Blue vs. Green: Peaceful Dialogue with Mainland, Deadly Struggle on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 12, 2014
Summary: People have become accustomed to blue vs. green confrontation. The domestic political atmosphere has left many numb. They have had their fill of politicians' antics in the legislature. The just convened emergency session is likely end in a melee. People may no longer be angry. But consider the situation from a better vantage point. The KMT and CCP long ago began a rapprochement. Green Camp politicians have recently made a show of goodwill towards the CCP. But here on Taiwan, the blue and green camps remain at each others' throats, and every cut draws blood. Is this political chaos, or is this the failure of democracy?
Full Text Below:
People have become accustomed to blue vs. green confrontation. The domestic political atmosphere has left many numb. They have had their fill of politicians' antics in the legislature. The just convened emergency session is likely end in a melee. People may no longer be angry. But consider the situation from a better vantage point. The KMT and CCP long ago began a rapprochement. Green Camp politicians have recently made a show of goodwill towards the CCP. But here on Taiwan, the blue and green camps remain at each others' throats, and every cut draws blood. Is this political chaos, or is this the failure of democracy?
Even the man in the street realizes that Taiwan's political system cannot breath. Tsai Ing-wen has taken over as DPP Chairperson. But she has not changed Su Tseng-chang's policy of obstructionism. She has ordered the DPP legislative caucus to continue blocking the STA and cross-strait agreement oversight regulations. She refused to participate in the upcoming Executive Yuan's national trade conference. She threatened a "fierce battle" during the Legislative Yuan emergency session. She singled out the draft law for free trade zones, saying it was a nonsensical policy that would undermine the political system and hurt Taiwan's economy. She swore to block it with all her might, and demanded that it be totally rewritten.
She is attempting to abort these measures before they are born. She is attempting to prevent the Ma adminstration from implementing any of its economic policies and making any economic contributions. This includes external measures such as the STA and FTAs, and internal measures such as free trade zones.
Meanwhile, the Ma administration has changed its once passive strategy. It has begun to take the offensive. Lai Ching-teh once said that cross-Strait direct flights were a Trojan horse. President Ma fired back. He pointed out how Lai flitted to the Mainland and begged for direct flights to Tainan. Tsai Ing-wen once said that the free trade zones were a "potluck dinner run amok." President Ma fired back. He accused Tsai of distorting the facts for political gain. He fired back at the green camp, charging it with indiscriminate obstructionism, "minority violence," and "minority tyranny." Premier Jiang Yi-hua blasted the opposition for obstructing major policies. He said many young people are highly proactive. "They do not complain about the government all day, and do not attribute their own failures to others." The implication was that the student movement only knew how to complain.
The blue and green camps have intensified their rhetoric and hardened their positions. From a partisan perspective, these are offensive and defensive tactics for the year end seven in one elections. But from the public's perspective, this is a battle to the death. Government policy and the national interest will become a political football. It will become cannon fodder. If the public merely watches the fight from the sidelines, or takes it for granted, the politicians will be able to obstruct anything, and proclaim that democracy is nothing more than the "institutionalization of internal conflict."
Blue vs. green confrontation may leave people weary. But consider the attitudinal changes that have taken place in cross-Strait policy. The bizzarre developments have left people breathless.
In recent years, cross-Strait rapprochement has made blue camp figures shuttling back and forth across the Taiwan Strait a matter of routine. But even more interesting is how many green camp figures have found their way to the Mainland. Tainan Mayor Lai Ching-teh recently visited Shanghai. He is the last of the green camp mayors to visit the Mainland. Everyone is aware of his political coloration, seniority, and prestige. Yet he was terrified of missing the boat. While discussing cross-Strait exchanges at Fudan University he advocated "understanding, comprehension, forgiveness, and reconciliation." His demeanor was moderate and deferential. Tsai Ing-wen welcomed Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun to Taiwan. She even seized the initiative and said that "As long as there are no preconditions, he could even meet the Democratic Progressive Party Central Committee."
What's curious is how Tsai Ing-wen could express so much goodwill toward CCP officials. Yet when the Ma administration invited her to participate in the National Economic Affairs Conference, she abruptly refused. She even orderd the DPP legislative caucus to block any Ma administration bills, forthwith. Could it be that blue vs. green grievances run even deeper than grievances across the Strait? When Lai Ching-teh was on the Mainland addressing cross-Strait exchanges, he spoke of "understanding, comprehension, forgiveness, and reconciliation." Yet the green camp attitude toward the Ma administration is "Do not speak to it, do not listen to it, do not look at it, do not meet with it." It is as if a high wall separates the two parties. Are we to understand that the grievances between the blue and green parties are less amenable to solutions than the historical grievances between Taiwan and the Mainland?
Consider something even more absurd. The DPP has put on an elaborate show of goodwill towards the CCP. But back on Taiwan, it shrilly promotes hatred for Mainland] China. It opposes the STA, opposes the MTA, opposes the influx of Mainland capital, and opposes free trade zones. It waves the "Oppose China" banner to oppose Ma. Isn't this flagrant self-contradiction? For green camp supporters, Ma Ying-jeou has become more hated than Communist China. Hasn't the DPP gone off the deep end?
Political competition allows one to express oppositon, but not indiscriminate opposition. It allows one to have intense feelings, but to resort to any means necessary. It allows one to use one's ingenuity, but not to flip-flop endlessly without taking a firm stand. It allows one to be stubborn, but not if it leaves the nation in ruins. This is why democracies speak of the "loyal opposition." An opposition party can engage in endless obstructionism. But the bottom line is that it must not go against the national interest. The DPP has long trumpeted its "love for Taiwan." Yet its loyalty towards Taiwan appears to evaporated into nothingness.
藍綠皆與對岸談和 卻在島內互相廝殺
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.06.12 02:24 am
習
慣了藍綠對峙的民眾，對目前國內沉悶的政治氛圍也許已經失去了痛覺；看多了立法院鬧劇的民眾，對於即將召開的國會臨時會可能以混戰收場，或許也已不再憤
怒。但是，如果把鏡頭拉遠來看這場劇情，當國共兩黨早已融冰，綠營人物最近也競向中共示好，而藍綠政黨卻在島內殺得刀刀見骨；這是政治的錯亂，還是民主的
頹唐？
就算是一般市井小民，應該也都察覺到台灣的政治刻正進入一種令人呼吸困難的狀態。蔡英文接任民進黨主席後，不改蘇貞昌的全面抵制作
風，要求黨團繼續在立法院杯葛服貿協議、兩岸協議監督條例的立法。近日，她先拒絕參加行政院即將召開的「經貿國是會議」，並揚言將在立院臨時會進行一場
「激烈的戰鬥」，更將矛頭指向《自由經濟示範區條例》草案，稱這是一個破壞體制的無厘頭錯誤政策，將重創台灣經濟，誓言極力杯葛，要求全面翻修。
這些舉動，無非是要將馬政府推動的所有經濟政策，從對外的服貿、貨貿、自由貿易協定等，到對內的自由經濟示範區，一律阻殺於陣前，不容有任何進度。
與
此同時，人們也看到馬政府一改先前的被動戰略，開始採取反擊攻勢。馬總統批評賴清德曾說兩岸開放直航是「木馬屠城」，現在卻跑到大陸要求和台南直航；再
如，馬總統反擊蔡英文指示範區是「無限延伸的拼盤雜燴」之說，批評這是扭曲事實的政治操作，也反咬綠營濫行杯葛是「少數暴力」及「少數專制」。同時間，閣
揆江宜樺則痛批在野黨阻撓重大政策，並稱許社會有不少年輕人積極進取，「不會整天抱怨政府，也不會把失敗歸諸別人」，暗諷學運學生只會抱怨。
藍
綠同時拉高聲調及對立姿態，從政黨政治的角度看，是年底七合一選舉的攻防戰術；但從民眾的角度看，如此血腥的爭鬥，其結果將是把政府政策和國家利益送上火
線，當成砲灰。如果人們對這樣的纏鬥廝殺一味冷眼旁觀，或視為當然，那麼，政客當然可以把杯葛手段玩到無所不用其極，並宣稱民主就是「內耗制度化」的保證
書。
光看藍綠對決，或許只是讓人感到疲乏；但如果看看藍綠在兩岸大形勢下的態度變化，則其間的奇異風光，不能不教人倒抽一口氣。
近
幾年兩岸融冰，藍軍人物穿梭於台海之間已是司空見慣；但更引人注意的，則是綠營人物近期絡繹於途地登陸訪問。台南市長賴清德日前訪問上海，已是綠營縣市長
登陸的最後一人；以其色彩、資歷和聲望，竟也走到訪中「唯恐誤了這班車」的地步。而且，在復旦大學的座談談到兩岸交流時，他提出「了解、理解、諒解、和
解」的「四解」主張，表現得十足溫良恭讓。與此同時，蔡英文提到國台辦主任張志軍訪台之事，也主動示意歡迎說：「只要不預設前提，可以在民進黨中央黨部會
面。」
讓人好奇的是，蔡英文可以向中共官員釋出這樣的善意，但馬政府邀請她參加「經貿國是會議」，她卻立刻悍然拒絕，並對立院黨團下達法
案封殺令。難道說，藍綠心結之深，竟然比台灣海峽還深？同樣的，賴清德在大陸大談兩岸交流的「了解、理解、諒解、和解」，但整個綠營對於馬政府的態度卻是
「不談、不聽、不見、不會」，兩黨間如同存在一面高牆。難道說，藍綠間的仇恨，竟然比兩岸的歷史恩怨還要難解？
更荒謬的是，民進黨一方面
不斷向中共示好作態，另一方面，它卻在國內大肆販售「仇中」言論，無論是反服貿、反貨貿、反中資、反示範區，皆是舉著「反中」的旗幟來「反馬」；如此，不
覺得自我矛盾嗎？對綠營的支持者而言，「馬英九」變成比「中共」還可恨的敵人，不覺得走火入魔嗎？
政黨的競爭，可以反對，卻不能漫無底
限；可以激烈，卻不能不擇手段；可以機巧，卻不能反反覆覆到沒有立場；可以頑固，卻不能企圖讓國家與之俱焚。民主政治之所以要強調「忠誠的反對黨」，就是
這個道理；一個反對黨可以用盡手段杯葛，然其最終底線是不能違背國家的利益。就這點看，一向喜歡高談「愛台灣」的民進黨，似乎正漸漸悖離它對台灣的忠誠。
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
Tuesday, June 10, 2014
Tsai Ing-wen's Declaration of War
Tsai Ing-wen's Declaration of War
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2014
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.
Full Text below:
Life is unpredictable. Late last year discussions concerning cross-Strait relations focused on the likelihood of a Ma Xi meeting at this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. They focused on whether the STA and MTA would help Taiwan's economy. They focused on whether the establishment of cross-strait representative offices would strengthen political relations. Shortly after the Spring Festival, Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Yu-chi and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun met successfully in Nanjing. This raised expectations for cross-Strait peaceful development. No one foresaw the mass protests against the STA in March of this year. Since then, all progress in cross-Strait relations has remained stalled. This was followed by James Soong's trip to the Mainland. Xi Jinping used the opportunity to send an important message to Taiwan. This was followed by the "broad one China declaration" transcending blue vs. green partisanship. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly declared her willingness to meet with Zhang Zhijun at DPP Headquarters when he came to Taiwan, providing there were no preconditions. And finally, Lai Ching-teh, Mayor of Tainan City and a Taiwan independence advocate, visited Shanghai. Events have occurred faster than the eye can follow. Peoples' plans can no longer keep up with the changes.
Among these swift changes however, some things remain as immovable as mountains. For example, the Mainland's Taiwan policy. The central theme of Mainland Taiwan policy is peaceful development. The basis for Xi Jinping era Taiwan policy is that "The two sides of the Strait are one family." No matter how much Taiwan has changed, the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not budged. Time is on the Mainland's side. As long as Taiwan does not cross the line, Beijing will not jump to any conclusions, or change its approach to winning over the public on Taiwan. It will not be affected by momentary frustrations or some random politician's rantings. Objective evidence suggests that public opinion on Taiwan is increasingly alienated from the Mainland. Some even interpret Mainland goodwill as a sign of weakness. The public sees CCP concessions to Taiwan as reunification ploys. The DPP rejects both the carrot and the stick. The rhetoric may change. But the substance remains the same. Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen ordered the DPP to block Ma administration cross-Strait policy at all costs. That much is clear.
Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen expressed a willingness to meet with Director Zhang Zhijun. This is one link in the DPP's 2016 strategy chain. First disrupt Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait relations. Prevent a Xi Ma meeting from taking place. Wait until Ma Ying-jeou has become a lame duck. Then promote reconciliation, including reconciliation with the Mainland. Establish DPP/CCP dialogue. Finally, freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. This is what DPP legislative caucus chief convener Ker Chien-ming told outsiders.
The DPP is indulging in wishful thinking. On the one hand, it is making a show of goodwill toward Mainland China. On the other hand, it is lashing out at the Kuomintang. It wants the public on Taiwan to conclude that the DPP is capable of managing cross-Strait relations, and that the KMT does have an exclusive franchise on cross-Strait affairs. It wants reassure the international community that the DPP is capable of changing with the times, that it is not reactionary, and that it does not oppose change out of sheer obstinacy. The DPP of course believes that this strategy will succeed.
But consider this. The DPP may be willing to reconcile with the Mainland. Tsai Ing-wen may welcome a visit by Zhang Zhijun. But have the DPP and Tsai actually changed their policy path? Or have they merely changed their public relations strategy? Tsai Ing-wen said she was willing to meet with Zhang Zhijun -- without preconditions. But what was her stipulation, other than a precondition? Zhang Zhijun visiting the Democratic Progressive Party is tantamount to party to party exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party. Unless the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence, such an exchange is impossible. Anyone with any shred of common sense knows this.
The Taipei Declaration, initiated by Shih Ming-teh, addressed sovereignty, jurisdiction, and even national identity. It was unavoidable. It was similar to the interim agreement advocated by Kenneth Lieberthal and Harry Harding. First the two sides proposed a closed interim agreement with the ultimate goal of reunification. Taipei was the first to reject this. The Mainland refused to respond. Later they offered an improved, open interim agreement without reunification as a goal. Chen Shui-bian was probably willing to accept it. But Beijing naturally rejected it. In the end it all came to nothing. Within the "broad one China framework," the "one China" is virtual, the "two countries" is real. As a result the authorities on both sides have reverted to long held official positions. Beijing reaffirms that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Taipei reaffirms the 1992 Consensus.
For the time being, the STA has no hope of passage. The MTA and other trade negotiations have also been suspended. Polls conducted on Taiwan indicate declining Identification with China. The Chinese mainland is deeply frustated with the cross-Strait status quo. The key obstacle to improved cross-Strait relations is internal politics on Taiwan. The DPP has made clear that it will not allow the STA to pass. Tsai Ing-wen has said she will wage full scale war in the Legislative Yuan over the STA, the cross-strait oversight regulations, and free trade zones. The Ma administration will probably find it difficult to improve cross-Strait relations.
Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.
