Tsai Ing-wen and the KMT: Content Free
China Times News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 14, 2014
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's transformation efforts remain hollow. But they serve as a reminder to the KMT. In the remaining two years that Ma Ying-jeou has as president, the KMT must concentrate efforts to revive the economy and ensure full employment. Ma Ying-jeou is party chairman. He must do his utmost to rebuild the KMT's public support. The two go hand in hand. Only then can the KMT revitalize itself. Tsai Ing-wen's ersatz transformation of the DPP will not fool voters.
Full text below:
The DPP faces a critical choice in its cross-strait policy path. Tsai Ing-wen has suddenly decided to speak up. She said the DPP has its traditional view of cross-strait relations. But its views must also acknowledge political reality. It must view cross-strait issues from Taiwan's perspective. But it must also dialogue and interact with [Mainland] China. This was classic Tsai Ing-wen. Rattle off all manner of feel-good terms, including "values," "reality," and "dialogue." In fact, none of these terms contain any substance, because she is simply unwilling to reveal where she actually stands.
Tsai Ing-wen said that a DPP China policy debate would require comprehensive and precise planning. Otherwise the DPP could lose maneuvering room. She said cross-strait policy is a sensitive issue. She said some topics are suitable for debate, while others are not. Obviously she has reservations about the DPP debating its cross-strait policy path. Tsai Ing-wen has a short memory. Many years ago, when Hsu Hsing-liang promoted a major debate, he did not shrink the DPP's maneuvering room. Just the opposite. He won rave reviews. Nor did Tsai Ing-wen explain which topics were suitable for debate and her own position on sensitive issues.
Tsai Ing-wen's attitude is both conservative and ambiguous. There can be only one real reason for this. She wants to avoids taking any position whatsoever. She wants to come across as flexibile and pragmatic. But she cannot bring herself to forgo the support of Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Therefore she utters meaningless euphemisms. On key issues she casts herself as a pragmatist charged with DPP reform.
Tsai Ing-wen wants to play the role of helmsman in the DPP's transformation. On the one hand, she evades cross-strait issues, while in practice, she clings to Taiwan independence. On the other hand, she panders to civic groups. She appeals to them, hoping to win political support. Tsai Ing-wen says the DPP must undergo reform. The party must "decide how to relate to civil society." She says it must not "relinquish the streets to civic groups" and allow the DPP "to become just another onlooker." Tsai called for "a progressive alliance to transform Taiwan." She is trying to present herself as the political representative of civic groups.
Consider Tsai Ing-wen's family background and political path. She originally had nothing in common with lower middle class voters, the pro-democracy movement, or social movements. When she served as a cabinet official, her dominant policy concerns seldom had anything to do with human rights and social justice. Examine her past record. Her positions on nuclear power plants and Guoguang Petrochemical underwent huge changes. She has totally reversed herself on many issues. But once she found herself out of power, Tsai Ing-wen began holding forth on human rights, social justice, and social movements. She began establishing foundations and online fora, recruiting talent, extending her antennae, parroting social movement rhetoric, all in an effort to burnish her halo. But was she using the social movements, or genuinely lending them her support? Was Tsai Ing-wen really born again? Or merely given a makeover? The answer is clear.
Tsai Ing-wen's nominal "transformation" gained wide applause. It was not because Tsai Ing-wen became chummy with the lower middle class and socially disadvantaged. It was not because she offered a clear agenda. It was because the ruling Kuomintang left a huge political vacuum that the DPP could exploit
The ruling KMT government's policies and personnel appointments reflect its obliviousness to public sentiment. They provoke public discontent. They have become the primary target of civic group protests. The KMT is increasingly chummy with powerful plutocrats, It is increasingly alienated from ordinary people. The KMT has never reversed this image. KMT political rhetoric is uninspiring. It cannot inspire enthusiasm among the electorate. The above highlight the serious disconnect between the KMT and the new era and the new generation.
The KMT has been steady and forward-looking on cross-strait issues. On these it has been more trustworthy than the DPP. It currently wields political power. As long as the KMT formulates sound policy and makes full use of its resources, it can connect with the larger society and enable the party to remain in power. But this entails a number of related conditions. First, its personnel appointments must recruit the right people, with fresh perspectives. This will ensure that its policies achieve a better balance between economic development and social justice. Second, the KMT needs to communicate better with civic groups. It must reflect the values and issues held by civil society. It must accept advice from civic groups on specific policy, and put them into practice. It must not go through the motions, such that "the ship passes and leaves no trace upon the waters." Third, the KMT organizational structure must be more flexible. It must attract qualified people from different walk of life. Politically, it must be more inclusive. It must allow "center-right" to "center-left" forces to gain a foothold within the party, enhance its vitality, and expand its social base.
Unfortunately, over the past five years, the KMT leadership has lacked such thinking. Call for reform reverberated, but remained on the surface. The KMT has promoted many young people. But it has not allowed them to engage in creative thinking. The KMT has many representatives from social organizations and academia on its roster of legislators without portfolio. But their performance in the Legislative Yuan has remained lackluster. They have not been able to set the agenda, increase popular support, or rebuild the image of the party.
Tsai Ing-wen's transformation efforts remain hollow. But they serve as a reminder to the KMT. In the remaining two years that Ma Ying-jeou has as president, the KMT must concentrate efforts to revive the economy and ensure full employment. Ma Ying-jeou is party chairman. He must do his utmost to rebuild the KMT's public support. The two go hand in hand. Only then can the KMT revitalize itself. Tsai Ing-wen's ersatz transformation of the DPP will not fool voters.
社論－蔡英文的空與國民黨的虛
2014-01-14 01:32
中國時報
【本報訊】
民進黨兩岸路線的轉型已經面臨關鍵性的抉擇，就在這個時候，蔡英文說話了。她說，民進黨有傳統的兩岸立場與價值思考，但也要納進政治現實，從台灣角度看兩岸問題，並須持續與中國對話、互動。這是典型的蔡氏風格，什麼好聽的詞都說了，包括價值、現實、對話等等，但是就是沒有實質內容，不願表露立場。
蔡英文還說，民進黨如果要辦中國政策辯論，要經完整且精密規畫，否則可能消失很多處理事情的空間，又說兩岸政策很敏感，有些事適合辯論、有些事不適合。顯然，她對民進黨辯論兩岸路線是持保留態度。蔡英文忘了，當年許信良推動大辯論，並沒有讓民進黨的空間消失，反而普獲好評，她也根本不說清楚，哪些議題適合辯論，她自己在這些敏感問題上又是什麼立場。
蔡英文的保守、曖昧態度，只有一個真正的理由，就是她迴避表態，她想沾上彈性、務實的美名，又不能失掉獨派支持，所以始終說空話，並且在實際的、關鍵性的問題上，扮演牽制民進黨轉型前進的角色。
但是，蔡英文還是要把自己裝扮成民進黨轉型的舵手，所以她一方面迴避兩岸問題，實際上堅持獨派立場，一方面向公民運動招手、示好，希望從中累積資本。蔡英文聲稱民進黨必須轉型，黨「與公民社會的關係必須做出抉擇」，不能再「把街頭讓給了公民團體」，民進黨自己「變成眾多觀眾之一」。蔡英文還「號召組織一個改變台灣的進步聯盟」，努力想把自己打扮成公民運動的政治代理人。
回顧蔡英文的家世背景與從政道路，原本和中下階層、民主運動、社會運動可以說毫無淵源，她在擔任內閣官員時，所主導或關注的政策議題，和人權、社會正義也少有關連。翻開過去的紀錄，我們會發現，她在核四、國光石化等眾多議題上，立場巨變，昨是今非。但是，在野之後的蔡英文，開始從口中吐出人權、社會正義、公民運動等辭彙，更透過成立基金會與網路論壇等方式，廣納人才，伸長觸角，呼應公民運動熱潮，試圖打造身上的光環。但，這究竟是利用公民運動，還是誠意支持？這是蔡英文的脫胎換骨，還是塗脂抹粉？答案其實是很清楚的。
然而，不可否認的，蔡英文的「轉型」還是引來不少掌聲，原因不在於蔡英文真的和中下階層、弱勢群體打成一片，或者是提出了什麼清楚具體的主張，而是執政的國民黨自己竟然放棄一大塊政治空間，徒然讓民進黨從中取利。
當今政府無感的政策與人事布局，不斷製造民怨，已經成為公民運動主要的抗爭對象。國民黨和財閥權貴更為親近、離庶民百姓更為遙遠的刻板印象，也始終沒有根本扭轉。國民黨人的政治語言普遍貧乏，難以爭取選民熱情支持。凡此種種，皆凸顯國民黨和新時代、新世代的新議題已經嚴重脫節。
在兩岸議題上穩健前進的國民黨，原本就比民進黨更獲得民眾信賴。而作為掌握政權的力量，國民黨只要善於運用政策與資源，完全可以擴大社會連結，讓該黨能永居不敗之地。但這需要幾個環環相扣的條件。首先，是在人事布局上，能進用有新思維、新視野的適當人才，讓政策本身就能更全面，更能平衡經濟發展與社會公義。其次，是要善於和各類公民團體對話，要嘛是能呼應公民團體所倡議的價值與議題，要嘛是能在具體的政策上採納公民團體的建言，具體的加以實踐，絕非「船過水無痕」，淪為形式主義。第三，國民黨本身在組織結構上應該要更有彈性，吸納不同社會領域的優質人才，在政治光譜與價值理念上則應該更為廣泛，讓從「中間偏右」到「中間偏左」的力量都能在黨內取得一席之地，藉以增進黨的活力，擴大黨的社會基礎。
可惜的是，5年多下來，國民黨領導層始終缺乏這樣的思考與布局，「改革」口號喊得響徹雲霄，實際上卻停留在非常表面的層次上。國民黨確實拔擢了不少青年才俊，但未必能讓他們的創意與理念得到揮灑空間，國民黨在不分區名單上安排了多位社會團體和學界的代表，但在立法院表現卻乏善可陳，起不了引領議題風潮、擴大支持群眾，重建政黨形象的作用。
蔡英文的轉型努力即使看起來仍空，但可以提醒國民黨：在剩下的兩年多時間，馬英九作為總統，要集中精力搞好為全民拚經濟、拚民生的工作，作為主席，更要竭盡心力推動重建國民黨社會基礎的工作，兩者同時並進，國民黨才能重現生機，而民進黨或蔡英文的假轉型，也就起不了什麼騙選票的作用。
Monday, January 13, 2014
Sunday, January 12, 2014
A "Taiwan Consensus" Absent a DPP Consensus?
A "Taiwan Consensus" Absent a DPP Consensus?
Editorial contributed by a noted Technology Manager
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 10, 2014
Summary: The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue. Alas, the DPP spin on "consensus" does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.
Full text below:
The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and aproved the "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." The proposal to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform did not pass. The committee then resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue.
The DPP is proficient at word games. Once again it has demonstrated this proficiency in spades. Anyone can see at a glance that this was merely old wine in new bottles. It was the product of a compromise among the DPP's various factions. The content is nothing new. It is essentially the "Taiwan consensus" that Tsai Ing-wen trotted out during the 2012 election campaign. It has merely been poured into a new bottle labeled "Taiwan's internal consensus." DPP elites and pro-Green academics convened for days on end to discuss the DPP's "China policy." But what reaction is possible, other than "Where's the beef?" It truly was a let-down.
Tsai Ing-wen lost her presidential bid in 2012. The main reason was her failure to rid herself of the Taiwan independence albatross around her neck. Her vague and ambiguous "Taiwan consensus" and "Peace with differences" slogans left voters scratching their heads, and made them wonder whether she was selling them a pig in a poke.
The Democratic Progressive Party had been out of power for six years. But who knew factional disputes within would prevent it from arriving at a cross-strait policy consensus? Would the consensus be "one China" or "different constitutional interpretations?" Would the Taiwan independence party platform be frozen or not? No consensus could be achieved. And yet they expect to consolidate a "Taiwan consensus?" This is what is referred to in Chinese as "searching for fish in a tree."
The DPP's "Taiwan consensus" is subject to hundreds of different interpretations. This is the most perverse aspect of the DPP's "Taiwan consensus" or renamed "Taiwan's internal consensus." What is it really? How does anyone know whether a consensus has been reached? Who is qualified to determine whether a consensus has been reached? How much support must it have before it can be referred to as a consensus?
One argument is that a consensus can be determined through opinion polls.
Frank Hsieh has his own take on this. As he told reporters, the DPP's cross-strait policy has a 27% public approval rating. The KMT policy's rating is 35%. The DPP must seek to achieve a 60% approval rating. According to Hsieh, a consensus requires a greater than 60% approval rating. On this, both the ruling and opposition parties have falled short.
Another argument is that a consensus can be discerned by means of a public referendum.
This has been a goal of the DPP for years. The DPP has longed to use a referendum to show "respect for the Taiwanese peoples' right to self-determination." But if the DPP includes "declaring Taiwan independence and founding a new nation" within the referendum, it becomes a double-edged sword. If such a referendum were to succeed, it would prove that the DPP's Taiwan independence advocacy has traction. But if it were to fail, the DPP would not merely lose popular support. It would leave the Taiwan independence movement prostrate for years to come.
A third argument is that a consensus can be achieved by means of political party negotiations.
MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi will soon visit the Mainland. The ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan have reached a consensus. When Wang Yu-chi visits the Mainland, they want him to reject or ignore proposals regarding the "one China framework" or "opposition to Taiwan independence." Otherwise he will be held politically accountable. According to this argument, the result of "interparty consultation" within the Legislative Yuan amounts to a consensus. It represents majority opinion. But consider the evils perpetrated by the Legislature in the past. Such "interparty consultation" is merely a minority overriding a majority. It is utterly contrary to the principle of majority rule within a democracy. How can it possibly represent mainstream public opinion?
A fourth argument is that a DPP victory would in itself amount to a popular consensus.
If by some fluke the DPP emerges victorious in local and central elections, it will argue that its victory was the result of a majority of people agreeing with their political ideas and cross-strait policy. Therefore their proposal naturally represents a Taiwan consensus. But consider the paradox. The KMT clung to the 1992 consensus, and emerged victorious during the previous election. Yet the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. It refuses to concede that the KMT's proposals represent mainstream public opinion, and constitute a Taiwan consensus.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was baffling. During the 2012 election, she argued that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." She argued that this premise would provide Taiwan with the greatest degree of internal cohesion. It would amount to a Taiwan consensus. It would clearly distinguish the DPP from the Kuomintang. But this makes no sense whatsoever. The KMT also argues that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." Therefore how does this provide market segmentation? Was Tsai once again merely playing with words? Is this really what she thinks the national consensus is? If she does, why do the DPP and the Deep Greens disagree? Why are they unwilling to accept even the ROC Constitution, the ROC National Flag, and the ROC National Anthem?
In other words , the DPP spin on "consensus," does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.
