恐不能掉以輕心。
駐星代表史亞平因踩到台星關係紅線遭調回，繼任人選等候星國的同意已經多時，直到昨天才同意由謝發達接任。在此之前，國防部長高華柱率團訪星的消息遭綠營立委在違反雙方保密協定下輕率曝光，對雙方關係則更雪上加霜。與此同時，駐日代表馮寄台退休，接替的沈斯淳則因日語程度及缺乏「知日」背景，亦招致外界議論。
史亞平是馬英九欽點的駐星代表，她無法獲得新加坡政府的信賴，也許不必上綱為星國與馬總統的芥蒂。但雙邊摩擦已長達數月，其間更曾委託連戰利用出席APEC居間傳話，希望由國安會前祕書長丁懋時赴星溝通，卻遭婉拒；由此可見，新加坡的不悅恐非芝麻小事。我方提名的新代表遲遲始獲對方同意，包括台星洽簽經濟夥伴協議延擱了近兩年，恐有更深層的原因，馬政府的應對恐嫌遲緩。
史亞平是五年級外交官中受到重用的代表人物，她的鎩羽而歸，不僅是她個人的挫折，也是中生代外交官試煉的挫敗。再看沈斯淳的爭議，他雖有「專業外交官」的資歷，但出使日本這樣文化獨特的國家，畢竟與其派駐捷克和加拿大的經驗截然不同；缺乏知日背景，總是讓人感到不足。儘管馬總統以「直達天聽」為沈斯淳加持，但反觀史亞平的「天聽」卻弄到台星關係亮起紅燈，可見外交關係的穩定更在乎平日的步步為營，而不在乎外交官的個人關係。
駐日代表無法尋求適當的知日人士出任，若不是政府擇才的偏失，那恐怕就是外交人才庫的空虛問題了。包括駐美代表袁健生，即將屆滿七十歲退休，如何尋覓其接任人選，目前也是馬政府的棘手問題。尤其在美牛問題衝擊下，ＴＩＦＡ、軍售等議題擱置不前，在在增加了選擇使者的難度。勉強派出新人，恐不足以膺重任；再請老將出馬，又增加體系升遷阻塞的怨懟。
這種青黃不接的現象，其實是台灣兩度政黨輪替所帶來的副作用，迄今無法有效解決。簡單地說，陳水扁執政的八年，因國家認同的歧異，對外交體系造成了強烈的排擠作用及震盪效應。八年之中，在外行領導及政治干擾下，不僅讓外交官的升遷和價值出現了異化和斷裂，也造成不少人才流失；但這個現象，卻未能在馬政府的首任四年適度修補或調整。相反的，由於兩岸關係的修和，外交陣線從先前的對峙狀態變成休兵狀態，不僅顯得鬆懈，有些地方甚至因無法產生新的工作方針，而失去士氣和紀律。
最明顯的例子，近年駐外單位頻頻爆出風紀問題，甚至私德醜聞，已嚴重影響台灣的國家形象。去年中我駐斐濟大使秦日新在駐地爆發不倫戀，同時涉嫌濫用公款；其後我駐堪薩斯代表處長劉姍姍涉嫌虐傭，更在美國遭逮捕受審；近日，更傳出駐南非一等祕書呂清揚因代墊公款問題而謂遭外交部打壓，一度揚言要向南非尋求「政治庇護」。這一連串不倫戀、苛虐外傭及政治庇護醜聞，一方面顯示外交部在管理上的失當，另方面也暴露了外交官員缺乏私德的倫理危機；這比起外交人才的捉襟見肘，危險性恐怕猶有過之。
從台星關係的生變，到外交的人才斷層，到駐外人員的醜聞事件頻傳，都反映當前外交體系管理螺絲鬆弛，且埋藏著更深刻的認同和倫理危機。我們要提醒馬總統注意的是：在兩岸關係走向和解之際，仍不可輕忽台灣多邊外交之平衡；在為免簽證國家破百而自得之餘，不能忘記更深層的外交耕耘。這一連串「外弛內張」的現象，已經發出了嚴重的警訊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2012
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have stabilized in recent years. Cross-Strait diplomatic confrontation abroad has also moderated. And yet our government has encountered obstacles in the appointment of representatives to several usually friendly nations. Our relationships with them have stagnated. What does this "inside out" turn of events mean? Has a problem arisen within our diplomatic hierarchy? The question is one President Ma must take seriously.
Full Text below:
Cross-Strait relations have stabilized in recent years. Cross-Strait diplomatic confrontation abroad has also moderated. And yet our government has encountered obstacles in the appointment of representatives to several usually friendly nations. Our relationships with them have stagnated. What does this "inside out" turn of events mean? Has a problem arisen within our diplomatic hierarchy? The question is one President Ma must take seriously.
ROC Representative to Singapore Vanessa Shih stepped on a landmine in Taipei/Singapore relations. As a result she was recalled. Only yesterday did Singapore finally approve the appointment of Hsieh Fa-ta as her successor. Prior to this, ROC Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu led a delegation to Singapore. Green Camp legislators, in contravention of bilateral confidentiality agreements, recklessly revealed this fact. Bilateral relations suffered yet another blow. At the same time, ROC Representative to Japan John Feng has retired. Successor Shen Ssu-tsun does not speak Japanese well and is not knowledgeable about Japan. This has also invited criticism.
Vanessa Shi was Ma Ying-jeou's personally appointed representative to Singapore. But she could not win the trust of the Singapore government. Does Singapore hold a grudge against President Ma? Perhaps not. But bilateral frictions have persisted for several months. Lien Chan was commissioned to attend the APEC Summit and act as go-between. The hope was that he could communicate with former National Security Council Secretary-General Ting Mou-shi before visiting Singapore. But he was turned down. From this we can see that Singapore's displeasure was hardly trivial. Our candidates for Representative to Singapore were belatedly approved. The Taipei/Singapore economic partnership agreement was delayed for nearly two years. There may well be a deeper reason. The Ma administration's response may well be tardy.
Vanessa Shi is a trusted diplomat born in the 1950's. Her recall was more than a personal setback. It was a setback for every diplomat of her generation. Consider the controversy over Shen Ssu-tsun. He may be a qualified career diplomat. But Japan is a country with special cultural characteristics. It is very different from the Czech Republic or Canada. A representative who lacks knowledge about Japan will inevitably appear inadequate. President Ma may underscore his support for Shen Ssu-tsun by offering a direct line to himself. But Vanessa Shi also had a direct line to Ma. Nevertheless she still stepped on a landmine. Clearly stable diplomatic relations depend more on day to day vigilance than on a diplomat's relationship to a president.
