TIFA: First Test for New Cabinet
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 6, 2013
Summary: The government's new fiscal policy cabinet is gradually taking shape. Everyone is looking forward to cooperation between the old and new cabinet members. They hope the cabinet can make a fresh start. Two major issues need to be addressed immediately. One. Talks are about to resume for the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Two. Cross-strait trade agreement negotiations are about to become a touchstone for the new cabinet. A cross-strait agreement is nearing completion. TIFA is about to begin. These are real tests for the new cabinet.
Full text below:
The government's new fiscal policy cabinet is gradually taking shape. Everyone is looking forward to cooperation between the old and new cabinet members. They hope the cabinet can make a fresh start. Two major issues need to be addressed immediately. One. Talks are about to resume for the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Two. Cross-strait trade agreement negotiations are about to become a touchstone for the new cabinet. A cross-strait agreement is nearing completion. TIFA is about to begin. These are real tests for the new cabinet.
TIFA is a platform for Taipei and Washington to deal with bilateral economic and trade issues. Taipei and Washington may have other channels of communication for individual issues. But TIFA is the only high level, formal, consultative mechanism between Taipei and Washington that encompasses all ministries. It is a means by which we can join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Therefore we must succeed. Failure is not an option.
TIFA is still a long way from becoming a free trade agreement (FTA). But it can serve as a starting point for a Taipei-Washington FTA and TPP. TIFA has two main functions. One. It enables negotiations over individual issues such as insurance agreements, inspection standards, and e-commerce cooperation. It strengthens bilateral economic and trade relations. It lays a cornerstone for a future FTA. Two. It gradually eliminates economic and trade barriers between Taipei and Washington. It helps us gains future TPP membership.
But the relationship between Taipei and Washington is asymmetrical. For us the goal of TIFA is a Taipei-Washington FTA. But for the U.S. a Taipei-Washington FTA is not its preferred solution. Therefore Washington focuses more on the elimination of trade barriers. Put simply, Washington gauges our determination to liberalize by how vigorously we eliminate trade barriers. This also determines whether TIFA can become the mechanism for normal dialogue.
Consider the nature of Taipei-Washington trade barriers. Some people look forward to further liberalization by both sides, based on commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Others seek the fulfillment of WTO obligations. To the former, Taipei must voluntarily engage in self-examination and implement reform. Otherwise, the failure to do so will become an obstacle to a future Taipei-Washington FTA or TPP. To the latter, Taipei must fulfill its obligations. Therefore Washington considers its demands entirely righteous. Failure to fulfill these obligations will be the main source of pressure. These matters issues cannot be delayed until negotiations over an FTA or TPP. They must be to resolved in advance. Only then will we be in a sound negotiating position. Only then can we hope to gain future TPP membership.
The trade barrier Washington is most concerned about is for clenbuterol or ractopamine treated U.S. pork. This is the most controversial issue. It is likely to be the most difficult issue during renewed TIFA talks. Under WTO rules, the maximum amount of ractopamine residues allowed in meat products should be based on international standards. If the importing country has different eating habits, or wishes to set more stringent standards, it must cite scientific evidence.
The U.S. beef imports controversy early last year was actually an advance skirmish in the battle over US pork imports. In the U.S. beef imports case, the government eventually cited scientific arguments and the residue limits specified by the United Nations Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex). It established open standards. But the Codex international standards also apply to pork, chicken, duck, and other poultry products. Therefore past claims that ractopamine is safe also apply to pork. Never mind that we have already accepted international standards for beef. If we want pork treated differently we must summon up even more scientific evidence.
Domestic beef production accounts for only 7% of domestic beef consumption. The market is also segmented. Domestic beef is mostly isothermal. Therefore opening up the market to U.S. beef is unlikely to impact the domestic beef industry. Even then, it generated enormous controversy. Pork is the public's most important meat product. Domestic pork production meets 94% of all domestic pork demand. US pork, especially organ meats and pigs feet, are priced much lower than domestic pork. The impact from increased US pork imports would vastly exceed the impact from US beef imports. A backlash is predictable. Moreover the government has already committed to treating beef and pork differently. It cannot take back what it said. This makes a solution even more difficult.
Three responses are needed. One. TIFA is a "framework agreement." We hope ractopamine is not on the early harvest list. First build the framework. Then deal with this issue later. That would be best for both sides. Two. Our eating habits differ from people in the West. Ractopamine treated U.S. beef has been allowed in. But restaurants all over display "We serve only Australian or New Zealand beef" signs. This can be cited during negotiations with Washington. Three. US pork can in fact be imported. It is merely that they must not contain ractopamine. Therefore there is still room for negotiation. Washington need not make a fuss over this issue.
But most importantly, we must improve the quality of domestic pork and of its marketing. A Taipei-Washington FTA or TPP means a more open environment. We may enjoy a temporary buffer period. But eventually US pork will have to be allowed in. Therefore we must strengthen our competitiveness. That is the only way for long-term development of the pork industry. Ultimately we will have to solve the problem with a "We use only domestic pork" approach.
TIFA是新內閣的第一個考驗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.06
政府新經濟團隊陸續到位，各界也期盼能在老幹新枝搭配下，能開創出新的局面。不過眼前立即要解決的，有兩件大事，一是即將復談的台美貿易暨投資架構協定（ＴＩＦＡ），一是兩岸服務貿易協議協商，這將成為新內閣的第一個試金石。其中兩岸協議即將完成，但ＴＩＦＡ卻才要開始，是真正的考驗所在。
ＴＩＦＡ是台美處理、解決雙邊經貿議題的平台，目前台美之間雖還有其他個別議題的溝通管道，但是ＴＩＦＡ將是台美之間唯一的高層級、跨部會的正式協商機制，同時也是我國爭取美國支持加入「跨太平洋夥伴協定」（ＴＰＰ）的重要途徑，因此有只許成功，不許失敗的壓力。
ＴＩＦＡ的層次距離自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）雖還很遠，但其之所以能作為台美ＦＴＡ及ＴＰＰ的起點，主要有兩個功能：首先，在於藉此啟動如投保協定、檢驗標準調和及電子商務合作等個別議題談判，強化雙方經貿關係，堆砌未來ＦＴＡ的基石；其次，在於逐步解決當前台美雙方關切的經貿障礙，以取得加入ＴＰＰ的入場券。
然而，台美的情勢卻不對等。對於我國而言，ＴＩＦＡ的目標在於推動台美ＦＴＡ。但對於美方而言，台美ＦＴＡ並非優先選項，因此將更注重貿易障礙的消除。所以簡單的說，我國消除障礙的程度及力道，正是美方評估、檢驗我國自由化決心的考題，更是ＴＩＦＡ能否回復成為常態性對話機制的關鍵。
按照台美貿易障礙的性質，有些是期待雙方能在世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）承諾的基礎上，進一步自由化的項目，有些則是屬於落實ＷＴＯ義務的議題。對於前者，除非我國自願在現階段檢討改革，否則將會是未來啟動台美ＦＴＡ或ＴＰＰ後的談判議題，彈性較大。但對於後者，因涉及既定義務的滿足，美方要求起來自認為理直氣壯，也會是主要的壓力來源。也由於這些問題無法拖到未來加入ＦＴＡ或ＴＰＰ後再談，必須先予以化解後，方可能創造取得談判資格的條件，才會被稱為ＴＰＰ的入場券。
在美方所關切的「入場券」型的貿易障礙中，大概以開放含有瘦肉精的美國豬肉進口最具爭議性，也很可能是ＴＩＦＡ復談後最困難的一題。在ＷＴＯ的規範下，肉類產品中的瘦肉精（萊克多巴胺）的最高殘留值，原則上應該依據國際標準，但若是進口國因飲食習慣等原因，要訂出比國際標準更嚴格的限制，則必須建立在充分的科學證據上。
去年初引發爭議的美牛事件，其實是美豬的前哨戰。在美牛一案中，政府最後依據學界論證及聯合國食品法典委員會（Codex）所訂的殘留值，訂出開放標準。然而Codex的國際標準，實際上也包含了豬肉及雞、鴨等家禽，所以過去許多萊克多巴胺安全無虞的論述，也一樣適用在豬肉上。更何況已經接受牛肉的國際標準後，未來要對豬肉差別待遇，所需要的科學證據就要更充分。
國產牛的產量僅佔國人消費的七％，而且市場區隔明顯（國產牛多屬溫體供應），因此開放美牛並不至於影響國內養殖業。但即便如此，還是引起很大的爭議。豬肉是國人最主要肉類產品，國產豬的產量可滿足九十％的需求；美豬（特別是內臟及豬腳）價格遠低於國產，一旦擴大進口，影響不是美牛可以比擬，激烈反彈已可預見。何況在政府「牛豬分離」的政策下，話已說死，都增加解題的難度。
因應之道有三：一、ＴＩＦＡ既是「架構協定」，希望萊劑豬肉不列「早收清單」；先將「架構」搭起，延後處理此一議題，這對雙方應皆是上策。二、國人飲食習慣異於西方，萊劑美牛雖開放，但滿街皆見「本店使用澳紐牛肉」的告示，或可據此向美國力爭。三、美豬其實原本即可進口，只是不得含有萊劑，因此還有用其他開放議題以交換美方不再拿此做文章的空間。
當然，最重要的，還是要提升國產豬的品質及行銷，因為未來台美ＦＴＡ或ＴＰＰ皆將朝向更加開放的境界邁進，即使暫時有緩衝期，豬肉的門禁恐怕最終還是必須打開，因此強化競爭力，才是養豬產業長期發展的不二法門，最終或許仍須以「本店使用本土豬肉」的告示來解決問題。
Tuesday, February 5, 2013
Monday, February 4, 2013
Can an Unconventional Cabinet Rejuvenate Taiwan?
Can an Unconventional Cabinet Rejuvenate Taiwan?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2013
Summary: The Chiang-Mao Cabinet has more or less been sorted out. Attention has been focused mainly on the reorganization of ministries charged with fiscal policy. Shih Yen-hsiang and Yin Chi-ming have been made national policy advisors. Their places are being filled by Chang Chia-chu and Kuan Chung-ming. Can such a cabinet restore ROC economic prosperity? That depends on whether the cabinet leaders and managers can work efficiently hand in hand.
Full text below:
The Chiang-Mao Cabinet has more or less been sorted out. Attention has been focused mainly on the reorganization of ministries charged with fiscal policy. Shih Yen-hsiang and Yin Chi-ming have been made national policy advisors. Their places are being filled by Chang Chia-chu and Kuan Chung-ming. Can such a cabinet restore ROC economic prosperity? That depends on whether the cabinet leaders and managers can work efficiently hand in hand.
The current cabinet reshuffle was unconventional. Incoming Premier Chiang Yi-hua made the transition from ordinary academic to minister in four short years, then jumped to cabinet chief. Many people are unfamiliar with him. Even Blue camp comrades are still sizing him up. Meanwhile, Green camp opponents are wary. They are not treating the matter lightly. This point is worth pondering. Many officials responsible for the transportation system have assumed positions of authority during the recent reshuffle. Mao Chi-kuo, Chang Chia-chu, Ye Kuang-shi and others have hopped onto the cabinet locomotive. At the same time, fiscal policy oriented personnel have retreated. This too, was unconventional.
The ROC economy faces a difficult transition. Yet the cabinet reshuffle has put personnel without fiscal policy experience in positions of authority. Was this because talent was hard to find? Or was it because those in power consider non-economic factors the problem, and are attempting to solve the problem in a different way? This is puzzling. In any event, this unconventional cabinet has broken the old pattern. Can the government break with the past and form a new cabinet the public can looks forward to? That depends on how serious Chiang Yi-hua and his team are about this experiment in reshuffling. That depends on whether they do everything in their power to achieve their goals.
Last year at about this time, Sean Chen was ordered to form a cabinet. The public had high hopes for his fiscal policy oriented cabinet. But the ROC economy has remained at its nadir all year. The economic growth rate has been revised downwards nine times. The Free Trade Zone Pilot Program has remained stalled. Obstacles continue to block industrial transformation. Sean Chen himself made little progress on reform for U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, pensions, and state-owned enterprises. Admittedly complex political factors are involved, for which he should nto be blamed. But the ineptitude of the CEPD has also disillusioned people about the fiscal policy oriented cabinet. This is one of the most important factors leading to the current cabinet reshuffle.
From this perspective, it matters little who is or is not in the cabinet. It matters little who offered advice behind the scenes. The Chiang-Mao cabinet's most important task is to boost public confidence and change the public mood. It matters little whether this cabinet is considered a fiscal policy oriented cabinet. That is unimportant. What is important is whether it can overcome the current atmosphere of fiscal impotence. The cabinet lacks shining fiscal policy stars. The cabinet must rely on Chiang Yi-hua's leadership, on Mao Chi-kuo's management skills, on Chang Chia-chu's comprehensive governance, and on Kuan Chung-min's reason and enthusiasm. They can inspire each other. They can consult individuals and businesses, in search of answers. Only then can they achieve their goals.
In recent years, when people talk about fiscal policy oriented officials, they invariably voice nostalgia for Sun Yun-suan, Li Kuo-ting, Chao Yao-tung and other pioneering geniuses. But officials of such vision are not easy to find today, Today's political and economic environment is riddled with social divisions. Even if pioneers with their vision were to appear, it might be impossible to persuade people to trust them. Furthermore, Li Kuo-ting and others were able to lay such a solid foundation for Taiwan, not because they possessed any particular expertise in fiscal policy, but because they had an extraordinary sense of mission. They had the ability of engineers to analyze and solve problems. As a result they constantly pursued excellence. They constantly worked to realize their vision, and they constantly endeavored to surpass themselves.
When Sun Yun-suan was ordered to form a cabinet, or Li Kuo-ting was invited to join a cabinet. their first thought was not "I've been promoted!" It was "How can I possibly fulfill this impossible mission I have been entrusted with?" Only this provided them with the impetus necessary to bring these grand plans for the nation to fruition, despite their limited authority. Chen Shui-bian was in office eight years. Ma Ying-jeou has been in office five-years. During this 13 year period, the ROC had 11 different premiers and hundreds of different cabinet members. They include ministers who served only 48 days before leaving office in a panic. They include ministers who cared more about their own image than contributing to the cabinet, and therefore hastily resigned. Today the cabinet is being reshuffled. We need not anticipate the arrival of any Superman. But we hope all cabinet members will be serious about their mission. Is that too much to expect?