名家專論－黨內都沒共識 哪來「台灣共識」
稍後再讀
中國時報 洛杉基 2014年01月13日 04:10
民進黨本月召開中國事務委會並通過《2014對中政策檢討紀要》，「凍結台獨黨綱」提議未過關，將以「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」作為兩岸對話基礎。
善於玩弄文字遊戲的民進黨，這次再度發揮到極致。明眼人一看就知，這根本是新瓶裝舊酒，是各派系妥協下的產物。內容本質其實就是蔡英文在2012大選年所提出的「台灣共識」，這次換了個新瓶子叫「台灣內部共識」，實在是了無新意。民進黨的菁英與挺綠學者齊聚一堂，討論了好幾天的「對中政策」，竟然端不出一盤新鮮的牛肉，實在讓人失望！
蔡英文女士在2012年敗選，主要的原因，就是拋不開「台獨」這個沉重包袱。外加她提出的「台灣共識」、「和而不同」等模稜兩可的空泛口號，讓選民聽不懂她葫蘆裡到底賣的是什麼藥。
沒想到，在野6年的民進黨，由於內部派系意見分歧，依然無法凝聚黨內兩岸政策的「共識」，到底是憲法一中還是憲政各表，是凍結台獨黨綱還是無需多此一舉等等，莫衷一是，他們卻期待台灣內部能夠凝聚「台灣共識」，可謂是緣木求魚。
如果認真分析民進黨所謂的「台灣共識」意涵，我們會發現，這句話能有上百種的不同解讀。這就是「台灣共識」或「台灣內部共識」最弔詭的地方。到底什麼是共識？如何知道已經達成共識？誰有資格決定共識已形成？得到多少支持度，才叫做共識？
第一種說法：共識靠民調。
對此謝長廷有他的看法。他向媒體表示，民進黨兩岸政策民意滿意度為2成7，國民黨則有3成5。民進黨應尋求6成以上共識。依照他的解釋，所謂的「共識」，必須得到6成以上的民調支持。這點朝野兩黨都不及格。
第二種說法：共識靠公投。
這是民進黨多年來追求的目標，用公投來彰顯「尊重台灣人民自決的主張」。但是如果把「獨立建國」列入公投，可是一把兩面刃；成功了固然讓民進黨的台獨主張有了著力點，但是如果不幸失敗，不但讓民進黨失去民心，還讓台獨主張多年無法翻身。
第三種說法：共識靠政黨協商。
陸委會主委王郁琦近期將登陸，立院朝野達成「共識」，要求王郁琦赴陸訪問期間，不得接受或呼應「一中框架」、「反台獨」等主張，否則自負政治責任。也就是說，立法院的「朝野協商」結果就是「共識」，就可以代表多數民意。不過從過去立法院的斑斑劣跡來看，這個「朝野協商」根本就是個少數凌駕多數、完全違背民主多數決的畸形產物，哪能代表真正主流民意？
第四種說法：民進黨勝選就足以代表人民共識。
如果民進黨僥倖能在地方及中央選舉勝選，他們自然會振振有詞地說，他們勝選正由於多數民眾認同他們的政治主張與兩岸政策。他們的主張自然就是台灣人民的「共識」。不過弔詭的是，即令堅持「九二共識」的國民黨在大選獲勝，依然無法讓民進黨接受「九二共識」，依然無法讓民進黨認為國民黨代表了主流民意、代表了台灣共識。
蔡英文說得很玄。她說：2012年大選時，她提出「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」；若能以此為基礎，凝聚台灣內部最大共識，就是台灣共識，可和國民黨明確區隔。這點我們又更看不懂了，難道「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」不也正是國民黨的主張，如何做市場區隔？還是又在玩弄文字遊戲？如果這就是她認為的全民共識，為何民進黨及深綠的民眾無法認同？為何他們連中華民國憲法、國旗國歌都不願意承認？
換句話說，民進黨對共識的解釋，不但黨內無法形成共識，也無法與全民形成共識。而民進黨內部對台灣共識的解讀，與真正的主流民意，兩者相距十萬八千里。（作者為科技業經理人）
Editorial contributed by a noted Technology Manager
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 10, 2014
Summary: The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue. Alas, the DPP spin on "consensus" does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.
Full text below:
The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and aproved the "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." The proposal to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform did not pass. The committee then resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue.
The DPP is proficient at word games. Once again it has demonstrated this proficiency in spades. Anyone can see at a glance that this was merely old wine in new bottles. It was the product of a compromise among the DPP's various factions. The content is nothing new. It is essentially the "Taiwan consensus" that Tsai Ing-wen trotted out during the 2012 election campaign. It has merely been poured into a new bottle labeled "Taiwan's internal consensus." DPP elites and pro-Green academics convened for days on end to discuss the DPP's "China policy." But what reaction is possible, other than "Where's the beef?" It truly was a let-down.
Tsai Ing-wen lost her presidential bid in 2012. The main reason was her failure to rid herself of the Taiwan independence albatross around her neck. Her vague and ambiguous "Taiwan consensus" and "Peace with differences" slogans left voters scratching their heads, and made them wonder whether she was selling them a pig in a poke.
The Democratic Progressive Party had been out of power for six years. But who knew factional disputes within would prevent it from arriving at a cross-strait policy consensus? Would the consensus be "one China" or "different constitutional interpretations?" Would the Taiwan independence party platform be frozen or not? No consensus could be achieved. And yet they expect to consolidate a "Taiwan consensus?" This is what is referred to in Chinese as "searching for fish in a tree."
The DPP's "Taiwan consensus" is subject to hundreds of different interpretations. This is the most perverse aspect of the DPP's "Taiwan consensus" or renamed "Taiwan's internal consensus." What is it really? How does anyone know whether a consensus has been reached? Who is qualified to determine whether a consensus has been reached? How much support must it have before it can be referred to as a consensus?
One argument is that a consensus can be determined through opinion polls.
Frank Hsieh has his own take on this. As he told reporters, the DPP's cross-strait policy has a 27% public approval rating. The KMT policy's rating is 35%. The DPP must seek to achieve a 60% approval rating. According to Hsieh, a consensus requires a greater than 60% approval rating. On this, both the ruling and opposition parties have falled short.
Another argument is that a consensus can be discerned by means of a public referendum.
This has been a goal of the DPP for years. The DPP has longed to use a referendum to show "respect for the Taiwanese peoples' right to self-determination." But if the DPP includes "declaring Taiwan independence and founding a new nation" within the referendum, it becomes a double-edged sword. If such a referendum were to succeed, it would prove that the DPP's Taiwan independence advocacy has traction. But if it were to fail, the DPP would not merely lose popular support. It would leave the Taiwan independence movement prostrate for years to come.
A third argument is that a consensus can be achieved by means of political party negotiations.
MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi will soon visit the Mainland. The ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan have reached a consensus. When Wang Yu-chi visits the Mainland, they want him to reject or ignore proposals regarding the "one China framework" or "opposition to Taiwan independence." Otherwise he will be held politically accountable. According to this argument, the result of "interparty consultation" within the Legislative Yuan amounts to a consensus. It represents majority opinion. But consider the evils perpetrated by the Legislature in the past. Such "interparty consultation" is merely a minority overriding a majority. It is utterly contrary to the principle of majority rule within a democracy. How can it possibly represent mainstream public opinion?
A fourth argument is that a DPP victory would in itself amount to a popular consensus.
If by some fluke the DPP emerges victorious in local and central elections, it will argue that its victory was the result of a majority of people agreeing with their political ideas and cross-strait policy. Therefore their proposal naturally represents a Taiwan consensus. But consider the paradox. The KMT clung to the 1992 consensus, and emerged victorious during the previous election. Yet the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. It refuses to concede that the KMT's proposals represent mainstream public opinion, and constitute a Taiwan consensus.
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was baffling. During the 2012 election, she argued that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." She argued that this premise would provide Taiwan with the greatest degree of internal cohesion. It would amount to a Taiwan consensus. It would clearly distinguish the DPP from the Kuomintang. But this makes no sense whatsoever. The KMT also argues that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." Therefore how does this provide market segmentation? Was Tsai once again merely playing with words? Is this really what she thinks the national consensus is? If she does, why do the DPP and the Deep Greens disagree? Why are they unwilling to accept even the ROC Constitution, the ROC National Flag, and the ROC National Anthem?
In other words , the DPP spin on "consensus," does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.
名家專論－黨內都沒共識 哪來「台灣共識」
稍後再讀
中國時報 洛杉基 2014年01月13日 04:10
民進黨本月召開中國事務委會並通過《2014對中政策檢討紀要》，「凍結台獨黨綱」提議未過關，將以「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」作為兩岸對話基礎。
善於玩弄文字遊戲的民進黨，這次再度發揮到極致。明眼人一看就知，這根本是新瓶裝舊酒，是各派系妥協下的產物。內容本質其實就是蔡英文在2012大選年所提出的「台灣共識」，這次換了個新瓶子叫「台灣內部共識」，實在是了無新意。民進黨的菁英與挺綠學者齊聚一堂，討論了好幾天的「對中政策」，竟然端不出一盤新鮮的牛肉，實在讓人失望！
蔡英文女士在2012年敗選，主要的原因，就是拋不開「台獨」這個沉重包袱。外加她提出的「台灣共識」、「和而不同」等模稜兩可的空泛口號，讓選民聽不懂她葫蘆裡到底賣的是什麼藥。
沒想到，在野6年的民進黨，由於內部派系意見分歧，依然無法凝聚黨內兩岸政策的「共識」，到底是憲法一中還是憲政各表，是凍結台獨黨綱還是無需多此一舉等等，莫衷一是，他們卻期待台灣內部能夠凝聚「台灣共識」，可謂是緣木求魚。
如果認真分析民進黨所謂的「台灣共識」意涵，我們會發現，這句話能有上百種的不同解讀。這就是「台灣共識」或「台灣內部共識」最弔詭的地方。到底什麼是共識？如何知道已經達成共識？誰有資格決定共識已形成？得到多少支持度，才叫做共識？
第一種說法：共識靠民調。
對此謝長廷有他的看法。他向媒體表示，民進黨兩岸政策民意滿意度為2成7，國民黨則有3成5。民進黨應尋求6成以上共識。依照他的解釋，所謂的「共識」，必須得到6成以上的民調支持。這點朝野兩黨都不及格。
第二種說法：共識靠公投。
這是民進黨多年來追求的目標，用公投來彰顯「尊重台灣人民自決的主張」。但是如果把「獨立建國」列入公投，可是一把兩面刃；成功了固然讓民進黨的台獨主張有了著力點，但是如果不幸失敗，不但讓民進黨失去民心，還讓台獨主張多年無法翻身。
第三種說法：共識靠政黨協商。
陸委會主委王郁琦近期將登陸，立院朝野達成「共識」，要求王郁琦赴陸訪問期間，不得接受或呼應「一中框架」、「反台獨」等主張，否則自負政治責任。也就是說，立法院的「朝野協商」結果就是「共識」，就可以代表多數民意。不過從過去立法院的斑斑劣跡來看，這個「朝野協商」根本就是個少數凌駕多數、完全違背民主多數決的畸形產物，哪能代表真正主流民意？
第四種說法：民進黨勝選就足以代表人民共識。
如果民進黨僥倖能在地方及中央選舉勝選，他們自然會振振有詞地說，他們勝選正由於多數民眾認同他們的政治主張與兩岸政策。他們的主張自然就是台灣人民的「共識」。不過弔詭的是，即令堅持「九二共識」的國民黨在大選獲勝，依然無法讓民進黨接受「九二共識」，依然無法讓民進黨認為國民黨代表了主流民意、代表了台灣共識。
蔡英文說得很玄。她說：2012年大選時，她提出「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」；若能以此為基礎，凝聚台灣內部最大共識，就是台灣共識，可和國民黨明確區隔。這點我們又更看不懂了，難道「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」不也正是國民黨的主張，如何做市場區隔？還是又在玩弄文字遊戲？如果這就是她認為的全民共識，為何民進黨及深綠的民眾無法認同？為何他們連中華民國憲法、國旗國歌都不願意承認？
換句話說，民進黨對共識的解釋，不但黨內無法形成共識，也無法與全民形成共識。而民進黨內部對台灣共識的解讀，與真正的主流民意，兩者相距十萬八千里。（作者為科技業經理人）
Thursday, January 9, 2014
The DPP Must Not Play Taiwan Independence Tricks
The DPP Must Not Play Taiwan Independence Tricks
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 10, 2014
Summary: Circuses often offer the spinning plate trick. Jugglers spin a number of plates on top of bamboo poles. The trick requires a great deal of practice. The Democratic Progressive Party has its own spinning plate trick. It is a dangerous trick, rife with perils. Yesterday the DPP was supposed to issue a "Cross-Strait Policy Summary Report." Instead, the report was demoted to a "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." In other words, the DPP's spinning plates came crashing to the floor.
Full text below:
Circuses often offer the spinning plate trick. Jugglers spin a number of plates on top of bamboo poles. The trick requires a great deal of practice. The Democratic Progressive Party has its own spinning plate trick. It is a dangerous trick, rife with perils. Yesterday the DPP was supposed to issue a "Cross-Strait Policy Summary Report." Instead, the report was demoted to a "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." In other words, the DPP's spinning plates came crashing to the floor.
The DPP's Taiwan independence spinning plates trick used three plates. The first plate was "freezing Taiwan independence." Ker Chien-ming proposed "freezing Taiwan independence." Lin Cho-shui speculates that Ker Chien-ming coordinated with Beijing and the DPP before making the proposal. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office heaped high praise on Ker Chien-ming, saying that "someone in the know issued an urgent message." Su Tseng-chang said "Freezing the Taiwan independence party platform is not on the agenda." Tsai Ing-wen said "I am unaware of its source." Lin said Su's remarks and Tsai's remarks were evidence of advance coordination. Ker Chien-ming has never been a standard-bearer for DPP ideology. He is a pragmatist whose first concern is making political deals. His "freeze Taiwan independence" showed Beijing the DPP's asking cross-strait policy asking price. From this day forward, the DPP's cross-strait policy asking price can never be any higher. "Freezing Taiwan independence" is its most recent asking price. The asking price can only fall. It can never again rise.
The second plate was yesterday's newly issued "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." The original draft of this [Mainland] China Policy called for "DPP dialogue with the CCP based on a constitutional consensus." But Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office said beforehand that "The term constitutional consensus blurs Taiwan independence advocacy, therefore it is unacceptable." In other words, a Mainland policy involving a "constitutional consensus" was clearly unacceptable to Beijing. The DPP deliberately ran headlong into a brick wall. Is this sort of call to arms really the DPP's Mainland policy? Such a Mainland policy cannot compete with Ker Chien-ming's "freezing Taiwan independence" proposal. Nor can it compete with Frank Hsieh's "constitutional one China" proposal. As a result, the term "constitutional consensus" vanished without a trace from the minutes, leaving only the "next phase discussions."
The third plate was the trade in services agreement. In cross-strait policy, political and economic considerations must be coordinated. Put bluntly, advocating Taiwan independence means opposition to the trade in services agreement. If one has decided that one "cannot turn the clock back and promote Taiwan independence," then there is no reason to oppose this version of the trade in services agreement. Yet Ker Chien-ming has obstructed passage of the trade in services agreement in the legislature, even as he called for freezing Taiwan independence outside the legislature. Ker Chien-ming contradicts himself on cross-strait policy. He reflects the contradictions in the DPP's cross-strait policy.
The DPP currently advocates a cross-strait policy that Beijing openly refers to as "fuzzy Taiwan independence." Some insiders advocate "freezing Taiwan independence" even as the party maliciously obstructs a win/win cross-Strait trade in services agreement. The DPP failed at its spinning plates trick. It is sure to end up picking broken plates off the floor in panic.