The administration could not find a knowledgeable Representative to Japan, This represents more than an inability to pick qualified talent. This represents the emptiness of the diplomatic talent pool. This includes Representative to the United States Jason Yuan, He is 70 years old and about to retire. Where will we find a qualified successor? This is another thorny issue for the Ma administration. Especially given the U.S. beef imports controversy, TIFA, arms sales, and other issues currently on hold. These increase the difficulty of choosing a representative. New personnel reluctantly assigned to these positions may not be up to the task. Inviting experienced veterans to return will only inspire resentment among those in line for promotion.
This gap in succession is a side effect of two changes in the nation's ruling party. So far no effective solution has been found. Simply put, the Chen Shui-bian regime refused to swear allegiance to the Republic of China during its eight year reign, This shock to the system marginalized professional diplomats. During these eight years, ignorant amateurs ordered about and interfered with knowledgeable professionals. They disrupted the promotion of professional diplomats. Their refusal to swear allegiance to the Republic of China created a rupture in the system, leading to a massive brain drain. The Ma administration was unable to remedy this situation during its first four-year term. Cross-Strait relations were being mended. Diplomatic relations were neglected. They changed from a state of confrontation to a state of truce. They fell apart, Some overseas stations were unable to formulate new operational principles. As a result morale plummeted and discipline was lost.
Consider the most obvious example. In recent years overseas stations experienced frequent lapses in discipline, and even scandals relating to personal conduct. These have inflicted serious damage to the Republic of China's national image. Last year the ROC Representative to Fiji, Chin Ji-hsing was involved in an illicit affair. He is also suspected of misusing public funds. Subsequently the ROC Representive to Kansas Liu Shan-shan was suspected of abusing her domestic staff. She was arrested in the United States and must stand trial. Recently, ROC Representative to South Africa, First Secretary Lu Ching-yang, alleged persecution by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the disbursement of public funds, She threatened to seek political asylum in South Africa. These incidents of illicit affairs, abuse of foreign domestic staff, and political asylum scandals, reveal Ministry of Foreign Affairs mismanagegment. They also reveal a personal ethical crisis among diplomats. This is an even more serious problem than the lack of diplomatic talent,
The relationship between Taipei and Singapore has changed. Faultlines have disrupted the personnel succession in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomats posted abroad have been repeatedly involved in scandals. These reveal the loose screws in the diplomatic machinery. They reveal a deeper crisis in national allegiance and personal ethics. We would like to offer President Ma a suggestion. Cross-Strait relations are undergoing a thaw. But multi-lateral diplomacy must not be ignored as a consequence. We have won visa-free entry to over a hundred different countries. But we cannot ignore the cultivation of long term diplomatic relations. This series of "inside out" events is a warning sign.
小心外交陣線外弛內張問題
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.09 01:52 am
近年兩岸關係穩定，兩岸在全球的外交交鋒也轉趨緩和；在此之際，我國派駐幾個傳統友好國家的代表卻同時傳出異動調整不順暢，乃至關係停滯的問題。這種「外弛內張」的現象，究竟外交體系出了什麼問題，馬總統恐不能掉以輕心。
駐星代表史亞平因踩到台星關係紅線遭調回，繼任人選等候星國的同意已經多時，直到昨天才同意由謝發達接任。在此之前，國防部長高華柱率團訪星的消息遭綠營立委在違反雙方保密協定下輕率曝光，對雙方關係則更雪上加霜。與此同時，駐日代表馮寄台退休，接替的沈斯淳則因日語程度及缺乏「知日」背景，亦招致外界議論。
史亞平是馬英九欽點的駐星代表，她無法獲得新加坡政府的信賴，也許不必上綱為星國與馬總統的芥蒂。但雙邊摩擦已長達數月，其間更曾委託連戰利用出席APEC居間傳話，希望由國安會前祕書長丁懋時赴星溝通，卻遭婉拒；由此可見，新加坡的不悅恐非芝麻小事。我方提名的新代表遲遲始獲對方同意，包括台星洽簽經濟夥伴協議延擱了近兩年，恐有更深層的原因，馬政府的應對恐嫌遲緩。
史亞平是五年級外交官中受到重用的代表人物，她的鎩羽而歸，不僅是她個人的挫折，也是中生代外交官試煉的挫敗。再看沈斯淳的爭議，他雖有「專業外交官」的資歷，但出使日本這樣文化獨特的國家，畢竟與其派駐捷克和加拿大的經驗截然不同；缺乏知日背景，總是讓人感到不足。儘管馬總統以「直達天聽」為沈斯淳加持，但反觀史亞平的「天聽」卻弄到台星關係亮起紅燈，可見外交關係的穩定更在乎平日的步步為營，而不在乎外交官的個人關係。
駐日代表無法尋求適當的知日人士出任，若不是政府擇才的偏失，那恐怕就是外交人才庫的空虛問題了。包括駐美代表袁健生，即將屆滿七十歲退休，如何尋覓其接任人選，目前也是馬政府的棘手問題。尤其在美牛問題衝擊下，ＴＩＦＡ、軍售等議題擱置不前，在在增加了選擇使者的難度。勉強派出新人，恐不足以膺重任；再請老將出馬，又增加體系升遷阻塞的怨懟。
這種青黃不接的現象，其實是台灣兩度政黨輪替所帶來的副作用，迄今無法有效解決。簡單地說，陳水扁執政的八年，因國家認同的歧異，對外交體系造成了強烈的排擠作用及震盪效應。八年之中，在外行領導及政治干擾下，不僅讓外交官的升遷和價值出現了異化和斷裂，也造成不少人才流失；但這個現象，卻未能在馬政府的首任四年適度修補或調整。相反的，由於兩岸關係的修和，外交陣線從先前的對峙狀態變成休兵狀態，不僅顯得鬆懈，有些地方甚至因無法產生新的工作方針，而失去士氣和紀律。
最明顯的例子，近年駐外單位頻頻爆出風紀問題，甚至私德醜聞，已嚴重影響台灣的國家形象。去年中我駐斐濟大使秦日新在駐地爆發不倫戀，同時涉嫌濫用公款；其後我駐堪薩斯代表處長劉姍姍涉嫌虐傭，更在美國遭逮捕受審；近日，更傳出駐南非一等祕書呂清揚因代墊公款問題而謂遭外交部打壓，一度揚言要向南非尋求「政治庇護」。這一連串不倫戀、苛虐外傭及政治庇護醜聞，一方面顯示外交部在管理上的失當，另方面也暴露了外交官員缺乏私德的倫理危機；這比起外交人才的捉襟見肘，危險性恐怕猶有過之。
從台星關係的生變，到外交的人才斷層，到駐外人員的醜聞事件頻傳，都反映當前外交體系管理螺絲鬆弛，且埋藏著更深刻的認同和倫理危機。我們要提醒馬總統注意的是：在兩岸關係走向和解之際，仍不可輕忽台灣多邊外交之平衡；在為免簽證國家破百而自得之餘，不能忘記更深層的外交耕耘。這一連串「外弛內張」的現象，已經發出了嚴重的警訊。
Speaking Freely About US Beef Imports
Speaking Freely About US Beef Imports
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 8, 2012
Summary: One can stop smoking. But one cannot prevent the sale of cigarettes. We cannot stop the sale of U.S. beef imports containing Clenbuterol and Ractopamine. But we can decide whether we eat them. This is how matters stand in over 160 countries around the world. The public on Taiwan must understand how to respond to both scientific evidence and diplomatic pressure. We need only shine some light on the issue.