社論－解讀蔡英文的戰鬥宣言
2014年06月11日 04:10
本報訊
世事難料，去年底展望兩岸關係，討論最多的是今年亞太經合會期間馬習會的可能、兩岸服貿及貨貿協議對台灣經濟的幫助、兩岸互設兩會辦事機構對政治關係的強化等。春節過後，陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍在南京成功會面，令人對兩岸和平發展大局大有期待。任何人大概想不到會有今年3月反服貿群眾運動，使得所有兩岸關係進展都受到波及、延宕；接著是宋楚瑜的大陸行，習近平藉機發表對台重要宣示，然後又有所謂跨藍綠大一中架構宣言；還有就是蔡英文突然表示，願在不設前提的情況下，與訪台的張志軍在民進黨中央黨部見面；最後就是台獨支持者台南市市長賴清德訪問上海。事態發展讓人目不暇給，誠所謂計畫趕不上變化。
但在種種快速變動中，卻有一些事顯得不動如山，譬如大陸對台政策。和平發展是大陸對台政策主軸、兩岸一家親則是習近平時代對台策略的總依據，不論台灣怎麼變，大陸對台政策卻未有任何搖擺移動。既然時間站在大陸的一方，只要台灣沒有出格的舉措，北京斷不會為了一時的挫折或某些政治人物一時的言論，而遽下定論，或改變其爭取台灣民心的作法。雖然一些客觀的事實顯示，台灣民意仍在往異化的方向發展，某些人更把大陸的善意視為軟弱，民眾把中共的對台讓利視為統戰陰謀，民進黨則是軟硬不吃，不斷變換說法，本質卻未變，這從蔡英文主席下達強硬抵制馬政府兩岸政策的命令，可以得到證實。
先說蔡英文主席表示願意與張志軍主任見面，其實是民進黨因應2016策略大布局的一環，先打斷馬英九的兩岸關係布局，阻擾習馬會實現，等馬英九徹底跛腳後，接著推動大和解，包括對大陸的和解，以建立民共對話關係，最後要凍結台獨黨綱，這是民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘對外的透露。
民進黨的如意算盤是，一方面對中國大陸表達善意，另一方面要打擊國民黨，希望讓台灣民眾相信，民進黨同樣有能力妥善處理兩岸關係，兩岸事務並非國民黨的專利，同時又可以讓國際社會放心，表明民進黨能夠與時俱進，不會食古不化的為反對而反對。對此，民進黨當然自以為得計。
但是，我們必須確認，民進黨願意與大陸和解、蔡英文歡迎張志軍來訪，究竟是策略的調整或路線的改變？細就蔡英文所謂願意在沒有前提下與張志軍見面，其實就是一個前提，要張志軍往訪民進黨中央黨部，形同與中共進行黨對黨交流，民進黨未放棄台獨情形下有無可能，只要用常識就能判斷。
施明德主導的台北宣言，同時涉及主權與治權，和國家認同更脫不了關係，其內涵相當程度上和當年李侃如、何漢理等人主張的中程協議相似。彼等首先提出的是封閉式，有終極統一目標的兩岸中程協議，台北拒絕在先，大陸也就沒有回應，後來再提改良式中程協議，採開放、沒有統一願景的模式，即使陳水扁政府有意接受，北京當然嚴詞拒絕，終告無疾而終。大一中架構中的一中其實是虛，兩國為實，因此兩岸官方仍然回到一貫立場，北京強調兩岸非國與國關係，台北政府也重申九二共識。
《兩岸服貿協議》暫時生效無望，貨貿協議及其他經貿議題協商均已暫停，台灣民意調查的中國認同持續降低，中國大陸對兩岸現狀應有很大的挫折感。當前兩岸問題的關鍵是在台灣內政，民進黨已經表明不會讓《服貿協議》短期內過關，蔡英文放話要在立法院為反《服貿協議》、反兩岸監督條例、反經濟示範區條例激烈戰鬥，看來馬英九政府已經很難再強力推動兩岸關係的進一步發展。
兩岸關係陷入泥淖，但仍有改變的槓桿支點。如果兩岸當局願意將張志軍訪台單純化，不對其訪台賦與太多政治意涵，不要在枝節上有太多算計或小動作，彼此配合營造氣氛、創造條件，積極促成，或許是一個化不可能為可能的作法，機會不大卻值得一試。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2014
Summary: Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.
Full Text below:
Life is unpredictable. Late last year discussions concerning cross-Strait relations focused on the likelihood of a Ma Xi meeting at this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. They focused on whether the STA and MTA would help Taiwan's economy. They focused on whether the establishment of cross-strait representative offices would strengthen political relations. Shortly after the Spring Festival, Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Yu-chi and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun met successfully in Nanjing. This raised expectations for cross-Strait peaceful development. No one foresaw the mass protests against the STA in March of this year. Since then, all progress in cross-Strait relations has remained stalled. This was followed by James Soong's trip to the Mainland. Xi Jinping used the opportunity to send an important message to Taiwan. This was followed by the "broad one China declaration" transcending blue vs. green partisanship. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly declared her willingness to meet with Zhang Zhijun at DPP Headquarters when he came to Taiwan, providing there were no preconditions. And finally, Lai Ching-teh, Mayor of Tainan City and a Taiwan independence advocate, visited Shanghai. Events have occurred faster than the eye can follow. Peoples' plans can no longer keep up with the changes.
Among these swift changes however, some things remain as immovable as mountains. For example, the Mainland's Taiwan policy. The central theme of Mainland Taiwan policy is peaceful development. The basis for Xi Jinping era Taiwan policy is that "The two sides of the Strait are one family." No matter how much Taiwan has changed, the Mainland's Taiwan policy has not budged. Time is on the Mainland's side. As long as Taiwan does not cross the line, Beijing will not jump to any conclusions, or change its approach to winning over the public on Taiwan. It will not be affected by momentary frustrations or some random politician's rantings. Objective evidence suggests that public opinion on Taiwan is increasingly alienated from the Mainland. Some even interpret Mainland goodwill as a sign of weakness. The public sees CCP concessions to Taiwan as reunification ploys. The DPP rejects both the carrot and the stick. The rhetoric may change. But the substance remains the same. Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen ordered the DPP to block Ma administration cross-Strait policy at all costs. That much is clear.
Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen expressed a willingness to meet with Director Zhang Zhijun. This is one link in the DPP's 2016 strategy chain. First disrupt Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait relations. Prevent a Xi Ma meeting from taking place. Wait until Ma Ying-jeou has become a lame duck. Then promote reconciliation, including reconciliation with the Mainland. Establish DPP/CCP dialogue. Finally, freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. This is what DPP legislative caucus chief convener Ker Chien-ming told outsiders.
The DPP is indulging in wishful thinking. On the one hand, it is making a show of goodwill toward Mainland China. On the other hand, it is lashing out at the Kuomintang. It wants the public on Taiwan to conclude that the DPP is capable of managing cross-Strait relations, and that the KMT does have an exclusive franchise on cross-Strait affairs. It wants reassure the international community that the DPP is capable of changing with the times, that it is not reactionary, and that it does not oppose change out of sheer obstinacy. The DPP of course believes that this strategy will succeed.
But consider this. The DPP may be willing to reconcile with the Mainland. Tsai Ing-wen may welcome a visit by Zhang Zhijun. But have the DPP and Tsai actually changed their policy path? Or have they merely changed their public relations strategy? Tsai Ing-wen said she was willing to meet with Zhang Zhijun -- without preconditions. But what was her stipulation, other than a precondition? Zhang Zhijun visiting the Democratic Progressive Party is tantamount to party to party exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party. Unless the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence, such an exchange is impossible. Anyone with any shred of common sense knows this.
The Taipei Declaration, initiated by Shih Ming-teh, addressed sovereignty, jurisdiction, and even national identity. It was unavoidable. It was similar to the interim agreement advocated by Kenneth Lieberthal and Harry Harding. First the two sides proposed a closed interim agreement with the ultimate goal of reunification. Taipei was the first to reject this. The Mainland refused to respond. Later they offered an improved, open interim agreement without reunification as a goal. Chen Shui-bian was probably willing to accept it. But Beijing naturally rejected it. In the end it all came to nothing. Within the "broad one China framework," the "one China" is virtual, the "two countries" is real. As a result the authorities on both sides have reverted to long held official positions. Beijing reaffirms that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Taipei reaffirms the 1992 Consensus.
For the time being, the STA has no hope of passage. The MTA and other trade negotiations have also been suspended. Polls conducted on Taiwan indicate declining Identification with China. The Chinese mainland is deeply frustated with the cross-Strait status quo. The key obstacle to improved cross-Strait relations is internal politics on Taiwan. The DPP has made clear that it will not allow the STA to pass. Tsai Ing-wen has said she will wage full scale war in the Legislative Yuan over the STA, the cross-strait oversight regulations, and free trade zones. The Ma administration will probably find it difficult to improve cross-Strait relations.
Cross-Strait relations have become mired in quicksand. But some leverage is still available. The authorities on both sides can keep Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan simple. They can refrain from overly politicizing it. They can refrain from making too many petty calculations. They can cooperate with each other in order to establish a positive atmosphere. They can create the conditions needed to make it happen. This may be a case of "Mission Impossible." But it is worth a try.
社論－解讀蔡英文的戰鬥宣言
2014年06月11日 04:10
本報訊
世事難料，去年底展望兩岸關係，討論最多的是今年亞太經合會期間馬習會的可能、兩岸服貿及貨貿協議對台灣經濟的幫助、兩岸互設兩會辦事機構對政治關係的強化等。春節過後，陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍在南京成功會面，令人對兩岸和平發展大局大有期待。任何人大概想不到會有今年3月反服貿群眾運動，使得所有兩岸關係進展都受到波及、延宕；接著是宋楚瑜的大陸行，習近平藉機發表對台重要宣示，然後又有所謂跨藍綠大一中架構宣言；還有就是蔡英文突然表示，願在不設前提的情況下，與訪台的張志軍在民進黨中央黨部見面；最後就是台獨支持者台南市市長賴清德訪問上海。事態發展讓人目不暇給，誠所謂計畫趕不上變化。
但在種種快速變動中，卻有一些事顯得不動如山，譬如大陸對台政策。和平發展是大陸對台政策主軸、兩岸一家親則是習近平時代對台策略的總依據，不論台灣怎麼變，大陸對台政策卻未有任何搖擺移動。既然時間站在大陸的一方，只要台灣沒有出格的舉措，北京斷不會為了一時的挫折或某些政治人物一時的言論，而遽下定論，或改變其爭取台灣民心的作法。雖然一些客觀的事實顯示，台灣民意仍在往異化的方向發展，某些人更把大陸的善意視為軟弱，民眾把中共的對台讓利視為統戰陰謀，民進黨則是軟硬不吃，不斷變換說法，本質卻未變，這從蔡英文主席下達強硬抵制馬政府兩岸政策的命令，可以得到證實。
先說蔡英文主席表示願意與張志軍主任見面，其實是民進黨因應2016策略大布局的一環，先打斷馬英九的兩岸關係布局，阻擾習馬會實現，等馬英九徹底跛腳後，接著推動大和解，包括對大陸的和解，以建立民共對話關係，最後要凍結台獨黨綱，這是民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘對外的透露。
民進黨的如意算盤是，一方面對中國大陸表達善意，另一方面要打擊國民黨，希望讓台灣民眾相信，民進黨同樣有能力妥善處理兩岸關係，兩岸事務並非國民黨的專利，同時又可以讓國際社會放心，表明民進黨能夠與時俱進，不會食古不化的為反對而反對。對此，民進黨當然自以為得計。
但是，我們必須確認，民進黨願意與大陸和解、蔡英文歡迎張志軍來訪，究竟是策略的調整或路線的改變？細就蔡英文所謂願意在沒有前提下與張志軍見面，其實就是一個前提，要張志軍往訪民進黨中央黨部，形同與中共進行黨對黨交流，民進黨未放棄台獨情形下有無可能，只要用常識就能判斷。
施明德主導的台北宣言，同時涉及主權與治權，和國家認同更脫不了關係，其內涵相當程度上和當年李侃如、何漢理等人主張的中程協議相似。彼等首先提出的是封閉式，有終極統一目標的兩岸中程協議，台北拒絕在先，大陸也就沒有回應，後來再提改良式中程協議，採開放、沒有統一願景的模式，即使陳水扁政府有意接受，北京當然嚴詞拒絕，終告無疾而終。大一中架構中的一中其實是虛，兩國為實，因此兩岸官方仍然回到一貫立場，北京強調兩岸非國與國關係，台北政府也重申九二共識。
《兩岸服貿協議》暫時生效無望，貨貿協議及其他經貿議題協商均已暫停，台灣民意調查的中國認同持續降低，中國大陸對兩岸現狀應有很大的挫折感。當前兩岸問題的關鍵是在台灣內政，民進黨已經表明不會讓《服貿協議》短期內過關，蔡英文放話要在立法院為反《服貿協議》、反兩岸監督條例、反經濟示範區條例激烈戰鬥，看來馬英九政府已經很難再強力推動兩岸關係的進一步發展。
兩岸關係陷入泥淖，但仍有改變的槓桿支點。如果兩岸當局願意將張志軍訪台單純化，不對其訪台賦與太多政治意涵，不要在枝節上有太多算計或小動作，彼此配合營造氣氛、創造條件，積極促成，或許是一個化不可能為可能的作法，機會不大卻值得一試。
Monday, June 9, 2014
Where Is the DPP Cross-Strait Express Headed?
Where Is the DPP Cross-Strait Express Headed?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2014
Summary: We welcome anything that is conducive to cross-Strait relations, to "peace, stability and development," We welcome anything that will facilitate the beginning of a new era. We are however worried about the KMT's ability to respond. Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai. The KMT mocked him and criticized him for changing his political stance. But suppose Lai Ching-teh has in fact changed his political stance? Isn't that something the KMT should applaud? A new era in cross-Strait relations has begun. People will also be listening to what the KMT says and watching what the KMT does. Only that can prevent the KMT from falling behind the times.
Full Text Below:
The relationship between the red, blue, and green parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is changing. The changes may well be critical in nature and herald a breakthrough. The Mainland is more confident than ever about cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen is now chairperson. The DPP now has a new view of cross-Strait relations and a new manner of response.
First of all, Tsai Ing-wen has expressed a new attitude toward a "Tsai Zhang Meeting." State Council for Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun may visit Taiwan. When Tsai Ing-wen met with DPP China Affairs Committee members, she said "As long as there are no preconditions, I can meet with Zhang Zhijun at DPP Party Headquarters." According to media reports, Tsai Ing-wen specially convened members of the China Affairs Committee, right after the DPP Central Standing Committee meeting. Former Premier Frank Hsieh, Yu Shyi-kun, Ker Chien-ming, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu, and Tainan Mayor Lai Ching-teh attended. They discussed the future of the committee. Chen Chu, Lai Ching-teh, and Ker Chien-ming used phrases such as "If Zhang Zhijun visits Taiwan" and "If Zhang Zhijun invites me," and discussed how the DPP should to respond. Ker Chien-ming made it clear that, "We must change our attitude of blanket opposition." It was precisely during this exchange that Tsai Ing-wen offered her above mentioned response.
When ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the DPP behaved outrageously. They beseiged him for the entire duration of his visit. By contrast, the DPP is cautiously welcoming Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun's visit, as a gesture of goodwill. The DPP has indeed made a major about-face on cross-Strait issues. The DPP's Mainland policy express train has turned around. But we still cannot see where it is heading or how fast it is traveling. But at least it is departing from the right place.
Soon after Tsai Ing-wen made her remarks, Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai as part of a city to city cultural exchange. In Shanghai, Lai Ching-teh refused to comment on a number of sensitive topics. But his overal demeanor was frank, positive, and friendly. When questioned about Lai Ching-teh's visit to Shanghai, Tsai Ing-wen stressed that "The two sides should enhance mutual understanding through frank exchanges and dialogue. Both sides should seek common ground based on past history. They should seek peace, stability, and development." Her words suggest that the DPP is responding positively and aggressively to mainstream hopes for "cross-Strait peaceful development." The DPP has repeatedly stressed the importance of stable cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's remarks, Lai Ching-teh's visit to Shanghai, and the DPP's response were not improvized. Nor were they verbal gaffes. Rather they respresent the DPP leadership's new cross-Strait policy. They were preplanned. They represented the more pragmatic policy orientation of many younger generation DPP leaders.
Political parties and politicians are often sized up by "listening to what they say and watching what they do." Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-teh, and the DPP are doing something new. Naturally this requires "listening to what they say and watching what they do." In fact, so-called "listening to what they say and watching what they do" is not limited to the DPP. On a deeper level it requires listening to what the DPP says and watching what the DPP does about cross-Strait policy. The question must be examined on at least two levels.