The Taiwan stock market gave the Sean Chen cabinet an enthusiastic welcome. But the cabinet was a flash in the pan, and the market steadily declined. This time, Chiang Yi-hua has been ordered to form a cabinet. The market rose a mere five points. Public support was also cooler. This shows that observers are capable of evaluating the new cabinet without jumping to conclusions, based merely on outside appearance. Chiang Yi-hua has never undergone any major battles. He must show that he is capable of assuming the heavy burden of premier. He must keep his eyes and ears open, and think clearly. That is more important than constantly trying to read the president's mind.
The new cabinet is hardly scintillating. Can it exceed public expectations? That will depend on team spirit, cooperation, effort, as well as cabinet members's attitude towards their own work.
「非典」內閣能否再造台灣榮景
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.05 04:13 am
「江毛內閣」大致底定。最受矚目的財經部會改組，施顏祥和尹啟銘轉任國策顧問，遺缺分由張家祝、管中閔接掌。此一組合能否擔負再造台灣經濟榮景的重任，關鍵繫於內閣團隊的領導及管理是否有效整合。
這次內閣改組最大的特色，就是「非典型」。新揆江宜樺短短四年多從一介學者搖身成為部長，再躍升為閣揆；不僅許多民眾對他仍極感陌生，藍軍同志對他也仍在估量。相形之下，綠營對手則對他保持戒懼，絲毫不敢輕忽，這點值得玩味。此外，交通體系官員多人在這波出線，包括毛治國、張家祝、葉匡時等人進入內閣火車頭；與此同時，財經體系人馬卻呈現消退，這也是非典型布局。
正當台灣經濟面臨轉型困局，內閣改組卻反而是非財經背景人馬當道，這究竟是人才難覓？或是主政者看到財經困局裡的非經濟因素而試圖以不同手法突圍？讓人好奇。無論如何，這個非典型內閣具有突破舊格局的本質，而最後能否「由破而立」建立民眾期待的新局，則要看江宜樺和他的新團隊有多認真看待這場改組實驗，並竭盡所能去完成自己的目標。
去年此時，陳?受命組閣，他所領軍的「財經內閣」曾被民眾寄予厚望。然而，整整一年台灣經濟都始終在谷底掙扎，經濟成長率九度下修，自由經濟示範區的推動緩步不前，產業轉型的障礙依舊如故。而陳?本人，則在美牛開放、證所稅、年金及國營事業改革等議題的夾攻下，難有施展。其中，固有許多「非戰之罪」的複雜政治因素，但經建部門的表現無力，也使人們對「財經內閣」失去了幻想。這正是這波內閣改組最主要的因素。
從這個角度看，無論內閣是誰進誰出，或何人在幕後操刀獻計，江毛內閣最重要的任務，就是提振台灣的信心和氣象。這個內閣有無「財經內閣」之名，其實已不重要；重要的是，要能設法突破目前財經的沉悶與無力。那麼，在缺乏亮眼財經明星的情況下，內閣團隊唯有靠江宜樺擅長的提綱挈領、毛治國的管理長才、張家祝的綜合治理、加上管中閔的理性和熱情，彼此激盪砥礪，並不時勤訪民間及企業尋求良策，方有可能達成目標。
這些年，人們談到財經官員，無不對孫運璿、李國鼎、趙耀東等人開創的不凡時代緬懷不已。但不可諱言，如此視野宏大的官員已不易見，而以今天的政經環境和社會的撕裂，就算出現真知灼見的先行者，或也未必能得到人們一致信服。進一步說，李國鼎等人之所以能為台灣奠立如此堅實的根基，原因並非他們具有特殊的財經專長，而在他們具有非凡的使命感，具有工程師般窮究問題、解決問題的訓練，因此能夠不斷地追求、瞻望、實踐與超越。
當年孫運璿受命組閣或李國鼎應邀入閣時，他們心中想的，絕對不是自己「升官」的喜悅，而是應如何完成使命始能不負所託的惶恐。唯有那樣，才有足夠的動力，推促他們完成超乎自身權位應許的國家大計。從陳水扁的八年到馬英九的五年，台灣十三年間換過十一位閣揆，異動過上百名閣員，其中有任期四十八天即倉皇求去的部長，有愛惜羽毛重於團隊表現而草率掛冠的部長。今天的改組，我們不必說渴望什麼「超人」降臨，但期待所有閣員嚴肅看待自己的使命，應不算奢望吧？
陳?組閣時，台股給了他熱烈的慶祝行情，但曇花一現後即一路走跌。這次，江宜樺受命組閣，股市僅小漲五點淡定以對，民調支持也是偏冷。這樣的對照，說明外界對新閣的表現可以再作觀察，不必從外觀急於遽下結論。唯對未曾經歷重大戰役的江宜樺而言，要證明自己擔得起這個閣揆的重任，保持耳目的開放及思維的清晰，絕對比不斷去猜測總統的心思重要。
新內閣的布局並未令人驚艷，能否拿出超乎人們預期的成績，端視這個團隊有沒有合作及奮進精神，以及閣員用什麼態度看待自己的工作。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2013
Summary: The Chiang-Mao Cabinet has more or less been sorted out. Attention has been focused mainly on the reorganization of ministries charged with fiscal policy. Shih Yen-hsiang and Yin Chi-ming have been made national policy advisors. Their places are being filled by Chang Chia-chu and Kuan Chung-ming. Can such a cabinet restore ROC economic prosperity? That depends on whether the cabinet leaders and managers can work efficiently hand in hand.
Full text below:
The Chiang-Mao Cabinet has more or less been sorted out. Attention has been focused mainly on the reorganization of ministries charged with fiscal policy. Shih Yen-hsiang and Yin Chi-ming have been made national policy advisors. Their places are being filled by Chang Chia-chu and Kuan Chung-ming. Can such a cabinet restore ROC economic prosperity? That depends on whether the cabinet leaders and managers can work efficiently hand in hand.
The current cabinet reshuffle was unconventional. Incoming Premier Chiang Yi-hua made the transition from ordinary academic to minister in four short years, then jumped to cabinet chief. Many people are unfamiliar with him. Even Blue camp comrades are still sizing him up. Meanwhile, Green camp opponents are wary. They are not treating the matter lightly. This point is worth pondering. Many officials responsible for the transportation system have assumed positions of authority during the recent reshuffle. Mao Chi-kuo, Chang Chia-chu, Ye Kuang-shi and others have hopped onto the cabinet locomotive. At the same time, fiscal policy oriented personnel have retreated. This too, was unconventional.
The ROC economy faces a difficult transition. Yet the cabinet reshuffle has put personnel without fiscal policy experience in positions of authority. Was this because talent was hard to find? Or was it because those in power consider non-economic factors the problem, and are attempting to solve the problem in a different way? This is puzzling. In any event, this unconventional cabinet has broken the old pattern. Can the government break with the past and form a new cabinet the public can looks forward to? That depends on how serious Chiang Yi-hua and his team are about this experiment in reshuffling. That depends on whether they do everything in their power to achieve their goals.
Last year at about this time, Sean Chen was ordered to form a cabinet. The public had high hopes for his fiscal policy oriented cabinet. But the ROC economy has remained at its nadir all year. The economic growth rate has been revised downwards nine times. The Free Trade Zone Pilot Program has remained stalled. Obstacles continue to block industrial transformation. Sean Chen himself made little progress on reform for U.S. beef imports, capital gains taxes, pensions, and state-owned enterprises. Admittedly complex political factors are involved, for which he should nto be blamed. But the ineptitude of the CEPD has also disillusioned people about the fiscal policy oriented cabinet. This is one of the most important factors leading to the current cabinet reshuffle.
From this perspective, it matters little who is or is not in the cabinet. It matters little who offered advice behind the scenes. The Chiang-Mao cabinet's most important task is to boost public confidence and change the public mood. It matters little whether this cabinet is considered a fiscal policy oriented cabinet. That is unimportant. What is important is whether it can overcome the current atmosphere of fiscal impotence. The cabinet lacks shining fiscal policy stars. The cabinet must rely on Chiang Yi-hua's leadership, on Mao Chi-kuo's management skills, on Chang Chia-chu's comprehensive governance, and on Kuan Chung-min's reason and enthusiasm. They can inspire each other. They can consult individuals and businesses, in search of answers. Only then can they achieve their goals.
In recent years, when people talk about fiscal policy oriented officials, they invariably voice nostalgia for Sun Yun-suan, Li Kuo-ting, Chao Yao-tung and other pioneering geniuses. But officials of such vision are not easy to find today, Today's political and economic environment is riddled with social divisions. Even if pioneers with their vision were to appear, it might be impossible to persuade people to trust them. Furthermore, Li Kuo-ting and others were able to lay such a solid foundation for Taiwan, not because they possessed any particular expertise in fiscal policy, but because they had an extraordinary sense of mission. They had the ability of engineers to analyze and solve problems. As a result they constantly pursued excellence. They constantly worked to realize their vision, and they constantly endeavored to surpass themselves.
When Sun Yun-suan was ordered to form a cabinet, or Li Kuo-ting was invited to join a cabinet. their first thought was not "I've been promoted!" It was "How can I possibly fulfill this impossible mission I have been entrusted with?" Only this provided them with the impetus necessary to bring these grand plans for the nation to fruition, despite their limited authority. Chen Shui-bian was in office eight years. Ma Ying-jeou has been in office five-years. During this 13 year period, the ROC had 11 different premiers and hundreds of different cabinet members. They include ministers who served only 48 days before leaving office in a panic. They include ministers who cared more about their own image than contributing to the cabinet, and therefore hastily resigned. Today the cabinet is being reshuffled. We need not anticipate the arrival of any Superman. But we hope all cabinet members will be serious about their mission. Is that too much to expect?
The Taiwan stock market gave the Sean Chen cabinet an enthusiastic welcome. But the cabinet was a flash in the pan, and the market steadily declined. This time, Chiang Yi-hua has been ordered to form a cabinet. The market rose a mere five points. Public support was also cooler. This shows that observers are capable of evaluating the new cabinet without jumping to conclusions, based merely on outside appearance. Chiang Yi-hua has never undergone any major battles. He must show that he is capable of assuming the heavy burden of premier. He must keep his eyes and ears open, and think clearly. That is more important than constantly trying to read the president's mind.
The new cabinet is hardly scintillating. Can it exceed public expectations? That will depend on team spirit, cooperation, effort, as well as cabinet members's attitude towards their own work.
「非典」內閣能否再造台灣榮景
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.05 04:13 am
「江毛內閣」大致底定。最受矚目的財經部會改組，施顏祥和尹啟銘轉任國策顧問，遺缺分由張家祝、管中閔接掌。此一組合能否擔負再造台灣經濟榮景的重任，關鍵繫於內閣團隊的領導及管理是否有效整合。
這次內閣改組最大的特色，就是「非典型」。新揆江宜樺短短四年多從一介學者搖身成為部長，再躍升為閣揆；不僅許多民眾對他仍極感陌生，藍軍同志對他也仍在估量。相形之下，綠營對手則對他保持戒懼，絲毫不敢輕忽，這點值得玩味。此外，交通體系官員多人在這波出線，包括毛治國、張家祝、葉匡時等人進入內閣火車頭；與此同時，財經體系人馬卻呈現消退，這也是非典型布局。
正當台灣經濟面臨轉型困局，內閣改組卻反而是非財經背景人馬當道，這究竟是人才難覓？或是主政者看到財經困局裡的非經濟因素而試圖以不同手法突圍？讓人好奇。無論如何，這個非典型內閣具有突破舊格局的本質，而最後能否「由破而立」建立民眾期待的新局，則要看江宜樺和他的新團隊有多認真看待這場改組實驗，並竭盡所能去完成自己的目標。
去年此時，陳?受命組閣，他所領軍的「財經內閣」曾被民眾寄予厚望。然而，整整一年台灣經濟都始終在谷底掙扎，經濟成長率九度下修，自由經濟示範區的推動緩步不前，產業轉型的障礙依舊如故。而陳?本人，則在美牛開放、證所稅、年金及國營事業改革等議題的夾攻下，難有施展。其中，固有許多「非戰之罪」的複雜政治因素，但經建部門的表現無力，也使人們對「財經內閣」失去了幻想。這正是這波內閣改組最主要的因素。
從這個角度看，無論內閣是誰進誰出，或何人在幕後操刀獻計，江毛內閣最重要的任務，就是提振台灣的信心和氣象。這個內閣有無「財經內閣」之名，其實已不重要；重要的是，要能設法突破目前財經的沉悶與無力。那麼，在缺乏亮眼財經明星的情況下，內閣團隊唯有靠江宜樺擅長的提綱挈領、毛治國的管理長才、張家祝的綜合治理、加上管中閔的理性和熱情，彼此激盪砥礪，並不時勤訪民間及企業尋求良策，方有可能達成目標。
這些年，人們談到財經官員，無不對孫運璿、李國鼎、趙耀東等人開創的不凡時代緬懷不已。但不可諱言，如此視野宏大的官員已不易見，而以今天的政經環境和社會的撕裂，就算出現真知灼見的先行者，或也未必能得到人們一致信服。進一步說，李國鼎等人之所以能為台灣奠立如此堅實的根基，原因並非他們具有特殊的財經專長，而在他們具有非凡的使命感，具有工程師般窮究問題、解決問題的訓練，因此能夠不斷地追求、瞻望、實踐與超越。
當年孫運璿受命組閣或李國鼎應邀入閣時，他們心中想的，絕對不是自己「升官」的喜悅，而是應如何完成使命始能不負所託的惶恐。唯有那樣，才有足夠的動力，推促他們完成超乎自身權位應許的國家大計。從陳水扁的八年到馬英九的五年，台灣十三年間換過十一位閣揆，異動過上百名閣員，其中有任期四十八天即倉皇求去的部長，有愛惜羽毛重於團隊表現而草率掛冠的部長。今天的改組，我們不必說渴望什麼「超人」降臨，但期待所有閣員嚴肅看待自己的使命，應不算奢望吧？
陳?組閣時，台股給了他熱烈的慶祝行情，但曇花一現後即一路走跌。這次，江宜樺受命組閣，股市僅小漲五點淡定以對，民調支持也是偏冷。這樣的對照，說明外界對新閣的表現可以再作觀察，不必從外觀急於遽下結論。唯對未曾經歷重大戰役的江宜樺而言，要證明自己擔得起這個閣揆的重任，保持耳目的開放及思維的清晰，絕對比不斷去猜測總統的心思重要。
新內閣的布局並未令人驚艷，能否拿出超乎人們預期的成績，端視這個團隊有沒有合作及奮進精神，以及閣員用什麼態度看待自己的工作。
Sunday, February 3, 2013
Beyond the Chinese Civil War: Cross-Strait Model for Human Civilization
Beyond the Chinese Civil War:
Cross-Strait Model for Human Civilization
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2013
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have long ago transcended the framework of the KMT vs. CCP Chinese Civil War. Instead, they have become significant events in the history of human civilization, with a palpable moral dimension. Needless to say, they are even more significant for the history of China.
