Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul FTA Sets Off Alarms in Taipei
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2012
Summary: Recently leaders of Mainland China, South Korea, and Japan signed an
investment agreement in Beijing. They agreed to negotiate a three nation
FTA (Free Trade Area). They expect to make it official two or three
years down the road. This is not a death knell for Taiwan's economic and
trade relations, But it is definitely a warning bell. If the government
and private industry cannot catch up, Taiwan's economic future will be
in jeopardy. No wonder President Ma expressed concern, No wonder he
instructed the Executive Yuan to accelerate economic and trade
negotiations with other nations. No wonder he stressed that follow-up
consultations with the Mainland over ECFA must be completed as soon as
possible. Otherwise the competitive advantage Taiwan enjoys over Japan
and South Korea, made possible by ECFA, will soon be neutralized. .
Full Text below:
Recently leaders of Mainland China, South Korea, and Japan signed an investment agreement in Beijing. They agreed to negotiate a three nation FTA (Free Trade Area). They expect to make it official two or three years down the road. This is not a death knell for Taiwan's economic and trade relations, But it is definitely a warning bell. If the government and private industry cannot catch up, Taiwan's economic future will be in jeopardy. No wonder President Ma expressed concern, No wonder he instructed the Executive Yuan to accelerate economic and trade negotiations with other nations. No wonder he stressed that follow-up consultations with the Mainland over ECFA must be completed as soon as possible. Otherwise the competitive advantage Taiwan enjoys over Japan and South Korea, made possible by ECFA, will soon be neutralized. .
Asia has Four Little Dragons. Hong Kong and Singapore are city-states, They are mainly service and financial industry oriented. Their gross domestic product (GDP) may be lower. But their per capita income is higher. Taiwan and South Korea, on the other hand, are manufacturing oriented. The two economies export largely the same products. Consequently South Korea is regarded as a direct competitor. The two economies each have strengths and weaknesses. Taiwan has long been in the lead. South Korea even collapsed during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. It caught up only in 2000.
While recovering from the 2008 financial tsunami, the strengths and weaknesses of the two economies became clear. The gap between Taiwan and South Korea has steadily widened. Over the past few years, South Korea has been moving full speed ahead. It has signed FTAs with major nations as the United States, India, and the European Union. Taiwan meanwhile, signed nothing except ECFA with the Mainland. Taiwan's technology industry clearly lags in DRAM and LCD production. ECFA has enabled Taiwan to catch its breath by enabling it to retain its competitive advantage in the Mainland market. Taiwan can still compete with South Korea in the Mainland LCD market. In fact it commands a slightly larger share of the market than South Korea. But if the mainland and South Korea sign an FTA, the advantages ECFA provides Taiwan will be completely neutralized. Faced with these pressures and changes in the strategic picture, can government authorities, the ruling and opposition parties, and the general public really remain unconscious and unresponsive?
Over the past decade, global trade and economic relations have shifted in the direction of bilateral agreements. The trend is unlikely to change. Nearly 300 FTAs have been signed the world over. South Korea has seen the farthest and made the most elaborate plans. South Korea has signed FTAs with the United States and the European Union. India has followed suit. It is negotiating FTAs with Mainland China and Japan, the world's second and third largest economies, If these are signed, Mainland China's FTAs with Japan and South Korea will account for over 12 trillion dollars in GDP. They will account for almost a fifth of the world's wealth. South Korea's global FTA master plan will be complete.
Nations that sign FTAs demand that both sides open their markets to each other, usually in three to five years. They demand that tariffs on over 95% of the products they export be reduced to zero. They demand the removal of import barriers. Once tariffs are reduced to zero, bilateral trade invariably increases. For state-owned enterprises, the zero-tariff rate makes these nations more competitive than nations which levy tariffs. The other side is forced to open its markets, but so is ours. Some domestic industries may be "hurt." But the nation's overall efficiency is invariably increased. This is why 300 FTAs have been signed in a single decade the world over. This is why South Korea has systematic plans to sign FTAs with every one of the world's major economies. It knows that FTAs upgrade its economy and increase its growth.
Now take Taiwan. Taiwan investments on the Mainland have enabled Taiwan companies to benefit from export-driven investments. They have enabled them to enjoy a huge trade surplus on the Mainland for some time. Taiwan companies on Mainland China have also enjoyed an edge on the competition due to language and culture. The Mainland is gradually transitioning from world factory to world market. Each year it imports 1.7 trillion US. This is close to the United States' 1.9 trillion US. This market of course is what financial gurus have their eyes on.
The Mainland and ASEAN are about to sign the ASEAN-plus-one East Asia Free Trade Area. Concerns about Taiwan being marginalized encouraged Taipei and Beijing to sign ECFA. This gave Taiwan time to catch its breath. But ECFA is a slapdash, half-baked FTA. Follow-up work expanding its scope remains. Meanwhile, South Korea has signed FTAs with three other economies. Suppose Seoul signs an FTA with Beijing? Suppose Taipei fails to complete follow-up work expanding the scope of ECFA with Beijing as soon as possible? ECFA will be totally neutralized. Taiwan will find it nearly impossible to compete with South Korea, either globally or on the Mainland.
Taiwan must break out. It must complete follow-up negotiations expanding the scope of ECFA, as soon as possible. This will help Taiwan businesses to seize the market. FTA negotiations with other countries should be accelerated. The business community has undergone both growth and decline while competing with South Korea in the global marketplace. The government's negotiations with foreign nations may proceed smoothly. This may provide businesses with better and more competitive market conditions. But in the end, success or failure will be determined by the businesses themselves. Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea are negotiating an FTA, Taiwan's economic and trade prospects remain unclear. Everyone in the government and the private sector, must mobilize to defuse the crisis.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.18
社論－中日韓FTA 敲響台灣經貿警鐘
本報訊
大陸與南韓、日本等三國領導人日前於北京簽下投資協定，並同意啟動三國的ＦＴＡ（自由貿易區）談判，預計二到三年正式上路。對台灣經貿而言，這雖不是敲響「喪鐘」，但確實是一個非常嚴重的「警鐘」；如果政府與民間企業不能奮起直追，台灣經濟危矣！也難怪連馬總統都表達了憂慮，並特別指示政院加速與各國的經貿談判，與大陸的ＥＣＦＡ後續協商也務必盡速完成，否則因ＥＣＦＡ所帶來的對韓競爭優勢，很快就會被抵銷。
亞洲四小龍中，港、星是城市經濟體，以服務與金融產業為主，雖然總體國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）較低，但平均國民所得則較高；台、韓則以製造業為主，且兩國的出口項目有八成是雷同，處於競爭狀態。也因此，台灣一直視韓國為主要競爭對手。兩國互有優劣之處，但台灣長期處於較領先，韓國甚至還垮在一九九七年的亞洲金融風暴中，到二○○○年後才又逐漸趕上來。
但二○○八金融海嘯後的復甦過程中，台韓的優劣差距逐漸拉大。韓國在這幾年間，快馬加鞭，與包括美國、印度、歐盟等主要國家簽訂ＦＴＡ，台灣則只有與大陸簽下ＥＣＦＡ；台灣的科技產業─如ＤＲＡＭ、ＬＣＤ等，又明顯落居下風。靠著ＥＣＦＡ，台灣還「吊住一口氣」，保住在大陸市場的競爭優勢。例如台灣的ＬＣＤ在大陸的市占率仍能與韓國抗衡、甚至微幅超越韓廠；但如果大陸與韓國之間也簽下了ＦＴＡ，台灣的ＥＣＦＡ可說優勢全失。面對此一壓力與變局，政府當局、朝野黨派、社會各界，豈能毫無知覺、毫無反應？
近十多年來，全球經貿由多邊協定走向雙邊，已是難以逆轉的趨勢；全球的ＦＴＡ已達近三百個。南韓一直是所有國家中布局最深、最有計畫的國家；韓國與美、歐的ＦＴＡ已上路，印度也已完成洽簽；現在則是進行與全球第二、三大經濟體大陸、日本的ＦＴＡ談判。如果順利完成，中日韓的ＦＴＡ，其ＧＤＰ超過十二兆美元、貿易量占全球近二成，韓國的全球ＦＴＡ拼圖也完成。
對簽訂ＦＴＡ的國家而言，彼此要對對方開放市場，一般而言，都是在三到五年內，把接近九十五％以上的商品關稅降到零；去除進口障礙、關稅降到零後，雙方貿易量必然增加。對該國企業而言，因為零關稅，其競爭力必然高於其它需要課徵關稅之國家。不過，在對方開放市場的同時，自己也要開放市場，因此國內也同時會有所謂「受損產業」。但一來一往之間，其總體效益必然高於原來。這也是全球在短短十多年內，簽下三百個ＦＴＡ的原因，更是韓國有計畫、有步驟的與全球各大經濟體完成ＦＴＡ洽簽的原因。因為，ＦＴＡ的確有助於一個經濟體的提升、成長。
對台灣而言，過去台商在大陸的投資，讓台灣企業能享受「以投資帶動出口」的利益，長期對大陸享有鉅額的順差；台灣企業在大陸，也因同文同種、語言及文字皆相通，而在競爭上享有優勢。在大陸逐漸由「世界工廠」轉型為「世界市場」，每年進口金額一．七兆美元，已接近美國的一．九兆美元，這個市場，當然是全球企業逐鹿的焦點。
在大陸與東協間的「東協加一」東亞自由貿易區上路時，為了擔心台灣被邊緣化，台灣與大陸簽下ＥＣＦＡ，台灣因此得到「喘一口氣」的時間；但ＥＣＦＡ畢竟是急就章的半吊子ＦＴＡ，後續的擴大項目也遲遲未完成。但同時間南韓已先後與三大經濟體簽下ＦＴＡ，如果再與大陸簽下ＦＴＡ，台灣又未能盡速與大陸談定擴大ＥＣＦＡ項目，那麼，ＥＣＦＡ效益將歸零，台灣幾乎無法與南韓在全球乃至大陸競爭。
台灣的突圍之道，除了盡快完成ＥＣＦＡ擴大項目的談判，讓台商搶占市場外，與其它國家的ＦＴＡ談判亦應加速。而企業界從近年台韓的全球競爭力消長中，更該有體認，政府即使對外談判順利，為企業提供一個更佳的對外競爭條件，但最後決定成敗的關鍵因素，還是要靠企業自己的努力。因應中日韓ＦＴＡ談判啟動，為台灣經貿前景帶來濃厚的陰霾，從政府到民間，是該進行一次危機總動員才可能化解危機。
Thursday, May 17, 2012
Flights to Avoid Prosecution Must Be Stopped
Flights to Avoid Prosecution Must Be Stopped
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2012
Summary: Convicted criminals fleeing the country as the result of loopholes in the justice system poses a problem. People from all segments of society are concerned. According to Bureau of Investigation Fugitive Tracking Unit data, at least 192 well known criminals, plus nearly one thousand other major criminals, have already fled overseas. This constitutes a serious setback to judicial credibility. The government must track them down through various channels. It must remedy the situation by putting an end to judicial loopholes.
Full Text below:
Former legislators Luo Fu-chu and Chiang Lian-fu, also known as the "two Fus," have fled the country, one after the other, before they could be taken to prison. Convicted criminals fleeing the country as the result of loopholes in the justice system poses a problem. People from all segments of society are concerned. According to Bureau of Investigation Fugitive Tracking Unit data, at least 192 well known criminals, plus nearly one thousand other major criminals, have already fled overseas. This constitutes a serious setback to judicial credibility. The government must track them down through various channels. It must remedy the situation by putting an end to judicial loopholes.
Most of these fugitives flee to the Mainland, the United States, Canada, and Southeast Asia. Mainland China is a favorite with fugitives due to language, culture, and geographical proximity. Fugitives to the Mainland include former Tuntex president Chen You-hao, former Kozo Group president Tseng Cheng-jen, former Legislative Yuan President Liu Sung-fan, former legislators Wang Chi-hsiung, Ho Chih-hui, and "White Wolf" Chang An-lo. Some have gone into hiding. Others are living high-profile second lives. Chen You-hao is suspected of embezzling $600 billion NT and investing in on the Mainland, in the Sinopec Group. In Xiamen, he pays annual taxes in excess of 100 million RMB. His debts meanwhile, remain on Taiwan. His crimes and his punishment remain on Taiwan. He has made a glorious comeback on the Mainland. He has gotten a fresh start. When the people on Taiwan witness this, how can they feel anything but disgust?
Others have fled to the United States, Canada or Europe. Most of these are white collar criminals who already obtained local passports or the right of permanent residence. These people once had family fortunes. They are protected by their legal status as immigrants, and by tedious and lengthy legal procedures. Taipei has no extradition agreements with these countries. These fugitives know Taipei cannot touch them.
Examples include former Rebar Group chairman Wang You-cheng and his wife, Ching Chi-jiu who embezzled public funds in the PNG corruption scandal, and Huang Fang-yan, former vice president of Shin Kong Hospital, who is suspected of laundering money for the Chen family. He is reportedly living in the lap of luxury in Los Angeles. Some are hiding in Canada. JWOS Group chairman Zhang Wanli and his son siphoned off tens of billions of dollars worth of school property. Former National Security Bureau cashier Liu Kuan-chun and his wife are suspected of embezzling 190 million dollars in public funds in the Feng Tian and Dang Yang scandals. The amount of money these people have embezzled is astonishing.
Others chose to flee to Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Most of these fugitives are drug dealers and major criminals. Altogether, there are 192 of them. One hundred twenty-five of them are guilty of white collar crimes. Thirty-three of them are guilty of political corruption. These notorious criminals can order up the weather. Their numbers are startling. No matter how much they pocket in Taiwan, they are free and clear as soon as they flee overseas. Who knows how many faceless petty criminals have fled overseas to avoid prosecution.
Many people do not understand, Taipei and Beijing have joint crime-fighting and legal assistance mechanisms. Cross-Strait relations have improved considerably in recent years. So why don't these mechanisms work when we need to catch wanted criminals? Forget the small fry. Chen You-hao is openly conducting business on the Mainland. Why don't we demand that the cross-Strait cooperation mechanism extradite him? The answer is that Taipei's law enforcement entities cannot exercise authority on the Mainland. Tracking down and arresting these criminals requires assistance from Beijing. Watching as a major criminal thumbs his nose at the law makes people wonder about the effectiveness of cross-Strait reconciliation.
The loopholes in the legal system are huge. For the justice system on Taiwan, this is a huge irony. A justice system must punish evildoers to maintain public confidence in the social system. Universal respect for the rule of law ensures social stability and a feeling of security. But we cavalierly allow criminals to flee. They escape legal consequences. They even thumb their noses at us from abroad. We can do nothing about it, As a result, the public is disillusioned with the justice system. Once the justice system loses its credibility, public cooperation and support for law enforcement is no longer forthcoming. An important social institution will be eroded.
Not long ago, word emerged that Luo Fu-chu was about to flee. Yet prosecutors and police did nothing. The day Luo was to be taken to prison, they ostentatiously issued an arrest warrant and sent marshals to take him into custody. All the while however, everyone knew it was all for nothing. Nevertheless they followed the script to the letter. They seemed to be putting on a show for the public. Perhaps they were playing dumb. Perhaps they were taking the public for fools. Perhaps they were merely amusing themselves. In any event, the justice system was turned into a joke. Did Luo Fu-chu have a good belly laugh while watching the news from the safety of the Mainland? All we know is many people on Taiwan swore up a storm.
