Cross-Strait Exchanges: Take Off the White Gloves
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16 2012
Summary: This is a critical moment. Both sides must act. They must begin by setting up cultural and economic offices. Both sides must consider removing their "white gloves." At the very least, they must replace them with disposable gloves. Both sides must set up cultural and economic offices. They must establish links based on the two sides' existing legal systems. This is an urgent task. We must not squander this precious opportunity.
Full Text below:
Yesterday ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin said, "I hope we can begin talks on the establishment of cultural and economic offices, and establish them within the year." Chen's remarks show that the cultural and economic offices will use the same names as the two cross-Strait committees. They will remain "white gloves," i.e., intermediaries, and the goal will still be to establish them within the year.
Given the progress in cross-Strait relations, we should consider removing the white gloves from the cultural and economic offices. Establishing the cultural and economic offices could be the cross-Strait issue with the most creative potential heading into 2016. It offers the two sides much to ponder and discuss. We must ensure maximum synergy. We need not turn it into a rush job. The establishment of the offices should enable us to break through existing cross-Strait bottlenecks. Otherwise they can be temporarily shelved, rather than be allowed to undermine the entire undertaking.
Her are our recommendations. Beijing is looking into the establishment of cultural and economic offices. It is probably taking its cue from the 18th National Congress Political Report. It read, "Look into cross-Strait political relations under special conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified. Make reasonable arrangements." The Ma administration can base its thinking on the amended Constitution of the Republic of China. The preface calls for "thinking about how to respond to the nation's needs prior to reunification." The establishment of the two cultural and economic offices should be consistent with the following four conditions: One. The nation has yet to be reunified. Two. The nation faces special conditions. Three. The two sides of the Strait have a political relationship. Four. The two sides must make reasonable arrangements.
The "Cross-Strait Peace Agreement" could have dealt with this problem. We could have signed a peace agreement to reaffirm the aforementioned four conditions. We could have established offices predicated upon these four conditions. But the peace agreement ran aground. Therefore, we must consider first setting up cultural and economic offices. We must then ensure that the cultural and economic offices are consistent with the four conditions. The agreement to establish cultural and economic offices is a stand-in for a peace agreement.
As we see it, The most reasonable solution is the "big roof concept of China." This is consistent with the four conditions for cross-Strait relations. There is only one China in the world. The Republic of China is democratic China. The People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. Both are part of a single China whose sovereignty they share. Together they comprise one China. The two sides should establish cultural and economic offices under the big roof China concept. The big roof China concept acknowledges the ROC. The ROC recognizes the big roof China concept. It is consistent with the new four conditions for cross-Strait relations.
After years of agitation and conflict, the two sides understand that reunification is no easy matter. Therefore a long process must precede reunification. This process will transform goal-oriented policies into process-oriented policies. This transformation will enable us to extend, improve, and enhance our goals. This transformation will enable us to prolong and slow the process. This transformation is consistent with the common interests of both sides.
We initially hoped the peace agreement could materialize and take effect. But the peace agreement is currently infeasible. Therefore we must consider an alternative, an agreement to establish cultural and economic offices in pursuit of the same goal.
Therefore we must consider removing the white gloves from the cultural and economic offices. Beijing has repeatedly referred to "using the two sides' existing provisions as a point of departure." Beijing is of course referring to the two sides' legal provisions, including their constitutions and laws. This constitutes "seeking common ground regarding one China, while shelving differences regarding the political content." Therefore these arguments should be rendered into text. They should be incorporated into the negotiations over the establishment of cultural and economic offices. They will help define their roles. Take the two sides' existing legal systems as our point of departure. Seek common ground while shelving differences. Acknowledge the special circumstances the two sides find themselves in. Do this, and the two sides' will no longer need white gloves. They can acknowledge that political relations between the two sides is a special case.
In fact cross-Strait exchanges and the status quo make it difficult to distinguish the hand from the glove. Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office and ARATS are a case of "the same staff, with two different door signs." A future cultural and economic office would be a case of "the same staff, with three different door signs." Why the unnecessary redundancy? Why the self-deception?
Are cross-Strait relations rooted in "the two sides' existing legal systems?" If they are, they should be reflected in the status of the two sides' cultural and economic offices. They should be consistent with the two sides' existing legal systems." This will enable the two sides to cope with cross-Strait relations under "exceptional circumstances." This will enable them to set up cultural and economic offices on both sides.
Even if this cannot be achieved, the same staff, with two or three different door signs, remains a reality. It is clearly laid out in the provisions of the agreement. For example, it clearly states that "Based on the two sides' existing legal systems, authorities on both sides will assume their appropriate roles and participate in the operations of the cultural and economic offices." Terms such as "respective legal systems, " "authorities," and "officials" are contained in the text of the agreement. The hand within the glove is visible. This shows that the two sides respect each others' existing legal systems.
The two sides are at an impasse. Beijing wants Taipei to uphold its "one China constitution." But it refuses to recognize the Republic of China's existing legal system. The ROC's "one China constitution" gets no respect from either side. The political situation on Taiwan is unstable. The two sides know they will not be reunified for some time. Without the "big roof China concept" as a framework for "special cross-Strait political relations" how can the two sides ensure "peaceful development?"
In 2012, the threshold for cross-strait relations was ECFA. The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party crossed the threshold. Now the Democratic Progressive Party has "unconditionally accepted" it as well. We hope that in 2016, the two sides can sign a cross-Strait agreement based on the two sides' existing legal systems. The agreement would be fully consistent with the four conditions required for the new relationship. We hope the agreement will become a new threshold for cross-Strait relations. We hope the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party can cross it. We hope the DPP can as well.
The issue for 2012 was whether to rescind ECFA. The issue for 2016 is whether to eliminate the two sides' economic and cultural Offices.
This is a critical moment. Both sides must act. They must begin by setting up cultural and economic offices. Both sides must consider removing the white gloves. At the very least, they must replace them with disposable gloves. Both sides must set up cultural and economic offices. They must establish links based on the two sides' existing legal systems. This is an urgent task. We must not squander this precious opportunity.
兩岸辦事處應當脫掉白手套
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.16 03:42 am
大陸海協會長陳雲林日前表示，「希望盡快啟動兩會互設辦事機構商談，爭取年內完成互設」；此言顯示，辦事處掛的還是「兩會」的招牌，仍是白手套，時程則希望在年內實現。
我們認為，兩岸關係進展至今日地步，應當通盤考慮未來的辦事處是否應當脫掉白手套；至於時程方面，由於互設辦事處可能是二○一六年前兩岸最具創新潛能的議題，為了使雙方有充裕的思考與討論空間，以產生最大的綜合效應，其實沒有「趕工」的必要。倘若辦事處的設置，不能突破兩岸交流的現有瓶頸，甚至不妨暫時擱置，不要糟蹋了這個題材。
我們的建議是：北京在研榷兩岸辦事處時，應可從十八大政治報告所指「探討尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」開始發想；而馬政府則可根據憲法增修條文序文所稱「為因應國家統一前的需要」啟動思考。於是，兩岸辦事處的設立，應當反映並滿足四個條件：
一、國家尚未統一；二、特殊情況下的；三、兩岸政治關係；四、作出合情合理的安排。
原本，《兩岸和平協議》應可處理這個問題，也就是先簽和平協議，以確立前述四條件，再根據四條件設置辦事處；但是，如今和平協議已告擱淺，因此似可考慮先設置辦事處，而藉辦事處來反映並滿足四條件，亦即以設置辦事處的協議來替代和平協議。
在我們的想像中，欲反映並滿足「兩岸新關係四條件」，最「合情合理」的方案即是「大屋頂中國」：世界上只有一個中國，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬「兩岸主權相互含蘊並相互合成的一個中國」。兩岸倘能在「大屋頂中國」的思維下簽署互設辦事處的協議，中華民國得到「大屋頂中國」的接納，而「大屋頂中國」得到中華民國的認同，即有可能反映並滿足兩岸的「新關係四條件」。
經歷多年的激盪與折衝，兩岸雙方皆知「統一」之「目的」絕非容易，因而必須經營一個長期的「尚未統一」的「過程」。這使得雙方的政策皆從「目的論」，轉向了「過程論」；此一轉換，可使「目的」推遠、改善、提升，亦可將「過程」拉長、放緩，應當符合兩岸各自的與共同的利益。
這原是希望由《和平協議》實現的功效，但如今簽不成和平協議，即可思考由互設辦事處的協議來體現這樣的追求。
所以，應當思考讓兩岸辦事處脫掉白手套。在兩岸交往中，北京屢申「由雙方各自規定出發」，其實即是指「由雙方各自法制（憲法及法律）出發」，又稱「求一個中國之同，存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」；既是如此，即應將這類論述化為文字，載入兩岸互設辦事處的協議中，藉此為辦事處定位。如果能確立「從各自法制出發」、「求同存異」的「特殊情況」，則兩岸辦事處實已不必再有白手套，因為雙方即可面對並承認兩岸是一種「特殊情況下的政治關係」。
其實，兩岸交流現狀，手與手套已是表裡難分，北京的國台辦與海協會更是「一套人馬／兩塊招牌」；未來若成立辦事處，亦將是「一套人馬／三塊招牌」。試想：何必如此疊床架屋？更何必如此自欺欺人？
倘若兩岸關係應以「雙方現行法制」為準據，即應在辦事處的設置上反映此種認知；例如載明「依據雙方現行法制」，為了處理「特殊情況下的兩岸關係」，而互設辦事處。
即使作不到如此，亦可將「兩塊（三塊）招牌／一套人馬」的事實，明載於協議條文中，例如明文：「依據兩岸各自現行法制，雙方當局官員得以適宜身分參與辦事處運作。」藉由將「各自法制」、「當局」、「官員」等詞彙之載入協議文本，把手從手套中露出來，顯示雙方對「各自現行法制」的維持與尊重。
兩岸今日僵局在於：北京既要台灣維持「一中憲法」的「現行規定」，卻又不承認中華民國的「現行法制」；而「一中憲法」在兩岸之間既得不到支撐，台灣的政局就難以安定。而既然兩岸皆知「尚未統一」將是長期的過程，倘若不以「大屋頂中國」為「特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，兩岸將如何「和平發展」？
二○一二年，兩岸關係的門檻是ＥＣＦＡ，國民黨與中共都跨過了，如今也已帶領民進黨「概括跨過」；我們寄望，在二○一六年，根據「兩岸現行法制」所簽署的兩岸辦事處協議，得以充分反映及滿足兩岸的「新關係四條件」，且能成為兩岸的新門檻，而國民黨與中共皆能跨過，也可帶著民進黨跨過。
倘係如此，二○一二年的議題是：要不要廢ＥＣＦＡ？二○一六年的議題則成為：要不要廢兩岸辦事處？
關鍵的時刻，兩岸應有關鍵的作為；就從兩岸互設辦事處作起，雙方應考慮脫去白手套，至少須換上透明的可拋棄式手套。否則，倘若兩岸互設辦事處，不能在回歸兩岸各自現行法制上有所連結與突破，則亦非當務之急，也就不必平白糟蹋了這個寶貴的題材。
Wednesday, January 16, 2013
Tuesday, January 15, 2013
Policy Change: The Soft Underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party
Policy Change: The Soft Underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power. Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen.
One. For starters, Su Tseng-chang refused to allow Frank Hsieh to head up the China Affairs Committee. This was Su's declaration that he favored the path taken by the Taiwan independence movement. He is serving notice. He intends to take a very different path than reform advocates Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. Two. Su has resorted to heavy-handed measures. He is demanding the impeachment of Blue camp legislators and President Ma. He intends to take extreme and hawkish measures. He intends to take a very different path than the moderate and dovish Tsai Ing-wen. Three. He has escalated the conflict. He is calling for the impeachment of the president. This clashes head on with Tsai Ing-wen's call for a National Policy Conference. After all, Su Tseng-chang cannot simultaneously impeach President Ma Ying-jeou and demand that he convene a National Policy Conference. Su Tseng-chang has also committed himself to the DPP's "alternative" pension program in the Legislative Yuan.
Su Tseng-chang is siding with Taiwan independence hawks to consolidate his leadership within the Pan Green camp and the DPP. He is attempting to marginalize Tsai Ing-wen. That is why Su Tseng-chang's slogan is "change policies, change legislators, change the president." It is not a policy declaration. It is a call to arms. His primary goal is to heighten Blue vs. Green conflict in order to undermine Tsai Ing-wen. Will this enable Su to lead the DPP out of the political winderness? For the moment Su Tseng-chang cannot be bothered with that.
What does "change policies, change legislators, change the president" mean? It means to incite clashes over policy, initiate a cabinet reshuffle, impeach legislators, and impeach the president. It means a multi-front political struggle aimed at effecting ruling party change and to return to power.
But this path is strewn with pitfalls. The main driving force behind presidential change or ruling party change should derive from policy change. But Su Tseng-chang has put policy change on hold. His focus is clearly on the political struggle. His "policy," if it can be called that, is fragmented and unclear. In fact, this is Su Tseng-chang's weak point. This is also the soft underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party.
We all know why the DPP is mired where it is today. The main reason is its desire to "change policies." The DPP demands change. But it demands the wrong kind of change. The DPP demands Taiwan independence, the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." It wants more than just policy change. It wants to change the constitution and even the name of the country.
In 2008, he KMT regained political power. The voters demanded change -- from DPP policy. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen went down in defeat. The voters refused to allow the DPP to change the KMT's 1992 consensus and ECFA. The DPP was forced to promise that "If we return to power, we will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This being the case, precisely what policies does Su Tseng-chang intend to change?
The DPP must establish a credible long term policy regarding national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations. All other policy debates, are mere pretexts for fodder for political struggles. They will not restore public confidence in the DPP and allow it to return to office. So the question is, just what sort of "change" is the DPP calling for with regards national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations?
Consider other DPP policies. From the perspective of political struggles, it may pay to be paranoid. But if the DPP expects to rule once again, it cannot afford to miss the forest for the trees. Take the matter of nuclear power generation. Antinuclear sentiments are currently on the rise. Naturally this sentiment can be exploited. But the abolition of nuclear power generation is a serious matter. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared three times that he opposed a nuclear free Japan. The DPP has characterized gasoline price and electricity rate increases as tyranny. The DPP advocates the elimination of nuclear power generation. So how does it stand on gasoline and electricity subsidies? What about the capital gains tax, health insurance rate hikes, pension reform, and the so-called "media monopoly?" It cannot just vent its rage. It must offer policy proposals. Ideology is not "policy." Political struggle is not "reform." Inciting social divisions is not "love for Taiwan." Su Tseng-chang's "policy changes" were merely political struggles, not policy reform.