Full text below:
Cross-Strait relations have long ago transcended the framework of the KMT vs. CCP Chinese Civil War. Instead, they have become significant events in the history of human civilization, with a palpable moral dimension. Needless to say, they are even more significant for the history of China.
The Chinese Civil War was a war between two armed political entities. It was a dog eat dog, life-and-death struggle. But the Republic of China has created the first liberal democracy in five thousand years of Chinese history. Should it really be eaten? Also, the People's Republic of China has become a rising power. It must bear the great responsibility that comes with great power. It must not adopt a dog eat dog approach to cross-Strait issues. This has a bearing on more than just the Chinese Civil War. It has a bearing on human history. It is a significant event in the history of Chinese civilization, with a significant moral dimension.
Cross-strait relations have evolved. People the world over have no desire to witness a dog eat dog scenario. Nor are the Chinese people eager to add another dog eat dog chapter to China's history. Consider the matter from the perspective of global civilization and Chinese history. The ultimate solution for cross-strait relations ought to be something worthy of human civilization and China's glorious history. It should not be a tragedy that leaves a black mark on global civilization and Chinese history.
In June 1983, Deng Xiaoping said "Reunification is not about me swallowing up you. Nor is it about you swallowing up me." His words divided 64 years of cross-Strait relations into three stages.
Stage One. During the three decades prior to 1983, the two sides found themselves mired within the framework of the Cold War. The two sides experienced great trouble managing their internal affairs. This was the era of "Liberate Taiwan!" vs. "Reconquer the Mainland!" This was a dog eat dog deadlock.
Stage Two. During the three decades following 1983, the sides established an atmosphere that enabled peaceful development. Deng Xiaoping articulated his "I don't swallow you, and you don't swallow me" thesis, and his "peaceful reunification, one country, two systems" thesis. In 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and enabled cross-Strait visits. In 2005, Lien Chan and Hu Jintao held their historic summit. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election.
Today, in 2013, the two sides are entering Stage Three. In November 2012, Hu Jintao issued the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress Report on Taiwan. Hu wrote "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless both part of one China." He wrote, "we must seek to establish political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, making fair and reasonable arrangements." This stage is characterized by a shift in the focus of cross-strait policy. It has shifted from a yearning for far off reunification, to a search for political relations under yet to be reunified conditions.
Stage Three attempts to resolve the quandary posed by Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping said "Reunification is not about me swallowing you. Nor is it about you swallowing me." But doesn't "one country, two systems" imply the "Hong Kong model?" What is that, if not "swallowing me?" Therefore, how does establish a framework in which "I do not swallow you, and you do not swallow me?"
If one wishes to establish a framework for Stage Three, that framework must be based on a "big roof concept of China." Under the big roof, the Republic of China is "democratic China." The People's Republic of China is "socialist China." Both are part of one China. Both belong under one big roof. They are both part of a one China in which sovereignty is shared. Political relations under conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, ensures that "I did not swallow you, and you do not swallow me." The goal of cross-strait relations is long-term mutual adaptation, leading to the creation of a model befitting global civilization and China's glorious history, one that could proudly considered a "Renaissance for the Chinese people."
Today's Republic of China is "democratic China." This is the primary reason the Republic of China must not be swallowed up. The Republic of China is a "Republic" of "China." It is a moral legacy of Chinese civilization. It is no longer merely the civil war political opponent of the Communist Chinese Party. Cross-strait relations are no longer about the Chinese civil war. They are about man's history and Chinese civilization.
The People's Republic of China is politically and economically powerful. But even according to social democratic legal standards, the Beijing regime has yet to meet the expectations of human civilization and Chinese history. Consider the recent "Southern Weekend" and "Yan Huang Chun Qiu" incidents. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China has yet to live up to its commitments.
Therefore, only under the big roof concept of China, can the Republic of China expect greater freedom and democracy in the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China should be content, provided the Republic of China is under the big roof concept of China. This would affirm its respect for human civilization and responsibility to Chinese history.
If, on the other hand, one side swallows up the other, that would surely leave a black mark in the history of human civilization and Chinese history.
History has moved on. The two sides have moved beyond the dog eat dog framework of the Chinese Civil War. The big roof concept of China offers a reasonable process by which to advance the two sides' political and economic platform, to set an example for world civilization, and to author a glorious chapter in China's history.
超越國共內戰，兩岸共創人類文明典範
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.03
現在的兩岸關係，已經遠遠不只是「國共內戰」的架構；而是一個人類歷史上非常重大的文明事件與道德課題，當然更是中國歷史上重大無比的文明事件與道德課題。
「國共內戰」是兩個武裝力量之間的政權之戰，那是一個「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的你死我活的鬥爭。但當中華民國已然實現了中國五千年來首見的自由民主體制，它應不應當被「吃掉」？又當中華人民共和國已然成為崛起的大國與強國，它具備了包容與涵納的能力與責任，則能不能用「誰吃掉誰」的方式來處理兩岸問題？這些，皆不能僅僅視為「國共內戰」的課題，而是人類史上，尤其是中國史上非常重大的文明事件與道德課題。
兩岸關係發展至今日境地，世界文明必不願見其發展為「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的一頁；中國歷史必也不忍再添「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的一章。站在世界文明和中國歷史的高度看，未來兩岸關係的終極解決方案，應當是共創人類文明的典範與中國歷史的光榮，而萬萬不可造成人類文明的恥辱與中國歷史的悲劇。
一九八三年六月，鄧小平說：「統一不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我。」這一句話，將六十四年來的兩岸關係，劃出了三個階段。
第一階段，在一九八三年以前的三十年，大體上說，兩岸陷於冷戰的框架裡，且各自的內政治理皆在十分艱難的境況中；那是一個「解放台灣vs.反攻大陸」的時代，也就是僵持在「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的階段。
第二階段，自一九八三年以後的三十年，仍是大體而言，起自鄧小平「不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我」的「和平統一／一國兩制」，至一九八七年蔣經國的「解嚴／交流」，再至二○○五年「連胡會」到二○○八年的馬英九勝選，兩岸逐漸營造出「和平發展」的機遇和氛圍。
如今，到了二○一三年前後，兩岸儼然進入了第三階段。二○一二年十一月，胡錦濤在中共十八大總結對台工作報告指出，「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」、「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」；此一階段的特徵，是將兩岸政策的關注焦點，從遙遠難期的「統一」，轉移至「探討尚未統一的政治關係」。
第三階段儼然是在嘗試回答鄧小平的問題。鄧小平說：「統一不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我。」但即使是「一國兩制」，若是指「香港模式」，仍豈不是「吃掉」？那麼，究竟怎樣始有可能「我不吃掉你，你不吃掉我」？
若欲搭建起這個「第三階段」的架構，那就必須奠基在「大屋頂中國」。在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬一個大屋頂中國，亦即同屬「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。而此種「尚未統一的政治關係」，正是要保證「不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我」，而是欲將兩岸關係的發展，經由長期的細緻磨合與精心營造，共同創造人類文明的典範與中國歷史的光榮，那始可言「中華民族的偉大復興」。
今日的中華民國是民主中國，這是中華民國不容被「吃掉」的主要理由；因為中華民國是「中華」的「民國」，亦即是「中華文明」的「道德資產」，而不再只是中共的「內戰政敵」而已；所以，兩岸關係已不是「國共內戰」那個層次的題目，而是人類歷史及中國歷史的重大文明課題。
何況，中華人民共和國的政經勢力已然崛起，但即使以「社會主義的民主法制」來衡量北京政權，它亦尚欠人類文明及中國歷史一個完整的履約踐諾；且看近日《南方周末》與《炎黃春秋》事件，問題在連《中華人民共和國憲法》亦未兌現。
因此，唯有在大屋頂中國下，中華民國可以等待中華人民共和國更加走向自由民主；而中華人民共和國則應包容涵納中華民國在大屋頂中國之下，以宣示其對人類文明的敬畏及對中國歷史的責任。
但是，如果是「誰吃掉誰」，那必將演成人類文明的恥辱與中國歷史的悲劇。
在歷史的巧妙推移下，兩岸已然超越了「我吃掉你，你吃掉我」的「國共內戰」架構，大屋頂中國將可提供「從合理的過程，到改善之目的」的政經平台，共創世界文明的典範，共譜中國歷史的光榮。
Cross-Strait Model for Human Civilization
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2013
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have long ago transcended the framework of the KMT vs. CCP Chinese Civil War. Instead, they have become significant events in the history of human civilization, with a palpable moral dimension. Needless to say, they are even more significant for the history of China.
Full text below:
Cross-Strait relations have long ago transcended the framework of the KMT vs. CCP Chinese Civil War. Instead, they have become significant events in the history of human civilization, with a palpable moral dimension. Needless to say, they are even more significant for the history of China.
The Chinese Civil War was a war between two armed political entities. It was a dog eat dog, life-and-death struggle. But the Republic of China has created the first liberal democracy in five thousand years of Chinese history. Should it really be eaten? Also, the People's Republic of China has become a rising power. It must bear the great responsibility that comes with great power. It must not adopt a dog eat dog approach to cross-Strait issues. This has a bearing on more than just the Chinese Civil War. It has a bearing on human history. It is a significant event in the history of Chinese civilization, with a significant moral dimension.
Cross-strait relations have evolved. People the world over have no desire to witness a dog eat dog scenario. Nor are the Chinese people eager to add another dog eat dog chapter to China's history. Consider the matter from the perspective of global civilization and Chinese history. The ultimate solution for cross-strait relations ought to be something worthy of human civilization and China's glorious history. It should not be a tragedy that leaves a black mark on global civilization and Chinese history.
In June 1983, Deng Xiaoping said "Reunification is not about me swallowing up you. Nor is it about you swallowing up me." His words divided 64 years of cross-Strait relations into three stages.
Stage One. During the three decades prior to 1983, the two sides found themselves mired within the framework of the Cold War. The two sides experienced great trouble managing their internal affairs. This was the era of "Liberate Taiwan!" vs. "Reconquer the Mainland!" This was a dog eat dog deadlock.
Stage Two. During the three decades following 1983, the sides established an atmosphere that enabled peaceful development. Deng Xiaoping articulated his "I don't swallow you, and you don't swallow me" thesis, and his "peaceful reunification, one country, two systems" thesis. In 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and enabled cross-Strait visits. In 2005, Lien Chan and Hu Jintao held their historic summit. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election.
Today, in 2013, the two sides are entering Stage Three. In November 2012, Hu Jintao issued the Chinese Communist Party's 18th National Congress Report on Taiwan. Hu wrote "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are nevertheless both part of one China." He wrote, "we must seek to establish political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, making fair and reasonable arrangements." This stage is characterized by a shift in the focus of cross-strait policy. It has shifted from a yearning for far off reunification, to a search for political relations under yet to be reunified conditions.
Stage Three attempts to resolve the quandary posed by Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping said "Reunification is not about me swallowing you. Nor is it about you swallowing me." But doesn't "one country, two systems" imply the "Hong Kong model?" What is that, if not "swallowing me?" Therefore, how does establish a framework in which "I do not swallow you, and you do not swallow me?"
If one wishes to establish a framework for Stage Three, that framework must be based on a "big roof concept of China." Under the big roof, the Republic of China is "democratic China." The People's Republic of China is "socialist China." Both are part of one China. Both belong under one big roof. They are both part of a one China in which sovereignty is shared. Political relations under conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified, ensures that "I did not swallow you, and you do not swallow me." The goal of cross-strait relations is long-term mutual adaptation, leading to the creation of a model befitting global civilization and China's glorious history, one that could proudly considered a "Renaissance for the Chinese people."
Today's Republic of China is "democratic China." This is the primary reason the Republic of China must not be swallowed up. The Republic of China is a "Republic" of "China." It is a moral legacy of Chinese civilization. It is no longer merely the civil war political opponent of the Communist Chinese Party. Cross-strait relations are no longer about the Chinese civil war. They are about man's history and Chinese civilization.
The People's Republic of China is politically and economically powerful. But even according to social democratic legal standards, the Beijing regime has yet to meet the expectations of human civilization and Chinese history. Consider the recent "Southern Weekend" and "Yan Huang Chun Qiu" incidents. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China has yet to live up to its commitments.
Therefore, only under the big roof concept of China, can the Republic of China expect greater freedom and democracy in the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China should be content, provided the Republic of China is under the big roof concept of China. This would affirm its respect for human civilization and responsibility to Chinese history.
If, on the other hand, one side swallows up the other, that would surely leave a black mark in the history of human civilization and Chinese history.
History has moved on. The two sides have moved beyond the dog eat dog framework of the Chinese Civil War. The big roof concept of China offers a reasonable process by which to advance the two sides' political and economic platform, to set an example for world civilization, and to author a glorious chapter in China's history.