The Judicial Yuan has responded. It has urged the Legislative Yuan to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, When a court sentences someone to over two years imprisonment, they no longer need to wait until the defendant has heard the verdict. Prosecutors will be able to skip the existing summons and custody procedures. They will be able to take the accused into custody and begin monitoring his or her movements. Electronic surveillance and convict custody are not included in the amended law however. Enforcement of the law must strike a balance with protection of human rights, But overly lenient treatment of potential flight risks also harms society. The law should be amended as soon as possible. Flights to avoid prosecution must be prevented. Prosecutors and police must be able to implement the law. Only then will we know whether it actually works.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.17
社論－杜絕要犯潛逃 重建司法威信
本報訊
前立委羅福助、江連福「二福」接連在發監前落跑後，定罪要犯趁司法空隙潛逃出境的問題，已經引發各界關切。據調查局追緝外逃小組的資料，目前至少有一百九十二名大咖、外加上千名刑事通緝要犯逃亡海外，重挫司法威信。政府除了必須循各種管道追拿之外，還必須亡羊補牢，杜絕司法漏洞。
這些要犯的潛逃地以中國大陸、美加與東南亞為大宗。中國大陸因為語言文化相通、地理接近，成為落跑最愛。包括前東帝士總裁陳由豪、前廣三集團總裁曾正仁、前立法院長劉松藩、前立委王志雄、何智輝、「白狼」張安樂等，有的神隱不知所終，有的高調展開「第二人生」。涉嫌掏空台灣六百億元的陳由豪到大陸重建石化集團，在廈門每年納稅逾億元人民幣。債留台灣，罪刑也留台灣，風光前進大陸再世為人，這叫台灣民眾看了，能不吐血嗎？
另外一群前進美加或歐洲地區的，多是已經取得當地護照或居留權的經濟犯。這些人本有身家，再仗著法律對移民的保障，以及訴訟程序的冗長繁瑣，加上我國與對方國沒有簽署引渡協定，所以吃定台灣政府拿他們沒皮條。
例如前力霸集團董事長王又曾夫婦、侵吞「巴紐案」公款的金紀玖，和涉及扁家洗錢案的新光醫院前副院長黃芳彥，據說都在美國加州洛杉磯逍遙。躲藏到加拿大的，則有違法吸金並掏空校產上百億元的前景文集團董事長張萬利父子，涉嫌侵吞「奉天專案」、「當陽專案」公款一億九千萬元的前國安局上校出納組長劉冠軍夫婦。這些人犯案的金額加一加，還真是不得了。
至於選擇逃往東南亞菲律賓、泰國、越南、柬埔寨的，則以毒品等刑事犯居多。總計一百九十二名逃犯裡，以經濟犯一百廿五人為最大宗，其次是貪汙犯卅三人。這麼多大名鼎鼎、喊水會結凍的大咖，數都數到手指頭酸了，他們無論在台灣捅了多大樓子，落跑到外面之後都能平安無事，其他跑出去規避司法懲罰的不知名小咖，恐怕更加不知凡幾。
很多人也會不解，兩岸原本就有共同打擊犯罪及司法互助機制，近年來兩岸關係有相當改善，為什麼在抓通緝犯時卻沒辦法發揮作用？小咖也就罷了，像陳由豪這種堂而皇之做生意的，為什麼不能循兩岸合作機制遣返歸案？我國治安單位畢竟不能在大陸行使公權力，追查及緝捕需要中國方面的協助，眼看著落跑大咖在對岸風光得意，也會讓人對兩岸和解的成效感到疑惑。
法網漏洞破這麼大，對台灣的司法正義實在是一大諷刺。司法體系的維持，在於能公正有效地懲凶罰惡，讓人民對整個社會制度產生信任，並在共同遵守法制下，維持社會的穩定與安心感。如果壞人可以輕易落跑，不必接受法律的制裁，甚至隔海招搖猖狂，我們卻拿他們莫可奈何，那麼民眾會對司法感到失望與懷疑。司法一旦失去威信，執法時會因為得不到民眾合作與支持而益發困難，也讓這項重要的社會體制遭到侵蝕傷害。
尤其，前不久羅福助早已傳出落跑，檢警卻毫無動作，等到發監當日，再煞有介事地發出拘票並大陣仗派人拘提，明明大家都知道會白忙一場，卻還是照著劇本走完程序，給人感覺彷彿是在演戲給民眾看，自愚愚人也好，自娛娛人也罷，司法威信簡直成了笑話，不知道羅福助在對岸看到新聞會不會笑到翻，至少台灣這邊很多人是罵到翻。
司法院於是緊急提《刑事訴訟法》修正案送立法院，未來經法院判刑二年以上確定，不用等到被告收到判決書，檢方將可直接跳過現行的傳喚、監控程序，逕行拘提被告發監執刑。但「電子監控」、「有罪羈押」部分，因未列入此次修法範圍。固然，司法手段必須與人權保障取得平衡，但過度鬆懈縱放要犯，對社會公益也會造成傷害。是否能及早完成修法，未來是否能夠有效防堵脫逃，檢警必須以實際執行成效接受檢驗。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2012
Summary: Convicted criminals fleeing the country as the result of loopholes in the justice system poses a problem. People from all segments of society are concerned. According to Bureau of Investigation Fugitive Tracking Unit data, at least 192 well known criminals, plus nearly one thousand other major criminals, have already fled overseas. This constitutes a serious setback to judicial credibility. The government must track them down through various channels. It must remedy the situation by putting an end to judicial loopholes.
Full Text below:
Former legislators Luo Fu-chu and Chiang Lian-fu, also known as the "two Fus," have fled the country, one after the other, before they could be taken to prison. Convicted criminals fleeing the country as the result of loopholes in the justice system poses a problem. People from all segments of society are concerned. According to Bureau of Investigation Fugitive Tracking Unit data, at least 192 well known criminals, plus nearly one thousand other major criminals, have already fled overseas. This constitutes a serious setback to judicial credibility. The government must track them down through various channels. It must remedy the situation by putting an end to judicial loopholes.
Most of these fugitives flee to the Mainland, the United States, Canada, and Southeast Asia. Mainland China is a favorite with fugitives due to language, culture, and geographical proximity. Fugitives to the Mainland include former Tuntex president Chen You-hao, former Kozo Group president Tseng Cheng-jen, former Legislative Yuan President Liu Sung-fan, former legislators Wang Chi-hsiung, Ho Chih-hui, and "White Wolf" Chang An-lo. Some have gone into hiding. Others are living high-profile second lives. Chen You-hao is suspected of embezzling $600 billion NT and investing in on the Mainland, in the Sinopec Group. In Xiamen, he pays annual taxes in excess of 100 million RMB. His debts meanwhile, remain on Taiwan. His crimes and his punishment remain on Taiwan. He has made a glorious comeback on the Mainland. He has gotten a fresh start. When the people on Taiwan witness this, how can they feel anything but disgust?
Others have fled to the United States, Canada or Europe. Most of these are white collar criminals who already obtained local passports or the right of permanent residence. These people once had family fortunes. They are protected by their legal status as immigrants, and by tedious and lengthy legal procedures. Taipei has no extradition agreements with these countries. These fugitives know Taipei cannot touch them.
Examples include former Rebar Group chairman Wang You-cheng and his wife, Ching Chi-jiu who embezzled public funds in the PNG corruption scandal, and Huang Fang-yan, former vice president of Shin Kong Hospital, who is suspected of laundering money for the Chen family. He is reportedly living in the lap of luxury in Los Angeles. Some are hiding in Canada. JWOS Group chairman Zhang Wanli and his son siphoned off tens of billions of dollars worth of school property. Former National Security Bureau cashier Liu Kuan-chun and his wife are suspected of embezzling 190 million dollars in public funds in the Feng Tian and Dang Yang scandals. The amount of money these people have embezzled is astonishing.
Others chose to flee to Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Most of these fugitives are drug dealers and major criminals. Altogether, there are 192 of them. One hundred twenty-five of them are guilty of white collar crimes. Thirty-three of them are guilty of political corruption. These notorious criminals can order up the weather. Their numbers are startling. No matter how much they pocket in Taiwan, they are free and clear as soon as they flee overseas. Who knows how many faceless petty criminals have fled overseas to avoid prosecution.
Many people do not understand, Taipei and Beijing have joint crime-fighting and legal assistance mechanisms. Cross-Strait relations have improved considerably in recent years. So why don't these mechanisms work when we need to catch wanted criminals? Forget the small fry. Chen You-hao is openly conducting business on the Mainland. Why don't we demand that the cross-Strait cooperation mechanism extradite him? The answer is that Taipei's law enforcement entities cannot exercise authority on the Mainland. Tracking down and arresting these criminals requires assistance from Beijing. Watching as a major criminal thumbs his nose at the law makes people wonder about the effectiveness of cross-Strait reconciliation.
The loopholes in the legal system are huge. For the justice system on Taiwan, this is a huge irony. A justice system must punish evildoers to maintain public confidence in the social system. Universal respect for the rule of law ensures social stability and a feeling of security. But we cavalierly allow criminals to flee. They escape legal consequences. They even thumb their noses at us from abroad. We can do nothing about it, As a result, the public is disillusioned with the justice system. Once the justice system loses its credibility, public cooperation and support for law enforcement is no longer forthcoming. An important social institution will be eroded.
Not long ago, word emerged that Luo Fu-chu was about to flee. Yet prosecutors and police did nothing. The day Luo was to be taken to prison, they ostentatiously issued an arrest warrant and sent marshals to take him into custody. All the while however, everyone knew it was all for nothing. Nevertheless they followed the script to the letter. They seemed to be putting on a show for the public. Perhaps they were playing dumb. Perhaps they were taking the public for fools. Perhaps they were merely amusing themselves. In any event, the justice system was turned into a joke. Did Luo Fu-chu have a good belly laugh while watching the news from the safety of the Mainland? All we know is many people on Taiwan swore up a storm.
The Judicial Yuan has responded. It has urged the Legislative Yuan to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, When a court sentences someone to over two years imprisonment, they no longer need to wait until the defendant has heard the verdict. Prosecutors will be able to skip the existing summons and custody procedures. They will be able to take the accused into custody and begin monitoring his or her movements. Electronic surveillance and convict custody are not included in the amended law however. Enforcement of the law must strike a balance with protection of human rights, But overly lenient treatment of potential flight risks also harms society. The law should be amended as soon as possible. Flights to avoid prosecution must be prevented. Prosecutors and police must be able to implement the law. Only then will we know whether it actually works.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.17
社論－杜絕要犯潛逃 重建司法威信
本報訊
前立委羅福助、江連福「二福」接連在發監前落跑後，定罪要犯趁司法空隙潛逃出境的問題，已經引發各界關切。據調查局追緝外逃小組的資料，目前至少有一百九十二名大咖、外加上千名刑事通緝要犯逃亡海外，重挫司法威信。政府除了必須循各種管道追拿之外，還必須亡羊補牢，杜絕司法漏洞。
這些要犯的潛逃地以中國大陸、美加與東南亞為大宗。中國大陸因為語言文化相通、地理接近，成為落跑最愛。包括前東帝士總裁陳由豪、前廣三集團總裁曾正仁、前立法院長劉松藩、前立委王志雄、何智輝、「白狼」張安樂等，有的神隱不知所終，有的高調展開「第二人生」。涉嫌掏空台灣六百億元的陳由豪到大陸重建石化集團，在廈門每年納稅逾億元人民幣。債留台灣，罪刑也留台灣，風光前進大陸再世為人，這叫台灣民眾看了，能不吐血嗎？
另外一群前進美加或歐洲地區的，多是已經取得當地護照或居留權的經濟犯。這些人本有身家，再仗著法律對移民的保障，以及訴訟程序的冗長繁瑣，加上我國與對方國沒有簽署引渡協定，所以吃定台灣政府拿他們沒皮條。
例如前力霸集團董事長王又曾夫婦、侵吞「巴紐案」公款的金紀玖，和涉及扁家洗錢案的新光醫院前副院長黃芳彥，據說都在美國加州洛杉磯逍遙。躲藏到加拿大的，則有違法吸金並掏空校產上百億元的前景文集團董事長張萬利父子，涉嫌侵吞「奉天專案」、「當陽專案」公款一億九千萬元的前國安局上校出納組長劉冠軍夫婦。這些人犯案的金額加一加，還真是不得了。
至於選擇逃往東南亞菲律賓、泰國、越南、柬埔寨的，則以毒品等刑事犯居多。總計一百九十二名逃犯裡，以經濟犯一百廿五人為最大宗，其次是貪汙犯卅三人。這麼多大名鼎鼎、喊水會結凍的大咖，數都數到手指頭酸了，他們無論在台灣捅了多大樓子，落跑到外面之後都能平安無事，其他跑出去規避司法懲罰的不知名小咖，恐怕更加不知凡幾。
很多人也會不解，兩岸原本就有共同打擊犯罪及司法互助機制，近年來兩岸關係有相當改善，為什麼在抓通緝犯時卻沒辦法發揮作用？小咖也就罷了，像陳由豪這種堂而皇之做生意的，為什麼不能循兩岸合作機制遣返歸案？我國治安單位畢竟不能在大陸行使公權力，追查及緝捕需要中國方面的協助，眼看著落跑大咖在對岸風光得意，也會讓人對兩岸和解的成效感到疑惑。
法網漏洞破這麼大，對台灣的司法正義實在是一大諷刺。司法體系的維持，在於能公正有效地懲凶罰惡，讓人民對整個社會制度產生信任，並在共同遵守法制下，維持社會的穩定與安心感。如果壞人可以輕易落跑，不必接受法律的制裁，甚至隔海招搖猖狂，我們卻拿他們莫可奈何，那麼民眾會對司法感到失望與懷疑。司法一旦失去威信，執法時會因為得不到民眾合作與支持而益發困難，也讓這項重要的社會體制遭到侵蝕傷害。
尤其，前不久羅福助早已傳出落跑，檢警卻毫無動作，等到發監當日，再煞有介事地發出拘票並大陣仗派人拘提，明明大家都知道會白忙一場，卻還是照著劇本走完程序，給人感覺彷彿是在演戲給民眾看，自愚愚人也好，自娛娛人也罷，司法威信簡直成了笑話，不知道羅福助在對岸看到新聞會不會笑到翻，至少台灣這邊很多人是罵到翻。
司法院於是緊急提《刑事訴訟法》修正案送立法院，未來經法院判刑二年以上確定，不用等到被告收到判決書，檢方將可直接跳過現行的傳喚、監控程序，逕行拘提被告發監執刑。但「電子監控」、「有罪羈押」部分，因未列入此次修法範圍。固然，司法手段必須與人權保障取得平衡，但過度鬆懈縱放要犯，對社會公益也會造成傷害。是否能及早完成修法，未來是否能夠有效防堵脫逃，檢警必須以實際執行成效接受檢驗。
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
To Which "One China" do the Two Sides Belong?
To Which "One China" do the Two Sides Belong?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 16, 2012
Summary: On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks. Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."
Full Text below:
On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks.
Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."
During the 2012 presidential election, the chief topic of cross-Strait debate was the 1992 consensus. The DPP rejected the premise and went down in defeat. Now the DPP is looking ahead to the 2016 presidential election. But it remains reluctant to reverse itself. It remains unwilling to accept the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." It is attempting to arrive at its own framework for cross-Strait relations. One example is Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations."
