Democratic Dysfunction Erodes Taiwan’s Institutional Advantages
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2014
Executive Summary: For the welfare of the people, Taiwan cannot afford to “live by democracy, only to die by democracy.” We must prove that Taiwan's democracy is more than just the Sunflower Student Movement forcibly occupying the legislature, legislators forcibly occupying the podium, backroom deals passed off as "political consultations," and the nine in one Kuomintang election defeat. Taiwan’s democracy must unite people, and save the nation. Otherwise, Taiwan's one time advantage will be gradually eroded by internal conflict.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland is touting is "constitutional rule", but the public is silent. Taiwan is touting “constitutional reform”, and the public is vocal.
But this picture is incomplete. The two sides’ political systems are different. Consider their frameworks. The Mainland has more constitutional rule and less democracy. Taiwan has democracy, but a shaky constitution. In terms of concrete achievements, the Mainland may have less democracy, but it gets more results. Taiwan may have democracy, but fails to get results. As a result, in cross-Strait political competition, Taiwan has gradually lost its institutional advantages.
Taiwan once enjoyed "democracy and freedom" instead of "one-party dictatorship." It felt superior and confident. Now however, it has cause for concern. The "China collapse theory" has been discredited. Now the question is how a Taiwan suffering from "democratic dysfunction" can remain in coopetition with the Mainland?
Compare Taiwan’s "democracy and freedom" to the Mainland’s "one-party dictatorship." In terms of human rights, Taiwan is superior. Moreover, Taiwan's democracy is the primary lever by which it can to control cross-Strait relations. It is essential to resisting pressure from the Mainland. These are all advantages Taiwan has in cross-Strait relations. But democracy has malfunctioned and debilitated Taiwan. It has even made it difficult for Taiwan to contend with the Mainland. If Taiwan remains trapped in this state, it will lose its capacity to compete and respond. The outlook is grim.
Consider the political aspect. The Mainland’s constitutional rule means adhering to a Communist dictatorship. Such constitutional rule violates human rights and democratic ideals. Yet somehow its record has been exemplary. By contrast, Taiwan's constitutional rule has led to divisions even on the issue of national identity. The constitution has been amended seven times. Currently, yet another amendment is being proposed. Furthermore, Taiwan's constitutional difficulties involve far more than constitutional provisions. For example, the Legislative Yuan's "political consultations" amount to fake democracy and has destroyed the constitutional principle of majority rule. This amounts to democracy without constitutional rule.
Consider the economic aspect. The Mainland’s one-party dictatorship turns industries into caged birds. To adjust salaries, they issue an executive order forcing those with high salaries to accept pay cuts and those with low salaries to receive pay raises. When they wish to participate in FTAs, they can ignore complaints from "vulnerable industries." By contrast, Taiwan's democracy has made nuclear energy policy untenable, brought the petrochemical industry to its knees, and made industrial policy indecipherable. It has made free markets and liberalization impossible. The only way to raise wages is "moral suasion." As a result, economic policy debates often become "struggle sessions” to denounce government that never establish any sound goals, strategies, or policy paths. Compare the two sides’ frameworks. Three characteristics stand out. One. The Mainland enjoys an "autocratic advantage." Taiwan must endure a "democratic burden." Two. The Mainland enjoys a "space advantage." The Wenzhou earthquake was merely a regional earthquake. But the 9/21 earthquake shook the entire island of Taiwan. On Taiwan, a single Wen Lin-yuan event turns into an island-wide trend. But on the Mainland, “nail house” protests are merely local events. Three. The Mainland enjoys a "demographic advantage." It is the world's factory to the world market. Both exports and domestic demand make full use of the economies of scale provided by 1.3 billion people. If Taiwan throws its doors open, it will become a “shallow dish economy” due to its small population.
Compare the two systems. On the Mainland authoritarian politics dominates economics. The economy in turn bolsters authoritarian politics. This is the “economic coopetition controlling political opposition" approach that Xi Jinping adopted at Yanqi during ECFA. It reflects the domestic and foreign benefits of political and economic synergy. By contrast, Taiwan’s economic growth remains hobbled by democratic politics. The sluggish economy in turn undermines democracy. For example, the Sunflower Student Movement describes itself as a democratic movement. But its proposed political program opposes market freedom by obstructing the STA, MTA, and FEPZs. Is this either reasonable or practical?
The Mainland’s one-party dictatorship can be criticized from a civilizational perspective. But the “China collapse theory" is seldom heard these days. The entire world is wondering how to respond to the Mainland’s "autocratic advantage, space advantage, and demographic advantage.” The Mainland’s performance record has been exemplary. By contrast, as mentioned earlier, Taiwan's democracy and freedom enjoy an advantage in terms of human rights. Democracy is also the most important political lever by which Taiwan can counter the Mainland. But "democratic dysfunction" threatens the survival of democracy and the nation’s strategic advantage. Democracy incites social unrest, but cannot solve the nation’s problems.
Taiwan, of course, should adhere to its democratic institutions in cross-Strait relations. But Taiwan's democracy can no longer resort to inciting social divisions as means of seizing power during elections. It must offer ways to save the nation. The Mainland uses its dictatorship to create a record of achievements. Taiwan must be able to use its democracy to create a record of achievements. "Democratic dysfunction" will make reversing long term deterioration in the cross-Strait situation difficult.
For the welfare of the people, Taiwan cannot afford to “live by democracy, only to die by democracy.” We must prove that Taiwan's democracy is more than just the Sunflower Student Movement forcibly occupying the legislature, legislators forcibly occupying the podium, backroom deals passed off as "political consultations," and the nine in one Kuomintang election defeat. Taiwan’s democracy must unite people, and save the nation. Otherwise, Taiwan's one time advantage will be gradually eroded by internal conflict.
民主失能 台灣的體制優勢正在流失
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.16 02:13 am
北京高舉「依憲治國」，萬馬齊瘖；台灣正醞釀修憲，眾議紛紜。
一斑窺豹，兩岸政治體制的差異立現。就架構言，北京可謂「憲政」穩固而少「民主」，台灣則是有「民主」而「憲政」動盪；再就政績言，則北京可謂少「民主」而有「績效」，台灣則是有「民主」而無「績效」。於是，若從「政治體制競賽」的角度看兩岸情勢，台灣的體制優勢似在逐漸流失。
過去，台灣向有「民主自由」較「一黨專政」優越的光榮感與自信心。但如今值得憂慮的卻是：如果「中國崩潰論」已漸漸退出思考可及的時間範圍，「民主失能」的台灣要如何與中國大陸維持平衡的競合關係？
台灣的「民主自由」，相較於北京的「一黨專政」，在人權理念層次當然比較優越。而且，台灣的民主政治是節制兩岸關係的主要槓桿，非此無以抵拒北京的壓力。這些因素，皆曾是台灣在兩岸關係中的優勢。但是，這套民主體制因實踐上的「失能」，已逐漸成為耗弱台灣的因素，甚至使台灣陷於難以抗衡北京的困局。台灣若繼續陷此狀態，將失去兩岸競合的因應能力，前景堪虞。
先從政治面看。例如，北京的「依憲治國」，就是「堅持共產黨專政」，此種「憲政」在人權或民主理念上誠受批評，卻產生了如臂使指的治理績效。相對的，台灣的「憲政」連國家認同都呈現撕裂，且經歷七次修憲的憲法，如今又聞修憲之議。再者，台灣的憲政操作問題，遠較憲法條文的問題更嚴重；例如，立法院的「政黨協商」，假「民主」之名摧毀了「多數治理」的憲政原則，這不啻是有民主而無憲政。
再從經濟面看。例如，北京的一黨專政，要產業轉型就騰籠換鳥，要調節分配就以行政命令強制高薪者減薪、低薪者加薪，要參與ＦＴＡ也聽不到「弱勢產業」的聲音。相對的，台灣的民主體制，使核能政策站不住、石化工業起不來，產業政策莫衷一是，自由開放陷於自相矛盾，要加薪則只能「道德勸說」。於是，經濟政策的辯論往往淪為「罵政府」的比賽，卻始終無以建立目標、策略與路徑。
兩岸的體制對比，約有三項特徵：一、北京有「專制紅利」，台灣卻有「民主負荷」。二、北京有「空間紅利」，汶川地震只是區域事件，但一個九二一地震卻幾使台灣動搖國本；在台灣，一個文林苑事件演成全國風潮，但大陸上的釘子戶皆是地方事件。三、北京有「人口紅利」，自世界工廠到世界市場、自外銷到內需，皆可運用十三億人口的規模條件，大開大闔，台灣則因人口規模小而成淺碟經濟。
由於此種體制對比，北京是以專制政治主導經濟，再以經濟支撐專制政治。此由習近平在雁棲湖ＥＣＦＡ「以經濟競合操作政治對抗」的手法，即可概見其政經相輔相成的內外效益。相對而言，台灣則陷於民主政治攪亂經濟發展，經濟遲滯又回頭攪亂了民主政治的困境。例如，太陽花事件即使自譽為民主表現，但其提出的政經方案卻是封殺服貿、貨貿及自由經濟示範區，是否合理可行？
大陸「一黨專政」的體制，在文明理念上自可批評，但如今卻已罕聞「中國崩潰論」之說，而全世界皆在思考該如何因應在「專制紅利／空間紅利／人口紅利」上表現出高度績效的北京政權。相對而言，如前所述，台灣的民主自由在人權理念上當然比較優越，且民主政治亦是台灣賴以與大陸抗衡的最重要的政治槓桿；但是，「民主失能」已使民主與國家的生存戰略剝離，「民主」只能掀起社會風潮，卻不能解決國家的問題。
台灣當然仍應以民主體制來維持兩岸競合關係。但台灣的民主政治，不能再以撕裂為手段，不可只知選舉奪權，卻提不出救國方案；也就是說，面對以「專政建立政績」的北京，台灣必須能「以民主建立政績」，「失能的民主」將難以扭轉兩岸消長情勢的繼續惡化。
為人民福祉計，台灣不可自陷「成也民主／敗也民主」的悖論。我們必須證明：台灣的民主政治，除了太陽花占據立法院、立委霸占主席台、「政黨協商」，及使國民黨九合一大敗之外，我們還能團結國人，共策救國方案。否則，台灣原本具有的民主體制優勢，因內耗空轉，正在逐漸流失之中。
Monday, December 15, 2014
Time to Confront Economic Reality
Time to Confront Economic Reality
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 15, 2014
Executive Summary: Cross-strait economic relations involve both cooperation and competition. The Mainland and Taiwan both face problems of economic transformation and upgrading. Time waits for no man. The ruling and opposition parties must not delay. Something must be done to help society overcome difficulties. People need to understand that international trade is not something remote and far away, but has a direct bearing on our jobs and income.
Full Text Below:
ARATS chief Chen Deming is currently visiting Taiwan. He said that substantive negotiations on the PRC-ROK FTA were concluded last month, and that the agreement will take effect within two years. When it does, trade in goods between the two countries will be almost 90% tariff-free.The STA grants quasi-citizen treatment. Meanwhile, during its December 12th executive meeting, the State Council decided to establish three free trade zones in Guangdong, Tianjin, and Fujian. How should Taiwan respond to the impact of these major developments?
Chen Deming once served as Minister of Commerce. He was responsible for negotiating global bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. He is now dealing with Taiwan-related affairs. He revealed that South Korea, Mainland China, and Australia were aggressively negotiating FTAs at a rate that surprised even the Mainland. By contrast, the STA has remained stalled all year. The MTA may follow in its footsteps. He expressed concern over the future of Taiwan. He stressed that over the next two years, the Mainland will take part in regional economic integration with the United States, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and even Japan. The Mainland has decided to adopt an FTA web consistent with global standards. Taiwan must not miss out on this opportunity. He hoped that Taiwan would allow ECFA follow-up agreements to be completed as soon as possible and take effect before the PRC-ROK FTA, and avoid being marginalized by global integration. Everything he said was straight from the heart. The public should not assume that his words were mere hot air.
Taiwan and South Korean exports have a high degree of overlap. The Mainland is the largest export market for both. Seventy percent of their export products overlap. One side's products can easily be substituted with the other's. Taiwan and South Korea are clearly competitors in the Mainland market. Unfortunately, many in the Green Camp still think the PRC-ROK FTA has yet to take effect. Some items, such as flat panels and machine tools, have not been included in the tariff reduction program. Therefore many in the green camp assume that the government has exaggerated the impact of the PRC-ROK FTA on Taiwan. They say government agencies should not use the PRC-ROK FTA to intimidate the public on Taiwan.
This is self-deception. It is highly adverse to Taiwan's growth, elections, and politics. The nine in one elections are over. The counties and municipalities have already gone from blue to green. The 2016 legislative and presidential election is likely to lead to a change in the ruling party. The Green Camp really ought not disrupt cross-Strait economic and trade policies. The ruling and opposition parties should sit down and talk as soon as possible. They should seek countermeasures against the impact of the Mainland's economic liberalization and FTAs.
Shanghai established a free trade zone more than one year ago. It is a precedent that can be copied, and a practice that can be generalized. The Tianjin, Canton, and Fujian free trade zones will change the legal provisions based on local conditions as well as introduce new provisions. The free trade zones will lead to new patterns of competition. They will promote a new round of high-level liberalization that will help the Mainland grow.
Tianjin has adopted the Beijing Tianjin strategic initiative. The Tianjin Free Trade Zone includes a Binhai New Area. It has also compiled a check list of obstacles to free trade that it will eliminate. It will facilitate investment and financing, allowing financial leasing businesses to develop the Northeast Asian market. The Free Trade Zone in Guangdong is aimed primarily at Hong Kong, Zhuhai, and Macao. It will introduce Hong Kong's advanced financial technology in order to promote high finance. The Free Trade Zone will become a pool for offshore renminbi and accelerate RMB internationalization. Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Pingtan have announced a tripartite free trade zone. This will help the Haixi Economic Zone enjoy rapid growth. It may also strengthen cross-Strait economic and trade relations.
By contrast, now look at Taiwan. Our pwm FEPZ has been crippled by Green Camp obstructionism. This has hampered industrial upgrading and restructuring. Free trade zones are beneficial to the two sides' industrial upgrading. They are a mutually beneficial win-win proposition. But competition will have a magnetic effect. Ever since the establishment of a free trade zone in Shanghai, Taiwan companies have shown great interest. Currently 153 Taiwan companies have signed on. The magnetic effect of a future Fujian free trade zone may be even greater.
The STA and MTA must go through. Otherwise Taiwan's major trading partners will refuse to sign free trade agreements with us. Taiwan will then pay a heavy price in foreign trade. Faced with tariffs and trade barriers, our export industry has only two means of survival. Reduce costs, reduce profits to win contracts, or rely on the government to increase price competitiveness through currency devaluation. The former would clearly hurt exporters. business owners, and employees, all of whom will be knocked for a loop. If this proves untenable, companies will eventually have to close down. The latter approach is somewhat smarter. It shifts the problem from individual companies to the government. Forcing the entire nation to bear the burden. Depreciating the NTD however worsens the terms of trade, increases the cost of imports, and reduces the purchasing power of the NTD. It is highly detrimental to economic growth and social stability. When the above two roads prove impassable, as they have in the past, companies will vote with their feet. They will migrate abroad or to the Mainland. Those unable to relocate, i.e., workers, will be denied job opportunities. The impact on Taiwan's growth will be extremely negative.
Cross-strait economic relations involve both cooperation and competition. The Mainland and Taiwan both face problems of economic transformation and upgrading. Time waits for no man. The ruling and opposition parties must not delay. Something must be done to help society overcome difficulties. People need to understand that international trade is not something remote and far away, but has a direct bearing on our jobs and income.