Full Text below:
On March 3, Premier Sean Chen announced a "three noes" policy on U.S. beef imports: no commitments, no timetables, no preconceptions. On the evening of March 5, the Executive Yuan announced that US beef could be imported to Taiwan, on four conditions: safety permits, separation of beef and pork, mandatory labeling, and no organ meats.
The U.S. beef imports controversy involves two major issues. First, scientific evidence. Second, diplomatic pressure. Rational policy debate on Taiwan is often difficult. Neither side is willing to consider the pros and cons of the issue. The U.S. beef imports controversy is a Gordian Knot. Those stubbornly opposed to U.S. beef imports are unwilling to consider the scientific evidence. Meanwhile the Ma administration denies feeling any diplomatic pressure.
In fact, the Ma administration has long been aware of both the scientific evidence and the diplomatic pressure. But it feigned ignorance and proclaimed its "three noes" posture. The Ma administration hoped that open and democratic debate would provide it with the public support it sought. As expected, open debate merely enabled those opposed to US beef imports to swiftly gain the upper hand and monopolize media coverage. It even had a chilling effect on public expression. Intense debate failed to produce greater clarity. On the contrary, it precipitated greater confrontation. The Ma administration has lost its chance to enjoy fair winds and following seas. It now finds itself sailing against the wind and swimming against the tide.
First take the scientific arguments. The issue has already been intensely debated. On March 4th, President Ma cited conclusions reached by experts on US beef imports after they met for the third time: "There is no scientific evidence that the consumption of meat containing the feed additive ractopamine is harmful to human beings." Sticklers for precision may want to add the condition, "so far." That would be more accurate. Nevertheless, this is the currently available scientific evidence. Dissenters may harbor doubts. But they cannot cite any scientific evidence to the contrary. As Yang Chi-liang opined, "If President Ma rams his policy through, he will have to bear the political consequences." But Yang also opined that hundreds of millions of Americans have been eating US beef products for the past decade. That amounts to the most comprehensive experiment using human subjects one could ever imagine. Among the nations of the world, only the 27 nations of the EU, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have banned ractopamine treated beef. Others, including Japan and South Korea, allow importation, either conditionally or unconditionally. This shows scientific support for ractopamine treated beef. Those dead set against the use of ractopamine in beef can stress their concerns. But they must still cite scientific arguments in response to scientific arguments.
Take diplomatic pressure. The Ma administration initially denied that Washington had linked U.S. beef imports to diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington. It denied any link to TIFA and TPP. It denied any link to US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Francisco Sanchez's cancellation of his visit to Taiwan. It said it had made "no commitment" to Washington. It was wary of charges of "trading sovereignty for US beef." But none of these charges were true. The Ma administration did attempt a cover-up. The public did feel the Ma administration was putting on an act, was being opaque, and had lost important leverage. Sure enough, at the last minute President Ma admitted that "On condition that our national health remains unharmed, domestic industry, trade, diplomacy and other factors must be considered." He also admitted through various channels that "diplomatic pressure" had increased.
If our government permits the importation of US containing safe amounts of ractopamine, the European Union and Mainland China will be the only governments in the world still prohibiting them. The U.S. is unable to exert pressure on the EU unrelated to the scientific evidence. Beijing is also able to resist any pressures Washington might bring to bear. Tokyo and Seoul have already made concessions. Taipei wants TIFA, TPP, visa-free treatment, and extradition agreements. These cards are all in Washington's hands. Taipei is in no position to resist.
The real key to U.S. beef imports is social psychology, industry interests, and Taiwan's economic liberalization. Take social psychology, Politically speaking it is difficult to say what is "humiliating." After all, the Chen Shui-bian government also promised to permit U.S. beef imports. Tokyo and Seoul have done likewise. Take food safety. Mandatory labeling showing the country of origin is non-negotiable, This will allow anyone who with doubts about the safety of US beef to boycott it. Another possiblity is to label U.S. beef as "containing Ractopamine" and "not containing Ractopamine," and allow consumers to choose.
Take industry interests. The government should keep beef and pork separate. This will protect pig farmers. Cattle ranchers are no longer protected. The beef industry is defunct, and the pork industry is on life support. The government hopes to hold the line in areas where scienfific evidence is not an issue. The United States does not want to overplay its hand. It wants to avoid provoking even greater public anger.
Take Taiwan's economic liberalization, If our refusal to allow U.S. beef imports delays visa-free access, extradition, TIFA, and TPP, then we are being penny wise and pound foolish. For Washington to delay closer Taipei/Washington relations over US beef imports would be disproportionate. We hope that once the dust settles, Taipei and Washington can accelerate the implementation of bilateral projects, This will help integrate Taiwan into the international community, This would be in Taipei and Washington's interest alike.
One can stop smoking. But one cannot prevent the sale of cigarettes. We cannot stop the sale of U.S. beef imports containing Clenbuterol and Ractopamine. But we can decide whether we eat them. This is how matters stand in over 160 countries around the world. The public on Taiwan must understand how to respond to both scientific evidence and diplomatic pressure. We need only shine some light on the issue.