超越國共內戰，兩岸共創人類文明典範
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.03
現在的兩岸關係，已經遠遠不只是「國共內戰」的架構；而是一個人類歷史上非常重大的文明事件與道德課題，當然更是中國歷史上重大無比的文明事件與道德課題。
「國共內戰」是兩個武裝力量之間的政權之戰，那是一個「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的你死我活的鬥爭。但當中華民國已然實現了中國五千年來首見的自由民主體制，它應不應當被「吃掉」？又當中華人民共和國已然成為崛起的大國與強國，它具備了包容與涵納的能力與責任，則能不能用「誰吃掉誰」的方式來處理兩岸問題？這些，皆不能僅僅視為「國共內戰」的課題，而是人類史上，尤其是中國史上非常重大的文明事件與道德課題。
兩岸關係發展至今日境地，世界文明必不願見其發展為「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的一頁；中國歷史必也不忍再添「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的一章。站在世界文明和中國歷史的高度看，未來兩岸關係的終極解決方案，應當是共創人類文明的典範與中國歷史的光榮，而萬萬不可造成人類文明的恥辱與中國歷史的悲劇。
一九八三年六月，鄧小平說：「統一不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我。」這一句話，將六十四年來的兩岸關係，劃出了三個階段。
第一階段，在一九八三年以前的三十年，大體上說，兩岸陷於冷戰的框架裡，且各自的內政治理皆在十分艱難的境況中；那是一個「解放台灣vs.反攻大陸」的時代，也就是僵持在「我吃掉你，或你吃掉我」的階段。
第二階段，自一九八三年以後的三十年，仍是大體而言，起自鄧小平「不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我」的「和平統一／一國兩制」，至一九八七年蔣經國的「解嚴／交流」，再至二○○五年「連胡會」到二○○八年的馬英九勝選，兩岸逐漸營造出「和平發展」的機遇和氛圍。
如今，到了二○一三年前後，兩岸儼然進入了第三階段。二○一二年十一月，胡錦濤在中共十八大總結對台工作報告指出，「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」、「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」；此一階段的特徵，是將兩岸政策的關注焦點，從遙遠難期的「統一」，轉移至「探討尚未統一的政治關係」。
第三階段儼然是在嘗試回答鄧小平的問題。鄧小平說：「統一不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我。」但即使是「一國兩制」，若是指「香港模式」，仍豈不是「吃掉」？那麼，究竟怎樣始有可能「我不吃掉你，你不吃掉我」？
若欲搭建起這個「第三階段」的架構，那就必須奠基在「大屋頂中國」。在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬一個大屋頂中國，亦即同屬「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。而此種「尚未統一的政治關係」，正是要保證「不是我吃掉你，也不是你吃掉我」，而是欲將兩岸關係的發展，經由長期的細緻磨合與精心營造，共同創造人類文明的典範與中國歷史的光榮，那始可言「中華民族的偉大復興」。
今日的中華民國是民主中國，這是中華民國不容被「吃掉」的主要理由；因為中華民國是「中華」的「民國」，亦即是「中華文明」的「道德資產」，而不再只是中共的「內戰政敵」而已；所以，兩岸關係已不是「國共內戰」那個層次的題目，而是人類歷史及中國歷史的重大文明課題。
何況，中華人民共和國的政經勢力已然崛起，但即使以「社會主義的民主法制」來衡量北京政權，它亦尚欠人類文明及中國歷史一個完整的履約踐諾；且看近日《南方周末》與《炎黃春秋》事件，問題在連《中華人民共和國憲法》亦未兌現。
因此，唯有在大屋頂中國下，中華民國可以等待中華人民共和國更加走向自由民主；而中華人民共和國則應包容涵納中華民國在大屋頂中國之下，以宣示其對人類文明的敬畏及對中國歷史的責任。
但是，如果是「誰吃掉誰」，那必將演成人類文明的恥辱與中國歷史的悲劇。
在歷史的巧妙推移下，兩岸已然超越了「我吃掉你，你吃掉我」的「國共內戰」架構，大屋頂中國將可提供「從合理的過程，到改善之目的」的政經平台，共創世界文明的典範，共譜中國歷史的光榮。
Thursday, January 31, 2013
Wool Comes From Sheep: No to Pension Reform Grandstanding
Wool Comes From Sheep: No to Pension Reform Grandstanding
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2013
Summary: The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Full text below:
The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Compare the Blue and Green camp versions. They involve three key differences. One. They differ on the monthly benefits income replacement rate for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. The Executive Yuan wants the rate reduced to somewhere between 75% and 80%. The DPP wants it reduced to somewhere between 60% and 70%. Two. They differ on premium-sharing. The Blue camp wants the government employee/civil service employee debt burden ratio set at 65:35. The Green camp wants it changed to 60:40. They differ on labor health insurance. The Blue camp wants the government/employer/labor burden set at 10:70:20. Green Camp wants the government burden eliminated, and employers and employees to pay 60:40. Three. They differ on the labor insurance premium rate. The Blue camp wants the current 8% divided over 23 years, increased to 19%. The Green camp wants it increased to 16.25%, divided over 30 years.
The DPP has offered an opposition party alternative on a major policy issue. This has enabled the public to compare and to choose. This is healthy rivalry that merits acknowledgment. But the Green camp released its alternative late at night. In terms of content, it was "plenty of thunder, but little rain." As we can see, Taiwan's pension reform dilemma must be dealt with pragmatically. There is no room for boasting and grandstanding. The two camps' versions are so close. If the Green camp persists in characterizing President Ma's version as "a scam," and as "phony reform," it is merely revealing its limited vocabulary.
Examine both versions closely. The Blue and Green camp versions both leave room for ruling and opposition party haggling. Take the income replacement ratio. Can a compromise be found between the 80% Blue camp version, and the 70% Green camp version? That depends on phase two negotiations. Take the labor insurance premium rate. Will the Blue camp 19% version move toward the Green camp 16.25% version? That will require broader society wide negotiations. Both the Blue and Green camps are seeking to satisfy the demands of 9 million laborers. This includes the basis for monthly pension retirement calculations. Will it be the Blue camp version of 10 to 15 years for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, and 15 years for labor? Or will it be the Green camp version of 10 years for everyone? These are all negotiable.
The ruling and opposition parties can jockey for political advantage all they want. But the final version must be reasonable. Haggling over details must not undermine the integrity of the pension reform program as a whole. In essence, the pension reform is a money problem. Whose pockets will be picked for the money needed? Any change in the rates or burden will affect the interests of other groups within the system. All of this must be carefully calculated. Only then can we avoid repeating the 18% preferential interest rate experience.
Take the Blue and Green camp's premium sharing ratios. It is obvious why a tiny change can affect the overall result. The Blue camp version places a greater burden on the government, both for public health insurance and labor health insurance. The government is responsible for 65% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. It is responsible for 10% of the burden for labor. The Green camp version places even more of the burden on wage earners. The government is responsible for 40% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, as well as for labor health insurance. But the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. is the government, The Blue and Green camp versions' "employer's share" are in fact paid out of taxes. The "employer" for labor health insurance meanwhile, is private enterprise. Both the Blue camp 70% version and the Green camp 60% version, impose a heavy burden on the employer. If adopted, the Green camp version would result in the labor health insurance premium burden surging from 20% to 40%. This is a heavy burden as well.
According to detailed estimates, by 2036 the Blue camp version will require employers to bear an additional 124.5 billion in labor expenditures. This is nearly double what it is under the current system. If labor costs must remain unchanged, the inevitable result will be downward pressure on compensation levels. The Green camp version would reduce government spending, but double the burden on labor. To subject labor to downward pressure on compensation, would peel another layer of skin from an already skinned goose.
In fact, the entire pension reform program is nothing more than robbing Peter to pay Paul. This includes the "18% preferential interest rate" and "income replacement rate 121%." They are clear examples of "relative deprivation" and violations of social justice. The most critical issue is where the money is coming from. In fact, the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers is the government. The government's wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e., the taxpayers. The employer for labor is private enterprise. The bosses' wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e, labor. Whether the money comes from the government, the employer, or the employee, all of them will be feeling the pain.
Both the Blue and Green camp versions, to put it bluntly, are mere band aids that require one to pay more to get less. The real problem is not whether people will swallow this bitter medicine. The real question is whether once this pension reform time bomb has been disarmed, Taiwan can make an economic comeback. Can everyone's concerns about retirement be allayed? Can everyone's hopes for a better life be restored? Only then will the current pension reform program be possible and make sense.
羊毛出在羊身上 年金方案不能耍花槍
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.01
藍綠版的年金改革案皆已出爐。兩者除替代率、負擔比、費率等主張略有差異，雙方提出的改革手段，並無太大分別。朝野如能站在這樣的見解上誠懇討論，那麼年金改革或許有可能尋得較佳版本。
比較藍綠版本，主要差別包括：第一，軍公教月退所得替代率，政院版主張減至七成五到八成，民進黨版則主張降為六至七成。第二，保費分擔方面，藍版主張政府／公務員的負擔比為六成五比三成五，綠版則主張改為六與四比。勞保部分，藍版主張政府／雇主／勞工各負擔一比七比二，綠營則主張取消政府負擔，雇主和勞工各負擔六與四。第三，勞保費率方面，藍版主張由現行的八趴分廿三年調高至十九趴，綠版則主張在卅年內調至十六點二五趴即可。
民進黨能就重大政策提出在野黨的相對方案，供人民參考比較與選擇，這是政黨政治良性競爭的表現，值得肯定。然而，綠營更晚提出對案，其內容卻只留下「無甚高論／不過爾爾」的印象；可見當前台灣年金面臨的困境只能務實面對，沒有太多買空賣空、耍花槍的餘地。在雙方版本雷同度如此高的情況下，綠營若再批評馬總統的提案是「騙局」、「假改革」，顯已辭窮。
仔細觀察，藍綠版本都各自保留了一些供未來朝野協商、角力的空間。以所得替代率為例，未來會不會在藍版的八成及綠版的七成之間找到新的折衷點，要看第二階段的溝通如何。以勞保費率為例，會不會由藍版的十九趴往綠版的十六點二五趴下移，則涉及更大範圍的社會溝通，藍綠都在競向九百萬勞工訴求。包括退休金的月退計算基礎，是要以藍版的軍公教十到十五年、勞保十五年為準，或以綠版標準向十年一致化，都有討論空間。
但無論朝野如何攻防，我們認為最後的版本都必須照顧整體改革方案結構的合理性，不能為了若干枝節討價還價或刪砍，而導致改革架構的傾斜。質言之，年金改革圍繞的不外是一個「錢」的問題：多繳的錢要由誰的口袋裡掏，不夠的錢要讓誰少拿一些？任何一環的費率或比重稍有改變，就會影響整個制度中另一群人的權益，必須精密計算，才不致重蹈十八趴的覆轍。
以藍綠版的「保費分擔比」為例，即可看出為何些微的調整能影響大局。藍營的版本，無論是公保或勞保均賦予政府較大的負擔（軍公教部分政府負擔六成五，勞保部分則是一成），綠營版本則更重視受薪者負擔（軍公教及勞保均為四成）。然而，軍公教的「雇主」是政府，藍綠版的「雇主分擔」其實皆由稅金支付；但在勞保部分，「雇主」是企業，不論是藍版的七成或綠版的六成，「雇主」的負擔都不輕。而若採綠版，勞工保費分擔要從兩成驟增為四成，亦是極沉重的負擔。
根據精算，藍版到了民國一二五年，全國雇主在勞保支出上將增加一二四五億的負擔，較現制幾乎倍增。而若必須維持勞動成本不變，必然的結果就是薪資水準的壓低。若依照綠版，政府減少支出，而勞工的負擔則是倍增；若再承受減薪壓力，無異一隻瘦鵝要剝兩層皮。
事實上，整個年金方案，在處理完如「十八趴」及「所得替代率一二○趴」等明顯「相對剝奪」及違反「社會正義」的案類後，剩下的都只是「朝三暮四」、「捉襟見肘」、「挖東牆／補西牆」的手法而已。最關鍵的問題皆在：錢從哪裡來？其實，軍公教的雇主是政府，政府的羊毛出在納稅人的羊身上；勞工的雇主則是企業，而老闆的羊毛出在勞工的羊身上。不論出錢的是政府、雇主或受雇者，誰都會喊痛。
無論藍綠版本，說穿了，今天年金問題都只有「多繳、少領」一帖解藥，別無良方。真正的問題，其實不在人們吞不吞得下這帖苦藥；而在拆解了這顆年金炸彈後，台灣能不能努力把經濟的榮景找回來，把大家從為退休生活的憂心盤算，拉回到更充實的人生憧憬。那樣，此次年金改革，才有可能，也才有意義。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2013
Summary: The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Full text below:
The Blue and Green camps' pension reform programs have been released. The two camps differ slightly on the income replacement rate and burden rates. But otherwise the two camps' reforms show no significant differences. If the ruling and opposition parties are willing to discuss the issues in earnest, a better version may be possible.
Compare the Blue and Green camp versions. They involve three key differences. One. They differ on the monthly benefits income replacement rate for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. The Executive Yuan wants the rate reduced to somewhere between 75% and 80%. The DPP wants it reduced to somewhere between 60% and 70%. Two. They differ on premium-sharing. The Blue camp wants the government employee/civil service employee debt burden ratio set at 65:35. The Green camp wants it changed to 60:40. They differ on labor health insurance. The Blue camp wants the government/employer/labor burden set at 10:70:20. Green Camp wants the government burden eliminated, and employers and employees to pay 60:40. Three. They differ on the labor insurance premium rate. The Blue camp wants the current 8% divided over 23 years, increased to 19%. The Green camp wants it increased to 16.25%, divided over 30 years.
The DPP has offered an opposition party alternative on a major policy issue. This has enabled the public to compare and to choose. This is healthy rivalry that merits acknowledgment. But the Green camp released its alternative late at night. In terms of content, it was "plenty of thunder, but little rain." As we can see, Taiwan's pension reform dilemma must be dealt with pragmatically. There is no room for boasting and grandstanding. The two camps' versions are so close. If the Green camp persists in characterizing President Ma's version as "a scam," and as "phony reform," it is merely revealing its limited vocabulary.
Examine both versions closely. The Blue and Green camp versions both leave room for ruling and opposition party haggling. Take the income replacement ratio. Can a compromise be found between the 80% Blue camp version, and the 70% Green camp version? That depends on phase two negotiations. Take the labor insurance premium rate. Will the Blue camp 19% version move toward the Green camp 16.25% version? That will require broader society wide negotiations. Both the Blue and Green camps are seeking to satisfy the demands of 9 million laborers. This includes the basis for monthly pension retirement calculations. Will it be the Blue camp version of 10 to 15 years for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, and 15 years for labor? Or will it be the Green camp version of 10 years for everyone? These are all negotiable.
The ruling and opposition parties can jockey for political advantage all they want. But the final version must be reasonable. Haggling over details must not undermine the integrity of the pension reform program as a whole. In essence, the pension reform is a money problem. Whose pockets will be picked for the money needed? Any change in the rates or burden will affect the interests of other groups within the system. All of this must be carefully calculated. Only then can we avoid repeating the 18% preferential interest rate experience.
Take the Blue and Green camp's premium sharing ratios. It is obvious why a tiny change can affect the overall result. The Blue camp version places a greater burden on the government, both for public health insurance and labor health insurance. The government is responsible for 65% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. It is responsible for 10% of the burden for labor. The Green camp version places even more of the burden on wage earners. The government is responsible for 40% of the burden for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, as well as for labor health insurance. But the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers. is the government, The Blue and Green camp versions' "employer's share" are in fact paid out of taxes. The "employer" for labor health insurance meanwhile, is private enterprise. Both the Blue camp 70% version and the Green camp 60% version, impose a heavy burden on the employer. If adopted, the Green camp version would result in the labor health insurance premium burden surging from 20% to 40%. This is a heavy burden as well.