Ker Chien-ming has already announced a low asking price. If the DPP wants to join the cross-strait bidding war, the minimum bid must be "Freezing Taiwan independence." The DPP can no longer trot out its 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It has already replaced the 1991 "Taiwan independence party platform." According to the DPP's own logic, the 2007 "Resolution for a Normal Nation" has already replaced the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The Chen government's Taiwan independence antics between 2000 and 2008 already shredded the " Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" expressly advocates "abandoning the one China principle," or what is currently referred to as the "one China framework." It was rejected by Beijing long ago. That path is a dead end. The "constitutional consensus" remains a "fuzzy concept." Its sole purpose was to enable the DPP to dodge the "different constitutional interpretations" and "constitutional one China" concepts. The "Review of the Minutes" proposed exchanges with local governments and think tanks. In fact, Chen Chu, Su Chih-fen, Lai Ching-teh have already visited the Mainland or Hong Kong. This proposal is already behind the curve, politically speaking. On the one hand the DPP insists it wants to create a "friendly environment" for Mainland spouses, Mainland students, and Mainland tourists. On the other hand, it maliciously obstructs the trade in services agreement. Is this not a contradiction? As we can see, the "Review of the Minutes" is nothing more than an unpresentable pile of broken plates.
As the above shows, Ker Chien-ming's call for "freezing Taiwan independence" is now the DPP's cross-strait asking price. Lin Cho-shui already realizes what has happened. He warned Ker Chien-ming that the next step after "Freezing Taiwan independence" will the "one China framework." Lin Cho-shui is right. The DPP is afraid to advocate Taiwan independence. (It makes no difference whether the DPP says it has replaced Taiwan independence with something else, or has "frozen" it. The DPP is also unwilling to return to the "one China framework." But it must return to the "one China framework under a one China Constitution." It cannot repudiate the "one China Constitution." It must uphold in the dignity and interests of the Republic of China's "one China framework."
The DPP must not attempt the Taiwan independence plate spinning trick. It must eventually return to the "one China framework under the ROC Constitution." This must be the DPP's next step. It has no other way out.
民進黨不可在台獨議題上耍盤子
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.10 04:25 am
馬戲團裡數隻竹枝耍起幾個盤子的功夫，那是叔叔有練過。現在，民進黨在台獨議題上也玩起耍盤子的戲法，卻是險象環生，危機四伏；原定昨日發布的《兩岸政策總結報告》，降格為《兩岸政策檢討紀要》，正是一隻盤子乒乓落地。
這場台獨戲法有三隻盤子，第一隻是凍獨。林濁水推測，柯建銘在提出凍獨方案前，已與北京和黨內要角套過招。證諸國台辦以「有識之士的積極信號」盛譽柯建銘，及蘇貞昌的「沒有凍不凍的問題」，與蔡英文的「尚不清楚其脈絡」，皆露出套招的痕跡。柯建銘從來不是民進黨內意識形態的旗手，而是主持政治交易的實務派；如今，他以「凍獨」喊出了民進黨兩岸政策的「破盤價」，此後民進黨在兩岸政策上的價碼已不可能高過這個標準，「凍獨」已是最新的公告牌價。價錢只會再跌，無可能回漲。
第二隻盤子是昨天發表的《兩岸政策檢討紀要》。「對中政策」的原來稿本主張，「以憲政共識為民進黨與共產黨對話基礎」；但是，國台辦已有言在先：「憲政共識是模糊的台獨主張，不可能接受。」也就是說，這樣的「對中政策」，儼然是明明頂著「中國不能接受」的「憲政共識」，擺明了偏偏就是要「推車撞壁」，這種宣戰檄文難道真的就是民進黨的「對中政策」嗎？這種「對中政策」不但價碼較柯建銘的凍獨案沒有競爭力，賣相也不如謝長廷的「憲法各表」；因此，「憲政共識」四字遂從《檢討紀要》中消失，留待「下一階段討論」。
第三隻盤子是《服貿協議》。在兩岸政策上，必須政治與經濟協調。直白而言，若主張台獨，就應反對或杯葛服貿協議；若是「不再回頭搞台獨」，就沒有理由反對現在這個版本的服貿協議。但是，如今柯建銘一面在立法院內封殺服貿協議，另一方面卻又在立法院外倡議凍獨；柯建銘在兩岸政策上的矛盾，正是反映了整個民進黨在兩岸政策上的矛盾。
此時此刻的民進黨，在兩岸政策上，擎著北京明指其為「模糊台獨」的「對中政策」大旗，內部則演出「凍獨」的跳樓大拍賣，卻又惡劣抵制促成兩岸經貿雙贏的服貿協議。叔叔沒練過，這個耍盤子戲法，勢必要演成滿地撿破盤子的狼狽下場。
柯建銘已喊出破「盤」價，民進黨要加入兩岸弈局，基本消費額就是「凍獨」。民進黨不能說一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》已經「取代」了一九九一的《台獨黨綱》，因為，若依此說，二○○七的《正常國家決議文》也已「取代」了一九九九的《台灣前途決議文》，何況二○○○至二○○八扁政府的台獨操作已經完全撕毀了《台灣前途決議文》。尤其，《台灣前途決議文》明文主張「揚棄一中原則」（今日語彙稱「一中架構」），早為北京所拒絕，已然宣告此路不通。至於「憲政共識」，更是一個「模糊的概念」，只是徒然益加彰顯了民進黨是在迴避「憲法各表」與「憲法一中」。再者，《檢討紀要》主張地方政府交流及智庫交流，其實陳菊、蘇治芬、賴清德皆已訪陸或訪港，可見此一主張已遠遠落在政治現實之後；而一方面謂將營造對於陸配、陸生、陸客的「友善環境」，另一方面卻又在《服貿協議》死纏惡鬥，這豈不是自相矛盾？在在可見，這一本《檢討紀要》，其實是滿地的碎盤子，端不上檯面。
前文已論，柯建銘喊出「凍獨」，這是民進黨在兩岸餐桌上的基本消費額。林濁水已看出底細，警告柯建銘，「凍獨」的「下一步」就是「一中架構」。林濁水沒錯，因為，民進黨不可能一方面不敢主張台獨（無論說是被取代或凍結），另一方面卻又不願回到「一中架構」。如今若是主張「台獨被取代」或「台獨被凍結」，即須回到「一中憲法下的一中架構」；亦即，不可否定「一中憲法」，但應堅持中華民國在「一中架構」中的尊嚴與利益。
民進黨在台獨議題上不可耍盤子，終究必須回到「中華民國憲法的一中架構」之下。這必然是民進黨的「下一步」，捨此無路可走。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 10, 2014
Summary: Circuses often offer the spinning plate trick. Jugglers spin a number of plates on top of bamboo poles. The trick requires a great deal of practice. The Democratic Progressive Party has its own spinning plate trick. It is a dangerous trick, rife with perils. Yesterday the DPP was supposed to issue a "Cross-Strait Policy Summary Report." Instead, the report was demoted to a "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." In other words, the DPP's spinning plates came crashing to the floor.
Full text below:
Circuses often offer the spinning plate trick. Jugglers spin a number of plates on top of bamboo poles. The trick requires a great deal of practice. The Democratic Progressive Party has its own spinning plate trick. It is a dangerous trick, rife with perils. Yesterday the DPP was supposed to issue a "Cross-Strait Policy Summary Report." Instead, the report was demoted to a "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." In other words, the DPP's spinning plates came crashing to the floor.
The DPP's Taiwan independence spinning plates trick used three plates. The first plate was "freezing Taiwan independence." Ker Chien-ming proposed "freezing Taiwan independence." Lin Cho-shui speculates that Ker Chien-ming coordinated with Beijing and the DPP before making the proposal. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office heaped high praise on Ker Chien-ming, saying that "someone in the know issued an urgent message." Su Tseng-chang said "Freezing the Taiwan independence party platform is not on the agenda." Tsai Ing-wen said "I am unaware of its source." Lin said Su's remarks and Tsai's remarks were evidence of advance coordination. Ker Chien-ming has never been a standard-bearer for DPP ideology. He is a pragmatist whose first concern is making political deals. His "freeze Taiwan independence" showed Beijing the DPP's asking cross-strait policy asking price. From this day forward, the DPP's cross-strait policy asking price can never be any higher. "Freezing Taiwan independence" is its most recent asking price. The asking price can only fall. It can never again rise.
The second plate was yesterday's newly issued "Cross-Strait Policy Review Minutes." The original draft of this [Mainland] China Policy called for "DPP dialogue with the CCP based on a constitutional consensus." But Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office said beforehand that "The term constitutional consensus blurs Taiwan independence advocacy, therefore it is unacceptable." In other words, a Mainland policy involving a "constitutional consensus" was clearly unacceptable to Beijing. The DPP deliberately ran headlong into a brick wall. Is this sort of call to arms really the DPP's Mainland policy? Such a Mainland policy cannot compete with Ker Chien-ming's "freezing Taiwan independence" proposal. Nor can it compete with Frank Hsieh's "constitutional one China" proposal. As a result, the term "constitutional consensus" vanished without a trace from the minutes, leaving only the "next phase discussions."
The third plate was the trade in services agreement. In cross-strait policy, political and economic considerations must be coordinated. Put bluntly, advocating Taiwan independence means opposition to the trade in services agreement. If one has decided that one "cannot turn the clock back and promote Taiwan independence," then there is no reason to oppose this version of the trade in services agreement. Yet Ker Chien-ming has obstructed passage of the trade in services agreement in the legislature, even as he called for freezing Taiwan independence outside the legislature. Ker Chien-ming contradicts himself on cross-strait policy. He reflects the contradictions in the DPP's cross-strait policy.
The DPP currently advocates a cross-strait policy that Beijing openly refers to as "fuzzy Taiwan independence." Some insiders advocate "freezing Taiwan independence" even as the party maliciously obstructs a win/win cross-Strait trade in services agreement. The DPP failed at its spinning plates trick. It is sure to end up picking broken plates off the floor in panic.
Ker Chien-ming has already announced a low asking price. If the DPP wants to join the cross-strait bidding war, the minimum bid must be "Freezing Taiwan independence." The DPP can no longer trot out its 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It has already replaced the 1991 "Taiwan independence party platform." According to the DPP's own logic, the 2007 "Resolution for a Normal Nation" has already replaced the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The Chen government's Taiwan independence antics between 2000 and 2008 already shredded the " Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" expressly advocates "abandoning the one China principle," or what is currently referred to as the "one China framework." It was rejected by Beijing long ago. That path is a dead end. The "constitutional consensus" remains a "fuzzy concept." Its sole purpose was to enable the DPP to dodge the "different constitutional interpretations" and "constitutional one China" concepts. The "Review of the Minutes" proposed exchanges with local governments and think tanks. In fact, Chen Chu, Su Chih-fen, Lai Ching-teh have already visited the Mainland or Hong Kong. This proposal is already behind the curve, politically speaking. On the one hand the DPP insists it wants to create a "friendly environment" for Mainland spouses, Mainland students, and Mainland tourists. On the other hand, it maliciously obstructs the trade in services agreement. Is this not a contradiction? As we can see, the "Review of the Minutes" is nothing more than an unpresentable pile of broken plates.
As the above shows, Ker Chien-ming's call for "freezing Taiwan independence" is now the DPP's cross-strait asking price. Lin Cho-shui already realizes what has happened. He warned Ker Chien-ming that the next step after "Freezing Taiwan independence" will the "one China framework." Lin Cho-shui is right. The DPP is afraid to advocate Taiwan independence. (It makes no difference whether the DPP says it has replaced Taiwan independence with something else, or has "frozen" it. The DPP is also unwilling to return to the "one China framework." But it must return to the "one China framework under a one China Constitution." It cannot repudiate the "one China Constitution." It must uphold in the dignity and interests of the Republic of China's "one China framework."
The DPP must not attempt the Taiwan independence plate spinning trick. It must eventually return to the "one China framework under the ROC Constitution." This must be the DPP's next step. It has no other way out.
民進黨不可在台獨議題上耍盤子
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.10 04:25 am
馬戲團裡數隻竹枝耍起幾個盤子的功夫，那是叔叔有練過。現在，民進黨在台獨議題上也玩起耍盤子的戲法，卻是險象環生，危機四伏；原定昨日發布的《兩岸政策總結報告》，降格為《兩岸政策檢討紀要》，正是一隻盤子乒乓落地。
這場台獨戲法有三隻盤子，第一隻是凍獨。林濁水推測，柯建銘在提出凍獨方案前，已與北京和黨內要角套過招。證諸國台辦以「有識之士的積極信號」盛譽柯建銘，及蘇貞昌的「沒有凍不凍的問題」，與蔡英文的「尚不清楚其脈絡」，皆露出套招的痕跡。柯建銘從來不是民進黨內意識形態的旗手，而是主持政治交易的實務派；如今，他以「凍獨」喊出了民進黨兩岸政策的「破盤價」，此後民進黨在兩岸政策上的價碼已不可能高過這個標準，「凍獨」已是最新的公告牌價。價錢只會再跌，無可能回漲。
第二隻盤子是昨天發表的《兩岸政策檢討紀要》。「對中政策」的原來稿本主張，「以憲政共識為民進黨與共產黨對話基礎」；但是，國台辦已有言在先：「憲政共識是模糊的台獨主張，不可能接受。」也就是說，這樣的「對中政策」，儼然是明明頂著「中國不能接受」的「憲政共識」，擺明了偏偏就是要「推車撞壁」，這種宣戰檄文難道真的就是民進黨的「對中政策」嗎？這種「對中政策」不但價碼較柯建銘的凍獨案沒有競爭力，賣相也不如謝長廷的「憲法各表」；因此，「憲政共識」四字遂從《檢討紀要》中消失，留待「下一階段討論」。
第三隻盤子是《服貿協議》。在兩岸政策上，必須政治與經濟協調。直白而言，若主張台獨，就應反對或杯葛服貿協議；若是「不再回頭搞台獨」，就沒有理由反對現在這個版本的服貿協議。但是，如今柯建銘一面在立法院內封殺服貿協議，另一方面卻又在立法院外倡議凍獨；柯建銘在兩岸政策上的矛盾，正是反映了整個民進黨在兩岸政策上的矛盾。
此時此刻的民進黨，在兩岸政策上，擎著北京明指其為「模糊台獨」的「對中政策」大旗，內部則演出「凍獨」的跳樓大拍賣，卻又惡劣抵制促成兩岸經貿雙贏的服貿協議。叔叔沒練過，這個耍盤子戲法，勢必要演成滿地撿破盤子的狼狽下場。
柯建銘已喊出破「盤」價，民進黨要加入兩岸弈局，基本消費額就是「凍獨」。民進黨不能說一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》已經「取代」了一九九一的《台獨黨綱》，因為，若依此說，二○○七的《正常國家決議文》也已「取代」了一九九九的《台灣前途決議文》，何況二○○○至二○○八扁政府的台獨操作已經完全撕毀了《台灣前途決議文》。尤其，《台灣前途決議文》明文主張「揚棄一中原則」（今日語彙稱「一中架構」），早為北京所拒絕，已然宣告此路不通。至於「憲政共識」，更是一個「模糊的概念」，只是徒然益加彰顯了民進黨是在迴避「憲法各表」與「憲法一中」。再者，《檢討紀要》主張地方政府交流及智庫交流，其實陳菊、蘇治芬、賴清德皆已訪陸或訪港，可見此一主張已遠遠落在政治現實之後；而一方面謂將營造對於陸配、陸生、陸客的「友善環境」，另一方面卻又在《服貿協議》死纏惡鬥，這豈不是自相矛盾？在在可見，這一本《檢討紀要》，其實是滿地的碎盤子，端不上檯面。
前文已論，柯建銘喊出「凍獨」，這是民進黨在兩岸餐桌上的基本消費額。林濁水已看出底細，警告柯建銘，「凍獨」的「下一步」就是「一中架構」。林濁水沒錯，因為，民進黨不可能一方面不敢主張台獨（無論說是被取代或凍結），另一方面卻又不願回到「一中架構」。如今若是主張「台獨被取代」或「台獨被凍結」，即須回到「一中憲法下的一中架構」；亦即，不可否定「一中憲法」，但應堅持中華民國在「一中架構」中的尊嚴與利益。
民進黨在台獨議題上不可耍盤子，終究必須回到「中華民國憲法的一中架構」之下。這必然是民進黨的「下一步」，捨此無路可走。
Wednesday, January 8, 2014
TPP and RCEP Membership Requires Comprehensive Planning
TPP and RCEP Membership Requires Comprehensive Planning
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 9, 2014
Summary: The Shanghai Free Trade Zone is a means by which the Chinese mainland can join the TPP. On January 6 the Mainland took another step, and allowed in seven value-added telecommunications services. The Mainland's cross-Strait trade in services agreement was supposed to give Taiwan special e-commerce treatment. Instead, these have been given to the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Political disputes made Taiwan miss a golden opportunity. It must now catch up. It must pass the agreement as soon as possible. It must accelerate the process of trade liberalization and integration into the Asian-Pacific regional economy. Taiwan's industrial competitiveness risks disintegration.