Take what the DPP says. The DPP has started using "the Chinese side," and "the other side," to refer to Mainland China. This represents progress and goodwill. Tsai and the DPP talk about "cross-Strait peace, stability and development." That too is a sign of goodwill. It is even a sign of policy change. To date however, what the DPP says has been confined to the level of appearances. The DPP has made a few friendly gestures. They were certainly worth encouraging. But more importantly they involve substance and content. That is precisely how the DPP must change its cross-Strait rhetoric. That is precisely what requires close observation.
Now take what the DPP does. Tsai Ing-wen said she welcomes a "Tsai Zhang Meeting." Lai Ching-teh took part in city to city exchanges. These are important changes in behavior. But these to are confined to the level of exchanges. Further observation of what the DPP does is required. How will the DPP deal with critically important bills relating to cross-Strait relations? Will the DPP cling to its scorched earth policy? To delaying tactics? Is it willing to engage in earnest democratic oversight? Is it willing to play an active role as the loyal opposition? Is it willing to review bills in order to make them better? Many on Taiwan are watching closely. So are many on the Mainland.
So far, the Mainland has cautiously welcomed the DPP's changes. The Hong Kong based China Review noted that Tsai Ing-wen's "intentions toward the Mainland are sincere." It noted that she "has demonstrated forcefulness in cross-Strait relations." It said that Tsai Ing-wen is "rational, and aware that cross-Strait relations are the most important factor in whether the Democratic Progressive Party can return to power." It said the DPP "has already behaved in a friendly manner," and that the "Mainland must appreciate this and respond in kind. "
If the DPP is increasingly sincere in both its words and deeds, the DPP/CCP freeze can be thawed, bit by bit. DPP/CCP exchanges can be promoted, step by step, A new era in cross-Strait relations can begin. For the red, blue, and green parties, this constitutes a new era, rich with challenges and opportunities.
We welcome anything that is conducive to cross-Strait relations, to "peace, stability and development," We welcome anything that will facilitate the beginning of a new era. We are however worried about the KMT's ability to respond. Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai. The KMT mocked him and criticized him for changing his political stance. But suppose Lai Ching-teh has in fact changed his political stance? Isn't that something the KMT should applaud? A new era in cross-Strait relations has begun. People will also be listening to what the KMT says and watching what the KMT does. Only that can prevent the KMT from falling behind the times.
社論－民進黨兩岸列車轉向何方？
2014年06月10日 04:10
本報訊
兩岸三黨紅藍綠的關係，正在發生變化，甚至有可能是關鍵性的變化，變化的突破口，在大陸對兩岸關係的自信，及蔡英文出任主席後，民進黨對兩岸關係的新說法與新作為。
首 先，最引人注目的是蔡英文關於「蔡張會」的新表態。在和民進黨「中國事務委員會」委員們會面時，蔡英文表示，如果國台辦主任張志軍能來台訪問，「只要不設 前提，我也可以和張志軍在民進黨中央會面。」根據媒體的報導，蔡英文是在民進黨中常會後，特別召集中國事務委員會成員，包括前行政院長謝長廷、游錫堃，以 及柯建銘、高雄市長陳菊、台南市長賴清德，針對該會的未來走向進行談話會。陳菊、賴清德和柯建銘在會中都提到「假如張志軍來台回訪」、「假如張志軍約 我」，民進黨到底該如何因應，柯建銘甚至明確表示：「我們逢中必反的態度有必要轉變了」。正是在這樣的互動之中，蔡英文做出了上述的回應。
從悍然包圍遠道來訪的海協會會長陳雲林，到釋出善意、謹慎歡迎國台辦主任張志軍來訪交流，民進黨確實在兩岸問題上轉了一個大彎，但我們還看不清楚民進黨大陸政策的列車在轉彎之後，將要開往何方，又會以怎樣的速度前行，但是起點肯定是對的。
在 蔡英文的談話之後，賴清德出訪上海，這是城市交流也是文化交流，在上海，賴清德被動回應了一些比較敏感的話題，總的來說，態度是坦率、健康而友善的。蔡英 文在面對媒體詢問賴清德訪滬一事時，還強調兩岸「雙方應該要透過坦誠的交流與對話，增進了解，在各自過去發展的歷史基礎上，進一步求同存異，為兩岸的和 平、穩定與發展創造契機」。從這短短的幾句話中，我們可以窺見，民進黨是在正面、積極的回應「兩岸和平發展」這樣的主流理念，也特別多次強調了兩岸關係 「穩定」的重要性。蔡英文的談話，賴清德的訪滬，民進黨的回應，都不是即興之作，不是擦槍走火，而是民進黨新黨中央政策性的、規畫性的作為，也多少代表民 進黨青壯世代或者說務實派的政策取向。
人們常說，對於政黨或政治人物要「聽其言，觀其行」。對於蔡英文、賴清德和民進黨的新變化、新作 為，自然也是要「聽其言，觀其行」。其實，所謂的「聽其言，觀其行」，不僅僅是觀察民進黨的後續作為而已，深入地來說，關於民進黨兩岸政策的「言」與 「行」，都至少有兩個層次的課題需要探究。
在「言」的部分，我們看到民進黨開始改用「中方」、「對岸」來稱呼中國大陸方面，這當然是一個 進展，也是善意，蔡英文和民進黨談「兩岸的和平、穩定與發展」當然也是另外一個善意的訊號，甚至是政策取向改弦更張的流露。然而，到目前為止，這樣的 「言」，多半還停留在「形式」的層面上，民進黨擺出友善的姿態，固然值得鼓勵期待，更關鍵、更重要的還在於「實質」的「內涵」層面，也就是民進黨的兩岸論 述究竟會有怎樣的調整，這才是真正需要認真觀察的重點。
在「行」的部分，亦然。蔡英文歡迎「蔡張會」，賴清德進行城市交流，這都是重要的 變化，但同樣也停留在「交流」的這種形式的層面上。更需要觀察的「行」，是民進黨會怎樣面對許多關鍵性、重要性的兩岸關係相關議案，在這樣一些兩岸關係相 關議案上，民進黨是否仍繼續採取焦土抗戰、拖延戰術，還是願意進行誠懇的民主監督，積極的發揮「建設性反對黨」的角色，從「促使其完善」的角度進行審查， 不但台灣社會相當關注，相信大陸方面也在密切觀察。
到目前為止，大陸方面對民進黨的新變化是審慎歡迎的。香港中國評論網的快訊指出：蔡英 文「對大陸是有善意的」，「在兩岸關係方面是有魄力的」，蔡英文還「是理智的，深知兩岸關係能否把握對民進黨能否執政是最為重要的因素」。評論認為民進黨 「友善的動作已經做出來了」，而「大陸必須充分理解，也加以善意的互動」。
看來，只要民進黨的「言」與「行」能夠更為正面積極、更為一致，民共的僵局會一點一點的打開，民共的交流會一步一步的進行，兩岸關係的局面就會因此進入一個全新的階段，對紅藍綠三黨來說，一個充滿挑戰與機會的新階段。
只 要有利於兩岸關係的「和平、穩定與發展」，我們樂見、也會促進這個新階段的到來。然而，我們卻也開始憂心於國民黨的回應能力。面對賴清德的訪滬，國民黨採 取了譏嘲批評的方式指責賴清德政治立場的變化，然而，如果賴清德真正有了變化，難道是國民黨所不樂見的嗎？面對兩岸關係新階段的到來，國民黨同樣該認真在 「言」與「行」上下功夫，才不會一再落在形勢發展之後。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2014
Summary: We welcome anything that is conducive to cross-Strait relations, to "peace, stability and development," We welcome anything that will facilitate the beginning of a new era. We are however worried about the KMT's ability to respond. Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai. The KMT mocked him and criticized him for changing his political stance. But suppose Lai Ching-teh has in fact changed his political stance? Isn't that something the KMT should applaud? A new era in cross-Strait relations has begun. People will also be listening to what the KMT says and watching what the KMT does. Only that can prevent the KMT from falling behind the times.
Full Text Below:
The relationship between the red, blue, and green parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is changing. The changes may well be critical in nature and herald a breakthrough. The Mainland is more confident than ever about cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen is now chairperson. The DPP now has a new view of cross-Strait relations and a new manner of response.
First of all, Tsai Ing-wen has expressed a new attitude toward a "Tsai Zhang Meeting." State Council for Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun may visit Taiwan. When Tsai Ing-wen met with DPP China Affairs Committee members, she said "As long as there are no preconditions, I can meet with Zhang Zhijun at DPP Party Headquarters." According to media reports, Tsai Ing-wen specially convened members of the China Affairs Committee, right after the DPP Central Standing Committee meeting. Former Premier Frank Hsieh, Yu Shyi-kun, Ker Chien-ming, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu, and Tainan Mayor Lai Ching-teh attended. They discussed the future of the committee. Chen Chu, Lai Ching-teh, and Ker Chien-ming used phrases such as "If Zhang Zhijun visits Taiwan" and "If Zhang Zhijun invites me," and discussed how the DPP should to respond. Ker Chien-ming made it clear that, "We must change our attitude of blanket opposition." It was precisely during this exchange that Tsai Ing-wen offered her above mentioned response.
When ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the DPP behaved outrageously. They beseiged him for the entire duration of his visit. By contrast, the DPP is cautiously welcoming Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun's visit, as a gesture of goodwill. The DPP has indeed made a major about-face on cross-Strait issues. The DPP's Mainland policy express train has turned around. But we still cannot see where it is heading or how fast it is traveling. But at least it is departing from the right place.
Soon after Tsai Ing-wen made her remarks, Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai as part of a city to city cultural exchange. In Shanghai, Lai Ching-teh refused to comment on a number of sensitive topics. But his overal demeanor was frank, positive, and friendly. When questioned about Lai Ching-teh's visit to Shanghai, Tsai Ing-wen stressed that "The two sides should enhance mutual understanding through frank exchanges and dialogue. Both sides should seek common ground based on past history. They should seek peace, stability, and development." Her words suggest that the DPP is responding positively and aggressively to mainstream hopes for "cross-Strait peaceful development." The DPP has repeatedly stressed the importance of stable cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's remarks, Lai Ching-teh's visit to Shanghai, and the DPP's response were not improvized. Nor were they verbal gaffes. Rather they respresent the DPP leadership's new cross-Strait policy. They were preplanned. They represented the more pragmatic policy orientation of many younger generation DPP leaders.
Political parties and politicians are often sized up by "listening to what they say and watching what they do." Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-teh, and the DPP are doing something new. Naturally this requires "listening to what they say and watching what they do." In fact, so-called "listening to what they say and watching what they do" is not limited to the DPP. On a deeper level it requires listening to what the DPP says and watching what the DPP does about cross-Strait policy. The question must be examined on at least two levels.
Take what the DPP says. The DPP has started using "the Chinese side," and "the other side," to refer to Mainland China. This represents progress and goodwill. Tsai and the DPP talk about "cross-Strait peace, stability and development." That too is a sign of goodwill. It is even a sign of policy change. To date however, what the DPP says has been confined to the level of appearances. The DPP has made a few friendly gestures. They were certainly worth encouraging. But more importantly they involve substance and content. That is precisely how the DPP must change its cross-Strait rhetoric. That is precisely what requires close observation.
Now take what the DPP does. Tsai Ing-wen said she welcomes a "Tsai Zhang Meeting." Lai Ching-teh took part in city to city exchanges. These are important changes in behavior. But these to are confined to the level of exchanges. Further observation of what the DPP does is required. How will the DPP deal with critically important bills relating to cross-Strait relations? Will the DPP cling to its scorched earth policy? To delaying tactics? Is it willing to engage in earnest democratic oversight? Is it willing to play an active role as the loyal opposition? Is it willing to review bills in order to make them better? Many on Taiwan are watching closely. So are many on the Mainland.
So far, the Mainland has cautiously welcomed the DPP's changes. The Hong Kong based China Review noted that Tsai Ing-wen's "intentions toward the Mainland are sincere." It noted that she "has demonstrated forcefulness in cross-Strait relations." It said that Tsai Ing-wen is "rational, and aware that cross-Strait relations are the most important factor in whether the Democratic Progressive Party can return to power." It said the DPP "has already behaved in a friendly manner," and that the "Mainland must appreciate this and respond in kind. "
If the DPP is increasingly sincere in both its words and deeds, the DPP/CCP freeze can be thawed, bit by bit. DPP/CCP exchanges can be promoted, step by step, A new era in cross-Strait relations can begin. For the red, blue, and green parties, this constitutes a new era, rich with challenges and opportunities.
We welcome anything that is conducive to cross-Strait relations, to "peace, stability and development," We welcome anything that will facilitate the beginning of a new era. We are however worried about the KMT's ability to respond. Lai Ching-teh visited Shanghai. The KMT mocked him and criticized him for changing his political stance. But suppose Lai Ching-teh has in fact changed his political stance? Isn't that something the KMT should applaud? A new era in cross-Strait relations has begun. People will also be listening to what the KMT says and watching what the KMT does. Only that can prevent the KMT from falling behind the times.
社論－民進黨兩岸列車轉向何方？
2014年06月10日 04:10
本報訊
兩岸三黨紅藍綠的關係，正在發生變化，甚至有可能是關鍵性的變化，變化的突破口，在大陸對兩岸關係的自信，及蔡英文出任主席後，民進黨對兩岸關係的新說法與新作為。
首 先，最引人注目的是蔡英文關於「蔡張會」的新表態。在和民進黨「中國事務委員會」委員們會面時，蔡英文表示，如果國台辦主任張志軍能來台訪問，「只要不設 前提，我也可以和張志軍在民進黨中央會面。」根據媒體的報導，蔡英文是在民進黨中常會後，特別召集中國事務委員會成員，包括前行政院長謝長廷、游錫堃，以 及柯建銘、高雄市長陳菊、台南市長賴清德，針對該會的未來走向進行談話會。陳菊、賴清德和柯建銘在會中都提到「假如張志軍來台回訪」、「假如張志軍約 我」，民進黨到底該如何因應，柯建銘甚至明確表示：「我們逢中必反的態度有必要轉變了」。正是在這樣的互動之中，蔡英文做出了上述的回應。
從悍然包圍遠道來訪的海協會會長陳雲林，到釋出善意、謹慎歡迎國台辦主任張志軍來訪交流，民進黨確實在兩岸問題上轉了一個大彎，但我們還看不清楚民進黨大陸政策的列車在轉彎之後，將要開往何方，又會以怎樣的速度前行，但是起點肯定是對的。
在 蔡英文的談話之後，賴清德出訪上海，這是城市交流也是文化交流，在上海，賴清德被動回應了一些比較敏感的話題，總的來說，態度是坦率、健康而友善的。蔡英 文在面對媒體詢問賴清德訪滬一事時，還強調兩岸「雙方應該要透過坦誠的交流與對話，增進了解，在各自過去發展的歷史基礎上，進一步求同存異，為兩岸的和 平、穩定與發展創造契機」。從這短短的幾句話中，我們可以窺見，民進黨是在正面、積極的回應「兩岸和平發展」這樣的主流理念，也特別多次強調了兩岸關係 「穩定」的重要性。蔡英文的談話，賴清德的訪滬，民進黨的回應，都不是即興之作，不是擦槍走火，而是民進黨新黨中央政策性的、規畫性的作為，也多少代表民 進黨青壯世代或者說務實派的政策取向。
人們常說，對於政黨或政治人物要「聽其言，觀其行」。對於蔡英文、賴清德和民進黨的新變化、新作 為，自然也是要「聽其言，觀其行」。其實，所謂的「聽其言，觀其行」，不僅僅是觀察民進黨的後續作為而已，深入地來說，關於民進黨兩岸政策的「言」與 「行」，都至少有兩個層次的課題需要探究。
在「言」的部分，我們看到民進黨開始改用「中方」、「對岸」來稱呼中國大陸方面，這當然是一個 進展，也是善意，蔡英文和民進黨談「兩岸的和平、穩定與發展」當然也是另外一個善意的訊號，甚至是政策取向改弦更張的流露。然而，到目前為止，這樣的 「言」，多半還停留在「形式」的層面上，民進黨擺出友善的姿態，固然值得鼓勵期待，更關鍵、更重要的還在於「實質」的「內涵」層面，也就是民進黨的兩岸論 述究竟會有怎樣的調整，這才是真正需要認真觀察的重點。
在「行」的部分，亦然。蔡英文歡迎「蔡張會」，賴清德進行城市交流，這都是重要的 變化，但同樣也停留在「交流」的這種形式的層面上。更需要觀察的「行」，是民進黨會怎樣面對許多關鍵性、重要性的兩岸關係相關議案，在這樣一些兩岸關係相 關議案上，民進黨是否仍繼續採取焦土抗戰、拖延戰術，還是願意進行誠懇的民主監督，積極的發揮「建設性反對黨」的角色，從「促使其完善」的角度進行審查， 不但台灣社會相當關注，相信大陸方面也在密切觀察。
到目前為止，大陸方面對民進黨的新變化是審慎歡迎的。香港中國評論網的快訊指出：蔡英 文「對大陸是有善意的」，「在兩岸關係方面是有魄力的」，蔡英文還「是理智的，深知兩岸關係能否把握對民進黨能否執政是最為重要的因素」。評論認為民進黨 「友善的動作已經做出來了」，而「大陸必須充分理解，也加以善意的互動」。
看來，只要民進黨的「言」與「行」能夠更為正面積極、更為一致，民共的僵局會一點一點的打開，民共的交流會一步一步的進行，兩岸關係的局面就會因此進入一個全新的階段，對紅藍綠三黨來說，一個充滿挑戰與機會的新階段。
只 要有利於兩岸關係的「和平、穩定與發展」，我們樂見、也會促進這個新階段的到來。然而，我們卻也開始憂心於國民黨的回應能力。面對賴清德的訪滬，國民黨採 取了譏嘲批評的方式指責賴清德政治立場的變化，然而，如果賴清德真正有了變化，難道是國民黨所不樂見的嗎？面對兩岸關係新階段的到來，國民黨同樣該認真在 「言」與「行」上下功夫，才不會一再落在形勢發展之後。
Sunday, June 8, 2014
Unilateral Constitutional Revision Equals Partisan Political Struggle
Unilateral Constitutional Revision Equals Partisan Political Struggle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2014
Summary: With election season approaching, the DPP and its allies have put forth a variety of proposals for constitutional amendments. To be successful. any party that proposes a constitutional amendment must seek political consensus rather than political struggle. Yet the political parties that are determined to amend the constitution hold precisely the opposite view. That means any political party that proposes a constitutional amendment during election season is probably doing so out of malice. Any proposed constitutional amendment is likely to be stillborn. Proposing it will merely make trouble.