社論－格局已定，該誠實面對經濟困局了
2014年12月15日 04:10
本報訊
大陸海協會長陳德銘一行正在台灣訪問，他曾談到中韓自由貿易協定（FTA）上月完成實質談判，將在兩年內啟動，屆時兩國貨貿近9成零關稅，服貿則給予準國民待遇。與此同時，12月12日大陸國務院常務會議決定，將在廣東、天津、福建特定區域再設3個自由貿易區。台灣在這些大趨勢衝擊下，應該如何自處？
陳德銘擔任過商務部長，曾經負責大陸的全球雙邊與多邊自貿協定談判，現在以會長身分處理涉台事務。他也透露韓、澳兩國與大陸洽談FTA的積極程度，令大陸驚訝，對比兩岸服貿協議卡關1年、貨貿可能步上後塵，他對台灣未來十分憂心。他也強調，大陸在未來2年內，將與美國、韓國、澳洲、新加坡甚至日本，進行區域經濟整合。大陸已決定走向全球高標準的自貿區網路，台灣不應錯過這個機會。他希望台灣能趕在中韓FTA生效前，讓ECFA後續協議盡速完成，以免在全球整合過程中被邊緣化。他所說的全是肺腑之言，社會不應把他的諍言當成馬耳東風。
台灣與南韓出口高度競爭，大陸是雙方共同的最大出口市場，7成以上出口產品相同，替代性很高；台韓在大陸市場上的競爭不言而喻。很不幸的是，台灣綠營及不少人認為中韓FTA還沒有正式生效；且其中有一些重要的產品項目，例如面板和工具機等等，不一定會放在降稅項目中，因此中韓FTA對台灣的影響，是被政府誇大；政府部門不應該用中韓FTA來恐嚇台灣人民。
這樣的論調是掩耳盜鈴的說法，實在不利台灣的發展，選舉前或有其政治效應，九合一選舉已經結束，縣市執政版圖藍天已經變綠地，2016的立委與總統大選極可能也會變天。綠營實在不應該，也不需要再阻擾兩岸經貿政策了。朝野應該盡速坐下來會談，針對FTA與大陸經濟自由化兩大趨勢謀求對策。
上海自由貿易試驗區設立1年多來，已形成了一批可複製、可推廣的經驗作法。津粵閩的新自貿區會結合地方特點，進行相關法律規定調整，充實新的試點內容；但自貿區將開啟競爭模式下的新格局，推動實施新一輪高水準對外開放，來幫助大陸進步。
天津承接京津冀戰略，天津自貿園區除了為濱海新區的發展定位，也借此推廣負面清單、投融資便利化，及金融租賃業務來開拓東北亞市場。廣東的自貿園區主要對準港珠澳，引進香港先進金融技術，發展高端金融，將該自貿園區變成境外人民幣的回流池，加速人民幣國際化戰略。福建自貿區由福州、廈門、平潭三地聯合申報，來幫助海西經濟區迅速發展，也希望藉此加強兩岸經貿關係。
反觀台灣，我們的自由經濟示範區，因為綠營的杯葛，目前推動嚴重受阻，不利我國產業升級轉型。兩岸自貿區雖有利於兩岸攜手促進產業升級，實現互利共贏。但競爭部分也會產生磁吸的效果。值得注意的是從上海自貿區設立以來，台灣企業展示濃厚興趣，目前新設的台灣企業就已達到了153家。未來福建自貿區的磁吸效應可能更大。
兩岸服貿、貨貿若無法突破，台灣與主要貿易夥伴簽訂自由貿易協定注定寸步難行，我們可以預知，台灣在對外貿易上將付出沉重的代價。面對關稅及貿易障礙，我國出口業者為生存計只有兩條路可以走，不是減低成本、減低利潤搶奪訂單，就是靠政府貨幣貶值增加價格競爭力。對於前者，明顯的會對出口企業本身的傷害很大，企業主、員工都將打落牙齒和血吞，若無法堅持下去，最後還是關門大吉。後者稍微聰明一點，是把自己的問題，轉給國家，由社會一起承擔。但新台幣貶值，貿易條件惡化，則進口成本增加，新台幣購買力減低，對整體國家的發展，社會的穩定都相當不利。當以上兩條路都走不通，長久以往，企業將也將在地理上重新布局或用腳投票，遷移到國外或大陸，不能遷移的，就是勞工，受減少就業機會之苦，對台灣的發展相當不利。
兩岸經濟存在著既合作又競爭的關係。大陸與台灣都面臨著經濟轉型升級的問題。時間不會等我們，朝野不能以拖待變，必須有所作為，帶領社會突破困境。民眾更該理解，國際貿易問題並非遠在天邊，而是和你我的工作權及薪水有關的。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 15, 2014
Executive Summary: Cross-strait economic relations involve both cooperation and competition. The Mainland and Taiwan both face problems of economic transformation and upgrading. Time waits for no man. The ruling and opposition parties must not delay. Something must be done to help society overcome difficulties. People need to understand that international trade is not something remote and far away, but has a direct bearing on our jobs and income.
Full Text Below:
ARATS chief Chen Deming is currently visiting Taiwan. He said that substantive negotiations on the PRC-ROK FTA were concluded last month, and that the agreement will take effect within two years. When it does, trade in goods between the two countries will be almost 90% tariff-free.The STA grants quasi-citizen treatment. Meanwhile, during its December 12th executive meeting, the State Council decided to establish three free trade zones in Guangdong, Tianjin, and Fujian. How should Taiwan respond to the impact of these major developments?
Chen Deming once served as Minister of Commerce. He was responsible for negotiating global bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. He is now dealing with Taiwan-related affairs. He revealed that South Korea, Mainland China, and Australia were aggressively negotiating FTAs at a rate that surprised even the Mainland. By contrast, the STA has remained stalled all year. The MTA may follow in its footsteps. He expressed concern over the future of Taiwan. He stressed that over the next two years, the Mainland will take part in regional economic integration with the United States, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and even Japan. The Mainland has decided to adopt an FTA web consistent with global standards. Taiwan must not miss out on this opportunity. He hoped that Taiwan would allow ECFA follow-up agreements to be completed as soon as possible and take effect before the PRC-ROK FTA, and avoid being marginalized by global integration. Everything he said was straight from the heart. The public should not assume that his words were mere hot air.
Taiwan and South Korean exports have a high degree of overlap. The Mainland is the largest export market for both. Seventy percent of their export products overlap. One side's products can easily be substituted with the other's. Taiwan and South Korea are clearly competitors in the Mainland market. Unfortunately, many in the Green Camp still think the PRC-ROK FTA has yet to take effect. Some items, such as flat panels and machine tools, have not been included in the tariff reduction program. Therefore many in the green camp assume that the government has exaggerated the impact of the PRC-ROK FTA on Taiwan. They say government agencies should not use the PRC-ROK FTA to intimidate the public on Taiwan.
This is self-deception. It is highly adverse to Taiwan's growth, elections, and politics. The nine in one elections are over. The counties and municipalities have already gone from blue to green. The 2016 legislative and presidential election is likely to lead to a change in the ruling party. The Green Camp really ought not disrupt cross-Strait economic and trade policies. The ruling and opposition parties should sit down and talk as soon as possible. They should seek countermeasures against the impact of the Mainland's economic liberalization and FTAs.
Shanghai established a free trade zone more than one year ago. It is a precedent that can be copied, and a practice that can be generalized. The Tianjin, Canton, and Fujian free trade zones will change the legal provisions based on local conditions as well as introduce new provisions. The free trade zones will lead to new patterns of competition. They will promote a new round of high-level liberalization that will help the Mainland grow.
Tianjin has adopted the Beijing Tianjin strategic initiative. The Tianjin Free Trade Zone includes a Binhai New Area. It has also compiled a check list of obstacles to free trade that it will eliminate. It will facilitate investment and financing, allowing financial leasing businesses to develop the Northeast Asian market. The Free Trade Zone in Guangdong is aimed primarily at Hong Kong, Zhuhai, and Macao. It will introduce Hong Kong's advanced financial technology in order to promote high finance. The Free Trade Zone will become a pool for offshore renminbi and accelerate RMB internationalization. Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Pingtan have announced a tripartite free trade zone. This will help the Haixi Economic Zone enjoy rapid growth. It may also strengthen cross-Strait economic and trade relations.
By contrast, now look at Taiwan. Our pwm FEPZ has been crippled by Green Camp obstructionism. This has hampered industrial upgrading and restructuring. Free trade zones are beneficial to the two sides' industrial upgrading. They are a mutually beneficial win-win proposition. But competition will have a magnetic effect. Ever since the establishment of a free trade zone in Shanghai, Taiwan companies have shown great interest. Currently 153 Taiwan companies have signed on. The magnetic effect of a future Fujian free trade zone may be even greater.
The STA and MTA must go through. Otherwise Taiwan's major trading partners will refuse to sign free trade agreements with us. Taiwan will then pay a heavy price in foreign trade. Faced with tariffs and trade barriers, our export industry has only two means of survival. Reduce costs, reduce profits to win contracts, or rely on the government to increase price competitiveness through currency devaluation. The former would clearly hurt exporters. business owners, and employees, all of whom will be knocked for a loop. If this proves untenable, companies will eventually have to close down. The latter approach is somewhat smarter. It shifts the problem from individual companies to the government. Forcing the entire nation to bear the burden. Depreciating the NTD however worsens the terms of trade, increases the cost of imports, and reduces the purchasing power of the NTD. It is highly detrimental to economic growth and social stability. When the above two roads prove impassable, as they have in the past, companies will vote with their feet. They will migrate abroad or to the Mainland. Those unable to relocate, i.e., workers, will be denied job opportunities. The impact on Taiwan's growth will be extremely negative.
Cross-strait economic relations involve both cooperation and competition. The Mainland and Taiwan both face problems of economic transformation and upgrading. Time waits for no man. The ruling and opposition parties must not delay. Something must be done to help society overcome difficulties. People need to understand that international trade is not something remote and far away, but has a direct bearing on our jobs and income.
社論－格局已定，該誠實面對經濟困局了
2014年12月15日 04:10
本報訊
大陸海協會長陳德銘一行正在台灣訪問，他曾談到中韓自由貿易協定（FTA）上月完成實質談判，將在兩年內啟動，屆時兩國貨貿近9成零關稅，服貿則給予準國民待遇。與此同時，12月12日大陸國務院常務會議決定，將在廣東、天津、福建特定區域再設3個自由貿易區。台灣在這些大趨勢衝擊下，應該如何自處？
陳德銘擔任過商務部長，曾經負責大陸的全球雙邊與多邊自貿協定談判，現在以會長身分處理涉台事務。他也透露韓、澳兩國與大陸洽談FTA的積極程度，令大陸驚訝，對比兩岸服貿協議卡關1年、貨貿可能步上後塵，他對台灣未來十分憂心。他也強調，大陸在未來2年內，將與美國、韓國、澳洲、新加坡甚至日本，進行區域經濟整合。大陸已決定走向全球高標準的自貿區網路，台灣不應錯過這個機會。他希望台灣能趕在中韓FTA生效前，讓ECFA後續協議盡速完成，以免在全球整合過程中被邊緣化。他所說的全是肺腑之言，社會不應把他的諍言當成馬耳東風。
台灣與南韓出口高度競爭，大陸是雙方共同的最大出口市場，7成以上出口產品相同，替代性很高；台韓在大陸市場上的競爭不言而喻。很不幸的是，台灣綠營及不少人認為中韓FTA還沒有正式生效；且其中有一些重要的產品項目，例如面板和工具機等等，不一定會放在降稅項目中，因此中韓FTA對台灣的影響，是被政府誇大；政府部門不應該用中韓FTA來恐嚇台灣人民。
這樣的論調是掩耳盜鈴的說法，實在不利台灣的發展，選舉前或有其政治效應，九合一選舉已經結束，縣市執政版圖藍天已經變綠地，2016的立委與總統大選極可能也會變天。綠營實在不應該，也不需要再阻擾兩岸經貿政策了。朝野應該盡速坐下來會談，針對FTA與大陸經濟自由化兩大趨勢謀求對策。
上海自由貿易試驗區設立1年多來，已形成了一批可複製、可推廣的經驗作法。津粵閩的新自貿區會結合地方特點，進行相關法律規定調整，充實新的試點內容；但自貿區將開啟競爭模式下的新格局，推動實施新一輪高水準對外開放，來幫助大陸進步。
天津承接京津冀戰略，天津自貿園區除了為濱海新區的發展定位，也借此推廣負面清單、投融資便利化，及金融租賃業務來開拓東北亞市場。廣東的自貿園區主要對準港珠澳，引進香港先進金融技術，發展高端金融，將該自貿園區變成境外人民幣的回流池，加速人民幣國際化戰略。福建自貿區由福州、廈門、平潭三地聯合申報，來幫助海西經濟區迅速發展，也希望藉此加強兩岸經貿關係。
反觀台灣，我們的自由經濟示範區，因為綠營的杯葛，目前推動嚴重受阻，不利我國產業升級轉型。兩岸自貿區雖有利於兩岸攜手促進產業升級，實現互利共贏。但競爭部分也會產生磁吸的效果。值得注意的是從上海自貿區設立以來，台灣企業展示濃厚興趣，目前新設的台灣企業就已達到了153家。未來福建自貿區的磁吸效應可能更大。
兩岸服貿、貨貿若無法突破，台灣與主要貿易夥伴簽訂自由貿易協定注定寸步難行，我們可以預知，台灣在對外貿易上將付出沉重的代價。面對關稅及貿易障礙，我國出口業者為生存計只有兩條路可以走，不是減低成本、減低利潤搶奪訂單，就是靠政府貨幣貶值增加價格競爭力。對於前者，明顯的會對出口企業本身的傷害很大，企業主、員工都將打落牙齒和血吞，若無法堅持下去，最後還是關門大吉。後者稍微聰明一點，是把自己的問題，轉給國家，由社會一起承擔。但新台幣貶值，貿易條件惡化，則進口成本增加，新台幣購買力減低，對整體國家的發展，社會的穩定都相當不利。當以上兩條路都走不通，長久以往，企業將也將在地理上重新布局或用腳投票，遷移到國外或大陸，不能遷移的，就是勞工，受減少就業機會之苦，對台灣的發展相當不利。
兩岸經濟存在著既合作又競爭的關係。大陸與台灣都面臨著經濟轉型升級的問題。時間不會等我們，朝野不能以拖待變，必須有所作為，帶領社會突破困境。民眾更該理解，國際貿易問題並非遠在天邊，而是和你我的工作權及薪水有關的。
Thursday, December 11, 2014
Open Not the Pandora's Box of Political Calculation
Open Not the Pandora's Box of Political Calculation
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 12, 2014
Executive Summary: The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option. Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?
Full Text Below:
The nine in one elections ended with a KMT rout. Now "constitutional reform" has become the hot political topic. Advocates of constitutional reform have focused on the cabinet system, the legislative elections, youth suffrage, and cross-strait negotiation oversight. The most critical issue is the distribution of power and the operation of the central government in a cabinet system.
Advocates of the cabinet system can be divided into two categories. The first category is "cabinet system hawks." They have consistently advocated the cabinet system. They feel the cabinet system is more responsive to and reflective of public opinion. They feel that the distribution of power helps avoid zero-sum games. They feel it more closely aligns the executive and legislative powers. They feel it is more applicable to Taiwan society, with its blue vs. green divisions, so-called “ethnic group” frictions, and long-standing disagreements over reunification vs independence. They feel it would promote reconciliation and symbiosis among the political parties and better avoid polarization than the presidential system. These people are concept-based supporters of the cabinet system.
The second category is "cabinet system vultures." Currently, most cabinet system advocates belong in this category. They have no firm beliefs regarding the relative merits of the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. What they advocated yesterday may not be what they advocate today. Their positions change with the political winds. Today, the KMT has gone down in defeat. Ma Ying-jeou has become the target of public criticism. Cabinet system vultures are demanding that Ma step down to take responsibility. They are also pushing for a constitutional amendment to implement a cabinet system. They want to reduct the president to a figure head. This has became the most extreme expression of "anti-Ma" sentiment. Those who fall into this category change with the wind. They perceive personal advantages in adopting a cabinet system. They are realpolitik-based supporters of the cabinet system.