Frank Hsieh is attempting to substitue "different constitutional interpretations" for "one China, different interpretations." But "one China, different interpretations" includes "different constitutional interpretations." Therefore advocating "different constitutional interpretations" does not supersede "one China, different interpretations." The KMT is not about to set aside the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" during the run up to the 2016 election, merely to go along with the DPP's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." Beijing is not about to let the DPP define the cross-Strait relationship. Therefore if the framework for cross-Strait relations does not change over the next four years, the question will still be: "Do you accept the 1992 consensus?" Why? Because this question impacts all three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and their ability to set the agenda.
When referring to the 1992 consensus, Taipei emphasizes "one China, different interpretations." Beijing emphasizes "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Alas, both positions still smack of "you are you and I am me" attitudes. That is why Beijing hopes to take one more step forward. It wants to stress that "the two sides are both part of one China." Its position is understandable. But the current positions involve the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Changing that to "the two sides are both part of one China" would immediately touch off a controversy. If the two sides are both part of one China, just exactly which China are they a part of?
If one remains within the framework of the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements," these problems can be set aside and not discussed. But if one insists that "the two sides are both part of one China," the question immediately arises, which side are they a part of?
Beijing is unlikely to insist that both sides are part of one China, i.e. that both sides are part of the People's Republic of China. Such a statement would be too unrealistic, too far off the mark, and anger the public on Taiwan. Can someone turn Taiwan into part of the Peoples Republic of China merely by declaring it so? Since the "two sides are not part of the People's Republic of China," why not reaffirm the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking agreement while shelving disagreements?" The 1992 consensus is also predicated upon one China. The only qualification is that the two sides hold "different interpretations" while seeking common ground and shelving disagreements."
In fact, the framework for cross-Strait relations can move toward "the two sides are both part of one China." We merely need to define "one China" as a "big roof" covering both sides. If "one China" is this "big roof," then the two sides are adjacent rooms under the "big roof." This would establish a new framework for cross-Strait relations.
On New Year's Eve 2008, Hu Jintao announced his "Hu Six Points." He said, "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified. the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China, This fact remains unchanged." The "one China" he referred to was the "big roof." Hu said that before the nation is reunified, the two sides can maintain "cross-Strait political relations under the special circumstances," and expand pragmatic dialogue. The special circumstances that Hu referred to is the special relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Here is where the "big roof" gives us more room to maneuver.
Over the next four years, under the "big roof," the two sides may be able to sign a peace agreement or cross-strait confidence building framework agreement (CBFA). This would transform the framework for cross-Strait relations. This would enable the two sides to declare that they are both part of one China. In the event this proves impossible, the two sides should adhere to the 1992 consensus, to "one China, different interpretations," and to "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." They should not overvalue rhetorical flourishes. The relationship between the three parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must not be upset and thrown into chaos.
Over the next four years, we can expect the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpetations" to gradually improve relations. This will honor the two sides' desire for "different interpetations." This will enable the two sides to "seek common ground while shelving disagreement," thereby enabling both sides to proclaim that they are both part of one China. Concepts such as "one country, two regions" and "different constitutional interpetations" should be subsumed under the 1992 consensus. The definition of one China still requires "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." It is inadvisable to provoke controversy over "just exactly which China are we talking about?"
If the two sides can establish a "big roof" and an "interim agreement," that may enable the two sides to create an even more desirable cross-Strait framework.
兩岸同屬哪一個「中國」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.16 02:22 am
馬英九總統五二○就職演說將對兩岸政策作何宣示，極受矚目。
北 京方面不斷釋出的訊息顯示，似乎希望能超越「九二共識」的層次，將兩岸論述的落點置於「兩岸同屬一個中國」。然而，雖然「九二共識」其實已包涵了「兩岸同 屬一個中國」的潛台詞，但畢竟在邏輯上仍隔了一層；我們認為，現在並不是改換兩岸論述主命題的時機，仍應留在「九二共識」的層次，不必變換到「兩岸同屬一 個中國」。
二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述主命題是「九二共識」，民進黨因拒絕此項主命題而挫敗；現在，民進黨面對二○一六總統大選，似仍不肯回過頭來接受「九二共識／一中各表」，因而正嘗試另外建立兩岸論述的主命題，如謝長廷的「憲法共識／憲法各表」即是。
問 題是：謝長廷欲以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」；但是，「一中各表」其實包含了「憲法各表」，則既主張「憲法各表」，何以否定「一中各表」？因此，至二○ 一六年大選，國民黨屆時似無可能擱下「九二共識／一中各表」，去跟隨「憲法共識／憲法各表」，北京亦不可能將兩岸主命題的定義權交給民進黨。因而，倘若未 來四年間，兩岸論述沒有更進一步的發展或定調，「接不接受九二共識」，應當仍是不變的主命題，因為這牽涉到兩岸三黨在話語權的主導權。
然 而，「九二共識」，台灣強調「一中各表」，大陸主張「求同存異」；這仍是一個「你是你，我是我」的態勢，因而，北京希望能夠向前邁一步，改換成「兩岸同屬 一個中國」的主命題，亦屬可以理解。但是，如果要從「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的主命題，變換至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，立即觸發的爭議是：兩岸同屬 一個中國，究竟是指哪一個「中國」？
也就是說，如果停留在「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的層次，此一問題或可置而不論，但若要進入「兩岸同屬一個中國」的層次，則立即浮現的問題將是：究竟是指哪一個中國？
北 京大概不會說：兩岸同屬一個中國，就是兩岸同屬中華人民共和國。因為，這種說法不實際，太離譜，且必會惹怒了台灣人；畢竟，誰能只憑一個說法，就把台灣說 成是中華人民共和國的？於是，既然不是「兩岸同屬中華人民共和國」，則何不回到「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」？因為，「九二共識」也是「一個中國」， 只是「各自表述／求同存異」罷了。
其實，兩岸主命題亦不無可能推至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，只要能界定這「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」即可。如果「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」，兩岸則是「同屬一個中國」的兩間「房間」，新的主命題即告建立。
胡 錦濤在二○○八年除夕發表的「胡六點」指出，「雖然兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實並未改變」，此處所言「一個中國」，應當即是「屋頂中 國」；而胡錦濤又說，「兩岸可以就國家統一前的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實的探討」，此處所指「特殊情況下的特殊關係」，當然即是指「中華民國與中華人 民共和國的特殊情況下的政治關係」，此間亦有「屋頂中國」的想像空間。
我們認為，未來四年，兩岸倘能在「屋頂中國」 的概念下，簽定《和平協議》或《兩岸信任架構協議》（ＣＢＦＡ），即可變換採用「兩岸同屬一個中國」的主命題；倘若不能，則仍宜停留在「九二共識／一中各 表／求同存異」的階段，不要貪逞口舌之快，而使兩岸三黨的主命題再度陷於失衡失焦的亂局。
目前可以預期的是，「九二 共識／一中各表」在未來四年應可愈加友善化，「各表」的尊嚴得以維繫，「一中」則在求同存異中成為穩定默契；「一國兩區」、「憲法各表」等議論，皆應回歸 到「九二共識」尋求解答。在「一中」的定義尚在「存異各表」之際，不宜惹出「究竟是哪一個中國？」的爭議。
當然，若能建立「屋頂中國／中程方案」的架構，那將確是兩岸關係更加可欲的新的主命題。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 16, 2012
Summary: On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks. Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."
Full Text below:
On May 20, President Ma Ying-jeou will deliver his inaugural speech. What will he say about cross-Strait policy? The question has everyone on tenterhooks.
Beijing has been dropping hints. Apparently it hopes to go beyond the 1992 consensus. It wants to emphasize that "the two sides are both part of one China." The 1992 consensus implies that "the two sides are both part of one China." But it does so with qualifications. Now is not the time for the two sides to deal with such a major issue. The issue should remain within the framework of the 1992 consensus. It is unnecessary to reframe the issue as "the two sides are part of one China."
During the 2012 presidential election, the chief topic of cross-Strait debate was the 1992 consensus. The DPP rejected the premise and went down in defeat. Now the DPP is looking ahead to the 2016 presidential election. But it remains reluctant to reverse itself. It remains unwilling to accept the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations." It is attempting to arrive at its own framework for cross-Strait relations. One example is Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations."
Frank Hsieh is attempting to substitue "different constitutional interpretations" for "one China, different interpretations." But "one China, different interpretations" includes "different constitutional interpretations." Therefore advocating "different constitutional interpretations" does not supersede "one China, different interpretations." The KMT is not about to set aside the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations" during the run up to the 2016 election, merely to go along with the DPP's "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." Beijing is not about to let the DPP define the cross-Strait relationship. Therefore if the framework for cross-Strait relations does not change over the next four years, the question will still be: "Do you accept the 1992 consensus?" Why? Because this question impacts all three political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and their ability to set the agenda.
When referring to the 1992 consensus, Taipei emphasizes "one China, different interpretations." Beijing emphasizes "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Alas, both positions still smack of "you are you and I am me" attitudes. That is why Beijing hopes to take one more step forward. It wants to stress that "the two sides are both part of one China." Its position is understandable. But the current positions involve the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." Changing that to "the two sides are both part of one China" would immediately touch off a controversy. If the two sides are both part of one China, just exactly which China are they a part of?
If one remains within the framework of the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements," these problems can be set aside and not discussed. But if one insists that "the two sides are both part of one China," the question immediately arises, which side are they a part of?
Beijing is unlikely to insist that both sides are part of one China, i.e. that both sides are part of the People's Republic of China. Such a statement would be too unrealistic, too far off the mark, and anger the public on Taiwan. Can someone turn Taiwan into part of the Peoples Republic of China merely by declaring it so? Since the "two sides are not part of the People's Republic of China," why not reaffirm the 1992 consensus, "one China, different interpretations," and "seeking agreement while shelving disagreements?" The 1992 consensus is also predicated upon one China. The only qualification is that the two sides hold "different interpretations" while seeking common ground and shelving disagreements."
In fact, the framework for cross-Strait relations can move toward "the two sides are both part of one China." We merely need to define "one China" as a "big roof" covering both sides. If "one China" is this "big roof," then the two sides are adjacent rooms under the "big roof." This would establish a new framework for cross-Strait relations.
On New Year's Eve 2008, Hu Jintao announced his "Hu Six Points." He said, "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified. the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China, This fact remains unchanged." The "one China" he referred to was the "big roof." Hu said that before the nation is reunified, the two sides can maintain "cross-Strait political relations under the special circumstances," and expand pragmatic dialogue. The special circumstances that Hu referred to is the special relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Here is where the "big roof" gives us more room to maneuver.
Over the next four years, under the "big roof," the two sides may be able to sign a peace agreement or cross-strait confidence building framework agreement (CBFA). This would transform the framework for cross-Strait relations. This would enable the two sides to declare that they are both part of one China. In the event this proves impossible, the two sides should adhere to the 1992 consensus, to "one China, different interpretations," and to "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." They should not overvalue rhetorical flourishes. The relationship between the three parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must not be upset and thrown into chaos.
Over the next four years, we can expect the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpetations" to gradually improve relations. This will honor the two sides' desire for "different interpetations." This will enable the two sides to "seek common ground while shelving disagreement," thereby enabling both sides to proclaim that they are both part of one China. Concepts such as "one country, two regions" and "different constitutional interpetations" should be subsumed under the 1992 consensus. The definition of one China still requires "seeking common ground while shelving disagreements." It is inadvisable to provoke controversy over "just exactly which China are we talking about?"
If the two sides can establish a "big roof" and an "interim agreement," that may enable the two sides to create an even more desirable cross-Strait framework.
兩岸同屬哪一個「中國」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.16 02:22 am
馬英九總統五二○就職演說將對兩岸政策作何宣示，極受矚目。
北 京方面不斷釋出的訊息顯示，似乎希望能超越「九二共識」的層次，將兩岸論述的落點置於「兩岸同屬一個中國」。然而，雖然「九二共識」其實已包涵了「兩岸同 屬一個中國」的潛台詞，但畢竟在邏輯上仍隔了一層；我們認為，現在並不是改換兩岸論述主命題的時機，仍應留在「九二共識」的層次，不必變換到「兩岸同屬一 個中國」。
二○一二總統大選的兩岸論述主命題是「九二共識」，民進黨因拒絕此項主命題而挫敗；現在，民進黨面對二○一六總統大選，似仍不肯回過頭來接受「九二共識／一中各表」，因而正嘗試另外建立兩岸論述的主命題，如謝長廷的「憲法共識／憲法各表」即是。
問 題是：謝長廷欲以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」；但是，「一中各表」其實包含了「憲法各表」，則既主張「憲法各表」，何以否定「一中各表」？因此，至二○ 一六年大選，國民黨屆時似無可能擱下「九二共識／一中各表」，去跟隨「憲法共識／憲法各表」，北京亦不可能將兩岸主命題的定義權交給民進黨。因而，倘若未 來四年間，兩岸論述沒有更進一步的發展或定調，「接不接受九二共識」，應當仍是不變的主命題，因為這牽涉到兩岸三黨在話語權的主導權。
然 而，「九二共識」，台灣強調「一中各表」，大陸主張「求同存異」；這仍是一個「你是你，我是我」的態勢，因而，北京希望能夠向前邁一步，改換成「兩岸同屬 一個中國」的主命題，亦屬可以理解。但是，如果要從「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的主命題，變換至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，立即觸發的爭議是：兩岸同屬 一個中國，究竟是指哪一個「中國」？
也就是說，如果停留在「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」的層次，此一問題或可置而不論，但若要進入「兩岸同屬一個中國」的層次，則立即浮現的問題將是：究竟是指哪一個中國？
北 京大概不會說：兩岸同屬一個中國，就是兩岸同屬中華人民共和國。因為，這種說法不實際，太離譜，且必會惹怒了台灣人；畢竟，誰能只憑一個說法，就把台灣說 成是中華人民共和國的？於是，既然不是「兩岸同屬中華人民共和國」，則何不回到「九二共識／一中各表／求同存異」？因為，「九二共識」也是「一個中國」， 只是「各自表述／求同存異」罷了。
其實，兩岸主命題亦不無可能推至「兩岸同屬一個中國」，只要能界定這「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」即可。如果「一個中國」是「屋頂中國」，兩岸則是「同屬一個中國」的兩間「房間」，新的主命題即告建立。
胡 錦濤在二○○八年除夕發表的「胡六點」指出，「雖然兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實並未改變」，此處所言「一個中國」，應當即是「屋頂中 國」；而胡錦濤又說，「兩岸可以就國家統一前的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實的探討」，此處所指「特殊情況下的特殊關係」，當然即是指「中華民國與中華人 民共和國的特殊情況下的政治關係」，此間亦有「屋頂中國」的想像空間。
我們認為，未來四年，兩岸倘能在「屋頂中國」 的概念下，簽定《和平協議》或《兩岸信任架構協議》（ＣＢＦＡ），即可變換採用「兩岸同屬一個中國」的主命題；倘若不能，則仍宜停留在「九二共識／一中各 表／求同存異」的階段，不要貪逞口舌之快，而使兩岸三黨的主命題再度陷於失衡失焦的亂局。
目前可以預期的是，「九二 共識／一中各表」在未來四年應可愈加友善化，「各表」的尊嚴得以維繫，「一中」則在求同存異中成為穩定默契；「一國兩區」、「憲法各表」等議論，皆應回歸 到「九二共識」尋求解答。在「一中」的定義尚在「存異各表」之際，不宜惹出「究竟是哪一個中國？」的爭議。
當然，若能建立「屋頂中國／中程方案」的架構，那將確是兩岸關係更加可欲的新的主命題。
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
GIO Closes Shop: Media Holds All Night Vigil
GIO Closes Shop: Media Holds All Night Vigil
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2012
Summary: The government has undergone a wave of reorganization. The Government Information Office (GIO) will officially close its doors on May 20. Today it invited past GIO directors to a "thank you and farewell party." The "farewell" part is true enough. But as far as the "thank you" part is concerned, where does one begin? Sixty-five years have passed. The GIO has always drawn more brickbats than bouquets. Expressing thanks at a farewell party is just a wee bit hypocritical.