Full Text Below:
With election season approaching, the DPP and its allies have put forth a variety of proposals for constitutional amendments. Some with a stake in the elections, such as Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, have proposed that legislative elections be changed from a Separated Two-Vote System to a Compensatory Two-Vote System, and the number of legislative seats be increased, Others advocate lowering the voting age. Those not directly involved in the elections, who are more concerned about constitutional ideals, advocate changing to the cabinet system.
First consider the cabinet system. This is by no means new. During the early years of the republic, Sun Yat-sen proposed a presidential system. By the time Song Jiaoren proposed a cabinet system, the debate had dragged on for some time, but without any resolution. Politicians who seek the presidency advocate the presidential system. Others, who value the separation of powers advocate the cabinet system. Those who seek to control of both the legislature and the cabinet, favor the cabinet system. By doing so, they hope to improve government efficiency and ensure party responsibility. We lack a democratic tradition, but are struggling to affirm our constitutional system. The presidential system and cabinet system each have their supporters. The two political forces are at loggerheads. Under these conditions, a semi-presidential system appears to be the most feasible compromise.
Emerging constitutional states usually adopt a semi-presidential system. Our constitutional path is no exception. As we move toward a cabinet system, the elected president must be reduced to a figurehead. Expending a huge effort to elect a figurehead president makes no sense. It inevitably raises questions. We lack a hereditary monarch. If not by means of elections, how will we choose a Head of State? Advocates of the cabinet system propose choosing a Head of State by means of public opinion. The cabinet system relies on the legislature to direct politics. The Legislative Yuan on today's Taiwan lacks public trust. Some advocate constitutional reform and the adoption of a cabinet system. But they must first ensure legislative reform. Otherwise, it will remain empty talk. Any discussion of Legislative Yuan reform will make it necessary to discuss other constitutional amendments.
The most baffling proposal for a constitutional amendment is increasing the number of legislators. It lacks any political justification. We will not mince words. The caliber of today's elected legislators is far from ideal. The number of qualified candidates is extremely limited. Considering how poorly they have performed, how can increasing their numbers improve the caliber of the Legislative Yuan? This is clearly contrary to common sense. This is clearly wishful thinking. When one considers who made this proposal, newly installed DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen. it is even less persuasive. Years ago Mr. Lin Yi-hsiung held a hunger strike, successfully pressuring the ruling and opposition parties into passing his constitutional amendment to halve the number of legislators. Yet today the rationale is exactly the opposite. No one has offered a thoughtful solution. It is hard not to suspect partisan political calculations. No one appears interested in a constitutional amendment to ensure lasting peace and stability for Taiwan as a whole.
Another proposal for a constitutional amendment involves changing the Legislative Yuan electoral system, from the current Separated Two-Vote System to a German-style Compensatory Two-Vote System. The advantage is that the latter avoids large discrepancies between the political party votes and the number of seats obtained, which can raise questions about political fairness. The German Compensatory Two-Vote System is more complex. But it is more scientific and fair. The Compensatory Two-Vote System yields a result more representative of party constituency than the Separated Two-Vote System. A Separated Two-Vote System may alter the political parties' proportional representation by expelling a member from the party. With a Compensatory Two-Vote System, only the original district's political constituency can decide his or her fate. Among the several proposals for constitutional amendments, the Compensatory Two-Vote System has the greatest political justification.
Conisider the constitutional amendment lowering the voting age. This is controversial. Currently the age of majority is 20 years old. It is difficult to explain why some citizens have the right to vote and participate in political decision-making, yet are legally constrained in their civil and commercial activities. Some issues remain to be considered before amending the Civil Code pertaining to the age of majority.
The above is merely a discussion of the political legitimacy of some of the proposed constitutional amendments. Assuming constitutional process is followed, one must also consider political costs and political repercussions. The current constitutional threshold is very high. That means that if any constitutional issue is highly controversial, it simply will not pass. In terms of constitutional principles, a high degree of political consensus should be required for passage. Only then can one amend a nation's basic law according to constitutional procedures. This is entirely consistent with the ideals of deliberative democracy. As we can see, proposals to adopt the cabinet system and increase the number of legislators are not politically realistic, They would merely invite political turmoil. Calculating the political effects of lowering the voting age is not easy. It is not obvious who its supporters are. The likelihood it will meet the threshold is low. A constitutional amendment to adopt a Compensatory Two-Vote System is more worthy of consideration. But it will require support from both the blue and green parties to pass.
The above discussion shows what sort of understanding anyone on Taiwan involved in amending the constitution must have. To be successful. any party that proposes a constitutional amendment must seek political consensus rather than political struggle. Yet the political parties that are determined to amend the constitution hold precisely the opposite view. That means any political party that proposes a constitutional amendment during election season is probably doing so out of malice. Any proposed constitutional amendment is likely to be stillborn. Proposing it will merely make trouble.
片面主張修憲 只是政黨鬥爭
2014年06月09日 04:10
本報訊
隨著選舉季節接近，民進黨及其盟友提出各種修憲主張。與選舉相關者，如蔡英文主席提出國會選舉方式從並立制改採聯立制、增加立法委員席次，也有主張降低選舉年齡者，與選舉無直接關連而較具憲政理想性者，則是主張改採內閣制者。
先談內閣制的倡議絕不是新話題，民國初年孫中山主張總統制，宋教仁主張內閣制時即已開其端緒。政治人物有總統大位之想者，多主張建立總統制，乃強調權力分立制度的優點；思同時掌握國會與內閣權力者，則心儀內閣制，以提高政府效能並確立政黨責任政治。在無民主傳統而輸入憲政制度的國家，總統制與內閣制通常會各有擁戴。政治力量相持不下，最容易以雙首長制達成妥協。
新興憲政國家以採取雙首長制比例最高，我國憲政軌跡不外如是。我國如改採內閣制，就必須讓民選總統成為虛位元首，花費偌大工夫選個虛位總統的制度理性何在，不免引人質疑；沒有世襲的君主，又不使用民選的方式，要如何產生國家元首，提倡內閣制者必須提出主張並通過民意。內閣制依靠國會主導政治，以台灣今日立法院表現難邀民眾信任的程度，主張修憲採取內閣制者，必須同時提出有效改革立法院的方案，否則恐怕只是空談。談改革立法院，不免就要討論另外幾項修憲主張了。
最啟人疑竇而不具政治正當性的修憲倡議，恐怕就是增加立法委員人數的主張。我們且不以人廢言，以今日選舉產生的立法委員，普遍品質距離理想甚遠的情形而言，人數極其有限的菁英，尚且表現如此，認為增加人數就可以提高立法院的品質，不免有違常識，而且太過一廂情願。若再追問是誰作此提議，就更沒有說服力了。民進黨新任主席蔡英文要否定當年靠著林義雄先生絕食壯舉，迫使朝野接受、全民埋單的「國會減半」修憲，反其道而行的道理何在，聽不到深思熟慮的思考，很難不使人懷疑只是一黨為了當下的政治利害算計，而不是為了台灣長治久安的長期整體利益而修憲。
另外一項修憲主張，是改變立法院選舉制度，從現行政黨比例代表與區域代表並立制改為德國聯立制，其制度優點是避免政黨得票率與獲得的席次出現過大差異，引起政治公平的質疑。德式的聯立制雖然在制度設計上較為複雜，但是確實更為科學而且公平。同時因為要從區域產生同額的政黨比例代表，民意代表性也比並立制更高。如果並立制具有理由可由政黨開除黨籍而撤換政黨比例代表，聯立制則只能由原選區選民而非政黨決定其去留。在各項修憲提案中，聯立制修憲案的政治正當性其實比較明顯。
至於降低選舉年齡的修憲主張，其實也有爭議。目前成年年齡為20歲，很難解釋為何部分有投票權可以參與政治決策的公民，可以是民商事行為的限制行為能力人。而修改民法成年年齡，也還有一些要周延考慮的問題。
以上只是從各項修憲提議的內容討論其政治正當性，如果從修憲程序的可行而言，還必須討論其政治成本及政治效應的問題。現在修憲的門檻甚高，意謂任何具有高度爭議性的修憲議題，根本不具有可行性。從憲法原理言之，必須是贏得高度政治共識的題目，才能順利通過修憲程序載入根本大法，其實相當符合審議民主的理想。依此觀察，內閣制與增加立委名額的修憲提議，恐怕不切政治實際，強加推動徒增政治紛擾而已。降低選齡案的政治效應一方面不易計算，另一方面支持者並不明顯，通過門檻的機會恐也有限。較有討論價值的是聯立制國會議選舉的修憲案，但是必須得到包括藍綠兩黨在內各方的支持，才可能通過。
以上的討論，顯示了台灣今日從事修憲所應有的政治認識。那就是提出修憲案的政黨，必須努力尋求政治共識，而非進行政黨鬥爭，才有可能成功。這點似乎和今日政黨政治的實況完全相反，那就意味著，任何在選舉季節之中主張修憲的政黨，如果還是惡習不改，任何修憲的提議都會是徒勞無功，不過惹事生非而已！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2014
Summary: With election season approaching, the DPP and its allies have put forth a variety of proposals for constitutional amendments. To be successful. any party that proposes a constitutional amendment must seek political consensus rather than political struggle. Yet the political parties that are determined to amend the constitution hold precisely the opposite view. That means any political party that proposes a constitutional amendment during election season is probably doing so out of malice. Any proposed constitutional amendment is likely to be stillborn. Proposing it will merely make trouble.
Full Text Below:
With election season approaching, the DPP and its allies have put forth a variety of proposals for constitutional amendments. Some with a stake in the elections, such as Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, have proposed that legislative elections be changed from a Separated Two-Vote System to a Compensatory Two-Vote System, and the number of legislative seats be increased, Others advocate lowering the voting age. Those not directly involved in the elections, who are more concerned about constitutional ideals, advocate changing to the cabinet system.
First consider the cabinet system. This is by no means new. During the early years of the republic, Sun Yat-sen proposed a presidential system. By the time Song Jiaoren proposed a cabinet system, the debate had dragged on for some time, but without any resolution. Politicians who seek the presidency advocate the presidential system. Others, who value the separation of powers advocate the cabinet system. Those who seek to control of both the legislature and the cabinet, favor the cabinet system. By doing so, they hope to improve government efficiency and ensure party responsibility. We lack a democratic tradition, but are struggling to affirm our constitutional system. The presidential system and cabinet system each have their supporters. The two political forces are at loggerheads. Under these conditions, a semi-presidential system appears to be the most feasible compromise.
Emerging constitutional states usually adopt a semi-presidential system. Our constitutional path is no exception. As we move toward a cabinet system, the elected president must be reduced to a figurehead. Expending a huge effort to elect a figurehead president makes no sense. It inevitably raises questions. We lack a hereditary monarch. If not by means of elections, how will we choose a Head of State? Advocates of the cabinet system propose choosing a Head of State by means of public opinion. The cabinet system relies on the legislature to direct politics. The Legislative Yuan on today's Taiwan lacks public trust. Some advocate constitutional reform and the adoption of a cabinet system. But they must first ensure legislative reform. Otherwise, it will remain empty talk. Any discussion of Legislative Yuan reform will make it necessary to discuss other constitutional amendments.
The most baffling proposal for a constitutional amendment is increasing the number of legislators. It lacks any political justification. We will not mince words. The caliber of today's elected legislators is far from ideal. The number of qualified candidates is extremely limited. Considering how poorly they have performed, how can increasing their numbers improve the caliber of the Legislative Yuan? This is clearly contrary to common sense. This is clearly wishful thinking. When one considers who made this proposal, newly installed DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen. it is even less persuasive. Years ago Mr. Lin Yi-hsiung held a hunger strike, successfully pressuring the ruling and opposition parties into passing his constitutional amendment to halve the number of legislators. Yet today the rationale is exactly the opposite. No one has offered a thoughtful solution. It is hard not to suspect partisan political calculations. No one appears interested in a constitutional amendment to ensure lasting peace and stability for Taiwan as a whole.
Another proposal for a constitutional amendment involves changing the Legislative Yuan electoral system, from the current Separated Two-Vote System to a German-style Compensatory Two-Vote System. The advantage is that the latter avoids large discrepancies between the political party votes and the number of seats obtained, which can raise questions about political fairness. The German Compensatory Two-Vote System is more complex. But it is more scientific and fair. The Compensatory Two-Vote System yields a result more representative of party constituency than the Separated Two-Vote System. A Separated Two-Vote System may alter the political parties' proportional representation by expelling a member from the party. With a Compensatory Two-Vote System, only the original district's political constituency can decide his or her fate. Among the several proposals for constitutional amendments, the Compensatory Two-Vote System has the greatest political justification.
Conisider the constitutional amendment lowering the voting age. This is controversial. Currently the age of majority is 20 years old. It is difficult to explain why some citizens have the right to vote and participate in political decision-making, yet are legally constrained in their civil and commercial activities. Some issues remain to be considered before amending the Civil Code pertaining to the age of majority.
The above is merely a discussion of the political legitimacy of some of the proposed constitutional amendments. Assuming constitutional process is followed, one must also consider political costs and political repercussions. The current constitutional threshold is very high. That means that if any constitutional issue is highly controversial, it simply will not pass. In terms of constitutional principles, a high degree of political consensus should be required for passage. Only then can one amend a nation's basic law according to constitutional procedures. This is entirely consistent with the ideals of deliberative democracy. As we can see, proposals to adopt the cabinet system and increase the number of legislators are not politically realistic, They would merely invite political turmoil. Calculating the political effects of lowering the voting age is not easy. It is not obvious who its supporters are. The likelihood it will meet the threshold is low. A constitutional amendment to adopt a Compensatory Two-Vote System is more worthy of consideration. But it will require support from both the blue and green parties to pass.