According to detailed estimates, by 2036 the Blue camp version will require employers to bear an additional 124.5 billion in labor expenditures. This is nearly double what it is under the current system. If labor costs must remain unchanged, the inevitable result will be downward pressure on compensation levels. The Green camp version would reduce government spending, but double the burden on labor. To subject labor to downward pressure on compensation, would peel another layer of skin from an already skinned goose.
In fact, the entire pension reform program is nothing more than robbing Peter to pay Paul. This includes the "18% preferential interest rate" and "income replacement rate 121%." They are clear examples of "relative deprivation" and violations of social justice. The most critical issue is where the money is coming from. In fact, the "employer" for retired military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers is the government. The government's wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e., the taxpayers. The employer for labor is private enterprise. The bosses' wool comes out of the hide of the sheep, i.e, labor. Whether the money comes from the government, the employer, or the employee, all of them will be feeling the pain.
Both the Blue and Green camp versions, to put it bluntly, are mere band aids that require one to pay more to get less. The real problem is not whether people will swallow this bitter medicine. The real question is whether once this pension reform time bomb has been disarmed, Taiwan can make an economic comeback. Can everyone's concerns about retirement be allayed? Can everyone's hopes for a better life be restored? Only then will the current pension reform program be possible and make sense.
羊毛出在羊身上 年金方案不能耍花槍
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.02.01
藍綠版的年金改革案皆已出爐。兩者除替代率、負擔比、費率等主張略有差異，雙方提出的改革手段，並無太大分別。朝野如能站在這樣的見解上誠懇討論，那麼年金改革或許有可能尋得較佳版本。
比較藍綠版本，主要差別包括：第一，軍公教月退所得替代率，政院版主張減至七成五到八成，民進黨版則主張降為六至七成。第二，保費分擔方面，藍版主張政府／公務員的負擔比為六成五比三成五，綠版則主張改為六與四比。勞保部分，藍版主張政府／雇主／勞工各負擔一比七比二，綠營則主張取消政府負擔，雇主和勞工各負擔六與四。第三，勞保費率方面，藍版主張由現行的八趴分廿三年調高至十九趴，綠版則主張在卅年內調至十六點二五趴即可。
民進黨能就重大政策提出在野黨的相對方案，供人民參考比較與選擇，這是政黨政治良性競爭的表現，值得肯定。然而，綠營更晚提出對案，其內容卻只留下「無甚高論／不過爾爾」的印象；可見當前台灣年金面臨的困境只能務實面對，沒有太多買空賣空、耍花槍的餘地。在雙方版本雷同度如此高的情況下，綠營若再批評馬總統的提案是「騙局」、「假改革」，顯已辭窮。
仔細觀察，藍綠版本都各自保留了一些供未來朝野協商、角力的空間。以所得替代率為例，未來會不會在藍版的八成及綠版的七成之間找到新的折衷點，要看第二階段的溝通如何。以勞保費率為例，會不會由藍版的十九趴往綠版的十六點二五趴下移，則涉及更大範圍的社會溝通，藍綠都在競向九百萬勞工訴求。包括退休金的月退計算基礎，是要以藍版的軍公教十到十五年、勞保十五年為準，或以綠版標準向十年一致化，都有討論空間。
但無論朝野如何攻防，我們認為最後的版本都必須照顧整體改革方案結構的合理性，不能為了若干枝節討價還價或刪砍，而導致改革架構的傾斜。質言之，年金改革圍繞的不外是一個「錢」的問題：多繳的錢要由誰的口袋裡掏，不夠的錢要讓誰少拿一些？任何一環的費率或比重稍有改變，就會影響整個制度中另一群人的權益，必須精密計算，才不致重蹈十八趴的覆轍。
以藍綠版的「保費分擔比」為例，即可看出為何些微的調整能影響大局。藍營的版本，無論是公保或勞保均賦予政府較大的負擔（軍公教部分政府負擔六成五，勞保部分則是一成），綠營版本則更重視受薪者負擔（軍公教及勞保均為四成）。然而，軍公教的「雇主」是政府，藍綠版的「雇主分擔」其實皆由稅金支付；但在勞保部分，「雇主」是企業，不論是藍版的七成或綠版的六成，「雇主」的負擔都不輕。而若採綠版，勞工保費分擔要從兩成驟增為四成，亦是極沉重的負擔。
根據精算，藍版到了民國一二五年，全國雇主在勞保支出上將增加一二四五億的負擔，較現制幾乎倍增。而若必須維持勞動成本不變，必然的結果就是薪資水準的壓低。若依照綠版，政府減少支出，而勞工的負擔則是倍增；若再承受減薪壓力，無異一隻瘦鵝要剝兩層皮。
事實上，整個年金方案，在處理完如「十八趴」及「所得替代率一二○趴」等明顯「相對剝奪」及違反「社會正義」的案類後，剩下的都只是「朝三暮四」、「捉襟見肘」、「挖東牆／補西牆」的手法而已。最關鍵的問題皆在：錢從哪裡來？其實，軍公教的雇主是政府，政府的羊毛出在納稅人的羊身上；勞工的雇主則是企業，而老闆的羊毛出在勞工的羊身上。不論出錢的是政府、雇主或受雇者，誰都會喊痛。
無論藍綠版本，說穿了，今天年金問題都只有「多繳、少領」一帖解藥，別無良方。真正的問題，其實不在人們吞不吞得下這帖苦藥；而在拆解了這顆年金炸彈後，台灣能不能努力把經濟的榮景找回來，把大家從為退休生活的憂心盤算，拉回到更充實的人生憧憬。那樣，此次年金改革，才有可能，也才有意義。
A Step in the Right Direction: Hope for Pension Reform
A Step in the Right Direction: Hope for Pension Reform
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2013
Summary: Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Full text below:
Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Many people are concerned about the details of the pension reform program. Who will be affected? How large will the impact be? This reaction is perfectly natural. But we are more concerned about the how. Compared to other policy making fiascoes over the past six months, this reform was carried out in a remarkably deft manner.
First of all, this reform was not the product of a handful of civil servants gathered in a conference room. Before the first phase was announced yesterday, the Executive held 124 seminars. As we understand it, even after yesterday's announcement, the government continued holding seminars eliciting the views of the public.
Some people are criticizing the first phase of the pension reform program. They are saying it includes no details. They are even implying that the lack of details means a lack of commitment to reform. Such criticism is worse than unfair. It is misleading. This phase is only supposed to indicate a general direction. Many details must await the next gathering, when they solicit the views of all parties. Only when a consensus forms, will the program be made into law. This is the correct procedure. The reason is simple. This reform is important. It cannot be a decision arrived at by a handful of officials, then rammed down everyones' throats. Major policy reforms must be submitted to everyone in advance, in order to solicit their opinions.
We hope the seminars held between now and April will invite reform groups or their representatives. We hope there will be close coordination. We hope that once the agencies in charge hear these opinions, they will not dig in their heels, but instead make any needed changes.
Secondly, regarding labor insurance, we applaud the government for not treating the outsourced actuarial report, which provoked public panic, as gospel. This newspaper has mentioned this before on its editorial page. The conclusion of the actuarial report is based on numerous assumptions. The most significant were interest rate assumptions. When interest rates were low, the assumption was that interest rates would always be low. But this was overly pessimistic.
Based on assumptions of low interest rates, the labor insurance actuarial report's target rate was 27.8%. But a preliminary version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform plan sets the ceiling at 19.5%. This is a far more reasonable figure than 27.8%. We applaud the Executive Yuan's professional and unhurried attitude.
We hope that during the coming months coordination continues, and that details of the policy will continue to emerge. We hope the Examination Yuan, which is responsible for the Public Service Pension, has the same understanding, and makes sound decisions. The outsourced actuarial report included hidden liabilities within the 18% preferential interest rate. It made long term discount rate assumptions for the next three to five decades. It used the average yield of 1.8% for 20 year government bonds in 2011. But who can say that the interest rate will be that low for the next three to five decades? For example, U.S. 10-year government bond yields over the past 50 years has been an average of 6.5%. That is much higher than this number.
Currently interest rates are low. Using ultra low discount rates to estimate future government liabilities, will lead to number inflation. The calculated financial risk will be exaggerated. Using these figures to make decisions is premature. This is also true for the Public Service Pension Fund actuarial report, and premium rates in the civil servants and public school teachers actuarial report. The ROI for the next three to five decades is set at 3.5%. This estimate is probably low. We hope the Executive Yuan will consider the views of all parties, and arrive at a sound decision.
We would like to say something on behalf of the government regarding pension reform for civil servants and public school teachers. After the Ma administration took office, it made five changes. These are changes that the opposition DPP boasted it would implement for several decades. But during its rule it implemented almost nothing. This includes the 2010 civil service retirement system, which was changed from the "75 system" to the "85 system." This includes setting a ceiling on the retirement income replacement rate for civil servants. This includes the January 2010 cancellation of tax exemptions for primary and secondary school teachers and military personnel. This includes lowering the ceiling for political appointees preferential savings from 3.3 million to 2.2 million. This includes last year's cancellation of most military and government retirees condolence payments.
This experience, along with labor insurance reform, provide a ray of hope for the social security system. There is only one fly in the ointment. The government has not indicated how it intends to cope with the declining birthrate. It has not offered an incentive program to encourage childbirth. Such a program is urgently needed. The falling birth rate must be slowed. Doing so would help solve social security's structural problem. We hope the government will tackle this problem as soon as possible, in its next wave of plans.
踏出正確第一步 年金改革露曙光
2013-01-31
中國時報
馬總統昨天在總統府親自召開記者會，邀集行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平及考試院長關中等，說明我國年金制度改革的基本理念和大方向，為各界期許甚高的年金改革列車，下達了啟動的號令。
在這個時候，很多人關心改革的細節是什麼？哪些人會受到影響？影響的幅度有多大？有這樣的反應是很自然的，不過我們更重視的是進行的方式和程序。基本上，相較於過去半年多項政策的制訂過程而言，本次改革的進行方式可圈可點。
首先，這次的改革並不只是少數公務員在辦公室裡討論，就產生了最終方案。在昨天宣布第一階段方案之前，行政院已經舉辦了一百二十四場座談會；而據了解，在昨天階段性的宣布之後，還會繼續辦座談會，聽取各界的意見。
有些人批評第一階段改革方案只有方向，沒有確定的細節，甚至因此推論看不出改革的決心；這樣的批評不但很不公平，事實上更是誤導。現階段本來就應該只定大方向，很多細節要等到接下來蒐集各方意見、凝聚共識之後形成，然後再去立法，這才是正確的程序。原因很簡單，這個改革事關重大，絕對不容許只是少數官員做成決議，就強迫大家接受；重大政策改革本來就應該多方聽取各界意見。
我們希望從現在到四月之間所舉行的座談會，一定要邀請被改革者的團體或代表參加，做好充分的溝通。相關單位在聽取意見之後，也請不要堅持己見，要作出必要的修正，當改則改。
其次我們要肯定的是在勞保方面，政府沒有把先前引發恐慌的委外精算報告當作聖旨。先前本報社論已經提及，精算報告的結論是基於很多前提假設，其中攸關重大的就是利率的假設；在現在低利率時代，假設未來永遠都會維持低利率實在是過度悲觀。
基於低利率的假設，那一份勞保精算報告中所建議的費率目標是二七．八％，但是我們現在看到行政院初步版本，費率上限會訂在十九．五％，這就是一個遠比二七．八％合理的數字；我們對於這種重專業、不躁進的態度表示肯定。
我們希望在未來幾個月的溝通和細節政策形成過程中，主管公務人員退撫的考試院應當要有同樣的認知和態度，做出合理的決定。該機關委外的十八趴潛藏負債精算報告中，對未來三、五十年長期折現率的假設，是採用民國一百年度二十年期以上政府公債的平均殖利率一．八％。問題是，誰敢說未來三、五十年利率都會這麼低？例如美國十年期公債殖利率過去五十年平均數為六．五％，即遠高於此數。
在目前低利率環境下，以此種超低折現率來估算未來政府負債，必然被過度膨脹，所計算的財務風險，必然被過度誇大，如果根據這些數字來做決策，也必然過度躁進。同理，公務人員退休撫卹基金精算報告，以及公教人員保險費率精算報告書，將未來三、五十的投資報酬率訂為三．五％，恐怕也是偏低的估計。我們希望該院能妥善衡量各方意見，做出合理決定。
對於公教人員的改革，我們還要為政府講一句公道話。事實上馬政府上台以後，已經做了五項變革，這些是過去幾十年來反對黨口口聲聲說要做，但在其執政期間，幾乎是掛零的改革，包含：九十九年把公務員退休制度「七五制」改為「八五制」；為公務人員退休所得替代率設定上限；民國一百年元月取消中小學教師及軍人免稅優惠；領月退政務人員優惠存款金額上限由三百三十萬降到二百萬；去年年底取消大多數軍公教退休人士的年終慰問金等。
經過這樣的歷程，加上勞保這次也同步進行改革，我們相信可以為這些社會保險制度未來的前景，建構出一線曙光。這次改革方案中，唯一美中不足的就是政府沒有同時提出如何因應少子化、提高國人生育率的正面激勵方案。我們現在亟需這樣的方案，來降低少子化的速度，這對解決社會保險根本性的結構問題一定會有幫助，希望政府在接下來的進一步規畫中，能盡快推出。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 31, 2013
Summary: Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Full text below:
Yesterday President Ma held a press conference at the presidential palace. He invited Premier Sean Chen, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Examination Yuan President Kuan Chung, and others. He explained the general outlines of the government's pension reform program. Everyone has high hopes for the pension reform express train. He gave the order to begin implementation.
Many people are concerned about the details of the pension reform program. Who will be affected? How large will the impact be? This reaction is perfectly natural. But we are more concerned about the how. Compared to other policy making fiascoes over the past six months, this reform was carried out in a remarkably deft manner.
First of all, this reform was not the product of a handful of civil servants gathered in a conference room. Before the first phase was announced yesterday, the Executive held 124 seminars. As we understand it, even after yesterday's announcement, the government continued holding seminars eliciting the views of the public.