打開天窗說美牛
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.08 01:48 am
三月三日，行政院長陳?宣示美牛政策的「三沒有」，「沒有任何承諾，沒有時間表，沒有預設立場」；三月五日晚間，行政院宣布，在「安全容許，牛豬分離，強制標示，排除內臟」的「四條件」下，可望有條件開放美牛。
美牛議題有兩大焦點，一是科學論據，二是外交壓力。在台灣，公共政策辯論的困難往往在於，正反雙方都不願打開天窗說亮話。美牛事件的癥結正在於：絕對反對美牛開放者不願理性面對「科學論據」，而馬政府方面則諱言「外交壓力」。
其實，馬政府對美牛問題的「科學論據」及「外交壓力」早已心知肚明，只是故作「三沒有」狀，希望能經由開放的民主辯論，取得「順水推舟」的勢位；詎料，開放辯論後，反對聲浪挾民調優勢迅速取得上風，充斥媒體篇幅，甚至使相對意見出現寒蟬效應，事理並未愈辯愈明，反而使撕裂對立更趨嚴重。至此，馬政府非但失去「順水推舟」的勢位，反而處於「逆水行舟」的惡境。
先說「科學論據」。在經歷各方辯論後，馬總統在四日舉出第三次美牛專家會議的結論稱，「沒有科學證據證明食用飼料添加萊克多巴胺的肉品對人體有害」；若要較講究一些，此說可訂正為「（迄今）沒有科學證據」，即更精準。不過，無論如何，這應是目前可供參照的科學論據；持異議者或可提出種種「疑慮」，但皆無「科學證據」提出反證。另如楊志良雖認為，「馬總統若硬幹，須承擔政治後果」；但他也認為，數億美國人吃了十幾年，這就是最好的「人體實驗」。何況，全世界只有歐盟二十七國及台海兩岸禁止「萊劑牛肉」，其他包括日韓在內，皆不禁或有條件開放，此亦可證明萊劑牛肉在科學論據上有其支撐。絕對反對萊劑牛肉者，可以強調其疑慮，但也須以科學論據回應科學論據。
再談「外交壓力」。馬政府起初矢口否認美牛議題與台美外交掛鉤，謂與TIFA、TPP沒有連結，美商務次長取消訪台亦無關聯，對美亦「沒有任何承諾」；這是唯恐陷於「主權換美牛」的罵名，但這些皆非真相。馬政府的遮掩，使人覺得做作，不面對，不透明，且是自己丟掉了一隻有用的槓桿。果然，到了最後關頭，馬總統也承認，要「在國民健康無害的前提下，就國內產業、經貿、外交等層面兼籌並顧」，並從各個管道增加放出「外交壓力」的訊息。
如果台灣也有條件開放安全容量下的萊劑牛肉，全世界就只剩歐盟及中國大陸禁止；唯因美國對歐盟沒有「非科學的壓力」，中國大陸也比較挺得住，則日韓既已讓步，台灣又有TIFA、TPP、免簽、引渡協定握在老美手裡，已無抵拒的可能性。
美牛問題的核心問題，其實是在社會心理問題、產業利益問題及台灣開放問題。關於社會心理問題，一方面是在政治上，不宜說什麼「喪權辱國」的話；其實扁政府也承諾過開放美牛，畢竟日韓也挺不住。另一方面是在食品安全上，必須明確標示是不可退讓的底線，或者強制標示產地，可使對美牛有疑慮者不吃所有美牛，或區隔標示「含萊」及「不含萊」的美牛，讓消費者自主選擇。
產業利益問題，則是應盡量力守「牛豬分離」的政策，以保護本土養豬戶。如今牛肉棄守，牛亡豬寒，政府要力挺這個「非科學理由」的防線，美方亦莫為已甚，庶免激起更大的民憤。
至於台灣開放問題，台灣若因美牛而延誤免簽證、引渡、TIFA、TPP等作為，誠是因小失大；而美國若因美牛而延阻台美關係在那些方面的進展，尤其是不符比例。希望在美牛事件塵埃落定後，台美能加速這些延誤的雙邊工程，促使台灣成為更開放的國際角色，畢竟這最能符合台美的共同利益。
可以不吸菸，但做不到不賣菸；擋不住萊劑美牛進口，但吃不吃卻有自主權。這是全世界一百六十餘國家的現況，台灣人民也必會懂得在「科學論據」與「外交壓力」下如何因應，只要大家都能打開天窗說亮話。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 8, 2012
Summary: One can stop smoking. But one cannot prevent the sale of cigarettes. We cannot stop the sale of U.S. beef imports containing Clenbuterol and Ractopamine. But we can decide whether we eat them. This is how matters stand in over 160 countries around the world. The public on Taiwan must understand how to respond to both scientific evidence and diplomatic pressure. We need only shine some light on the issue.
Full Text below:
On March 3, Premier Sean Chen announced a "three noes" policy on U.S. beef imports: no commitments, no timetables, no preconceptions. On the evening of March 5, the Executive Yuan announced that US beef could be imported to Taiwan, on four conditions: safety permits, separation of beef and pork, mandatory labeling, and no organ meats.
The U.S. beef imports controversy involves two major issues. First, scientific evidence. Second, diplomatic pressure. Rational policy debate on Taiwan is often difficult. Neither side is willing to consider the pros and cons of the issue. The U.S. beef imports controversy is a Gordian Knot. Those stubbornly opposed to U.S. beef imports are unwilling to consider the scientific evidence. Meanwhile the Ma administration denies feeling any diplomatic pressure.
In fact, the Ma administration has long been aware of both the scientific evidence and the diplomatic pressure. But it feigned ignorance and proclaimed its "three noes" posture. The Ma administration hoped that open and democratic debate would provide it with the public support it sought. As expected, open debate merely enabled those opposed to US beef imports to swiftly gain the upper hand and monopolize media coverage. It even had a chilling effect on public expression. Intense debate failed to produce greater clarity. On the contrary, it precipitated greater confrontation. The Ma administration has lost its chance to enjoy fair winds and following seas. It now finds itself sailing against the wind and swimming against the tide.
First take the scientific arguments. The issue has already been intensely debated. On March 4th, President Ma cited conclusions reached by experts on US beef imports after they met for the third time: "There is no scientific evidence that the consumption of meat containing the feed additive ractopamine is harmful to human beings." Sticklers for precision may want to add the condition, "so far." That would be more accurate. Nevertheless, this is the currently available scientific evidence. Dissenters may harbor doubts. But they cannot cite any scientific evidence to the contrary. As Yang Chi-liang opined, "If President Ma rams his policy through, he will have to bear the political consequences." But Yang also opined that hundreds of millions of Americans have been eating US beef products for the past decade. That amounts to the most comprehensive experiment using human subjects one could ever imagine. Among the nations of the world, only the 27 nations of the EU, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have banned ractopamine treated beef. Others, including Japan and South Korea, allow importation, either conditionally or unconditionally. This shows scientific support for ractopamine treated beef. Those dead set against the use of ractopamine in beef can stress their concerns. But they must still cite scientific arguments in response to scientific arguments.