Su Tseng-chang knows full well that he must change policy to justify presidential change and ruling party change. But policies cannot be changed without reason. U.S. beef imports is one example. Some policies were unsuccessful due to execution rather than principle. These include gasoline prices and electricity rates. Some policies in particular must not be enacted rashly. These include the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." These amount to changing the constitution and the name of the country. The DPP must offer sober policy proposals for peacefully governing the nation. Otherwise it is merely fanning the flames of discontent in the guise of "policy." The public may have to put up with such an opposition party. But it is under no obligation to make it the ruling party.
The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power.
Finally, Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.
換政策：民進黨的軟肋
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.15 03:37 am
蘇貞昌將「火大遊行」操作成與蔡英文一決雌雄的槓桿。
一、先前，蘇貞昌否決了謝長廷出掌中國事務委員會，這是宣示蘇將在黨內採較傾獨派的路線，以與蔡英文及謝長廷可能採取的轉型路線作出區隔。二、如今，蘇又祭出「罷免立委／罷免總統」的重手，不啻宣示將以鷹派的激烈手段，與蔡英文可能採取的鴿派溫和路線作出區隔。三、既然將調門升高至「罷免總統」的層次，即不啻超越並否定了蔡英文「國是會議」的訴求；因為，蘇貞昌不能一面要罷免馬英九總統，又要馬英九以總統地位召開國是會議；何況，蘇貞昌已承諾將在立法院提出民進黨的年金對案。
蘇貞昌欲以傾獨鷹派的角色，重新鞏固他在綠營及民進黨的領導地位，而試圖藉此將蔡英文擠向邊緣地帶。因而，蘇貞昌喊出「換政策／換立委／換總統」的口號，這不是「政策」的宣言，而是「政治鬥爭」的檄文；他的首要目標是欲藉升高藍綠衝突將蔡英文壓下去，至於能否就此帶領民進黨走出一條生路，目前蘇貞昌恐怕尚無暇顧及。
「換政策／換內閣／換立委／換總統」，其意是指：用挑激政策衝突、發動閣潮、罷免立委、罷免總統的多層次及複合式政治鬥爭，以實現政黨輪替，重返執政。
此一路線的弔詭在於：「換總統」或「換執政黨」，主要的動力，皆應出自「換政策」；但蘇貞昌擺出的架式，卻顯然是側重「鬥爭」，但在「政策」上卻是支離破碎或交代不清。其實，這非但是蘇貞昌的弱項，亦正是民進黨的軟肋。
眾所皆知，民進黨陷於今日境地，最重要的敗因正是出自「換政策」；「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」，不但是要「換政策」，而且是要「換憲法／換國家」。
二○○八年，國民黨贏回政權，正是選民要「換掉」民進黨的「政策」；接著，二○一二年，蔡英文落敗，則是選民不容民進黨「換」掉國民黨「九二共識」及ＥＣＦＡ的「政策」。何況，民進黨還說：「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。」然則，類此顛三倒四，蘇貞昌今日所稱的「換政策」，究何所指？
其實，民進黨若不先在國憲認同及兩岸關係上確立一套可信可行、可大可久的「政策」，其他一切的「政策」辯論，充其量皆只能作為政爭題材，而不可能作為重建國人信任及重返執政的憑藉。請問：關於國憲認同及兩岸關係，民進黨要「換」什麼「政策」？
至於民進黨在其他政策的辯論，就政爭的角度或許必須有所偏執，但若要執政治國卻不可見樹不見林。以核電論，現在反核民意上升，當然是民氣可用；但廢核畢竟茲事體大，君不見日相安倍晉三宣示反對「零核電」？至於油電漲價被民進黨形容成暴政，但主張廢核的民進黨豈有主張補貼油電價的立場？再如證所稅、健保調漲、年金改制、媒體壟斷等，皆不能只有「火大」，而必須拿出「政策」；亦即，不能將「意識形態」視為「政策」，將「政爭」視為「改革」，將「撕裂」視為「愛台灣」。準此以論，蘇貞昌所列舉的幾項「換政策」，其實皆是「政治鬥爭」高於「政策改革」。
蘇貞昌亦知，必須以「換政策」來支撐其「換總統」、「換執政黨」的正當性。然而，有些政策不能無理「換」掉，如美牛案；有些政策其實是敗在操作而非錯在原則，如油電漲價；有些政策則尤其不能輕舉妄動，如「正名制憲／一邊一國」，那將牽動到「換憲法」、「換國家」。倘若民進黨不能以安邦定國的嚴正立場來拿出「政策」，而只是將「政策」作為助長「火大」的政爭薪柴；國人也許不得不接受這樣的反對黨，卻未必能支持這樣的政黨成為執政黨。
民進黨若欲燃起「換內閣／換立委／換總統」的遍地烽火，應先向國人交代：民進黨究竟要「換」什麼「政策」來重返執政？
最後，蘇貞昌以「罷免總統」叫陣，拉開了黨內蘇蔡競爭的架構，也預告藍綠鬥爭將無寧日，儼然已將指向二○一六年的台灣政治時程表大幅提前。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power. Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang has manipulated the "Raging Citizens Protest March." He has turned it into a showdown between himself and Tsai Ing-wen.
One. For starters, Su Tseng-chang refused to allow Frank Hsieh to head up the China Affairs Committee. This was Su's declaration that he favored the path taken by the Taiwan independence movement. He is serving notice. He intends to take a very different path than reform advocates Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. Two. Su has resorted to heavy-handed measures. He is demanding the impeachment of Blue camp legislators and President Ma. He intends to take extreme and hawkish measures. He intends to take a very different path than the moderate and dovish Tsai Ing-wen. Three. He has escalated the conflict. He is calling for the impeachment of the president. This clashes head on with Tsai Ing-wen's call for a National Policy Conference. After all, Su Tseng-chang cannot simultaneously impeach President Ma Ying-jeou and demand that he convene a National Policy Conference. Su Tseng-chang has also committed himself to the DPP's "alternative" pension program in the Legislative Yuan.
Su Tseng-chang is siding with Taiwan independence hawks to consolidate his leadership within the Pan Green camp and the DPP. He is attempting to marginalize Tsai Ing-wen. That is why Su Tseng-chang's slogan is "change policies, change legislators, change the president." It is not a policy declaration. It is a call to arms. His primary goal is to heighten Blue vs. Green conflict in order to undermine Tsai Ing-wen. Will this enable Su to lead the DPP out of the political winderness? For the moment Su Tseng-chang cannot be bothered with that.
What does "change policies, change legislators, change the president" mean? It means to incite clashes over policy, initiate a cabinet reshuffle, impeach legislators, and impeach the president. It means a multi-front political struggle aimed at effecting ruling party change and to return to power.
But this path is strewn with pitfalls. The main driving force behind presidential change or ruling party change should derive from policy change. But Su Tseng-chang has put policy change on hold. His focus is clearly on the political struggle. His "policy," if it can be called that, is fragmented and unclear. In fact, this is Su Tseng-chang's weak point. This is also the soft underbelly of the Democratic Progressive Party.
We all know why the DPP is mired where it is today. The main reason is its desire to "change policies." The DPP demands change. But it demands the wrong kind of change. The DPP demands Taiwan independence, the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." It wants more than just policy change. It wants to change the constitution and even the name of the country.
In 2008, he KMT regained political power. The voters demanded change -- from DPP policy. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen went down in defeat. The voters refused to allow the DPP to change the KMT's 1992 consensus and ECFA. The DPP was forced to promise that "If we return to power, we will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This being the case, precisely what policies does Su Tseng-chang intend to change?
The DPP must establish a credible long term policy regarding national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations. All other policy debates, are mere pretexts for fodder for political struggles. They will not restore public confidence in the DPP and allow it to return to office. So the question is, just what sort of "change" is the DPP calling for with regards national allegiance, constitutional allegiance, and cross-Strait relations?
Consider other DPP policies. From the perspective of political struggles, it may pay to be paranoid. But if the DPP expects to rule once again, it cannot afford to miss the forest for the trees. Take the matter of nuclear power generation. Antinuclear sentiments are currently on the rise. Naturally this sentiment can be exploited. But the abolition of nuclear power generation is a serious matter. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared three times that he opposed a nuclear free Japan. The DPP has characterized gasoline price and electricity rate increases as tyranny. The DPP advocates the elimination of nuclear power generation. So how does it stand on gasoline and electricity subsidies? What about the capital gains tax, health insurance rate hikes, pension reform, and the so-called "media monopoly?" It cannot just vent its rage. It must offer policy proposals. Ideology is not "policy." Political struggle is not "reform." Inciting social divisions is not "love for Taiwan." Su Tseng-chang's "policy changes" were merely political struggles, not policy reform.
Su Tseng-chang knows full well that he must change policy to justify presidential change and ruling party change. But policies cannot be changed without reason. U.S. beef imports is one example. Some policies were unsuccessful due to execution rather than principle. These include gasoline prices and electricity rates. Some policies in particular must not be enacted rashly. These include the "rectification of names" and "one country on each side." These amount to changing the constitution and the name of the country. The DPP must offer sober policy proposals for peacefully governing the nation. Otherwise it is merely fanning the flames of discontent in the guise of "policy." The public may have to put up with such an opposition party. But it is under no obligation to make it the ruling party.
The DPP hopes to fan the flames of change. It hopes to "change the cabinet, change legislators, and change the president." But it must first tell the public what changes it intends to make in the event it returns to power.
Finally, Su Tseng-chang wants to impeach the president. He has pitted himself against Tsai Ing-wen. He is serving notice. Blue vs. Green struggle will continue. There will be no peace. The time table for 2016 has apparently been moved up, dramatically.
換政策：民進黨的軟肋
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.15 03:37 am
蘇貞昌將「火大遊行」操作成與蔡英文一決雌雄的槓桿。
一、先前，蘇貞昌否決了謝長廷出掌中國事務委員會，這是宣示蘇將在黨內採較傾獨派的路線，以與蔡英文及謝長廷可能採取的轉型路線作出區隔。二、如今，蘇又祭出「罷免立委／罷免總統」的重手，不啻宣示將以鷹派的激烈手段，與蔡英文可能採取的鴿派溫和路線作出區隔。三、既然將調門升高至「罷免總統」的層次，即不啻超越並否定了蔡英文「國是會議」的訴求；因為，蘇貞昌不能一面要罷免馬英九總統，又要馬英九以總統地位召開國是會議；何況，蘇貞昌已承諾將在立法院提出民進黨的年金對案。
蘇貞昌欲以傾獨鷹派的角色，重新鞏固他在綠營及民進黨的領導地位，而試圖藉此將蔡英文擠向邊緣地帶。因而，蘇貞昌喊出「換政策／換立委／換總統」的口號，這不是「政策」的宣言，而是「政治鬥爭」的檄文；他的首要目標是欲藉升高藍綠衝突將蔡英文壓下去，至於能否就此帶領民進黨走出一條生路，目前蘇貞昌恐怕尚無暇顧及。
「換政策／換內閣／換立委／換總統」，其意是指：用挑激政策衝突、發動閣潮、罷免立委、罷免總統的多層次及複合式政治鬥爭，以實現政黨輪替，重返執政。
此一路線的弔詭在於：「換總統」或「換執政黨」，主要的動力，皆應出自「換政策」；但蘇貞昌擺出的架式，卻顯然是側重「鬥爭」，但在「政策」上卻是支離破碎或交代不清。其實，這非但是蘇貞昌的弱項，亦正是民進黨的軟肋。
眾所皆知，民進黨陷於今日境地，最重要的敗因正是出自「換政策」；「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」，不但是要「換政策」，而且是要「換憲法／換國家」。
二○○八年，國民黨贏回政權，正是選民要「換掉」民進黨的「政策」；接著，二○一二年，蔡英文落敗，則是選民不容民進黨「換」掉國民黨「九二共識」及ＥＣＦＡ的「政策」。何況，民進黨還說：「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。」然則，類此顛三倒四，蘇貞昌今日所稱的「換政策」，究何所指？
其實，民進黨若不先在國憲認同及兩岸關係上確立一套可信可行、可大可久的「政策」，其他一切的「政策」辯論，充其量皆只能作為政爭題材，而不可能作為重建國人信任及重返執政的憑藉。請問：關於國憲認同及兩岸關係，民進黨要「換」什麼「政策」？
至於民進黨在其他政策的辯論，就政爭的角度或許必須有所偏執，但若要執政治國卻不可見樹不見林。以核電論，現在反核民意上升，當然是民氣可用；但廢核畢竟茲事體大，君不見日相安倍晉三宣示反對「零核電」？至於油電漲價被民進黨形容成暴政，但主張廢核的民進黨豈有主張補貼油電價的立場？再如證所稅、健保調漲、年金改制、媒體壟斷等，皆不能只有「火大」，而必須拿出「政策」；亦即，不能將「意識形態」視為「政策」，將「政爭」視為「改革」，將「撕裂」視為「愛台灣」。準此以論，蘇貞昌所列舉的幾項「換政策」，其實皆是「政治鬥爭」高於「政策改革」。
蘇貞昌亦知，必須以「換政策」來支撐其「換總統」、「換執政黨」的正當性。然而，有些政策不能無理「換」掉，如美牛案；有些政策其實是敗在操作而非錯在原則，如油電漲價；有些政策則尤其不能輕舉妄動，如「正名制憲／一邊一國」，那將牽動到「換憲法」、「換國家」。倘若民進黨不能以安邦定國的嚴正立場來拿出「政策」，而只是將「政策」作為助長「火大」的政爭薪柴；國人也許不得不接受這樣的反對黨，卻未必能支持這樣的政黨成為執政黨。
民進黨若欲燃起「換內閣／換立委／換總統」的遍地烽火，應先向國人交代：民進黨究竟要「換」什麼「政策」來重返執政？
最後，蘇貞昌以「罷免總統」叫陣，拉開了黨內蘇蔡競爭的架構，也預告藍綠鬥爭將無寧日，儼然已將指向二○一六年的台灣政治時程表大幅提前。
Monday, January 14, 2013
Ketagalan Boulevard is not the DPP's Permanent Destination
Ketagalan Boulevard is not the DPP's Permanent Destination
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2012
Summary: Taiwan has never lacked "raging citizens." Nor has it ever lacked protest marches. The DPP in particular, has never lacked "raging citizens." Still less has it lacked protest marches. Merely expressing "rage" is not a solution. Merely expressing "rage" is not a policy. The DPP should rise above "rage." It should offer solutions to Taiwan's problems. The solution to Taiwan's problems is not "rage." The DPP went to a great deal of trouble to lead its supporters to Ketegelan Boulevard and back. It should offer Taiwan a way out in terms of policy.
Full Text below:
Taiwan has never lacked "raging citizens." Nor has it ever lacked protest marches. The DPP in particular, has never lacked "raging citizens." Still less has it lacked protest marches.
The weather of late has been both cold and wet. The protestors' enthusiasm was inspiring. The DPP has repeatedly marched to Ketegelan Boulevard and back. But just exactly where are they leading them? Are they merely spinning their wheels, while awaiting the next Ketegalan Boulevard "Raging Citizens Protest March?"