If we look back at the history of constitutional reform on Taiwan, we see that most advocates of constitutional reform have been opportunists for whom personal and partisan interests trump national stability. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian amended the constitution seven times. Their motives were almost always personal or partisan advantage for those in power, usually to consolidate power or squash dissent. Many people have criticized the existing constitutional system, in which the president wields power but bears no responsibility. But this system was the crowning achievement of Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms.
The ROC Constitution originally stipulated that "Before the president may issue an executive order, it must be countersigned by the Executive Yuan or the Premier and the heads of the relevant ministries." Also, “Presidential nominees for Premier must be approved by the Legislative Yuan.” These were clearly cabinet system oriented provisions. These provisions date back many years, to when Chang Chun-mai and others were promoting Chinese democracy in an attempt to limit Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorial powers.
Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms changed the central government system into something neither fish nor fowl. It destroyed the cabinet system, but failed to replicate either an American-style presidential system or the French-style dual leadership system. The President could now appoint the Premier without Legislative Yuan consent. The President was no longer subject to legislative oversight. The Premier was reduced to the president’s chief of staff. Checks and balances, the most important feature of democracy, virtually disappeared. This is the root cause of the chaos in Taiwan's current system.
During the latter days of Chen Shui-bian's reign, corruption scandals erupted one after another. Cross-Strait crises followed wave after wave. Public support for the DPP plummeted. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou stood a good chance of winning the presidential election. Advocacy of the cabinet system resurfaced. Those who once advocated a presidential system because it would "strengthen the national will" and "confront the Chinese mainland," suddenly became overnight converts to the cabinet system. Why? Because "Taiwan's democracy has already been consolidated," and "A cabinet system would prevent the president from being bought out by the CCP." Politicians who relentlessly incited blue vs. green confrontation and “ethnic group” frictions, suddenly expressed vigorous support for the cabinet system, because it "promoted ethnic reconciliation." This wave of cabinet system initiatives died stillborn. But the political calculations behind them were all too clear.
The history of constitutional reform is a painful one. The memories are still fresh. Should we amend the constitution? If so, how? Constitutional reform must no longer be motivated by personal or partisan political calculations. They must no longer be the consequence of myopic political considerations. Opposition to Ma is hardly a valid reason to amend the constitution or adopt a cabinet system. Nor is the desire to attain high office or effect a change in the ruling party a valid reason to advocate a presidential system. Central government institutions and constitutional issues must take into consideration three factors. One. Long-term national stability. Two. The pros and cons of the current system. Three. Taiwan's political character and political culture.
If after careful consideration, a cabinet system turns out to be difficult to implement, it should cease being the goal of current political reform. The cabinet system is essentially "parliamentary democracy." The legislature is the heart of the nation’s political institutions. But as it happens the legislature is the branch of government most in need of reform. It is the object of most public criticism and the cause of most people’s suffering. After the 1992 legislative election, a number of capable legislators remained. But local faction leaders and representatives of monied interests came to dominate the legislature. The implementation of the single-member district system, localized and factionalized lawmakers, turning them into family enterprises. These “low information” legislators emphasized local business and ignored national affairs. They lack the qualifications necessary to become cabinet members and form ruling party cabinets. Given Taiwan's political character and political culture, a cabinet system would be truly difficult to implement at this time.
Consider the matter of national stability. Western nations’ experience with the cabinet system, reveal problems with ruling party changes, political instability, and the proliferation of splinter parties. Blue vs. green confrontation has left Taiwan battered. It cannot afford to be subjected to such turmoil again.
The president “wields power but bears no responsibility.” The premier "bears responsibilities but wields no power." Presidential power is too concentrated. The cabinet system is not necessarily the most effective or direct solution. The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option.
Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?
社論－不要打開政治算計的潘朵拉之盒
2014年12月12日 04:10
本報訊
九合一選舉結束，國民黨慘敗，「修憲」一時之間又成了政壇話題。這次的修憲聲浪，針對的焦點有內閣制、立委選制、青年參政權和兩岸談判的監督等等，其中，要以涉及中央層級權力分配與運作的內閣制問題最為關鍵。
談到主張內閣制修憲的陣營，一般可以粗分為兩大類，一是「內閣制鷹派」，他們長期以來不改其志，始終認定內閣制具有迅速而準確反映民意，避免政治權力分配的零合遊戲，行政與立法密切配合等優點，且適用於台灣這種藍綠、族群、統獨長期對立分裂的社會，能夠促進政治黨派的和解共生，避免兩極化，與總統制相比更為優越。這群人也可稱之為內閣制的「理念型支持者」。
另一種可稱之為「內閣制禿鷹派」，多數在此時主張內閣制修憲的政客屬於此陣營，他們對於總統制、內閣制沒有固定的信念，往往昨是今非，不斷隨政治局勢演變而變更立場。如今，國民黨敗選，馬英九成為眾矢之的，除要求他下台負責外，推動「內閣制修憲」，讓總統成為虛位元首，更成了「反馬」的釜底抽薪之計。這群順應時勢變化，看有利可圖而主張採行內閣制的人士，也可以說是內閣制的「現實型支持者」。
回首台灣的修憲史，多數推動修憲的人士都是屬於個人與黨派利害至上，忽視國家長治久安的「現實派」。從李登輝到陳水扁，台灣進行了7次修憲，幾乎多是從掌權者的一己之私、一黨之利出發而修憲，多是為了鞏固權力、打壓異己而修憲。許多人批評現行憲政體制下，總統有權無責，但是這樣的制度設計，其實正是李登輝修憲的「成果」。
原本《中華民國憲法》規定「總統依法公布法律，發布命令，須經行政院院長之副署，或行政院院長及有關部會首長之副署」，同時「行政院院長由總統提名，經立法院同意任命之」，這些條文明顯具有內閣制的精神，這是當年張君勱等人制憲時，為了促進中國民主、限縮蔣介石獨裁的巧思。
李登輝主導的修憲，卻將中央政府體制改得不倫不類，失去內閣制精神，卻又不是美國式總統制，更和法國雙首長制有很大差別，總統任命行政院長無須立法院同意，總統又不直接受到國會監督，行政院長成了總統幕僚長，民主政治中最重要的制衡原則幾乎消失殆盡，這是今日台灣政治體制錯亂、政局動盪的根源。
陳水扁執政後期，貪腐問題接連爆發，兩岸關係風波不斷，民意支持大幅下滑，眼看著國民黨的馬英九大有機會在總統大選中獲勝，這時，內閣制之議又起。原本主張總統制，因為可以「凝聚國民意志」、「對抗中國大陸」的人士，現在搖身一變成了內閣制的倡議者，理由是「台灣民主已經鞏固」，「內閣制可以避免總統被中共收買」，而原本不斷挑動藍綠、族群對抗的政客，轉過頭來又大力擁護內閣制，因為可以「促進族群和解」。這波有關內閣制的倡議雖然胎死腹中，但卻也清楚看出其背後的政治盤算。
過去幾段修憲痛史，殷鑑不遠，修憲與否，如何修，實在不能再從個人與黨派的政治算計出發，不能再從眼前的政治需要出發，「反馬」固然不宜也不應成為內閣制修憲的原因與動力，謀取大位、政黨輪替也不是支持總統制的主要理由。思考中央政府體制與修憲問題，一要從國家的長治久安著眼，二要從當前體制的利弊得失檢討，三要從台灣的政治特性、政治文化考量。
如果通盤衡酌，「內閣制」實在難成為、也不應為當前台灣政治改革的目標。內閣制可說是「議會民主制」，是以國會為國家政治中心的體制，然而，恰恰好立法院卻是最需要改革、也最遭受民眾詬病的對象。1992年國會全面改選後，雖然一度有不少專業立委進入國會問政，但地方派系、金權代表越來越成為國會的主流，隨著小選區制的實施，立法委員地方化、派系化、家族化的問題日益嚴重，偏重地方經營，忽視國家大政，問政品質低落，遑論有能力入閣、組閣執政。從台灣政治文化考量，內閣制實在有窒礙難行之處。
若從國家長治久安著眼，西方國家內閣制的經驗，往往難以擺脫政府更迭、政局不穩，甚至小黨林立的弊害，對已飽受藍綠對立摧殘的台灣政治來說，實在難以再承受這樣的動盪不安。
至於針對總統「有權無責」、行政院長「有責無權」，甚至總統權力過於集中等體制問題，「內閣制」也未必是最有效、最直接的解決方案。最便捷的路徑，就是「行憲」，恢復《中華民國憲法》本文中閣揆副署權、立院行使閣揆同意權等條文，可能還是成本最低、風險最小的可行方案。
修憲，曾被認為是「政治改革」的手段，但實踐驗證的結果，修憲卻可能成為「潘朵拉的盒子」，我們豈能不慎？又豈能貿然開啟？
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 12, 2014
Executive Summary: The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option. Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?
Full Text Below:
The nine in one elections ended with a KMT rout. Now "constitutional reform" has become the hot political topic. Advocates of constitutional reform have focused on the cabinet system, the legislative elections, youth suffrage, and cross-strait negotiation oversight. The most critical issue is the distribution of power and the operation of the central government in a cabinet system.
Advocates of the cabinet system can be divided into two categories. The first category is "cabinet system hawks." They have consistently advocated the cabinet system. They feel the cabinet system is more responsive to and reflective of public opinion. They feel that the distribution of power helps avoid zero-sum games. They feel it more closely aligns the executive and legislative powers. They feel it is more applicable to Taiwan society, with its blue vs. green divisions, so-called “ethnic group” frictions, and long-standing disagreements over reunification vs independence. They feel it would promote reconciliation and symbiosis among the political parties and better avoid polarization than the presidential system. These people are concept-based supporters of the cabinet system.
The second category is "cabinet system vultures." Currently, most cabinet system advocates belong in this category. They have no firm beliefs regarding the relative merits of the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. What they advocated yesterday may not be what they advocate today. Their positions change with the political winds. Today, the KMT has gone down in defeat. Ma Ying-jeou has become the target of public criticism. Cabinet system vultures are demanding that Ma step down to take responsibility. They are also pushing for a constitutional amendment to implement a cabinet system. They want to reduct the president to a figure head. This has became the most extreme expression of "anti-Ma" sentiment. Those who fall into this category change with the wind. They perceive personal advantages in adopting a cabinet system. They are realpolitik-based supporters of the cabinet system.
If we look back at the history of constitutional reform on Taiwan, we see that most advocates of constitutional reform have been opportunists for whom personal and partisan interests trump national stability. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian amended the constitution seven times. Their motives were almost always personal or partisan advantage for those in power, usually to consolidate power or squash dissent. Many people have criticized the existing constitutional system, in which the president wields power but bears no responsibility. But this system was the crowning achievement of Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms.
The ROC Constitution originally stipulated that "Before the president may issue an executive order, it must be countersigned by the Executive Yuan or the Premier and the heads of the relevant ministries." Also, “Presidential nominees for Premier must be approved by the Legislative Yuan.” These were clearly cabinet system oriented provisions. These provisions date back many years, to when Chang Chun-mai and others were promoting Chinese democracy in an attempt to limit Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorial powers.
Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms changed the central government system into something neither fish nor fowl. It destroyed the cabinet system, but failed to replicate either an American-style presidential system or the French-style dual leadership system. The President could now appoint the Premier without Legislative Yuan consent. The President was no longer subject to legislative oversight. The Premier was reduced to the president’s chief of staff. Checks and balances, the most important feature of democracy, virtually disappeared. This is the root cause of the chaos in Taiwan's current system.
During the latter days of Chen Shui-bian's reign, corruption scandals erupted one after another. Cross-Strait crises followed wave after wave. Public support for the DPP plummeted. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou stood a good chance of winning the presidential election. Advocacy of the cabinet system resurfaced. Those who once advocated a presidential system because it would "strengthen the national will" and "confront the Chinese mainland," suddenly became overnight converts to the cabinet system. Why? Because "Taiwan's democracy has already been consolidated," and "A cabinet system would prevent the president from being bought out by the CCP." Politicians who relentlessly incited blue vs. green confrontation and “ethnic group” frictions, suddenly expressed vigorous support for the cabinet system, because it "promoted ethnic reconciliation." This wave of cabinet system initiatives died stillborn. But the political calculations behind them were all too clear.
The history of constitutional reform is a painful one. The memories are still fresh. Should we amend the constitution? If so, how? Constitutional reform must no longer be motivated by personal or partisan political calculations. They must no longer be the consequence of myopic political considerations. Opposition to Ma is hardly a valid reason to amend the constitution or adopt a cabinet system. Nor is the desire to attain high office or effect a change in the ruling party a valid reason to advocate a presidential system. Central government institutions and constitutional issues must take into consideration three factors. One. Long-term national stability. Two. The pros and cons of the current system. Three. Taiwan's political character and political culture.
If after careful consideration, a cabinet system turns out to be difficult to implement, it should cease being the goal of current political reform. The cabinet system is essentially "parliamentary democracy." The legislature is the heart of the nation’s political institutions. But as it happens the legislature is the branch of government most in need of reform. It is the object of most public criticism and the cause of most people’s suffering. After the 1992 legislative election, a number of capable legislators remained. But local faction leaders and representatives of monied interests came to dominate the legislature. The implementation of the single-member district system, localized and factionalized lawmakers, turning them into family enterprises. These “low information” legislators emphasized local business and ignored national affairs. They lack the qualifications necessary to become cabinet members and form ruling party cabinets. Given Taiwan's political character and political culture, a cabinet system would be truly difficult to implement at this time.
Consider the matter of national stability. Western nations’ experience with the cabinet system, reveal problems with ruling party changes, political instability, and the proliferation of splinter parties. Blue vs. green confrontation has left Taiwan battered. It cannot afford to be subjected to such turmoil again.
The president “wields power but bears no responsibility.” The premier "bears responsibilities but wields no power." Presidential power is too concentrated. The cabinet system is not necessarily the most effective or direct solution. The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option.
Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?