Full text below:
The Shanghai Free Trade Zone is a means by which the Chinese mainland can join the TPP. On January 6 the Mainland took another step, and allowed in seven value-added telecommunications services. The Mainland's cross-Strait trade in services agreement was supposed to give Taiwan special e-commerce treatment. Instead, these have been given to the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Political disputes made Taiwan miss a golden opportunity. It must now catch up. It must pass the agreement as soon as possible. It must accelerate the process of trade liberalization and integration into the Asian-Pacific regional economy. Taiwan's industrial competitiveness risks disintegration.
The United States is willing to allow the Chinese mainland to take part in TPP negotiations. The Mainland has yet to officially respond. It is promoting the ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations while it keeps an eye on TPP negotiations . The Shanghai Free Trade Zone went into effect last September. Since then the Mainland has aggressively used FTAs to achieve a new wave of trade liberalization. Its goal was obvious, and the results have been substantitive.
According to news reports, late last November the Shanghai Free Trade Zone Trade and Industry Department admitted 1,733 new companies. These funded 1675 new enterprises. Total registered capital approached 40 billion RMB. As we can see, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone has attracted considerable domestic capital. It has inspired the establishment of free trade zones in the Tianjin Binhai New Area, Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau Free Trade Zone, the Zhejiang Zhoushan area, Chongqing Two Rivers area, Hebei Caofeidian area, and Fujian Pingtan area.
The Chinese mainland is using free trade zones as a means of liberalization. It is loosening regulations to attract private capital and a foreign presence. This achieves its goal of promoting investment. This also enables it to meet regional trade agreement liberalization requirements.
More importantly, Mainland China's accession to WTO constitutes its first wave of trade liberalization and integration with the global economy. Economic liberalization has enabled the Mainland to enjoy a decade of rapid growth. The Mainland has successfully transitioned from an agriculturally-based economy to an industrially-based economy. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone also explores ways of gradually transitioning from an industrially-based economy to a service-based industry. The Mainland is moving in the same direction as the developed economies. Taiwan must pay attention to the Mainland's development and seize whatever opportunities present themselves.
The TPP and RCEP are two forces for Asian-Pacific regional economic integration, and a new wave of Chinese mainland industrial restructuring. Taiwan has no time to waste. It must ride the wave of Asian-Pacific economic integration as soon as possible. It must take concrete steps to ensure Taiwan's accession the RCEP and TPP.
Taiwan may wish to join the RCEP or the TPP. If so, it must acknowledge the role of the Mainland. The Mainland is Taiwan's largest trading partner. Taiwan must sign the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement and the Cross-Strait Trade in Goods Agreement, as soon as possible. These will help Taiwan's integration into the Asia-Pacific regional economy. They will reduce the impact of the FTA between Mainland China and Korea on Taiwan's economy.
Taiwan must take advantage of cross-Strait economic cooperation, as soon as possible. It must seek ways to integrate the two sides in the global economy and the East Asian regional economy. Mainland China has yet to join the TPP. Taiwan seeks early accession to the TPP. To improve its chances, Taiwan must understand the Mainland's reasons for joining the TPP. It must adjust its timetable for joining the TPP. It must realize its chances for joining may change.
Secondly, taking part in regional economic integration requires putting industry interests first. The TPP is a new style, high-standard regional trade agreement. Industry as a whole will benefit. But Taiwan must consider the impact on agriculture and traditional industries. It must provide concrete policy plans for industrial transformation.
Take the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The most difficult issue during negotiations was U.S. beef imports. Was Taiwan ready for the impact? Are producers of other sensitive agricultural products prepared to expand production in order to make the pie bigger? Take intellectual property. The TPP may require term extensions for patent medicines. This may increase health care costs. Are coping strategies in place? The government must communicate with industry before joining. It must mitigate the impact on industry. We believe TPP will enhance the efficiency of Taiwan's economy .
Taiwan must pay attention to Mainland Chinese dynamics. It must maintain good communications. The Mainland has already joined the RCEP. We must promote Taiwan's accession as soon as possible, before the RCEP completes negotiations in 2015. We must get a firm handle on RCEP negotiations once they are completed in 2015. We must explain the role of our foreign economic partners to the public. We must seek to maximize public support, and minimize opposition political pressure. We must also propose a comprehensive domestic industrial policy plan, on several tracks at the same time. We must sign regional trade agreements to improve the domestic economy. Only then can we achieve early integration into the new Asian-Pacific regional economy.
社論－加入TPP及RCEP政府需全面布局
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月09日 04:09
可視為中國大陸加入TPP試點的上海自由貿易區，於1月6日進一步開放7項增值電信業務，將大陸在《兩岸服務貿易協議》中開放給台灣的電子商務優惠，先給了上海自貿區，台灣因政治爭議錯失了一次大好機會，若再不急起直追，盡速通過協議，並加速經貿自由化進程以融入亞太區域經濟整合，台灣產業競爭優勢可能有崩解之虞。
美國已表示願意邀請中國大陸加入TPP談判，大陸雖然尚未正式回應，但在積極推動參與東協區域全面經濟夥伴關係（RCEP）談判同時，始終重視並追蹤TPP談判的進展。事實上，我們從上海自貿區去年9月底掛牌啟動後的運作可以看出，大陸積極利用自貿區試點達成新一波經貿自由化的目的相當明顯，且已收到實質成效。
報載上海自貿區截至去年11月底，工商部門已辦新設企業共計1733家，其中內資新設企業1675家，註冊資本額近400億元，可看出上海自貿區的開放措施吸引許多內資入駐，也因此引起天津濱海新區、粵港澳自貿區、浙江舟山、重慶兩江、河北曹妃甸、福建平潭等地區對於成立自由貿易區的興趣。
中國大陸藉由自由貿易區各試點所進行的開放措施，以鬆綁法規方式吸引民間資金及外資進駐投資，不但達成促進投資之目的，亦符合全球經貿自由化下，積極洽談的區域貿易協定自由化要求。
更重要的是，中國大陸加入WTO做為第一波與全球經貿自由化接軌以來，已使大陸坐享十年經貿自由化所帶來的快速成長果實，並將大陸產業結構成功地從農業為主轉為工業為主。此次藉由推動上海自貿區進行試點，進一步試探大陸從工業為主的產業結構型態，逐漸轉為以服務業為主要產業型態，朝向已開發經濟體看齊的方向前進，值得台灣關注其發展，並掌握商機。
面對TPP及RCEP兩股亞太區域經濟整合的力道，以及中國大陸新一波產業結構調整，台灣實無時間繼續蹉跎，必須盡速全力融入新一波亞太經濟整合態勢之中，以具體行動，雙軌推動台灣加入RCEP及TPP。
首先，無論台灣想要加入RCEP或是TPP，都必須正視中國大陸的角色。大陸是台灣第一大貿易夥伴，盡速完成《兩岸服務貿易協議》之生效，以及海峽兩岸貨品貿易協議之簽署，將有利於台灣融入亞太區域經濟整合，並減緩「中」韓FTA對於台灣經濟之衝擊。
此外，台灣應該盡速利用兩岸經濟合作，尋求兩岸共同融入全球及東亞區域經濟整合的途徑。面對中國大陸尚未加入TPP的事實，為提高台灣盡早加入TPP之機率，台灣應積極掌握大陸加入TPP之意願，隨時修正台灣加入TPP的時程及機率。
其次，加入區域經濟整合，仍要以產業利益為先。面對TPP為新型態高標準的區域貿易協定，雖然整體產業會因而受益，然而台灣仍應重視農業及部分傳統產業所受到的衝擊，提出產業轉型的具體政策規畫。
舉例而言，台美貿易暨投資架構協議（TIFA）談判時最為棘手的美牛開放，台灣是否已準備好對策？對於其他敏感性農產品是否已經做好藉由引進產品擴大加工製造、把餅做大的準備？智慧財產權部分，面對TPP可能要求原廠藥延長專利期限所可能提高的健保成本，是否已經有因應對策？政府若能在加入之前，與產業做好充分溝通，減緩產業衝擊，相信更能提高加入TPP對於台灣經濟的效益。
台灣應關注中國大陸的動態，並與之做好溝通。對於大陸已加入的RCEP，應盡速於2015年RCEP完成談判前，推動台灣加入，並掌握2015年RCEP談判完成後，外圍經濟夥伴參與條款之發展，對內應充分溝通，爭取最大化民意支持力度，減輕反對黨的政治壓力，同時提出完整的國內產業政策規畫，多軌進行，才能提高簽署區域貿易協定對國內經濟之效能，真正達成盡早融入新一波亞太區域經濟整合的目的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 9, 2014
Summary: The Shanghai Free Trade Zone is a means by which the Chinese mainland can join the TPP. On January 6 the Mainland took another step, and allowed in seven value-added telecommunications services. The Mainland's cross-Strait trade in services agreement was supposed to give Taiwan special e-commerce treatment. Instead, these have been given to the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Political disputes made Taiwan miss a golden opportunity. It must now catch up. It must pass the agreement as soon as possible. It must accelerate the process of trade liberalization and integration into the Asian-Pacific regional economy. Taiwan's industrial competitiveness risks disintegration.
Full text below:
The Shanghai Free Trade Zone is a means by which the Chinese mainland can join the TPP. On January 6 the Mainland took another step, and allowed in seven value-added telecommunications services. The Mainland's cross-Strait trade in services agreement was supposed to give Taiwan special e-commerce treatment. Instead, these have been given to the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Political disputes made Taiwan miss a golden opportunity. It must now catch up. It must pass the agreement as soon as possible. It must accelerate the process of trade liberalization and integration into the Asian-Pacific regional economy. Taiwan's industrial competitiveness risks disintegration.
The United States is willing to allow the Chinese mainland to take part in TPP negotiations. The Mainland has yet to officially respond. It is promoting the ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations while it keeps an eye on TPP negotiations . The Shanghai Free Trade Zone went into effect last September. Since then the Mainland has aggressively used FTAs to achieve a new wave of trade liberalization. Its goal was obvious, and the results have been substantitive.
According to news reports, late last November the Shanghai Free Trade Zone Trade and Industry Department admitted 1,733 new companies. These funded 1675 new enterprises. Total registered capital approached 40 billion RMB. As we can see, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone has attracted considerable domestic capital. It has inspired the establishment of free trade zones in the Tianjin Binhai New Area, Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau Free Trade Zone, the Zhejiang Zhoushan area, Chongqing Two Rivers area, Hebei Caofeidian area, and Fujian Pingtan area.
The Chinese mainland is using free trade zones as a means of liberalization. It is loosening regulations to attract private capital and a foreign presence. This achieves its goal of promoting investment. This also enables it to meet regional trade agreement liberalization requirements.
More importantly, Mainland China's accession to WTO constitutes its first wave of trade liberalization and integration with the global economy. Economic liberalization has enabled the Mainland to enjoy a decade of rapid growth. The Mainland has successfully transitioned from an agriculturally-based economy to an industrially-based economy. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone also explores ways of gradually transitioning from an industrially-based economy to a service-based industry. The Mainland is moving in the same direction as the developed economies. Taiwan must pay attention to the Mainland's development and seize whatever opportunities present themselves.
The TPP and RCEP are two forces for Asian-Pacific regional economic integration, and a new wave of Chinese mainland industrial restructuring. Taiwan has no time to waste. It must ride the wave of Asian-Pacific economic integration as soon as possible. It must take concrete steps to ensure Taiwan's accession the RCEP and TPP.
Taiwan may wish to join the RCEP or the TPP. If so, it must acknowledge the role of the Mainland. The Mainland is Taiwan's largest trading partner. Taiwan must sign the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement and the Cross-Strait Trade in Goods Agreement, as soon as possible. These will help Taiwan's integration into the Asia-Pacific regional economy. They will reduce the impact of the FTA between Mainland China and Korea on Taiwan's economy.
Taiwan must take advantage of cross-Strait economic cooperation, as soon as possible. It must seek ways to integrate the two sides in the global economy and the East Asian regional economy. Mainland China has yet to join the TPP. Taiwan seeks early accession to the TPP. To improve its chances, Taiwan must understand the Mainland's reasons for joining the TPP. It must adjust its timetable for joining the TPP. It must realize its chances for joining may change.
Secondly, taking part in regional economic integration requires putting industry interests first. The TPP is a new style, high-standard regional trade agreement. Industry as a whole will benefit. But Taiwan must consider the impact on agriculture and traditional industries. It must provide concrete policy plans for industrial transformation.
Take the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The most difficult issue during negotiations was U.S. beef imports. Was Taiwan ready for the impact? Are producers of other sensitive agricultural products prepared to expand production in order to make the pie bigger? Take intellectual property. The TPP may require term extensions for patent medicines. This may increase health care costs. Are coping strategies in place? The government must communicate with industry before joining. It must mitigate the impact on industry. We believe TPP will enhance the efficiency of Taiwan's economy .
Taiwan must pay attention to Mainland Chinese dynamics. It must maintain good communications. The Mainland has already joined the RCEP. We must promote Taiwan's accession as soon as possible, before the RCEP completes negotiations in 2015. We must get a firm handle on RCEP negotiations once they are completed in 2015. We must explain the role of our foreign economic partners to the public. We must seek to maximize public support, and minimize opposition political pressure. We must also propose a comprehensive domestic industrial policy plan, on several tracks at the same time. We must sign regional trade agreements to improve the domestic economy. Only then can we achieve early integration into the new Asian-Pacific regional economy.