This particular protest march differed from past protest marches in three respects. One. There were no calls for "upholding sovereignty," or "defending Taiwan." On the one hand, this reflects pressure for reform. On the other hand, it reflects the vacuousness of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Two. Su Tseng-chang, the instigator of the recent protest march, is the highly controversial. His support within the party and among the public is weak. Three. This is the first time voices from both inside and outside the party have loudly criticized the DPP for failing to include a credible policy proposal as part of the protest march. As critics put it, "All we see is rage. We see no policy proposals."
The protest marchers made three demands. They demanded a cabinet reshuffle. But this demand found little traction. They trumpeted "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias" This demand failed to see the forest for the trees. They demanded "pension reform." This demand is trapped within a political struggle. The protest march was the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals."
Consider the DPP's demands. The DPP alleges that the media is guilty of "pro-[Mainland] China media bias." Therefore it must not permitted to enjoy a "monopoly." We have no desire to debate the truth or falsity of this allegation. We agree that the media's commentary on social issues is subject to public criticism. But the DPP's "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias" is part and parcel of its own anti-[Mainland] China political bias. It is clearly evading its own bias and indulging in selective indignation.
The DPP is currently under pressure from within to reform its cross-Strait policy. But it has yet to propose a policy that deals with the Big Picture. The DPP's only "China Policy" is to proclaim its "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias." But the media is hardly alone in letting down its guard. The public on Taiwan is at risk in many respects. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lacks any grand strategy for cross-Strait relations. The best the DPP has been able to do, is trot out "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias." What is this, if not failing to see the forest for the trees? What is this, if not seeing the mote in another's eye while ignoring the beam in one's own?
For the past twenty years, the DPP has equated Taiwan independence with cross-Strait policy. Return to the past for a moment. Recall Taiwan independence rhetoric about "demands for freedom of speech" and "calls for a single voice." This forced the public to endure a "death of a thousand cuts." The DPP wants once again to become the ruling party. Can it do nothing more than express "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias?" Is it content to have no forward-looking, comprehensive cross-Strait policy? What is this, but the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals?"
Now take the pension system for military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and farmers. The DPP approach is twofold. One. Demean the Legislative Yuan. Call for the convening of a "National Policy Conference." Two. Proclaim that it already has an "alternative," but offer absolutely no details.
If the DPP's undeclared "alternative" compassionately lavishes benefits on the public, it will contradict its current position. If it ruthlessly slashes benefits, it may receive little public support. Can the Presidential Office and the Cabinet reach a reasonable compromise? The public, military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor, and farmers may conclude that if the DPP withdraws, a more reasonable solution is possible. The public may conclude that not convening a "National Policy Conference" was a good thing. The public may decide that they DPP should show them just what "alternative" they have in mind. Why not show us what you have? The DPP may increase or cut benefits. Either way, it will end up on the horns of a dilemma. What is this, if not the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals?"
It is true. The Ma administration's record is unsatisfactory. Public "rage" and disappointment are universal. As the ruling administration, the Ma government is in no position to accuse the DPP of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals." Instead, it should consider the protest march an indicator of public sentiment. It should examine the defects in its national policy. It should acknowledge the need for reform and improvement.
Critics accuse the protest organizers of having "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals." Yesterday, Su Tseng-chang responded to these charges. He announced that the DPP would impeach KMT legislators and President Ma. But this was hardly a declaration of policy. This was nothing more than a call to arms in a political struggle. The DPP is citing the KMT's attempt to impeach Chen Shui-bian as justification for its attempt to impeach Ma Ying-jeou. But Ma is not Chen. The two mens' situations are entirely different. The nation's situation, then and now, are entirely different. The DPP's moves may muddy the water. But it may also cover itself in mud.
Decades of political experience have taught the public that ideology is not policy, political struggle is not reform, and the incitement of social divisions is not love for Taiwan. The DPP is attempting to package deal its impeachment attempt with next year's seven in one elections. But it would be well-advised to make a rational evaluation of the pros and cons of its strategy first.
Merely expressing "rage" is not a solution. Merely expressing "rage" is not a policy. The DPP should rise above "rage." It should offer solutions to Taiwan's problems. The solution to Taiwan's problems is not "rage." The DPP went to a great deal of trouble to lead its supporters to Ketegalan Boulevard and back. It should offer Taiwan a way out in terms of policy.
凱達格蘭大道不是民進黨的永遠終站
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.14 02:56 am
台灣從來不缺「火大」，也不缺「遊行」；民進黨尤其不缺「火大」，更不缺「遊行」。
天寒雨冷，遊行群眾的熱情令人動容；但民進黨次次遊行均在凱達格蘭大道來回往復，究竟要帶著支持者與台灣社會前往何處，或只是空轉內耗，等待再下一次的凱道「火大遊行」？
此次遊行，較諸過去，有三大特徵：一、不見「顧主權」、「護台灣」之類的主題；一方面顯示轉型的壓力，另一方面也反映青黃不接的兩岸政策空虛。二、主持者蘇貞昌儼然是歷次遊行中，最具爭議性的總指揮；在黨內及社會上的支持均相對薄弱。三、「空有火大，不見主張」，這也是首次黨內外皆大聲質疑民進黨未提出可信可行之政策主張的一次遊行。
遊行標舉三大訴求。除「內閣改組」覓無槓桿外，「反傾中媒體」見樹不見林，「年金改革」亦陷於政爭操作，可謂具是「空有火大，不見主張」。
民進黨的訴求是：媒體「傾中」，因此不准其「壟斷」。我們不欲討論此一問題在實質上的真偽正誤，且也認為媒體的言論操作或言論集中是可受公評與應當關切的社會議題。但是，民進黨將「反傾中媒體」置於其一貫的「反中國」論述之下，卻顯得避重就輕，輕重失衡。
民進黨在這一波黨內兩岸政策的轉型風潮中，迄未提出一個足以瞻顧全局的論述，卻只知以「反傾中媒體」來宣示其「中國政策」的立場。然而，豈不知面對「中國」，其實不只媒體可能失守，台灣社會的方方面面亦皆承受重大風險；民進黨在兩岸關係的大戰略及大政策上迄無方案，只會拿「反傾中媒體」來起乩作法，豈不是見樹而不見林，只見他人腳上疥癬，而不見自己的膏肓之患？
何況，二十餘年來，民進黨以「台獨」為「兩岸政策」，何不回想其過去在「台獨」的「快意言論自由」與「意圖言論集中」，使台灣社會承受了多大的政治凌遲？如今，民進黨作為一個想要重返執政的政黨，更總不能只會喊叫「反傾中媒體」，自己卻始終拿不出一套瞻顧全局的「兩岸政策」吧？這豈不是「空有火大，不見主張」？
再言軍公教勞農的年金制度。民進黨的手法是：一、矮化立法院，主張召開國是會議；二、宣稱手上已有「對案」，卻密而不宣。
然而，民進黨密而不宣的對案，若是從優體恤的「加法」，即是自失立場；倘是大砍大殺的「減法」，又未必能獲得社會支持。所以，只要府閣方面的溝通能夠兼顧情理，如果社會大眾及軍公教勞農發現，在民進黨退出的空間中，反而可能是獲得合情合理方案的場域；那麼，整個社會即可能會回過頭來慶幸還好沒有開「國是會議」；而民進黨屆時到立法院端出的「對案」（何不現在端出來？），無論是「加法」或「減法」，恐皆是左右為難，進退失據。這又豈不是空有火大，主張何在？
不過，馬政府的政績確實不如人意，民眾的「火大」與失望可謂人同此心；站在主政者立場，馬政府並無資格指民進黨「空有火大，不見主張」，而應當將這場遊行所反映的民情視作一種砥礪，深刻檢視國政的鏽鈍，知所革新改進。
面對外界「空有火大，不見政策」的質疑，蘇貞昌昨天宣布，將發動罷免立法委員及罷免馬總統。但是，這畢竟不是「政策」的宣示，而是「政治鬥爭」的檄文。民進黨以「當年國民黨罷免陳水扁」，來建立「罷免馬英九」的正當性；但馬與扁的情況不同，今昔國家的處境亦迥異，民進黨的操作或許足可攪渾政局，卻也可能同時搞得自己一身汙泥。
經過數十年的政治閱歷，如今國人越來越知「意識形態」不是「政策」，「政爭」不是「改革」，「撕裂」不是「愛台灣」；民進黨若欲以罷免運動作為綁明年七合一選舉的權謀，恐須對其利弊得失作更清明理智的思索。
「火大」只是方法，「火大」不是政策。民進黨應從「火大」中自我超越，為台灣的難題在「政策」上找到解答。台灣的出路不在「火大」上，民進黨不宜帶著群眾在凱道來回往復，而應在「政策」上為他們找到台灣的生路。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2012
Summary: Taiwan has never lacked "raging citizens." Nor has it ever lacked protest marches. The DPP in particular, has never lacked "raging citizens." Still less has it lacked protest marches. Merely expressing "rage" is not a solution. Merely expressing "rage" is not a policy. The DPP should rise above "rage." It should offer solutions to Taiwan's problems. The solution to Taiwan's problems is not "rage." The DPP went to a great deal of trouble to lead its supporters to Ketegelan Boulevard and back. It should offer Taiwan a way out in terms of policy.
Full Text below:
Taiwan has never lacked "raging citizens." Nor has it ever lacked protest marches. The DPP in particular, has never lacked "raging citizens." Still less has it lacked protest marches.
The weather of late has been both cold and wet. The protestors' enthusiasm was inspiring. The DPP has repeatedly marched to Ketegelan Boulevard and back. But just exactly where are they leading them? Are they merely spinning their wheels, while awaiting the next Ketegalan Boulevard "Raging Citizens Protest March?"
This particular protest march differed from past protest marches in three respects. One. There were no calls for "upholding sovereignty," or "defending Taiwan." On the one hand, this reflects pressure for reform. On the other hand, it reflects the vacuousness of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Two. Su Tseng-chang, the instigator of the recent protest march, is the highly controversial. His support within the party and among the public is weak. Three. This is the first time voices from both inside and outside the party have loudly criticized the DPP for failing to include a credible policy proposal as part of the protest march. As critics put it, "All we see is rage. We see no policy proposals."
The protest marchers made three demands. They demanded a cabinet reshuffle. But this demand found little traction. They trumpeted "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias" This demand failed to see the forest for the trees. They demanded "pension reform." This demand is trapped within a political struggle. The protest march was the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals."
Consider the DPP's demands. The DPP alleges that the media is guilty of "pro-[Mainland] China media bias." Therefore it must not permitted to enjoy a "monopoly." We have no desire to debate the truth or falsity of this allegation. We agree that the media's commentary on social issues is subject to public criticism. But the DPP's "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias" is part and parcel of its own anti-[Mainland] China political bias. It is clearly evading its own bias and indulging in selective indignation.
The DPP is currently under pressure from within to reform its cross-Strait policy. But it has yet to propose a policy that deals with the Big Picture. The DPP's only "China Policy" is to proclaim its "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias." But the media is hardly alone in letting down its guard. The public on Taiwan is at risk in many respects. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lacks any grand strategy for cross-Strait relations. The best the DPP has been able to do, is trot out "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias." What is this, if not failing to see the forest for the trees? What is this, if not seeing the mote in another's eye while ignoring the beam in one's own?
For the past twenty years, the DPP has equated Taiwan independence with cross-Strait policy. Return to the past for a moment. Recall Taiwan independence rhetoric about "demands for freedom of speech" and "calls for a single voice." This forced the public to endure a "death of a thousand cuts." The DPP wants once again to become the ruling party. Can it do nothing more than express "opposition to pro-[Mainland] China media bias?" Is it content to have no forward-looking, comprehensive cross-Strait policy? What is this, but the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals?"
Now take the pension system for military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and farmers. The DPP approach is twofold. One. Demean the Legislative Yuan. Call for the convening of a "National Policy Conference." Two. Proclaim that it already has an "alternative," but offer absolutely no details.
If the DPP's undeclared "alternative" compassionately lavishes benefits on the public, it will contradict its current position. If it ruthlessly slashes benefits, it may receive little public support. Can the Presidential Office and the Cabinet reach a reasonable compromise? The public, military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor, and farmers may conclude that if the DPP withdraws, a more reasonable solution is possible. The public may conclude that not convening a "National Policy Conference" was a good thing. The public may decide that they DPP should show them just what "alternative" they have in mind. Why not show us what you have? The DPP may increase or cut benefits. Either way, it will end up on the horns of a dilemma. What is this, if not the consequence of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals?"
It is true. The Ma administration's record is unsatisfactory. Public "rage" and disappointment are universal. As the ruling administration, the Ma government is in no position to accuse the DPP of "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals." Instead, it should consider the protest march an indicator of public sentiment. It should examine the defects in its national policy. It should acknowledge the need for reform and improvement.
Critics accuse the protest organizers of having "an abundance of rage, a dearth of proposals." Yesterday, Su Tseng-chang responded to these charges. He announced that the DPP would impeach KMT legislators and President Ma. But this was hardly a declaration of policy. This was nothing more than a call to arms in a political struggle. The DPP is citing the KMT's attempt to impeach Chen Shui-bian as justification for its attempt to impeach Ma Ying-jeou. But Ma is not Chen. The two mens' situations are entirely different. The nation's situation, then and now, are entirely different. The DPP's moves may muddy the water. But it may also cover itself in mud.
Decades of political experience have taught the public that ideology is not policy, political struggle is not reform, and the incitement of social divisions is not love for Taiwan. The DPP is attempting to package deal its impeachment attempt with next year's seven in one elections. But it would be well-advised to make a rational evaluation of the pros and cons of its strategy first.
Merely expressing "rage" is not a solution. Merely expressing "rage" is not a policy. The DPP should rise above "rage." It should offer solutions to Taiwan's problems. The solution to Taiwan's problems is not "rage." The DPP went to a great deal of trouble to lead its supporters to Ketegalan Boulevard and back. It should offer Taiwan a way out in terms of policy.