社論－不要打開政治算計的潘朵拉之盒
2014年12月12日 04:10
本報訊
九合一選舉結束，國民黨慘敗，「修憲」一時之間又成了政壇話題。這次的修憲聲浪，針對的焦點有內閣制、立委選制、青年參政權和兩岸談判的監督等等，其中，要以涉及中央層級權力分配與運作的內閣制問題最為關鍵。
談到主張內閣制修憲的陣營，一般可以粗分為兩大類，一是「內閣制鷹派」，他們長期以來不改其志，始終認定內閣制具有迅速而準確反映民意，避免政治權力分配的零合遊戲，行政與立法密切配合等優點，且適用於台灣這種藍綠、族群、統獨長期對立分裂的社會，能夠促進政治黨派的和解共生，避免兩極化，與總統制相比更為優越。這群人也可稱之為內閣制的「理念型支持者」。
另一種可稱之為「內閣制禿鷹派」，多數在此時主張內閣制修憲的政客屬於此陣營，他們對於總統制、內閣制沒有固定的信念，往往昨是今非，不斷隨政治局勢演變而變更立場。如今，國民黨敗選，馬英九成為眾矢之的，除要求他下台負責外，推動「內閣制修憲」，讓總統成為虛位元首，更成了「反馬」的釜底抽薪之計。這群順應時勢變化，看有利可圖而主張採行內閣制的人士，也可以說是內閣制的「現實型支持者」。
回首台灣的修憲史，多數推動修憲的人士都是屬於個人與黨派利害至上，忽視國家長治久安的「現實派」。從李登輝到陳水扁，台灣進行了7次修憲，幾乎多是從掌權者的一己之私、一黨之利出發而修憲，多是為了鞏固權力、打壓異己而修憲。許多人批評現行憲政體制下，總統有權無責，但是這樣的制度設計，其實正是李登輝修憲的「成果」。
原本《中華民國憲法》規定「總統依法公布法律，發布命令，須經行政院院長之副署，或行政院院長及有關部會首長之副署」，同時「行政院院長由總統提名，經立法院同意任命之」，這些條文明顯具有內閣制的精神，這是當年張君勱等人制憲時，為了促進中國民主、限縮蔣介石獨裁的巧思。
李登輝主導的修憲，卻將中央政府體制改得不倫不類，失去內閣制精神，卻又不是美國式總統制，更和法國雙首長制有很大差別，總統任命行政院長無須立法院同意，總統又不直接受到國會監督，行政院長成了總統幕僚長，民主政治中最重要的制衡原則幾乎消失殆盡，這是今日台灣政治體制錯亂、政局動盪的根源。
陳水扁執政後期，貪腐問題接連爆發，兩岸關係風波不斷，民意支持大幅下滑，眼看著國民黨的馬英九大有機會在總統大選中獲勝，這時，內閣制之議又起。原本主張總統制，因為可以「凝聚國民意志」、「對抗中國大陸」的人士，現在搖身一變成了內閣制的倡議者，理由是「台灣民主已經鞏固」，「內閣制可以避免總統被中共收買」，而原本不斷挑動藍綠、族群對抗的政客，轉過頭來又大力擁護內閣制，因為可以「促進族群和解」。這波有關內閣制的倡議雖然胎死腹中，但卻也清楚看出其背後的政治盤算。
過去幾段修憲痛史，殷鑑不遠，修憲與否，如何修，實在不能再從個人與黨派的政治算計出發，不能再從眼前的政治需要出發，「反馬」固然不宜也不應成為內閣制修憲的原因與動力，謀取大位、政黨輪替也不是支持總統制的主要理由。思考中央政府體制與修憲問題，一要從國家的長治久安著眼，二要從當前體制的利弊得失檢討，三要從台灣的政治特性、政治文化考量。
如果通盤衡酌，「內閣制」實在難成為、也不應為當前台灣政治改革的目標。內閣制可說是「議會民主制」，是以國會為國家政治中心的體制，然而，恰恰好立法院卻是最需要改革、也最遭受民眾詬病的對象。1992年國會全面改選後，雖然一度有不少專業立委進入國會問政，但地方派系、金權代表越來越成為國會的主流，隨著小選區制的實施，立法委員地方化、派系化、家族化的問題日益嚴重，偏重地方經營，忽視國家大政，問政品質低落，遑論有能力入閣、組閣執政。從台灣政治文化考量，內閣制實在有窒礙難行之處。
若從國家長治久安著眼，西方國家內閣制的經驗，往往難以擺脫政府更迭、政局不穩，甚至小黨林立的弊害，對已飽受藍綠對立摧殘的台灣政治來說，實在難以再承受這樣的動盪不安。
至於針對總統「有權無責」、行政院長「有責無權」，甚至總統權力過於集中等體制問題，「內閣制」也未必是最有效、最直接的解決方案。最便捷的路徑，就是「行憲」，恢復《中華民國憲法》本文中閣揆副署權、立院行使閣揆同意權等條文，可能還是成本最低、風險最小的可行方案。
修憲，曾被認為是「政治改革」的手段，但實踐驗證的結果，修憲卻可能成為「潘朵拉的盒子」，我們豈能不慎？又豈能貿然開啟？
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
Punish Ting Hsin, but Uphold the Rule of Law
Punish Ting Hsin, but Uphold the Rule of Law
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 11, 2014
Executive Summary: The Ting Hsin Group was unscrupulous. The public has a right to punish it. But public opinion is one thing. That does not mean the government can engage in gross exaggeration, pander to populist sentiment, ignore the law, and use the opportunity to expand its power and abuse the innocent. The Taipei 101 Building ownership issue is a relatively minor matter. The government becoming impatient and acting rashly in order to punish Ting Hsing is a far more serious matter. If this undermines Taiwan’s reputation for rule of law in the eyes of domestic and foreign investors, the cost will truly overshadow any perceived benefits.
Full Text Below:
The Ting Hsin Group (Wei Chuan) revealed that it plans to sell its 37% stake in the Taipei 101 Building to the Malaysian-based IOI Group. This raised alarm bells for three government head, including Finance Minister Chang Sheng-ho, FSC Chairman Tseng Ming-chung, and Central Bank president Perng Huai-nan. Together they stepped forward to oppose it. Taipei 101 is a Taiwan landmark, they declared. Its shares must not be sold to foreign investors.
The Ting Hsin Group rancid oil scandal provoked national outrage. Enormous social pressures led to operating difficulties. The subsequent financial pressures forced the Ting Hsin Group to sell off its 101 shares. The building commands a high price because real estate prices have skyrocketed in recent years. The sale of its shares is sure to be profitable. Such is the nature of the market economy. But the Ting Hsin Group profiting from the sale has made the public angry. The result has been political pressure on the new cabinet. That the three officials would make such a statement is understandable.
The Ting Hsin Group has provoked public anger. But is the government acting in accordance with the law? That is another matter altogether. If 101 shares are traded on the market, there will be buyers and sellers. Any trade will reflect market prices. The Republic of China, after all, is a nation ruled by law, which respects the fundamental laws of the marketplace. If the government wants the Ting Hsin Group to bear legal or social responsibility, it can prosecute its executives. But it cannot arbitrarily intervene in the transaction merely because it wants to punish the Ting Hsin Group or is angry at the buyer. The government cannot force the Ting Hsin Group to sell off its 101 shares, and also dictate who may purchase them. Otherwise what will it be, other than a dictatorship?
IOI has yet to submit an application to the government as a foreign investor. Yet government officials have already declared that foreign investments are unwelcome and will not be approved. They were clearly pandering to populist sentiment. The Ting Hsin Group’s rancid oil scandal provoked public wrath. But the government was actually the first party to act irresponsibly. It failed to detect the problem before the fact. It provided no solution to the problem after the fact. Its prosecution of the case was inept. It was impotent in the face of public anger. It has no right to posture as public savior, when in fact it was one of the guilty parties. It has no right to use the opportunity to become the de facto owner of the Taipei 101 Building. It has no right to use the opportunity to increase government control of the Taipei 101 Building. Foreign investors have yet to submit applications. Yet the government has already intervened and declared that it will not allow any such investments? What was their legal basis for not allowing such investments? If the government acts without any legal basis, is not merely rash. That is an abuse of public authority in the market place.
Peng Huai-nan, the president of the Central Bank has long been respected by the public. Yet he meddled in the case. He declared that Taipei 101 is a Taiwan landmark, therefore “it is best owned by our own citizens." This arrogant display of central bank exchange control authority was shocking. President Peng said that in the event no laws applied, other means to prevent foreign ownership should be sought. He clearly realized that he lacked any legal grounds, or at least was not aware of any legal grounds. Yet he was determined to act regardless. His behavior calls for public condemnation.
Finance Minister Chang Sheng-ho knew the ministry had no authority to decide who sold what shares to whom. Yet he argued that since IOI "intended" to contact other shareholders to obtain the right to operate the building, it was not purely a financial investment, and expressed his personal opposition to the Investment Commission. He clearly lacked any understanding of the rule of law. Government-owned shares may compete with the IOI franchise in the market place in many ways. But if the government abuses its public authority to prevent IOI shares from participating, then a player has become the referee.
The newly installed Minister of Economic Affairs argued that foreigners must invest in accordance with the provisions of the law. The law prohibits foreign investments that “have adverse affects on national security, public order, good morals, or national health." His comment was particularly unbelievable. How can the Taipei 101 Building possibly “have adverse affects on national security, public order, good morals, or national health?" How can foreign ownership of a Taiwan Landmark be contrary to public order? What manner of legal interpretation is this? The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for auditing foreign investments in this country. If it adopts this kind of closed door, nationalist attitude toward law enforcement, how many foreigners will be willing to invest in Taiwan? How many foreigners will be willing to humiliated by a government that show so little respect for the rule of law?
The government has long adopted this attitude toward enterprises involving public shares and government participation. How many local Taiwan companies will be willing to cooperate with the government in the future? The ruling administration endlessly trumpets its ambition to boost the economy, to internationalize, and to liberalize. Yet three officials responsible for foreign investments have demonstrated their utter disregard for the law, engaged in hyperbole, and acted upon whim. How can such a ruling administration attract foreign investments to Taiwan? How can we still talk about international competitiveness?
The Ting Hsin Group was unscrupulous. The public has a right to punish it. But public opinion is one thing. That does not mean the government can engage in gross exaggeration, pander to populist sentiment, ignore the law, and use the opportunity to expand its power and abuse the innocent. The Taipei 101 Building ownership issue is a relatively minor matter. The government becoming impatient and acting rashly in order to punish Ting Hsing is a far more serious matter. If this undermines Taiwan’s reputation for rule of law in the eyes of domestic and foreign investors, the cost will truly overshadow any perceived benefits.
社論－頂新可誅 法治不可壞
2014年12月11日 04:10
本報訊
頂新集團計畫將台北101大樓逾37%持股售與馬來西亞IOI集團，驚動了政府3位首長，包括財政部長張盛和，金管會主委曾銘宗，還有央行總裁彭淮南，一齊站出來表示反對。理由是台北101大樓是台灣的地標，其股權不宜賣給外資。
頂新集團黑心食油案引起全民公憤，鉅大的社會壓力，造成集團整體營運困難，財務壓力下決定出售101大樓股權。這棟大樓產權價值甚高，近年房地產價格飆漲，出售股權必然獲利，這本是市場經濟的法則，但頂新集團獲利出場，社會大眾憤憤不平，因而對新內閣造成政治壓力，財經三長集體喊話是可以理解的。
然而，頂新集團引起社會公憤是一回事，政府如何依法行事，則是另一回事；101大樓的股權在市場上進行交易，有賣方就有買方，有交易就有市場價格。台灣畢竟是一個應該尊重基本市場經濟秩序的法治國家，政府要求頂新集團負起法律或是社會責任，可以依法追訴頂新，但是不能只是因欲制裁頂新，而擁有遷怒買方，恣意干預交易主體或是交易價格的權力。政府又想強迫頂新出脫101股權，又想決定誰才可以成為買主，豈不成了專制政治？
在IOI還未以外資的身分向政府有關部門提出外人投資申請之前，政府財金首長就列隊表示並不歡迎外資，聲言不會同意，擺明的是討好民粹的舉動。然而在頂新黑心油事件招致民怨四起的過程之中，政府失察在先，又是應對無方，取締乏力，面對社會指責而難辭其咎，也就缺乏扮演救世主的道德立場，利用對付頂新集團的機會，球員兼裁判，實有欲順勢成為101大樓產業的實質控制者，趁機擴大政府在101大樓產權的版圖之嫌！在外資提出申請之前，就看到政府橫加干預而且表示不會允許，我們必須追問一句：不予允許的法律依據是什麼？政府行事缺乏法律上的依據，那就不只是孟浪，而是濫用公權力干預市場的舉措了！
一向受人尊敬的中央銀行彭總裁這次竟也參與其事，只因101是台灣的地標，就說股權「最好由國人取得較好」，這如果是在傲慢地展現中央銀行實施外匯管制的權力，不免令人訝異。彭總裁強調須問相關法令有無依據，如果沒有就要看看有無其他辦法阻止外資入股，他顯然了解此舉並無法律依據，至少是還不知道有什麼法律依據，竟然還要出面阻止，絕非值得贊許的舉動。
財政部長張盛和明明知財政部不能影響頂新出售持股給誰，卻還因為IOI「打算」洽詢其他股東取得經營權，不是單純的財務性投資，就要在投審會中表達反對立場，豈不是明白缺乏法治觀念？官股在市場上與IOI競爭經營權，可以採取的方法很多，卻竟然只想用手上的公權力不允IOI入股，不是球員兼裁判是什麼？
甫上任的經濟部長則指出是要依據外人投資條例的規定，禁止外人投資「對國家安全、公共秩序、善良風俗或國民健康不利影響的事業」，尤難令人置信。101大樓竟然會是「對國家安全、公共秩序、善良風俗或國民健康不利影響的事業」？台灣的地標由外資持股就能算是違反公共秩序？這又算是哪門子的法律解釋？負責審核外人投資的經濟部用這種鎖國式的民族主義態度執法，還有多少外人投資願意進入台灣來接受如此不知法治為何物的政府羞辱？
政府對於有公股參與的事業，予取予奪的姿態一至於此，試問又有幾家本土企業以後敢與政府合作經營事業？執政團隊口口聲聲要為台灣拚經濟，國際化、自由化的口號整日掛在嘴邊，三大財金首長對於外人投資卻是如此無視於法律的規定而誇誇其談，恣意行事，這樣的執政團隊憑什麼為台灣向全世界招商引資？還談什麼國際競爭？
頂新集團無良，國人皆曰可誅，固是社會輿情所同然；但是並不代表政府就可以無限上綱，一味迎合民粹，有法不依，藉機擴張並濫用主管機關的權力地位，殃及無辜。101大樓的股權歸屬其實事小，政府部門沉不住氣，為了對付頂新而行事操切，砸了台灣歡迎外人投資的法治國家招牌，使得國內與國外的投資人對於台灣望而卻步，那真將會是得不償失了！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 11, 2014
Executive Summary: The Ting Hsin Group was unscrupulous. The public has a right to punish it. But public opinion is one thing. That does not mean the government can engage in gross exaggeration, pander to populist sentiment, ignore the law, and use the opportunity to expand its power and abuse the innocent. The Taipei 101 Building ownership issue is a relatively minor matter. The government becoming impatient and acting rashly in order to punish Ting Hsing is a far more serious matter. If this undermines Taiwan’s reputation for rule of law in the eyes of domestic and foreign investors, the cost will truly overshadow any perceived benefits.
Full Text Below:
The Ting Hsin Group (Wei Chuan) revealed that it plans to sell its 37% stake in the Taipei 101 Building to the Malaysian-based IOI Group. This raised alarm bells for three government head, including Finance Minister Chang Sheng-ho, FSC Chairman Tseng Ming-chung, and Central Bank president Perng Huai-nan. Together they stepped forward to oppose it. Taipei 101 is a Taiwan landmark, they declared. Its shares must not be sold to foreign investors.
The Ting Hsin Group rancid oil scandal provoked national outrage. Enormous social pressures led to operating difficulties. The subsequent financial pressures forced the Ting Hsin Group to sell off its 101 shares. The building commands a high price because real estate prices have skyrocketed in recent years. The sale of its shares is sure to be profitable. Such is the nature of the market economy. But the Ting Hsin Group profiting from the sale has made the public angry. The result has been political pressure on the new cabinet. That the three officials would make such a statement is understandable.
The Ting Hsin Group has provoked public anger. But is the government acting in accordance with the law? That is another matter altogether. If 101 shares are traded on the market, there will be buyers and sellers. Any trade will reflect market prices. The Republic of China, after all, is a nation ruled by law, which respects the fundamental laws of the marketplace. If the government wants the Ting Hsin Group to bear legal or social responsibility, it can prosecute its executives. But it cannot arbitrarily intervene in the transaction merely because it wants to punish the Ting Hsin Group or is angry at the buyer. The government cannot force the Ting Hsin Group to sell off its 101 shares, and also dictate who may purchase them. Otherwise what will it be, other than a dictatorship?