The above discussion shows what sort of understanding anyone on Taiwan involved in amending the constitution must have. To be successful. any party that proposes a constitutional amendment must seek political consensus rather than political struggle. Yet the political parties that are determined to amend the constitution hold precisely the opposite view. That means any political party that proposes a constitutional amendment during election season is probably doing so out of malice. Any proposed constitutional amendment is likely to be stillborn. Proposing it will merely make trouble.
片面主張修憲 只是政黨鬥爭
2014年06月09日 04:10
本報訊
隨著選舉季節接近，民進黨及其盟友提出各種修憲主張。與選舉相關者，如蔡英文主席提出國會選舉方式從並立制改採聯立制、增加立法委員席次，也有主張降低選舉年齡者，與選舉無直接關連而較具憲政理想性者，則是主張改採內閣制者。
先談內閣制的倡議絕不是新話題，民國初年孫中山主張總統制，宋教仁主張內閣制時即已開其端緒。政治人物有總統大位之想者，多主張建立總統制，乃強調權力分立制度的優點；思同時掌握國會與內閣權力者，則心儀內閣制，以提高政府效能並確立政黨責任政治。在無民主傳統而輸入憲政制度的國家，總統制與內閣制通常會各有擁戴。政治力量相持不下，最容易以雙首長制達成妥協。
新興憲政國家以採取雙首長制比例最高，我國憲政軌跡不外如是。我國如改採內閣制，就必須讓民選總統成為虛位元首，花費偌大工夫選個虛位總統的制度理性何在，不免引人質疑；沒有世襲的君主，又不使用民選的方式，要如何產生國家元首，提倡內閣制者必須提出主張並通過民意。內閣制依靠國會主導政治，以台灣今日立法院表現難邀民眾信任的程度，主張修憲採取內閣制者，必須同時提出有效改革立法院的方案，否則恐怕只是空談。談改革立法院，不免就要討論另外幾項修憲主張了。
最啟人疑竇而不具政治正當性的修憲倡議，恐怕就是增加立法委員人數的主張。我們且不以人廢言，以今日選舉產生的立法委員，普遍品質距離理想甚遠的情形而言，人數極其有限的菁英，尚且表現如此，認為增加人數就可以提高立法院的品質，不免有違常識，而且太過一廂情願。若再追問是誰作此提議，就更沒有說服力了。民進黨新任主席蔡英文要否定當年靠著林義雄先生絕食壯舉，迫使朝野接受、全民埋單的「國會減半」修憲，反其道而行的道理何在，聽不到深思熟慮的思考，很難不使人懷疑只是一黨為了當下的政治利害算計，而不是為了台灣長治久安的長期整體利益而修憲。
另外一項修憲主張，是改變立法院選舉制度，從現行政黨比例代表與區域代表並立制改為德國聯立制，其制度優點是避免政黨得票率與獲得的席次出現過大差異，引起政治公平的質疑。德式的聯立制雖然在制度設計上較為複雜，但是確實更為科學而且公平。同時因為要從區域產生同額的政黨比例代表，民意代表性也比並立制更高。如果並立制具有理由可由政黨開除黨籍而撤換政黨比例代表，聯立制則只能由原選區選民而非政黨決定其去留。在各項修憲提案中，聯立制修憲案的政治正當性其實比較明顯。
至於降低選舉年齡的修憲主張，其實也有爭議。目前成年年齡為20歲，很難解釋為何部分有投票權可以參與政治決策的公民，可以是民商事行為的限制行為能力人。而修改民法成年年齡，也還有一些要周延考慮的問題。
以上只是從各項修憲提議的內容討論其政治正當性，如果從修憲程序的可行而言，還必須討論其政治成本及政治效應的問題。現在修憲的門檻甚高，意謂任何具有高度爭議性的修憲議題，根本不具有可行性。從憲法原理言之，必須是贏得高度政治共識的題目，才能順利通過修憲程序載入根本大法，其實相當符合審議民主的理想。依此觀察，內閣制與增加立委名額的修憲提議，恐怕不切政治實際，強加推動徒增政治紛擾而已。降低選齡案的政治效應一方面不易計算，另一方面支持者並不明顯，通過門檻的機會恐也有限。較有討論價值的是聯立制國會議選舉的修憲案，但是必須得到包括藍綠兩黨在內各方的支持，才可能通過。
以上的討論，顯示了台灣今日從事修憲所應有的政治認識。那就是提出修憲案的政黨，必須努力尋求政治共識，而非進行政黨鬥爭，才有可能成功。這點似乎和今日政黨政治的實況完全相反，那就意味著，任何在選舉季節之中主張修憲的政黨，如果還是惡習不改，任何修憲的提議都會是徒勞無功，不過惹事生非而已！
Thursday, June 5, 2014
Taiwan's Illusory Sense of Superiority
Taiwan's Illusory Sense of Superiority
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2014
Summary: The economic and political miracle that contributed to the Taiwanese sense of superiority has become an obstacle to Taiwan's continued progress. Many refuse to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Mainland. They insist on seeing the Mainland as a threat, as a negative example. are closed-minded and lack pragmatism. They refuse to learn from the Mainland's experience, They refuse to work together toward a common dream. If they have their way, a golden opportunity will be lost.
Full Text Below:
Now that she is once again DPP chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen's main task is to engineer a return to power. Her biggest challenge, everyone agrees, is cross-Strait policy. Most people focus on Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy positions. Will the DPP relinquish its Taiwan independence party platform? Just exactly what is the "Taiwan consensus"? Has Tsai accepted the 1992 consensus? Is the "Taiwan consensus" too vague? Accepting the 1992 consensus would appear to be adopting the same position as the KMT. If it is, can Tsai and the DPP advance any new ideas? Can they persuade the Mainland to accept their ideas? The back and forth arguments are always about such questions.
But the DPP's political path is also a matter of concern. The DPP's political path is closely related to factional power struggles. Are Tsai and Hsieh allies? What relationship do they have to Taiwan independence elements? Do they enjoy Lee Teng-hui's support? Su Tseng-chang harbors grievances. Will that affect DPP policy reform? These topics are the ones that interest the media.
Everyone is concerned about policy positions and power struggles. But few are concerned about deeper issues, such as the underlying social psychological obstacles to DPP policy reform. In fact, social psychological issues may be the biggest obstacle standing in the way of DPP policy reform.
Ever since Tsai Ing-wen became involved in politics, including cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait policy, she has been the beneficiary of two political assets. One. Tsai Ing-wen is recognized as the mastermind behind Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory." She is perceived as being close to Lee Teng-hui, both personally and ideologically. Therefore Taiwan independence elements have high expectations of her and good feelings toward her. Two. Tsai Ing-wen has a background in international trade. As Vice Premier she was relatively pragmatic on cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. She deliberately cultivated a relatively moderate and rational political image. As a result swing voters looked to her to lead DPP cross-Strait policy reform. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's two assets are mutually contradictory. She often flip-flops between the two. The real problem is that Tsai Ing-wen lacks the will, the determination, and the ability to change the DPP's political path. Taiwan independence elements have a deeply ingrained a sense of "Taiwanese superiority." This is the underlying social psychological obstacle to DPP policy reform.
What is this Taiwanese sense of superiority? It is the belief that Taiwan's economic development, democratic politics, and way of life make it vastly superior to the Chinese mainland. It is the belief that Taiwan cannot afford and has no need to conduct exchanges with the Mainland. let alone integrate itself with the Mainland. It is the belief that doing so would hurt Taiwan, lead to the loss of our existing assets, to economic dependency, would turn the clock back on democracy and undermine our way of life.
No one can deny that Taiwan experienced an economic miracle that became the basis for Taiwan's superiority. But Taiwan is currently experiencing sluggish economic growth. Looking back at the causes of Taiwan's economic miracle and momentum will help us see into the future. Taiwan's economic miracle has often been portrayed as an achievement of Big Government, of Very Important People, or of diligent workers. Most people ignore the Cold War factor. The confrontation between the East and West provided Taiwan with many opportunities. In order to fight the Communist bloc, the U.S. deliberately nurtured the economies of Taiwan and South Korea. Money and material assistance partially solved the problem of capital accumulation for economic growth. Open markets solved Taiwan's exports problem. Dependence on the United States made Taiwan's economic miracle possible. But dependence on the United States also meant that a weakened U.S. economy would stall Taiwan's growth engine.
Under the Cold War the United States helped shape Taiwan's democracy. Democracy countered Communism. U.S. support for Taiwan's government ensured stability and contributed to democratic reforms. The U.S. helped create a peaceful and democratic transition. But transplanting America's democracy also led to its current debasement on Taiwan.
Cold War confrontation and dependence upon the United States enabled Taiwan to enjoy economic prosperity, political stability, and social progress. The public on Taiwan used the opportunity to work hard. Meanwhile, the Mainland watched as Taiwan took flight, Formerly complacent, the Mainland noted the obvious gap between the two sides.
Taiwan's economic and political miracle brought jubilation. But it also encouraged people to ignore the defects in their system. People blinded themselves to Taiwan's limitations. Their myopia encouraged people to look down their noses at the Mainland as a whole, including its culture and society. But competition is dynamic process. The Mainland reformed and liberalized. Cold War confrontation ended. The scales of history tipped in the opposite direction. Taiwan's limitations were slowly exposed. A grave lack of international understanding made Taiwan complacent. It made Taiwan repeat the past mistakes of the Mainland. The Mainland has now risen. It may surpass Taiwan, Our past sense of superiority has paradoxically increased our hostility.
Taiwan needs self-reflection. It needs to open itself up in the search for opportunities. The economic and political miracle that contributed to the Taiwanese sense of superiority has become an obstacle to Taiwan's continued progress. Many refuse to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Mainland. They insist on seeing the Mainland as a threat, as a negative example. They are closed-minded and lack pragmatism. They refuse to learn from the Mainland's experience, They refuse to work together toward a common dream. If they have their way, a golden opportunity will be lost.
Tsai Ing-wen has become party chairperson. Her primary task must be to confront and deal with this illusory sense of Taiwanese superiority. Tsai Ing-wen has recently emphasized the importance of understanding [Mainland] China. If the public on Taiwan refuses to abandon this sense of superiority, it cannot possibly understand [Mainland] China
社論－虛幻的台灣優越感
2014年06月06日 04:10
編輯部
重新當上民進黨主席之後，蔡英文最主要的任務就是重返執政，最大的挑戰就是兩岸政策，這幾乎是社會的主流共識。（中新社資料照片）
重 新當上民進黨主席之後，蔡英文最主要的任務就是重返執政，最大的挑戰就是兩岸政策，這幾乎是社會的主流共識。然而，絕大多數人關於蔡英文兩岸政策的討論， 都集中在「論述」層面。民進黨放不放棄《台獨黨綱》？什麼是「台灣共識」？蔡英文接不接受「九二共識」？如果「台灣共識」過於模糊，接受「九二共識」似乎 又等於向國民黨靠攏、趨同，那麼蔡英文和民進黨能提出什麼新主張？又如何讓大陸方面接受？討論來、討論去，焦點始終集中在這些問題上。
在論述層面之外，民進黨的路線問題也備受關注，路線又和民進黨的權力與派系角力密切相關。蔡英文是否和謝系結盟？和獨派的關係如何？是否得到李登輝支持？和蘇貞昌矛盾心結又如何影響民進黨的路線轉型？這類的話題，很可能是媒體更關心、更有興趣的新聞。
然而，在「論述」與「權鬥」外，很少人關注更「深層次」的課題，那就是民進黨路線轉型重重障礙的社會心理基礎問題。事實上，社會心理問題可能是民進黨論述與路線轉型最大的障礙。
從 政以來，蔡英文在兩岸關係、兩岸政策上，有兩種「政治資產」。其一，蔡英文始終被認為是李登輝「兩國論」的規畫者，也被認為和李登輝的個人關係與政治理念 契合，所以獨派對她抱持高度期待與好感。其二，蔡英文具有國際經貿背景，在擔任行政院副院長期間，在兩岸經貿交流問題上相對務實，加上個人政治色彩較為淡 薄，又刻意打造中間理性形象，因而一些中間選民期待她能帶領民進黨實現兩岸路線轉型。蔡英文這兩種資產是相互矛盾的，她也往往依違在這兩者之間，然而，說 到根本問題，還在於流露路線轉型意向的蔡英文，並沒有堅定的意志、決心和能力面對獨派民眾普遍的「台灣優越感」，解決民進黨轉型的社會心理基礎障礙。
什麼是台灣優越感？簡言之，就是認為台灣在經濟發展、民主政治和生活方式上都遠遠優於中國大陸，台灣沒有能力、更沒有必要去和大陸交流、融合，因為這只會傷害、流失台灣既有的資產，進而出現經濟依賴、民主倒退、生活方式受到破壞等危機。
是 的，誰也無法否認台灣曾經有過經濟奇蹟，這也是台灣優越感的最主要根基。然而，在台灣經濟成長遲滯的此時此刻，回首台灣經濟奇蹟的成因與動能，有助於我們 思索未來。台灣經濟奇蹟曾經不斷被描繪為大政府、大人物或勤奮工人的貢獻，人們卻選擇性忽略了在冷戰結構下，東西兩大集團對峙給台灣帶來的機遇。由於對抗 共產集團，美國刻意扶植台灣（及南韓等地）的經濟，透過金錢和物資援助，部分解決經濟成長的資本積累問題，透過開放市場，解決台灣產品出口換匯問題，在對 美依附結構下，台灣才有經濟奇蹟。正因為對美依附結構的限制，美國經濟趨弱後，台灣成長引擎也就熄火。
在冷戰結構下，美國還協助塑造台灣的民主品牌，在民主對抗共產的兩極對立下，美國支持台灣政府的穩定，也促使台灣進行溫和的民主改革，美國協助打造一個和平民主轉型的外部環境，但是移植美式民主的後果，也產生今天「橘逾淮為枳」的流弊。
冷戰對立、對美依附，帶給台灣的好處是經濟起飛、政治安定、社會進步，台灣民眾在這過程中也利用客觀環境提供的機會，努力打拚，同時，對岸的大陸在台灣起飛的同時，曾經陷於故步自封的境地，使得兩岸的對比出現明顯的差距。
但 是台灣在經濟政治奇蹟的喜悅之中，卻忘記了自己存在的流弊，更無視於自身缺乏國際宏觀視野的重大局限，甚至對大陸的體制、文化與社會產生優越感，看不起大 陸人。然而，競爭比賽是動態的。當大陸走向改革開放，當冷戰結構瓦解崩潰，歷史天秤悄悄出現了偏移，台灣的局限性也慢慢的曝露出來。嚴重的國際視野不足， 讓台灣缺乏危機意識，也讓台灣重蹈了當年大陸故步自封的覆轍。一旦發現大陸已經崛起，甚至可能超越台灣，過去的優越感受到創傷，反而增加敵視心態。
台 灣需要的是自我反思、是全面開放、全方位的找尋機會。但是經濟政治奇蹟所型塑台灣民眾的優越感，卻成了妨礙台灣再升級、再進步的絆腳石，不願正視中國大陸 所提供的機遇，視大陸為威脅、是負面示範，無法以務實和虛心的精神，學習大陸正面向上的經驗，進而尋求共同合作、共同築夢，這將流失了台灣再起飛的大好機 會。
蔡英文重任黨主席之後的首要課題，就是面對並處理台灣民眾這種虛幻的優越感，不揚棄這種優越感，台灣社會就不可能做到蔡英文近來一直強調的了解中國、認識中國。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2014
Summary: The economic and political miracle that contributed to the Taiwanese sense of superiority has become an obstacle to Taiwan's continued progress. Many refuse to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Mainland. They insist on seeing the Mainland as a threat, as a negative example. are closed-minded and lack pragmatism. They refuse to learn from the Mainland's experience, They refuse to work together toward a common dream. If they have their way, a golden opportunity will be lost.