凱達格蘭大道不是民進黨的永遠終站
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.14 02:56 am
台灣從來不缺「火大」，也不缺「遊行」；民進黨尤其不缺「火大」，更不缺「遊行」。
天寒雨冷，遊行群眾的熱情令人動容；但民進黨次次遊行均在凱達格蘭大道來回往復，究竟要帶著支持者與台灣社會前往何處，或只是空轉內耗，等待再下一次的凱道「火大遊行」？
此次遊行，較諸過去，有三大特徵：一、不見「顧主權」、「護台灣」之類的主題；一方面顯示轉型的壓力，另一方面也反映青黃不接的兩岸政策空虛。二、主持者蘇貞昌儼然是歷次遊行中，最具爭議性的總指揮；在黨內及社會上的支持均相對薄弱。三、「空有火大，不見主張」，這也是首次黨內外皆大聲質疑民進黨未提出可信可行之政策主張的一次遊行。
遊行標舉三大訴求。除「內閣改組」覓無槓桿外，「反傾中媒體」見樹不見林，「年金改革」亦陷於政爭操作，可謂具是「空有火大，不見主張」。
民進黨的訴求是：媒體「傾中」，因此不准其「壟斷」。我們不欲討論此一問題在實質上的真偽正誤，且也認為媒體的言論操作或言論集中是可受公評與應當關切的社會議題。但是，民進黨將「反傾中媒體」置於其一貫的「反中國」論述之下，卻顯得避重就輕，輕重失衡。
民進黨在這一波黨內兩岸政策的轉型風潮中，迄未提出一個足以瞻顧全局的論述，卻只知以「反傾中媒體」來宣示其「中國政策」的立場。然而，豈不知面對「中國」，其實不只媒體可能失守，台灣社會的方方面面亦皆承受重大風險；民進黨在兩岸關係的大戰略及大政策上迄無方案，只會拿「反傾中媒體」來起乩作法，豈不是見樹而不見林，只見他人腳上疥癬，而不見自己的膏肓之患？
何況，二十餘年來，民進黨以「台獨」為「兩岸政策」，何不回想其過去在「台獨」的「快意言論自由」與「意圖言論集中」，使台灣社會承受了多大的政治凌遲？如今，民進黨作為一個想要重返執政的政黨，更總不能只會喊叫「反傾中媒體」，自己卻始終拿不出一套瞻顧全局的「兩岸政策」吧？這豈不是「空有火大，不見主張」？
再言軍公教勞農的年金制度。民進黨的手法是：一、矮化立法院，主張召開國是會議；二、宣稱手上已有「對案」，卻密而不宣。
然而，民進黨密而不宣的對案，若是從優體恤的「加法」，即是自失立場；倘是大砍大殺的「減法」，又未必能獲得社會支持。所以，只要府閣方面的溝通能夠兼顧情理，如果社會大眾及軍公教勞農發現，在民進黨退出的空間中，反而可能是獲得合情合理方案的場域；那麼，整個社會即可能會回過頭來慶幸還好沒有開「國是會議」；而民進黨屆時到立法院端出的「對案」（何不現在端出來？），無論是「加法」或「減法」，恐皆是左右為難，進退失據。這又豈不是空有火大，主張何在？
不過，馬政府的政績確實不如人意，民眾的「火大」與失望可謂人同此心；站在主政者立場，馬政府並無資格指民進黨「空有火大，不見主張」，而應當將這場遊行所反映的民情視作一種砥礪，深刻檢視國政的鏽鈍，知所革新改進。
面對外界「空有火大，不見政策」的質疑，蘇貞昌昨天宣布，將發動罷免立法委員及罷免馬總統。但是，這畢竟不是「政策」的宣示，而是「政治鬥爭」的檄文。民進黨以「當年國民黨罷免陳水扁」，來建立「罷免馬英九」的正當性；但馬與扁的情況不同，今昔國家的處境亦迥異，民進黨的操作或許足可攪渾政局，卻也可能同時搞得自己一身汙泥。
經過數十年的政治閱歷，如今國人越來越知「意識形態」不是「政策」，「政爭」不是「改革」，「撕裂」不是「愛台灣」；民進黨若欲以罷免運動作為綁明年七合一選舉的權謀，恐須對其利弊得失作更清明理智的思索。
「火大」只是方法，「火大」不是政策。民進黨應從「火大」中自我超越，為台灣的難題在「政策」上找到解答。台灣的出路不在「火大」上，民進黨不宜帶著群眾在凱道來回往復，而應在「政策」上為他們找到台灣的生路。
Thursday, January 10, 2013
Pension Reform Symposia: The Name is Irrelevant, Problem Solving is Not
Pension Reform Symposia:
The Name is Irrelevant, Problem Solving is Not
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 11, 2012
Summary: In one short month, the Executive Yuan convened 120 pension reform symposia. Recently it convened a central government level experts symposia. Yesterday it convened the first Yuan-level symposia. Representatives from the four largest political parties, including the ruling party, as well military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and capital, all gathered in one place. Each of the groups voiced their opinions. This was an all too rare exchange of views between the ruling and opposition parties
Full Text below:
In one short month, the Executive Yuan convened 120 pension reform symposia. Recently it convened a central government level experts symposia. Yesterday it convened the first Yuan-level symposia. Representatives from the four largest political parties, including the ruling party, as well military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and capital, all gathered in one place. Each of the groups voiced their opinions. This was an all too rare exchange of views between the ruling and opposition parties
Over 100 symposia were held. Will they enable the Ma administration to untangle the knots in the pension reform program by the end of the month? That is difficult to say. But this much is certain. There was broad participation, from the grassroots to the central government. Nearly 10,000 people took part in intense debates. The administration can now sift through the ideas proposed by the various parties and separate the wheat from the chaff. This should make possible a consensus. One thing is commendable. The blue, green, orange and yellow political parties, i.e., the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, all sent expert representatives. They all expressed their viewpoints. DPP representative Huang Mei-ling did not speak in concrete terms. But she said the DPP would offer its own alternative to the KMT's pension reform proposal. This may be a meaningful development.
The complex pension reform problem must be resolved by the end of January. Many see this as "Mission Impossible." Forget the backlash from military veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. Forget the tug of war with laborers and farmers who wish to retain the current system. Ruling vs. opposition party wrangling in the legislature alone will drag out the process and make any resolution difficult. This is especially true now that the DPP is rubbing its hands and preparing to take to the streets, Executive Yuan consultations will go nowhere. All the administration can do is solicit opinions from the various cities and counties, and communicate with the grassroots. We have unwittingly embarked on a new path of social dialogue. This unexpected bounty may be the result of the government vs. opposition deadlock.
This glimpse of the Big Picture should set off alarms within the DPP. One. The symposia included businesses and representatives from different parties. It amounted to an "alternative national symposium." Its scale and content was broader than the "National Policy Conference" the DPP previously demanded. Two. Representatives from various sectors fought for the opportunity to speak. Yet the largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, remained silent. This was deeply regrettable. Three. The Democratic Progressive Party persists in blindly obstructing democracy. It persists in conveying its message through outside channels. It persists in remaining silent within the institutional framework. This weakens its own role in a system of checks and balances. It may even lead to its own degeneration. Such worries are not unfounded. Consider the ruling and opposition parties in the US, wrangling over the fiscal cliff crisis. This is a clear example. The fiscal cliff was imminent. The opposition Republican Party refused to increase taxes. The Obama administration was unwilling to compromise. Their diehard attitudes offended the American people. John Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, presided over the negotiations. He failed to notice the loss of support from the public and his colleagues. Eventually Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell and Vice President Joe Biden took charge of negotiations. Only then did they arrive at an agreement. The Republicans enjoyed a majority in the House of Representatives. But Boehner stubbornly refused to admit his mistake. This led to a debacle. Was it wise? An opposition party that lacks rational leadership, is assuredly not conducive to the advancement of democracy.
Recent legislation slashed state-owned enterprise performance bonuses. This was a surprise attack launched by the TSU legislative caucus, which occupies only three seats. The KMT could do little more than offer a two month countermeasure. The DPP is preoccupied with mobilizing for its "Raging Citizens Protest March." It has failed to adopt proactive strategic thinking. It is merely playing catch up. It has forfeited its status as the largest opposition party.
The symposia opened the door to social dialogue. The government sponsored 100 pension fund reform symposia. It communicated with the people on major policy issues. This made it valuable. One. If the opposition DPP rejects democratic dialogue, or abuses its role as the loyal opposition, it will force the ruling party to appeal directly to the people in order to achieve legitimacy in its decision-making. The opposition DPP's obstructionism and non-participation could lead to self-marginalization. Two. Consider another perspective. A large-scale symposia has reached a community consensus. This seldom happens on major issues. But it required an immense effort and massive resources. This is not an economical or effective decision-making model. After all, the purpose of the constitutional framework is to allow legislators to represent different groups of people within the legislature. The purpose was an effective system of representation.
The ruling and opposition parties have yet to convene the "National Policy Conference" demanded by the DPP. But the pension reform symposia was far more representative. It was more explicitly multi-party in character. It effectively broke through the ruling vs. opposition party deadlock. The 100 symposia offered a new channel for social dialogue. It showed that the important aspect was not the name of the symposia, but problem solving. Meanwhile, back in the legislature, the machinery remains stalled.
The DPP attended, but said little. It said it would offer its own alternative for pension reform. Perhaps this was a pragmatic decision. From a partisan and democratic perspective such a change is something worth anticipating.
會議不在名稱，而在解決問題
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.11
短短一個多月，行政院在全台舉辦了一百廿場「年金改革」座談會，近日並展開中央政府級的專家座談。日昨首場院級會議，朝野四大黨代表、軍公教和勞資團體代表共聚一堂，各方各抒己見，不失為一場難得的朝野意見交流。
一百多場座談，能否匯聚成馬政府本月底打開所有年金糾結之鑰的方案，目前尚難斷言。但可以肯定的是，經過從基層到中央近萬人的廣泛參與和密集討論，各方意見應可逐漸去蕪存菁，有助形成共識。難能可貴的是，藍綠橘黃四個主要政黨都推派專家代表與會，並在會中表達立場；民進黨代表黃玫玲雖未具體發言，但她表示民進黨將就年金改革提出「對案」，這亦不妨視為一項有意義的發展。
千絲萬縷的年金問題要在元月底就拿出全套改革方案，被許多人視為「不可能的任務」。且不提軍公教的反彈和勞農保制度的拉鋸，光是在國會的朝野角力衝撞，即必然是曠日廢時而難有所成。尤其，正當民進黨摩拳擦掌準備上街遊行，行政院協商無門，只能以聚沙成塔的方式在各縣市召開座談，與基層溝通。但如此一來，反而在無意間走出一條新的社會對話路徑，或許是朝野始料未及的收穫。
這個大畫面所透露的訊息，應讓民進黨感到警惕。第一，這場座談囊括了各行各業及跨黨派代表，被稱為「另類國是會議」，其規模和涵蓋面向其實已比民進黨先前要求召開的「國是會議」更廣。第二，各界代表在會中爭相發言，而作為最大在野黨的民進黨代表卻三緘其口，令人遺憾。第三，民進黨若在國會體制內只追求一味杯葛，在體制外的溝通會議又自我噤聲，其制衡角色恐將自行削弱，甚至扭曲變質。
這樣的擔心並非杞人憂天，觀察美國朝野兩黨為財政懸崖的角力，即是鮮明殷鑑。當時財政墜崖危機已迫在眉睫，在野的共和黨卻一意堅持「拒絕加稅」的立場，對歐巴馬政府寸步不讓，死硬態度讓美國民眾深覺反感。原先領導共和黨代表談判的眾院議長貝納，因未能體察民意而失去同僚的支持；最後，改由共和黨參院領袖麥康納接手與副總統拜登談判，才完成協商方案。試想，共和黨在眾院占有多數優勢，卻因貝納一味抵制的錯誤領導而慘遭挫敗，豈是明智？一個缺乏理性操持的在野黨，絕對不利於民主政治的發展。
再看近日立法大砍國營事業績效獎金之役，竟是由僅占三席的台聯黨團發動奇襲，導致國民黨只能提出一點二個月的對策抵擋。在此議題上，民進黨也因一心專注在動員火大遊行，而未能發揮主動的戰略思考，只能跟進，坐失最大在野黨的操持地位。
從開啟社會對話大門的角度看，政府舉辦百場年金座談，就重大政策和人民溝通，意義值得重視。一、若在野黨不棄絕民主體制的對話設計，乃至濫用反對角色，將迫使執政黨直接訴諸人民取得決策的正當性；如此，在野黨的無限度杯葛可能反而導致自我邊緣化。二、換一個角度看，透過如此大規模的座談求取社會共識，在重大議題上雖可偶一為之，但因勞師動眾，這並非一個經濟、有效的決策模式；畢竟，憲政上之所以設計由立委在國會為不同的民眾代言，追求的就是代議制度的效能。
無論如何，朝野雖未開成民進黨要求的「國是會議」，卻在年金議題上召開了代表性更多元、主題更明確的跨黨派會議，有效突破了朝野僵峙的困局。這百場座談，不僅指出一條新的社會對話管道，也說明會議重要的不在名稱，而在解決問題。但是，回歸國會，仍為最後的歸趨。
此時，民進黨在沉默出席之後，決定將就年金議題提出對案，或許正是一種務實的反思。從政黨政治及國會體制的角度看，這樣的改變，值得期待。
The Name is Irrelevant, Problem Solving is Not
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 11, 2012
Summary: In one short month, the Executive Yuan convened 120 pension reform symposia. Recently it convened a central government level experts symposia. Yesterday it convened the first Yuan-level symposia. Representatives from the four largest political parties, including the ruling party, as well military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and capital, all gathered in one place. Each of the groups voiced their opinions. This was an all too rare exchange of views between the ruling and opposition parties
Full Text below:
In one short month, the Executive Yuan convened 120 pension reform symposia. Recently it convened a central government level experts symposia. Yesterday it convened the first Yuan-level symposia. Representatives from the four largest political parties, including the ruling party, as well military veterans, civil servants, public school teachers, labor and capital, all gathered in one place. Each of the groups voiced their opinions. This was an all too rare exchange of views between the ruling and opposition parties
Over 100 symposia were held. Will they enable the Ma administration to untangle the knots in the pension reform program by the end of the month? That is difficult to say. But this much is certain. There was broad participation, from the grassroots to the central government. Nearly 10,000 people took part in intense debates. The administration can now sift through the ideas proposed by the various parties and separate the wheat from the chaff. This should make possible a consensus. One thing is commendable. The blue, green, orange and yellow political parties, i.e., the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, all sent expert representatives. They all expressed their viewpoints. DPP representative Huang Mei-ling did not speak in concrete terms. But she said the DPP would offer its own alternative to the KMT's pension reform proposal. This may be a meaningful development.
The complex pension reform problem must be resolved by the end of January. Many see this as "Mission Impossible." Forget the backlash from military veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. Forget the tug of war with laborers and farmers who wish to retain the current system. Ruling vs. opposition party wrangling in the legislature alone will drag out the process and make any resolution difficult. This is especially true now that the DPP is rubbing its hands and preparing to take to the streets, Executive Yuan consultations will go nowhere. All the administration can do is solicit opinions from the various cities and counties, and communicate with the grassroots. We have unwittingly embarked on a new path of social dialogue. This unexpected bounty may be the result of the government vs. opposition deadlock.