Take diplomatic pressure. The Ma administration initially denied that Washington had linked U.S. beef imports to diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington. It denied any link to TIFA and TPP. It denied any link to US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Francisco Sanchez's cancellation of his visit to Taiwan. It said it had made "no commitment" to Washington. It was wary of charges of "trading sovereignty for US beef." But none of these charges were true. The Ma administration did attempt a cover-up. The public did feel the Ma administration was putting on an act, was being opaque, and had lost important leverage. Sure enough, at the last minute President Ma admitted that "On condition that our national health remains unharmed, domestic industry, trade, diplomacy and other factors must be considered." He also admitted through various channels that "diplomatic pressure" had increased.
If our government permits the importation of US containing safe amounts of ractopamine, the European Union and Mainland China will be the only governments in the world still prohibiting them. The U.S. is unable to exert pressure on the EU unrelated to the scientific evidence. Beijing is also able to resist any pressures Washington might bring to bear. Tokyo and Seoul have already made concessions. Taipei wants TIFA, TPP, visa-free treatment, and extradition agreements. These cards are all in Washington's hands. Taipei is in no position to resist.
The real key to U.S. beef imports is social psychology, industry interests, and Taiwan's economic liberalization. Take social psychology, Politically speaking it is difficult to say what is "humiliating." After all, the Chen Shui-bian government also promised to permit U.S. beef imports. Tokyo and Seoul have done likewise. Take food safety. Mandatory labeling showing the country of origin is non-negotiable, This will allow anyone who with doubts about the safety of US beef to boycott it. Another possiblity is to label U.S. beef as "containing Ractopamine" and "not containing Ractopamine," and allow consumers to choose.
Take industry interests. The government should keep beef and pork separate. This will protect pig farmers. Cattle ranchers are no longer protected. The beef industry is defunct, and the pork industry is on life support. The government hopes to hold the line in areas where scienfific evidence is not an issue. The United States does not want to overplay its hand. It wants to avoid provoking even greater public anger.
Take Taiwan's economic liberalization, If our refusal to allow U.S. beef imports delays visa-free access, extradition, TIFA, and TPP, then we are being penny wise and pound foolish. For Washington to delay closer Taipei/Washington relations over US beef imports would be disproportionate. We hope that once the dust settles, Taipei and Washington can accelerate the implementation of bilateral projects, This will help integrate Taiwan into the international community, This would be in Taipei and Washington's interest alike.
One can stop smoking. But one cannot prevent the sale of cigarettes. We cannot stop the sale of U.S. beef imports containing Clenbuterol and Ractopamine. But we can decide whether we eat them. This is how matters stand in over 160 countries around the world. The public on Taiwan must understand how to respond to both scientific evidence and diplomatic pressure. We need only shine some light on the issue.
打開天窗說美牛
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.08 01:48 am
三月三日，行政院長陳?宣示美牛政策的「三沒有」，「沒有任何承諾，沒有時間表，沒有預設立場」；三月五日晚間，行政院宣布，在「安全容許，牛豬分離，強制標示，排除內臟」的「四條件」下，可望有條件開放美牛。
美牛議題有兩大焦點，一是科學論據，二是外交壓力。在台灣，公共政策辯論的困難往往在於，正反雙方都不願打開天窗說亮話。美牛事件的癥結正在於：絕對反對美牛開放者不願理性面對「科學論據」，而馬政府方面則諱言「外交壓力」。
其實，馬政府對美牛問題的「科學論據」及「外交壓力」早已心知肚明，只是故作「三沒有」狀，希望能經由開放的民主辯論，取得「順水推舟」的勢位；詎料，開放辯論後，反對聲浪挾民調優勢迅速取得上風，充斥媒體篇幅，甚至使相對意見出現寒蟬效應，事理並未愈辯愈明，反而使撕裂對立更趨嚴重。至此，馬政府非但失去「順水推舟」的勢位，反而處於「逆水行舟」的惡境。
先說「科學論據」。在經歷各方辯論後，馬總統在四日舉出第三次美牛專家會議的結論稱，「沒有科學證據證明食用飼料添加萊克多巴胺的肉品對人體有害」；若要較講究一些，此說可訂正為「（迄今）沒有科學證據」，即更精準。不過，無論如何，這應是目前可供參照的科學論據；持異議者或可提出種種「疑慮」，但皆無「科學證據」提出反證。另如楊志良雖認為，「馬總統若硬幹，須承擔政治後果」；但他也認為，數億美國人吃了十幾年，這就是最好的「人體實驗」。何況，全世界只有歐盟二十七國及台海兩岸禁止「萊劑牛肉」，其他包括日韓在內，皆不禁或有條件開放，此亦可證明萊劑牛肉在科學論據上有其支撐。絕對反對萊劑牛肉者，可以強調其疑慮，但也須以科學論據回應科學論據。
再談「外交壓力」。馬政府起初矢口否認美牛議題與台美外交掛鉤，謂與TIFA、TPP沒有連結，美商務次長取消訪台亦無關聯，對美亦「沒有任何承諾」；這是唯恐陷於「主權換美牛」的罵名，但這些皆非真相。馬政府的遮掩，使人覺得做作，不面對，不透明，且是自己丟掉了一隻有用的槓桿。果然，到了最後關頭，馬總統也承認，要「在國民健康無害的前提下，就國內產業、經貿、外交等層面兼籌並顧」，並從各個管道增加放出「外交壓力」的訊息。
如果台灣也有條件開放安全容量下的萊劑牛肉，全世界就只剩歐盟及中國大陸禁止；唯因美國對歐盟沒有「非科學的壓力」，中國大陸也比較挺得住，則日韓既已讓步，台灣又有TIFA、TPP、免簽、引渡協定握在老美手裡，已無抵拒的可能性。
美牛問題的核心問題，其實是在社會心理問題、產業利益問題及台灣開放問題。關於社會心理問題，一方面是在政治上，不宜說什麼「喪權辱國」的話；其實扁政府也承諾過開放美牛，畢竟日韓也挺不住。另一方面是在食品安全上，必須明確標示是不可退讓的底線，或者強制標示產地，可使對美牛有疑慮者不吃所有美牛，或區隔標示「含萊」及「不含萊」的美牛，讓消費者自主選擇。
產業利益問題，則是應盡量力守「牛豬分離」的政策，以保護本土養豬戶。如今牛肉棄守，牛亡豬寒，政府要力挺這個「非科學理由」的防線，美方亦莫為已甚，庶免激起更大的民憤。
至於台灣開放問題，台灣若因美牛而延誤免簽證、引渡、TIFA、TPP等作為，誠是因小失大；而美國若因美牛而延阻台美關係在那些方面的進展，尤其是不符比例。希望在美牛事件塵埃落定後，台美能加速這些延誤的雙邊工程，促使台灣成為更開放的國際角色，畢竟這最能符合台美的共同利益。
可以不吸菸，但做不到不賣菸；擋不住萊劑美牛進口，但吃不吃卻有自主權。這是全世界一百六十餘國家的現況，台灣人民也必會懂得在「科學論據」與「外交壓力」下如何因應，只要大家都能打開天窗說亮話。
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
Non-Partisan Perspective on Major Policy Issues
Non-Partisan Perspective on Major Policy Issues
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 7, 2012
Summary: Amidst intense controversy, the Sean Chen cabinet has set forth four conditions for U.S. beef imports. If we examine these conditions, we find they are not that different from the conditions set forth by the Chen administration when it allowed US beef imports in mid-2007. Basically it follows Japan's dual track approach. The difference today is that the roles of the two parties have been reversed. The Ma administration has gone from being the opposition party, to being the ruling party responsible for making policy. The DPP has gone from advocating US beef imports to opposing them.