IOI has yet to submit an application to the government as a foreign investor. Yet government officials have already declared that foreign investments are unwelcome and will not be approved. They were clearly pandering to populist sentiment. The Ting Hsin Group’s rancid oil scandal provoked public wrath. But the government was actually the first party to act irresponsibly. It failed to detect the problem before the fact. It provided no solution to the problem after the fact. Its prosecution of the case was inept. It was impotent in the face of public anger. It has no right to posture as public savior, when in fact it was one of the guilty parties. It has no right to use the opportunity to become the de facto owner of the Taipei 101 Building. It has no right to use the opportunity to increase government control of the Taipei 101 Building. Foreign investors have yet to submit applications. Yet the government has already intervened and declared that it will not allow any such investments? What was their legal basis for not allowing such investments? If the government acts without any legal basis, is not merely rash. That is an abuse of public authority in the market place.
Peng Huai-nan, the president of the Central Bank has long been respected by the public. Yet he meddled in the case. He declared that Taipei 101 is a Taiwan landmark, therefore “it is best owned by our own citizens." This arrogant display of central bank exchange control authority was shocking. President Peng said that in the event no laws applied, other means to prevent foreign ownership should be sought. He clearly realized that he lacked any legal grounds, or at least was not aware of any legal grounds. Yet he was determined to act regardless. His behavior calls for public condemnation.
Finance Minister Chang Sheng-ho knew the ministry had no authority to decide who sold what shares to whom. Yet he argued that since IOI "intended" to contact other shareholders to obtain the right to operate the building, it was not purely a financial investment, and expressed his personal opposition to the Investment Commission. He clearly lacked any understanding of the rule of law. Government-owned shares may compete with the IOI franchise in the market place in many ways. But if the government abuses its public authority to prevent IOI shares from participating, then a player has become the referee.
The newly installed Minister of Economic Affairs argued that foreigners must invest in accordance with the provisions of the law. The law prohibits foreign investments that “have adverse affects on national security, public order, good morals, or national health." His comment was particularly unbelievable. How can the Taipei 101 Building possibly “have adverse affects on national security, public order, good morals, or national health?" How can foreign ownership of a Taiwan Landmark be contrary to public order? What manner of legal interpretation is this? The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for auditing foreign investments in this country. If it adopts this kind of closed door, nationalist attitude toward law enforcement, how many foreigners will be willing to invest in Taiwan? How many foreigners will be willing to humiliated by a government that show so little respect for the rule of law?
The government has long adopted this attitude toward enterprises involving public shares and government participation. How many local Taiwan companies will be willing to cooperate with the government in the future? The ruling administration endlessly trumpets its ambition to boost the economy, to internationalize, and to liberalize. Yet three officials responsible for foreign investments have demonstrated their utter disregard for the law, engaged in hyperbole, and acted upon whim. How can such a ruling administration attract foreign investments to Taiwan? How can we still talk about international competitiveness?
The Ting Hsin Group was unscrupulous. The public has a right to punish it. But public opinion is one thing. That does not mean the government can engage in gross exaggeration, pander to populist sentiment, ignore the law, and use the opportunity to expand its power and abuse the innocent. The Taipei 101 Building ownership issue is a relatively minor matter. The government becoming impatient and acting rashly in order to punish Ting Hsing is a far more serious matter. If this undermines Taiwan’s reputation for rule of law in the eyes of domestic and foreign investors, the cost will truly overshadow any perceived benefits.
社論－頂新可誅 法治不可壞
2014年12月11日 04:10
本報訊
頂新集團計畫將台北101大樓逾37%持股售與馬來西亞IOI集團，驚動了政府3位首長，包括財政部長張盛和，金管會主委曾銘宗，還有央行總裁彭淮南，一齊站出來表示反對。理由是台北101大樓是台灣的地標，其股權不宜賣給外資。
頂新集團黑心食油案引起全民公憤，鉅大的社會壓力，造成集團整體營運困難，財務壓力下決定出售101大樓股權。這棟大樓產權價值甚高，近年房地產價格飆漲，出售股權必然獲利，這本是市場經濟的法則，但頂新集團獲利出場，社會大眾憤憤不平，因而對新內閣造成政治壓力，財經三長集體喊話是可以理解的。
然而，頂新集團引起社會公憤是一回事，政府如何依法行事，則是另一回事；101大樓的股權在市場上進行交易，有賣方就有買方，有交易就有市場價格。台灣畢竟是一個應該尊重基本市場經濟秩序的法治國家，政府要求頂新集團負起法律或是社會責任，可以依法追訴頂新，但是不能只是因欲制裁頂新，而擁有遷怒買方，恣意干預交易主體或是交易價格的權力。政府又想強迫頂新出脫101股權，又想決定誰才可以成為買主，豈不成了專制政治？
在IOI還未以外資的身分向政府有關部門提出外人投資申請之前，政府財金首長就列隊表示並不歡迎外資，聲言不會同意，擺明的是討好民粹的舉動。然而在頂新黑心油事件招致民怨四起的過程之中，政府失察在先，又是應對無方，取締乏力，面對社會指責而難辭其咎，也就缺乏扮演救世主的道德立場，利用對付頂新集團的機會，球員兼裁判，實有欲順勢成為101大樓產業的實質控制者，趁機擴大政府在101大樓產權的版圖之嫌！在外資提出申請之前，就看到政府橫加干預而且表示不會允許，我們必須追問一句：不予允許的法律依據是什麼？政府行事缺乏法律上的依據，那就不只是孟浪，而是濫用公權力干預市場的舉措了！
一向受人尊敬的中央銀行彭總裁這次竟也參與其事，只因101是台灣的地標，就說股權「最好由國人取得較好」，這如果是在傲慢地展現中央銀行實施外匯管制的權力，不免令人訝異。彭總裁強調須問相關法令有無依據，如果沒有就要看看有無其他辦法阻止外資入股，他顯然了解此舉並無法律依據，至少是還不知道有什麼法律依據，竟然還要出面阻止，絕非值得贊許的舉動。
財政部長張盛和明明知財政部不能影響頂新出售持股給誰，卻還因為IOI「打算」洽詢其他股東取得經營權，不是單純的財務性投資，就要在投審會中表達反對立場，豈不是明白缺乏法治觀念？官股在市場上與IOI競爭經營權，可以採取的方法很多，卻竟然只想用手上的公權力不允IOI入股，不是球員兼裁判是什麼？
甫上任的經濟部長則指出是要依據外人投資條例的規定，禁止外人投資「對國家安全、公共秩序、善良風俗或國民健康不利影響的事業」，尤難令人置信。101大樓竟然會是「對國家安全、公共秩序、善良風俗或國民健康不利影響的事業」？台灣的地標由外資持股就能算是違反公共秩序？這又算是哪門子的法律解釋？負責審核外人投資的經濟部用這種鎖國式的民族主義態度執法，還有多少外人投資願意進入台灣來接受如此不知法治為何物的政府羞辱？
政府對於有公股參與的事業，予取予奪的姿態一至於此，試問又有幾家本土企業以後敢與政府合作經營事業？執政團隊口口聲聲要為台灣拚經濟，國際化、自由化的口號整日掛在嘴邊，三大財金首長對於外人投資卻是如此無視於法律的規定而誇誇其談，恣意行事，這樣的執政團隊憑什麼為台灣向全世界招商引資？還談什麼國際競爭？
頂新集團無良，國人皆曰可誅，固是社會輿情所同然；但是並不代表政府就可以無限上綱，一味迎合民粹，有法不依，藉機擴張並濫用主管機關的權力地位，殃及無辜。101大樓的股權歸屬其實事小，政府部門沉不住氣，為了對付頂新而行事操切，砸了台灣歡迎外人投資的法治國家招牌，使得國內與國外的投資人對於台灣望而卻步，那真將會是得不償失了！
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Green Camp Celebrates Victory with Confrontation
Green Camp Celebrates Victory with Confrontation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2014
Executive Summary: The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
Full Text Below:
The Democratic Progressive Party took 13 counties and municipalities during the recent elections. Wen-Je Ko won by a landslide in the capital city of Taipei. The green camp significantly expanded its territory. It won because the ruling KMT lost the peoples’ hearts and minds. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen however has not been carried away by the victory. She said the DPP “must remain vigilant, as if walking on thin ice." She said the DPP must see the KMT’s loss as a warning. Yet lo and behold, little more than a week after the elections, victorious DPP county chiefs and city mayors were talking and acting in just the opposite manner.
It is not wrong to say that the KMT lost this election. But is it right for the DPP to boast that it won this election? No, it is not. The reason is simple. The Kuomintang suffered a crushing defeat. The main reason was that the public was disappointed with the central government’s performance. Many people simply could not bring themselves to cast their ballots for the KMT. Under these circumstances, for the DPP to boast that they did something miraculous to win peoples’ hearts and minds, can only provoke ridicule.
This was why Tsai Ing-wen pledged to remain prudent and low-key about the DPP’s victory. Hers was the right attitude. She knew it was merely a one-time expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling KMT. It was not a heartfelt affirmation of the Democratic Progressive Party. Lest we forget, one of the main reasons Ma government policies could not be implemented was DPP obstructionism. Voters did not take the DPP to task on this during the recent election. But that does not mean they will not take them to task during the next election.
Pundits are scrutinizing the shortcomings of the Ma government. Many in the DPP cannot suppress their Schadenfreude. They constantly reveal their arrogance, even an overweening haughtiness. The most obvious examples are the DPP’s newly-elected county chiefs and city mayors. Upon emerging victorious, they did not inform voters how they intend to restart the economy. Instead, the very first thing they did was launch an attack on the central government. They threatened to push for a "fiscal revenue allocation law" and an "administrative regions law" demanding money and usurping authority from the central government.
From a political perspective, this is entirely consistent with the DPP strategy of "using local governments to besiege the central government." But from an economic perspective, this is merely more evidence of local DPP government "ineptitude at wealth creation and aptitude at wealth redistribution.” Some DPP ruled counties have become accustomed to the long term abuse of welfare to buy voter support. But repeatedly rejecting necessary construction and development has led to financial embarrassments, accumulated debts, and increased unemployment. Under these circumstances, cities and counties must explore economic alternatives. If they habitually extort money from the central government when it is in trouble, can Taiwan's economy withstand such plundering of a weak central government by strong local governments?
Another result of the DPP victory has been calls to "Free Chen Shui-bian!" Is Chen's physical condition reason for medical parole? That is a question that ought to be decided by medical experts. But DPP county chiefs and city mayors have deliberately politicized the Chen corruption case. They explicitly or implicitly claim that the Chen corruption case was the result of "unjust verdicts" and a "miscarriage of justice." They are attempting to use political means to override the criminal justice system, and mislead the public about the facts of the case.
The green camp has begun a siege of the central government. The pan green “bai li hou” has adopted a confrontational posture. It is attempting to overthrow existing construction plans. The clearest example is Ilan County Chief Lin Tsung-hsien. He and Wen-Je Ko are demanding that the “Taipei-Ilan Direct Railway Line” plan be discarded, and the "shortest route" be adopted. In order to save eight to nine minutes of time, they are willing to jeopardize the safety and natural beauty of the Jade Reservoir. Wen-Je Ko considers himself smarter than other people. Whenever he challenges existing policies, he adopts an air of unassailable righteousness. But these routes were subjected to careful planning. Environmentalists, geologists, and ecologists have debated the options repeatedly. Why does a surgeon think he knows more than these experts?
Ko’s "Ilan direct railway route" is hardly an isolated case. The same drama is playing out in Taoyuan and Keelung. Taoyuan City Mayor Elect Cheng Wen-chan is demanding the overthrow of the already finalized "Nan Tao elevated railway plan" and demanding that it be built underground. He is even blackmailing Taoyuan by threatening to stop payment of 10 billion NTD. In Keelung, Lin You-chang is demanding that the Taipei MRT Bannan Line be extended to Keelung. He wants to overturn the Executive Yuan’s original decision to extend the Xizhi Minsheng Line. How these two construction projects should proceed may be a matter of opinion. But the plans are subject to real world constraints, and most of all, by limited funds. If every project on Taiwan must be built to the highest standards and biggest budgets, where will the money come from? Won’t these plans sacrifice the interests of other communities?
Even more incredibly, Tu Hsing-che insists on changing the name of "Chueiyang Road" in Chiayi City to “Chen Cheng-po Avenue." Why? Because he considers the name “chuei yang” to be "prejudicial to masculine honor." Chuei Yang means “hanging poplar.” But Tu Hsing-che thinks it can be read as “non-erect phallus.” When Tu Hsing-che raised this issue before the election, his poll numbers plummeted. After the election everyone assumed the matter would be laid to rest. But Tu insists that the issue be the subject of a public referendum. Is changing the name of old streets really the highest priority?
The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
綠營決以對抗模式慶祝勝選？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.10 01:54 am
民進黨在這次選舉中豪取十三個縣市，加上柯文哲在首都的大勝，泛綠執政版圖大幅擴張。因執政黨的不得人心而暴得勝利，民進黨主席蔡英文並未被欣喜沖昏頭，表示「誠惶誠恐、如履薄冰」，並強調會以國民黨的失敗為警惕。然而，觀察選後一個多星期以來民進黨新科縣市長們的言行，卻似與此背道而馳。
老實說，分析這次選舉結果，固然可以說國民黨敗得一點都不冤枉，但是民進黨能宣稱自己贏得理直氣壯嗎？恐怕不然！原因無他，國民黨這次落得一敗塗地，主要是中央執政成績欠佳使民眾失望，讓許多人覺得「投不下去」；在這種情況下，民進黨若要宣稱自己做了什麼大獲民心之舉而贏得勝選，只怕會招來訕笑。
也因此，蔡英文對勝利當頭而保持審慎的低調，是正確的態度；因為她了解這只是一次民意對執政黨的倒戈，而不是全民對民進黨的心悅誠服。更何況，馬政府施政之難以施展，其實有很大成分是受到民進黨的激烈掣肘所致；這筆帳，這次選舉無法清算，並不表示下次選舉不會被提起。
然而，正當輿論全面檢討馬政府施政缺失之際，民進黨不少人卻抑不住勝利的狂喜，而不斷露出驕態，甚至表現出唯我獨尊的倨傲。最明顯的例子是，民進黨新科縣市首長勝選後的第一件事，不是向選民談如何為地方創造財富，而是集體向中央政府叫陣，揚言推動《財政收支劃分法》和《行政區劃法》的修法，向中央搶錢、搶權。
從政治面看，這是民進黨「以地方包圍中央」的一貫策略；但從經濟面看，這卻是地方政府「拙於生產、巧於爭錢」現象的進一步惡化。民進黨長期執政的一些縣市慣於濫用社福措施討好選民，卻又屢屢否決相關的建設開發，導致財政越來越困窘，債務越積越多，失業率越來越高。在這種情況下，各縣市若不開發經濟出路，一味想對中央政府趁火打劫，台灣的經濟和財政豈禁得起這樣「弱中央、強地方」的掠奪嗎？
民進黨勝選軍團另一項急如星火的聯合訴求，是呼籲「釋放陳水扁」。陳水扁的身體狀況是否能獲保外就醫的機會，理應經由專業的評估決定，但民進黨縣市長的訴求，甚至故意將扁案政治化，明示或暗示扁案是「不公平審判」的結果，是個「冤獄」。這種態度，是試圖用政治手段干預司法，並誤導民眾對正義的認知。
除了發起包圍中央的戰爭，泛綠新百里侯也開始以對抗的姿態，試圖推翻一些既定的建設計畫。最具代表性的例子，是柯文哲聯合宜蘭縣長林聰賢要求對四月核定的「北宜直鐵」路線翻案，要求採「最短路線」，為了搶八、九分鐘的時間，寧可賭上翡翠水庫的安全與品質。柯文哲自許聰明過人，他要質疑或推翻什麼都理直氣壯；但是，這些路線的規劃與選擇早已經過不同環境、地質、生態專家的多少次辯論，憑什麼一名外科醫師覺得自己的才智可以壓倒這些專家？
「北宜直鐵」遭到質疑並非特例，桃園和基隆也有類似情事。桃園市長當選人鄭文燦要求推翻已定案的「南桃鐵路高架化方案」，要求改採地下化，甚至不惜以停編桃園要負擔的一百億元為要脅。基隆的林右昌則堅持捷運延伸至基隆之規劃，必須改採「板南線延伸」，推翻由「汐止民生線」延伸的行政院原決定。這兩項建設要如何選擇，容或見仁見智，但除了計畫本身的條件及可行性，問題主要都在經費是否容許；試想，若全台各地都要求以最高預算執行最佳計畫，政府財政哪裡足夠支應？如此一來，豈不要犧牲其他地方的利益？
更令人匪夷所思的，是涂醒哲執意將嘉義市的「垂楊路」更名「陳澄波大道」，理由竟是垂楊二字「有損男性雄風」。涂醒哲在選前提出此議時，曾一度讓他的選情跌落谷底；選後各方認為此議可以休矣，但他竟然堅持將此案交付公投。改掉一個有歷史記憶的路名，真是施政優先重點嗎？
民進黨在「重返執政」的路上大勢看好，如果這些諸侯們一味採取「對抗模式」來慶祝勝利，而不是透過良性的「治理模式」來爭取人心，絕非明智的選擇。那天蔡英文在勝選演說中說：「人民給予我們的支持，也隨時可能被收回」；她知道最難的是最後一哩路，但那些狂傲的縣市長在乎嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2014
Executive Summary: The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
Full Text Below:
The Democratic Progressive Party took 13 counties and municipalities during the recent elections. Wen-Je Ko won by a landslide in the capital city of Taipei. The green camp significantly expanded its territory. It won because the ruling KMT lost the peoples’ hearts and minds. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen however has not been carried away by the victory. She said the DPP “must remain vigilant, as if walking on thin ice." She said the DPP must see the KMT’s loss as a warning. Yet lo and behold, little more than a week after the elections, victorious DPP county chiefs and city mayors were talking and acting in just the opposite manner.