社論－加入TPP及RCEP政府需全面布局
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月09日 04:09
可視為中國大陸加入TPP試點的上海自由貿易區，於1月6日進一步開放7項增值電信業務，將大陸在《兩岸服務貿易協議》中開放給台灣的電子商務優惠，先給了上海自貿區，台灣因政治爭議錯失了一次大好機會，若再不急起直追，盡速通過協議，並加速經貿自由化進程以融入亞太區域經濟整合，台灣產業競爭優勢可能有崩解之虞。
美國已表示願意邀請中國大陸加入TPP談判，大陸雖然尚未正式回應，但在積極推動參與東協區域全面經濟夥伴關係（RCEP）談判同時，始終重視並追蹤TPP談判的進展。事實上，我們從上海自貿區去年9月底掛牌啟動後的運作可以看出，大陸積極利用自貿區試點達成新一波經貿自由化的目的相當明顯，且已收到實質成效。
報載上海自貿區截至去年11月底，工商部門已辦新設企業共計1733家，其中內資新設企業1675家，註冊資本額近400億元，可看出上海自貿區的開放措施吸引許多內資入駐，也因此引起天津濱海新區、粵港澳自貿區、浙江舟山、重慶兩江、河北曹妃甸、福建平潭等地區對於成立自由貿易區的興趣。
中國大陸藉由自由貿易區各試點所進行的開放措施，以鬆綁法規方式吸引民間資金及外資進駐投資，不但達成促進投資之目的，亦符合全球經貿自由化下，積極洽談的區域貿易協定自由化要求。
更重要的是，中國大陸加入WTO做為第一波與全球經貿自由化接軌以來，已使大陸坐享十年經貿自由化所帶來的快速成長果實，並將大陸產業結構成功地從農業為主轉為工業為主。此次藉由推動上海自貿區進行試點，進一步試探大陸從工業為主的產業結構型態，逐漸轉為以服務業為主要產業型態，朝向已開發經濟體看齊的方向前進，值得台灣關注其發展，並掌握商機。
面對TPP及RCEP兩股亞太區域經濟整合的力道，以及中國大陸新一波產業結構調整，台灣實無時間繼續蹉跎，必須盡速全力融入新一波亞太經濟整合態勢之中，以具體行動，雙軌推動台灣加入RCEP及TPP。
首先，無論台灣想要加入RCEP或是TPP，都必須正視中國大陸的角色。大陸是台灣第一大貿易夥伴，盡速完成《兩岸服務貿易協議》之生效，以及海峽兩岸貨品貿易協議之簽署，將有利於台灣融入亞太區域經濟整合，並減緩「中」韓FTA對於台灣經濟之衝擊。
此外，台灣應該盡速利用兩岸經濟合作，尋求兩岸共同融入全球及東亞區域經濟整合的途徑。面對中國大陸尚未加入TPP的事實，為提高台灣盡早加入TPP之機率，台灣應積極掌握大陸加入TPP之意願，隨時修正台灣加入TPP的時程及機率。
其次，加入區域經濟整合，仍要以產業利益為先。面對TPP為新型態高標準的區域貿易協定，雖然整體產業會因而受益，然而台灣仍應重視農業及部分傳統產業所受到的衝擊，提出產業轉型的具體政策規畫。
舉例而言，台美貿易暨投資架構協議（TIFA）談判時最為棘手的美牛開放，台灣是否已準備好對策？對於其他敏感性農產品是否已經做好藉由引進產品擴大加工製造、把餅做大的準備？智慧財產權部分，面對TPP可能要求原廠藥延長專利期限所可能提高的健保成本，是否已經有因應對策？政府若能在加入之前，與產業做好充分溝通，減緩產業衝擊，相信更能提高加入TPP對於台灣經濟的效益。
台灣應關注中國大陸的動態，並與之做好溝通。對於大陸已加入的RCEP，應盡速於2015年RCEP完成談判前，推動台灣加入，並掌握2015年RCEP談判完成後，外圍經濟夥伴參與條款之發展，對內應充分溝通，爭取最大化民意支持力度，減輕反對黨的政治壓力，同時提出完整的國內產業政策規畫，多軌進行，才能提高簽署區域貿易協定對國內經濟之效能，真正達成盡早融入新一波亞太區域經濟整合的目的。
Tuesday, January 7, 2014
The Great Silent Majority Finally Has a Voice
The Great Silent Majority Finally Has a Voice
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 8, 2014
Summary: On the eve of the Control Yuan's second impeachment hearing, Academia Sinica member Hu Fo personally denounced the persecution campaign waged against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming. We want Hu Fo to know that he is not alone. His is not a voice in the wilderness. Taiwan society has not sunk to the level where right and wrong no longer matter. It is merely that those who spout absurdities have seized the bully pulpit. We would like to express our appreciation for Hu Fo's moral courage.
Full text below:
Yesterday the Control Yuan convened another impeachment hearing. After more than two hours of debate, the final vote was six against six. The move to impeach failed to pass. For the time being Huang Shim-ing will retain his post as Prosecutor General. Huang Shi-ming said that if the Control Yuan or a court of the first instance found him guilty, he would step down. Today, the Control Yuan failed to impeach him for the second time. According to Control Yuan provisions, the same person shall not be subject to impeachment proceedings for the same offense more than twice. This means that for the time being at least, Huang Shi-ming's job is secure.
On the eve of the Control Yuan's second impeachment hearing, Academia Sinica member Hu Fo submitted an article to the China Times. It was entitled, "In Broad daylight, Wallowing in Sin." He invoked the constitution and the rule of law. He personally denounced the persecution campaign waged against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming.
Hu Fo's article merits attention. He is among the few who have come forth in support of Huang Shi-ming. He has underscored the most troubling question that haunts our society. Why have the opposition party whip and the speaker of the legislature not been investigated for their crimes, while President Ma, who supported an investigation, been denounced seven ways from Sunday? Why have the two prosecutors who participated in influence peddling been repeatedly let off, scot free, while the Prosecutor General, who prosecuted influence peddling, been villified as Public Enemy Number One, as guilty of some heinous crime, and as someone who must be dismissed or even impeached to mollify public outrage?
In his article Hu Fo avoided political rhetoric. Instead he cited the constitution and the law. He offered legal interpretations of the charges against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming. For example, he cited the constitution's presidential powers provisions, and the Court Organization Law. He affirmed that the Prosecutor General does indeed have the duty to report to the President, especially when the case involves the Legislative Yuan, the Minister of Justice, the High Prosecutors Office, and prosecutors. The case had a bearing on the independence of the criminal justice system and on major criminal cases. The Prosecutor General reported to the President and accepted Presidential advice, entirely consistent with his duties. His conduct was fully responsible. How can anyone mischaracterize this as "leaking secrets" to the President?
Well said, indeed. Over the past several months a witch hunt against "leaking secrets" has eclipsed the prosecution of influence peddling. Many commentators have been either vague or evasive about influence peddling. But when dealing with "leaking secrets," they have held up a magnifying glass and gone over the issue with a fine tooth comb. To paraphrase President Ma's much derided remark: "If this is not a double standard, what is a double standard?"
If President Ma and Prosecutor General Huang did nothing illegal, why have they been treated like "Enemies of the People" over the past several months? Why, on the other hand, have the politicians and prosecutors who participated in influence peddling been treated as if they were egregiously wronged innocent victims? Taiwan has beein inculcating the rule of law and moral education for many years. The public ought to have a better understanding of due process and right and wrong than this. So why have right and wrong so outrageously inverted? How exactly did this come about?
Hu Fo concluded his article with the following lament. "The current political situation in Taiwan involves social polarization, plutarchy, factional struggle, and Blue vs. Green populist demagoguery. Society is indifferent to right and wrong. It substitutes falsehood for reality. It lacks values and direction. People have lost faith in democracy and the rule of law." Hu Fo sighed in frustration. He was in essence sighing for everyone on Taiwan.
Consider the current atmosphere on Taiwan. It is either Blue vs. Green opposition or factional interests uber alles. We can almost predict what the response will be to Hu Fo's article. His arguments about the rule of law may be irrefutable. But it will not matter. His arguments about right and wrong my be clear. But it will not matter. Many in the Green Camp and many who are unhappy with the Ma government, will insist that speaking on behalf of President Ma and Huang Shi-ming is wrong and must be denounced. Even if one is entirely right, to them it will make no difference.
One can predict that over the next few days, Hu Fo will be attacked, en masse, in a wide range of fora. All manner of ugly rhetoric will be emerge. A thousand fingers will be pointed at him. But on the other hand, Hu Fo's words will echo in our ears. Perhaps they will provoke a reaction from those concerned only about Blue or Green political coloration, and those who care nothing for right and wrong. They will make them show their hand. That might not be such a bad thing. At least it will validate Hu Fo's assessment of the current state of Taiwan .
We want Hu Fo to know that he is not alone. His is not a voice in the wilderness. Taiwan society has not sunk to the level where right and wrong no longer matter. It is merely that those who spout absurdities have seized the bully pulpit. Many members of the public have decided that they may as well remain silent. It does not mean everyone is blind to the facts. Hu Fo's article points to the many voices of the Great Silent Majority. Here we would like to express our appreciation for Hu Fo's moral courage.
社論－沉默多數的心聲終於獲得伸張
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月08日 04:09
監察院昨日再度召開彈劾審查會，歷經兩個多小時的討論，最後以6票對6票，彈劾案未過關，黃世銘暫時保住檢察總長的職位。由於先前黃世銘曾表示，若遭監察院彈劾或法院一審判有罪，他就下台；如今監院二度彈劾未過關，依規定監院不得再對同一人、同一案由提案彈劾；這意味黃世銘將暫保總長職位。
就在監院召開二次彈劾審查會前夕，中央研究院院士胡佛以〈光天化日、陷人於罪〉為題投書《中國時報》時論廣場，以《憲法》與法律的高度，針對檢察總長黃世銘所蒙受的對待與攻訐，提出他個人的評論。
這篇評論值得重視的原因，不只因為其是很少數支持黃世銘行止的論述之一，而是其道出了這個社會中許多人心中最大的困惑：為什麼進行關說的在野黨總召與立法院長沒啥人加以質疑，而支持偵辦的馬總統被罵到臭頭？為什麼接受關說的兩位檢察官一而再、再而三的被「輕輕放下」，而辦關說的檢察總長卻彷彿犯下天理不容、人神共憤的滔天大罪，非治之以撤職、彈劾甚或司法審判，否則不足以平息輿論之怒火？
胡院士在他的投書中，完全不玩弄政治語言，而是引經據典透過《憲法》及相關法律條文的規定，詮釋檢察總長黃世銘所受到的所有指控。例如他根據《憲法》中有關總統職權以及《法院組織法》中有關最高檢署檢察總長產生方式的規定，認為檢察總長當然要向總統負政策執行的責任。特別是當碰到一樁涉及立法院長、法務部部長、高檢署檢察長及檢察官，且影響到司法獨立的特殊重大不法案件，檢察總長立即向總統提出報告，並接受總統諮詢，這在職務的履行上，是非常盡責的作法，如何談得上向總統洩密呢？
誠哉斯言，過去幾個月以來，不就是針對「洩密」的撻伐，遠遠多過對「關說」的質疑！不少論者碰到「關說」的部分不是模糊以對、就是語焉不詳，但是一碰到「洩密」的部分，就是拿著放大鏡，仿若雞蛋裡挑骨頭似的檢視。套用馬總統一再被嘲弄的一句修辭法：如果這樣都不是雙重標準，還要怎樣才算是雙重標準呢？
如果馬總統與黃檢察總長都沒有「違法」疑義，那麼過去幾個月，為什麼是他們被打成仿如人民公敵，而那些行使關說的政客與被關說的檢察官，卻恍若成為最無辜的受害者？我們在台灣實施這麼多年的法治教育與道德教育，對依法行政的判定，對倫理是非的分辨，不應該是這樣的吧！那麼為什麼竟然會顛倒是非至此呢？這一切又到底是怎麼回事呢？
胡佛院士在他投書最後的結語中，發出了這樣的慨嘆：「當前的台灣政局，在族群撕裂、金權交易、派閥牽引、民粹操弄及藍綠惡鬥的情況下，整個社會變成無是無非，甚至以假當真，不但缺乏正確的價值觀與發展方向，且令人對民主法治喪失信心。」試問，胡院士嘆息與無奈，不正就是當前整個台灣最需要嘆息與無奈的地方嗎？
審視當前台灣的輿情氛圍，不就是藍綠分立、黨派為先嗎？講得再直白一些，我們幾乎現在就可以預期，胡院士這篇讜論，就算其中的就法論法的論證再堅實不過，就算其所論述的價值是非也再清晰不過，但在許多綠營人士，或是部分不滿馬政府人士的眼中，替馬總統與黃世銘講話就是不對，就是該批，那怕你講得全都是對的也沒用！
可預見，這兩天瞄準胡院士攻擊的文字，肯定會在各個平台量產，什麼難聽的話都會出籠，胡院士免不了要暫時陷入「橫眉冷對千夫指」的處境了！不過換個角度說，如果胡院士一篇擲地有聲的文字，能夠引出那些只問藍綠、不論是非的論者立即現形，那也不是壞事，至少它印證了胡院士對台灣現況的評斷。
我們想說的是，胡院士並不孤獨，他的見解也絕不是這個社會中的少數聲音！台灣社會並沒有沉淪到是非不分的地步，只不過在許多奇談怪論占領重要發言位置後，許多人乾脆選擇沉默，但絕不意味大家都已盲目到看不清事實，胡院士的這篇文字，正是道出了許多沉默大多數人的心聲，在此謹對胡院士的道德勇氣，表達我們最誠摯的敬意！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 8, 2014
Summary: On the eve of the Control Yuan's second impeachment hearing, Academia Sinica member Hu Fo personally denounced the persecution campaign waged against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming. We want Hu Fo to know that he is not alone. His is not a voice in the wilderness. Taiwan society has not sunk to the level where right and wrong no longer matter. It is merely that those who spout absurdities have seized the bully pulpit. We would like to express our appreciation for Hu Fo's moral courage.
Full text below:
Yesterday the Control Yuan convened another impeachment hearing. After more than two hours of debate, the final vote was six against six. The move to impeach failed to pass. For the time being Huang Shim-ing will retain his post as Prosecutor General. Huang Shi-ming said that if the Control Yuan or a court of the first instance found him guilty, he would step down. Today, the Control Yuan failed to impeach him for the second time. According to Control Yuan provisions, the same person shall not be subject to impeachment proceedings for the same offense more than twice. This means that for the time being at least, Huang Shi-ming's job is secure.
On the eve of the Control Yuan's second impeachment hearing, Academia Sinica member Hu Fo submitted an article to the China Times. It was entitled, "In Broad daylight, Wallowing in Sin." He invoked the constitution and the rule of law. He personally denounced the persecution campaign waged against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming.
Hu Fo's article merits attention. He is among the few who have come forth in support of Huang Shi-ming. He has underscored the most troubling question that haunts our society. Why have the opposition party whip and the speaker of the legislature not been investigated for their crimes, while President Ma, who supported an investigation, been denounced seven ways from Sunday? Why have the two prosecutors who participated in influence peddling been repeatedly let off, scot free, while the Prosecutor General, who prosecuted influence peddling, been villified as Public Enemy Number One, as guilty of some heinous crime, and as someone who must be dismissed or even impeached to mollify public outrage?
In his article Hu Fo avoided political rhetoric. Instead he cited the constitution and the law. He offered legal interpretations of the charges against Prosecutor General Huang Shi-ming. For example, he cited the constitution's presidential powers provisions, and the Court Organization Law. He affirmed that the Prosecutor General does indeed have the duty to report to the President, especially when the case involves the Legislative Yuan, the Minister of Justice, the High Prosecutors Office, and prosecutors. The case had a bearing on the independence of the criminal justice system and on major criminal cases. The Prosecutor General reported to the President and accepted Presidential advice, entirely consistent with his duties. His conduct was fully responsible. How can anyone mischaracterize this as "leaking secrets" to the President?
Well said, indeed. Over the past several months a witch hunt against "leaking secrets" has eclipsed the prosecution of influence peddling. Many commentators have been either vague or evasive about influence peddling. But when dealing with "leaking secrets," they have held up a magnifying glass and gone over the issue with a fine tooth comb. To paraphrase President Ma's much derided remark: "If this is not a double standard, what is a double standard?"
If President Ma and Prosecutor General Huang did nothing illegal, why have they been treated like "Enemies of the People" over the past several months? Why, on the other hand, have the politicians and prosecutors who participated in influence peddling been treated as if they were egregiously wronged innocent victims? Taiwan has beein inculcating the rule of law and moral education for many years. The public ought to have a better understanding of due process and right and wrong than this. So why have right and wrong so outrageously inverted? How exactly did this come about?