Full Text below:
The government has undergone a wave of reorganization. The Government Information Office (GIO) will officially close its doors on May 20. Today it invited past GIO directors to a "thank you and farewell party." The "farewell" part is true enough. But as far as the "thank you" part is concerned, where does one begin? Sixty-five years have passed. The GIO has always drawn more brickbats than bouquets. Expressing thanks at a farewell party is just a wee bit hypocritical.
Under Chen Shui-bian calls were made for the GIO's abolition. But it is officially closing its doors under Ma Ying-jeou. This decade-long process illustrates the peculiar fate of the GIO. It also tracks the evolution of democracy on Taiwan.
Under martial law the GIO was the iron fist that throttled the free press and free speech. Under democracy martial law was lifted. The iron fist should have been eliminated. The rule of law should have been restored. Such was the megatrend. Yet when Chen Shui-bian came to power he failed to make use of his authority. He failed to reform the GIO. Instead, he made one controversial appointment after another to the post of GIO Chief. These appointees launched inappropriate, extremist attacks on the regime's political enemies. They persecuted private citizens and the media. These practices deepened antagonisms toward the GIO.
When President Ma took office he called for the GIO's dissolution. He called for its functions to be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, among others. He established a position in the Executive Yuan for a single government spokesman. Now, on the day of his second Inauguration, he is completing this reorganization. He intends to ensure that the GIO, which was more powerful than its name suggested, will lower its flag with dignity, He intends to restore the media's right to oversee cultural and publishing realms. Today former GIO Chiefs will meet. They should be glad that the GIO is making a graceful exit. Democratization has taken a step forward. There is not much worth celebrating, It would be inappropriate to make too much of the occasion.
This does not mean we should ignore what the GIO did for 60 years. The GIO was established in 1942, in a troubled time. It took on the important job of explaining national policy, at home and abroad. It sponsored and subsidized films and cultural activities. Many people invested their creativity and effort. On the other hand, the GIO censored the media, speech, and publishing, It adopted a high profile during authoritarian rule. It clung to its bureaucratic nature after the lifting of martial law, For these it was strongly criticized. During democratization and diversification, the GIO served as the government's mouthpiece, even as it oversaw the media and the publishing industry. These roles were clearly contradictory. The GIO's dissolution was inevitable.
The dissolution of the GIO was necessitated not merely by democratization, but also by political clashes that occurred during democratization. The destruction of a free press was not merely the result of the GIO. It was the result of many political forces, all of which were guilty of the same mentality as the GIO. For example, even after martial law was lifted, President Lee Teng-hui abused his power. He spearheaded a take no prisoners "newspaper boycott" during his term of office. This was something the GIO never had the temerity to undertake. The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the White Terror. But when the Chen regime came to power, it repeatedly abused its power conducting searches of newspapers and reporters' private residences. It imposed a Green Terror. It censored TV stations that provided open forums for political debate. It desisted only when Washington intervened. James Soong interfered with the media when he was GIO Chief, Later, when he was a presidential candidate, he asked the GIO to order the television media to provide equal coverage for all candidates. For example, the Green Camp frequently denounced the media as "pro-reunification." It behaved even worse when it was in power than the Taiwan Garrison Command. The public needs to understand these peculiar political developments. They are sadder than any sadness old hands feel at the GIO's closing.
The real concern as the GIO turns off its lights and closes its doors, is the slump the media seems to have fallen into. The quality of tv shows and news shows is abysmal. News is dominated by paparazzi reports, The National Communications Commission has taken over from the GIO. But it clearly cannot control the broadcasting industry. The inadequately funded Ministry of Culture will soon be charged with overseeing the publishing industry and movie industry. These are all worrying developments.
The decline in media quality has nothing to do with the abolition of the GIO. It has to do with cutthroat competition and the rise of the Internet. More importantly, democratization has destroyed many of the values and beliefs once held sacred on Taiwan, In the meantime, society has yet to reach a new consensus. This is why we face mass confusion. The GIO is about to close its doors. This is something the media and the public should ponder. Democracy is not established overnight. It must be constructed one brick at a time. Martial law was lifted 20 years ago. Yet the dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties remains shallow. The same holds true for public opinion. This is democracy backsliding.
The GIO is turning off its lights, The media is holding an all night vigil. The work of guarding democracy on Taiwan now falls upon the shoulders of the best and brightest within the Fifth Estate.
新聞局熄燈 媒體續守無眠夜
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.15 03:11 am
過去這波政府組織改造，行政院新聞局將於五二○正式熄燈關門，今天將邀歷任局長舉行「感恩道別」惜別會。「道別」是真的，但「感恩」則不知從何說起；走過六十五個年頭，新聞局的角色向來爭議多過讚譽，在此臨別之際說感恩未免矯情。
在陳水扁手中喊撤，在馬英九手中正式關上大門，這漫長十年的裁撤過程，描述了新聞局奇特的命運軌跡，也標誌了台灣民主政治的演化。
在戒嚴年代扮演媒體及言論箝制怪手的新聞局，到了民主解嚴年代自應放下鐵腕，回歸正常法制及行政管理角色，這是時勢所趨。陳水扁執政時，無法以元首之尊透過體制推動新聞局的實質改革，卻不斷任用爭議人物出任新聞局長，以偏激、失當的言論攻擊對手，騷擾社會視聽。這些作法，在在加深了外界對新聞局的惡感。
馬總統上任後，順勢而為推動新聞局的解構，將相關功能移交外交部、文化部等，僅在行政院設置政府發言人一職。如今，在他第二任就職日完成這項組織改造，至少確保「實大於名」的新聞局有尊嚴地落日降旗，也使台灣文化、出版的行政管理各歸其所。今天歷任新聞局長聚首一堂話當年時，應慶幸新聞局得以優雅謝幕，政治民主化更往前邁出一步；至於沒太多光榮可以回味的過去，恐怕就不宜作太多緬懷或炫耀了。
這樣說，並不表示新聞局一甲子的功能可以一筆抹煞。民國三十六年，在風雨飄搖中成立的新聞局，肩負著向海內外闡明國家政策的重任，包括對外宣傳與國際交流，對電影、文化事業的扶持與補助，其間，許多人投注了智慧與汗水。但從另一面看，新聞局對媒體言論及出版的管制，從威權年代的高姿態施壓，到解嚴後的不改官僚習氣，都使其深受訾議。更關鍵的是，隨著國家民主化、多元化的發展，新聞局作為政府發言麥克風、卻又兼管諸多媒體及出版事業的職能顯得蕪雜及矛盾，它的裁併和解體也就無可避免。
進一步看，新聞局的裁併不只是台灣民主化的一個結果，它也沉澱了民主化過程中複雜的政治碰撞及重組的經驗。對台灣新聞自由的摧殘，與其說是來自「新聞局這個機構」，不如說是來自各種政治勢力間皆有的「新聞局的心態」。例如，解嚴後，李登輝在任內以總統之尊發動鋪天蓋地的「退報運動」，這其實是過去新聞局也不敢為；又如，民進黨聲討白色恐怖，但扁政府也曾數度濫權搜索報社及記者住所，遂行綠色恐怖，更欲查封主持開放論壇的電視台，經美國阻止始罷手。再如，在新聞局長任內曾對媒體橫加干預的宋楚瑜，後來參選總統時，曾要求新聞局下令電視媒體給予他和不同候選人的公平報導。再如，綠營人士動輒亂貼「統派媒體」的標籤，其行徑實較過去的警總更為惡劣。觀察這些浪潮的升降和反覆，社會大眾必然更了解政治的詭譎變化，其況味應遠超乎新聞局老員工嘆關門的離愁了。
真正值得關切的是，就在新聞局燈火將盡之際，台灣媒體的生態和品質似乎也陷入了一個低谷。除了電視節目及新聞品質貧乏、狗仔文化當道，接管了新聞局廣電業務的國家通訊傳播委員會則顯然掌控不了這艘大船，即將接管出版、電影業務的文化部則陷於預算不足的窘境，這些都讓人憂心。
客觀而論，媒體品質的下滑，與新聞局的裁撤其實無關，而與過度競爭與網路興起的衝擊有關。但更關鍵的因素，則是台灣在民主化過程中摧毀了許多原有的價值和信仰，卻遲遲無法凝聚出新的共識，才會出現這種不知何去何從的集體迷惘現象。在新聞局即將打烊之際，這確實值得新聞媒體及社會大眾共同深思：民主不是一蹴可幾，而需要日復一日的錘鍊；台灣在解嚴廿多年之後，朝野對話及社會輿論卻日形淺薄，這其實是民主的反潮。
新聞局要熄燈了，但媒體的不眠之夜仍正漫長，台灣民主政治的守護工作仍有賴各路新聞工作者接力以赴。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2012
Summary: The government has undergone a wave of reorganization. The Government Information Office (GIO) will officially close its doors on May 20. Today it invited past GIO directors to a "thank you and farewell party." The "farewell" part is true enough. But as far as the "thank you" part is concerned, where does one begin? Sixty-five years have passed. The GIO has always drawn more brickbats than bouquets. Expressing thanks at a farewell party is just a wee bit hypocritical.
Full Text below:
The government has undergone a wave of reorganization. The Government Information Office (GIO) will officially close its doors on May 20. Today it invited past GIO directors to a "thank you and farewell party." The "farewell" part is true enough. But as far as the "thank you" part is concerned, where does one begin? Sixty-five years have passed. The GIO has always drawn more brickbats than bouquets. Expressing thanks at a farewell party is just a wee bit hypocritical.
Under Chen Shui-bian calls were made for the GIO's abolition. But it is officially closing its doors under Ma Ying-jeou. This decade-long process illustrates the peculiar fate of the GIO. It also tracks the evolution of democracy on Taiwan.
Under martial law the GIO was the iron fist that throttled the free press and free speech. Under democracy martial law was lifted. The iron fist should have been eliminated. The rule of law should have been restored. Such was the megatrend. Yet when Chen Shui-bian came to power he failed to make use of his authority. He failed to reform the GIO. Instead, he made one controversial appointment after another to the post of GIO Chief. These appointees launched inappropriate, extremist attacks on the regime's political enemies. They persecuted private citizens and the media. These practices deepened antagonisms toward the GIO.
When President Ma took office he called for the GIO's dissolution. He called for its functions to be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, among others. He established a position in the Executive Yuan for a single government spokesman. Now, on the day of his second Inauguration, he is completing this reorganization. He intends to ensure that the GIO, which was more powerful than its name suggested, will lower its flag with dignity, He intends to restore the media's right to oversee cultural and publishing realms. Today former GIO Chiefs will meet. They should be glad that the GIO is making a graceful exit. Democratization has taken a step forward. There is not much worth celebrating, It would be inappropriate to make too much of the occasion.
This does not mean we should ignore what the GIO did for 60 years. The GIO was established in 1942, in a troubled time. It took on the important job of explaining national policy, at home and abroad. It sponsored and subsidized films and cultural activities. Many people invested their creativity and effort. On the other hand, the GIO censored the media, speech, and publishing, It adopted a high profile during authoritarian rule. It clung to its bureaucratic nature after the lifting of martial law, For these it was strongly criticized. During democratization and diversification, the GIO served as the government's mouthpiece, even as it oversaw the media and the publishing industry. These roles were clearly contradictory. The GIO's dissolution was inevitable.
The dissolution of the GIO was necessitated not merely by democratization, but also by political clashes that occurred during democratization. The destruction of a free press was not merely the result of the GIO. It was the result of many political forces, all of which were guilty of the same mentality as the GIO. For example, even after martial law was lifted, President Lee Teng-hui abused his power. He spearheaded a take no prisoners "newspaper boycott" during his term of office. This was something the GIO never had the temerity to undertake. The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the White Terror. But when the Chen regime came to power, it repeatedly abused its power conducting searches of newspapers and reporters' private residences. It imposed a Green Terror. It censored TV stations that provided open forums for political debate. It desisted only when Washington intervened. James Soong interfered with the media when he was GIO Chief, Later, when he was a presidential candidate, he asked the GIO to order the television media to provide equal coverage for all candidates. For example, the Green Camp frequently denounced the media as "pro-reunification." It behaved even worse when it was in power than the Taiwan Garrison Command. The public needs to understand these peculiar political developments. They are sadder than any sadness old hands feel at the GIO's closing.
The real concern as the GIO turns off its lights and closes its doors, is the slump the media seems to have fallen into. The quality of tv shows and news shows is abysmal. News is dominated by paparazzi reports, The National Communications Commission has taken over from the GIO. But it clearly cannot control the broadcasting industry. The inadequately funded Ministry of Culture will soon be charged with overseeing the publishing industry and movie industry. These are all worrying developments.
The decline in media quality has nothing to do with the abolition of the GIO. It has to do with cutthroat competition and the rise of the Internet. More importantly, democratization has destroyed many of the values and beliefs once held sacred on Taiwan, In the meantime, society has yet to reach a new consensus. This is why we face mass confusion. The GIO is about to close its doors. This is something the media and the public should ponder. Democracy is not established overnight. It must be constructed one brick at a time. Martial law was lifted 20 years ago. Yet the dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties remains shallow. The same holds true for public opinion. This is democracy backsliding.
The GIO is turning off its lights, The media is holding an all night vigil. The work of guarding democracy on Taiwan now falls upon the shoulders of the best and brightest within the Fifth Estate.