It is not wrong to say that the KMT lost this election. But is it right for the DPP to boast that it won this election? No, it is not. The reason is simple. The Kuomintang suffered a crushing defeat. The main reason was that the public was disappointed with the central government’s performance. Many people simply could not bring themselves to cast their ballots for the KMT. Under these circumstances, for the DPP to boast that they did something miraculous to win peoples’ hearts and minds, can only provoke ridicule.
This was why Tsai Ing-wen pledged to remain prudent and low-key about the DPP’s victory. Hers was the right attitude. She knew it was merely a one-time expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling KMT. It was not a heartfelt affirmation of the Democratic Progressive Party. Lest we forget, one of the main reasons Ma government policies could not be implemented was DPP obstructionism. Voters did not take the DPP to task on this during the recent election. But that does not mean they will not take them to task during the next election.
Pundits are scrutinizing the shortcomings of the Ma government. Many in the DPP cannot suppress their Schadenfreude. They constantly reveal their arrogance, even an overweening haughtiness. The most obvious examples are the DPP’s newly-elected county chiefs and city mayors. Upon emerging victorious, they did not inform voters how they intend to restart the economy. Instead, the very first thing they did was launch an attack on the central government. They threatened to push for a "fiscal revenue allocation law" and an "administrative regions law" demanding money and usurping authority from the central government.
From a political perspective, this is entirely consistent with the DPP strategy of "using local governments to besiege the central government." But from an economic perspective, this is merely more evidence of local DPP government "ineptitude at wealth creation and aptitude at wealth redistribution.” Some DPP ruled counties have become accustomed to the long term abuse of welfare to buy voter support. But repeatedly rejecting necessary construction and development has led to financial embarrassments, accumulated debts, and increased unemployment. Under these circumstances, cities and counties must explore economic alternatives. If they habitually extort money from the central government when it is in trouble, can Taiwan's economy withstand such plundering of a weak central government by strong local governments?
Another result of the DPP victory has been calls to "Free Chen Shui-bian!" Is Chen's physical condition reason for medical parole? That is a question that ought to be decided by medical experts. But DPP county chiefs and city mayors have deliberately politicized the Chen corruption case. They explicitly or implicitly claim that the Chen corruption case was the result of "unjust verdicts" and a "miscarriage of justice." They are attempting to use political means to override the criminal justice system, and mislead the public about the facts of the case.
The green camp has begun a siege of the central government. The pan green “bai li hou” has adopted a confrontational posture. It is attempting to overthrow existing construction plans. The clearest example is Ilan County Chief Lin Tsung-hsien. He and Wen-Je Ko are demanding that the “Taipei-Ilan Direct Railway Line” plan be discarded, and the "shortest route" be adopted. In order to save eight to nine minutes of time, they are willing to jeopardize the safety and natural beauty of the Jade Reservoir. Wen-Je Ko considers himself smarter than other people. Whenever he challenges existing policies, he adopts an air of unassailable righteousness. But these routes were subjected to careful planning. Environmentalists, geologists, and ecologists have debated the options repeatedly. Why does a surgeon think he knows more than these experts?
Ko’s "Ilan direct railway route" is hardly an isolated case. The same drama is playing out in Taoyuan and Keelung. Taoyuan City Mayor Elect Cheng Wen-chan is demanding the overthrow of the already finalized "Nan Tao elevated railway plan" and demanding that it be built underground. He is even blackmailing Taoyuan by threatening to stop payment of 10 billion NTD. In Keelung, Lin You-chang is demanding that the Taipei MRT Bannan Line be extended to Keelung. He wants to overturn the Executive Yuan’s original decision to extend the Xizhi Minsheng Line. How these two construction projects should proceed may be a matter of opinion. But the plans are subject to real world constraints, and most of all, by limited funds. If every project on Taiwan must be built to the highest standards and biggest budgets, where will the money come from? Won’t these plans sacrifice the interests of other communities?
Even more incredibly, Tu Hsing-che insists on changing the name of "Chueiyang Road" in Chiayi City to “Chen Cheng-po Avenue." Why? Because he considers the name “chuei yang” to be "prejudicial to masculine honor." Chuei Yang means “hanging poplar.” But Tu Hsing-che thinks it can be read as “non-erect phallus.” When Tu Hsing-che raised this issue before the election, his poll numbers plummeted. After the election everyone assumed the matter would be laid to rest. But Tu insists that the issue be the subject of a public referendum. Is changing the name of old streets really the highest priority?
The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
綠營決以對抗模式慶祝勝選？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.10 01:54 am
民進黨在這次選舉中豪取十三個縣市，加上柯文哲在首都的大勝，泛綠執政版圖大幅擴張。因執政黨的不得人心而暴得勝利，民進黨主席蔡英文並未被欣喜沖昏頭，表示「誠惶誠恐、如履薄冰」，並強調會以國民黨的失敗為警惕。然而，觀察選後一個多星期以來民進黨新科縣市長們的言行，卻似與此背道而馳。
老實說，分析這次選舉結果，固然可以說國民黨敗得一點都不冤枉，但是民進黨能宣稱自己贏得理直氣壯嗎？恐怕不然！原因無他，國民黨這次落得一敗塗地，主要是中央執政成績欠佳使民眾失望，讓許多人覺得「投不下去」；在這種情況下，民進黨若要宣稱自己做了什麼大獲民心之舉而贏得勝選，只怕會招來訕笑。
也因此，蔡英文對勝利當頭而保持審慎的低調，是正確的態度；因為她了解這只是一次民意對執政黨的倒戈，而不是全民對民進黨的心悅誠服。更何況，馬政府施政之難以施展，其實有很大成分是受到民進黨的激烈掣肘所致；這筆帳，這次選舉無法清算，並不表示下次選舉不會被提起。
然而，正當輿論全面檢討馬政府施政缺失之際，民進黨不少人卻抑不住勝利的狂喜，而不斷露出驕態，甚至表現出唯我獨尊的倨傲。最明顯的例子是，民進黨新科縣市首長勝選後的第一件事，不是向選民談如何為地方創造財富，而是集體向中央政府叫陣，揚言推動《財政收支劃分法》和《行政區劃法》的修法，向中央搶錢、搶權。
從政治面看，這是民進黨「以地方包圍中央」的一貫策略；但從經濟面看，這卻是地方政府「拙於生產、巧於爭錢」現象的進一步惡化。民進黨長期執政的一些縣市慣於濫用社福措施討好選民，卻又屢屢否決相關的建設開發，導致財政越來越困窘，債務越積越多，失業率越來越高。在這種情況下，各縣市若不開發經濟出路，一味想對中央政府趁火打劫，台灣的經濟和財政豈禁得起這樣「弱中央、強地方」的掠奪嗎？
民進黨勝選軍團另一項急如星火的聯合訴求，是呼籲「釋放陳水扁」。陳水扁的身體狀況是否能獲保外就醫的機會，理應經由專業的評估決定，但民進黨縣市長的訴求，甚至故意將扁案政治化，明示或暗示扁案是「不公平審判」的結果，是個「冤獄」。這種態度，是試圖用政治手段干預司法，並誤導民眾對正義的認知。
除了發起包圍中央的戰爭，泛綠新百里侯也開始以對抗的姿態，試圖推翻一些既定的建設計畫。最具代表性的例子，是柯文哲聯合宜蘭縣長林聰賢要求對四月核定的「北宜直鐵」路線翻案，要求採「最短路線」，為了搶八、九分鐘的時間，寧可賭上翡翠水庫的安全與品質。柯文哲自許聰明過人，他要質疑或推翻什麼都理直氣壯；但是，這些路線的規劃與選擇早已經過不同環境、地質、生態專家的多少次辯論，憑什麼一名外科醫師覺得自己的才智可以壓倒這些專家？
「北宜直鐵」遭到質疑並非特例，桃園和基隆也有類似情事。桃園市長當選人鄭文燦要求推翻已定案的「南桃鐵路高架化方案」，要求改採地下化，甚至不惜以停編桃園要負擔的一百億元為要脅。基隆的林右昌則堅持捷運延伸至基隆之規劃，必須改採「板南線延伸」，推翻由「汐止民生線」延伸的行政院原決定。這兩項建設要如何選擇，容或見仁見智，但除了計畫本身的條件及可行性，問題主要都在經費是否容許；試想，若全台各地都要求以最高預算執行最佳計畫，政府財政哪裡足夠支應？如此一來，豈不要犧牲其他地方的利益？
更令人匪夷所思的，是涂醒哲執意將嘉義市的「垂楊路」更名「陳澄波大道」，理由竟是垂楊二字「有損男性雄風」。涂醒哲在選前提出此議時，曾一度讓他的選情跌落谷底；選後各方認為此議可以休矣，但他竟然堅持將此案交付公投。改掉一個有歷史記憶的路名，真是施政優先重點嗎？
民進黨在「重返執政」的路上大勢看好，如果這些諸侯們一味採取「對抗模式」來慶祝勝利，而不是透過良性的「治理模式」來爭取人心，絕非明智的選擇。那天蔡英文在勝選演說中說：「人民給予我們的支持，也隨時可能被收回」；她知道最難的是最後一哩路，但那些狂傲的縣市長在乎嗎？
Monday, December 8, 2014
Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.
Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2014
Executive Summary: In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
Full Text Below:
In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
This newspaper originally advocated a cabinet system. Between 1991 and 2004, the Constitution was amended seven times. Those demanding the amendments claimed they were based on the French Fifth Republic’s “dual leadership system." This newspaper has consistently advocated four principles during these seven constitutional amendment processes. One. Presidents must be elected by an absolute majority. Two. Authority must correspond with responsibility. Three. The Legislative Yuan must retain the right to approve nominees for premier. Four. Depending on whether the president and premier belong to the same political party, executive power must automatically revert to the Premier. The above four principles are the four pillars of the French Fifth Republic’s system. The seven amendments to our constitution were touted as a replication of the French system. In fact, they destroyed these four pillars. This failed attempt at replication led to our current disaster.
These amendments created confusion in the institutional framework for authority and responsibility. The main reason was Taiwan's unique political character. The meaning of the constitution has long remained unclear. Who knows when it will be clarified? Space is limited. Therefore we will confine ourselves to only two of these unclear issues. One. National identity remains divided. Some support "one China, different interpretations." Others support "backdoor listing." Taiwan independence elements go so far as to say “Except for the electoral system, I do not recognize the constitution." As a result, the constitution gets no respect, and the constitutional amendment process becomes a political battleground. Two. Playing fast and loose with the constitution is a fundamental breach of the democratic process. Currently some advocate changing the "presidential system" to a "cabinet system." Note how the so-called "dual-leadership system" has morphed into a "presidential system" in the real world? This is a distortion of the political culture. Yet when the cabinet system is adopted, the green camp demands back room political deals and resorts to forcible occupations of the podium. This rides roughshod over the spirit of majority rule. Therefore what difference would it make if we adopted the cabinet system?
Therefore when calls for constitutional amendments are renewed, three things must be understood. One. What are the the pros and cons of the current system? What defects are buried in its structure? What scourges will the amendment process let loose? Two. What advantages if any, would a new Constitution offer? What disadvantages? We must not make things worse. Three. Seven constitutional amendment processes turned into power struggles. The current constitutional amendment process also shows signs of turning into a political struggle. For example, the KMT advocates the “dual leadership system." Some even advocate a cabinet system. The DPP originally advocated a cabinet system. Now it advocates a presidential system. Tsai Ing-wen would only touch on the issue of "mixed-member proportional representation, parallel voting." The past seven constitutional amendment processes have taught us a lesson. The constitutional amendment process is an opportunity for waging political struggles. The constitutional amendment process is not easy. It must not be undertaken lightly.
Consider first the pros and cons of the current system. Taiwan has been torn asunder by disagreements over cross-Strait relations and reunification vs. independence. Presidential elections have become defacto referenda. They have shown that a Taiwan First mindset has had a powerful impact on democracy and cross-Strait relations. This is precisely what a cabinet system finds difficult to cope with. Authority and responsibility remain unclear. As long as the President appoints a majority party legislative leader as premier, the result is likely to be executive power automatically reverting to the premier, and a "cabinet system style dual leadership system." Add to this calls to eliminate back room political deals and return to majority rule. Some even think the dual leadership system need not be eliminated. They think all that is needed is the amending of the constitution and improvements in its implementation.
Consider the political calculations behind the constitutional amendment process. The advantage of the cabinet system is its flexibility. The flipside is that political currents are changeable, and cabinets lack longevity. This is confirmed by the painful experience of Japan. Furthermore, in most cabinet systems the Premier is the Chief Executive, therefore also the head of state. Britain, Japan, Thailand, and the British Commonwealth all have hereditary monarchs as figureheads. Therefore they are more stable. If Taiwan wants a cabinet system, will it also have a president? How would such a system be established? Could a president legally and realistically be relegated to a figurehead? People on Taiwan remain divided on the question of national identity. Suppose the the president supports Taiwan independence while the cabinet opposes Taiwan independence? How will they rule? Taiwan has essentially adopted a presidential system. Changing the role of the president requires more than merely changing some constitutional provisions.
In particular, under the current constitution the executive power and the elected legislature are distinct from each other. This has become an important firewall against political corruption. Years of corruption cases have shown us that campaign contributions can easily be used to bribe Chief Executives. The cabinet system links elections, political contributions, administrative power, and political bribery. This could lead to intolerable violations of government ethics.
Some advocate increasing the number of legislators and "mixed-member proportional representation. with parallel voting." Such calls are commonplace. But the political spectrum for elected representatives on Taiwan has long been indistinguishable from the political spectrum for public policy. Candidates invariably fall somewhere on the reunification vs. independence, blue vs. green political policy spectrum. The New Party was followed by the PFP. The TAIP was followed by the TSU, then by the Taiwan Citizen Union. Do these distinctions further constitutional interests or not? Furthermore, if the number of legislators is increased, voting district must be shrunk. if smaller voting districts elect legislators who become cabinet ministers, will these legislators become cabinet leaders, or obedient puppets?