Some people are criticizing the first phase of the pension reform program. They are saying it includes no details. They are even implying that the lack of details means a lack of commitment to reform. Such criticism is worse than unfair. It is misleading. This phase is only supposed to indicate a general direction. Many details must await the next gathering, when they solicit the views of all parties. Only when a consensus forms, will the program be made into law. This is the correct procedure. The reason is simple. This reform is important. It cannot be a decision arrived at by a handful of officials, then rammed down everyones' throats. Major policy reforms must be submitted to everyone in advance, in order to solicit their opinions.
We hope the seminars held between now and April will invite reform groups or their representatives. We hope there will be close coordination. We hope that once the agencies in charge hear these opinions, they will not dig in their heels, but instead make any needed changes.
Secondly, regarding labor insurance, we applaud the government for not treating the outsourced actuarial report, which provoked public panic, as gospel. This newspaper has mentioned this before on its editorial page. The conclusion of the actuarial report is based on numerous assumptions. The most significant were interest rate assumptions. When interest rates were low, the assumption was that interest rates would always be low. But this was overly pessimistic.
Based on assumptions of low interest rates, the labor insurance actuarial report's target rate was 27.8%. But a preliminary version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform plan sets the ceiling at 19.5%. This is a far more reasonable figure than 27.8%. We applaud the Executive Yuan's professional and unhurried attitude.
We hope that during the coming months coordination continues, and that details of the policy will continue to emerge. We hope the Examination Yuan, which is responsible for the Public Service Pension, has the same understanding, and makes sound decisions. The outsourced actuarial report included hidden liabilities within the 18% preferential interest rate. It made long term discount rate assumptions for the next three to five decades. It used the average yield of 1.8% for 20 year government bonds in 2011. But who can say that the interest rate will be that low for the next three to five decades? For example, U.S. 10-year government bond yields over the past 50 years has been an average of 6.5%. That is much higher than this number.
Currently interest rates are low. Using ultra low discount rates to estimate future government liabilities, will lead to number inflation. The calculated financial risk will be exaggerated. Using these figures to make decisions is premature. This is also true for the Public Service Pension Fund actuarial report, and premium rates in the civil servants and public school teachers actuarial report. The ROI for the next three to five decades is set at 3.5%. This estimate is probably low. We hope the Executive Yuan will consider the views of all parties, and arrive at a sound decision.
We would like to say something on behalf of the government regarding pension reform for civil servants and public school teachers. After the Ma administration took office, it made five changes. These are changes that the opposition DPP boasted it would implement for several decades. But during its rule it implemented almost nothing. This includes the 2010 civil service retirement system, which was changed from the "75 system" to the "85 system." This includes setting a ceiling on the retirement income replacement rate for civil servants. This includes the January 2010 cancellation of tax exemptions for primary and secondary school teachers and military personnel. This includes lowering the ceiling for political appointees preferential savings from 3.3 million to 2.2 million. This includes last year's cancellation of most military and government retirees condolence payments.
This experience, along with labor insurance reform, provide a ray of hope for the social security system. There is only one fly in the ointment. The government has not indicated how it intends to cope with the declining birthrate. It has not offered an incentive program to encourage childbirth. Such a program is urgently needed. The falling birth rate must be slowed. Doing so would help solve social security's structural problem. We hope the government will tackle this problem as soon as possible, in its next wave of plans.
踏出正確第一步 年金改革露曙光
2013-01-31
中國時報
馬總統昨天在總統府親自召開記者會，邀集行政院長陳?、立法院長王金平及考試院長關中等，說明我國年金制度改革的基本理念和大方向，為各界期許甚高的年金改革列車，下達了啟動的號令。
在這個時候，很多人關心改革的細節是什麼？哪些人會受到影響？影響的幅度有多大？有這樣的反應是很自然的，不過我們更重視的是進行的方式和程序。基本上，相較於過去半年多項政策的制訂過程而言，本次改革的進行方式可圈可點。
首先，這次的改革並不只是少數公務員在辦公室裡討論，就產生了最終方案。在昨天宣布第一階段方案之前，行政院已經舉辦了一百二十四場座談會；而據了解，在昨天階段性的宣布之後，還會繼續辦座談會，聽取各界的意見。
有些人批評第一階段改革方案只有方向，沒有確定的細節，甚至因此推論看不出改革的決心；這樣的批評不但很不公平，事實上更是誤導。現階段本來就應該只定大方向，很多細節要等到接下來蒐集各方意見、凝聚共識之後形成，然後再去立法，這才是正確的程序。原因很簡單，這個改革事關重大，絕對不容許只是少數官員做成決議，就強迫大家接受；重大政策改革本來就應該多方聽取各界意見。
我們希望從現在到四月之間所舉行的座談會，一定要邀請被改革者的團體或代表參加，做好充分的溝通。相關單位在聽取意見之後，也請不要堅持己見，要作出必要的修正，當改則改。
其次我們要肯定的是在勞保方面，政府沒有把先前引發恐慌的委外精算報告當作聖旨。先前本報社論已經提及，精算報告的結論是基於很多前提假設，其中攸關重大的就是利率的假設；在現在低利率時代，假設未來永遠都會維持低利率實在是過度悲觀。
基於低利率的假設，那一份勞保精算報告中所建議的費率目標是二七．八％，但是我們現在看到行政院初步版本，費率上限會訂在十九．五％，這就是一個遠比二七．八％合理的數字；我們對於這種重專業、不躁進的態度表示肯定。
我們希望在未來幾個月的溝通和細節政策形成過程中，主管公務人員退撫的考試院應當要有同樣的認知和態度，做出合理的決定。該機關委外的十八趴潛藏負債精算報告中，對未來三、五十年長期折現率的假設，是採用民國一百年度二十年期以上政府公債的平均殖利率一．八％。問題是，誰敢說未來三、五十年利率都會這麼低？例如美國十年期公債殖利率過去五十年平均數為六．五％，即遠高於此數。
在目前低利率環境下，以此種超低折現率來估算未來政府負債，必然被過度膨脹，所計算的財務風險，必然被過度誇大，如果根據這些數字來做決策，也必然過度躁進。同理，公務人員退休撫卹基金精算報告，以及公教人員保險費率精算報告書，將未來三、五十的投資報酬率訂為三．五％，恐怕也是偏低的估計。我們希望該院能妥善衡量各方意見，做出合理決定。
對於公教人員的改革，我們還要為政府講一句公道話。事實上馬政府上台以後，已經做了五項變革，這些是過去幾十年來反對黨口口聲聲說要做，但在其執政期間，幾乎是掛零的改革，包含：九十九年把公務員退休制度「七五制」改為「八五制」；為公務人員退休所得替代率設定上限；民國一百年元月取消中小學教師及軍人免稅優惠；領月退政務人員優惠存款金額上限由三百三十萬降到二百萬；去年年底取消大多數軍公教退休人士的年終慰問金等。
經過這樣的歷程，加上勞保這次也同步進行改革，我們相信可以為這些社會保險制度未來的前景，建構出一線曙光。這次改革方案中，唯一美中不足的就是政府沒有同時提出如何因應少子化、提高國人生育率的正面激勵方案。我們現在亟需這樣的方案，來降低少子化的速度，這對解決社會保險根本性的結構問題一定會有幫助，希望政府在接下來的進一步規畫中，能盡快推出。
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
A Pension Plan for the Nation, not Blue vs. Green Confrontation
A Pension Plan for the Nation, not Blue vs. Green Confrontation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2013
Summary: The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction.
Full text below:
The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction. But one form of preferential treatment remains, the income replacement rate and monthly retirement benefit calculations. This will determine whether pension reform will win public support and persuade veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. There is no room for opportunism or carelessness.
Yesterday, before reporting to President Ma, the Executive Yuan and the KMT legislative caucus coordinated with each other. The process was smoother than expected. No significant disagreements arose. The main reason for this was that the Executive Yuan made adequate preparations. They considered the ramifications of pension reform at all levels. They left little for legislators to criticize. The channels of communication this time were also relatively open. They held over 100 grassroots level forums. They consulted people far and wide. They enabled the Examination Yuan and Legislative Yuan to coordinate with each other. They allowed dissenters opportunities to amend the bill. Even more importantly, the nation's circumstances are different. The public is more supportive of pension reform. People have examined the issue more closely and concluded that the arguments in favor of reform are valid.
In all fairness, sweeping the 18% interest rate into the dustbin of history was no easy task. The Executive Yuan sought relief. It distanced itself from the 1995 dividing line approach. It looked after impoverished early retirees. It used the income replacement rate to reduce preferential deposits for affluent veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. It deftly performed an end run around the 18% preferential interest dilemma. For some time, the 18% preferential interest rate has amounted to a form of Original Sin that veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers have been forced to assume. With this reform, at least those veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers who have no chance of receiving these government benefits will no longer need to bear this cross.
Contrast this with the DPP's pension reform alternative. The ruling and opposition party versions have roughly the same income replacement rate for monthly benefits. But the Green camp version, also advocates incorporating the 18% preferential interest rate into the income replacement rate, gradually phasing it out. On this point, both sides seem to be thinking alike. Should the income replacement rate be high or low? Should it be 70%, 75%, or 80%? This may require some debate.
On what basis should government pensions for veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers be calculated? In the past it was calculated on the basis of one's salary during the year of retirement. The Ministry of Civil Service advocates using the labor insurance model. It would base pensions on one's average salary over one's last 15 years of service. This seems reasonable. This standard is more stringent than the last 10 years version proposed by the DPP. Seen in this light, the ruling KMT's attitude toward pension reform is no more conservative than the opposition DPP's. The Executive Yuan later changed its wording, to a vaguer "ten to twenty years." This was probably a response to ruling vs opposition party confrontation within the legislature. They wanted to allow for haggling.
Overall, this version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform proposal is solid. But many blank spaces still need to be filled. These will require delicate handling. If the Ma administration wants to convince all parties, he must adopt a more aggressive approach. He can emulate the approach used to care for impoverished veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. He can establish a floor as well as a ceiling. This would eliminate the phenomenon of 100,000 to 200,000 NT monthly benefits for wealthy retired officlals.
The government is distributing monthly benefits. Its aim is to provide retirees with benefits that are appropriate. It is not to enable them to strike it rich from retirement benefits. That would be contrary to justice and reason. That would be wrong even if the nation had the money, which it does not. Also, more highly paid civil servants received large salaries while in office. They usually have considerable savings. After retirement they often have other sources of income or part-time employment. Yet again the government provided them with exorbitant monthly benefits. This was merely icing on the cake. This merely increased the injustice. Take the Executive Yuan's thinking about labor insurance pension reform. For pensions over 30,000 NT, it would reduce its annual capital payment rate from 1.55% to 1.3%. This "law of diminishing marginal utility" could be applied to highly paid officials. This would be more consistent with the spirit of reform. This would also mollify ordinary veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers.
The current pension reform underwent negotiations within the Executive Yuan. The ruling and opposition parties' versions are comparable. Differences remain, but the basic direction is the same. Therefore one can be optimistic. What's important is that everyone, including the ruling and opposition parties and the public, understand that pension reform is inevitable, and the only just and reasonable course. Only reform can win public approval. Only reform can satisfy reformers. Therefore, the Ma administration must proceed cautiously. It must not repeat the capital gains tax fiasco, which was fair yet won little public approval. Labor insurance issues must not be broached now. Mentioning them in the same breath is sure to provoke controversy. If nine million laborers and one million veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers lash out simultaneously, the Ma administration would be unable to survive the political storm.
We would like to remind the DPP. Successful pension reform is good for everyone on Taiwan. The Green camp must not use the issue to make political hay and engage in irrational obstructionism. If the DPP can offer a sound alternative, the public will be only too happy to support it.
這是國家大計，不是藍綠對決
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.30
行政院版的年金改革方案輪廓成形。從既有的內容看，十八趴確定將走入歷史，以往「退休比在職領得多」的荒謬現象將不復見。僅這兩點，即說明年金改革走在正確的方向上。然而，最後的優利基準、所得替代率、及月退本俸計算基礎的選擇，仍是決定年金改革能否贏得民眾掌聲及軍公教信服的關鍵，絲毫沒有投機或馬虎的空間。
在向馬總統報告前，行政院日昨和執政黨立院黨團進行溝通，過程較預期順利，雙方沒有重大的歧見。主要原因是，行政院事前準備充分，對改革涉及的各個層面作了周全思慮，沒有太多偏失或疏漏讓立委挑剔。此外，這次的整個溝通運作也比較成熟，除在基層辦了百場座談廣徵民意，和考試、立法兩院的協調也都預留足夠空間，使不同意見有修正的機會。更重要的是，鑑於國家大環境變化的前提，社會各界對於這次的年金改革普遍有更大的共識，以嚴格眼光檢驗著論證的合理性。
平心而論，光是如何將十八趴送入歷史，就是一項極其棘手的艱鉅工程。行政院的解套方式，是採取以民國八十四年為界的切割辦法，既照顧了早年退休的清寒人員，又以所得替代率連動的設計讓較豐裕的軍公教必須降領優惠存款；如此，不失聰明地迂迴化解了十八趴的難題。長期以來，十八趴幾已成為軍公教難以承受的「原罪」，經過這次改革，至少可讓那些根本無緣領受此一「德政」的軍公教人員不必再背負罵名。
比對民進黨目前已浮現的改革對案，雖然朝野版本對於月退所得替代率的高低還有約莫一成的差距，但綠營的版本，也是主張將十八趴納入所得替代率計算，使之漸次消失於無形。這點，雙方似乎是英雄所見略同。而所得替代率應該從高或從低，是七成、七成五或八成為宜，恐怕還需經一番辯論。
至於軍公教退休年金的計算基礎，過去一直是以退休當年的本俸從高計算；銓敘部主張比照勞保模式，以「最後十五年」的平均計算，似乎是合理的方式。這個標準，甚至比民進黨版所提的「最後十年」，是更嚴的標準。由此看來，執政黨的改革思維並不比在野黨保守。雖然最後行政部門又改口以比較模糊的「十年或廿年」的訴求代替，這恐怕只是為因應朝野國會修法角力而預留的討價還價空間。
整體而言，這次行政院的年金改革版本堪稱架構穩健，但其中還有不少留白等待填補，這些都需要再作細膩處理。如果馬政府有更大的企圖想要讓各方心服口服，我們建議還可採取一個更積極的作法：可仿照照顧弱勢軍公教設置門檻下限的作法，相對提出一個天花板上限，以消弭領取一、二十萬月退的「退休富官」現象。
政府發放月退，目的是在維持退休人員一個有尊嚴的退休生活，而不是讓他們甚至以退休金儲蓄致富，那就完全違反了公平合理。國家有錢不宜如此，何況國家沒錢。再說，高等公務員在任內領有高薪，通常應有一定積蓄，退休後又往往另有酬庸或兼職，政府再發放超高月退，只是錦上添花、徒增不公而已。再參考行政院在勞保年金乙案的改革思維，對於年金超過三萬以上的被保險人，將削減其年資給付率，由百分之一點五五降至一點三。這樣的「遞減法則」，如果也能適用在高薪官員，不僅更符合改革精神，也更能讓一般軍公教較感心服。
這次公教年金改革，從跨院際的協商氣氛，到朝野版本的比較，儘管若干差異仍然存在，但基本方向相去不遠，值得大家樂觀以待。重要的是，不論朝野或人民都明白年金改革是台灣無可迴避的改造工程，也唯有站穩公平、合理的立場，改革才能得到人們的掌聲，並獲得被改革者的信服。因此，馬政府必須步步為營，審慎因應，絕不能重蹈證所稅「有公平、無掌聲」的覆轍。尤其勞保問題要不要放在此際一併處理，勢必被相提並論進而引發爭議；如果九百萬勞工和一百萬軍公教同時反彈，馬政府消受得了嗎？
我們也要提醒民進黨：年金改革成功，是台灣人民同蒙其利，綠營千萬不可將之視作政治鬥爭而濫行杯葛。如果能提出好的對案，相信民眾都樂於支持。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30, 2013
Summary: The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction.