This glimpse of the Big Picture should set off alarms within the DPP. One. The symposia included businesses and representatives from different parties. It amounted to an "alternative national symposium." Its scale and content was broader than the "National Policy Conference" the DPP previously demanded. Two. Representatives from various sectors fought for the opportunity to speak. Yet the largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, remained silent. This was deeply regrettable. Three. The Democratic Progressive Party persists in blindly obstructing democracy. It persists in conveying its message through outside channels. It persists in remaining silent within the institutional framework. This weakens its own role in a system of checks and balances. It may even lead to its own degeneration. Such worries are not unfounded. Consider the ruling and opposition parties in the US, wrangling over the fiscal cliff crisis. This is a clear example. The fiscal cliff was imminent. The opposition Republican Party refused to increase taxes. The Obama administration was unwilling to compromise. Their diehard attitudes offended the American people. John Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, presided over the negotiations. He failed to notice the loss of support from the public and his colleagues. Eventually Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell and Vice President Joe Biden took charge of negotiations. Only then did they arrive at an agreement. The Republicans enjoyed a majority in the House of Representatives. But Boehner stubbornly refused to admit his mistake. This led to a debacle. Was it wise? An opposition party that lacks rational leadership, is assuredly not conducive to the advancement of democracy.
Recent legislation slashed state-owned enterprise performance bonuses. This was a surprise attack launched by the TSU legislative caucus, which occupies only three seats. The KMT could do little more than offer a two month countermeasure. The DPP is preoccupied with mobilizing for its "Raging Citizens Protest March." It has failed to adopt proactive strategic thinking. It is merely playing catch up. It has forfeited its status as the largest opposition party.
The symposia opened the door to social dialogue. The government sponsored 100 pension fund reform symposia. It communicated with the people on major policy issues. This made it valuable. One. If the opposition DPP rejects democratic dialogue, or abuses its role as the loyal opposition, it will force the ruling party to appeal directly to the people in order to achieve legitimacy in its decision-making. The opposition DPP's obstructionism and non-participation could lead to self-marginalization. Two. Consider another perspective. A large-scale symposia has reached a community consensus. This seldom happens on major issues. But it required an immense effort and massive resources. This is not an economical or effective decision-making model. After all, the purpose of the constitutional framework is to allow legislators to represent different groups of people within the legislature. The purpose was an effective system of representation.
The ruling and opposition parties have yet to convene the "National Policy Conference" demanded by the DPP. But the pension reform symposia was far more representative. It was more explicitly multi-party in character. It effectively broke through the ruling vs. opposition party deadlock. The 100 symposia offered a new channel for social dialogue. It showed that the important aspect was not the name of the symposia, but problem solving. Meanwhile, back in the legislature, the machinery remains stalled.
The DPP attended, but said little. It said it would offer its own alternative for pension reform. Perhaps this was a pragmatic decision. From a partisan and democratic perspective such a change is something worth anticipating.
會議不在名稱，而在解決問題
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.11
短短一個多月，行政院在全台舉辦了一百廿場「年金改革」座談會，近日並展開中央政府級的專家座談。日昨首場院級會議，朝野四大黨代表、軍公教和勞資團體代表共聚一堂，各方各抒己見，不失為一場難得的朝野意見交流。
一百多場座談，能否匯聚成馬政府本月底打開所有年金糾結之鑰的方案，目前尚難斷言。但可以肯定的是，經過從基層到中央近萬人的廣泛參與和密集討論，各方意見應可逐漸去蕪存菁，有助形成共識。難能可貴的是，藍綠橘黃四個主要政黨都推派專家代表與會，並在會中表達立場；民進黨代表黃玫玲雖未具體發言，但她表示民進黨將就年金改革提出「對案」，這亦不妨視為一項有意義的發展。
千絲萬縷的年金問題要在元月底就拿出全套改革方案，被許多人視為「不可能的任務」。且不提軍公教的反彈和勞農保制度的拉鋸，光是在國會的朝野角力衝撞，即必然是曠日廢時而難有所成。尤其，正當民進黨摩拳擦掌準備上街遊行，行政院協商無門，只能以聚沙成塔的方式在各縣市召開座談，與基層溝通。但如此一來，反而在無意間走出一條新的社會對話路徑，或許是朝野始料未及的收穫。
這個大畫面所透露的訊息，應讓民進黨感到警惕。第一，這場座談囊括了各行各業及跨黨派代表，被稱為「另類國是會議」，其規模和涵蓋面向其實已比民進黨先前要求召開的「國是會議」更廣。第二，各界代表在會中爭相發言，而作為最大在野黨的民進黨代表卻三緘其口，令人遺憾。第三，民進黨若在國會體制內只追求一味杯葛，在體制外的溝通會議又自我噤聲，其制衡角色恐將自行削弱，甚至扭曲變質。
這樣的擔心並非杞人憂天，觀察美國朝野兩黨為財政懸崖的角力，即是鮮明殷鑑。當時財政墜崖危機已迫在眉睫，在野的共和黨卻一意堅持「拒絕加稅」的立場，對歐巴馬政府寸步不讓，死硬態度讓美國民眾深覺反感。原先領導共和黨代表談判的眾院議長貝納，因未能體察民意而失去同僚的支持；最後，改由共和黨參院領袖麥康納接手與副總統拜登談判，才完成協商方案。試想，共和黨在眾院占有多數優勢，卻因貝納一味抵制的錯誤領導而慘遭挫敗，豈是明智？一個缺乏理性操持的在野黨，絕對不利於民主政治的發展。
再看近日立法大砍國營事業績效獎金之役，竟是由僅占三席的台聯黨團發動奇襲，導致國民黨只能提出一點二個月的對策抵擋。在此議題上，民進黨也因一心專注在動員火大遊行，而未能發揮主動的戰略思考，只能跟進，坐失最大在野黨的操持地位。
從開啟社會對話大門的角度看，政府舉辦百場年金座談，就重大政策和人民溝通，意義值得重視。一、若在野黨不棄絕民主體制的對話設計，乃至濫用反對角色，將迫使執政黨直接訴諸人民取得決策的正當性；如此，在野黨的無限度杯葛可能反而導致自我邊緣化。二、換一個角度看，透過如此大規模的座談求取社會共識，在重大議題上雖可偶一為之，但因勞師動眾，這並非一個經濟、有效的決策模式；畢竟，憲政上之所以設計由立委在國會為不同的民眾代言，追求的就是代議制度的效能。
無論如何，朝野雖未開成民進黨要求的「國是會議」，卻在年金議題上召開了代表性更多元、主題更明確的跨黨派會議，有效突破了朝野僵峙的困局。這百場座談，不僅指出一條新的社會對話管道，也說明會議重要的不在名稱，而在解決問題。但是，回歸國會，仍為最後的歸趨。
此時，民進黨在沉默出席之後，決定將就年金議題提出對案，或許正是一種務實的反思。從政黨政治及國會體制的角度看，這樣的改變，值得期待。
DPP: An Abundance of Rage, A Dearth of Proposals
DPP: An Abundance of Rage, A Dearth of Proposals
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2012
Summary: The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
Full Text below:
The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
The DPP has been spinning its wheels, hobbled by internal conflict. Take three examples. One. The Chen family corruption scandal. Two. ECFA. Three. U.S. beef imports. The DPP remains a hostage of the Chen family corruption scandal. Even today it lacks the courage to condemn Chen family corruption. Just the opposite, the entire party, in stubborn defiance of justice, is aiding and abetting Chen Shui-bian in his quest for "medical parole." It is twisting the meaning of the laws pertaining to parole. As a result the party's "Transitional Justice" has gone nowhere, and continues to spin its wheels. In 2008, the DPP demagogued ECFA, alleging that it "forfeited sovereignty, humiliated the nation" and "pandered to [Mainland] China and sold out Taiwan." It persisted until 2012, when it suddenly sang a different tune. It announced that "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This major about face was another example of DPP wheel-spinning. It happened because the DPP's cross-strait policy "reform" remains stillborn. The U.S. beef imports controversy raged for several months. DPP legislators even held an multi-night "slumber party" on the legislature floor. In the end however, they closed up shop and agreed to "abide by international standards." Their temper tantrum was for naught.
The Chen family corruption scandal shows that the DPP has forfeited the moral high ground. The DPP's cross-strait policy shows that its anti-ECFA crusade was a debacle. The U.S. beef imports controversy shows that the DPP's "Raging Citizens" card is the demagoguing of phony issues. These are all examples of how the DPP is spinning its wheels. These have forced caused the nation and society to spin their wheels as well. Little wonder that when contemplating Sunday's "Raging Citizens Protest March" some are saying, "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?"
The DPP has become a Machiavellian political party. Political trickery reigns supreme. It has abandoned its principles. It lacks a compass. It even lacks a goal. It aided and abetted Chen Shui-bian. It is deft at political trickery but lacking in moral principles. It opposed ECFA. It is deft at political trickery, but lacking in policy direction. During the U.S. beef imports controversy, it was adept at political protests, but lacking in policy goals. Being adept at political trickery but lacking in moral principles, has led it to equate ideology with "policy," political struggle with "reform," and incitement of social divisions with "love for Taiwan." This is a political party that pretends to take action. But its only real action is wheel-spinning. It holds countless protest marches. But its protests are mere internal bickering.
The DPP could have chosen not be such a political party. But its Machiavellianism has led to a transformation in character. This transformation includes three aspects. One. Before and after the lifting of martial law, the DPP's principles and goals were clear. Overthrow the "Ten Thousand Year Assembly," and return to constitutional rule. But then it colluded with Lee Teng-hui to "amend," i.e., shred the Constitution. It treated the Constitution is a sacrifice it its political struggle. Its Machiavellianism led to the shredding of the Constitution. Its "Taiwan independence party platform" called for the "Rectification of Names." This has been exposed for what it is, a phony issue. But it forced the nation and society to pay a heavy price -- two decades of wheel-spinning.
Two. Before and after the 1990s it proposed "subsidies for farmers," "allowances for the elderly," and "allowances for fishermen." It was originally a legitimate advocate of social welfare. But then it began competing with the KMT to see who could engage in the most political patronage. It underwent a transformation in character. Since then, the DPP's policies for social welfare, environmental protection, nuclear energy, annuities, health insurance, capital gains tax, have all been recut a la Machiavelli. The DPP neglects the Big Picture. It considers only tactical advantage in its ongoing political struggle.
Three. After 2008, the DPP's cross-Strait policy became opposition to ECFA and the 1992 consensus. It said it "opposed the forfeiting of sovereignty and the humiliation the nation," it said it opposed "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." It has yet to clean up the mess left by its Machievellianism. The DPP finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. Its plight is clear to see.
As we can see, the DPP thinks it can demagogue national and constitutional allegiance by means of Machievillian trickery. Suddenly it trots out its "Taiwan independence party platform." Suddenly it trots out its "five noes." Suddenly it trots out its "rectification of names." It resorts to Machievellian trickery in nuclear energy policy. Suddenly it halts construction of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it orders an accelerated construction schedule for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it demands a nuclear-free homeland. It resorts to Machievellian trickery in cross-Strait policy. Suddenly it opposes ECFA. Suddenly it "unconditionally accepts" ECFA. We have a suggestion. Before the DPP takes to the streets on Sunday it should first ask itself this question. One protest march after another has arrived on Ketagalan Boulevard, then scattered. But what does the DPP want? What is its policy? What are its goals? Just where does the DPP want to go?
Today's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), cannot even form an intraparty "China Affairs Committee." Yet it shrilly demands a National Policy Conference. But convening a National Policy Conference is merely another Machievellian tactic in its ongoing political struggle. It is not a policy direction. What is it, but another "Raging Citizens Protest March?" One that ends up on the ash heap, spinning its wheels?
"All we saw was rage. Where were the policy proposals?" The DPP has a body, but it has no soul. The DPP acts, but it has no principles. The DPP moves, but it has no direction. Perhaps Su Tseng-chang hopes the march will injecdt life into the DPP. But he must first rebuild tge DPP's policy framework on a secure moral foundation. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The "Raging Citizens Protest March" is an example of Machievellian tactics trumping policy direction. Once the march has ended, will the DPP resume spinning its wheels?
空有火大 不見主張
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.10
民進黨的「火大遊行」周日上路，黨內中生代質疑「空有火大，不見主張」；並有人鐵口預言，遊行過後，民進黨仍將陷於目前這種空轉的困境。
民進黨已經久陷於嚴重的空轉內耗。僅舉三例：一、扁案。二、ＥＣＦＡ。三、美牛案。民進黨已完全被扁案挾持，迄今不敢對扁案做出道德譴責，反而整個黨正在協助陳水扁以「保外就醫」對抗司法，扭曲了監獄行刑法，已使黨內的轉型正義陷於無止境的空轉。ＥＣＦＡ則從二○○八年的「喪權辱國／傾中賣台」，一路鬧到二○一二，竟突然改口說「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；這個大轉彎迄今仍在「空轉」之中，因為民進黨的兩岸政策「轉型」尚在「空轉」。美牛案則吵了幾個月，甚至鬧到夜宿議場，結果卻以「遵照國際標準」收攤，白白「火大」了一場。
扁案顯示民進黨已喪失道德立場，反ＥＣＦＡ則反映民進黨的兩岸政策徹底失敗，美牛案則證明民進黨的「火大」有時根本是無的放矢的「假議題」。這些都是民進黨的內耗空轉，並也轉嫁成了國家社會的內耗空轉。也就難怪，面對周日的「火大遊行」，有人質疑：「空有火大，主張何在？」
民進黨已經成為一個「技術主義」或「權謀主義」掛帥的政黨；由於技術及權謀掛帥，因此失去原則，沒有方向，甚至無的放矢。挺扁，重權謀而無原則；反ＥＣＦＡ，重權謀而無方向；美牛案，更是只重抗爭技術，卻根本是無的放矢。由於重技術而無原則，因此遂將意識形態視為「政策」，將政治鬥爭視為「改革」，將撕裂視為「愛台灣」。這樣的政黨，動作很大，卻皆是空轉；遊行很多，卻只是內耗。
民進黨原本可以不是這樣的政黨，卻因權謀主義及技術主義而量變導致質變。其變化過程大致可分三個面向：一、解嚴前後，民進黨的政策原則與運動方向十分清楚，推翻萬年國會，回歸憲政；但自與李登輝聯手修憲而導致毀憲後，不啻將憲法視為政爭的供品，以權謀主義造成憲法敗毀；至於楬櫫《台獨黨綱》，倡議正名制憲，如今皆成假議題，卻使國家社會付出了近二十年空轉的代價。
二、一九九○年代前後，提出「老農津貼」、「老人津貼」、「漁民津貼」等，原是社會福利的正當主張，卻是以「與國民黨比賽利益綁樁」的「技術主義」為著眼，遂致變質。此後，民進黨的社福、環保、核能、年金、健保、證所稅等政策，皆以權謀主義見長；並無關照全局的政策理念，而是以政爭的技術觀點為依違。
三、二○○八年以後，民進黨以反ＥＣＦＡ及反九二共識為其「兩岸政策」的主軸，打著「反喪權辱國，反傾中賣台」的口號；這個出自「技術主義」的爛攤子迄今尚不知如何收拾，民進黨進退維谷、左支右絀的窘態可謂有目共睹。
由上述討論可見，在民進黨的「技術主義」操作下，國憲認同可以權謀化，一下子《台獨黨綱》，一下子「四不一沒有」，一下子正名制憲；核能政策可以權謀化，一下子停建核四，一下子命核四趕工，一下子非核家園；兩岸政策也可權謀化，一下子反ＥＣＦＡ，一下子「概括承受」。我們建議，民進黨人在周日上街以前，先自己問問自己：場場遊行皆可走到凱達格蘭大道就散場，但民進黨的主張究竟是什麼？政策究竟是什麼？方向究竟是什麼？民進黨究竟要往何處去？
今天的民進黨，連黨內的「中國事務委員會」都拼湊不起來，卻只是吼叫要開國是會議。然若召開國是會議仍只是政治鬥爭的「技術主義」，而非「政策取向」，豈不又是一場「火大」燒出了一堆「空轉」的灰燼？
「空有火大，不見主張」，這使民進黨陷於「無魂有體」、「有動作／無原則」、「有運動／無方向」的危境；蘇貞昌或許寄望這場遊行能使民進黨動起來，但若不能重建民進黨的道德立場與政策架構，天下豈有無薪自燃的道理？
這場「火大遊行」仍是「技術主義」超越「政策取向」。遊行過後，民進黨仍將空轉嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2012
Summary: The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
Full Text below:
The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
The DPP has been spinning its wheels, hobbled by internal conflict. Take three examples. One. The Chen family corruption scandal. Two. ECFA. Three. U.S. beef imports. The DPP remains a hostage of the Chen family corruption scandal. Even today it lacks the courage to condemn Chen family corruption. Just the opposite, the entire party, in stubborn defiance of justice, is aiding and abetting Chen Shui-bian in his quest for "medical parole." It is twisting the meaning of the laws pertaining to parole. As a result the party's "Transitional Justice" has gone nowhere, and continues to spin its wheels. In 2008, the DPP demagogued ECFA, alleging that it "forfeited sovereignty, humiliated the nation" and "pandered to [Mainland] China and sold out Taiwan." It persisted until 2012, when it suddenly sang a different tune. It announced that "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This major about face was another example of DPP wheel-spinning. It happened because the DPP's cross-strait policy "reform" remains stillborn. The U.S. beef imports controversy raged for several months. DPP legislators even held an multi-night "slumber party" on the legislature floor. In the end however, they closed up shop and agreed to "abide by international standards." Their temper tantrum was for naught.