Finally, we must clarify the relationship between the parties in this political struggle. Is the motive long-term stability and constitutional justice? Or are constitutional amendment processes merely opportunities to engage in political struggle? The nation has endured seven constitutional amendments in 13 years. Do we really need to relive the nightmare of constitutional amendments designed to destroy the constitution?
修憲，不可再毀憲！
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.09 02:54 am
一九九七年第四次修憲期間，本報發表《修憲，不可毀憲》系列社論五十八篇；如今，種種修憲主張又起，可見此部憲法確因過去七次修憲受到毀傷，而我們今天的看法仍是：「修憲，勿再毀憲！」
本報原本主張內閣制，唯一九九一年至二○○四年的七次修憲，宣稱是以法國第五共和「雙首長制」為範本，因此本報對七次修憲的一貫主張有四：一、總統選舉應採絕對多數制；二、權責相副；三、不宜取消立法院的閣揆同意權；四、視總統與閣揆是否同屬一個政黨，採行政權換軌制。以上四項，皆法國第五共和憲法的樑柱，而我國七次修憲宣稱仿襲法制，卻拆毀此四樑柱，遂致畫虎不成，貽禍至今。
憲政混亂至此，除了前述體制架構的錯亂以致中樞權責不明以外，主要又因台灣政治文化的特異，以致憲政久陷混濁，河清無日。篇幅所限，僅舉二端：一、國家認同呈撕裂狀態，有人「一中各表」，有人「借殼上市」，獨派甚至稱「除了選舉制度外，不承認這部憲法」，因此憲法的尊嚴無以確立，修憲亦成政治鬥爭的平台。二、憲政操作根本違反民主法則，今日有主張改「總統制」為「內閣制」者（「雙首長制」竟然在實際運作中變成了「總統制」，此即政治文化造成的變體），但若改行「內閣制」，卻仍採「政黨協商」及「霸占主席台」的運作，完全違反「多數主治」的精神，則改成內閣制又有何用？
因而，在修憲之議再起時，必須先弄清三件事：一、現制的利弊何在？架構形成的缺陷是什麼？操作引發的禍害又是什麼？二、新憲的必然優點是什麼？或然的缺點又是什麼？不要愈修愈糟糕。三、七次修憲淪為政治權力鬥爭的平台，這次修憲呼聲亦現鬥爭端倪。例如，國民黨主張「雙首長制」，如今有人改推「內閣制」；而民進黨原有「內閣制」的主張，今又改持「總統制」，蔡英文甚至只願碰「聯立制／並立制」的問題。鑑於過去七次修憲的教訓，倘未廓清「以修憲為政治鬥爭平台」的權謀思維，非徒修憲不易，更不可輕言修憲。
先略論現制的利弊何在。在統獨撕裂及兩岸關係成為國政主體的台灣，總統直選儼然已成某種形式的「全民公投」，這對凸顯台灣主體性、反映民主及平衡節制兩岸關係有重大效能，而這卻恰是內閣制難以匹比之處。至於中樞權責不明，只要由總統建立「任命國會多數為行政院長」的體制，即可能形成「行政權換軌制」及「傾內閣制的雙首長制」。再加上廢止「政黨協商」的操作，即可回復「多數主治」的原則。甚至有一種看法是，「雙首長制」其實未必要廢，只需藉修憲及端正操作加以改善。
再簡論修憲新制的利害。內閣制的優點在政府的去留較靈活，但從相對的角度看，即是政潮洶湧，內閣不長命，此從日本的痛苦經驗即可印證。再者，一般內閣制，閣揆為行政首長，因此仍設國家元首。英、日、泰及大英國協，皆以世襲君主為虛位元首，因此較為穩定。台灣若行內閣制，要不要另設總統？要如何設？總統在法制上及現實政治上有無可能完全「虛位」？且台灣畢竟在國家認同上尚處撕裂狀態，如果是「獨總統／非獨內閣」，如何左右共治？再者，台灣已然形成「總統制」的政治氛圍，則改變總統角色絕非只是改個憲法條文就能辦到的事。
尤其，現行憲法將行政權與經由選舉產生的立法院作出區隔，這對政治清廉成為重要的防火牆。從這些年來的貪腐案件可知，選舉時期的政治獻金關係，極易轉為對行政首長的賄賂行為，而內閣制若將「選舉／政治獻金／行政權／政治賄賂」連成一線，可能導致政府操守不堪聞問。
另有主張增加立委名額及重新斟酌「聯立制／並立制」者，皆不無見地。但台灣的民意代表光譜一向難用公共政策來區別，最後皆落在統獨藍綠的光譜上，如新黨後又有親民黨，又如建國黨後又有台聯再有公民組合，此種區分究竟是否符合憲政利益？再者，增加立委名額，即表示選區要再縮小；而若在愈來愈小的選區中選出立法委員，而要這些立委成為內閣制的閣員大臣，會不會令人不寒而慄？
最後，必須廓清各方主張修憲的政治鬥爭關係。如果不是真正為憲政正義的長治久安而修憲，而只是想藉修憲作為政治鬥爭的平台；國家曾因十三年七次修憲而創鉅痛深，難道還要重演「修憲以致再次毀憲」的噩夢？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2014
Executive Summary: In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
Full Text Below:
In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
This newspaper originally advocated a cabinet system. Between 1991 and 2004, the Constitution was amended seven times. Those demanding the amendments claimed they were based on the French Fifth Republic’s “dual leadership system." This newspaper has consistently advocated four principles during these seven constitutional amendment processes. One. Presidents must be elected by an absolute majority. Two. Authority must correspond with responsibility. Three. The Legislative Yuan must retain the right to approve nominees for premier. Four. Depending on whether the president and premier belong to the same political party, executive power must automatically revert to the Premier. The above four principles are the four pillars of the French Fifth Republic’s system. The seven amendments to our constitution were touted as a replication of the French system. In fact, they destroyed these four pillars. This failed attempt at replication led to our current disaster.
These amendments created confusion in the institutional framework for authority and responsibility. The main reason was Taiwan's unique political character. The meaning of the constitution has long remained unclear. Who knows when it will be clarified? Space is limited. Therefore we will confine ourselves to only two of these unclear issues. One. National identity remains divided. Some support "one China, different interpretations." Others support "backdoor listing." Taiwan independence elements go so far as to say “Except for the electoral system, I do not recognize the constitution." As a result, the constitution gets no respect, and the constitutional amendment process becomes a political battleground. Two. Playing fast and loose with the constitution is a fundamental breach of the democratic process. Currently some advocate changing the "presidential system" to a "cabinet system." Note how the so-called "dual-leadership system" has morphed into a "presidential system" in the real world? This is a distortion of the political culture. Yet when the cabinet system is adopted, the green camp demands back room political deals and resorts to forcible occupations of the podium. This rides roughshod over the spirit of majority rule. Therefore what difference would it make if we adopted the cabinet system?
Therefore when calls for constitutional amendments are renewed, three things must be understood. One. What are the the pros and cons of the current system? What defects are buried in its structure? What scourges will the amendment process let loose? Two. What advantages if any, would a new Constitution offer? What disadvantages? We must not make things worse. Three. Seven constitutional amendment processes turned into power struggles. The current constitutional amendment process also shows signs of turning into a political struggle. For example, the KMT advocates the “dual leadership system." Some even advocate a cabinet system. The DPP originally advocated a cabinet system. Now it advocates a presidential system. Tsai Ing-wen would only touch on the issue of "mixed-member proportional representation, parallel voting." The past seven constitutional amendment processes have taught us a lesson. The constitutional amendment process is an opportunity for waging political struggles. The constitutional amendment process is not easy. It must not be undertaken lightly.
Consider first the pros and cons of the current system. Taiwan has been torn asunder by disagreements over cross-Strait relations and reunification vs. independence. Presidential elections have become defacto referenda. They have shown that a Taiwan First mindset has had a powerful impact on democracy and cross-Strait relations. This is precisely what a cabinet system finds difficult to cope with. Authority and responsibility remain unclear. As long as the President appoints a majority party legislative leader as premier, the result is likely to be executive power automatically reverting to the premier, and a "cabinet system style dual leadership system." Add to this calls to eliminate back room political deals and return to majority rule. Some even think the dual leadership system need not be eliminated. They think all that is needed is the amending of the constitution and improvements in its implementation.
Consider the political calculations behind the constitutional amendment process. The advantage of the cabinet system is its flexibility. The flipside is that political currents are changeable, and cabinets lack longevity. This is confirmed by the painful experience of Japan. Furthermore, in most cabinet systems the Premier is the Chief Executive, therefore also the head of state. Britain, Japan, Thailand, and the British Commonwealth all have hereditary monarchs as figureheads. Therefore they are more stable. If Taiwan wants a cabinet system, will it also have a president? How would such a system be established? Could a president legally and realistically be relegated to a figurehead? People on Taiwan remain divided on the question of national identity. Suppose the the president supports Taiwan independence while the cabinet opposes Taiwan independence? How will they rule? Taiwan has essentially adopted a presidential system. Changing the role of the president requires more than merely changing some constitutional provisions.
In particular, under the current constitution the executive power and the elected legislature are distinct from each other. This has become an important firewall against political corruption. Years of corruption cases have shown us that campaign contributions can easily be used to bribe Chief Executives. The cabinet system links elections, political contributions, administrative power, and political bribery. This could lead to intolerable violations of government ethics.
Some advocate increasing the number of legislators and "mixed-member proportional representation. with parallel voting." Such calls are commonplace. But the political spectrum for elected representatives on Taiwan has long been indistinguishable from the political spectrum for public policy. Candidates invariably fall somewhere on the reunification vs. independence, blue vs. green political policy spectrum. The New Party was followed by the PFP. The TAIP was followed by the TSU, then by the Taiwan Citizen Union. Do these distinctions further constitutional interests or not? Furthermore, if the number of legislators is increased, voting district must be shrunk. if smaller voting districts elect legislators who become cabinet ministers, will these legislators become cabinet leaders, or obedient puppets?
Finally, we must clarify the relationship between the parties in this political struggle. Is the motive long-term stability and constitutional justice? Or are constitutional amendment processes merely opportunities to engage in political struggle? The nation has endured seven constitutional amendments in 13 years. Do we really need to relive the nightmare of constitutional amendments designed to destroy the constitution?
修憲，不可再毀憲！
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.09 02:54 am
一九九七年第四次修憲期間，本報發表《修憲，不可毀憲》系列社論五十八篇；如今，種種修憲主張又起，可見此部憲法確因過去七次修憲受到毀傷，而我們今天的看法仍是：「修憲，勿再毀憲！」
本報原本主張內閣制，唯一九九一年至二○○四年的七次修憲，宣稱是以法國第五共和「雙首長制」為範本，因此本報對七次修憲的一貫主張有四：一、總統選舉應採絕對多數制；二、權責相副；三、不宜取消立法院的閣揆同意權；四、視總統與閣揆是否同屬一個政黨，採行政權換軌制。以上四項，皆法國第五共和憲法的樑柱，而我國七次修憲宣稱仿襲法制，卻拆毀此四樑柱，遂致畫虎不成，貽禍至今。
憲政混亂至此，除了前述體制架構的錯亂以致中樞權責不明以外，主要又因台灣政治文化的特異，以致憲政久陷混濁，河清無日。篇幅所限，僅舉二端：一、國家認同呈撕裂狀態，有人「一中各表」，有人「借殼上市」，獨派甚至稱「除了選舉制度外，不承認這部憲法」，因此憲法的尊嚴無以確立，修憲亦成政治鬥爭的平台。二、憲政操作根本違反民主法則，今日有主張改「總統制」為「內閣制」者（「雙首長制」竟然在實際運作中變成了「總統制」，此即政治文化造成的變體），但若改行「內閣制」，卻仍採「政黨協商」及「霸占主席台」的運作，完全違反「多數主治」的精神，則改成內閣制又有何用？
因而，在修憲之議再起時，必須先弄清三件事：一、現制的利弊何在？架構形成的缺陷是什麼？操作引發的禍害又是什麼？二、新憲的必然優點是什麼？或然的缺點又是什麼？不要愈修愈糟糕。三、七次修憲淪為政治權力鬥爭的平台，這次修憲呼聲亦現鬥爭端倪。例如，國民黨主張「雙首長制」，如今有人改推「內閣制」；而民進黨原有「內閣制」的主張，今又改持「總統制」，蔡英文甚至只願碰「聯立制／並立制」的問題。鑑於過去七次修憲的教訓，倘未廓清「以修憲為政治鬥爭平台」的權謀思維，非徒修憲不易，更不可輕言修憲。
先略論現制的利弊何在。在統獨撕裂及兩岸關係成為國政主體的台灣，總統直選儼然已成某種形式的「全民公投」，這對凸顯台灣主體性、反映民主及平衡節制兩岸關係有重大效能，而這卻恰是內閣制難以匹比之處。至於中樞權責不明，只要由總統建立「任命國會多數為行政院長」的體制，即可能形成「行政權換軌制」及「傾內閣制的雙首長制」。再加上廢止「政黨協商」的操作，即可回復「多數主治」的原則。甚至有一種看法是，「雙首長制」其實未必要廢，只需藉修憲及端正操作加以改善。
再簡論修憲新制的利害。內閣制的優點在政府的去留較靈活，但從相對的角度看，即是政潮洶湧，內閣不長命，此從日本的痛苦經驗即可印證。再者，一般內閣制，閣揆為行政首長，因此仍設國家元首。英、日、泰及大英國協，皆以世襲君主為虛位元首，因此較為穩定。台灣若行內閣制，要不要另設總統？要如何設？總統在法制上及現實政治上有無可能完全「虛位」？且台灣畢竟在國家認同上尚處撕裂狀態，如果是「獨總統／非獨內閣」，如何左右共治？再者，台灣已然形成「總統制」的政治氛圍，則改變總統角色絕非只是改個憲法條文就能辦到的事。
尤其，現行憲法將行政權與經由選舉產生的立法院作出區隔，這對政治清廉成為重要的防火牆。從這些年來的貪腐案件可知，選舉時期的政治獻金關係，極易轉為對行政首長的賄賂行為，而內閣制若將「選舉／政治獻金／行政權／政治賄賂」連成一線，可能導致政府操守不堪聞問。
另有主張增加立委名額及重新斟酌「聯立制／並立制」者，皆不無見地。但台灣的民意代表光譜一向難用公共政策來區別，最後皆落在統獨藍綠的光譜上，如新黨後又有親民黨，又如建國黨後又有台聯再有公民組合，此種區分究竟是否符合憲政利益？再者，增加立委名額，即表示選區要再縮小；而若在愈來愈小的選區中選出立法委員，而要這些立委成為內閣制的閣員大臣，會不會令人不寒而慄？
最後，必須廓清各方主張修憲的政治鬥爭關係。如果不是真正為憲政正義的長治久安而修憲，而只是想藉修憲作為政治鬥爭的平台；國家曾因十三年七次修憲而創鉅痛深，難道還要重演「修憲以致再次毀憲」的噩夢？
Sunday, December 7, 2014
Youth Power: Wanjun vs. Xiaocao
Youth Power: Wanjun vs. Xiaocao
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2014
Executive Summary: Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
Full Text Below:
Observers of the nine in one elections underestimated the power of the younger generation in every way, from the propaganda offensive to voter mobilization. The younger generation had a profound impact on the election results. This emerging “youth power” participated in the recent elections, and includes two streams. One stream is the "Wanjun" or “Cyber Army,” which actively aired its views online. The other is the “Minzhu Xiaocao” stream, which used the election campaigns to infiltrate existing political parties at the grassroots level. Each stream has its own agenda. The long-term impact of the latter stream is likely to be substantial.