Full Text below:
Amidst intense controversy, the Sean Chen cabinet has set forth four conditions for U.S. beef imports. If we examine these conditions, we find they are not that different from the conditions set forth by the Chen administration when it allowed US beef imports in mid-2007. Basically it follows Japan's dual track approach. The difference today is that the roles of the two parties have been reversed. The Ma administration has gone from being the opposition party, to being the ruling party responsible for making policy. The DPP has gone from advocating US beef imports to opposing them.
Such a change in policy positions may be informed by the two parties' status as ruling and opposition parties. But it also reveals the shallowness of partisan politics on Taiwan, It leads to chronic missteps in political debate and decision making. In theory, the ruling party must consider the larger interests of the nation. When faced with incompatible alternatives it must weigh the pros and cons and make difficult choices. Opposition parties do not bear this burden, They can dig in their heels on any issue they choose. As long as they can embarrass the ruling party, they can score points. But when faced with major national issues, the ruling and opposition parties must find an alternative to gridlock.
Take the clenbuterol and ractopamine controversy, If the issue were only national health and national dignity, then of course, we should not compromise. But the United States has linked U.S. beef imports to the US-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). If we fail to resolve the clenbuterol and ractopamine controversy, far-reaching bilateral economic and trade agreements will be put on indefinite hold. This is the point at which the ruling and opposition parties must modify their position. They must agree not to undermine national health, then find a way to ensure the safety of US beef imports. That must be their priority. Japan and Korea have provided us with excellent examples of how to handle the U.S. beef imports controversy.
Five years ago the Blue Camp opposed the import of clenbuterol and ractopamine treated US beef. This led to the Ma administration's current dilemma. This offers us a profound lesson. Now take the DPP. When it was the ruling party it insisted that ractopamine was "safe." It went so far as to secretly discontinue inspections. Today the shoe is on the other foot. The DPP is now blasting the Ma administration for selling out the nation's health. The DPP was initially respectful, but later obdurate. It was also self-contradictory. Worse still, the Ma administration allowed the import of US beef containing clenbuterol and ractopamine out of concern for the nation's larger economic and trade interests. The Chen administration discontinued inspections of U.S. beef containing clenbuterol and ractopamine in exchange for allowing Chen Shui-bian to transit the United States. The motives in the two cases were hardly comparable.
Nor was U.S. beef imports the only issue. In recent years, political parties have flip-flopped repeatedly, They have contradicted themselves endlessly. Among them, the DPP has been the worst. The most notorious examples are the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant project, the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project, and subsidies for elderly farmers. In every one of these cases the Green Camp said one thing while in power, and another thing when it was out. It repudiated everything it said before. It disregarded the immense price paid by the nation and by society.
The DPP finds it easy to indulge in these inconsistencies. The main reason is its incorrect understanding of the role of an opposition party. During its early years the DPP opposed anything and everything the government did. Doing so enabled it to break the KMT's monopoly on power. As a result it concluded, incorrectly, that the raison d'etre of an opposition party is obstructionism. The DPP concluded, incorrectly, that only by singing a different tune can it check and balance the power of the ruling KMT. Such reasoning betrays an immature and irrational political consciousness. When carried to the extreme, it is often harmful to the national interest. Moreover, the DPP was the ruling party for eight years. It made who knows how many decisions. Now it finds itself in the opposition. If it now persists in irrational obstructionism, in utter disregard of the larger national interest. it merely exposes its own capriciousness, its lack of enduring convictions, its lack of guiding principles.
Advanced democracies long ago arrived at non-partisan/bipartisan means of compromise in order to solve major national controversies. When ruling party change becomes the norm. opportunities that arise while one in the opposition, become obstacles when one is in power. That is why political parties must begin by considering the national interest. That is why they must adhere to their core values. On U.S. beef imports in particular, the ruling and opposition parties must be on the same page. They must ensure food import safety. They must implement TIFA, This is the real "Taiwan consensus." They must not engage in bloody internecine conflict. Otherwise the ruling and opposition parties will each go their own way, provoking public anxiety. In the end, the government will still be forced to open the doors to U.S. beef imports. The opposition might get some small pleasure out of drawing blood. But would it be in the nation's interest?
Party interests must not trump the national interest. This is the basic premise behind non-partisan consultation. This is how the ruling and opposition parties must begin to think about national affairs. In 2007 COA chairman Su Chia-chuan spoke out on the U.S. beef imports controversy. He said that medical experts have proven that clenbuterol and ractopamine are beneficial to the livestock industry. Therefore banning clenbuterol and ractopanine is unreasonable. At the time Ma Ying-jeou, who was running for president, vowed to protect the public health, He opposed the double standard for clenbuterol and ractopamine, which banned pork but not beef. Today the two sides have switched places, They may wish to rethink their positions before and after. Consider this a lesson for both the ruling and opposition parties, one that hopefully will teach them the value of transcending partisanship.