Hu Fo concluded his article with the following lament. "The current political situation in Taiwan involves social polarization, plutarchy, factional struggle, and Blue vs. Green populist demagoguery. Society is indifferent to right and wrong. It substitutes falsehood for reality. It lacks values and direction. People have lost faith in democracy and the rule of law." Hu Fo sighed in frustration. He was in essence sighing for everyone on Taiwan.
Consider the current atmosphere on Taiwan. It is either Blue vs. Green opposition or factional interests uber alles. We can almost predict what the response will be to Hu Fo's article. His arguments about the rule of law may be irrefutable. But it will not matter. His arguments about right and wrong my be clear. But it will not matter. Many in the Green Camp and many who are unhappy with the Ma government, will insist that speaking on behalf of President Ma and Huang Shi-ming is wrong and must be denounced. Even if one is entirely right, to them it will make no difference.
One can predict that over the next few days, Hu Fo will be attacked, en masse, in a wide range of fora. All manner of ugly rhetoric will be emerge. A thousand fingers will be pointed at him. But on the other hand, Hu Fo's words will echo in our ears. Perhaps they will provoke a reaction from those concerned only about Blue or Green political coloration, and those who care nothing for right and wrong. They will make them show their hand. That might not be such a bad thing. At least it will validate Hu Fo's assessment of the current state of Taiwan .
We want Hu Fo to know that he is not alone. His is not a voice in the wilderness. Taiwan society has not sunk to the level where right and wrong no longer matter. It is merely that those who spout absurdities have seized the bully pulpit. Many members of the public have decided that they may as well remain silent. It does not mean everyone is blind to the facts. Hu Fo's article points to the many voices of the Great Silent Majority. Here we would like to express our appreciation for Hu Fo's moral courage.
社論－沉默多數的心聲終於獲得伸張
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月08日 04:09
監察院昨日再度召開彈劾審查會，歷經兩個多小時的討論，最後以6票對6票，彈劾案未過關，黃世銘暫時保住檢察總長的職位。由於先前黃世銘曾表示，若遭監察院彈劾或法院一審判有罪，他就下台；如今監院二度彈劾未過關，依規定監院不得再對同一人、同一案由提案彈劾；這意味黃世銘將暫保總長職位。
就在監院召開二次彈劾審查會前夕，中央研究院院士胡佛以〈光天化日、陷人於罪〉為題投書《中國時報》時論廣場，以《憲法》與法律的高度，針對檢察總長黃世銘所蒙受的對待與攻訐，提出他個人的評論。
這篇評論值得重視的原因，不只因為其是很少數支持黃世銘行止的論述之一，而是其道出了這個社會中許多人心中最大的困惑：為什麼進行關說的在野黨總召與立法院長沒啥人加以質疑，而支持偵辦的馬總統被罵到臭頭？為什麼接受關說的兩位檢察官一而再、再而三的被「輕輕放下」，而辦關說的檢察總長卻彷彿犯下天理不容、人神共憤的滔天大罪，非治之以撤職、彈劾甚或司法審判，否則不足以平息輿論之怒火？
胡院士在他的投書中，完全不玩弄政治語言，而是引經據典透過《憲法》及相關法律條文的規定，詮釋檢察總長黃世銘所受到的所有指控。例如他根據《憲法》中有關總統職權以及《法院組織法》中有關最高檢署檢察總長產生方式的規定，認為檢察總長當然要向總統負政策執行的責任。特別是當碰到一樁涉及立法院長、法務部部長、高檢署檢察長及檢察官，且影響到司法獨立的特殊重大不法案件，檢察總長立即向總統提出報告，並接受總統諮詢，這在職務的履行上，是非常盡責的作法，如何談得上向總統洩密呢？
誠哉斯言，過去幾個月以來，不就是針對「洩密」的撻伐，遠遠多過對「關說」的質疑！不少論者碰到「關說」的部分不是模糊以對、就是語焉不詳，但是一碰到「洩密」的部分，就是拿著放大鏡，仿若雞蛋裡挑骨頭似的檢視。套用馬總統一再被嘲弄的一句修辭法：如果這樣都不是雙重標準，還要怎樣才算是雙重標準呢？
如果馬總統與黃檢察總長都沒有「違法」疑義，那麼過去幾個月，為什麼是他們被打成仿如人民公敵，而那些行使關說的政客與被關說的檢察官，卻恍若成為最無辜的受害者？我們在台灣實施這麼多年的法治教育與道德教育，對依法行政的判定，對倫理是非的分辨，不應該是這樣的吧！那麼為什麼竟然會顛倒是非至此呢？這一切又到底是怎麼回事呢？
胡佛院士在他投書最後的結語中，發出了這樣的慨嘆：「當前的台灣政局，在族群撕裂、金權交易、派閥牽引、民粹操弄及藍綠惡鬥的情況下，整個社會變成無是無非，甚至以假當真，不但缺乏正確的價值觀與發展方向，且令人對民主法治喪失信心。」試問，胡院士嘆息與無奈，不正就是當前整個台灣最需要嘆息與無奈的地方嗎？
審視當前台灣的輿情氛圍，不就是藍綠分立、黨派為先嗎？講得再直白一些，我們幾乎現在就可以預期，胡院士這篇讜論，就算其中的就法論法的論證再堅實不過，就算其所論述的價值是非也再清晰不過，但在許多綠營人士，或是部分不滿馬政府人士的眼中，替馬總統與黃世銘講話就是不對，就是該批，那怕你講得全都是對的也沒用！
可預見，這兩天瞄準胡院士攻擊的文字，肯定會在各個平台量產，什麼難聽的話都會出籠，胡院士免不了要暫時陷入「橫眉冷對千夫指」的處境了！不過換個角度說，如果胡院士一篇擲地有聲的文字，能夠引出那些只問藍綠、不論是非的論者立即現形，那也不是壞事，至少它印證了胡院士對台灣現況的評斷。
我們想說的是，胡院士並不孤獨，他的見解也絕不是這個社會中的少數聲音！台灣社會並沒有沉淪到是非不分的地步，只不過在許多奇談怪論占領重要發言位置後，許多人乾脆選擇沉默，但絕不意味大家都已盲目到看不清事實，胡院士的這篇文字，正是道出了許多沉默大多數人的心聲，在此謹對胡院士的道德勇氣，表達我們最誠摯的敬意！
Monday, January 6, 2014
A Just Cause Invariably Gains Support: Key to China's Return to Glory
A Just Cause Invariably Gains Support: Key to China's Return to Glory
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 7, 2014
Summary: The New Year has already begun, but tensions in Northeast Asia have not improved. Beijing has forcefully reiterated that "The Chinese people do not fear demons, and do not believe evil will prevail." It has already declared its intention to fight to the bitter end. But the Japanese government under Abe shows no signs of softening. We appeal to all parties. War is hell. It involves life and death. When all is said and done, peace remains the highest value. Neither side should precipitate a major disaster merely because it could not endure a minor slight. Neither side should act to the detriment of its own national growth, national interests, and to regional security.
Full text below:
The New Year has already begun, but tensions in Northeast Asia have not improved. Beijing has forcefully reiterated that "The Chinese people do not fear demons, and do not believe evil will prevail." It has already declared its intention to fight to the bitter end. Some in the Mainland military and media say that sooner or later China and Japan must have a showdown. But the Japanese government under Abe shows no signs of softening. It even added fuel to the fire by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. It insists on further revising its textbooks, whitewashing Japanese war crimes. Chinese and Japanese nationalist sentiments are escalating. The outside world long ago concluded that the situation will get worse before it gets better. Consider the big picture. Consider practical interests. We appeal to all parties. War is hell. It involves life and death. When all is said and done, peace remains the highest value. Neither side should precipitate a major disaster merely because it could not endure a minor slight. Neither side should act to the detriment of its own national growth, national interests, and to regional security.
Everything has a beginning and end. The East China Sea dispute arose because Japan "nationalized" the Diaoyutai Islands. The Japanese side insists that its motives were pure. But It gave no prior warning. its behavior afterwards was unacceptable. Naturally this led to unnecessary suspicions. Once the status quo was disrupted, it became difficult to restore. Beijing established territorial waters baselines and an air defense identification zone. It dispatched maritime surveillance and fisheries vessels to Diaoyutai Islands waters. It demonstrated a willingness to go to war. The Japanese side fired back three security treaty arrows. It openly named China as the biggest threat to its national defense. It sought international support from the United States, Australia, and ASEAN. It is determined to crush Mainland China. Late last year, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, in a move deliberately calculated to provoke Mainland China. No wonder the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry named Abe persona non grata. A vicious cycle has formed between Mainland China and Japan.
Escalating tensions and conflict involve a process. First the parties exchange verbal threats. They halt exchanges. They withdraw diplomatic personnel. They impose economic sanctions. They dispatch troops. They stockpile materiel. A small-scale conflict becomes full-scale war. There are invariably warning signs. Most importantly, the countries involved must not send complex, contradictory signals. They must avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations. After all, rationally speaking, neither Mainland China nor Japan, nor even the United States, considers conflict absolutely necessary. In case the situation spins out of control, it will be a lose/lose, lose/lose/lose, everyone loses scenario. No country will benefit. Consider the situation logically. Many believe the United States hopes to provoke a Sino-Japanese conflict in order to undermine Mainland China's modernization. But such opportunism is far too risky. The consequences are far too unpredictable. America cannot afford such a gamble.
He who creates a problem ought to solve the problem. As matters stand, Mainland China cannot accept Japan's "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing has already delineated its territorial waters baselines. It has no reason to rescind its air defense identification zone. Japan may refuse to recognize Beijing's air defense identification zone. Japan's desire to become a "normal nation" is understandable. But whatever the outcome, Tokyo must confront Japan's past. It must dispel Asian-Pacific doubts about its reversion to militarism. In particular, Japan must acknowledge the reality of a rising Mainland China. It must deal with the WWII war criminals enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. It must avoid pouring salt into China and South Korea's wounds. It must seek diplomatic solutions based on current realities. Abe's empty rhetoric and lies will only increase the complexity of the problem. He must says something more constructive. He must do something more substantive. He must not go too far. That is how he can ease the current conflict.
We also have some suggestion for Mainland China. This is the 120th anniversary of First Sino-Japanese War. For over 100 years, the Chinese people have endured humiliation. The entire nation seeks to restore China's glorious history. Today a thriving Mainland China is a reality. Essentially the problem of being invaded, of being starved, and of being denounced has been solved. The Chinese people have the opportunity to contribute to peaceful development and economic prosperity. Unless there is no alternative, Beijing must safeguard China's national sovereignty, national security, and its pursuit of economic prosperity. Its national strength must have a firm foundation. If harsh words are required, it must utter them in a quiet voice. It must resort to more civilized means than others use to solve problems. America's hegemonic mannerism, and its "Big Stick" approach, is alien to China's political tradition. The best military strategy is an intelligent military strategy. A just cause will invariably gain broad support. Winning without fighting is always the best policy. If refusing to endure a minor slight results in a major debacle, and deprives China of the opportunity to restore its former glory, the CCP will go down in infamy.
Lastly, we must address President Ma Ying-jeou's long touted East China Sea Peace Initiative. Some say his proposal includes only principles, and lacks a roadmap for concrete action. But this sees only part of the picture. All of the countries involved have concerns they dare not express publicly. But privately all believe the disputes should be shelved, the resources developed jointly, and the dispute settled peacefully. In this regard, we must give the Ma government its due. Taipei's voice may be small. But the countries involved should all be thinking along these lines, and seeking to solve the problem. Taipei's proposal shows that it is a defender of the regional peace.
社論－得道多助才是中華民族復興之路
2014-01-07 01:54
中國時報
【本報訊】
新年伊始，東北亞緊張局勢並未好轉，北京儘管還未再度說出「中國人不怕鬼、不信邪」的狠話，但不惜奉陪到底的重話已經出口，大陸軍方及媒體迭有中、日終須一戰的呼聲，不過日本安倍政府非但未有絲毫軟化的跡象，還火上加油的前去參拜靖國神社，執意進一步修改教科書，在中日雙方民族主義情緒高漲的情況下，儘管外界早已認知，在局勢好轉之前，情況恐怕還有進一步惡化的可能，但不管是從大局出發或是現實利益考量，我們還是要懇切的呼籲相關各方，兵凶戰危，死生大事，一切還是要以和為貴，任何一方都不應小不忍而亂大謀，而損害了自己的國家發展、民族利益及區域安全。
物有本末、事有終始，東海爭議起源於日本將釣魚台國有化，雖然日方辯稱動機單純而善良，但自己的善意事前未見溝通、事後又不能讓人接受，當然就會引發必要或不必要的猜忌，而且現狀一經破壞即難恢復。北京先後劃出領海基線及防空識別區，派出海監、漁政船前往釣魚台海域執行公務，大有不惜一戰之慨。日方則是還以顏色的祭出安保三箭，明白把中國視為最大的國防威脅，並且分赴美、澳、東協爭取國際支持，企圖全面圍勦中共，而安倍去年底祭拜靖國神社的舉動更是蓄意挑動中方最敏感的神經，難怪中共外交部要將安倍列為不受歡迎人物。中、日雙方的惡性循環已經基本形成。
基本上，緊張和衝突的升高會有一個發展的過程，涉案各方會先由口頭威懾、中斷交流、撤使斷交、經濟制裁，調兵遣將、屯積糧草，從小規模的衝突再發展成全面的戰爭，事前總會有跡象可循。當前最重要的是，所有涉案的相關國家都不要送出錯綜複雜、前後矛盾的訊號，避免任何一方誤解、誤判局勢，畢竟在理性的層面上，中、日雙方，甚至美國都沒有蓄意製造衝突的絕對必要，萬一事態失控這將會是一個雙輸、三輸、多輸的最壞局面，沒有任何一個國家可以從中漁利。從邏輯上推敲，許多人相信美國想要挑起中、日衝突，從而破壞中國現代化的進程，但這種火中取栗的作法風險太大，美國未必承擔得起不可預知的後果。
若說解鈴還需繫鈴人，於今之計，中國當然不能接受日本把釣魚台國有化，北京已經劃定、設立的領海基線、防空識別區當然也無撤回之理，日本可以不承認大陸的防空識別區，它想要建立正常國家的意圖雖然可以理解，但東京好歹還是要坦誠面對其過去的歷史，祛除亞太國家對其重返軍國主義的疑慮，尤其是日本必須理性面對已然成長茁壯的中國大陸，務實處理靖國神社中所供奉的二次世界大戰戰犯問題，避免觸動尤其是中、韓兩國的歷史傷痛，然後大家再在當前現狀的基礎上，用外交的方式來徐圖解決之道。安倍的空言、大話只會增加問題的複雜性，多說好話、多做實事、莫為已甚，應為當前緩解衝突之道。
同樣的，我們對中國大陸也有一些良心的建議，今年是甲午戰爭120周年，百多年來中國人受盡了欺凌，舉國上下莫不以尋回歷史的光榮為職志，如今中國大陸成長茁壯已成事實，不但基本解決了挨打、挨餓、挨罵的問題，還有餘力為世界的和平發展、經濟的繁榮做出一定程度的貢獻，除非萬不得已，北京今天更應該在維護國家主權、保護國民安全、追求經濟發展之餘，以實力為基礎，學會輕聲說重話，用更文明的方式來解決問題。美式胳膊粗、棍子長的霸權作風並非中國政治文化的一部分，上兵伐謀，做一個得道多助的善霸，不戰而屈人之兵才是上上之策，若小不忍而亂大謀，毀了中國復興機會，中共將成為千古罪人。
最後，我們還是要談到馬英九總統所一再主張的東海和平倡議，雖然有人說這種主張只有原則，缺乏具體的行動綱領和路線圖，但這是只知其一不知其二，所有相關國家即使在公開場合都有各種各樣的顧慮，不敢公開給予肯定，但私下莫不認為這種擱置爭議、共同開發、和平解決的提議才是解決衝突的最佳方案。對此，我們還是要給馬政府相當的肯定和支持，也呼籲相關國家莫以台灣人微言輕，而應朝此方向思考，謀求解決問題，台灣的這種主張也說明了我們正是區域和平的維護者和諦造者。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 7, 2014
Summary: The New Year has already begun, but tensions in Northeast Asia have not improved. Beijing has forcefully reiterated that "The Chinese people do not fear demons, and do not believe evil will prevail." It has already declared its intention to fight to the bitter end. But the Japanese government under Abe shows no signs of softening. We appeal to all parties. War is hell. It involves life and death. When all is said and done, peace remains the highest value. Neither side should precipitate a major disaster merely because it could not endure a minor slight. Neither side should act to the detriment of its own national growth, national interests, and to regional security.