Full text below:
The broad outlines of the Executive Yuan's pension reform program have become clear. From what we see so far, the 18% preferential interest rate for retired civil servants is history. Past absurdities such as retirement benefits exceeding salaries are a thing of the past, never to be seen again. These two points alone show that pension reform is headed in the right direction. But one form of preferential treatment remains, the income replacement rate and monthly retirement benefit calculations. This will determine whether pension reform will win public support and persuade veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. There is no room for opportunism or carelessness.
Yesterday, before reporting to President Ma, the Executive Yuan and the KMT legislative caucus coordinated with each other. The process was smoother than expected. No significant disagreements arose. The main reason for this was that the Executive Yuan made adequate preparations. They considered the ramifications of pension reform at all levels. They left little for legislators to criticize. The channels of communication this time were also relatively open. They held over 100 grassroots level forums. They consulted people far and wide. They enabled the Examination Yuan and Legislative Yuan to coordinate with each other. They allowed dissenters opportunities to amend the bill. Even more importantly, the nation's circumstances are different. The public is more supportive of pension reform. People have examined the issue more closely and concluded that the arguments in favor of reform are valid.
In all fairness, sweeping the 18% interest rate into the dustbin of history was no easy task. The Executive Yuan sought relief. It distanced itself from the 1995 dividing line approach. It looked after impoverished early retirees. It used the income replacement rate to reduce preferential deposits for affluent veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. It deftly performed an end run around the 18% preferential interest dilemma. For some time, the 18% preferential interest rate has amounted to a form of Original Sin that veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers have been forced to assume. With this reform, at least those veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers who have no chance of receiving these government benefits will no longer need to bear this cross.
Contrast this with the DPP's pension reform alternative. The ruling and opposition party versions have roughly the same income replacement rate for monthly benefits. But the Green camp version, also advocates incorporating the 18% preferential interest rate into the income replacement rate, gradually phasing it out. On this point, both sides seem to be thinking alike. Should the income replacement rate be high or low? Should it be 70%, 75%, or 80%? This may require some debate.
On what basis should government pensions for veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers be calculated? In the past it was calculated on the basis of one's salary during the year of retirement. The Ministry of Civil Service advocates using the labor insurance model. It would base pensions on one's average salary over one's last 15 years of service. This seems reasonable. This standard is more stringent than the last 10 years version proposed by the DPP. Seen in this light, the ruling KMT's attitude toward pension reform is no more conservative than the opposition DPP's. The Executive Yuan later changed its wording, to a vaguer "ten to twenty years." This was probably a response to ruling vs opposition party confrontation within the legislature. They wanted to allow for haggling.
Overall, this version of the Executive Yuan's pension reform proposal is solid. But many blank spaces still need to be filled. These will require delicate handling. If the Ma administration wants to convince all parties, he must adopt a more aggressive approach. He can emulate the approach used to care for impoverished veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. He can establish a floor as well as a ceiling. This would eliminate the phenomenon of 100,000 to 200,000 NT monthly benefits for wealthy retired officlals.
The government is distributing monthly benefits. Its aim is to provide retirees with benefits that are appropriate. It is not to enable them to strike it rich from retirement benefits. That would be contrary to justice and reason. That would be wrong even if the nation had the money, which it does not. Also, more highly paid civil servants received large salaries while in office. They usually have considerable savings. After retirement they often have other sources of income or part-time employment. Yet again the government provided them with exorbitant monthly benefits. This was merely icing on the cake. This merely increased the injustice. Take the Executive Yuan's thinking about labor insurance pension reform. For pensions over 30,000 NT, it would reduce its annual capital payment rate from 1.55% to 1.3%. This "law of diminishing marginal utility" could be applied to highly paid officials. This would be more consistent with the spirit of reform. This would also mollify ordinary veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers.
The current pension reform underwent negotiations within the Executive Yuan. The ruling and opposition parties' versions are comparable. Differences remain, but the basic direction is the same. Therefore one can be optimistic. What's important is that everyone, including the ruling and opposition parties and the public, understand that pension reform is inevitable, and the only just and reasonable course. Only reform can win public approval. Only reform can satisfy reformers. Therefore, the Ma administration must proceed cautiously. It must not repeat the capital gains tax fiasco, which was fair yet won little public approval. Labor insurance issues must not be broached now. Mentioning them in the same breath is sure to provoke controversy. If nine million laborers and one million veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers lash out simultaneously, the Ma administration would be unable to survive the political storm.
We would like to remind the DPP. Successful pension reform is good for everyone on Taiwan. The Green camp must not use the issue to make political hay and engage in irrational obstructionism. If the DPP can offer a sound alternative, the public will be only too happy to support it.
這是國家大計，不是藍綠對決
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.30
行政院版的年金改革方案輪廓成形。從既有的內容看，十八趴確定將走入歷史，以往「退休比在職領得多」的荒謬現象將不復見。僅這兩點，即說明年金改革走在正確的方向上。然而，最後的優利基準、所得替代率、及月退本俸計算基礎的選擇，仍是決定年金改革能否贏得民眾掌聲及軍公教信服的關鍵，絲毫沒有投機或馬虎的空間。
在向馬總統報告前，行政院日昨和執政黨立院黨團進行溝通，過程較預期順利，雙方沒有重大的歧見。主要原因是，行政院事前準備充分，對改革涉及的各個層面作了周全思慮，沒有太多偏失或疏漏讓立委挑剔。此外，這次的整個溝通運作也比較成熟，除在基層辦了百場座談廣徵民意，和考試、立法兩院的協調也都預留足夠空間，使不同意見有修正的機會。更重要的是，鑑於國家大環境變化的前提，社會各界對於這次的年金改革普遍有更大的共識，以嚴格眼光檢驗著論證的合理性。
平心而論，光是如何將十八趴送入歷史，就是一項極其棘手的艱鉅工程。行政院的解套方式，是採取以民國八十四年為界的切割辦法，既照顧了早年退休的清寒人員，又以所得替代率連動的設計讓較豐裕的軍公教必須降領優惠存款；如此，不失聰明地迂迴化解了十八趴的難題。長期以來，十八趴幾已成為軍公教難以承受的「原罪」，經過這次改革，至少可讓那些根本無緣領受此一「德政」的軍公教人員不必再背負罵名。
比對民進黨目前已浮現的改革對案，雖然朝野版本對於月退所得替代率的高低還有約莫一成的差距，但綠營的版本，也是主張將十八趴納入所得替代率計算，使之漸次消失於無形。這點，雙方似乎是英雄所見略同。而所得替代率應該從高或從低，是七成、七成五或八成為宜，恐怕還需經一番辯論。
至於軍公教退休年金的計算基礎，過去一直是以退休當年的本俸從高計算；銓敘部主張比照勞保模式，以「最後十五年」的平均計算，似乎是合理的方式。這個標準，甚至比民進黨版所提的「最後十年」，是更嚴的標準。由此看來，執政黨的改革思維並不比在野黨保守。雖然最後行政部門又改口以比較模糊的「十年或廿年」的訴求代替，這恐怕只是為因應朝野國會修法角力而預留的討價還價空間。
整體而言，這次行政院的年金改革版本堪稱架構穩健，但其中還有不少留白等待填補，這些都需要再作細膩處理。如果馬政府有更大的企圖想要讓各方心服口服，我們建議還可採取一個更積極的作法：可仿照照顧弱勢軍公教設置門檻下限的作法，相對提出一個天花板上限，以消弭領取一、二十萬月退的「退休富官」現象。
政府發放月退，目的是在維持退休人員一個有尊嚴的退休生活，而不是讓他們甚至以退休金儲蓄致富，那就完全違反了公平合理。國家有錢不宜如此，何況國家沒錢。再說，高等公務員在任內領有高薪，通常應有一定積蓄，退休後又往往另有酬庸或兼職，政府再發放超高月退，只是錦上添花、徒增不公而已。再參考行政院在勞保年金乙案的改革思維，對於年金超過三萬以上的被保險人，將削減其年資給付率，由百分之一點五五降至一點三。這樣的「遞減法則」，如果也能適用在高薪官員，不僅更符合改革精神，也更能讓一般軍公教較感心服。
這次公教年金改革，從跨院際的協商氣氛，到朝野版本的比較，儘管若干差異仍然存在，但基本方向相去不遠，值得大家樂觀以待。重要的是，不論朝野或人民都明白年金改革是台灣無可迴避的改造工程，也唯有站穩公平、合理的立場，改革才能得到人們的掌聲，並獲得被改革者的信服。因此，馬政府必須步步為營，審慎因應，絕不能重蹈證所稅「有公平、無掌聲」的覆轍。尤其勞保問題要不要放在此際一併處理，勢必被相提並論進而引發爭議；如果九百萬勞工和一百萬軍公教同時反彈，馬政府消受得了嗎？
我們也要提醒民進黨：年金改革成功，是台灣人民同蒙其利，綠營千萬不可將之視作政治鬥爭而濫行杯葛。如果能提出好的對案，相信民眾都樂於支持。
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
Pension Reform: Equal Wealth, not Equal Poverty
Pension Reform: Equal Wealth, not Equal Poverty
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2013
Summary: The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
Full text below:
The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
In any discussion of pension reform, a few points must first be made clear. First of all, fiscal constraints are all too real. This phenomenon is not unique to the ROC. Governments the world over are cutting back on expenditures. The fiscal burden is not limited to civil service pensions. It also includes labour. If the problem remains unresolved, the burden will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the next generation. Pension reform affects generational justice. Laborers are not the only ones who have offspring. So do civil servants. This is something our generation must confront.
Secondly, pension reform for labor could lead to bankruptcies. This could include excessively high public sector retirement benefits and welfare. This could lead to conflicts between the government and the public. But public officials and private citizens have always been separate groups. One may try, but one can never make them completely the same. Private enterprise valiues results. Its evaluations are harsh. Performance levels are clearly reflected in income levels. Labor exploits any opportunity to demand high pay. But labor also risk being laid off or dismissed for poor performance. Civil servants are in a different boat altogether. No matter how hard they work, their salaries and benefits are fixed according to the system. Their annual salaries increase according to seniority. They do not receive annual bonuses. No matter how effective their department's performance might be, they will not receive bonuses. These life choices are made the moment one enters the workplace. During the course of one's career, one has many opportunities to change occupations. Whether one changes occupations depends on one's personal choices, personal values, and personal ambitions. As a civil servant, one must be psychologically prepared to do a good job even if one has job security and no chance to strike it rich. Making money should not be a priority for civil servants.
Thirdly, civil servants receive a preferential 18% interest rate on their savings. This has remained controversial for many years, and has undergone several adjustments. Those who entered the civil service after 1992 do not qualify for the special 18% interest rate. Their benefits have been reduced. Yet they remain targets during the current pension reforms. The reason why is simple. When the preferential 18% interest rate was set years ago, bank interest rates were 12% to 13%. Today bank interest rates have fallen sharply, to a mere 2% to 3%. This is clearly inconsistent with market level interest rates. Civil servants who chose early retirement have already benefitted from the 18% interest rate. They have already received ten to twenty years of preferential interest. They have not been mistreated by the government. Others retired late. Some retired after 1978. Taiwan's economy was then making a quantum leap. By then, civil service pay levels were already caught up with those in the private sector. Current salaries in the public sector are about the same as those in the private sector. Therefore there is no need to retain the 18% interest rate. Why make civil servants suffer such long-term humiliation?
To be fair, ROC civil servants are required to pass national exams before being hired. The standards are comparable to those in advanced countries. This is especially true for the Department of Household Registration and the Department of Civil Affairs. These civil servants stand on the front lines. They deal with the public. They are trained to be cordial and patient. Now consider the matter from another perspective. What's the difference between the civil service and private enterprise? In the civil service, the employer is the government. The government is the manager authorized by the public. In short, the boss of the civil service is every tax-paying citizen. In any agency, their job is to serve the people. Those who lack a sense of mission serving the public, cannot be good public servants. Consider government administration from the perspective of corporate governance. When government revenue shrinks, how can one make government sustainable? This is the shared responsibility of every civil servant. So why has pension reform provoked such a backlash?
Outgoing CLA Comprehensive Planning Director Lee Lai-hsi is being removed as manager. His labor pension reform called for employers to increase their contribution from six percent to eight percent. This may improve the labor retirement income replacement rate. So why is it necessary to cut civil service pensions? He also appealed to civil servants. "Raise your pens, use your keyboards, get the message out, show your strength." Lee Lai-hsi's removal suggests that he is being punished for criticizing his superiors. CLA chairman Pan Shi-wei tried to explain this away. Pan said. "Lee Lai-hsi's was a director. He was made an advisor. His salary is the same. How is this punishment?" Lee Lai-hsi's advocacy on behalf of civil servants is worth considering. Isn't the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) supposed to serve labor? Isn't it supposed to negotiate labor disputes. Isn't it supposed to put labor interests first? Government is a unified entity. The pension program controversy has just begun. Those responsible for labor matters must not allow themselves to descend into total chaos.