Full Text Below:
Now that she is once again DPP chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen's main task is to engineer a return to power. Her biggest challenge, everyone agrees, is cross-Strait policy. Most people focus on Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy positions. Will the DPP relinquish its Taiwan independence party platform? Just exactly what is the "Taiwan consensus"? Has Tsai accepted the 1992 consensus? Is the "Taiwan consensus" too vague? Accepting the 1992 consensus would appear to be adopting the same position as the KMT. If it is, can Tsai and the DPP advance any new ideas? Can they persuade the Mainland to accept their ideas? The back and forth arguments are always about such questions.
But the DPP's political path is also a matter of concern. The DPP's political path is closely related to factional power struggles. Are Tsai and Hsieh allies? What relationship do they have to Taiwan independence elements? Do they enjoy Lee Teng-hui's support? Su Tseng-chang harbors grievances. Will that affect DPP policy reform? These topics are the ones that interest the media.
Everyone is concerned about policy positions and power struggles. But few are concerned about deeper issues, such as the underlying social psychological obstacles to DPP policy reform. In fact, social psychological issues may be the biggest obstacle standing in the way of DPP policy reform.
Ever since Tsai Ing-wen became involved in politics, including cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait policy, she has been the beneficiary of two political assets. One. Tsai Ing-wen is recognized as the mastermind behind Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory." She is perceived as being close to Lee Teng-hui, both personally and ideologically. Therefore Taiwan independence elements have high expectations of her and good feelings toward her. Two. Tsai Ing-wen has a background in international trade. As Vice Premier she was relatively pragmatic on cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. She deliberately cultivated a relatively moderate and rational political image. As a result swing voters looked to her to lead DPP cross-Strait policy reform. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's two assets are mutually contradictory. She often flip-flops between the two. The real problem is that Tsai Ing-wen lacks the will, the determination, and the ability to change the DPP's political path. Taiwan independence elements have a deeply ingrained a sense of "Taiwanese superiority." This is the underlying social psychological obstacle to DPP policy reform.
What is this Taiwanese sense of superiority? It is the belief that Taiwan's economic development, democratic politics, and way of life make it vastly superior to the Chinese mainland. It is the belief that Taiwan cannot afford and has no need to conduct exchanges with the Mainland. let alone integrate itself with the Mainland. It is the belief that doing so would hurt Taiwan, lead to the loss of our existing assets, to economic dependency, would turn the clock back on democracy and undermine our way of life.
No one can deny that Taiwan experienced an economic miracle that became the basis for Taiwan's superiority. But Taiwan is currently experiencing sluggish economic growth. Looking back at the causes of Taiwan's economic miracle and momentum will help us see into the future. Taiwan's economic miracle has often been portrayed as an achievement of Big Government, of Very Important People, or of diligent workers. Most people ignore the Cold War factor. The confrontation between the East and West provided Taiwan with many opportunities. In order to fight the Communist bloc, the U.S. deliberately nurtured the economies of Taiwan and South Korea. Money and material assistance partially solved the problem of capital accumulation for economic growth. Open markets solved Taiwan's exports problem. Dependence on the United States made Taiwan's economic miracle possible. But dependence on the United States also meant that a weakened U.S. economy would stall Taiwan's growth engine.
Under the Cold War the United States helped shape Taiwan's democracy. Democracy countered Communism. U.S. support for Taiwan's government ensured stability and contributed to democratic reforms. The U.S. helped create a peaceful and democratic transition. But transplanting America's democracy also led to its current debasement on Taiwan.
Cold War confrontation and dependence upon the United States enabled Taiwan to enjoy economic prosperity, political stability, and social progress. The public on Taiwan used the opportunity to work hard. Meanwhile, the Mainland watched as Taiwan took flight, Formerly complacent, the Mainland noted the obvious gap between the two sides.
Taiwan's economic and political miracle brought jubilation. But it also encouraged people to ignore the defects in their system. People blinded themselves to Taiwan's limitations. Their myopia encouraged people to look down their noses at the Mainland as a whole, including its culture and society. But competition is dynamic process. The Mainland reformed and liberalized. Cold War confrontation ended. The scales of history tipped in the opposite direction. Taiwan's limitations were slowly exposed. A grave lack of international understanding made Taiwan complacent. It made Taiwan repeat the past mistakes of the Mainland. The Mainland has now risen. It may surpass Taiwan, Our past sense of superiority has paradoxically increased our hostility.
Taiwan needs self-reflection. It needs to open itself up in the search for opportunities. The economic and political miracle that contributed to the Taiwanese sense of superiority has become an obstacle to Taiwan's continued progress. Many refuse to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Mainland. They insist on seeing the Mainland as a threat, as a negative example. They are closed-minded and lack pragmatism. They refuse to learn from the Mainland's experience, They refuse to work together toward a common dream. If they have their way, a golden opportunity will be lost.
Tsai Ing-wen has become party chairperson. Her primary task must be to confront and deal with this illusory sense of Taiwanese superiority. Tsai Ing-wen has recently emphasized the importance of understanding [Mainland] China. If the public on Taiwan refuses to abandon this sense of superiority, it cannot possibly understand [Mainland] China
社論－虛幻的台灣優越感
2014年06月06日 04:10
編輯部
重新當上民進黨主席之後，蔡英文最主要的任務就是重返執政，最大的挑戰就是兩岸政策，這幾乎是社會的主流共識。（中新社資料照片）
重 新當上民進黨主席之後，蔡英文最主要的任務就是重返執政，最大的挑戰就是兩岸政策，這幾乎是社會的主流共識。然而，絕大多數人關於蔡英文兩岸政策的討論， 都集中在「論述」層面。民進黨放不放棄《台獨黨綱》？什麼是「台灣共識」？蔡英文接不接受「九二共識」？如果「台灣共識」過於模糊，接受「九二共識」似乎 又等於向國民黨靠攏、趨同，那麼蔡英文和民進黨能提出什麼新主張？又如何讓大陸方面接受？討論來、討論去，焦點始終集中在這些問題上。
在論述層面之外，民進黨的路線問題也備受關注，路線又和民進黨的權力與派系角力密切相關。蔡英文是否和謝系結盟？和獨派的關係如何？是否得到李登輝支持？和蘇貞昌矛盾心結又如何影響民進黨的路線轉型？這類的話題，很可能是媒體更關心、更有興趣的新聞。
然而，在「論述」與「權鬥」外，很少人關注更「深層次」的課題，那就是民進黨路線轉型重重障礙的社會心理基礎問題。事實上，社會心理問題可能是民進黨論述與路線轉型最大的障礙。
從 政以來，蔡英文在兩岸關係、兩岸政策上，有兩種「政治資產」。其一，蔡英文始終被認為是李登輝「兩國論」的規畫者，也被認為和李登輝的個人關係與政治理念 契合，所以獨派對她抱持高度期待與好感。其二，蔡英文具有國際經貿背景，在擔任行政院副院長期間，在兩岸經貿交流問題上相對務實，加上個人政治色彩較為淡 薄，又刻意打造中間理性形象，因而一些中間選民期待她能帶領民進黨實現兩岸路線轉型。蔡英文這兩種資產是相互矛盾的，她也往往依違在這兩者之間，然而，說 到根本問題，還在於流露路線轉型意向的蔡英文，並沒有堅定的意志、決心和能力面對獨派民眾普遍的「台灣優越感」，解決民進黨轉型的社會心理基礎障礙。
什麼是台灣優越感？簡言之，就是認為台灣在經濟發展、民主政治和生活方式上都遠遠優於中國大陸，台灣沒有能力、更沒有必要去和大陸交流、融合，因為這只會傷害、流失台灣既有的資產，進而出現經濟依賴、民主倒退、生活方式受到破壞等危機。
是 的，誰也無法否認台灣曾經有過經濟奇蹟，這也是台灣優越感的最主要根基。然而，在台灣經濟成長遲滯的此時此刻，回首台灣經濟奇蹟的成因與動能，有助於我們 思索未來。台灣經濟奇蹟曾經不斷被描繪為大政府、大人物或勤奮工人的貢獻，人們卻選擇性忽略了在冷戰結構下，東西兩大集團對峙給台灣帶來的機遇。由於對抗 共產集團，美國刻意扶植台灣（及南韓等地）的經濟，透過金錢和物資援助，部分解決經濟成長的資本積累問題，透過開放市場，解決台灣產品出口換匯問題，在對 美依附結構下，台灣才有經濟奇蹟。正因為對美依附結構的限制，美國經濟趨弱後，台灣成長引擎也就熄火。
在冷戰結構下，美國還協助塑造台灣的民主品牌，在民主對抗共產的兩極對立下，美國支持台灣政府的穩定，也促使台灣進行溫和的民主改革，美國協助打造一個和平民主轉型的外部環境，但是移植美式民主的後果，也產生今天「橘逾淮為枳」的流弊。
冷戰對立、對美依附，帶給台灣的好處是經濟起飛、政治安定、社會進步，台灣民眾在這過程中也利用客觀環境提供的機會，努力打拚，同時，對岸的大陸在台灣起飛的同時，曾經陷於故步自封的境地，使得兩岸的對比出現明顯的差距。
但 是台灣在經濟政治奇蹟的喜悅之中，卻忘記了自己存在的流弊，更無視於自身缺乏國際宏觀視野的重大局限，甚至對大陸的體制、文化與社會產生優越感，看不起大 陸人。然而，競爭比賽是動態的。當大陸走向改革開放，當冷戰結構瓦解崩潰，歷史天秤悄悄出現了偏移，台灣的局限性也慢慢的曝露出來。嚴重的國際視野不足， 讓台灣缺乏危機意識，也讓台灣重蹈了當年大陸故步自封的覆轍。一旦發現大陸已經崛起，甚至可能超越台灣，過去的優越感受到創傷，反而增加敵視心態。
台 灣需要的是自我反思、是全面開放、全方位的找尋機會。但是經濟政治奇蹟所型塑台灣民眾的優越感，卻成了妨礙台灣再升級、再進步的絆腳石，不願正視中國大陸 所提供的機遇，視大陸為威脅、是負面示範，無法以務實和虛心的精神，學習大陸正面向上的經驗，進而尋求共同合作、共同築夢，這將流失了台灣再起飛的大好機 會。
蔡英文重任黨主席之後的首要課題，就是面對並處理台灣民眾這種虛幻的優越感，不揚棄這種優越感，台灣社會就不可能做到蔡英文近來一直強調的了解中國、認識中國。
Youth and New Media: KMT Achilles Heel
Youth and New Media: KMT Achilles Heel
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2014
Summary: The 2014 mayoral campaign has begun. The 2016 presidential election drumbeats have been sounded. Blue and green camp spokesperson appointments could lead to upsets in key campaigns. How will their spokespersons use young people and the new media? That will surely have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections.
Full Text Below:
Over the past two years, the role of young people during blue camp election campaigns has gradually diminished. The blue camp has all but conceded the new media to its opponents. During the student movement, the Kuomintang virtually lost all touch with young people.
Ko Wen-je is the green camp's candidate for Mayor of Taipei. The search for a Ko campaign spokesperson has attracted much attention. Some think a pearl can be found in a sea of young people. Some think the search is merely a marketing gimmick. Before Ko Wen-je chooses a spokesperson, he should consult Ma Ying-jeou.
Most people think a spokesperson for a government official or political candidate is nothing more than a mouthpiece. This is only partly true. A spokesperson must also be a political leader's eyes and ears, even brains. A spokesperson must represent a political leader on the front lines. A spokesperson must express the political leader's views, while managing crises on the fly. A spokesperson must accurately gauge public opinion. When other political leaders express doubts, the spokesperson must immediately take control. The spokesperson must issue the proper response. The spokesperson must be like a musketeer under fire, as well as a sentry in the forest. An inept spokesperson could do more than undermine the political leader's defense. An inept spokesperson could leave the political leader blind and deaf.
The role of spokesperson is extremely important. One can see how the KMT and the DPP use people from their choice of spokespersons.
During the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou appointed three primary spokespersons. Wang Yu-chi, Su Chun-ping, and Lo Chi-chiang. All three were new faces, young, without strong political backgrounds. They were dubbed the Three Musketeers. When the general election began, they shined. Later they enjoyed smooth sailing in their careers. During the Ma administration's second term, Wang Yu-chi became the youngest ever Mainland Affairs Council Chair. Su Chun-ping became head of the GIO. In 2012, he traveled south to run for legislator. He helped Ma Ying-jeou break new ground in a hostile district. Lo Chi-chiang became deputy campaign manager in 2012. He was then promoted to Deputy Secretary of the Office of the President, but resigned during the September political storm.
During the 2012 Presidential Election, President Ma's spokesperson appointments revealed clear preferences. The first group of candidates included Li Chia-fei, 36 years old, Yin Wei, 30 years old, and Ma Wei-kuo, 29 years old. The average age was 31.6 years old. All were new to the political scene.
Tsai Ing-wen was completely different. Her spokesperson candidates included Chen Chi-mai, 48 years old, Hsu Chia-ching, 44 years old, Hsiao Bi-khim, 42 years old, Cheng Li-chun, 43 years old. The average age was 44.5 years old, a full 13 years older than Ma Ying-jeou's spokesperson candidates. The gap bridges an entire generation. These four spokespersons may become elected officials for many years. They may serve as political appointees. All have achieved prominence.
Consider the political style of the two sides' spokespersons. Blue camp spokespersons value discipline and teamwork over individual performance. Green camp spokespersons value independence. They do not await orders before going into action. Blue camp spokespersons may be young, but the speak with restraint. They tend to go by the book. Green camp spokespersons are tough. They tend to favor guerrilla tactics.
Generally speaking, the DPP is more willing to give young people a chance. But for spokesperson appointments, the opposite is true. The DPP is more conservative. Paradoxically, the KMT, which is usually considered more conservative, has boldly appointed young spokespersons.
Consider electoral and political culture. Ma Ying-jeou's campaign spokesperson appointments were a plus. The spokespersons gave him a public face. They showed that the KMT attached importance to young people. They closed the gap with the younger generation. This is the Internet era. The new media is growing in importance. Young people are far more familiar with the Internet than their elders. Young political leaders faimilar with the new media helped during the 2012 presidential election. FaceBook was the most important new media battleground. Before the election, Ma Ying-jeou's presence on FaceBook was weak. Once the election campaign began, younger spokespersons used the new media and came up from behind. On election day, Ma Ying-jeou had over one million FaceBook "friends." Tsai Ing-wen had approximately 400,000. The gap between the two was nearly 600,000. This of course affected the two sides' exposure and support.
Politics is ever changing. In 2012 the green camp learned a lesson. Over two short years, the student movement dialogued with the younger generation. Young people expanded their influence by using the new media. Tsai Ing-wen once again became party chairperson. Her Internet Division Director wants to boldly appoint young people familiar with Internet technology. His plan was dropped due to controversy. But it clearly showed DPP tactics have changed. Once President Ma was re-elected, the Office of the President abandoned the new media battlefield. This surely bears some relation to his current disastrous approval rating.
Over the last two years, the role of young people in the blue camp has diminished. The blue camp has surrendered the new media to its opponents. During the student movement, the Kuomintang nearly lost touch with young people. Although the KMT has used young people as spokespersons, its thinking remains conservative. Young people are not useful merely as fronts. They contribute to collective change in the political culture.
The 2014 mayoral campaign has begun. The 2016 presidential election drumbeats have been sounded. Blue and green camp spokesperson appointments could lead to upsets in key campaigns. How will their spokespersons use young people and the new media? That will surely have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections.