以超黨派視野面對國家重大議題
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.07 01:56 am
在漫天爭議中，陳?內閣就美國牛肉安全性提出四項條件，作為開放進口的管理方向。仔細比較，這些條件和二○○七年扁政府計畫開放美牛的構思，其實沒有太大差異，走的都是日本的「雙軌制」。不同的是，如今朝野角色對調，馬政府從當年的反對者變成決策者，民進黨則從主張開放站到了反方。
這樣的立場轉變，雖是執政與在野的角色易位使然，卻也說明了我國政黨政治文化的淺薄，導致政治論辯和決策的顛躓反覆。理論上，執政黨必須有整體的國家治理考量，在面對難以兩全的選擇時，必須權衡大局理出輕重得失，作出取捨。在野黨則無此負擔，可以在單一議題上全力杯葛，只要讓執政者難堪，自己就能得分。問題是，面對國家重大議題時，朝野除了對立，難道沒有第二條路可走？
以瘦肉精議題為例，若只從國民健康及主權尊嚴的立場看，當然不該有任何妥協。然而，當美方將美牛和美台貿易暨投資架構協定（ＴＩＦＡ）掛勾，不解決瘦肉精問題，影響深遠的雙邊經貿協定即無限期擱置；此時，朝野談論問題的視野自須隨之調整，如何在不損及國民健康的前提下一致對外，尋求最周全的進口管理，才是重要主軸。這些，從日、韓處理美牛問題的先例，都提供了極佳借鏡。
對馬政府而言，藍軍五年前杯葛瘦肉精開放，導致今天自己窮於面對此一棘手難題，當然是一個深刻的教訓。反觀民進黨，當年執政時聲稱萊克多巴胺是「安全的」，甚至私下偷偷解除了瘦肉精的行政檢驗；今天卻倒轉立場，反咬馬政府出賣國民健康，不僅前恭後倨，且自我矛盾。尤有甚者，馬政府今天開放瘦肉精，是著眼於台灣更大的經貿利益；而扁政府當初停驗美牛瘦肉精，只是為了交換陳水扁過境美國，兩者的用心設想，不能同日而語。
不僅美牛議題如此，近年來，政黨政策立場反覆不定、甚至自我矛盾的事件層出不窮；其中，尤以民進黨更為嚴重。最有名的例子，如核四案、國光石化案、老農津貼案等，無一不是綠色執政時說一套，在野時又全盤推翻，絲毫不考慮國家、社會付出的巨大成本。
民進黨之所以如此易於出爾反爾，主要原因是對「反對黨」角色作了錯誤解讀。民進黨早年靠著千方百計的杯葛和抵制，突破了國民黨的一黨獨大，這使它誤以為反對黨的角色就只有杯葛，以為只有和執政黨唱反調才是民主制衡。這種想法，其實並不是真正成熟、理性的政治態度，一旦推到極端，更往往會危害國家利益。更何況，民進黨有過執政八年的歷史，經手的決策不知凡幾；若一味為反對而反對，不顧國家整體利益，只會暴露自己的反覆無常，缺乏一貫信念及中心思想。
事實上，觀察先進民主國家的做法，早就發展出一套「超黨派」（Bipartisan）的妥協方式，來解決國家的重大爭議。亦即，一旦政黨輪替成為常態，所有在野時遇到的「機會」，都會成為自己在朝時的「風險」；那麼，政黨在思考問題時就不能不從更高的國家利益出發，並掌握自己的核心價值。在美牛這種問題上，朝野政黨更重要的是一致對外，做好進口把關，以便向ＴＩＦＡ進發，這才是最大的「台灣共識」，而不是只會在內部自相殘殺。否則，以目前朝野的各說各話繼續發展，民眾的恐慌被煽起，而政府最後仍得向美牛開放門戶，結果在野黨賺到了一點殺伐的快感，那會更符合台灣的利益嗎？
政黨的利益，不該高於國家的利益，這是「超黨派」協商的基本思維，也是朝野學習思考國家大政的出發點。二○○七年，農委會主委蘇嘉全面對美牛問題時說，若醫療單位證明使用瘦肉精對畜牧業有幫助，「禁瘦肉精就沒道理」；而正在競選總統的馬英九則聲言要維護國民健康，反對瘦肉精「禁豬不禁牛」的一國兩制。如今，雙方易地而處，不妨好好想想自己立場的前後顛躓變化，就當作朝野共同學習超越黨派的一課吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 7, 2012
Summary: Amidst intense controversy, the Sean Chen cabinet has set forth four conditions for U.S. beef imports. If we examine these conditions, we find they are not that different from the conditions set forth by the Chen administration when it allowed US beef imports in mid-2007. Basically it follows Japan's dual track approach. The difference today is that the roles of the two parties have been reversed. The Ma administration has gone from being the opposition party, to being the ruling party responsible for making policy. The DPP has gone from advocating US beef imports to opposing them.
Full Text below:
Amidst intense controversy, the Sean Chen cabinet has set forth four conditions for U.S. beef imports. If we examine these conditions, we find they are not that different from the conditions set forth by the Chen administration when it allowed US beef imports in mid-2007. Basically it follows Japan's dual track approach. The difference today is that the roles of the two parties have been reversed. The Ma administration has gone from being the opposition party, to being the ruling party responsible for making policy. The DPP has gone from advocating US beef imports to opposing them.
Such a change in policy positions may be informed by the two parties' status as ruling and opposition parties. But it also reveals the shallowness of partisan politics on Taiwan, It leads to chronic missteps in political debate and decision making. In theory, the ruling party must consider the larger interests of the nation. When faced with incompatible alternatives it must weigh the pros and cons and make difficult choices. Opposition parties do not bear this burden, They can dig in their heels on any issue they choose. As long as they can embarrass the ruling party, they can score points. But when faced with major national issues, the ruling and opposition parties must find an alternative to gridlock.
Take the clenbuterol and ractopamine controversy, If the issue were only national health and national dignity, then of course, we should not compromise. But the United States has linked U.S. beef imports to the US-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). If we fail to resolve the clenbuterol and ractopamine controversy, far-reaching bilateral economic and trade agreements will be put on indefinite hold. This is the point at which the ruling and opposition parties must modify their position. They must agree not to undermine national health, then find a way to ensure the safety of US beef imports. That must be their priority. Japan and Korea have provided us with excellent examples of how to handle the U.S. beef imports controversy.
Five years ago the Blue Camp opposed the import of clenbuterol and ractopamine treated US beef. This led to the Ma administration's current dilemma. This offers us a profound lesson. Now take the DPP. When it was the ruling party it insisted that ractopamine was "safe." It went so far as to secretly discontinue inspections. Today the shoe is on the other foot. The DPP is now blasting the Ma administration for selling out the nation's health. The DPP was initially respectful, but later obdurate. It was also self-contradictory. Worse still, the Ma administration allowed the import of US beef containing clenbuterol and ractopamine out of concern for the nation's larger economic and trade interests. The Chen administration discontinued inspections of U.S. beef containing clenbuterol and ractopamine in exchange for allowing Chen Shui-bian to transit the United States. The motives in the two cases were hardly comparable.
Nor was U.S. beef imports the only issue. In recent years, political parties have flip-flopped repeatedly, They have contradicted themselves endlessly. Among them, the DPP has been the worst. The most notorious examples are the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant project, the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project, and subsidies for elderly farmers. In every one of these cases the Green Camp said one thing while in power, and another thing when it was out. It repudiated everything it said before. It disregarded the immense price paid by the nation and by society.