The Chen family corruption scandal shows that the DPP has forfeited the moral high ground. The DPP's cross-strait policy shows that its anti-ECFA crusade was a debacle. The U.S. beef imports controversy shows that the DPP's "Raging Citizens" card is the demagoguing of phony issues. These are all examples of how the DPP is spinning its wheels. These have forced caused the nation and society to spin their wheels as well. Little wonder that when contemplating Sunday's "Raging Citizens Protest March" some are saying, "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?"
The DPP has become a Machiavellian political party. Political trickery reigns supreme. It has abandoned its principles. It lacks a compass. It even lacks a goal. It aided and abetted Chen Shui-bian. It is deft at political trickery but lacking in moral principles. It opposed ECFA. It is deft at political trickery, but lacking in policy direction. During the U.S. beef imports controversy, it was adept at political protests, but lacking in policy goals. Being adept at political trickery but lacking in moral principles, has led it to equate ideology with "policy," political struggle with "reform," and incitement of social divisions with "love for Taiwan." This is a political party that pretends to take action. But its only real action is wheel-spinning. It holds countless protest marches. But its protests are mere internal bickering.
The DPP could have chosen not be such a political party. But its Machiavellianism has led to a transformation in character. This transformation includes three aspects. One. Before and after the lifting of martial law, the DPP's principles and goals were clear. Overthrow the "Ten Thousand Year Assembly," and return to constitutional rule. But then it colluded with Lee Teng-hui to "amend," i.e., shred the Constitution. It treated the Constitution is a sacrifice it its political struggle. Its Machiavellianism led to the shredding of the Constitution. Its "Taiwan independence party platform" called for the "Rectification of Names." This has been exposed for what it is, a phony issue. But it forced the nation and society to pay a heavy price -- two decades of wheel-spinning.
Two. Before and after the 1990s it proposed "subsidies for farmers," "allowances for the elderly," and "allowances for fishermen." It was originally a legitimate advocate of social welfare. But then it began competing with the KMT to see who could engage in the most political patronage. It underwent a transformation in character. Since then, the DPP's policies for social welfare, environmental protection, nuclear energy, annuities, health insurance, capital gains tax, have all been recut a la Machiavelli. The DPP neglects the Big Picture. It considers only tactical advantage in its ongoing political struggle.
Three. After 2008, the DPP's cross-Strait policy became opposition to ECFA and the 1992 consensus. It said it "opposed the forfeiting of sovereignty and the humiliation the nation," it said it opposed "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." It has yet to clean up the mess left by its Machievellianism. The DPP finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. Its plight is clear to see.
As we can see, the DPP thinks it can demagogue national and constitutional allegiance by means of Machievillian trickery. Suddenly it trots out its "Taiwan independence party platform." Suddenly it trots out its "five noes." Suddenly it trots out its "rectification of names." It resorts to Machievellian trickery in nuclear energy policy. Suddenly it halts construction of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it orders an accelerated construction schedule for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it demands a nuclear-free homeland. It resorts to Machievellian trickery in cross-Strait policy. Suddenly it opposes ECFA. Suddenly it "unconditionally accepts" ECFA. We have a suggestion. Before the DPP takes to the streets on Sunday it should first ask itself this question. One protest march after another has arrived on Ketagalan Boulevard, then scattered. But what does the DPP want? What is its policy? What are its goals? Just where does the DPP want to go?
Today's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), cannot even form an intraparty "China Affairs Committee." Yet it shrilly demands a National Policy Conference. But convening a National Policy Conference is merely another Machievellian tactic in its ongoing political struggle. It is not a policy direction. What is it, but another "Raging Citizens Protest March?" One that ends up on the ash heap, spinning its wheels?
"All we saw was rage. Where were the policy proposals?" The DPP has a body, but it has no soul. The DPP acts, but it has no principles. The DPP moves, but it has no direction. Perhaps Su Tseng-chang hopes the march will injecdt life into the DPP. But he must first rebuild tge DPP's policy framework on a secure moral foundation. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The "Raging Citizens Protest March" is an example of Machievellian tactics trumping policy direction. Once the march has ended, will the DPP resume spinning its wheels?
空有火大 不見主張
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.10
民進黨的「火大遊行」周日上路，黨內中生代質疑「空有火大，不見主張」；並有人鐵口預言，遊行過後，民進黨仍將陷於目前這種空轉的困境。
民進黨已經久陷於嚴重的空轉內耗。僅舉三例：一、扁案。二、ＥＣＦＡ。三、美牛案。民進黨已完全被扁案挾持，迄今不敢對扁案做出道德譴責，反而整個黨正在協助陳水扁以「保外就醫」對抗司法，扭曲了監獄行刑法，已使黨內的轉型正義陷於無止境的空轉。ＥＣＦＡ則從二○○八年的「喪權辱國／傾中賣台」，一路鬧到二○一二，竟突然改口說「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；這個大轉彎迄今仍在「空轉」之中，因為民進黨的兩岸政策「轉型」尚在「空轉」。美牛案則吵了幾個月，甚至鬧到夜宿議場，結果卻以「遵照國際標準」收攤，白白「火大」了一場。
扁案顯示民進黨已喪失道德立場，反ＥＣＦＡ則反映民進黨的兩岸政策徹底失敗，美牛案則證明民進黨的「火大」有時根本是無的放矢的「假議題」。這些都是民進黨的內耗空轉，並也轉嫁成了國家社會的內耗空轉。也就難怪，面對周日的「火大遊行」，有人質疑：「空有火大，主張何在？」
民進黨已經成為一個「技術主義」或「權謀主義」掛帥的政黨；由於技術及權謀掛帥，因此失去原則，沒有方向，甚至無的放矢。挺扁，重權謀而無原則；反ＥＣＦＡ，重權謀而無方向；美牛案，更是只重抗爭技術，卻根本是無的放矢。由於重技術而無原則，因此遂將意識形態視為「政策」，將政治鬥爭視為「改革」，將撕裂視為「愛台灣」。這樣的政黨，動作很大，卻皆是空轉；遊行很多，卻只是內耗。
民進黨原本可以不是這樣的政黨，卻因權謀主義及技術主義而量變導致質變。其變化過程大致可分三個面向：一、解嚴前後，民進黨的政策原則與運動方向十分清楚，推翻萬年國會，回歸憲政；但自與李登輝聯手修憲而導致毀憲後，不啻將憲法視為政爭的供品，以權謀主義造成憲法敗毀；至於楬櫫《台獨黨綱》，倡議正名制憲，如今皆成假議題，卻使國家社會付出了近二十年空轉的代價。
二、一九九○年代前後，提出「老農津貼」、「老人津貼」、「漁民津貼」等，原是社會福利的正當主張，卻是以「與國民黨比賽利益綁樁」的「技術主義」為著眼，遂致變質。此後，民進黨的社福、環保、核能、年金、健保、證所稅等政策，皆以權謀主義見長；並無關照全局的政策理念，而是以政爭的技術觀點為依違。
三、二○○八年以後，民進黨以反ＥＣＦＡ及反九二共識為其「兩岸政策」的主軸，打著「反喪權辱國，反傾中賣台」的口號；這個出自「技術主義」的爛攤子迄今尚不知如何收拾，民進黨進退維谷、左支右絀的窘態可謂有目共睹。
由上述討論可見，在民進黨的「技術主義」操作下，國憲認同可以權謀化，一下子《台獨黨綱》，一下子「四不一沒有」，一下子正名制憲；核能政策可以權謀化，一下子停建核四，一下子命核四趕工，一下子非核家園；兩岸政策也可權謀化，一下子反ＥＣＦＡ，一下子「概括承受」。我們建議，民進黨人在周日上街以前，先自己問問自己：場場遊行皆可走到凱達格蘭大道就散場，但民進黨的主張究竟是什麼？政策究竟是什麼？方向究竟是什麼？民進黨究竟要往何處去？
今天的民進黨，連黨內的「中國事務委員會」都拼湊不起來，卻只是吼叫要開國是會議。然若召開國是會議仍只是政治鬥爭的「技術主義」，而非「政策取向」，豈不又是一場「火大」燒出了一堆「空轉」的灰燼？
「空有火大，不見主張」，這使民進黨陷於「無魂有體」、「有動作／無原則」、「有運動／無方向」的危境；蘇貞昌或許寄望這場遊行能使民進黨動起來，但若不能重建民進黨的道德立場與政策架構，天下豈有無薪自燃的道理？
這場「火大遊行」仍是「技術主義」超越「政策取向」。遊行過後，民進黨仍將空轉嗎？
Tuesday, January 8, 2013
Government Reform Must Not Create a No Man's Land
Government Reform Must Not Create a No Man's Land
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2012
Summary: The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
Full Text below:
The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
The chaos is mind-boggling. For example, the Construction and Planning Agency was supposed to be incorporated into the Ministry of Communications. In the end however, only a handful of personnel were transferred. The Ministry of Communications was supposed to be upgraded. It was supposed to become the figurehead for the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Directorate General of Highways. The Central Weather Bureau was supposed to be subsumed under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. But that decision was reversed long ago. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental Resources and Ministry of Science and Technology did not want it. As a result, it became an orphan. No one wants the Central Weather Bureau. The Forestry Bureau, on the other hand, has a vast forest resources. As a result it has become a bone of contention between the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental Resources. So far no one knows where it will end up.
The reason for this chaos is not hard to understand. First of all, the scale of the government's restructuring is much too great. It is attempting to dissolve the boundaries between all the ministries, then re-assemble them. This is not something that can be done overnight. Secondly, the Executive Yuan Organization Law was hurriedly amended three years ago. Many problems have yet to be ironed out. Failure to do so led to today's result: cutting and grafting and total gridlock. The current batch of legislators also have their own ideas. They want to do some cutting and grafting of their own. Thirdly, the various ministries cannot rise above their parochialism. They are unwilling to relinquish their current resources. They are unwilling to take over thorny sectors. They are engrossed in expanding their spheres of influence. These all add to the difficulty of restructuring.
One factor however, is the most puzzling. Government reform is the cornerstone of the government's long-term plans. Yet the Executive Yuan has not treated this as a high priority. It entrusted the responsibility solely to the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), an agency which commands little prestige. Therefore, many ministries will attempt to haggle during the coordination process, and even subvert the administration's agenda. The final round of restructuring will be difficult. Yet the Executive Yuan has not sought consensus through internal negotiations. Instead, it has allowed cadres to lobby individual legislators and attempt to directly amend the law. This has provided the ruling and opposition parties the opportunity to engage in confrontation and back room deals.
Consider the root of the problem. The restructuring of the government is meaningful and necessary, The government should make reasonable changes to its organizational structure in response to changing times. The government should urge government agencies to reevaluate their function and their performance. But it must never forget that restructuring is merely the means, not the end. The end is to create a government that better serves the people, and more effectively uses government and social resources. Will restructuring result merely in the hanging of new signs everywhere? Will policy implementation remain hobbled by outdated thinking? Will the governments' problem-solving ability remain as weak as before? If so, then the restructuring can hardly be termed a success.
Furthermore, restructuring is not simply the dismantling of various agencies and reassembling them elsewhere. It is evolution that enables the new organization to function more effectively. Otherwise, the government is merely rearranging the blocks in a game of Lego. In other words, reinventing government requires internal software integration, not external hardware reorganization. The former is the key. Alas, a number of problems have appeared. Executive branch agencies apparently cannot even solve the hardware problems. Solving the software problems is going to be a case of "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The Central Weather Bureau has been reduced to an orphan. The Forestry Bureau has become a bone of contention. These are passing phenomenon that will eventually be resolved. But unmanned service windows reveal the failure of upper echelon government official thinking. Restructuring has exposed their lack of direction. The greatest irony is in the existing government structure. The Forestry Bureau sits on valuable resources. Yet it was a neglected agency. Now, during restructuring, it has become a bone of contention between rival ministries. This is truly a paradox. Just what role do the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environmental Resources want the Forestry Bureau to fulfill?
What is the most worrisome aspect of the governmental restructuring? Some organizational functions were omitted during agency consolidation. They were relegated to a no man's land. But no one noticed. This is the most common pitfall during reform. The scale of the current restructuring is especially great. It was allowed too little time and given too little promotion. The public is accustomed to the current government structure. They no longer know where to seek solutions to many problems, old and new. Moreover, restructured agency personnel must be transferred hither, thither, and yon. New personnel must settle in and adapt to their new environment. If they are not properly settled, they will inevitably feel resentment. The public may not realize how much harm reinventing the government has already done.