Full text below:
The New Year has already begun, but tensions in Northeast Asia have not improved. Beijing has forcefully reiterated that "The Chinese people do not fear demons, and do not believe evil will prevail." It has already declared its intention to fight to the bitter end. Some in the Mainland military and media say that sooner or later China and Japan must have a showdown. But the Japanese government under Abe shows no signs of softening. It even added fuel to the fire by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. It insists on further revising its textbooks, whitewashing Japanese war crimes. Chinese and Japanese nationalist sentiments are escalating. The outside world long ago concluded that the situation will get worse before it gets better. Consider the big picture. Consider practical interests. We appeal to all parties. War is hell. It involves life and death. When all is said and done, peace remains the highest value. Neither side should precipitate a major disaster merely because it could not endure a minor slight. Neither side should act to the detriment of its own national growth, national interests, and to regional security.
Everything has a beginning and end. The East China Sea dispute arose because Japan "nationalized" the Diaoyutai Islands. The Japanese side insists that its motives were pure. But It gave no prior warning. its behavior afterwards was unacceptable. Naturally this led to unnecessary suspicions. Once the status quo was disrupted, it became difficult to restore. Beijing established territorial waters baselines and an air defense identification zone. It dispatched maritime surveillance and fisheries vessels to Diaoyutai Islands waters. It demonstrated a willingness to go to war. The Japanese side fired back three security treaty arrows. It openly named China as the biggest threat to its national defense. It sought international support from the United States, Australia, and ASEAN. It is determined to crush Mainland China. Late last year, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, in a move deliberately calculated to provoke Mainland China. No wonder the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry named Abe persona non grata. A vicious cycle has formed between Mainland China and Japan.
Escalating tensions and conflict involve a process. First the parties exchange verbal threats. They halt exchanges. They withdraw diplomatic personnel. They impose economic sanctions. They dispatch troops. They stockpile materiel. A small-scale conflict becomes full-scale war. There are invariably warning signs. Most importantly, the countries involved must not send complex, contradictory signals. They must avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations. After all, rationally speaking, neither Mainland China nor Japan, nor even the United States, considers conflict absolutely necessary. In case the situation spins out of control, it will be a lose/lose, lose/lose/lose, everyone loses scenario. No country will benefit. Consider the situation logically. Many believe the United States hopes to provoke a Sino-Japanese conflict in order to undermine Mainland China's modernization. But such opportunism is far too risky. The consequences are far too unpredictable. America cannot afford such a gamble.
He who creates a problem ought to solve the problem. As matters stand, Mainland China cannot accept Japan's "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing has already delineated its territorial waters baselines. It has no reason to rescind its air defense identification zone. Japan may refuse to recognize Beijing's air defense identification zone. Japan's desire to become a "normal nation" is understandable. But whatever the outcome, Tokyo must confront Japan's past. It must dispel Asian-Pacific doubts about its reversion to militarism. In particular, Japan must acknowledge the reality of a rising Mainland China. It must deal with the WWII war criminals enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. It must avoid pouring salt into China and South Korea's wounds. It must seek diplomatic solutions based on current realities. Abe's empty rhetoric and lies will only increase the complexity of the problem. He must says something more constructive. He must do something more substantive. He must not go too far. That is how he can ease the current conflict.
We also have some suggestion for Mainland China. This is the 120th anniversary of First Sino-Japanese War. For over 100 years, the Chinese people have endured humiliation. The entire nation seeks to restore China's glorious history. Today a thriving Mainland China is a reality. Essentially the problem of being invaded, of being starved, and of being denounced has been solved. The Chinese people have the opportunity to contribute to peaceful development and economic prosperity. Unless there is no alternative, Beijing must safeguard China's national sovereignty, national security, and its pursuit of economic prosperity. Its national strength must have a firm foundation. If harsh words are required, it must utter them in a quiet voice. It must resort to more civilized means than others use to solve problems. America's hegemonic mannerism, and its "Big Stick" approach, is alien to China's political tradition. The best military strategy is an intelligent military strategy. A just cause will invariably gain broad support. Winning without fighting is always the best policy. If refusing to endure a minor slight results in a major debacle, and deprives China of the opportunity to restore its former glory, the CCP will go down in infamy.
Lastly, we must address President Ma Ying-jeou's long touted East China Sea Peace Initiative. Some say his proposal includes only principles, and lacks a roadmap for concrete action. But this sees only part of the picture. All of the countries involved have concerns they dare not express publicly. But privately all believe the disputes should be shelved, the resources developed jointly, and the dispute settled peacefully. In this regard, we must give the Ma government its due. Taipei's voice may be small. But the countries involved should all be thinking along these lines, and seeking to solve the problem. Taipei's proposal shows that it is a defender of the regional peace.
社論－得道多助才是中華民族復興之路
2014-01-07 01:54
中國時報
【本報訊】
新年伊始，東北亞緊張局勢並未好轉，北京儘管還未再度說出「中國人不怕鬼、不信邪」的狠話，但不惜奉陪到底的重話已經出口，大陸軍方及媒體迭有中、日終須一戰的呼聲，不過日本安倍政府非但未有絲毫軟化的跡象，還火上加油的前去參拜靖國神社，執意進一步修改教科書，在中日雙方民族主義情緒高漲的情況下，儘管外界早已認知，在局勢好轉之前，情況恐怕還有進一步惡化的可能，但不管是從大局出發或是現實利益考量，我們還是要懇切的呼籲相關各方，兵凶戰危，死生大事，一切還是要以和為貴，任何一方都不應小不忍而亂大謀，而損害了自己的國家發展、民族利益及區域安全。
物有本末、事有終始，東海爭議起源於日本將釣魚台國有化，雖然日方辯稱動機單純而善良，但自己的善意事前未見溝通、事後又不能讓人接受，當然就會引發必要或不必要的猜忌，而且現狀一經破壞即難恢復。北京先後劃出領海基線及防空識別區，派出海監、漁政船前往釣魚台海域執行公務，大有不惜一戰之慨。日方則是還以顏色的祭出安保三箭，明白把中國視為最大的國防威脅，並且分赴美、澳、東協爭取國際支持，企圖全面圍勦中共，而安倍去年底祭拜靖國神社的舉動更是蓄意挑動中方最敏感的神經，難怪中共外交部要將安倍列為不受歡迎人物。中、日雙方的惡性循環已經基本形成。
基本上，緊張和衝突的升高會有一個發展的過程，涉案各方會先由口頭威懾、中斷交流、撤使斷交、經濟制裁，調兵遣將、屯積糧草，從小規模的衝突再發展成全面的戰爭，事前總會有跡象可循。當前最重要的是，所有涉案的相關國家都不要送出錯綜複雜、前後矛盾的訊號，避免任何一方誤解、誤判局勢，畢竟在理性的層面上，中、日雙方，甚至美國都沒有蓄意製造衝突的絕對必要，萬一事態失控這將會是一個雙輸、三輸、多輸的最壞局面，沒有任何一個國家可以從中漁利。從邏輯上推敲，許多人相信美國想要挑起中、日衝突，從而破壞中國現代化的進程，但這種火中取栗的作法風險太大，美國未必承擔得起不可預知的後果。
若說解鈴還需繫鈴人，於今之計，中國當然不能接受日本把釣魚台國有化，北京已經劃定、設立的領海基線、防空識別區當然也無撤回之理，日本可以不承認大陸的防空識別區，它想要建立正常國家的意圖雖然可以理解，但東京好歹還是要坦誠面對其過去的歷史，祛除亞太國家對其重返軍國主義的疑慮，尤其是日本必須理性面對已然成長茁壯的中國大陸，務實處理靖國神社中所供奉的二次世界大戰戰犯問題，避免觸動尤其是中、韓兩國的歷史傷痛，然後大家再在當前現狀的基礎上，用外交的方式來徐圖解決之道。安倍的空言、大話只會增加問題的複雜性，多說好話、多做實事、莫為已甚，應為當前緩解衝突之道。
同樣的，我們對中國大陸也有一些良心的建議，今年是甲午戰爭120周年，百多年來中國人受盡了欺凌，舉國上下莫不以尋回歷史的光榮為職志，如今中國大陸成長茁壯已成事實，不但基本解決了挨打、挨餓、挨罵的問題，還有餘力為世界的和平發展、經濟的繁榮做出一定程度的貢獻，除非萬不得已，北京今天更應該在維護國家主權、保護國民安全、追求經濟發展之餘，以實力為基礎，學會輕聲說重話，用更文明的方式來解決問題。美式胳膊粗、棍子長的霸權作風並非中國政治文化的一部分，上兵伐謀，做一個得道多助的善霸，不戰而屈人之兵才是上上之策，若小不忍而亂大謀，毀了中國復興機會，中共將成為千古罪人。
最後，我們還是要談到馬英九總統所一再主張的東海和平倡議，雖然有人說這種主張只有原則，缺乏具體的行動綱領和路線圖，但這是只知其一不知其二，所有相關國家即使在公開場合都有各種各樣的顧慮，不敢公開給予肯定，但私下莫不認為這種擱置爭議、共同開發、和平解決的提議才是解決衝突的最佳方案。對此，我們還是要給馬政府相當的肯定和支持，也呼籲相關國家莫以台灣人微言輕，而應朝此方向思考，謀求解決問題，台灣的這種主張也說明了我們正是區域和平的維護者和諦造者。
Sunday, January 5, 2014
Jettisoning Taiwan Independence Harder than Overthrowing a Regime
Jettisoning Taiwan Independence Harder than Overthrowing a Regime
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 6, 2014
Summary: The DPP is immobilized by the shackles of Taiwan independence. it can neither advance nor retreat. In 2000, Taiwan independence granted Chen Shui-bian a grace period. The Taiwan independence forces that Su Tseng-chang currently faces are not so reasonable. The DPP must not pretend to jettison Taiwan independence as an electioneering ploy. It must jettison Taiwan independence in fact, to ensure Taiwan's survival. Does the DPP really intend to ride Taiwan independence to power in 2016, only to ride Taiwan independence from power in 2020? Taiwan is unlikely to survive the ordeal.
Full text below:
The DPP is expected to announce its "[Mainland] China Policy" on the 9th. The most closely watched issue is how it will distance itself from Taiwan independence.
Su Tseng-chang said, "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." Frank Hsieh has proposed "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. Ker Chien-ming has proposed "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Platform." Key players within the DPP realize Taiwan independence is a game they can no longer afford to play. Everyone is awaiting the DPP's upcoming "China Policy" announcement. Everyone wants to see how the DPP will deal with the Taiwan independence albatross around its neck.
Over 40 years ago, Taiwan independence overtly and covertly infiltrated the pro-democracy movement. Back then, we predicted that Taiwan independence could neither dominate nor endure. In 1991, following the lifting of martial law, the DPP announced its " Taiwan Independence Party Platform." The DPP became the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. At the height of its arrogance, it cowed the KMT into hiding the ROC national flag during its election rallies, for fear it would result in lost votes. In 1999 however, for the sake of Chen Shui-bian's presidential bid, the DPP issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It strategically jettisoned its Taiwan independence stance. A split between Lien and Soong supporters enabled Chen to win office. But as soon as Chen took office, MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen pressured President Chen Shui-bian into repudiating the 1992 consensus. The ruling DPP then forced the entire country to participate in its Taiwan independence antics, including the "rectification of names" and the "Referendum on UN membership." Tsai Ing-wen lost her presidential bid in 2012 because she repudidated the 1992 consensus. The DPP longs to return to power. As a result it has begun reforming its cross-strait policy. Su Tseng-chang declared that "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." Frank Hsieh proposed "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. Ker Chien-ming proposed "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." These have all led to controversy.
Indications are however, that the DPP will not be able to free itself from the bonds of Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang said "Freezing the Taiwan independence party platform is not under consideration." He has already given us the answer. As everyone can see, the DPP faces a dilemma. If it wants to return to power it must shrug off the shackles of Taiwan Independence. But given the pro and con forces within the party, it cannot.
There is an old saying. "It is easy to eliminate the brigands hiding in the mountains. It is difficult to eliminate the evil hiding within one's heart." The DPP overthrew the Kuomintang regime in 2000. Ever since it passed its 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," it has been struggling to jettison Taiwan independence. Alas, Taiwan independence continues to bind it hand and foot, making it impossible to stand. As the title of this article notes, jettisoning Taiwan independence is harder than overthrowing a regime.
Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, in part because of the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" apparently jettisoned the party's Taiwan independence stance. But once it assumed power, Taiwan independence returned to haunt the party. Either that, or the DPP used Taiwan independence to manipulate the strategic picture. A look back proves that the DPP was merely pretending to jettison Taiwan independence in order to win the presidential election. It had no intention of jettisoning Taiwan independence. Today, the DPP longs to return to power. Once again it has floated all sorts of proposals to jettison Taiwan independence. These include Su Tseng-chang's "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." They include Frank Hsieh's "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. They include Ker Chien-ming's "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." But these are merely electioneering tricks. Their real purpose is to enable the DPP to return to power. The DPP will never change its Taiwan independence spots.
DPP factions are currently engaged in internal strife. The impression they are giving the outside world is that the DPP simply cannot jettison its Taiwan independence stance. Recall the problems encountered by Chen Shui-bian before and after he was elected in 2000. They led to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Under party chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, the process was characterized as smooth. But today's DPP has already "tasted bitterness." The Chen Shui-bian administration remained bound by the shackles of Taiwan independence for eight long years. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012 because she repudiated the 1992 consensus. The party includes people who say "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." It includes people who propose "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." But their position has not become a consensus within the party. As the title of this article implied, "It is easy to eliminate the brigands hiding in the mountains. It is difficult to eliminate the evil hiding within one's heart." It was easy to overthrow a pro-Taiwan independence DPP regime. But it is not so easy to persuade the DPP to jettison Taiwan independence.
Taiwan independence affects the international strategic picture. It affects the Republic of China's strategic survival. Yet the DPP has reduced it an electioneering ploy to enable its return to power. Suppose the DPP jettisons its Taiwan independence stance and is reelected? Will that fool Washington? Will that fool Beijing? In particular will that fool awakend voters? This was the bitter experience endured by the nation between 2000, when the DPP rose to power, and 2008, when the DPP fell from grace. Does the nation really wish to repeat this tragedy in 2016?