新聞局熄燈 媒體續守無眠夜
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.15 03:11 am
過去這波政府組織改造，行政院新聞局將於五二○正式熄燈關門，今天將邀歷任局長舉行「感恩道別」惜別會。「道別」是真的，但「感恩」則不知從何說起；走過六十五個年頭，新聞局的角色向來爭議多過讚譽，在此臨別之際說感恩未免矯情。
在陳水扁手中喊撤，在馬英九手中正式關上大門，這漫長十年的裁撤過程，描述了新聞局奇特的命運軌跡，也標誌了台灣民主政治的演化。
在戒嚴年代扮演媒體及言論箝制怪手的新聞局，到了民主解嚴年代自應放下鐵腕，回歸正常法制及行政管理角色，這是時勢所趨。陳水扁執政時，無法以元首之尊透過體制推動新聞局的實質改革，卻不斷任用爭議人物出任新聞局長，以偏激、失當的言論攻擊對手，騷擾社會視聽。這些作法，在在加深了外界對新聞局的惡感。
馬總統上任後，順勢而為推動新聞局的解構，將相關功能移交外交部、文化部等，僅在行政院設置政府發言人一職。如今，在他第二任就職日完成這項組織改造，至少確保「實大於名」的新聞局有尊嚴地落日降旗，也使台灣文化、出版的行政管理各歸其所。今天歷任新聞局長聚首一堂話當年時，應慶幸新聞局得以優雅謝幕，政治民主化更往前邁出一步；至於沒太多光榮可以回味的過去，恐怕就不宜作太多緬懷或炫耀了。
這樣說，並不表示新聞局一甲子的功能可以一筆抹煞。民國三十六年，在風雨飄搖中成立的新聞局，肩負著向海內外闡明國家政策的重任，包括對外宣傳與國際交流，對電影、文化事業的扶持與補助，其間，許多人投注了智慧與汗水。但從另一面看，新聞局對媒體言論及出版的管制，從威權年代的高姿態施壓，到解嚴後的不改官僚習氣，都使其深受訾議。更關鍵的是，隨著國家民主化、多元化的發展，新聞局作為政府發言麥克風、卻又兼管諸多媒體及出版事業的職能顯得蕪雜及矛盾，它的裁併和解體也就無可避免。
進一步看，新聞局的裁併不只是台灣民主化的一個結果，它也沉澱了民主化過程中複雜的政治碰撞及重組的經驗。對台灣新聞自由的摧殘，與其說是來自「新聞局這個機構」，不如說是來自各種政治勢力間皆有的「新聞局的心態」。例如，解嚴後，李登輝在任內以總統之尊發動鋪天蓋地的「退報運動」，這其實是過去新聞局也不敢為；又如，民進黨聲討白色恐怖，但扁政府也曾數度濫權搜索報社及記者住所，遂行綠色恐怖，更欲查封主持開放論壇的電視台，經美國阻止始罷手。再如，在新聞局長任內曾對媒體橫加干預的宋楚瑜，後來參選總統時，曾要求新聞局下令電視媒體給予他和不同候選人的公平報導。再如，綠營人士動輒亂貼「統派媒體」的標籤，其行徑實較過去的警總更為惡劣。觀察這些浪潮的升降和反覆，社會大眾必然更了解政治的詭譎變化，其況味應遠超乎新聞局老員工嘆關門的離愁了。
真正值得關切的是，就在新聞局燈火將盡之際，台灣媒體的生態和品質似乎也陷入了一個低谷。除了電視節目及新聞品質貧乏、狗仔文化當道，接管了新聞局廣電業務的國家通訊傳播委員會則顯然掌控不了這艘大船，即將接管出版、電影業務的文化部則陷於預算不足的窘境，這些都讓人憂心。
客觀而論，媒體品質的下滑，與新聞局的裁撤其實無關，而與過度競爭與網路興起的衝擊有關。但更關鍵的因素，則是台灣在民主化過程中摧毀了許多原有的價值和信仰，卻遲遲無法凝聚出新的共識，才會出現這種不知何去何從的集體迷惘現象。在新聞局即將打烊之際，這確實值得新聞媒體及社會大眾共同深思：民主不是一蹴可幾，而需要日復一日的錘鍊；台灣在解嚴廿多年之後，朝野對話及社會輿論卻日形淺薄，這其實是民主的反潮。
新聞局要熄燈了，但媒體的不眠之夜仍正漫長，台灣民主政治的守護工作仍有賴各路新聞工作者接力以赴。
Monday, May 14, 2012
Ganging Up on Su May Do Nothing to Help Tsai
Ganging Up on Su May Do Nothing to Help Tsai
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2012
Summary: DPP officials are indeed combative. They do not shrink from a fight. The current party chairmanship election is exactly as Su Tseng-chang recently described. What began as a "Stop Su" campaign has become an "Attack Su" or even "Gang up on Su" campaign. Will Su be elected party chairman? Whether he will be or not, Su Tseng-chang's legitimacy as either party chairman or presidential candidate has been seriously compromised. This was the most important strategic objective of the anti-Su elements within the party.
Full Text below:
DPP officials are indeed combative. They do not shrink from a fight. The current party chairmanship election is exactly as Su Tseng-chang recently described. What began as a "Stop Su" campaign has become an "Attack Su" or even "Gang up on Su" campaign. Will Su be elected party chairman? Whether he will be or not, Su Tseng-chang's legitimacy as either party chairman or presidential candidate has been seriously compromised. This was the most important strategic objective of the anti-Su elements within the party.
Given Su Tseng-chang's reputation and strength, anti-Su elements knew they could not bring him down. But they succeeded in two objectives. One. They proved that Su Tseng-chang was planning to run in 2016. Two. They argued that "Anyone planning to run for president must not serve as party chairman." After several debates, this became the consensus. Therefore, if Su Tseng-chang is elected, any personnel appointments, organizational restructuring, even words or actions, will be subject to close scrutiny. Being elected will be akin to being put into a straitjacket.
The DPP has never before demanded that a candidate for the party chairmanship sign an affidavit swearing not to run for president. Why has it established this unprecedented, ultra-high threshold for Su? The answer course has to do with the larger picture. Su Tseng-chang's personal style has become the focus of the election.
The political situation on Taiwan today is extremely strange. Ma Ying-jeou has yet to be inaugurated for his second term. Yet public support has plummeted. Worse still, a successor within the KMT has yet to be found. Vice President-elect Wu Den-yih has readied himself. Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng is strategically positioned. Xinbei City Mayor Eric Chu waits in silence. The KMT is about to undergo a reshuffle. The DPP knows which way the political winds blow. The current power vacuum offers the DPP its best chance for a comeback.
This is also true for the party chairmanship election following the party's defeat in the presidential election. Four years ago, the planets revolved around Tsai Ing-wen. Today, Su Tseng-chang is the target of a gang attack. Four years ago, Tsai Ing-wen was a martyr who sacrificed herself on behalf of the DPP. Today, Su Tseng-chang is an opportunist picking the ripest persimmons off the trees. Chaos reigns, precisely because in the hearts of DPP members, the timing is too perfect. They cannot abide Su Tseng-chang being the beneficiary of this opportunity.
Why is the DPP so anti-Su? It has to do with Su's personal style. Trong Chai blasted Su. He said Su ignored party rules during the 2010 five cities elections and nominated himself for Taipei mayor. Following the party's defeat in the 2005 county and municipal elections, Su resigned the party chairmanship. But he informed the media before he informed the DPP Central Standing Committee. Hsu Hsin-liang mocked Su, saying he lacked guts and shirked responsibility. He said Su was incompetent. He pulled no punches. He said Su ignores those who reason with him. He said Su was more suited to be a prosecutor or a judge. He said Su was unsuited to be a leader of the DPP. He said that requires human compassion and revolutionary spirit. Hsu's implication was that if Su won the presidency, he would refuse to share power with others. Tsai Ing-wen might be less experienced, but she is a people person. She knows how to share power. She is the one DPP heavyweights prefer to work with.
Green Camp people have learned that "investing in the DPP" is good business. In 2008 the Chen family corruption scandals erupted. The DPP found itself at its nadir. But even at its darkest moment, it received 42% of the vote. During the next several by-elections, Green Camp supporters remained loyal. The storm did nothing to dampen their enthusiasm. During the 2012 presidential election. they lost by six percentage points. Three more percentage points and they could have retaken the presidency. .
Since DPP members have Su, why bother with Tsai? If one is bullish on the DPP, one need not bet on Su Tseng-chang. Will DPP members support Su Tseng-chang? That is his problem. But is Tsai Ing-wen a sure thing? That is the DPP's problem.
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are competitors. Relations between the two are strained. But apart from leadership style, the two are not that different. Hsu Hsin-liang blasted Su Tseng-chang for never putting forth a meaningful cross-Strait policy. Hsu said Su's calls for dialogue and exchanges with the Mainland were empty rhetoric. Hsu said Su dismissed Washington's policy toward Taipei as "just talk." But these criticisms apply equally to Tsai Ing-wen. Her cross-Strait policy is also double talk. She too has seriously misread Washington's attitude toward Taipei. Only after her campaign defeat did DPP leaders belated complain that she was attacked on all three sides by Washington, Beijing, and the KMT.
DPP leaders have their eyes on the presidency. They would rather support Tsai than Su. But as long as the DPP avoids cross-Strait policy, surging waters will separate it from its destination. It will not be able to pass. The party chairmanship election has revealed the candidates' political views. The candidates agree about "Stopping Su." But on cross-Strait policy they are at loggerheads. Deep Greens such as Trong Chai, Su Huan-chih, Wu Rong-i embrace hardline Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang maintains a deliberately ambiguous position. Only Hsu Hsin-liang has confronted the cross-Strait situation. Can such a DPP arrive at a consensus on cross-Strait policy?
This is the key that will determine whether the DPP will once again govern. "Stopping Su" may do nothing to "Support Tsai."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.14
社論－卡蘇打蘇圍毆 未必就能拱蔡
本報訊
民進黨人士確實是會鬥、敢鬥，該黨這次的黨主席選舉，就如蘇貞昌自己所形容的，這是一場從「卡蘇」到「打蘇」、甚至是圍毆的選舉；最後，不論是否當選，蘇貞昌擔任黨主席進而角逐總統的正當性已經被嚴重摧毀，而這正是黨內反蘇人士最主要的戰略目的。
以蘇貞昌的聲望及實力，黨內反蘇勢力深知拉不下他，但是他們卻成功的達到兩個目標：第一、曝露蘇貞昌志在二○一六大位的企圖心，第二、「志在選總統的人，不適合擔任黨主席」，經過幾次辯論，成為黨的共識；因此，未來蘇貞昌一當選，他任何人事安排、組織調整甚至一言一行，都將受到高度檢視，形同是剛當選，就被戴上緊箍咒。
過去的民進黨，從未要求競選黨主席人士立下切結書、宣誓不角逐總統大位，這次為何史無前例為蘇貞昌立下超高門檻？這當然和整體大勢有關，蘇貞昌個人行事風格也因此成為選舉中的焦點。
台灣當前政治局勢異常詭異，馬英九第二任尚未就職，民意支持度已經重挫；更關鍵的是，國民黨內誰有能力接班仍然混沌不明，副總統當選人吳敦義蓄勢待發，立法院長王金平掌握有利位置，新北市長朱立倫默默蟄伏。國民黨面臨重新洗牌的時刻，深諳政治大勢的民進黨人士都了解，在此空虛時刻，正是民進黨重返大位的最好機會。
同樣是總統敗選後的黨主席，蔡英文四年前是眾星拱月，蘇貞昌此次卻是群起攻之；蔡英文當時是為了民進黨這個大我犧牲小我，蘇貞昌則被打成是柿子挑軟吃的投機分子。正因為在民進黨群雄心中，現在正是天下大亂、形勢大好的時機，由不得蘇貞昌撿便宜。
民進黨為何如此防蘇，當然和蘇的個人風格有關。蔡同榮批蘇，二○一○年五都選舉時不管黨的體制，自行提名參選北市；二○○五年縣市長敗選辭去黨主席，是先向媒體請辭才向中常會辭職；許信良不但貶抑蘇沒擔當、沒能力，更露骨的說，蘇不近人情，比較適任檢察官、法官，不適合領導有情有義有革命情誼的民進黨。這些批評意在言外的是：如果蘇贏得大位，是個不會共享天下的人；相對的，和這些老將比起來，蔡英文的政治年資雖然要少個零，但是她擅長合縱連橫，懂得分配權力，當然是民進黨大將比較屬意的合作對象。
當然，綠營人士慢慢學到的一件事是，「投資民進黨」確實是一門好生意。二○○八年扁家弊案爆發，民進黨情勢極度低迷，但最慘的狀況下，還是拿到四成二選票，接下來幾次補選，綠營支持者不離不棄，狂風暴雨也擋不住他們的投票意願；而二○一二總統大選，雖以六個百分點敗選，但只要來回三個百分點，今日的總統就是民進黨了！
因此，既生蘇、何生蔡，投資民進黨如果看漲，大家不一定要押蘇貞昌，這是蘇貞昌自己要面對的問題；但是，押寶蔡英文就沒問題了嗎？這才是民進黨真正要面對的問題。
蔡英文和蘇貞昌雖然是競爭者，關係緊張，但除了領導風格外，二人有其同質性，許信良批評蘇貞昌從未提出有意義的兩岸政策，和大陸交流的談話是一句空話，解讀美國對台政策是「隨便講講」。某種程度而言，這些批評也都適用於蔡英文，她談起兩岸政策，何嘗不像在打啞謎；她對美國政策更是嚴重誤讀，選戰後期才會出現如民進黨人士所形容的，他們是遭到美國、中國、國民黨三方夾殺。
民進黨諸將的盤算顯然是，大位當前，擁蘇不如擁蔡。但問題在於，只要民進黨仍然迴避兩岸政策，最後一哩的差距就還是滔滔大河、跨不過去。經過這次黨主席選舉，從諸位候選人政見可以看出，他們除了在「卡蘇」一事有志一同，在兩岸政策卻是南轅北轍，蔡同榮、蘇煥智、吳榮義都擁抱極獨、深綠，蘇貞昌保持模糊，只有許信良正視兩岸現狀；這樣的民進黨，未來有可能在兩岸政策上尋得共識嗎？
這才是民進黨能否執政的關鍵問題，「卡蘇」之後未必就能「拱蔡」！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2012
Summary: DPP officials are indeed combative. They do not shrink from a fight. The current party chairmanship election is exactly as Su Tseng-chang recently described. What began as a "Stop Su" campaign has become an "Attack Su" or even "Gang up on Su" campaign. Will Su be elected party chairman? Whether he will be or not, Su Tseng-chang's legitimacy as either party chairman or presidential candidate has been seriously compromised. This was the most important strategic objective of the anti-Su elements within the party.
Full Text below:
DPP officials are indeed combative. They do not shrink from a fight. The current party chairmanship election is exactly as Su Tseng-chang recently described. What began as a "Stop Su" campaign has become an "Attack Su" or even "Gang up on Su" campaign. Will Su be elected party chairman? Whether he will be or not, Su Tseng-chang's legitimacy as either party chairman or presidential candidate has been seriously compromised. This was the most important strategic objective of the anti-Su elements within the party.
Given Su Tseng-chang's reputation and strength, anti-Su elements knew they could not bring him down. But they succeeded in two objectives. One. They proved that Su Tseng-chang was planning to run in 2016. Two. They argued that "Anyone planning to run for president must not serve as party chairman." After several debates, this became the consensus. Therefore, if Su Tseng-chang is elected, any personnel appointments, organizational restructuring, even words or actions, will be subject to close scrutiny. Being elected will be akin to being put into a straitjacket.
The DPP has never before demanded that a candidate for the party chairmanship sign an affidavit swearing not to run for president. Why has it established this unprecedented, ultra-high threshold for Su? The answer course has to do with the larger picture. Su Tseng-chang's personal style has become the focus of the election.
The political situation on Taiwan today is extremely strange. Ma Ying-jeou has yet to be inaugurated for his second term. Yet public support has plummeted. Worse still, a successor within the KMT has yet to be found. Vice President-elect Wu Den-yih has readied himself. Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng is strategically positioned. Xinbei City Mayor Eric Chu waits in silence. The KMT is about to undergo a reshuffle. The DPP knows which way the political winds blow. The current power vacuum offers the DPP its best chance for a comeback.
This is also true for the party chairmanship election following the party's defeat in the presidential election. Four years ago, the planets revolved around Tsai Ing-wen. Today, Su Tseng-chang is the target of a gang attack. Four years ago, Tsai Ing-wen was a martyr who sacrificed herself on behalf of the DPP. Today, Su Tseng-chang is an opportunist picking the ripest persimmons off the trees. Chaos reigns, precisely because in the hearts of DPP members, the timing is too perfect. They cannot abide Su Tseng-chang being the beneficiary of this opportunity.
Why is the DPP so anti-Su? It has to do with Su's personal style. Trong Chai blasted Su. He said Su ignored party rules during the 2010 five cities elections and nominated himself for Taipei mayor. Following the party's defeat in the 2005 county and municipal elections, Su resigned the party chairmanship. But he informed the media before he informed the DPP Central Standing Committee. Hsu Hsin-liang mocked Su, saying he lacked guts and shirked responsibility. He said Su was incompetent. He pulled no punches. He said Su ignores those who reason with him. He said Su was more suited to be a prosecutor or a judge. He said Su was unsuited to be a leader of the DPP. He said that requires human compassion and revolutionary spirit. Hsu's implication was that if Su won the presidency, he would refuse to share power with others. Tsai Ing-wen might be less experienced, but she is a people person. She knows how to share power. She is the one DPP heavyweights prefer to work with.