The DPP finds it easy to indulge in these inconsistencies. The main reason is its incorrect understanding of the role of an opposition party. During its early years the DPP opposed anything and everything the government did. Doing so enabled it to break the KMT's monopoly on power. As a result it concluded, incorrectly, that the raison d'etre of an opposition party is obstructionism. The DPP concluded, incorrectly, that only by singing a different tune can it check and balance the power of the ruling KMT. Such reasoning betrays an immature and irrational political consciousness. When carried to the extreme, it is often harmful to the national interest. Moreover, the DPP was the ruling party for eight years. It made who knows how many decisions. Now it finds itself in the opposition. If it now persists in irrational obstructionism, in utter disregard of the larger national interest. it merely exposes its own capriciousness, its lack of enduring convictions, its lack of guiding principles.
Advanced democracies long ago arrived at non-partisan/bipartisan means of compromise in order to solve major national controversies. When ruling party change becomes the norm. opportunities that arise while one in the opposition, become obstacles when one is in power. That is why political parties must begin by considering the national interest. That is why they must adhere to their core values. On U.S. beef imports in particular, the ruling and opposition parties must be on the same page. They must ensure food import safety. They must implement TIFA, This is the real "Taiwan consensus." They must not engage in bloody internecine conflict. Otherwise the ruling and opposition parties will each go their own way, provoking public anxiety. In the end, the government will still be forced to open the doors to U.S. beef imports. The opposition might get some small pleasure out of drawing blood. But would it be in the nation's interest?
Party interests must not trump the national interest. This is the basic premise behind non-partisan consultation. This is how the ruling and opposition parties must begin to think about national affairs. In 2007 COA chairman Su Chia-chuan spoke out on the U.S. beef imports controversy. He said that medical experts have proven that clenbuterol and ractopamine are beneficial to the livestock industry. Therefore banning clenbuterol and ractopanine is unreasonable. At the time Ma Ying-jeou, who was running for president, vowed to protect the public health, He opposed the double standard for clenbuterol and ractopamine, which banned pork but not beef. Today the two sides have switched places, They may wish to rethink their positions before and after. Consider this a lesson for both the ruling and opposition parties, one that hopefully will teach them the value of transcending partisanship.
以超黨派視野面對國家重大議題
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.03.07 01:56 am
在漫天爭議中，陳?內閣就美國牛肉安全性提出四項條件，作為開放進口的管理方向。仔細比較，這些條件和二○○七年扁政府計畫開放美牛的構思，其實沒有太大差異，走的都是日本的「雙軌制」。不同的是，如今朝野角色對調，馬政府從當年的反對者變成決策者，民進黨則從主張開放站到了反方。
這樣的立場轉變，雖是執政與在野的角色易位使然，卻也說明了我國政黨政治文化的淺薄，導致政治論辯和決策的顛躓反覆。理論上，執政黨必須有整體的國家治理考量，在面對難以兩全的選擇時，必須權衡大局理出輕重得失，作出取捨。在野黨則無此負擔，可以在單一議題上全力杯葛，只要讓執政者難堪，自己就能得分。問題是，面對國家重大議題時，朝野除了對立，難道沒有第二條路可走？
以瘦肉精議題為例，若只從國民健康及主權尊嚴的立場看，當然不該有任何妥協。然而，當美方將美牛和美台貿易暨投資架構協定（ＴＩＦＡ）掛勾，不解決瘦肉精問題，影響深遠的雙邊經貿協定即無限期擱置；此時，朝野談論問題的視野自須隨之調整，如何在不損及國民健康的前提下一致對外，尋求最周全的進口管理，才是重要主軸。這些，從日、韓處理美牛問題的先例，都提供了極佳借鏡。
對馬政府而言，藍軍五年前杯葛瘦肉精開放，導致今天自己窮於面對此一棘手難題，當然是一個深刻的教訓。反觀民進黨，當年執政時聲稱萊克多巴胺是「安全的」，甚至私下偷偷解除了瘦肉精的行政檢驗；今天卻倒轉立場，反咬馬政府出賣國民健康，不僅前恭後倨，且自我矛盾。尤有甚者，馬政府今天開放瘦肉精，是著眼於台灣更大的經貿利益；而扁政府當初停驗美牛瘦肉精，只是為了交換陳水扁過境美國，兩者的用心設想，不能同日而語。
不僅美牛議題如此，近年來，政黨政策立場反覆不定、甚至自我矛盾的事件層出不窮；其中，尤以民進黨更為嚴重。最有名的例子，如核四案、國光石化案、老農津貼案等，無一不是綠色執政時說一套，在野時又全盤推翻，絲毫不考慮國家、社會付出的巨大成本。
民進黨之所以如此易於出爾反爾，主要原因是對「反對黨」角色作了錯誤解讀。民進黨早年靠著千方百計的杯葛和抵制，突破了國民黨的一黨獨大，這使它誤以為反對黨的角色就只有杯葛，以為只有和執政黨唱反調才是民主制衡。這種想法，其實並不是真正成熟、理性的政治態度，一旦推到極端，更往往會危害國家利益。更何況，民進黨有過執政八年的歷史，經手的決策不知凡幾；若一味為反對而反對，不顧國家整體利益，只會暴露自己的反覆無常，缺乏一貫信念及中心思想。
事實上，觀察先進民主國家的做法，早就發展出一套「超黨派」（Bipartisan）的妥協方式，來解決國家的重大爭議。亦即，一旦政黨輪替成為常態，所有在野時遇到的「機會」，都會成為自己在朝時的「風險」；那麼，政黨在思考問題時就不能不從更高的國家利益出發，並掌握自己的核心價值。在美牛這種問題上，朝野政黨更重要的是一致對外，做好進口把關，以便向ＴＩＦＡ進發，這才是最大的「台灣共識」，而不是只會在內部自相殘殺。否則，以目前朝野的各說各話繼續發展，民眾的恐慌被煽起，而政府最後仍得向美牛開放門戶，結果在野黨賺到了一點殺伐的快感，那會更符合台灣的利益嗎？
政黨的利益，不該高於國家的利益，這是「超黨派」協商的基本思維，也是朝野學習思考國家大政的出發點。二○○七年，農委會主委蘇嘉全面對美牛問題時說，若醫療單位證明使用瘦肉精對畜牧業有幫助，「禁瘦肉精就沒道理」；而正在競選總統的馬英九則聲言要維護國民健康，反對瘦肉精「禁豬不禁牛」的一國兩制。如今，雙方易地而處，不妨好好想想自己立場的前後顛躓變化，就當作朝野共同學習超越黨派的一課吧！
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