The DPP is immobilized by the shackles of Taiwan independence. it can neither advance nor retreat. In 2000, Taiwan independence granted Chen Shui-bian a grace period. The Taiwan independence forces that Su Tseng-chang currently faces are not so reasonable. The DPP must not pretend to jettison Taiwan independence as an electioneering ploy. It must in fact jettison Taiwan independence to ensure Taiwan's survival. Does the DPP really intend to ride Taiwan independence to power in 2016, only to ride Taiwan independence from power in 2020? Taiwan is unlikely to survive the ordeal.
The DPP is about to announce its "China policy." It must not allow the public to see its inadequacies and its dilemma.
甩掉台獨 比推翻一個政權還難
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.06 02:32 am
民進黨可能在九日公布其「對中政策」，最受矚目的表徵自是在如何與台獨切割。
蘇貞昌說「不必再回頭搞台獨」，謝長廷倡議「憲法各表」，柯建銘主張「凍結台獨黨綱」；在在顯示，民進黨內的一些要角已有「台獨再也玩不下去」的覺悟。這次「對中政策」發布，大家都在等著看民進黨如何處理這隻台獨包袱。
其實，在四十餘年前，台獨勢力或明或暗地進入台灣民主運動之際，我們即預言其不是可大可久；然而，解嚴後，民進黨在一九九一年正式發布《台獨黨綱》，自此民進黨就成了旗幟鮮明的台獨黨，其氣焰最盛時，甚至逼得國旗在國民黨的選舉集會中銷形匿跡，唯恐讓人看了刺眼，流失選票。但至一九九九年，為部署陳水扁參選總統，民進黨發布《台灣前途決議文》，策略性地擺出「甩掉台獨」的姿態，遂在連、宋分裂的局面下，贏得了執政地位；然而，扁政府上台後，陸委會主委蔡英文逼使陳水扁總統否定了九二共識，隨後民進黨政府又將整個國家捲入「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」等台獨風暴之中。如今，又因二○一二年蔡英文敗於「否定九二共識」，民進黨為了「重返執政」，遂再掀起兩岸政策轉型之議，始有前述蘇貞昌「不回頭搞台獨」、謝長廷「憲法各表」，與柯建銘「凍獨」的眾議紛紜。
然而，跡象顯示，民進黨此次仍不可能跳脫台獨的捆綁，蘇貞昌的「台獨黨綱沒有凍結不凍結的問題」，已經預示了解答。眾所共見，民進黨今日的困局正是：若想「重返執政」，必須跳脫台獨的捆綁；但在黨內正反力量的拉扯下，卻無可能做到。
語云：「去山中賊易，去心中賊難。」民進黨曾在二○○○年推翻了國民黨政權，但自一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》嘗試擺脫台獨以來，卻是迄今仍被台獨纏身，無法翻身。這就是本文標題所指：甩掉台獨，比推翻一個政權還難。
陳水扁在二○○○年贏得總統大選，部分是因《台灣前途決議文》擺出了「甩掉台獨」的姿態；但在執政後，台獨又回頭纏住了民進黨，或民進黨又回頭利用台獨元素來操作政局。如今回顧那段歷史，足證民進黨只是利用「甩掉台獨的姿態」來贏得總統大選，卻在黨的體質上根本沒有「甩掉台獨」的可能性。如今，民進黨為了「重返執政」，又出現「擺出甩掉台獨的姿態」之各種主意，包括蘇貞昌的「不回頭」、謝長廷的「憲法各表」與柯建銘的「凍獨」等，其實率皆只是一種「重返執政」的選舉權謀而已，卻無可能是民進黨在台獨體質上的脫胎換骨。
何況，如今民進黨在內部路線及派系的傾軋中，給外界的觀感是甚至連「擺出甩掉台獨的姿態」的能力都沒有。回想陳水扁當年預見二○○○年大選及當選後執政的難題，促成了《台灣前途決議文》的發布，在黨主席林義雄操持下，其過程堪稱十分流暢；但今日的民進黨，明明嘗盡陳水扁執政八年困於台獨枷鎖而走投無路的苦頭，又經歷蔡英文二○一二年敗於「否定九二共識」；但黨內雖有「不回頭」與「凍獨」的去獨思維，終究不能成為黨內的主流共識。可見，以本文的題旨而言，要在二○○八年推翻玩弄台獨的民進黨政權易（此為山中之賊），卻是要民進黨跳脫台獨的捆綁難（這是心中之賊）。
台獨是一個牽動國際因素、攸關台灣生死存亡的戰略課題，民進黨卻將其矮化成只是一個「重返執政」的選舉權謀工具。即使民進黨作出「甩掉台獨包袱的姿態」贏得了選舉，但騙得了美國嗎？騙得了北京嗎？尤其，最後騙得了覺醒的選民嗎？這正是民進黨自二○○○至二○○八贏得選舉又失掉政權並敗壞了國家的痛苦經驗，難道如今還想在二○一六年複製悲劇？
面對台獨的捆綁，民進黨已然左支右絀，進退失據。二○○○年陳水扁面對的台獨或尚有幾分賞味期的意思，如今蘇貞昌面對的台獨已是不可理喻。民進黨如果再用「作出甩掉台獨的姿態」為選舉權謀，而不能從「台灣生存戰略」的角度來真正「甩掉台獨」，難道民進黨仍想在二○一六抱著台獨重返執政，然後再在二○二○抱著台獨下台？台灣恐怕再也禁不起這種折騰了。
「對中政策」即將揭曉，民進黨最好不要再讓大家見到左支右絀、進退失據的窘態。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 6, 2014
Summary: The DPP is immobilized by the shackles of Taiwan independence. it can neither advance nor retreat. In 2000, Taiwan independence granted Chen Shui-bian a grace period. The Taiwan independence forces that Su Tseng-chang currently faces are not so reasonable. The DPP must not pretend to jettison Taiwan independence as an electioneering ploy. It must jettison Taiwan independence in fact, to ensure Taiwan's survival. Does the DPP really intend to ride Taiwan independence to power in 2016, only to ride Taiwan independence from power in 2020? Taiwan is unlikely to survive the ordeal.
Full text below:
The DPP is expected to announce its "[Mainland] China Policy" on the 9th. The most closely watched issue is how it will distance itself from Taiwan independence.
Su Tseng-chang said, "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." Frank Hsieh has proposed "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. Ker Chien-ming has proposed "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Platform." Key players within the DPP realize Taiwan independence is a game they can no longer afford to play. Everyone is awaiting the DPP's upcoming "China Policy" announcement. Everyone wants to see how the DPP will deal with the Taiwan independence albatross around its neck.
Over 40 years ago, Taiwan independence overtly and covertly infiltrated the pro-democracy movement. Back then, we predicted that Taiwan independence could neither dominate nor endure. In 1991, following the lifting of martial law, the DPP announced its " Taiwan Independence Party Platform." The DPP became the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. At the height of its arrogance, it cowed the KMT into hiding the ROC national flag during its election rallies, for fear it would result in lost votes. In 1999 however, for the sake of Chen Shui-bian's presidential bid, the DPP issued its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It strategically jettisoned its Taiwan independence stance. A split between Lien and Soong supporters enabled Chen to win office. But as soon as Chen took office, MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen pressured President Chen Shui-bian into repudiating the 1992 consensus. The ruling DPP then forced the entire country to participate in its Taiwan independence antics, including the "rectification of names" and the "Referendum on UN membership." Tsai Ing-wen lost her presidential bid in 2012 because she repudidated the 1992 consensus. The DPP longs to return to power. As a result it has begun reforming its cross-strait policy. Su Tseng-chang declared that "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." Frank Hsieh proposed "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. Ker Chien-ming proposed "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." These have all led to controversy.
Indications are however, that the DPP will not be able to free itself from the bonds of Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang said "Freezing the Taiwan independence party platform is not under consideration." He has already given us the answer. As everyone can see, the DPP faces a dilemma. If it wants to return to power it must shrug off the shackles of Taiwan Independence. But given the pro and con forces within the party, it cannot.
There is an old saying. "It is easy to eliminate the brigands hiding in the mountains. It is difficult to eliminate the evil hiding within one's heart." The DPP overthrew the Kuomintang regime in 2000. Ever since it passed its 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," it has been struggling to jettison Taiwan independence. Alas, Taiwan independence continues to bind it hand and foot, making it impossible to stand. As the title of this article notes, jettisoning Taiwan independence is harder than overthrowing a regime.
Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, in part because of the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" apparently jettisoned the party's Taiwan independence stance. But once it assumed power, Taiwan independence returned to haunt the party. Either that, or the DPP used Taiwan independence to manipulate the strategic picture. A look back proves that the DPP was merely pretending to jettison Taiwan independence in order to win the presidential election. It had no intention of jettisoning Taiwan independence. Today, the DPP longs to return to power. Once again it has floated all sorts of proposals to jettison Taiwan independence. These include Su Tseng-chang's "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." They include Frank Hsieh's "Different Constitutional Interpretations" [of "one China"]. They include Ker Chien-ming's "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." But these are merely electioneering tricks. Their real purpose is to enable the DPP to return to power. The DPP will never change its Taiwan independence spots.
DPP factions are currently engaged in internal strife. The impression they are giving the outside world is that the DPP simply cannot jettison its Taiwan independence stance. Recall the problems encountered by Chen Shui-bian before and after he was elected in 2000. They led to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Under party chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, the process was characterized as smooth. But today's DPP has already "tasted bitterness." The Chen Shui-bian administration remained bound by the shackles of Taiwan independence for eight long years. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012 because she repudiated the 1992 consensus. The party includes people who say "There is no need to turn the clock back and to engage in Taiwan independence." It includes people who propose "Freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Charter." But their position has not become a consensus within the party. As the title of this article implied, "It is easy to eliminate the brigands hiding in the mountains. It is difficult to eliminate the evil hiding within one's heart." It was easy to overthrow a pro-Taiwan independence DPP regime. But it is not so easy to persuade the DPP to jettison Taiwan independence.
Taiwan independence affects the international strategic picture. It affects the Republic of China's strategic survival. Yet the DPP has reduced it an electioneering ploy to enable its return to power. Suppose the DPP jettisons its Taiwan independence stance and is reelected? Will that fool Washington? Will that fool Beijing? In particular will that fool awakend voters? This was the bitter experience endured by the nation between 2000, when the DPP rose to power, and 2008, when the DPP fell from grace. Does the nation really wish to repeat this tragedy in 2016?
The DPP is immobilized by the shackles of Taiwan independence. it can neither advance nor retreat. In 2000, Taiwan independence granted Chen Shui-bian a grace period. The Taiwan independence forces that Su Tseng-chang currently faces are not so reasonable. The DPP must not pretend to jettison Taiwan independence as an electioneering ploy. It must in fact jettison Taiwan independence to ensure Taiwan's survival. Does the DPP really intend to ride Taiwan independence to power in 2016, only to ride Taiwan independence from power in 2020? Taiwan is unlikely to survive the ordeal.
The DPP is about to announce its "China policy." It must not allow the public to see its inadequacies and its dilemma.
甩掉台獨 比推翻一個政權還難
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.06 02:32 am
民進黨可能在九日公布其「對中政策」，最受矚目的表徵自是在如何與台獨切割。
蘇貞昌說「不必再回頭搞台獨」，謝長廷倡議「憲法各表」，柯建銘主張「凍結台獨黨綱」；在在顯示，民進黨內的一些要角已有「台獨再也玩不下去」的覺悟。這次「對中政策」發布，大家都在等著看民進黨如何處理這隻台獨包袱。
其實，在四十餘年前，台獨勢力或明或暗地進入台灣民主運動之際，我們即預言其不是可大可久；然而，解嚴後，民進黨在一九九一年正式發布《台獨黨綱》，自此民進黨就成了旗幟鮮明的台獨黨，其氣焰最盛時，甚至逼得國旗在國民黨的選舉集會中銷形匿跡，唯恐讓人看了刺眼，流失選票。但至一九九九年，為部署陳水扁參選總統，民進黨發布《台灣前途決議文》，策略性地擺出「甩掉台獨」的姿態，遂在連、宋分裂的局面下，贏得了執政地位；然而，扁政府上台後，陸委會主委蔡英文逼使陳水扁總統否定了九二共識，隨後民進黨政府又將整個國家捲入「正名制憲」、「入聯公投」等台獨風暴之中。如今，又因二○一二年蔡英文敗於「否定九二共識」，民進黨為了「重返執政」，遂再掀起兩岸政策轉型之議，始有前述蘇貞昌「不回頭搞台獨」、謝長廷「憲法各表」，與柯建銘「凍獨」的眾議紛紜。
然而，跡象顯示，民進黨此次仍不可能跳脫台獨的捆綁，蘇貞昌的「台獨黨綱沒有凍結不凍結的問題」，已經預示了解答。眾所共見，民進黨今日的困局正是：若想「重返執政」，必須跳脫台獨的捆綁；但在黨內正反力量的拉扯下，卻無可能做到。
語云：「去山中賊易，去心中賊難。」民進黨曾在二○○○年推翻了國民黨政權，但自一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》嘗試擺脫台獨以來，卻是迄今仍被台獨纏身，無法翻身。這就是本文標題所指：甩掉台獨，比推翻一個政權還難。
陳水扁在二○○○年贏得總統大選，部分是因《台灣前途決議文》擺出了「甩掉台獨」的姿態；但在執政後，台獨又回頭纏住了民進黨，或民進黨又回頭利用台獨元素來操作政局。如今回顧那段歷史，足證民進黨只是利用「甩掉台獨的姿態」來贏得總統大選，卻在黨的體質上根本沒有「甩掉台獨」的可能性。如今，民進黨為了「重返執政」，又出現「擺出甩掉台獨的姿態」之各種主意，包括蘇貞昌的「不回頭」、謝長廷的「憲法各表」與柯建銘的「凍獨」等，其實率皆只是一種「重返執政」的選舉權謀而已，卻無可能是民進黨在台獨體質上的脫胎換骨。
何況，如今民進黨在內部路線及派系的傾軋中，給外界的觀感是甚至連「擺出甩掉台獨的姿態」的能力都沒有。回想陳水扁當年預見二○○○年大選及當選後執政的難題，促成了《台灣前途決議文》的發布，在黨主席林義雄操持下，其過程堪稱十分流暢；但今日的民進黨，明明嘗盡陳水扁執政八年困於台獨枷鎖而走投無路的苦頭，又經歷蔡英文二○一二年敗於「否定九二共識」；但黨內雖有「不回頭」與「凍獨」的去獨思維，終究不能成為黨內的主流共識。可見，以本文的題旨而言，要在二○○八年推翻玩弄台獨的民進黨政權易（此為山中之賊），卻是要民進黨跳脫台獨的捆綁難（這是心中之賊）。
台獨是一個牽動國際因素、攸關台灣生死存亡的戰略課題，民進黨卻將其矮化成只是一個「重返執政」的選舉權謀工具。即使民進黨作出「甩掉台獨包袱的姿態」贏得了選舉，但騙得了美國嗎？騙得了北京嗎？尤其，最後騙得了覺醒的選民嗎？這正是民進黨自二○○○至二○○八贏得選舉又失掉政權並敗壞了國家的痛苦經驗，難道如今還想在二○一六年複製悲劇？
面對台獨的捆綁，民進黨已然左支右絀，進退失據。二○○○年陳水扁面對的台獨或尚有幾分賞味期的意思，如今蘇貞昌面對的台獨已是不可理喻。民進黨如果再用「作出甩掉台獨的姿態」為選舉權謀，而不能從「台灣生存戰略」的角度來真正「甩掉台獨」，難道民進黨仍想在二○一六抱著台獨重返執政，然後再在二○二○抱著台獨下台？台灣恐怕再也禁不起這種折騰了。
「對中政策」即將揭曉，民進黨最好不要再讓大家見到左支右絀、進退失據的窘態。
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