Green Camp people have learned that "investing in the DPP" is good business. In 2008 the Chen family corruption scandals erupted. The DPP found itself at its nadir. But even at its darkest moment, it received 42% of the vote. During the next several by-elections, Green Camp supporters remained loyal. The storm did nothing to dampen their enthusiasm. During the 2012 presidential election. they lost by six percentage points. Three more percentage points and they could have retaken the presidency. .
Since DPP members have Su, why bother with Tsai? If one is bullish on the DPP, one need not bet on Su Tseng-chang. Will DPP members support Su Tseng-chang? That is his problem. But is Tsai Ing-wen a sure thing? That is the DPP's problem.
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are competitors. Relations between the two are strained. But apart from leadership style, the two are not that different. Hsu Hsin-liang blasted Su Tseng-chang for never putting forth a meaningful cross-Strait policy. Hsu said Su's calls for dialogue and exchanges with the Mainland were empty rhetoric. Hsu said Su dismissed Washington's policy toward Taipei as "just talk." But these criticisms apply equally to Tsai Ing-wen. Her cross-Strait policy is also double talk. She too has seriously misread Washington's attitude toward Taipei. Only after her campaign defeat did DPP leaders belated complain that she was attacked on all three sides by Washington, Beijing, and the KMT.
DPP leaders have their eyes on the presidency. They would rather support Tsai than Su. But as long as the DPP avoids cross-Strait policy, surging waters will separate it from its destination. It will not be able to pass. The party chairmanship election has revealed the candidates' political views. The candidates agree about "Stopping Su." But on cross-Strait policy they are at loggerheads. Deep Greens such as Trong Chai, Su Huan-chih, Wu Rong-i embrace hardline Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang maintains a deliberately ambiguous position. Only Hsu Hsin-liang has confronted the cross-Strait situation. Can such a DPP arrive at a consensus on cross-Strait policy?
This is the key that will determine whether the DPP will once again govern. "Stopping Su" may do nothing to "Support Tsai."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.14
社論－卡蘇打蘇圍毆 未必就能拱蔡
本報訊
民進黨人士確實是會鬥、敢鬥，該黨這次的黨主席選舉，就如蘇貞昌自己所形容的，這是一場從「卡蘇」到「打蘇」、甚至是圍毆的選舉；最後，不論是否當選，蘇貞昌擔任黨主席進而角逐總統的正當性已經被嚴重摧毀，而這正是黨內反蘇人士最主要的戰略目的。
以蘇貞昌的聲望及實力，黨內反蘇勢力深知拉不下他，但是他們卻成功的達到兩個目標：第一、曝露蘇貞昌志在二○一六大位的企圖心，第二、「志在選總統的人，不適合擔任黨主席」，經過幾次辯論，成為黨的共識；因此，未來蘇貞昌一當選，他任何人事安排、組織調整甚至一言一行，都將受到高度檢視，形同是剛當選，就被戴上緊箍咒。
過去的民進黨，從未要求競選黨主席人士立下切結書、宣誓不角逐總統大位，這次為何史無前例為蘇貞昌立下超高門檻？這當然和整體大勢有關，蘇貞昌個人行事風格也因此成為選舉中的焦點。
台灣當前政治局勢異常詭異，馬英九第二任尚未就職，民意支持度已經重挫；更關鍵的是，國民黨內誰有能力接班仍然混沌不明，副總統當選人吳敦義蓄勢待發，立法院長王金平掌握有利位置，新北市長朱立倫默默蟄伏。國民黨面臨重新洗牌的時刻，深諳政治大勢的民進黨人士都了解，在此空虛時刻，正是民進黨重返大位的最好機會。
同樣是總統敗選後的黨主席，蔡英文四年前是眾星拱月，蘇貞昌此次卻是群起攻之；蔡英文當時是為了民進黨這個大我犧牲小我，蘇貞昌則被打成是柿子挑軟吃的投機分子。正因為在民進黨群雄心中，現在正是天下大亂、形勢大好的時機，由不得蘇貞昌撿便宜。
民進黨為何如此防蘇，當然和蘇的個人風格有關。蔡同榮批蘇，二○一○年五都選舉時不管黨的體制，自行提名參選北市；二○○五年縣市長敗選辭去黨主席，是先向媒體請辭才向中常會辭職；許信良不但貶抑蘇沒擔當、沒能力，更露骨的說，蘇不近人情，比較適任檢察官、法官，不適合領導有情有義有革命情誼的民進黨。這些批評意在言外的是：如果蘇贏得大位，是個不會共享天下的人；相對的，和這些老將比起來，蔡英文的政治年資雖然要少個零，但是她擅長合縱連橫，懂得分配權力，當然是民進黨大將比較屬意的合作對象。
當然，綠營人士慢慢學到的一件事是，「投資民進黨」確實是一門好生意。二○○八年扁家弊案爆發，民進黨情勢極度低迷，但最慘的狀況下，還是拿到四成二選票，接下來幾次補選，綠營支持者不離不棄，狂風暴雨也擋不住他們的投票意願；而二○一二總統大選，雖以六個百分點敗選，但只要來回三個百分點，今日的總統就是民進黨了！
因此，既生蘇、何生蔡，投資民進黨如果看漲，大家不一定要押蘇貞昌，這是蘇貞昌自己要面對的問題；但是，押寶蔡英文就沒問題了嗎？這才是民進黨真正要面對的問題。
蔡英文和蘇貞昌雖然是競爭者，關係緊張，但除了領導風格外，二人有其同質性，許信良批評蘇貞昌從未提出有意義的兩岸政策，和大陸交流的談話是一句空話，解讀美國對台政策是「隨便講講」。某種程度而言，這些批評也都適用於蔡英文，她談起兩岸政策，何嘗不像在打啞謎；她對美國政策更是嚴重誤讀，選戰後期才會出現如民進黨人士所形容的，他們是遭到美國、中國、國民黨三方夾殺。
民進黨諸將的盤算顯然是，大位當前，擁蘇不如擁蔡。但問題在於，只要民進黨仍然迴避兩岸政策，最後一哩的差距就還是滔滔大河、跨不過去。經過這次黨主席選舉，從諸位候選人政見可以看出，他們除了在「卡蘇」一事有志一同，在兩岸政策卻是南轅北轍，蔡同榮、蘇煥智、吳榮義都擁抱極獨、深綠，蘇貞昌保持模糊，只有許信良正視兩岸現狀；這樣的民進黨，未來有可能在兩岸政策上尋得共識嗎？
這才是民進黨能否執政的關鍵問題，「卡蘇」之後未必就能「拱蔡」！
Thursday, May 10, 2012
Regroup or Lose Half Your Fighting Effectiveness
Regroup or Lose Half Your Fighting Effectiveness
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's governing team has been dogged by problems every step of the way. The DPP has threatened a vote of no confidence. The vote of no confidence will fail, But the ruling administration must regroup, The cabinet need not be dissolved. But half of its members must step down. Even if the president were to don two helmets, he could not pass his reforms, Is the KMT prepared to repeat the mistakes of 2000? Is it prepared once again to relinquish power to others?
Full Text below:
The term "rebellion" may be too strong. The term "riot" may be an exaggeration. But over the past 12 days, KMT legislators have repeatedly defected and refused to toe the party line. They defected on U.S. beef imports, twice. They held up the capital gains tax bill in the Rules Committee. They forced President Ma, in his capacity as party chairman, to make urgent telephone calls to the KMT legislative caucus. Ma said "The content may be negotiated. But the process must not stop." This tells us one thing. External chaos is not to be feared. Only internal chaos is. The KMT legislative caucus, the party, and the administration, must all be politically restructured.
Blue Camp legislators have held up the Executive Yuan's version of the capital gains tax bill. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan were completely left out of the loop. When Ma Ying-jeou learned about the situation, he made an urgent phone call to Premier Sean Chen, to Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng, to KMT Secretary-General Lin Chung-sen, and to Policy Committee Convener Lam Chi. His instructions were to continue promoting the capital gains tax bill. He said it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan Rules Committee. He said the public must not conclude that the administration isn't playing for keeps. In the Chungshan Committee Report he stressed that "The KMT's position has never changed, and its determination has never wavered." The next day, in the Central Standing Committee meeting, he invited Finance Minister Christina Liu to deliver a special report entitled, "the Significance and Benefits of the Capital Gains Tax." He even said "Ma Ying-jeou has always played for keeps!"
Ma Ying-jeou may be playing for keeps. But do KMT legislators support him as he plays for keeps? That has been repeatedly called into question. Several Blue Camp legislators blocked the bill, saying, "The KMT legislative caucus blocked the Executive Yuan proposal. This established a Guinness record This was clearly a vote of no confidence in Finance Minister Christina Liu. For Christina Liu this was a slap in the face. Other than step down, there is nothing else to do." The Blue Camp legislators surely realize that the introduction of the capital gains tax was not really a Ministry of Finance or Christina Liu initiative. The policy was part of President Ma Ying-jeou's post-reelection promise to "don a steel helmet and fight for reform." Tax justice is one of President Ma's major second term reforms. In other words, the face the Blue Camp legislator slapped was none other than President Ma's.
U.S. beef imports, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and the capital gains tax have all undercut President Ma Ying-jeou's reputation. Blue Camp legislators are increasingly out of control. Gasoline and electricity rate hikes forced Ma Ying-jeou to call a late night press conference and announce that his single stage rate hike would be changed to a multi-stage rate hike. The capital gains tax also provoked a backlash within his won party. The "five man committee" was forced to meet at the Presidential Palace. The Ministry of Finance version had to be fine tuned before it could be sent to the Executive Yuan. Normally, they would have first consulted more parties. More importantly, when the Ministry of Finance sent its version of the bill to the Executive Yuan, a Legislative Yuan version had already been vetted by both Blue and Green Camp legislators. In other words, the Executive Yuan version might have been perfect. But once it is sent to the Legislative Yuan, it is normally reviewed alongside the Legislative Yuan's version.
Consider the Legislative Yuan proceedings. The capital gains tax is a major bill. Many people hold different views, A time-consuming debate is inevitable. Between submission to the Rules Committee and the Third Reading, there are bound to be twists and turns, The Ma administration could have used the review process to buy time. It could have improved communication and gained support. It submitted the case to the Rules Committee for review. But that does not mean the Third Reading can be successfully completed during this session. Suppose the Rules Committee shelves the bill as Ma said. This will make the public question the Ma administration's and President Ma's commitment to tax reform. The KMT legislative caucus held up the bill. Perhaps it did so as an expression of dissatisfaction with the lack of communication of the administration and the legislature. But this slap in Ma's face was also a slap in the KMT's face, The business sector opposes the capital gains tax. But many experts and NGOs have promoted this bill for years. The KMT legislative caucus won the hearts of the business sector. But it paid a price. It undercut its credibility regarding reform. Carelessness has hurt the presidential office, the Executive Yuan, and the party.
The KMT legislative caucus responded to the private sector. it even responded to political changes in the European Union, The resurgence of the left could lead to another economic crisis in the Eurozone. The KMT legislative caucus meant only to delay the bill. But it should have communicated better with the presidential office and the Executive Yuan. It should have eased outside concerns about a Blue Camp legislative rebellion. Strangely enough, the KMT legislative caucus did not give advance notice. When the Executive Yuan first heard about this development, it pretended nothing was wrong. It failed to offer a strong defense for its policy, It failed to toss the hot potato back at the Treasury, That evening its press release said, "The Ministry of Finance has been asked to communicate in a more proactive manner." As if the bill had been submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Ministry of Finance. It ignored the fact that any bill, any budget must come from the Executive Yuan. Compare this to the proactive stance of the Executive Yuan during the U.S. beef imports controversy. Clearly the Executive Yuan has reservations about this bill. IN which case the first communication hurdle was not with the Legislative Yuan, but the Executive Yuan.
It began with gasoline and electricity rates hikes, and ended with capital gains taxes. President Ma wore a helmet, even as he flip-flopped all the way, Eventually Blue Camp legislators could rightly claim that the president conceded that the bill need not pass this session, and put it on hold. In essence, Ma Ying-jeou's own attitude forced legislators to work the problem out on their own. This in turn led to chaos in the legislature. In which case Ma Ying-jeou's leadership style and decision-making mode is what needs to be examined.
The Ma administration's governing team has been dogged by problems every step of the way. The DPP has threatened a vote of no confidence. The vote of no confidence will fail, But the ruling administration must regroup, The cabinet need not be dissolved. But half of its members must step down. Even if the president were to don two helmets, he cou8ld not pass his reforms, Is the KMT prepared to repeat the mistakes of 2000? Is it prepared once again to relinquish power to others?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.11
再不重整戰力 不倒也垮大半
本報訊
說「造反」可能言重了，說「暴衝」或許也不至於；但是，國民黨立委在十二天之內，從美牛兩度跑票到程序委員會擋下開徵證所稅修法案，逼得馬總統以黨主席身分急電黨團，要求「內容可以討論，程序不要阻擋」，只說明一件事：不怕外亂，就怕禍起蕭牆，執政團隊從黨到政該重整步伐了。
行政院版證所稅案在立院程序委員會遭藍委暫緩列案，府院事前完全狀況外，馬英九得知後急電行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平、國民黨祕書長林中森、政策會執行長林鴻池，指示繼續推動證所稅案，務必付委，不要讓民眾以為政府「玩假的」，並在中山會報上強調，國民黨對於證所稅「立場沒有改變、決心從未鬆動」，隔天更在中常會邀請財政部長劉憶如專題報告「課徵證所稅之意義與效益」，他甚至說了一句，「馬英九從來不玩假的！」
馬英九或許真的不玩假的，但是，黨籍立委是否支持他玩真的，卻一再遭到挑戰。部分藍委在證所稅案被擋下後說，「黨團封殺行政院提案，創下金氏紀錄，無疑是對財政部長劉憶如投下不信任票，劉憶如被打了一耳光，除了下台之外，恐怕沒有第二條路。」藍委不會不知道，開徵證所稅案，嚴格說來並非財政部或劉憶如主動力推的政策，這個政策會出爐完全在於馬英九總統連任勝選後「戴著鋼盔拚改革」的宣示，租稅正義就是馬總統第二任的重大改革。換言之，藍委出手打的這一耳光，也打在了馬總統的臉上。
美牛案、油電雙漲政策到證所稅，重創馬英九總統的聲望，藍營立委益發肆無忌憚，油電雙漲逼到馬英九深夜舉行記者會宣布從一次漲足改弦更張為分階段調漲，證所稅案同樣是在黨內反彈並於總統府五人小組會議後，讓財政部方案送行政院後即先行微調，照正常，這個案子理應納入相對更多的意見；更重要的，早在財政部或行政院提出版本前，立法院藍綠立委早就提出不同的版本，換言之，不論行政院版本多麼完善，送進立法院之後，照正常程序就是要和立委版本併案審查。
從立法院議事程序分析，開徵證所稅是大案，各界意見甚多，耗費時日討論勢所必然，從付委到三讀，中間還有許多折衝時間，馬政府大可藉由審查過程以時間換取空間，並在這段時間擴大溝通，爭取支持，即使交付委員會審查，都未必表示這個會期能順利完成三讀，但若連付委程序都擱置，誠如馬英九所言，這會讓民眾懷疑馬政府、馬總統對租稅改革的決心。國民黨立院黨團透過「暫緩列案」，或許表達了他們對府院欠缺溝通的不滿，但這記耳光同樣打在國民黨臉上，工商界反對證所稅，但不少專家學者和民間團體多年推動此案，國民黨團遂了工商界的心，卻得付出反改革譏評的代價，輕重之間稍一不慎，就讓府院黨三方俱傷。
就算黨團有感於民間業者的反應，乃至歐盟諸國政治形勢變化，左派抬頭可能釀成歐元區再一波經濟風暴，有意緩列此案，也應與府院充分溝通，消弭外界對藍委造反的疑慮，奇特的是，黨團事前未照會，行政院第一時間聽聞此事也狀貌無事，既未為政策強力辯護，甚至直接把燙手山芋推回給財政部，晚間更直接以新聞稿表示，「責請財政部以更積極態度進行溝通」，彷彿此案係直接由財政部送進立法院，而疏忽了任何法案、預算都是從行政院出門的，對照美牛案時行政院的積極態度，很難不讓人懷疑包括行政院都對此案持保留態度，果若如此，那麼溝通的第一關還不在立法院，而在行政院了。
從油電雙漲到證所稅案，戴鋼盔的馬總統一路轉彎，轉到藍委可以理直氣壯以總統說這個會期可以不過而擋下法案付委，質言之，馬英九的態度造成立委揣摩的空間，進而釀成黨團亂象，那麼該檢討的還有馬英九的領導風格與決策模式。
一路數下來，馬政府的執政團隊每一個環節都有問題，民進黨揚言要發動倒閣，坦白講，倒閣不會成功，但執政團隊再不重整戰力，內閣不必倒也會垮掉一大半，就算總統戴兩頂鋼盔都無法進行改革，難道國民黨準備重蹈二千年之覆轍，再一次將政權拱手讓人嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2012
Summary: The Ma administration's governing team has been dogged by problems every step of the way. The DPP has threatened a vote of no confidence. The vote of no confidence will fail, But the ruling administration must regroup, The cabinet need not be dissolved. But half of its members must step down. Even if the president were to don two helmets, he could not pass his reforms, Is the KMT prepared to repeat the mistakes of 2000? Is it prepared once again to relinquish power to others?