Reinventing government requires time to iron out the kinks. But the process must be accelerated. Otherwise it will lead to social discontent. Premier Chen must pay more attention. He must resolve inter-ministerial differences. He must not allow rival ministries to treat restructuring as an opportunity for haggling. He must not allow the current administration to become the object of opposition party and public ridicule.
政府改造不可改出三不管地帶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.09
政府第二階段組織改造，已於元旦上路，連日來亂象頻傳；各部會爭相搶奪熱門單位，冷門機構則因部會推拒而淪為孤兒。更嚴重的，是有些部會趁機大伺擴張架構，膨脹員額；如此一來，越改造越臃腫，勢將失去提升政府效能的初衷。
檢視最近發生的亂象，令人感到匪夷所思。諸如：原預訂納入交通部的營建署，最後只移撥了一小撮人，使得交通部提升為「交通及建設部」淪為有名無實。而原隸交通部的氣象局則因早早被劃出，卻又不為「環境資源部」及「科技部」接納，成了部會棄兒。相對於氣象局的無人關愛，林務局則因擁有龐大的台灣山林資源，成為農委會及環境資源部爭奪的對象，至今尚不知歸屬何方。
之所以出現這些亂象，原因不難想見。第一，政府組織改造的規模太大，要打破所有的部會疆界，再重新組裝，絕非一朝一夕之事。第二，行政院組織法的修法工作三年前在倉促間完成，許多問題未及細思，留下了今天左支右絀的扞格難題；而本屆立委又有不同看法，希望再修枝鋸幹。第三，各部會不脫本位主義思維，或不願割捨既有資源，或不願接手棘手部門，或汲汲於擴大勢力範圍，更增加整併與再造的困難。
除了上述因素，最讓人不解的是，政府組織改造是國家長期布局的奠基工程，但行政院卻將此重擔交由層級不高、威望不重的研考會一肩承擔。因此，許多部會在協調中擺出討價還價的姿態，乃至要推翻前議。而對於最後整併上的疑難，行政院竟不透過院內討論尋求共識，卻放任若干部會逕自向個別立法委員遊說，企圖直接訴諸修法，這又為朝野對峙及密室協商提供了翻雲覆雨的機會。
正本清源，政府的組織改造當然是有意義、也有必要的工作，不僅可使整個政府架構因應時代及社會的變化而作出合理的調整，也可敦促政府部門重新檢視自己的功能和績效。但絕不能忘記的是，改造只是「手段」，而不是「目的」；其最後目的，是要實現政府對人民的更佳服務，以及對國家、社會資源的更有效整合運用。若組織改造的結果，只是許多部門掛起新招牌，但在行政作業上使用的卻仍是老套思維，解決問題的能力也依然疲弱如故；那麼，這次改造絕對難稱為成功。
進一步說，組織改造並不是把各單位拆解、再進行組裝這麼簡單的事，而是要讓新的組織在功能上產生「進化」，效能變得更強；否則，這就只是一場政府級的「樂高」遊戲而已。換言之，政府再造所追求的，不是外表的「硬體重組」，而是內部的「軟件整合」，後者才是核心重點。但從目前浮現的問題看，行政部門顯然連硬體的組合都無法解決，對軟體的進化恐怕更是心餘力絀。
從這個角度看，氣象局淪為部會孤兒，以及林務局變成爭奪對象，其實都尚只是暫時現象，最終會獲得解決。但此一空窗現象，實實在在地反映出政府改造「上層思維」的貧乏，才會在整併時面臨找不到方向的困境。最諷刺的是，在現有的政府架構中，坐擁珍貴資源的林務局原是一個受冷落的部門，如今它卻在改造時變成部會間爭奪的搶手貨，真是咄咄怪事。試問，農業部或環境資源部都想好要林務局扮演什麼角色了嗎？
不可諱言，政府改造最令人擔憂的是，既有的組織功能在部門整併中遭到遺漏或疏忽，而被推到三不管地帶，乏人聞問。這也是改革中最常見的陷阱。一則因為這次組織變動極大，二則是時間短促而宣導不足，而一般民眾早已習慣原有的政府架構，許多新舊問題不知要由什麼部門提供解決。更何況，各單位人員隨組織異動而遷徙，必然產生新的人事安頓及環境變動的適應問題，若缺乏妥適的安頓，必生怨懟；在這種情形下，民眾恐怕未享政府再造之利即先蒙其大害。
政府再造需要時間來磨合各部門的接縫，但這個過程必須加快，才不會導致社會怨聲載道。陳揆也必須對此付出更多關注，解決部會間的歧見，不能任由各方把整併工程當成買賣在那裡討價還價，讓在野黨和民眾看笑話。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2012
Summary: The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
Full Text below:
The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
The chaos is mind-boggling. For example, the Construction and Planning Agency was supposed to be incorporated into the Ministry of Communications. In the end however, only a handful of personnel were transferred. The Ministry of Communications was supposed to be upgraded. It was supposed to become the figurehead for the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Directorate General of Highways. The Central Weather Bureau was supposed to be subsumed under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. But that decision was reversed long ago. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental Resources and Ministry of Science and Technology did not want it. As a result, it became an orphan. No one wants the Central Weather Bureau. The Forestry Bureau, on the other hand, has a vast forest resources. As a result it has become a bone of contention between the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental Resources. So far no one knows where it will end up.
The reason for this chaos is not hard to understand. First of all, the scale of the government's restructuring is much too great. It is attempting to dissolve the boundaries between all the ministries, then re-assemble them. This is not something that can be done overnight. Secondly, the Executive Yuan Organization Law was hurriedly amended three years ago. Many problems have yet to be ironed out. Failure to do so led to today's result: cutting and grafting and total gridlock. The current batch of legislators also have their own ideas. They want to do some cutting and grafting of their own. Thirdly, the various ministries cannot rise above their parochialism. They are unwilling to relinquish their current resources. They are unwilling to take over thorny sectors. They are engrossed in expanding their spheres of influence. These all add to the difficulty of restructuring.
One factor however, is the most puzzling. Government reform is the cornerstone of the government's long-term plans. Yet the Executive Yuan has not treated this as a high priority. It entrusted the responsibility solely to the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), an agency which commands little prestige. Therefore, many ministries will attempt to haggle during the coordination process, and even subvert the administration's agenda. The final round of restructuring will be difficult. Yet the Executive Yuan has not sought consensus through internal negotiations. Instead, it has allowed cadres to lobby individual legislators and attempt to directly amend the law. This has provided the ruling and opposition parties the opportunity to engage in confrontation and back room deals.
Consider the root of the problem. The restructuring of the government is meaningful and necessary, The government should make reasonable changes to its organizational structure in response to changing times. The government should urge government agencies to reevaluate their function and their performance. But it must never forget that restructuring is merely the means, not the end. The end is to create a government that better serves the people, and more effectively uses government and social resources. Will restructuring result merely in the hanging of new signs everywhere? Will policy implementation remain hobbled by outdated thinking? Will the governments' problem-solving ability remain as weak as before? If so, then the restructuring can hardly be termed a success.
Furthermore, restructuring is not simply the dismantling of various agencies and reassembling them elsewhere. It is evolution that enables the new organization to function more effectively. Otherwise, the government is merely rearranging the blocks in a game of Lego. In other words, reinventing government requires internal software integration, not external hardware reorganization. The former is the key. Alas, a number of problems have appeared. Executive branch agencies apparently cannot even solve the hardware problems. Solving the software problems is going to be a case of "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The Central Weather Bureau has been reduced to an orphan. The Forestry Bureau has become a bone of contention. These are passing phenomenon that will eventually be resolved. But unmanned service windows reveal the failure of upper echelon government official thinking. Restructuring has exposed their lack of direction. The greatest irony is in the existing government structure. The Forestry Bureau sits on valuable resources. Yet it was a neglected agency. Now, during restructuring, it has become a bone of contention between rival ministries. This is truly a paradox. Just what role do the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environmental Resources want the Forestry Bureau to fulfill?
What is the most worrisome aspect of the governmental restructuring? Some organizational functions were omitted during agency consolidation. They were relegated to a no man's land. But no one noticed. This is the most common pitfall during reform. The scale of the current restructuring is especially great. It was allowed too little time and given too little promotion. The public is accustomed to the current government structure. They no longer know where to seek solutions to many problems, old and new. Moreover, restructured agency personnel must be transferred hither, thither, and yon. New personnel must settle in and adapt to their new environment. If they are not properly settled, they will inevitably feel resentment. The public may not realize how much harm reinventing the government has already done.
Reinventing government requires time to iron out the kinks. But the process must be accelerated. Otherwise it will lead to social discontent. Premier Chen must pay more attention. He must resolve inter-ministerial differences. He must not allow rival ministries to treat restructuring as an opportunity for haggling. He must not allow the current administration to become the object of opposition party and public ridicule.
政府改造不可改出三不管地帶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.09
政府第二階段組織改造，已於元旦上路，連日來亂象頻傳；各部會爭相搶奪熱門單位，冷門機構則因部會推拒而淪為孤兒。更嚴重的，是有些部會趁機大伺擴張架構，膨脹員額；如此一來，越改造越臃腫，勢將失去提升政府效能的初衷。
檢視最近發生的亂象，令人感到匪夷所思。諸如：原預訂納入交通部的營建署，最後只移撥了一小撮人，使得交通部提升為「交通及建設部」淪為有名無實。而原隸交通部的氣象局則因早早被劃出，卻又不為「環境資源部」及「科技部」接納，成了部會棄兒。相對於氣象局的無人關愛，林務局則因擁有龐大的台灣山林資源，成為農委會及環境資源部爭奪的對象，至今尚不知歸屬何方。
之所以出現這些亂象，原因不難想見。第一，政府組織改造的規模太大，要打破所有的部會疆界，再重新組裝，絕非一朝一夕之事。第二，行政院組織法的修法工作三年前在倉促間完成，許多問題未及細思，留下了今天左支右絀的扞格難題；而本屆立委又有不同看法，希望再修枝鋸幹。第三，各部會不脫本位主義思維，或不願割捨既有資源，或不願接手棘手部門，或汲汲於擴大勢力範圍，更增加整併與再造的困難。
除了上述因素，最讓人不解的是，政府組織改造是國家長期布局的奠基工程，但行政院卻將此重擔交由層級不高、威望不重的研考會一肩承擔。因此，許多部會在協調中擺出討價還價的姿態，乃至要推翻前議。而對於最後整併上的疑難，行政院竟不透過院內討論尋求共識，卻放任若干部會逕自向個別立法委員遊說，企圖直接訴諸修法，這又為朝野對峙及密室協商提供了翻雲覆雨的機會。
正本清源，政府的組織改造當然是有意義、也有必要的工作，不僅可使整個政府架構因應時代及社會的變化而作出合理的調整，也可敦促政府部門重新檢視自己的功能和績效。但絕不能忘記的是，改造只是「手段」，而不是「目的」；其最後目的，是要實現政府對人民的更佳服務，以及對國家、社會資源的更有效整合運用。若組織改造的結果，只是許多部門掛起新招牌，但在行政作業上使用的卻仍是老套思維，解決問題的能力也依然疲弱如故；那麼，這次改造絕對難稱為成功。
進一步說，組織改造並不是把各單位拆解、再進行組裝這麼簡單的事，而是要讓新的組織在功能上產生「進化」，效能變得更強；否則，這就只是一場政府級的「樂高」遊戲而已。換言之，政府再造所追求的，不是外表的「硬體重組」，而是內部的「軟件整合」，後者才是核心重點。但從目前浮現的問題看，行政部門顯然連硬體的組合都無法解決，對軟體的進化恐怕更是心餘力絀。
從這個角度看，氣象局淪為部會孤兒，以及林務局變成爭奪對象，其實都尚只是暫時現象，最終會獲得解決。但此一空窗現象，實實在在地反映出政府改造「上層思維」的貧乏，才會在整併時面臨找不到方向的困境。最諷刺的是，在現有的政府架構中，坐擁珍貴資源的林務局原是一個受冷落的部門，如今它卻在改造時變成部會間爭奪的搶手貨，真是咄咄怪事。試問，農業部或環境資源部都想好要林務局扮演什麼角色了嗎？
不可諱言，政府改造最令人擔憂的是，既有的組織功能在部門整併中遭到遺漏或疏忽，而被推到三不管地帶，乏人聞問。這也是改革中最常見的陷阱。一則因為這次組織變動極大，二則是時間短促而宣導不足，而一般民眾早已習慣原有的政府架構，許多新舊問題不知要由什麼部門提供解決。更何況，各單位人員隨組織異動而遷徙，必然產生新的人事安頓及環境變動的適應問題，若缺乏妥適的安頓，必生怨懟；在這種情形下，民眾恐怕未享政府再造之利即先蒙其大害。
政府再造需要時間來磨合各部門的接縫，但這個過程必須加快，才不會導致社會怨聲載道。陳揆也必須對此付出更多關注，解決部會間的歧見，不能任由各方把整併工程當成買賣在那裡討價還價，讓在野黨和民眾看笑話。
Neither Prosecute the Innocent, Nor Abet the Guilty
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2012
Summary: A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
Full Text below:
A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
But we see no fundamental difference between the two sides. Zhu, Weng, and Chiang have long advocated cracking down on corruption while avoiding malicious prosecution. The Ministry of Justice says that it is making distinctions between minor and major offenses. It says it is letting smaller fish go while going after corruption. The public has a very different perception. As they see it, the three elders from academia are merely covering up their own mistakes. As they see it, the prosecutors are merely persecuting the innocent. These impressions however, do not necessarily reflect the truth or the whole picture.
The three elders from academia began by comparing two categories of false reporting, which they termed Category A and Category B. Under Category A, "A professor use false invoices and pockets the money, or else uses the money to purchase personal items having nothing to do with research. Examples include designer bags and refrigerators for their homes. Such cases must be turned over to the authorities, who should exercise no leniency."
Under Category B, "A professor uses false invoices to purchase other kinds of research equipment. One example would be using an invoice for three toner cartridges to purchase a computer screen. Not one dime went into private pockets. The Corruption Offences Ordinance is not aimed at cases such as this."
The three elders from academia said "Different categories of false invoices call for different attitudes."
Actually the prosecution took this into account when leveling their indictments. They apparently subscribe to the same policy. If public funds have not entered private pockets, depending on the seriousness of the offense, they may choose not to prosecute. They may charge them with forgery, a Category B offense. Other categories, such as purchasing one thing while reporting another, will also be dealt with leniently. But if the accused colluded with the vendor to pad the invoice and pocketed the difference, that will be treated harshly. That would be a Category C offense. Abusing the power of one's office to embezzle and pocket public funds is an even worse form of corruption. That would be a Category A offense. The vast majority of offenses are Category D offenses. These the prosecution chose to overlook from the very outset. It either chose not to prosecute, or dropped the cases midstream. The prosecution does have a "different cases, different attitudes" policy.