Wen-Je Ko won the enthusiastic support of many netizens. The younger generation used social networking to demand Ma Ying-jeou's ouster. It also opposed power elites. This won it considerable support. The Internet generation's alternative mobilization techniques persuaded many young people at the grassroots level to stand up and be counted. For example, Chen Jiheng, the newly elected Mayor of Chichi, in Nantou County, is a 30-something with a tech industry background. He ran on the ticket of the “Tree Party,” which split from the Green Party only three months ago. He was swept right into office. The Green Party won two council member seats. One candidate was the youngest person ever elected on Taiwan, 26-year-old Wang Hao-yu. He received the second highest number of votes among Taoyuan City council candidates. A mere doctoral candidate, Chou Chiang-jie, was also elected to the Hsinchu County Council.
Nor was that all. The DPP's “Minzhu Xiaocao”(democratic grassroots) plan backed many young candidates for alderman. Forty-seven candidates were fielded. They won nine alderman races in six municipalities, and six more village and township races in other counties and municipalities. These “grassroots” candidates may constitute a small percentage of the larger political scene. But the younger generation is willing to work its way up from arid this nutrient-deprived grassroots level. By constantly planting new shoots, they may subvert the traditional model for grassroots politics. Over time, they may flourish. From this perspective, the development is cause for optimism. This of course is something the KMT must also do.
In recent years, one protest has followed on the heels of another. The Ta Pu protests were followed by protests against urban renewal and the death of Hung Chung-chiu, and more recently by protests staged by the Sunflower Student Movement. Various social movements on Taiwan claim to be fighting on behalf of justice. The front lines are often manned by members of the younger generation. They have raised the banner of "generational justice." They are reminiscent of surging youth demonstrations the world over, including the Jasmine Revolution and the Wall Street movement. All of these involve generational tensions rooted in globalization. Taiwan has not been spared. The election results were an outbreak of accumulated youth anger.
On the surface, the ability of these “Wanjun” to set the agenda by pounding away on their keyboards all day is immense. The rapidity with which they can spread ideas by social networking is amazing. The anger in their hearts is real. But on a deeper level, The Wanjun are emotional, and lack restraint. They often behave irrationally. They lack the insight required to cope with the inevitable frustrations one encounters in real life. Therefore when the government confronts this "youth power," it must do more than just listen to their demands. It must help them overcome their anger. It must help them understand the nature of society. It must help them solve social problems. It must help them understand life. It must help them find a new direction for the nation. All these are essential.
Chang San-cheng is about to take over the post of deputy premier. He says his administration will heed the "Wanjun." But he must remember that the government cannot merely implement some "little things that make us happy” style measures. That will not win over the Internet generation. That will not help one recruit a vast Cyber Army. That will not tame the new generation. If Chang attempts that, he will be barking up the wrong tree. Any effect is likely to be negative. The key is not Cyber Army wildfires. The key is real world generational contradictions. The government must implement generational transition. It must solve economic, social, and political generational conflicts. Only that offers a root cure.
The new generation faces lost opportunities due to changing times. The younger generation hides out in cyberspace venting its anger and frustrations. Either that, or it takes to the streets and protests. In fact, it would be better if they participated in the political process and sought reform. They might have a greater impact. During the recent election, the KMT did nothing. As a result it suffered a major defeat. The DPP also did nothing. Yet it enjoyed a major victory. This shows that democracy has seriously malfunctioned. Where does the problem lie? Does the political and economic system need a major course change? Does the national resource allocation system need to be be realigned? Only by allowing new blood into politics, can one find a solution. From this point of view, "Minzhu Xiaocao" sowing seeds at the grass roots, means a great deal.
Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
青勢力：解讀「婉君」和「小草」的分流
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.08 02:08 am
九合一選舉，從文宣攻防到投票動員，年輕世代的力量不可小覷，也對選舉結果產生了深刻影響。若將這股力量稱為「青勢力」，青年世代的政治參與在這次選舉中出現兩股分流：一股是活躍在輿論表層的「婉君」（網軍），另一股則是藉選舉潛入政治基層的「民主小草」，兩者各有目標，而後者的長期影響將更可觀。
這次選舉，不僅柯文哲獲得了網友的狂熱支持，青年世代透過社群網站呼籲倒馬、反權貴，也收到了可觀的效果。除此之外，網路世代的另類動員，也促成了一些年輕素人在基層的出線。例如，南投縣集集鎮選出的新鎮長，是年方卅、科技業出身的陳紀衡，他披的是三個月前才從綠黨分裂的「樹黨」戰袍，一舉當選。此外，綠黨這次也誕生了兩名議員，包括全台最年輕的當選人——廿六歲的王浩宇，以第二高票當選桃園市議員；以及仍就讀博士班的周江杰，當選新竹縣議員。
不僅如此，民進黨號召青年競選里長的「民主小草」計畫，共推出四十七名候選人，結果拿下六都的九個里長以及其他縣市的六個鄉鎮民代表。在整個政治的大盤中，這些「小草」所占的比率雖然不高，但年輕世代願意從養分貧瘠的基層開拓耕耘，藉由不斷植入較新穎的理念，應能持續顛覆台灣傳統的基層政治經營模式，久而久之，或許能產生開枝散葉的效果。從這點看，是值得樂觀的發展，這當然也是國民黨必須警惕的事。
近幾年，從大埔事件到都更抗爭，從洪仲丘事件到太陽花學運，台灣社會各項訴諸正義的抗爭，前線的戰鬥主力屢屢由新世代擔綱，擎起了「世代正義」的大旗。這和世界風起雲湧的青年示威、茉莉花革命，乃至占領華爾街運動一樣，都是全球化衝擊引發世代緊張的一環，台灣亦未倖免。這次的選舉結果，正是這股青年憤怒積累之後的總爆發。
從表層看，網路上這些成天敲著鍵盤沸沸揚揚的各路「婉君」，他們創造議題的能力是強大的，他們透過社群網路散播訊息的速度是驚人的，他們心中的憤怒也是極真實的。但深一層看，這些婉君們宣洩情緒的方式是缺乏節制的，他們探討問題的方式有時流於非理性，他們面對生命、處理挫折的態度則是不太瞻前顧後的。也因此，政府面對這股「青勢力」，除了呼應他們的想法與需要，如何引導他們走出憤怒的循環，如何讓他們透過參與了解社會問題的本質和解決之道，如何提升他們看待人生及國家格局的眼光，恐怕都不可或缺。
也因此，當即將接任副閣揆的張善政提到未來施政將把「婉君」和年輕人放在心上時，他必須意識到，政府不能只是提出一些「小確幸」措施，就想要籠絡網路世代；或以為培養一支網路大軍，就能馴服新世代。如果那樣的話，不僅是抓錯處方開錯藥，可能更收到反效果。關鍵不在「婉君」的喧囂野火，而在現實的世代矛盾；政府必須正視價值與實踐的世代遷移，並設法解決經濟、社會、政治各層面的世代矛盾，才是根本之道。
再回到新世代的立場看，面對自己因時代變化而流失的機會，年輕族群與其躲在網路自艾自怨，或游擊於街頭抗議發洩情緒，不如進入政治親自尋求體制的改革力量，或許能產生更大的能量。這次選舉，國民黨因缺乏作為而大敗，民進黨因缺乏作為而大勝，都顯示民主政治已面臨嚴重的功能性障礙。其中癥結，究竟是政經制度需要徹底改弦更張，或者是國家資源分配制度必須重新調整，只有讓更多新血投入政治，才能發現解決之道。從這點看，「民主小草」的植根基層，便具有更積極的意義。
台灣的正義課題，基本上是「階級差距」大過「世代差距」，這是年輕世代必須認清的方向。這次選舉，人們已領略了「青勢力」的奔放，而從「婉君」與「小草」的分流看，新世代浮泛的不滿若能轉為實際的政治參與，應更有助改善青年自身的處境。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2014
Executive Summary: Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
Full Text Below:
Observers of the nine in one elections underestimated the power of the younger generation in every way, from the propaganda offensive to voter mobilization. The younger generation had a profound impact on the election results. This emerging “youth power” participated in the recent elections, and includes two streams. One stream is the "Wanjun" or “Cyber Army,” which actively aired its views online. The other is the “Minzhu Xiaocao” stream, which used the election campaigns to infiltrate existing political parties at the grassroots level. Each stream has its own agenda. The long-term impact of the latter stream is likely to be substantial.
Wen-Je Ko won the enthusiastic support of many netizens. The younger generation used social networking to demand Ma Ying-jeou's ouster. It also opposed power elites. This won it considerable support. The Internet generation's alternative mobilization techniques persuaded many young people at the grassroots level to stand up and be counted. For example, Chen Jiheng, the newly elected Mayor of Chichi, in Nantou County, is a 30-something with a tech industry background. He ran on the ticket of the “Tree Party,” which split from the Green Party only three months ago. He was swept right into office. The Green Party won two council member seats. One candidate was the youngest person ever elected on Taiwan, 26-year-old Wang Hao-yu. He received the second highest number of votes among Taoyuan City council candidates. A mere doctoral candidate, Chou Chiang-jie, was also elected to the Hsinchu County Council.
Nor was that all. The DPP's “Minzhu Xiaocao”(democratic grassroots) plan backed many young candidates for alderman. Forty-seven candidates were fielded. They won nine alderman races in six municipalities, and six more village and township races in other counties and municipalities. These “grassroots” candidates may constitute a small percentage of the larger political scene. But the younger generation is willing to work its way up from arid this nutrient-deprived grassroots level. By constantly planting new shoots, they may subvert the traditional model for grassroots politics. Over time, they may flourish. From this perspective, the development is cause for optimism. This of course is something the KMT must also do.
In recent years, one protest has followed on the heels of another. The Ta Pu protests were followed by protests against urban renewal and the death of Hung Chung-chiu, and more recently by protests staged by the Sunflower Student Movement. Various social movements on Taiwan claim to be fighting on behalf of justice. The front lines are often manned by members of the younger generation. They have raised the banner of "generational justice." They are reminiscent of surging youth demonstrations the world over, including the Jasmine Revolution and the Wall Street movement. All of these involve generational tensions rooted in globalization. Taiwan has not been spared. The election results were an outbreak of accumulated youth anger.
On the surface, the ability of these “Wanjun” to set the agenda by pounding away on their keyboards all day is immense. The rapidity with which they can spread ideas by social networking is amazing. The anger in their hearts is real. But on a deeper level, The Wanjun are emotional, and lack restraint. They often behave irrationally. They lack the insight required to cope with the inevitable frustrations one encounters in real life. Therefore when the government confronts this "youth power," it must do more than just listen to their demands. It must help them overcome their anger. It must help them understand the nature of society. It must help them solve social problems. It must help them understand life. It must help them find a new direction for the nation. All these are essential.
Chang San-cheng is about to take over the post of deputy premier. He says his administration will heed the "Wanjun." But he must remember that the government cannot merely implement some "little things that make us happy” style measures. That will not win over the Internet generation. That will not help one recruit a vast Cyber Army. That will not tame the new generation. If Chang attempts that, he will be barking up the wrong tree. Any effect is likely to be negative. The key is not Cyber Army wildfires. The key is real world generational contradictions. The government must implement generational transition. It must solve economic, social, and political generational conflicts. Only that offers a root cure.
The new generation faces lost opportunities due to changing times. The younger generation hides out in cyberspace venting its anger and frustrations. Either that, or it takes to the streets and protests. In fact, it would be better if they participated in the political process and sought reform. They might have a greater impact. During the recent election, the KMT did nothing. As a result it suffered a major defeat. The DPP also did nothing. Yet it enjoyed a major victory. This shows that democracy has seriously malfunctioned. Where does the problem lie? Does the political and economic system need a major course change? Does the national resource allocation system need to be be realigned? Only by allowing new blood into politics, can one find a solution. From this point of view, "Minzhu Xiaocao" sowing seeds at the grass roots, means a great deal.
Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
青勢力：解讀「婉君」和「小草」的分流
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.08 02:08 am
九合一選舉，從文宣攻防到投票動員，年輕世代的力量不可小覷，也對選舉結果產生了深刻影響。若將這股力量稱為「青勢力」，青年世代的政治參與在這次選舉中出現兩股分流：一股是活躍在輿論表層的「婉君」（網軍），另一股則是藉選舉潛入政治基層的「民主小草」，兩者各有目標，而後者的長期影響將更可觀。
這次選舉，不僅柯文哲獲得了網友的狂熱支持，青年世代透過社群網站呼籲倒馬、反權貴，也收到了可觀的效果。除此之外，網路世代的另類動員，也促成了一些年輕素人在基層的出線。例如，南投縣集集鎮選出的新鎮長，是年方卅、科技業出身的陳紀衡，他披的是三個月前才從綠黨分裂的「樹黨」戰袍，一舉當選。此外，綠黨這次也誕生了兩名議員，包括全台最年輕的當選人——廿六歲的王浩宇，以第二高票當選桃園市議員；以及仍就讀博士班的周江杰，當選新竹縣議員。
不僅如此，民進黨號召青年競選里長的「民主小草」計畫，共推出四十七名候選人，結果拿下六都的九個里長以及其他縣市的六個鄉鎮民代表。在整個政治的大盤中，這些「小草」所占的比率雖然不高，但年輕世代願意從養分貧瘠的基層開拓耕耘，藉由不斷植入較新穎的理念，應能持續顛覆台灣傳統的基層政治經營模式，久而久之，或許能產生開枝散葉的效果。從這點看，是值得樂觀的發展，這當然也是國民黨必須警惕的事。
近幾年，從大埔事件到都更抗爭，從洪仲丘事件到太陽花學運，台灣社會各項訴諸正義的抗爭，前線的戰鬥主力屢屢由新世代擔綱，擎起了「世代正義」的大旗。這和世界風起雲湧的青年示威、茉莉花革命，乃至占領華爾街運動一樣，都是全球化衝擊引發世代緊張的一環，台灣亦未倖免。這次的選舉結果，正是這股青年憤怒積累之後的總爆發。
從表層看，網路上這些成天敲著鍵盤沸沸揚揚的各路「婉君」，他們創造議題的能力是強大的，他們透過社群網路散播訊息的速度是驚人的，他們心中的憤怒也是極真實的。但深一層看，這些婉君們宣洩情緒的方式是缺乏節制的，他們探討問題的方式有時流於非理性，他們面對生命、處理挫折的態度則是不太瞻前顧後的。也因此，政府面對這股「青勢力」，除了呼應他們的想法與需要，如何引導他們走出憤怒的循環，如何讓他們透過參與了解社會問題的本質和解決之道，如何提升他們看待人生及國家格局的眼光，恐怕都不可或缺。
也因此，當即將接任副閣揆的張善政提到未來施政將把「婉君」和年輕人放在心上時，他必須意識到，政府不能只是提出一些「小確幸」措施，就想要籠絡網路世代；或以為培養一支網路大軍，就能馴服新世代。如果那樣的話，不僅是抓錯處方開錯藥，可能更收到反效果。關鍵不在「婉君」的喧囂野火，而在現實的世代矛盾；政府必須正視價值與實踐的世代遷移，並設法解決經濟、社會、政治各層面的世代矛盾，才是根本之道。
再回到新世代的立場看，面對自己因時代變化而流失的機會，年輕族群與其躲在網路自艾自怨，或游擊於街頭抗議發洩情緒，不如進入政治親自尋求體制的改革力量，或許能產生更大的能量。這次選舉，國民黨因缺乏作為而大敗，民進黨因缺乏作為而大勝，都顯示民主政治已面臨嚴重的功能性障礙。其中癥結，究竟是政經制度需要徹底改弦更張，或者是國家資源分配制度必須重新調整，只有讓更多新血投入政治，才能發現解決之道。從這點看，「民主小草」的植根基層，便具有更積極的意義。
台灣的正義課題，基本上是「階級差距」大過「世代差距」，這是年輕世代必須認清的方向。這次選舉，人們已領略了「青勢力」的奔放，而從「婉君」與「小草」的分流看，新世代浮泛的不滿若能轉為實際的政治參與，應更有助改善青年自身的處境。
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