Full Text below:
The term "rebellion" may be too strong. The term "riot" may be an exaggeration. But over the past 12 days, KMT legislators have repeatedly defected and refused to toe the party line. They defected on U.S. beef imports, twice. They held up the capital gains tax bill in the Rules Committee. They forced President Ma, in his capacity as party chairman, to make urgent telephone calls to the KMT legislative caucus. Ma said "The content may be negotiated. But the process must not stop." This tells us one thing. External chaos is not to be feared. Only internal chaos is. The KMT legislative caucus, the party, and the administration, must all be politically restructured.
Blue Camp legislators have held up the Executive Yuan's version of the capital gains tax bill. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan were completely left out of the loop. When Ma Ying-jeou learned about the situation, he made an urgent phone call to Premier Sean Chen, to Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng, to KMT Secretary-General Lin Chung-sen, and to Policy Committee Convener Lam Chi. His instructions were to continue promoting the capital gains tax bill. He said it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan Rules Committee. He said the public must not conclude that the administration isn't playing for keeps. In the Chungshan Committee Report he stressed that "The KMT's position has never changed, and its determination has never wavered." The next day, in the Central Standing Committee meeting, he invited Finance Minister Christina Liu to deliver a special report entitled, "the Significance and Benefits of the Capital Gains Tax." He even said "Ma Ying-jeou has always played for keeps!"
Ma Ying-jeou may be playing for keeps. But do KMT legislators support him as he plays for keeps? That has been repeatedly called into question. Several Blue Camp legislators blocked the bill, saying, "The KMT legislative caucus blocked the Executive Yuan proposal. This established a Guinness record This was clearly a vote of no confidence in Finance Minister Christina Liu. For Christina Liu this was a slap in the face. Other than step down, there is nothing else to do." The Blue Camp legislators surely realize that the introduction of the capital gains tax was not really a Ministry of Finance or Christina Liu initiative. The policy was part of President Ma Ying-jeou's post-reelection promise to "don a steel helmet and fight for reform." Tax justice is one of President Ma's major second term reforms. In other words, the face the Blue Camp legislator slapped was none other than President Ma's.
U.S. beef imports, gasoline and electricity rate hikes, and the capital gains tax have all undercut President Ma Ying-jeou's reputation. Blue Camp legislators are increasingly out of control. Gasoline and electricity rate hikes forced Ma Ying-jeou to call a late night press conference and announce that his single stage rate hike would be changed to a multi-stage rate hike. The capital gains tax also provoked a backlash within his won party. The "five man committee" was forced to meet at the Presidential Palace. The Ministry of Finance version had to be fine tuned before it could be sent to the Executive Yuan. Normally, they would have first consulted more parties. More importantly, when the Ministry of Finance sent its version of the bill to the Executive Yuan, a Legislative Yuan version had already been vetted by both Blue and Green Camp legislators. In other words, the Executive Yuan version might have been perfect. But once it is sent to the Legislative Yuan, it is normally reviewed alongside the Legislative Yuan's version.
Consider the Legislative Yuan proceedings. The capital gains tax is a major bill. Many people hold different views, A time-consuming debate is inevitable. Between submission to the Rules Committee and the Third Reading, there are bound to be twists and turns, The Ma administration could have used the review process to buy time. It could have improved communication and gained support. It submitted the case to the Rules Committee for review. But that does not mean the Third Reading can be successfully completed during this session. Suppose the Rules Committee shelves the bill as Ma said. This will make the public question the Ma administration's and President Ma's commitment to tax reform. The KMT legislative caucus held up the bill. Perhaps it did so as an expression of dissatisfaction with the lack of communication of the administration and the legislature. But this slap in Ma's face was also a slap in the KMT's face, The business sector opposes the capital gains tax. But many experts and NGOs have promoted this bill for years. The KMT legislative caucus won the hearts of the business sector. But it paid a price. It undercut its credibility regarding reform. Carelessness has hurt the presidential office, the Executive Yuan, and the party.
The KMT legislative caucus responded to the private sector. it even responded to political changes in the European Union, The resurgence of the left could lead to another economic crisis in the Eurozone. The KMT legislative caucus meant only to delay the bill. But it should have communicated better with the presidential office and the Executive Yuan. It should have eased outside concerns about a Blue Camp legislative rebellion. Strangely enough, the KMT legislative caucus did not give advance notice. When the Executive Yuan first heard about this development, it pretended nothing was wrong. It failed to offer a strong defense for its policy, It failed to toss the hot potato back at the Treasury, That evening its press release said, "The Ministry of Finance has been asked to communicate in a more proactive manner." As if the bill had been submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Ministry of Finance. It ignored the fact that any bill, any budget must come from the Executive Yuan. Compare this to the proactive stance of the Executive Yuan during the U.S. beef imports controversy. Clearly the Executive Yuan has reservations about this bill. IN which case the first communication hurdle was not with the Legislative Yuan, but the Executive Yuan.
It began with gasoline and electricity rates hikes, and ended with capital gains taxes. President Ma wore a helmet, even as he flip-flopped all the way, Eventually Blue Camp legislators could rightly claim that the president conceded that the bill need not pass this session, and put it on hold. In essence, Ma Ying-jeou's own attitude forced legislators to work the problem out on their own. This in turn led to chaos in the legislature. In which case Ma Ying-jeou's leadership style and decision-making mode is what needs to be examined.
The Ma administration's governing team has been dogged by problems every step of the way. The DPP has threatened a vote of no confidence. The vote of no confidence will fail, But the ruling administration must regroup, The cabinet need not be dissolved. But half of its members must step down. Even if the president were to don two helmets, he cou8ld not pass his reforms, Is the KMT prepared to repeat the mistakes of 2000? Is it prepared once again to relinquish power to others?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.05.11
再不重整戰力 不倒也垮大半
本報訊
說「造反」可能言重了，說「暴衝」或許也不至於；但是，國民黨立委在十二天之內，從美牛兩度跑票到程序委員會擋下開徵證所稅修法案，逼得馬總統以黨主席身分急電黨團，要求「內容可以討論，程序不要阻擋」，只說明一件事：不怕外亂，就怕禍起蕭牆，執政團隊從黨到政該重整步伐了。
行政院版證所稅案在立院程序委員會遭藍委暫緩列案，府院事前完全狀況外，馬英九得知後急電行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平、國民黨祕書長林中森、政策會執行長林鴻池，指示繼續推動證所稅案，務必付委，不要讓民眾以為政府「玩假的」，並在中山會報上強調，國民黨對於證所稅「立場沒有改變、決心從未鬆動」，隔天更在中常會邀請財政部長劉憶如專題報告「課徵證所稅之意義與效益」，他甚至說了一句，「馬英九從來不玩假的！」
馬英九或許真的不玩假的，但是，黨籍立委是否支持他玩真的，卻一再遭到挑戰。部分藍委在證所稅案被擋下後說，「黨團封殺行政院提案，創下金氏紀錄，無疑是對財政部長劉憶如投下不信任票，劉憶如被打了一耳光，除了下台之外，恐怕沒有第二條路。」藍委不會不知道，開徵證所稅案，嚴格說來並非財政部或劉憶如主動力推的政策，這個政策會出爐完全在於馬英九總統連任勝選後「戴著鋼盔拚改革」的宣示，租稅正義就是馬總統第二任的重大改革。換言之，藍委出手打的這一耳光，也打在了馬總統的臉上。
美牛案、油電雙漲政策到證所稅，重創馬英九總統的聲望，藍營立委益發肆無忌憚，油電雙漲逼到馬英九深夜舉行記者會宣布從一次漲足改弦更張為分階段調漲，證所稅案同樣是在黨內反彈並於總統府五人小組會議後，讓財政部方案送行政院後即先行微調，照正常，這個案子理應納入相對更多的意見；更重要的，早在財政部或行政院提出版本前，立法院藍綠立委早就提出不同的版本，換言之，不論行政院版本多麼完善，送進立法院之後，照正常程序就是要和立委版本併案審查。
從立法院議事程序分析，開徵證所稅是大案，各界意見甚多，耗費時日討論勢所必然，從付委到三讀，中間還有許多折衝時間，馬政府大可藉由審查過程以時間換取空間，並在這段時間擴大溝通，爭取支持，即使交付委員會審查，都未必表示這個會期能順利完成三讀，但若連付委程序都擱置，誠如馬英九所言，這會讓民眾懷疑馬政府、馬總統對租稅改革的決心。國民黨立院黨團透過「暫緩列案」，或許表達了他們對府院欠缺溝通的不滿，但這記耳光同樣打在國民黨臉上，工商界反對證所稅，但不少專家學者和民間團體多年推動此案，國民黨團遂了工商界的心，卻得付出反改革譏評的代價，輕重之間稍一不慎，就讓府院黨三方俱傷。
就算黨團有感於民間業者的反應，乃至歐盟諸國政治形勢變化，左派抬頭可能釀成歐元區再一波經濟風暴，有意緩列此案，也應與府院充分溝通，消弭外界對藍委造反的疑慮，奇特的是，黨團事前未照會，行政院第一時間聽聞此事也狀貌無事，既未為政策強力辯護，甚至直接把燙手山芋推回給財政部，晚間更直接以新聞稿表示，「責請財政部以更積極態度進行溝通」，彷彿此案係直接由財政部送進立法院，而疏忽了任何法案、預算都是從行政院出門的，對照美牛案時行政院的積極態度，很難不讓人懷疑包括行政院都對此案持保留態度，果若如此，那麼溝通的第一關還不在立法院，而在行政院了。
從油電雙漲到證所稅案，戴鋼盔的馬總統一路轉彎，轉到藍委可以理直氣壯以總統說這個會期可以不過而擋下法案付委，質言之，馬英九的態度造成立委揣摩的空間，進而釀成黨團亂象，那麼該檢討的還有馬英九的領導風格與決策模式。
一路數下來，馬政府的執政團隊每一個環節都有問題，民進黨揚言要發動倒閣，坦白講，倒閣不會成功，但執政團隊再不重整戰力，內閣不必倒也會垮掉一大半，就算總統戴兩頂鋼盔都無法進行改革，難道國民黨準備重蹈二千年之覆轍，再一次將政權拱手讓人嗎？
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
Comrades Still Treat Each Other This Way
Comrades Still Treat Each Other This Way
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2012
Summary: When the Democratic Progressive Party held its 2012 presidential primaries, the Tsai Ing-wen faction called on party members to "Support Tsai Ing-wen and Tsai Ing-wen alone." It accused Su Tseng-chang of supporting the KMT's mobilization of farm associations. Su was forced to call a press conference to defend himself. "We are all members of the same party. Comrades should not treat each other this way!" Su Tseng-chang later lost to Tsai Ing-wen. Should comrades treat each other this way? Perhaps not. But what are you going to do about it?
Full Text below:
When the Democratic Progressive Party held its 2012 presidential primaries, the Tsai Ing-wen faction called on party members to "Support Tsai Ing-wen and Tsai Ing-wen alone." It accused Su Tseng-chang of supporting the KMT's mobilization of farm associations. Su was forced to call a press conference to defend himself. "We are all members of the same party. Comrades should not treat each other this way!" Su Tseng-chang later lost to Tsai Ing-wen.
History is repeating itself. The current DPP party chairmanship election has become a dress rehearsal for the 2016 presidential election. Rival factions have already begun attacking Su Tseng-chang. Supporters of Tsai Ing-wen are using harsh language in their attacks against him. Every word draws blood. Su Tseng-chang said "Comrades should not treat each other this way." But comrades are treating each other this way. This time the danger to Su is even greater than before.
Su Tseng-chang suddenly finds himself besieged on all sides. Some criticize Su's style and image. Hsu Hsin-liang accuses Su of "failing to assume responsibility" by turning down the party chairmanship in 2008. Trong Chai accuses Su of "nominating himself" during the Taipei mayoral election. He says Su's transgression warrants expulsion from the party. Meanwhile others question Su's political stance. Yao Chia-wen accuses him of being insufficiently "Taiwan-centric" or "pro-Taiwan independence." The Chen Shui-bian faction even says if Su becomes party chairman the One Country Each Side Connection may split and form its own party. Koo Kuan-min bluntly proclaimed, "Mr. Su, I disapprove of your candidacy!"
This powerful wave of "Topple Su" sentiment may represent the most intense infighting within the Green Camp since the "Condemn Kang Ning-hsiang" campaign in 1983. It may be more intense than the infighting that ensued when Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were expelled. This wave of infighting involves an ideological struggle over the party's political path. over whether to pardon Chen Shui-bian, and over unresolved difference between Su and Hsieh. More importantly, it is inextricably linked with the 2016 "Su vs. Tsai Rematch." For the factions involved it amounts o all out war.
Su Tseng-chang has decided to run for party chairman. He made a conspicuous attempt to ensure a seat for himself. He hopes to use the power of the party chairmanship to manage the situation. Who knew the tide would turn against him? Even if he is elected party chairman he is likely to become a target for all parties. He has become the storm center within the party. If Su Tseng-chang cannot become the universally acknowledged leader of the party, he is likely to become the universally acknowledged enemy of the party. The main reason? Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on the 2016 presidential election. Meanwhile support within the party for a Tsai Ing-wen candidacy in 2016 is growing. If Su Tseng-chang becomes party chairman, Tsai Ing-wen's supporters will see that as a roadblock.