The dispute between the three elders from academia and the Ministry of Justice is merely over the wording of "Neither prosecute the innocent, nor abet the guilty." Each side has its own job description. Each side has its own perspective. The three elders from academia may stress "not prosecuting the innocent." The Ministry of Justice may stress "not abetting the guilty." Each side has its own take on the matter. This is hardly surprising.
But the controversy involves an unshakeable core principle. Under existing laws, a public university professor is a civil servant. If he pockets public funds, he can be prosecuted for corruption. That is why the three elders from academia agree that offending public university professors would fall under Category A offenders. They "should unquestionably be handed over to the authorities for prosecution according to the letter of the law. They must not be treated leniently." This is what the Ministry of Justice refers to as "no room for ambiguity." Both parties agree about the core principle. Therefore the controversy over right and wrong is already half-solved.
What concerns the public is that the prosecution may have difficulty successfully prosecuting Category B and Category D offenses as embezzlement because they involve a grey area. The three elders from academia may have difficulty interceding on behalf of those accused of Category A and Category C offenses. .
Many individuals have been indicted for these offenses. But each case is an individual case. These are not indictments of educators, academicians, and professors, per se.
Prosecuting illegal activities has nothing to with the educators as such. Nor is it right to associate Category A suspects with "distinguished researchers." After all, even a distinguished president was involved in corruption. He was prosecuted according to the law. How can professors be exempt?
There already appears to be a consensus. At first academicians said the offenses were Category B and Category D offenses. But later on they said they were Category A offenses involving embezzlement. Some even said they were Category C offenses involving collusion. One reason for this guilt by association, is that suspects often get away scot free due to dumb luck. Another reason is a systemic lack of accountability. The prosecution is merely restoring long term accountability to the system. This could be seen as a belated attempt to restore accountability to academia as a whole.
The three elders from academia have addressed Category B and Category D offenses. They do not want the public thinking they are condoning Category A and Category C offenses. By contrast, if the prosecution cites Category B and Category D offenses when prosecuting corruption, it will generate chaos. It will undermine its credibility. Therefore the three elders from academia, the prosecution, and the public, must reach a clear consensus, namely, "different cases, different attitudes."
We believe the differences between the four types of offenses must be made clear. This will not "undermine morale in academia." It will clear the air. It will exonerate academicians. It will enhance their dignity and honor.
毋枉毋縱：三長與法部的共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.08 02:52 am
十多名教授涉嫌不實報銷案，被檢方以貪汙等罪名起訴；國科會主委朱敬一、中研院院長翁啟惠及教育部長蔣偉寧為此聯名聲明，表達憂慮與呼籲。雙方看似針鋒相對，壁壘分明。
然而，迄至目前，我們卻看不出雙方有何根本差異。朱翁蔣三長亦主張法辦貪汙，但不可造成冤錯；法務部則稱已經區別輕重，網開一面，但貪汙仍應法辦。然而，如今形成的社會印象卻是：三長只知護短，檢方則濫訴無辜，這些恐皆未必是如今事態的真相與全貌。
三長的公開聲明，開宗明義即舉出「兩種類型」的比較，茲稱之為甲類型與乙類型。甲類型：「如果教授以假發票報領經費拿進口袋，或是用此經費購買與研究無關的私人物品（如名牌包、家用電冰箱等），我們認為絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸。」
乙類型：「但是，假如以假發票報帳購買另一項研究器材（例如用三個碳粉匣的發票實購一個電腦螢幕），也沒有一毛錢進私人口袋，那麼畢竟不是貪汙治罪條例所該適用的對象。」
準此，三長表示：「假發票案的類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同。」
其實，檢方在過濾相關案件時，似乎亦持同一立場：倘公款未入私囊，視情節輕重，或不起訴，或訴以偽造文書（乙類型）；另對類如買Ａ報Ｂ的情節，亦從輕處理；但若與廠商勾串以低價高報，而將「預放款」（回扣）留為私用者，即不寬貸（此可謂為丙類型）；至於利用職務詐取公款納入私囊就是貪汙，沒有模糊空間（甲類型）；另外，還有居絕對多數的「丁類型」，早經檢方過濾掉了，以不起訴或請回結案。倘若此即檢方的辦案準則，豈不也是「案件類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同」？
因此，就我們看來，三長及法部之間若有爭執，亦僅在「毋枉毋縱」四字而已。只是，各自站在職司不同的立場，三長可能較重「毋枉」，但法部可能較重「毋縱」。此皆人情事理之自然，不足為怪。
這場爭論，有一個不可移變的中心準則，即是在現行法律下，倘將公立大學教授視為公務職位，則其人若將公款納入私囊，即可能被以貪汙罪訴究；因此，三長也認為在公立大學教授的法律責任中，亦有「甲類型」存在，「絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸」。此或即是法務部所稱的「沒有模糊空間」。只要雙方皆站在這個中心準則上，這場辯論的核心是非已可解決大半。
國人關切的是：檢方不宜將灰色地帶的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，辦成貪汙罪；三長亦不宜為「甲類型」、「丙類型」說項。
接下來可以一談的是，此事雖牽涉人數不少，但畢竟仍屬個案，不宜將之與「教育界／學術界／教授界」的全稱命題相提並論；畢竟，糾辦不法，不能視為與全體「教育界」為難。再者，亦不宜將涉案者的案情（如果是甲類型），與其是否為「研究傑出卓越者」混為一談；畢竟，即使是「傑出卓越的總統」，若涉貪汙，亦當法辦，教授又豈能免責？
然而，若說事態發展迄今，已有「制度共業」的意味，亦非全無道理。一開始，校園漸漸出現了便宜行事的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，然後就慢慢演變出監守自盜的「甲類型」，甚至惡化成教商勾結的「丙類型」。此種「制度共業」的形成，一方面是因涉案者的僥倖心理，另一方面亦因問責規範的失能；因而，這次檢方的動作，其實只是還原了原本早已應當運行的問責體制，可視為挽救「校園共業」的一個遲到的契機。
如今，三長要為「乙類型」、「丁類型」發言，亦不願社會誤解其是在為「甲類型」或「丙類型」撐腰。相對而言，倘若檢方真將「乙類型」、「丁類型」辦了貪汙案，即是亂了分寸，自失立場。所以，三長及檢方，與全體國人，已可在本案找到一個明確的共識，那就是：「案件的類型不同，我們對案件的態度也不同。」
我們相信，若能把四種類型區別清楚，非但不會「重挫學術界士氣」，反更將激濁揚清，清新校園，提升學術界的尊嚴與榮譽。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2012
Summary: A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
Full Text below:
A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
But we see no fundamental difference between the two sides. Zhu, Weng, and Chiang have long advocated cracking down on corruption while avoiding malicious prosecution. The Ministry of Justice says that it is making distinctions between minor and major offenses. It says it is letting smaller fish go while going after corruption. The public has a very different perception. As they see it, the three elders from academia are merely covering up their own mistakes. As they see it, the prosecutors are merely persecuting the innocent. These impressions however, do not necessarily reflect the truth or the whole picture.
The three elders from academia began by comparing two categories of false reporting, which they termed Category A and Category B. Under Category A, "A professor use false invoices and pockets the money, or else uses the money to purchase personal items having nothing to do with research. Examples include designer bags and refrigerators for their homes. Such cases must be turned over to the authorities, who should exercise no leniency."
Under Category B, "A professor uses false invoices to purchase other kinds of research equipment. One example would be using an invoice for three toner cartridges to purchase a computer screen. Not one dime went into private pockets. The Corruption Offences Ordinance is not aimed at cases such as this."
The three elders from academia said "Different categories of false invoices call for different attitudes."
Actually the prosecution took this into account when leveling their indictments. They apparently subscribe to the same policy. If public funds have not entered private pockets, depending on the seriousness of the offense, they may choose not to prosecute. They may charge them with forgery, a Category B offense. Other categories, such as purchasing one thing while reporting another, will also be dealt with leniently. But if the accused colluded with the vendor to pad the invoice and pocketed the difference, that will be treated harshly. That would be a Category C offense. Abusing the power of one's office to embezzle and pocket public funds is an even worse form of corruption. That would be a Category A offense. The vast majority of offenses are Category D offenses. These the prosecution chose to overlook from the very outset. It either chose not to prosecute, or dropped the cases midstream. The prosecution does have a "different cases, different attitudes" policy.
The dispute between the three elders from academia and the Ministry of Justice is merely over the wording of "Neither prosecute the innocent, nor abet the guilty." Each side has its own job description. Each side has its own perspective. The three elders from academia may stress "not prosecuting the innocent." The Ministry of Justice may stress "not abetting the guilty." Each side has its own take on the matter. This is hardly surprising.
But the controversy involves an unshakeable core principle. Under existing laws, a public university professor is a civil servant. If he pockets public funds, he can be prosecuted for corruption. That is why the three elders from academia agree that offending public university professors would fall under Category A offenders. They "should unquestionably be handed over to the authorities for prosecution according to the letter of the law. They must not be treated leniently." This is what the Ministry of Justice refers to as "no room for ambiguity." Both parties agree about the core principle. Therefore the controversy over right and wrong is already half-solved.
What concerns the public is that the prosecution may have difficulty successfully prosecuting Category B and Category D offenses as embezzlement because they involve a grey area. The three elders from academia may have difficulty interceding on behalf of those accused of Category A and Category C offenses. .
Many individuals have been indicted for these offenses. But each case is an individual case. These are not indictments of educators, academicians, and professors, per se.
Prosecuting illegal activities has nothing to with the educators as such. Nor is it right to associate Category A suspects with "distinguished researchers." After all, even a distinguished president was involved in corruption. He was prosecuted according to the law. How can professors be exempt?
There already appears to be a consensus. At first academicians said the offenses were Category B and Category D offenses. But later on they said they were Category A offenses involving embezzlement. Some even said they were Category C offenses involving collusion. One reason for this guilt by association, is that suspects often get away scot free due to dumb luck. Another reason is a systemic lack of accountability. The prosecution is merely restoring long term accountability to the system. This could be seen as a belated attempt to restore accountability to academia as a whole.
The three elders from academia have addressed Category B and Category D offenses. They do not want the public thinking they are condoning Category A and Category C offenses. By contrast, if the prosecution cites Category B and Category D offenses when prosecuting corruption, it will generate chaos. It will undermine its credibility. Therefore the three elders from academia, the prosecution, and the public, must reach a clear consensus, namely, "different cases, different attitudes."
We believe the differences between the four types of offenses must be made clear. This will not "undermine morale in academia." It will clear the air. It will exonerate academicians. It will enhance their dignity and honor.
毋枉毋縱：三長與法部的共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.08 02:52 am
十多名教授涉嫌不實報銷案，被檢方以貪汙等罪名起訴；國科會主委朱敬一、中研院院長翁啟惠及教育部長蔣偉寧為此聯名聲明，表達憂慮與呼籲。雙方看似針鋒相對，壁壘分明。
然而，迄至目前，我們卻看不出雙方有何根本差異。朱翁蔣三長亦主張法辦貪汙，但不可造成冤錯；法務部則稱已經區別輕重，網開一面，但貪汙仍應法辦。然而，如今形成的社會印象卻是：三長只知護短，檢方則濫訴無辜，這些恐皆未必是如今事態的真相與全貌。
三長的公開聲明，開宗明義即舉出「兩種類型」的比較，茲稱之為甲類型與乙類型。甲類型：「如果教授以假發票報領經費拿進口袋，或是用此經費購買與研究無關的私人物品（如名牌包、家用電冰箱等），我們認為絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸。」
乙類型：「但是，假如以假發票報帳購買另一項研究器材（例如用三個碳粉匣的發票實購一個電腦螢幕），也沒有一毛錢進私人口袋，那麼畢竟不是貪汙治罪條例所該適用的對象。」
準此，三長表示：「假發票案的類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同。」
其實，檢方在過濾相關案件時，似乎亦持同一立場：倘公款未入私囊，視情節輕重，或不起訴，或訴以偽造文書（乙類型）；另對類如買Ａ報Ｂ的情節，亦從輕處理；但若與廠商勾串以低價高報，而將「預放款」（回扣）留為私用者，即不寬貸（此可謂為丙類型）；至於利用職務詐取公款納入私囊就是貪汙，沒有模糊空間（甲類型）；另外，還有居絕對多數的「丁類型」，早經檢方過濾掉了，以不起訴或請回結案。倘若此即檢方的辦案準則，豈不也是「案件類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同」？
因此，就我們看來，三長及法部之間若有爭執，亦僅在「毋枉毋縱」四字而已。只是，各自站在職司不同的立場，三長可能較重「毋枉」，但法部可能較重「毋縱」。此皆人情事理之自然，不足為怪。
這場爭論，有一個不可移變的中心準則，即是在現行法律下，倘將公立大學教授視為公務職位，則其人若將公款納入私囊，即可能被以貪汙罪訴究；因此，三長也認為在公立大學教授的法律責任中，亦有「甲類型」存在，「絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸」。此或即是法務部所稱的「沒有模糊空間」。只要雙方皆站在這個中心準則上，這場辯論的核心是非已可解決大半。
國人關切的是：檢方不宜將灰色地帶的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，辦成貪汙罪；三長亦不宜為「甲類型」、「丙類型」說項。
接下來可以一談的是，此事雖牽涉人數不少，但畢竟仍屬個案，不宜將之與「教育界／學術界／教授界」的全稱命題相提並論；畢竟，糾辦不法，不能視為與全體「教育界」為難。再者，亦不宜將涉案者的案情（如果是甲類型），與其是否為「研究傑出卓越者」混為一談；畢竟，即使是「傑出卓越的總統」，若涉貪汙，亦當法辦，教授又豈能免責？
然而，若說事態發展迄今，已有「制度共業」的意味，亦非全無道理。一開始，校園漸漸出現了便宜行事的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，然後就慢慢演變出監守自盜的「甲類型」，甚至惡化成教商勾結的「丙類型」。此種「制度共業」的形成，一方面是因涉案者的僥倖心理，另一方面亦因問責規範的失能；因而，這次檢方的動作，其實只是還原了原本早已應當運行的問責體制，可視為挽救「校園共業」的一個遲到的契機。
如今，三長要為「乙類型」、「丁類型」發言，亦不願社會誤解其是在為「甲類型」或「丙類型」撐腰。相對而言，倘若檢方真將「乙類型」、「丁類型」辦了貪汙案，即是亂了分寸，自失立場。所以，三長及檢方，與全體國人，已可在本案找到一個明確的共識，那就是：「案件的類型不同，我們對案件的態度也不同。」
我們相信，若能把四種類型區別清楚，非但不會「重挫學術界士氣」，反更將激濁揚清，清新校園，提升學術界的尊嚴與榮譽。
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