社論－青年與新媒體成國民黨罩門
2014年06月05日 04:10
本報訊
最近兩年，藍營年輕人在選戰時發揮的戰力，已逐漸渙散，新媒體話語權更拱手交出，學運中，國民黨與年輕人幾乎完全斷鏈。圖／本報資料照片
準備代表綠營參選台北市長的柯文哲要海選發言人，引起熱議。有人認為，發言人可以從年輕之海裡挖掘珍珠，也有人認為只是候選人包裝形象的短線行銷手法。柯文哲在決定人選前，其實應該參考馬英九的經驗。
一 般人認為，發言人就是首長或候選人的喉舌，其實，這只對了一部分，發言人還必須是耳目，甚至是大腦。發言人不但要在火線上代表政治領袖，同時做好靜態的理 念闡述與動態的危機管理，更要在第一線蒐集輿情，當外界開始對政治領袖有所質疑時，能立即掌握訊息，做好準備，從容不迫做出正確反應。從辯護的功能論，發 言人是衝鋒陷陣的火槍兵，從輿情蒐集的功能論，是深入叢林的哨兵。發言人不好，不只影響辯護，更會讓政治領袖耳目不明。
發言人角色極為重要，從發言人任用，可以觀察國民黨與民進黨兩黨的用人風格。
2008 年總統大選，馬英九任命的3位主力發言人：王郁琦、蘇俊賓、羅智強都是政壇新面孔，年輕且無深厚政治背景，被稱三劍客的3位發言人，大選時衝鋒陷陣，戰功 彪炳，後來在政治發展上一路順遂，王郁琦在馬政府第二任期成為最年輕的陸委會主委；蘇俊賓先為新聞局長，2012年以刺客之姿南下參選立委，為馬英九在艱 困選區開疆闢土；羅智強2012選戰成為副操盤手，再被拔擢為總統府副祕書長，但在九月風暴中去職。
2012的總統大選馬總統任用發言人風格更為明顯，第一波公布的3位發言人，李佳霏36歲、殷瑋30歲、馬瑋國29歲，平均年齡31.6歲，都是政壇新鮮人。
蔡英文完全不同，第一波4位主力發言人，陳其邁48歲、徐佳青44歲、蕭美琴42歲、鄭麗君43歲，平均年齡44.5歲，比馬英九的發言人足足大13歲，是跨世代差距。這4位發言人，或擔任民意代表多年、或曾任政務官，個個頭角崢嶸。
縱觀雙方發言人的風格，藍營發言人重視紀律與團隊戰力，不求個人表現。綠營發言人則獨立性強、不待指令可單兵作戰。藍營雖用年輕人，發言反而穩守，偏向正規軍戰法，綠營發言人強悍，偏向叢林式游擊戰法。
一般認為，民進黨比較願意給年輕人機會，但在發言人的任用上剛好相反，比較保守。被認為比較保守的國民黨，發言人的任用上反而大膽、年輕。
從 選舉或政治培養的角度來看，馬英九選戰的發言人任用，是為他加分的。發言人的「門面效應」，有助於補強國民黨不重視年輕人、與年輕世代疏離的形象。尤其在 網路時代，新媒體戰場愈來愈重要，年輕人對網路的熟悉度與掌握度絕對超越年長者，用對年輕人有助於政治領袖對新媒體的經營。以2012總統大選最重要的新 媒體戰場──臉書來看，選戰開打前，馬英九的臉書聲勢十分低迷，選戰開打後，在年輕發言人與新媒體幕僚群衝刺下，卻後來居上。總統大選投票日前，馬英九臉 書粉絲已破百萬數，蔡英文則約莫40多萬，雙方差距近60萬，這當然影響了雙方在新媒體戰場的發聲權與支持度。
政治瞬息萬變，綠營在 2012嘗到教訓，短短兩年，在一波波的學運中與年輕世代保持對話，透過年輕人在新媒體上擴大影響力。蔡英文回任黨主席，網路部主任一度想大膽任用年輕的 網路科技人，雖然後來因為引發爭議而作罷，但已清楚顯示，民進黨戰法已經改變。反而馬總統在當選連任後，總統府未堅守新媒體戰場，應與如今民意支持度兵敗 如山倒有關。
最近兩年，藍營年輕人在選戰時發揮的戰力，已逐漸渙散，新媒體話語權更拱手交出，學運中，國民黨與年輕人幾乎完全斷鏈。這反映出，國民黨雖然在發言人上重用年輕人，但在思維上，並未走出保守習性，讓年輕人效用僅及於門面，沒有帶來政黨文化的集體改變。
2014年縣市長選戰戰火正殷，2016年總統大選戰鼓已響。藍綠的發言人任用學，就算不是扭轉戰役的絕對關鍵，但在年輕人與新媒體的戰場上，發言人如何用，必會有舉足輕重的影響力。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2014
Summary: The 2014 mayoral campaign has begun. The 2016 presidential election drumbeats have been sounded. Blue and green camp spokesperson appointments could lead to upsets in key campaigns. How will their spokespersons use young people and the new media? That will surely have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections.
Full Text Below:
Over the past two years, the role of young people during blue camp election campaigns has gradually diminished. The blue camp has all but conceded the new media to its opponents. During the student movement, the Kuomintang virtually lost all touch with young people.
Ko Wen-je is the green camp's candidate for Mayor of Taipei. The search for a Ko campaign spokesperson has attracted much attention. Some think a pearl can be found in a sea of young people. Some think the search is merely a marketing gimmick. Before Ko Wen-je chooses a spokesperson, he should consult Ma Ying-jeou.
Most people think a spokesperson for a government official or political candidate is nothing more than a mouthpiece. This is only partly true. A spokesperson must also be a political leader's eyes and ears, even brains. A spokesperson must represent a political leader on the front lines. A spokesperson must express the political leader's views, while managing crises on the fly. A spokesperson must accurately gauge public opinion. When other political leaders express doubts, the spokesperson must immediately take control. The spokesperson must issue the proper response. The spokesperson must be like a musketeer under fire, as well as a sentry in the forest. An inept spokesperson could do more than undermine the political leader's defense. An inept spokesperson could leave the political leader blind and deaf.
The role of spokesperson is extremely important. One can see how the KMT and the DPP use people from their choice of spokespersons.
During the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou appointed three primary spokespersons. Wang Yu-chi, Su Chun-ping, and Lo Chi-chiang. All three were new faces, young, without strong political backgrounds. They were dubbed the Three Musketeers. When the general election began, they shined. Later they enjoyed smooth sailing in their careers. During the Ma administration's second term, Wang Yu-chi became the youngest ever Mainland Affairs Council Chair. Su Chun-ping became head of the GIO. In 2012, he traveled south to run for legislator. He helped Ma Ying-jeou break new ground in a hostile district. Lo Chi-chiang became deputy campaign manager in 2012. He was then promoted to Deputy Secretary of the Office of the President, but resigned during the September political storm.
During the 2012 Presidential Election, President Ma's spokesperson appointments revealed clear preferences. The first group of candidates included Li Chia-fei, 36 years old, Yin Wei, 30 years old, and Ma Wei-kuo, 29 years old. The average age was 31.6 years old. All were new to the political scene.
Tsai Ing-wen was completely different. Her spokesperson candidates included Chen Chi-mai, 48 years old, Hsu Chia-ching, 44 years old, Hsiao Bi-khim, 42 years old, Cheng Li-chun, 43 years old. The average age was 44.5 years old, a full 13 years older than Ma Ying-jeou's spokesperson candidates. The gap bridges an entire generation. These four spokespersons may become elected officials for many years. They may serve as political appointees. All have achieved prominence.
Consider the political style of the two sides' spokespersons. Blue camp spokespersons value discipline and teamwork over individual performance. Green camp spokespersons value independence. They do not await orders before going into action. Blue camp spokespersons may be young, but the speak with restraint. They tend to go by the book. Green camp spokespersons are tough. They tend to favor guerrilla tactics.
Generally speaking, the DPP is more willing to give young people a chance. But for spokesperson appointments, the opposite is true. The DPP is more conservative. Paradoxically, the KMT, which is usually considered more conservative, has boldly appointed young spokespersons.
Consider electoral and political culture. Ma Ying-jeou's campaign spokesperson appointments were a plus. The spokespersons gave him a public face. They showed that the KMT attached importance to young people. They closed the gap with the younger generation. This is the Internet era. The new media is growing in importance. Young people are far more familiar with the Internet than their elders. Young political leaders faimilar with the new media helped during the 2012 presidential election. FaceBook was the most important new media battleground. Before the election, Ma Ying-jeou's presence on FaceBook was weak. Once the election campaign began, younger spokespersons used the new media and came up from behind. On election day, Ma Ying-jeou had over one million FaceBook "friends." Tsai Ing-wen had approximately 400,000. The gap between the two was nearly 600,000. This of course affected the two sides' exposure and support.
Politics is ever changing. In 2012 the green camp learned a lesson. Over two short years, the student movement dialogued with the younger generation. Young people expanded their influence by using the new media. Tsai Ing-wen once again became party chairperson. Her Internet Division Director wants to boldly appoint young people familiar with Internet technology. His plan was dropped due to controversy. But it clearly showed DPP tactics have changed. Once President Ma was re-elected, the Office of the President abandoned the new media battlefield. This surely bears some relation to his current disastrous approval rating.
Over the last two years, the role of young people in the blue camp has diminished. The blue camp has surrendered the new media to its opponents. During the student movement, the Kuomintang nearly lost touch with young people. Although the KMT has used young people as spokespersons, its thinking remains conservative. Young people are not useful merely as fronts. They contribute to collective change in the political culture.
The 2014 mayoral campaign has begun. The 2016 presidential election drumbeats have been sounded. Blue and green camp spokesperson appointments could lead to upsets in key campaigns. How will their spokespersons use young people and the new media? That will surely have a decisive influence on the outcome of the elections.
社論－青年與新媒體成國民黨罩門
2014年06月05日 04:10
本報訊
最近兩年，藍營年輕人在選戰時發揮的戰力，已逐漸渙散，新媒體話語權更拱手交出，學運中，國民黨與年輕人幾乎完全斷鏈。圖／本報資料照片
準備代表綠營參選台北市長的柯文哲要海選發言人，引起熱議。有人認為，發言人可以從年輕之海裡挖掘珍珠，也有人認為只是候選人包裝形象的短線行銷手法。柯文哲在決定人選前，其實應該參考馬英九的經驗。
一 般人認為，發言人就是首長或候選人的喉舌，其實，這只對了一部分，發言人還必須是耳目，甚至是大腦。發言人不但要在火線上代表政治領袖，同時做好靜態的理 念闡述與動態的危機管理，更要在第一線蒐集輿情，當外界開始對政治領袖有所質疑時，能立即掌握訊息，做好準備，從容不迫做出正確反應。從辯護的功能論，發 言人是衝鋒陷陣的火槍兵，從輿情蒐集的功能論，是深入叢林的哨兵。發言人不好，不只影響辯護，更會讓政治領袖耳目不明。
發言人角色極為重要，從發言人任用，可以觀察國民黨與民進黨兩黨的用人風格。
2008 年總統大選，馬英九任命的3位主力發言人：王郁琦、蘇俊賓、羅智強都是政壇新面孔，年輕且無深厚政治背景，被稱三劍客的3位發言人，大選時衝鋒陷陣，戰功 彪炳，後來在政治發展上一路順遂，王郁琦在馬政府第二任期成為最年輕的陸委會主委；蘇俊賓先為新聞局長，2012年以刺客之姿南下參選立委，為馬英九在艱 困選區開疆闢土；羅智強2012選戰成為副操盤手，再被拔擢為總統府副祕書長，但在九月風暴中去職。
2012的總統大選馬總統任用發言人風格更為明顯，第一波公布的3位發言人，李佳霏36歲、殷瑋30歲、馬瑋國29歲，平均年齡31.6歲，都是政壇新鮮人。
蔡英文完全不同，第一波4位主力發言人，陳其邁48歲、徐佳青44歲、蕭美琴42歲、鄭麗君43歲，平均年齡44.5歲，比馬英九的發言人足足大13歲，是跨世代差距。這4位發言人，或擔任民意代表多年、或曾任政務官，個個頭角崢嶸。
縱觀雙方發言人的風格，藍營發言人重視紀律與團隊戰力，不求個人表現。綠營發言人則獨立性強、不待指令可單兵作戰。藍營雖用年輕人，發言反而穩守，偏向正規軍戰法，綠營發言人強悍，偏向叢林式游擊戰法。
一般認為，民進黨比較願意給年輕人機會，但在發言人的任用上剛好相反，比較保守。被認為比較保守的國民黨，發言人的任用上反而大膽、年輕。
從 選舉或政治培養的角度來看，馬英九選戰的發言人任用，是為他加分的。發言人的「門面效應」，有助於補強國民黨不重視年輕人、與年輕世代疏離的形象。尤其在 網路時代，新媒體戰場愈來愈重要，年輕人對網路的熟悉度與掌握度絕對超越年長者，用對年輕人有助於政治領袖對新媒體的經營。以2012總統大選最重要的新 媒體戰場──臉書來看，選戰開打前，馬英九的臉書聲勢十分低迷，選戰開打後，在年輕發言人與新媒體幕僚群衝刺下，卻後來居上。總統大選投票日前，馬英九臉 書粉絲已破百萬數，蔡英文則約莫40多萬，雙方差距近60萬，這當然影響了雙方在新媒體戰場的發聲權與支持度。
政治瞬息萬變，綠營在 2012嘗到教訓，短短兩年，在一波波的學運中與年輕世代保持對話，透過年輕人在新媒體上擴大影響力。蔡英文回任黨主席，網路部主任一度想大膽任用年輕的 網路科技人，雖然後來因為引發爭議而作罷，但已清楚顯示，民進黨戰法已經改變。反而馬總統在當選連任後，總統府未堅守新媒體戰場，應與如今民意支持度兵敗 如山倒有關。
最近兩年，藍營年輕人在選戰時發揮的戰力，已逐漸渙散，新媒體話語權更拱手交出，學運中，國民黨與年輕人幾乎完全斷鏈。這反映出，國民黨雖然在發言人上重用年輕人，但在思維上，並未走出保守習性，讓年輕人效用僅及於門面，沒有帶來政黨文化的集體改變。
2014年縣市長選戰戰火正殷，2016年總統大選戰鼓已響。藍綠的發言人任用學，就算不是扭轉戰役的絕對關鍵，但在年輕人與新媒體的戰場上，發言人如何用，必會有舉足輕重的影響力。
Tuesday, June 3, 2014
Unconditional Acceptance: Tsai Ing-wen Has No Alternative
Unconditional Acceptance: Tsai Ing-wen Has No Alternative
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2014
Summary: In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen was elected party chair by 93% of the vote. This underscores her standing within the DPP. The next day, a poll showed her public approval rating trailing Eric Chu's by a mere 1%. This underscores her political support among the general public.
Following her defeat in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen said that if it hopes to return to power, the DPP must focus on the "final mile." Having been elected party chair however, she has changed her tune. She now says that she wants the DPP to focus on the "first mile." She said "Let us change the DPP, and furthermore change Taiwan." But the media thinks Tsai Ing-wen had better change Tsai Ing-wen first.
Does the DPP hope to return to power? If it does, it makes no difference whether it focuses on the "last mile" or the "first mile." The only change that will make a difference is changing its cross-Strait policy. It must put people at ease. But what did Tsai Ing-wen do? She demanded a constitutional amendment to promote the the "first mile." Clearly her words are at odds with her actions. They may well be a smokescreen to confuse the public.
Tsai Ing-wen argues that a constitutional amendment is required because the "votes are not of equal value." She says this is the main reason the DPP cannot win in Kinmen, Lianjiang, Taitung, Hualien, and sparsely populated aboriginal legislative districts. She says this leads to discrepancies in the votes to seats ratio. But the problem is not with the electoral system. There is no reason Kinmen and Matsu cannot be a single district. The DPP loses because of its image and its policies. Tsai Ing-wen's real motives for demanding a constitutional amendment are threefold. One. She hopes to discredit the constitution. She hopes to falsely characterize it as unfair to the DPP. Two. She hopes to turn the constitutional amendment into a political football. She hopes to drag in all sorts of issues, including national identity and the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. She hopes to confuse the public. The constitutional amendment will not pass. But she will have succeeded in muddying the political waters. Three. She hopes to demagogue constitutional issues to draw attention away from her defective cross-Strait policies. She hopes to confuse the public. She hopes to avoid cross-Strait issues by seeking safety in constitutional issues.