Among the party nomenklatura, Su Tseng-chang has become "a rat crossing the street," i.e., a whipping boy. But at the party membership level he still has enough support to win the party chairmanship. If he is elected party chairman however, he will immediately face a serious rift within the DPP. If he wants to heal the rift, he must mollify all the factions. Otherwise all hope of transforming the party will be lost. Will infighting erupt? How severe will it be? This is all up to others. This is all beyond Su Tseng-chang's control. When infighting erupts, the tree may wish to remain still, but the wind will continue to blow. Suppose Su is determined to enter the 2016 presidential race? His opponents will insist on Tsai Ing-wen. Unless one side yields, the internal struggle will intensify, until it is totally out of control.
This is the crisis the DPP faces in 2016. DPP leaders must put out the fires before the party chairmanship election. If they wait until the election results are announced, it will be too late to do anything about it. Consider one option. Su Tseng-chang announces that he will not run for president in 2016. Consider another option. The anti-Su and pro-Su factions reach an accord, and Su becomes party chairman. Otherwise, if Su is elected party chairman. then sets his sights on 2016, supporters of Tsai Ing-wen will refuse to yield. That would mark the beginning of a four year long Su vs. Tsai battle for the party's presidential nomination. The polls for the party chairmanship election open on May 27. The consequences are frightening to imagine.
The best way the Democratic Progressive Party can help itself, is to undergo reform and transformation. Unfortunately it is caught in a power struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. Apparently Su has been demonized all out of proportion. Tsai has been deified all out of proportion. Predictably this power struggle has increased factional tensions to the limit. It is certain to undermine reform and transformation. If Su Tseng-chang is elected party chairman, Tsai supporters will demand that he endorse Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. If the anti-Su forces can unite the party behind a single candidate, Taiwan independence hardliners and those who support exchanges may create a deadlock difficult to break. Ironically "transformation" has become a bargaining chip in the power struggle. It is now difficult to hold high expectations for the DPP. The Su vs. Cai power struggle has underscored this point, This bodes ill for reform.
Should comrades treat each other this way? Perhaps not. But what are you going to do about it?
同黨的還是這樣搞
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.10 02:49 am
民進黨二○一二總統候選人黨內初選期間，蔡英文方面操作「唯一支持蔡英文」，又指蘇貞昌獲國民黨動員農會系統輔選，逼得蘇在政見會上說：「大家都是同黨的，同黨的不要這樣搞！」後來，蘇貞昌敗給了蔡英文。
歷史在重演。如今，民進黨黨主席選舉儼然又成了二○一六總統選舉的序幕戰，各路人馬居然皆以蘇貞昌為攻擊對象，為蔡英文抬轎者對蘇的批評詞鋒之銳利，更已至刀刀見骨的地步。此情此景，對於蘇貞昌而言，可謂是「同黨的還是這樣搞」，其凶險更較前次猶有過之。
蘇貞昌陡然陷於四面楚歌之境。有人批評他的風格形象：許信良指他在二○○八拒絕出任黨主席，「沒有承當責任」；蔡同榮指他「自行參選／自行提名」為台北市長候選人，罪當開除黨籍。有人則質疑其政治立場：姚嘉文指他不是「台派，獨派」；陳水扁方面甚至放話稱，如果蘇當選黨主席，「一邊一國連線」可能組黨；辜寬敏則直說：「蘇先生，我不贊成你出來！」
這一股來勢洶洶的「倒蘇」風潮，可能將是一九八三年前後的「批康（寧祥）」以來，綠營最慘烈的內鬥，亦將更勝於逐出許信良及施明德的往事；因為，這股風潮蘊含著路線鬥爭、是否特赦陳水扁、蘇謝情結等因素，更重要的是，已與二○一六的「蘇蔡二次之爭」如麻花般糾纏在一起，難分難解，對於參與的各方皆是殊死一戰。
蘇貞昌決定參選黨主席，著眼在卡位，希望在掌握黨主席權位後可以操持情勢；不料，如今大勢逆轉，即或他當選了黨主席，也極可能成為各方的箭靶，反而成了黨內政潮的中心。蘇貞昌如果做不成黨內共主，就有可能成為黨內公敵。主因在於：蘇貞昌志在參選二○一六總統，但黨內擁護蔡英文再戰二○一六的聲音愈來愈大；蘇貞昌若出任黨主席，將被蔡英文的支持者視為擋路石。
此刻，蘇貞昌在黨內權力階層竟儼然已成過街老鼠，但他在黨員層次仍有贏得黨主席選舉的實力。不過，他若出任黨主席，必將立即面對一個嚴重分裂的民進黨；而他若欲對這個分裂的黨進行彌縫補罅，安撫各方，則一切轉型改革恐怕必告無望；何況，是否內鬥，及慘況如何，皆是操之在人，由不得蘇貞昌，屆時恐怕是樹欲停而風不止。因為，蘇若矢志參選二○一六總統，對方則非蔡英文不可，除非兩造有一方退讓，這場內鬥必是愈演愈烈，不可收拾。
這是民進黨面對二○一六的重大危機，必須在黨主席選前設法滅火，若待選舉揭曉就不易轉圜。可能方案之一，是蘇貞昌宣布不選二○一六總統；可能方案之二，是反蘇擁蔡者設法整合，贏得黨主席職位。否則，如果蘇當選了黨主席，且目標在二○一六，而擁蔡英文者不退讓，即不啻宣告一場將要歷時四年的蘇蔡總統候選人之爭，在五月二十七日黨主席投開票日開打，其後果實不堪想像。
目前民進黨最重要的自救之道是在改革與轉型，現在卻不幸陷於蘇貞昌及蔡英文的權力惡鬥之中。如今所見，蘇被不成比例地鬥臭、抹黑，蔡又被不成比例地美化與高估；已可預見，這場權力鬥爭，因為已使得派系的利害關係緊繃，必將影響改革轉型的空間。例如：蘇貞昌若當選黨主席，擁蔡者會吵著要他為蔡英文的兩岸政策背書；倘反蘇者能整合一人當選，則獨派與交流派的相互牽制亦不易解開。於是「轉型」反而成為用在「權力鬥爭」中討價還價的籌碼，也就難寄厚望了。對於民進黨而言，蘇蔡之爭激化至此，絕非改革轉型的吉兆。
但是，同黨的還是要這樣搞，嘸你嘜安納？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2012
Summary: When the Democratic Progressive Party held its 2012 presidential primaries, the Tsai Ing-wen faction called on party members to "Support Tsai Ing-wen and Tsai Ing-wen alone." It accused Su Tseng-chang of supporting the KMT's mobilization of farm associations. Su was forced to call a press conference to defend himself. "We are all members of the same party. Comrades should not treat each other this way!" Su Tseng-chang later lost to Tsai Ing-wen. Should comrades treat each other this way? Perhaps not. But what are you going to do about it?
Full Text below:
When the Democratic Progressive Party held its 2012 presidential primaries, the Tsai Ing-wen faction called on party members to "Support Tsai Ing-wen and Tsai Ing-wen alone." It accused Su Tseng-chang of supporting the KMT's mobilization of farm associations. Su was forced to call a press conference to defend himself. "We are all members of the same party. Comrades should not treat each other this way!" Su Tseng-chang later lost to Tsai Ing-wen.
History is repeating itself. The current DPP party chairmanship election has become a dress rehearsal for the 2016 presidential election. Rival factions have already begun attacking Su Tseng-chang. Supporters of Tsai Ing-wen are using harsh language in their attacks against him. Every word draws blood. Su Tseng-chang said "Comrades should not treat each other this way." But comrades are treating each other this way. This time the danger to Su is even greater than before.
Su Tseng-chang suddenly finds himself besieged on all sides. Some criticize Su's style and image. Hsu Hsin-liang accuses Su of "failing to assume responsibility" by turning down the party chairmanship in 2008. Trong Chai accuses Su of "nominating himself" during the Taipei mayoral election. He says Su's transgression warrants expulsion from the party. Meanwhile others question Su's political stance. Yao Chia-wen accuses him of being insufficiently "Taiwan-centric" or "pro-Taiwan independence." The Chen Shui-bian faction even says if Su becomes party chairman the One Country Each Side Connection may split and form its own party. Koo Kuan-min bluntly proclaimed, "Mr. Su, I disapprove of your candidacy!"
This powerful wave of "Topple Su" sentiment may represent the most intense infighting within the Green Camp since the "Condemn Kang Ning-hsiang" campaign in 1983. It may be more intense than the infighting that ensued when Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were expelled. This wave of infighting involves an ideological struggle over the party's political path. over whether to pardon Chen Shui-bian, and over unresolved difference between Su and Hsieh. More importantly, it is inextricably linked with the 2016 "Su vs. Tsai Rematch." For the factions involved it amounts o all out war.
Su Tseng-chang has decided to run for party chairman. He made a conspicuous attempt to ensure a seat for himself. He hopes to use the power of the party chairmanship to manage the situation. Who knew the tide would turn against him? Even if he is elected party chairman he is likely to become a target for all parties. He has become the storm center within the party. If Su Tseng-chang cannot become the universally acknowledged leader of the party, he is likely to become the universally acknowledged enemy of the party. The main reason? Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on the 2016 presidential election. Meanwhile support within the party for a Tsai Ing-wen candidacy in 2016 is growing. If Su Tseng-chang becomes party chairman, Tsai Ing-wen's supporters will see that as a roadblock.
Among the party nomenklatura, Su Tseng-chang has become "a rat crossing the street," i.e., a whipping boy. But at the party membership level he still has enough support to win the party chairmanship. If he is elected party chairman however, he will immediately face a serious rift within the DPP. If he wants to heal the rift, he must mollify all the factions. Otherwise all hope of transforming the party will be lost. Will infighting erupt? How severe will it be? This is all up to others. This is all beyond Su Tseng-chang's control. When infighting erupts, the tree may wish to remain still, but the wind will continue to blow. Suppose Su is determined to enter the 2016 presidential race? His opponents will insist on Tsai Ing-wen. Unless one side yields, the internal struggle will intensify, until it is totally out of control.
This is the crisis the DPP faces in 2016. DPP leaders must put out the fires before the party chairmanship election. If they wait until the election results are announced, it will be too late to do anything about it. Consider one option. Su Tseng-chang announces that he will not run for president in 2016. Consider another option. The anti-Su and pro-Su factions reach an accord, and Su becomes party chairman. Otherwise, if Su is elected party chairman. then sets his sights on 2016, supporters of Tsai Ing-wen will refuse to yield. That would mark the beginning of a four year long Su vs. Tsai battle for the party's presidential nomination. The polls for the party chairmanship election open on May 27. The consequences are frightening to imagine.
The best way the Democratic Progressive Party can help itself, is to undergo reform and transformation. Unfortunately it is caught in a power struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. Apparently Su has been demonized all out of proportion. Tsai has been deified all out of proportion. Predictably this power struggle has increased factional tensions to the limit. It is certain to undermine reform and transformation. If Su Tseng-chang is elected party chairman, Tsai supporters will demand that he endorse Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. If the anti-Su forces can unite the party behind a single candidate, Taiwan independence hardliners and those who support exchanges may create a deadlock difficult to break. Ironically "transformation" has become a bargaining chip in the power struggle. It is now difficult to hold high expectations for the DPP. The Su vs. Cai power struggle has underscored this point, This bodes ill for reform.
Should comrades treat each other this way? Perhaps not. But what are you going to do about it?
同黨的還是這樣搞
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.05.10 02:49 am
民進黨二○一二總統候選人黨內初選期間，蔡英文方面操作「唯一支持蔡英文」，又指蘇貞昌獲國民黨動員農會系統輔選，逼得蘇在政見會上說：「大家都是同黨的，同黨的不要這樣搞！」後來，蘇貞昌敗給了蔡英文。
歷史在重演。如今，民進黨黨主席選舉儼然又成了二○一六總統選舉的序幕戰，各路人馬居然皆以蘇貞昌為攻擊對象，為蔡英文抬轎者對蘇的批評詞鋒之銳利，更已至刀刀見骨的地步。此情此景，對於蘇貞昌而言，可謂是「同黨的還是這樣搞」，其凶險更較前次猶有過之。
蘇貞昌陡然陷於四面楚歌之境。有人批評他的風格形象：許信良指他在二○○八拒絕出任黨主席，「沒有承當責任」；蔡同榮指他「自行參選／自行提名」為台北市長候選人，罪當開除黨籍。有人則質疑其政治立場：姚嘉文指他不是「台派，獨派」；陳水扁方面甚至放話稱，如果蘇當選黨主席，「一邊一國連線」可能組黨；辜寬敏則直說：「蘇先生，我不贊成你出來！」
這一股來勢洶洶的「倒蘇」風潮，可能將是一九八三年前後的「批康（寧祥）」以來，綠營最慘烈的內鬥，亦將更勝於逐出許信良及施明德的往事；因為，這股風潮蘊含著路線鬥爭、是否特赦陳水扁、蘇謝情結等因素，更重要的是，已與二○一六的「蘇蔡二次之爭」如麻花般糾纏在一起，難分難解，對於參與的各方皆是殊死一戰。
蘇貞昌決定參選黨主席，著眼在卡位，希望在掌握黨主席權位後可以操持情勢；不料，如今大勢逆轉，即或他當選了黨主席，也極可能成為各方的箭靶，反而成了黨內政潮的中心。蘇貞昌如果做不成黨內共主，就有可能成為黨內公敵。主因在於：蘇貞昌志在參選二○一六總統，但黨內擁護蔡英文再戰二○一六的聲音愈來愈大；蘇貞昌若出任黨主席，將被蔡英文的支持者視為擋路石。
此刻，蘇貞昌在黨內權力階層竟儼然已成過街老鼠，但他在黨員層次仍有贏得黨主席選舉的實力。不過，他若出任黨主席，必將立即面對一個嚴重分裂的民進黨；而他若欲對這個分裂的黨進行彌縫補罅，安撫各方，則一切轉型改革恐怕必告無望；何況，是否內鬥，及慘況如何，皆是操之在人，由不得蘇貞昌，屆時恐怕是樹欲停而風不止。因為，蘇若矢志參選二○一六總統，對方則非蔡英文不可，除非兩造有一方退讓，這場內鬥必是愈演愈烈，不可收拾。
這是民進黨面對二○一六的重大危機，必須在黨主席選前設法滅火，若待選舉揭曉就不易轉圜。可能方案之一，是蘇貞昌宣布不選二○一六總統；可能方案之二，是反蘇擁蔡者設法整合，贏得黨主席職位。否則，如果蘇當選了黨主席，且目標在二○一六，而擁蔡英文者不退讓，即不啻宣告一場將要歷時四年的蘇蔡總統候選人之爭，在五月二十七日黨主席投開票日開打，其後果實不堪想像。
目前民進黨最重要的自救之道是在改革與轉型，現在卻不幸陷於蘇貞昌及蔡英文的權力惡鬥之中。如今所見，蘇被不成比例地鬥臭、抹黑，蔡又被不成比例地美化與高估；已可預見，這場權力鬥爭，因為已使得派系的利害關係緊繃，必將影響改革轉型的空間。例如：蘇貞昌若當選黨主席，擁蔡者會吵著要他為蔡英文的兩岸政策背書；倘反蘇者能整合一人當選，則獨派與交流派的相互牽制亦不易解開。於是「轉型」反而成為用在「權力鬥爭」中討價還價的籌碼，也就難寄厚望了。對於民進黨而言，蘇蔡之爭激化至此，絕非改革轉型的吉兆。
但是，同黨的還是要這樣搞，嘸你嘜安納？
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