The CLA is responsible for civil servants from the central to local government level. Civil servants must be clear in their understanding of the situation. They must be resolute in their purpose. Making money is a laudable goal in life, but not for civil servants. Once one enters public service, the most one can expect to enjoy is adequate safeguards and a modicum of security. One may feel a sense of accomplishment, but it will never be the result of personal achievements. They will be the result of serving the people as a whole. They will be the result of giving the people the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The vast majority of civil servants, including Lee Lai-hsi, will be happy if most laborers are happy. The purpsoe of pension reform is equal wealth, not equal poverty. The people will respect and appreciate civil servants willing to sacrifice their own vested interests.
年金改革追求的是富而均 非均而貧
2013-01-29
中國時報
年金改革方案即將正式出爐，然而，多數討論集中於退休公務員的待遇福利，如何與廣大的勞工盡可能拉平，讓八十萬公務員處於近乎集體情緒挫折狀態之中，反彈聲四起，讓執政黨立委紛紛醞釀提出不同的修法版本，情勢之複雜，已可預見改革難度之高，將讓改革未蒙其利先受其害。
年金改革的討論中，有幾個觀點必須釐清，第一，國家財政拮据是不爭的事實，而且，這個現象不僅台灣獨有，全球各國政府都在精簡支出，財政的負荷不僅在於公務員的年金，包括勞工亦然，如果不解決，包袱勢必遞延到下一代，年金改革攸關世代正義，不只勞工有下一代，公務員也有下一代，這是我們這一代人必須正視的課題。
第二，年金改革從勞保可能破產延伸到公部門退休待遇福利過高，隱隱有政府、民間相抗之勢，然而，官、民本來就是兩個系統，盡量拉平但不可能完全齊平，民間企業講究業績，考核銳利，績效高低反映在薪給落差極大，勞工有機會因為認真有戰功而暴得高薪，也有風險因為績效不彰而遭資遣或解雇；公務員則不然，再忠勤任事者，其薪給福利還是得照制度走，年度能加薪依年資順加，年度不能加薪則部門再有績效都不能獨加，人生在踏出職場的第一步時就做了抉擇，過程中有許多機會轉職，轉與不轉間自有個人對人生價值與志向的選擇。既為公務員，就要做好一輩子固有保障卻發不了大財的心理準備；賺錢，應該不是公務員的選項。
第三，公務員退休十八％優惠存款，在爭議多年並經幾次調整後，凡民國八十四年以後進入公部門的公務員、以及之後的年資都不計入十八％的適用範圍，相對過去已經縮減許多，還是在這一波年金改革中成為箭靶子，何以致此？理由很簡單，當年訂出十八％優存利率時，銀行利率還有十二到十三％，如今銀行利率大幅下滑到只剩下一.二或一.三％，顯然不符合利率市場所謂的公平。對已退休享受過十八％的公務員而言，早退者已經享受過十幾、廿多年的優惠存款，就政府的照顧而言，不能再說有所虧待，晚退者特別是民國七十多年之後台灣經濟大幅躍升，公務員薪給水準已經跟上民間部門，至於現任公務員的薪給待遇甚至比一般民間企業也不差，又何須強留十八％，讓公務員的尊嚴長期遭此羞辱？
持平而論，台灣公務員都得經過國家考試晉用，水準相對於先進國家一點都不差，尤其戶政、民政等第一線與民眾接觸的基層公務員，都得練就親切隨和耐煩的本事，但換一個角度想，公務員為什麼和一般民間企業不同？公務員的雇主是政府，政府是人民授權的管理單位，質言之，公務員的老闆是每一位納稅公民，不論在任何單位，其工作就是服務人民，沒有服務人民的使命感，就不可能做一個好的公僕。從企業治理看政府管理，當政府稅收拮据之際，如何讓政府永續經營，就是每一位公務員共同的責任，那麼又何須對年金改革反彈至此？
原任勞委會綜合規畫處長的李來希，傳出將調離主管職，他為年金改革發聲主張只要將勞退新制的雇主提撥率由現行六％提高到八％，就可能提高勞工退休的所得替代率，何須調降公務員退休年金？他更呼籲公務員「提起你的筆，用你的鍵盤，把訊息傳遞出去，展現力量…。」李來希的調動被聯想為因嗆高層而遭打壓，勞委會主委潘世偉嚴正澄清，「李來希從處長調參事，薪水、（主管）加給都沒少，這叫打壓嗎？」李來希為公務員發聲，值得深思，然而，勞委會不是該以服務勞工、協調勞資以為勞工爭權益為先嗎？政府一體，年金方案才冒出一點頭，勞工主管部門不能自己先亂了套。
從勞委會擴及政府中央到地方各部門的公務員們都要有正確的認知、堅強的心志，人生可以賺錢牟利為目的，但不是公務員，既入公門，能享受的頂多是足夠的保障，追求現世安妥，而其成就感的來源不單是個人的成功，而是服務最大多數人，讓人民有最多機會享受成功的果實；相信包括李來希在內的絕大多數公務員，都會以看到廣大勞工的笑容為樂。年金改革追求的是富而均，而非均而貧，相信全民也會向所有願意犧牲些微既有利益的公務員致上敬意和謝意。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2013
Summary: The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
Full text below:
The government is about to announce its pension reform plan. Debate has centered on salaries and benefits for retired civil servants. It has centered on how they can be made equal with those of most of the work force. It has had an poweful emotional effect on 800,000 civil servants. The backlash is felt everywhere. It has enabled DPP legislators to propose amending the law. The situation is complex. Any reform faces a high degree of difficulty. Reforms might do much harm before they do much good.
In any discussion of pension reform, a few points must first be made clear. First of all, fiscal constraints are all too real. This phenomenon is not unique to the ROC. Governments the world over are cutting back on expenditures. The fiscal burden is not limited to civil service pensions. It also includes labour. If the problem remains unresolved, the burden will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the next generation. Pension reform affects generational justice. Laborers are not the only ones who have offspring. So do civil servants. This is something our generation must confront.
Secondly, pension reform for labor could lead to bankruptcies. This could include excessively high public sector retirement benefits and welfare. This could lead to conflicts between the government and the public. But public officials and private citizens have always been separate groups. One may try, but one can never make them completely the same. Private enterprise valiues results. Its evaluations are harsh. Performance levels are clearly reflected in income levels. Labor exploits any opportunity to demand high pay. But labor also risk being laid off or dismissed for poor performance. Civil servants are in a different boat altogether. No matter how hard they work, their salaries and benefits are fixed according to the system. Their annual salaries increase according to seniority. They do not receive annual bonuses. No matter how effective their department's performance might be, they will not receive bonuses. These life choices are made the moment one enters the workplace. During the course of one's career, one has many opportunities to change occupations. Whether one changes occupations depends on one's personal choices, personal values, and personal ambitions. As a civil servant, one must be psychologically prepared to do a good job even if one has job security and no chance to strike it rich. Making money should not be a priority for civil servants.
Thirdly, civil servants receive a preferential 18% interest rate on their savings. This has remained controversial for many years, and has undergone several adjustments. Those who entered the civil service after 1992 do not qualify for the special 18% interest rate. Their benefits have been reduced. Yet they remain targets during the current pension reforms. The reason why is simple. When the preferential 18% interest rate was set years ago, bank interest rates were 12% to 13%. Today bank interest rates have fallen sharply, to a mere 2% to 3%. This is clearly inconsistent with market level interest rates. Civil servants who chose early retirement have already benefitted from the 18% interest rate. They have already received ten to twenty years of preferential interest. They have not been mistreated by the government. Others retired late. Some retired after 1978. Taiwan's economy was then making a quantum leap. By then, civil service pay levels were already caught up with those in the private sector. Current salaries in the public sector are about the same as those in the private sector. Therefore there is no need to retain the 18% interest rate. Why make civil servants suffer such long-term humiliation?
To be fair, ROC civil servants are required to pass national exams before being hired. The standards are comparable to those in advanced countries. This is especially true for the Department of Household Registration and the Department of Civil Affairs. These civil servants stand on the front lines. They deal with the public. They are trained to be cordial and patient. Now consider the matter from another perspective. What's the difference between the civil service and private enterprise? In the civil service, the employer is the government. The government is the manager authorized by the public. In short, the boss of the civil service is every tax-paying citizen. In any agency, their job is to serve the people. Those who lack a sense of mission serving the public, cannot be good public servants. Consider government administration from the perspective of corporate governance. When government revenue shrinks, how can one make government sustainable? This is the shared responsibility of every civil servant. So why has pension reform provoked such a backlash?
Outgoing CLA Comprehensive Planning Director Lee Lai-hsi is being removed as manager. His labor pension reform called for employers to increase their contribution from six percent to eight percent. This may improve the labor retirement income replacement rate. So why is it necessary to cut civil service pensions? He also appealed to civil servants. "Raise your pens, use your keyboards, get the message out, show your strength." Lee Lai-hsi's removal suggests that he is being punished for criticizing his superiors. CLA chairman Pan Shi-wei tried to explain this away. Pan said. "Lee Lai-hsi's was a director. He was made an advisor. His salary is the same. How is this punishment?" Lee Lai-hsi's advocacy on behalf of civil servants is worth considering. Isn't the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) supposed to serve labor? Isn't it supposed to negotiate labor disputes. Isn't it supposed to put labor interests first? Government is a unified entity. The pension program controversy has just begun. Those responsible for labor matters must not allow themselves to descend into total chaos.
The CLA is responsible for civil servants from the central to local government level. Civil servants must be clear in their understanding of the situation. They must be resolute in their purpose. Making money is a laudable goal in life, but not for civil servants. Once one enters public service, the most one can expect to enjoy is adequate safeguards and a modicum of security. One may feel a sense of accomplishment, but it will never be the result of personal achievements. They will be the result of serving the people as a whole. They will be the result of giving the people the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The vast majority of civil servants, including Lee Lai-hsi, will be happy if most laborers are happy. The purpsoe of pension reform is equal wealth, not equal poverty. The people will respect and appreciate civil servants willing to sacrifice their own vested interests.
年金改革追求的是富而均 非均而貧
2013-01-29
中國時報
年金改革方案即將正式出爐，然而，多數討論集中於退休公務員的待遇福利，如何與廣大的勞工盡可能拉平，讓八十萬公務員處於近乎集體情緒挫折狀態之中，反彈聲四起，讓執政黨立委紛紛醞釀提出不同的修法版本，情勢之複雜，已可預見改革難度之高，將讓改革未蒙其利先受其害。
年金改革的討論中，有幾個觀點必須釐清，第一，國家財政拮据是不爭的事實，而且，這個現象不僅台灣獨有，全球各國政府都在精簡支出，財政的負荷不僅在於公務員的年金，包括勞工亦然，如果不解決，包袱勢必遞延到下一代，年金改革攸關世代正義，不只勞工有下一代，公務員也有下一代，這是我們這一代人必須正視的課題。
第二，年金改革從勞保可能破產延伸到公部門退休待遇福利過高，隱隱有政府、民間相抗之勢，然而，官、民本來就是兩個系統，盡量拉平但不可能完全齊平，民間企業講究業績，考核銳利，績效高低反映在薪給落差極大，勞工有機會因為認真有戰功而暴得高薪，也有風險因為績效不彰而遭資遣或解雇；公務員則不然，再忠勤任事者，其薪給福利還是得照制度走，年度能加薪依年資順加，年度不能加薪則部門再有績效都不能獨加，人生在踏出職場的第一步時就做了抉擇，過程中有許多機會轉職，轉與不轉間自有個人對人生價值與志向的選擇。既為公務員，就要做好一輩子固有保障卻發不了大財的心理準備；賺錢，應該不是公務員的選項。
第三，公務員退休十八％優惠存款，在爭議多年並經幾次調整後，凡民國八十四年以後進入公部門的公務員、以及之後的年資都不計入十八％的適用範圍，相對過去已經縮減許多，還是在這一波年金改革中成為箭靶子，何以致此？理由很簡單，當年訂出十八％優存利率時，銀行利率還有十二到十三％，如今銀行利率大幅下滑到只剩下一.二或一.三％，顯然不符合利率市場所謂的公平。對已退休享受過十八％的公務員而言，早退者已經享受過十幾、廿多年的優惠存款，就政府的照顧而言，不能再說有所虧待，晚退者特別是民國七十多年之後台灣經濟大幅躍升，公務員薪給水準已經跟上民間部門，至於現任公務員的薪給待遇甚至比一般民間企業也不差，又何須強留十八％，讓公務員的尊嚴長期遭此羞辱？
持平而論，台灣公務員都得經過國家考試晉用，水準相對於先進國家一點都不差，尤其戶政、民政等第一線與民眾接觸的基層公務員，都得練就親切隨和耐煩的本事，但換一個角度想，公務員為什麼和一般民間企業不同？公務員的雇主是政府，政府是人民授權的管理單位，質言之，公務員的老闆是每一位納稅公民，不論在任何單位，其工作就是服務人民，沒有服務人民的使命感，就不可能做一個好的公僕。從企業治理看政府管理，當政府稅收拮据之際，如何讓政府永續經營，就是每一位公務員共同的責任，那麼又何須對年金改革反彈至此？
原任勞委會綜合規畫處長的李來希，傳出將調離主管職，他為年金改革發聲主張只要將勞退新制的雇主提撥率由現行六％提高到八％，就可能提高勞工退休的所得替代率，何須調降公務員退休年金？他更呼籲公務員「提起你的筆，用你的鍵盤，把訊息傳遞出去，展現力量…。」李來希的調動被聯想為因嗆高層而遭打壓，勞委會主委潘世偉嚴正澄清，「李來希從處長調參事，薪水、（主管）加給都沒少，這叫打壓嗎？」李來希為公務員發聲，值得深思，然而，勞委會不是該以服務勞工、協調勞資以為勞工爭權益為先嗎？政府一體，年金方案才冒出一點頭，勞工主管部門不能自己先亂了套。
從勞委會擴及政府中央到地方各部門的公務員們都要有正確的認知、堅強的心志，人生可以賺錢牟利為目的，但不是公務員，既入公門，能享受的頂多是足夠的保障，追求現世安妥，而其成就感的來源不單是個人的成功，而是服務最大多數人，讓人民有最多機會享受成功的果實；相信包括李來希在內的絕大多數公務員，都會以看到廣大勞工的笑容為樂。年金改革追求的是富而均，而非均而貧，相信全民也會向所有願意犧牲些微既有利益的公務員致上敬意和謝意。
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