This is known as "setting the agenda." Tsai Ing-wen knows that cross-Strait issues are the key to 2016. She knows she cannot escape this fact. Therefore she hopes to drag in constitutional issues to confuse the public. She hopes to reduce pressure on herself and the DPP on cross-Strait issues. Unfortunately this amounts to "covering one's ears while stealing a bell." This is an "ostrich with its head in the sand" strategy.
Chao Tian-ling was Tsai Ing-wen's Director of Chinese Affairs during her first term as party chair. Chao visited the US in February. According to Chao, U.S. officials said the DPP does not recognize the 1992 Consensus, therefore 2016 will probably be a replay of 2012. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen failed to complete the "final mile" because she refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen now insists on a replay the same script with her "first mile." If Tsai Ing-wen hopes for a different outcome, she must begin by reversing her position on the 1992 Consensus.
Frank Hsieh unsuccessfully attempted to substitute his "Constitutional Consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. As everyone could see, the Beijing authorities reiterated their bottom line. They demanded adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Beijing clearly has no intention of yielding on this point. The 1992 Consensus is a familiar proposition for both sides. Its meaning is clear. It needs no further elaboration. In other words, the agenda for the 2016 presidential election may still be adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In which case, does Tsai Ing-wen intend to respond by saying "What 1992 Consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen may be able to get elected by refusing to respond altogether. But she cannot refuse to respond in the event she is elected.
If Tsai Ing-wen cannot escape even the bonds of the 1992 Consensus, she is likely to trip over the same rope again in 2016. Tsai Ing-wen must hitch a ride on the Ma administration bandwagon. She must help the STA, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Bill, and Free Trade Zone Special Regulations pass.Yet she has openly declared her intention to "forcefully" obstruct them, then sit back and watch as these goldern opportunities are lost. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP return to power, they may refuse to "unconditionally accept" the Ma administration's policies. If so, how will the nation survive?
Tsai Ing-wen should help the DPP and herself by unconditionally accepting those conditions necessary to maintain cross-Strait relations. Globalization and cross-Strait relations leave her no alternative. Besides ECFA. TPP, and RCEP, Taiwan has nowhere else to go. This is where the Ma administration can immediately make a difference. If the DPP refuses to cooperate, Tsai Ing-wen will be helpless in the event she is elected. Even if she is not helpless, she will have missed a golden opportunity. The DPP may be able to "forcefully" obstruct the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. But Tsai Ing-wen must promote the early adoption of these bills. Otherwise she will destroy the very policies she will need to "unconditionally accept." That will amount to political suicide.
In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.
概括承受 蔡英文別無他途
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.06.04 04:44 am
蔡英文以九十三‧七％的得票率當選黨主席，這呈現了她在民進黨內的聲望；她在次日發表的民調支持率則僅差朱立倫一個百分點，這顯示了她在社會上的政治行情。
二○一二年落選，蔡英文說民進黨應走向重返執政的「最後一哩」；如今回鍋掌舵，她則改口說要帶民進黨走上重返執政的「第一哩路」。她說：「讓我們從改變民進黨，進一步改變台灣。」媒體則說，蔡英文應先改變蔡英文。
民進黨若欲重返執政，無論是「最後一哩」或「第一哩路」，皆必須改變其兩岸政策，以使國人安心。但蔡英文竟宣示以推動修憲作為其重新出發的「第一哩路」，則顯然文不對題，甚至是亂人耳目的煙幕彈。
蔡 英文主張的修憲主題是「票票不等值」，這主要是因民進黨常無法贏得金門、連江及台東、花蓮，及原住民等人口較少選區的幾席立委，致使總得票數與總席次的比 例出現落差。但這個問題與其說是選制的問題（金馬沒有理由不劃為單一選區），不如說民進黨的政策及形象才是敗選的原因。蔡英文以修憲為謀略的主因是：一、 攻擊憲法，偽稱民進黨因體制而處於不公。二、炒作修憲，引出種種包括國家認同及總統制、內閣制之類的爭議，以擾亂社會視聽；最後修憲未必成局，但已攪渾政 局。三、以炒作修憲來掩蔽兩岸議題，亂人耳目，在修憲的颱風眼中找到迴避兩岸議題的避風港。
這就叫做「議題設定」。蔡英文明知兩岸議題仍是二○一六的核心議題，她絕無可能逃避；但是，她卻想以修憲議題來亂人耳目，以減低兩岸議題給她自己及民進黨所帶來的無可逃逭的壓力。這是掩耳盜鈴，也是鴕鳥策略。
蔡英文首任的中國事務部主任趙天麟說，二月訪美，美方官員說，民進黨不承認九二共識，「恐怕二○一二年的作為，會再看到一次」。二○一二年，蔡英文的「最後一哩」摔倒在「否定九二共識」上；如今蔡英文重作馮婦的「第一哩路」，恐怕得從「重拾九二共識」做起。
自 謝長廷以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」的嘗試失敗後，眾所共見，北京當局又重新強調「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」的政治底線。北京顯然不會輕易放棄此一主場 議題，因為「九二共識」已是兩岸皆已熟悉的命題，操作起來簡易明確，不必再多費唇舌解說。也就是說，二○一六總統大選的「議題設定」可能仍是「堅持九二共 識／反對台獨」，那麼，蔡英文是否仍然要用二○一二「哪裡有九二共識」的答案回應？蔡英文即使有可能在二○一六年不予回應而當選，但絕無可能若在二○一六 當選後仍不回應。
蔡英文如果連「九二共識」的捆綁都不能跳脫，她在二○一六年就可能被同一條繩子絆倒第二次。尤其，蔡英文若不借用馬政府 之力，將《服貿協議》、《兩岸協議監督條例》及《自由經濟示範區特別條例》等通過，卻聲稱要「採取比較有『力』的方法加以阻擋」，則一旦坐視時機流失，蔡 英文及民進黨未來倘重返執政將連「概括承受」的可能性亦告喪失，則何以維繫國脈民命？
因此，蔡英文應以替民進黨及自己在兩岸關係上籌措 「概括承受」的條件為計。因為，面對無可閃躲的全球化及兩岸關係，除了「ＥＣＦＡ加上ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ」外，台灣已無路可走；而這正是馬政府當下努力以赴 之事，民進黨若拆了這個台，不但他日蔡英文若執政將沒有補救能力，且即使有補救之心也已錯失了契機。因此，民進黨現在儘管可做些「比較有『力』」的姿態加 以阻擋，但蔡英文仍應設法促使這些法案早日通過，否則即不啻自毀了可以「概括承受」的本錢，無異政治自殺。
蔡英文在二○○○年迫使陳水扁 否定「九二共識」，但如今北京卻等待她對「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」作出回應。蔡英文在二○一二年「概括承受」了ＥＣＦＡ，但如今她卻可能毀了她也可以 「概括承受」的服貿協議及自由經濟示範區。試問：面對全球化的大勢，若想重返執政，除了準備做好「概括承受」，及「延續前朝兩岸政策」之外，蔡英文豈有他 途可走？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2014
Summary: In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen was elected party chair by 93% of the vote. This underscores her standing within the DPP. The next day, a poll showed her public approval rating trailing Eric Chu's by a mere 1%. This underscores her political support among the general public.
Following her defeat in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen said that if it hopes to return to power, the DPP must focus on the "final mile." Having been elected party chair however, she has changed her tune. She now says that she wants the DPP to focus on the "first mile." She said "Let us change the DPP, and furthermore change Taiwan." But the media thinks Tsai Ing-wen had better change Tsai Ing-wen first.
Does the DPP hope to return to power? If it does, it makes no difference whether it focuses on the "last mile" or the "first mile." The only change that will make a difference is changing its cross-Strait policy. It must put people at ease. But what did Tsai Ing-wen do? She demanded a constitutional amendment to promote the the "first mile." Clearly her words are at odds with her actions. They may well be a smokescreen to confuse the public.
Tsai Ing-wen argues that a constitutional amendment is required because the "votes are not of equal value." She says this is the main reason the DPP cannot win in Kinmen, Lianjiang, Taitung, Hualien, and sparsely populated aboriginal legislative districts. She says this leads to discrepancies in the votes to seats ratio. But the problem is not with the electoral system. There is no reason Kinmen and Matsu cannot be a single district. The DPP loses because of its image and its policies. Tsai Ing-wen's real motives for demanding a constitutional amendment are threefold. One. She hopes to discredit the constitution. She hopes to falsely characterize it as unfair to the DPP. Two. She hopes to turn the constitutional amendment into a political football. She hopes to drag in all sorts of issues, including national identity and the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. She hopes to confuse the public. The constitutional amendment will not pass. But she will have succeeded in muddying the political waters. Three. She hopes to demagogue constitutional issues to draw attention away from her defective cross-Strait policies. She hopes to confuse the public. She hopes to avoid cross-Strait issues by seeking safety in constitutional issues.
This is known as "setting the agenda." Tsai Ing-wen knows that cross-Strait issues are the key to 2016. She knows she cannot escape this fact. Therefore she hopes to drag in constitutional issues to confuse the public. She hopes to reduce pressure on herself and the DPP on cross-Strait issues. Unfortunately this amounts to "covering one's ears while stealing a bell." This is an "ostrich with its head in the sand" strategy.
Chao Tian-ling was Tsai Ing-wen's Director of Chinese Affairs during her first term as party chair. Chao visited the US in February. According to Chao, U.S. officials said the DPP does not recognize the 1992 Consensus, therefore 2016 will probably be a replay of 2012. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen failed to complete the "final mile" because she refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen now insists on a replay the same script with her "first mile." If Tsai Ing-wen hopes for a different outcome, she must begin by reversing her position on the 1992 Consensus.
Frank Hsieh unsuccessfully attempted to substitute his "Constitutional Consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. As everyone could see, the Beijing authorities reiterated their bottom line. They demanded adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Beijing clearly has no intention of yielding on this point. The 1992 Consensus is a familiar proposition for both sides. Its meaning is clear. It needs no further elaboration. In other words, the agenda for the 2016 presidential election may still be adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In which case, does Tsai Ing-wen intend to respond by saying "What 1992 Consensus?" Tsai Ing-wen may be able to get elected by refusing to respond altogether. But she cannot refuse to respond in the event she is elected.
If Tsai Ing-wen cannot escape even the bonds of the 1992 Consensus, she is likely to trip over the same rope again in 2016. Tsai Ing-wen must hitch a ride on the Ma administration bandwagon. She must help the STA, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Bill, and Free Trade Zone Special Regulations pass.Yet she has openly declared her intention to "forcefully" obstruct them, then sit back and watch as these goldern opportunities are lost. If Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP return to power, they may refuse to "unconditionally accept" the Ma administration's policies. If so, how will the nation survive?
Tsai Ing-wen should help the DPP and herself by unconditionally accepting those conditions necessary to maintain cross-Strait relations. Globalization and cross-Strait relations leave her no alternative. Besides ECFA. TPP, and RCEP, Taiwan has nowhere else to go. This is where the Ma administration can immediately make a difference. If the DPP refuses to cooperate, Tsai Ing-wen will be helpless in the event she is elected. Even if she is not helpless, she will have missed a golden opportunity. The DPP may be able to "forcefully" obstruct the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies. But Tsai Ing-wen must promote the early adoption of these bills. Otherwise she will destroy the very policies she will need to "unconditionally accept." That will amount to political suicide.
In 2000, Tsai Ing-wen forced Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 Consensus. Beijing is now waiting for her to declare that she will adhere to 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. In 2013 Tsai Ing-wen "unconditionally accepted" ECFA. Now, however, she has ruined her chance to "unconditionally accept" the STA and Free Trade Zones. Globalization is here to stay. If the DPP hopes to return to power, it must "unconditionally accept" and "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen has no other alternative.
概括承受 蔡英文別無他途
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.06.04 04:44 am
蔡英文以九十三‧七％的得票率當選黨主席，這呈現了她在民進黨內的聲望；她在次日發表的民調支持率則僅差朱立倫一個百分點，這顯示了她在社會上的政治行情。
二○一二年落選，蔡英文說民進黨應走向重返執政的「最後一哩」；如今回鍋掌舵，她則改口說要帶民進黨走上重返執政的「第一哩路」。她說：「讓我們從改變民進黨，進一步改變台灣。」媒體則說，蔡英文應先改變蔡英文。
民進黨若欲重返執政，無論是「最後一哩」或「第一哩路」，皆必須改變其兩岸政策，以使國人安心。但蔡英文竟宣示以推動修憲作為其重新出發的「第一哩路」，則顯然文不對題，甚至是亂人耳目的煙幕彈。
蔡 英文主張的修憲主題是「票票不等值」，這主要是因民進黨常無法贏得金門、連江及台東、花蓮，及原住民等人口較少選區的幾席立委，致使總得票數與總席次的比 例出現落差。但這個問題與其說是選制的問題（金馬沒有理由不劃為單一選區），不如說民進黨的政策及形象才是敗選的原因。蔡英文以修憲為謀略的主因是：一、 攻擊憲法，偽稱民進黨因體制而處於不公。二、炒作修憲，引出種種包括國家認同及總統制、內閣制之類的爭議，以擾亂社會視聽；最後修憲未必成局，但已攪渾政 局。三、以炒作修憲來掩蔽兩岸議題，亂人耳目，在修憲的颱風眼中找到迴避兩岸議題的避風港。
這就叫做「議題設定」。蔡英文明知兩岸議題仍是二○一六的核心議題，她絕無可能逃避；但是，她卻想以修憲議題來亂人耳目，以減低兩岸議題給她自己及民進黨所帶來的無可逃逭的壓力。這是掩耳盜鈴，也是鴕鳥策略。
蔡英文首任的中國事務部主任趙天麟說，二月訪美，美方官員說，民進黨不承認九二共識，「恐怕二○一二年的作為，會再看到一次」。二○一二年，蔡英文的「最後一哩」摔倒在「否定九二共識」上；如今蔡英文重作馮婦的「第一哩路」，恐怕得從「重拾九二共識」做起。
自 謝長廷以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」的嘗試失敗後，眾所共見，北京當局又重新強調「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」的政治底線。北京顯然不會輕易放棄此一主場 議題，因為「九二共識」已是兩岸皆已熟悉的命題，操作起來簡易明確，不必再多費唇舌解說。也就是說，二○一六總統大選的「議題設定」可能仍是「堅持九二共 識／反對台獨」，那麼，蔡英文是否仍然要用二○一二「哪裡有九二共識」的答案回應？蔡英文即使有可能在二○一六年不予回應而當選，但絕無可能若在二○一六 當選後仍不回應。
蔡英文如果連「九二共識」的捆綁都不能跳脫，她在二○一六年就可能被同一條繩子絆倒第二次。尤其，蔡英文若不借用馬政府 之力，將《服貿協議》、《兩岸協議監督條例》及《自由經濟示範區特別條例》等通過，卻聲稱要「採取比較有『力』的方法加以阻擋」，則一旦坐視時機流失，蔡 英文及民進黨未來倘重返執政將連「概括承受」的可能性亦告喪失，則何以維繫國脈民命？
因此，蔡英文應以替民進黨及自己在兩岸關係上籌措 「概括承受」的條件為計。因為，面對無可閃躲的全球化及兩岸關係，除了「ＥＣＦＡ加上ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ」外，台灣已無路可走；而這正是馬政府當下努力以赴 之事，民進黨若拆了這個台，不但他日蔡英文若執政將沒有補救能力，且即使有補救之心也已錯失了契機。因此，民進黨現在儘管可做些「比較有『力』」的姿態加 以阻擋，但蔡英文仍應設法促使這些法案早日通過，否則即不啻自毀了可以「概括承受」的本錢，無異政治自殺。
蔡英文在二○○○年迫使陳水扁 否定「九二共識」，但如今北京卻等待她對「堅持九二共識／反對台獨」作出回應。蔡英文在二○一二年「概括承受」了ＥＣＦＡ，但如今她卻可能毀了她也可以 「概括承受」的服貿協議及自由經濟示範區。試問：面對全球化的大勢，若想重返執政，除了準備做好「概括承受」，及「延續前朝兩岸政策」之外，蔡英文豈有他 途可走？
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