Wang Zhang Meeting: Cross-Strait New Normal
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2015
Executive Summary: Beijing is not the only one that must adjust to the "new normal". Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP may be feeling smug. But they too must abandon the old normal. They must disabuse themselves of their delusions. They must cease their -deception. They must forsake their pipe dream of Taiwan independence. That will reduce the labor pains associated with the new normal. Only then can we look forward to a "new normal".
Full Text Below:
Mainland GDP has plummeted. The Beijing regime refers to it as the "new normal". By the same token, cross-Strait relations following the Kuomintang defeat can also be described as a "new normal".
The KMT suffered a major defeat in the nine in one local elections. But Beijing did not miss a step. It still allowed Chen Deming to visit Taiwan. The Cross-Strait Entrepreneurs Summit will still be held, on schedule. STA Technical Consultations will still take place in Beijing, as previously planned. Two months after the election, Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi will meet this weekend on Kinmen to reminisce. The CCP undoubtedly understands the new reality. This is the "new normal". These changes in cross-Strait relations must be acknowledged.
The “old normal" maintained that Ma Ying-jeou's landslide victory meant that most voters supported cross-Strait reconciliation. It meant that most voters supported closer political and economic ties between the two sides. Wave upon wave of “two states theory” and “one nation rhetoric on each side led to historic changes. New opportunities arose. Cross-Strait direct flights and ECFA clarified the Taiwan public's understanding, and eliminated calls for Taiwan independence. Over the past six or seven years the physical basis for cross-Strait relations has indeed been reinforced. But the emotional basis has been repeatedly weakened. The Mainland authorities adhere to reductive materialism. They believe in the materialistic old normal. They assumed that concessions, agreements, and procurements would provide prosperity, and melt the hearts of the public on Taiwan. But paradoxically during last year's election campaign, the Sunflower Student Movement obdurately rejected the STA despite all its concessions, bringing the "old normal" to an abrupt end.
The first Wang Zhang meeting was held one month before the outbreak of the Sunflower Student Movement. This was during the last stages of the "old normal". But in the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan will address the "san zhong yi qing” or “three medium/middles one young” problem. This foretells the advent of the "new normal". The current Wang Zhang meeting in Kinmen will debut after the Kuomintang's recent defeat. It marks the beginning of an even longer term "new normal".
What will the "new normal" entail? It is likely to entail greater long term momentum for Taiwan independence. The KMT is not necessarily down and out. But it may once again find itself in the opposition after 2016. How long will it remain out of power? No one knows. Under Democratic Progressive Party rule, cross-Strait relations will surely be difficult and filled with conflict. Eventually the DPP will come to realize that cross-Strait reintegration is inevitable. But before that, it must investigate the possibility of a cross-Strait political agreement. That will be a long process. But it truly will be the new normal.
The third Wang Zhang meeting is seen as the start of the “new normal". Why? Because it constitutes the highest level contacts yet between cross-Strait officialdom. It is being convened a mere two months after the defeat of the Kuomintang. The CCP is probably psychologically prepared for the policy consequences. This action may be an attempt by Xi Jinping to gauge public sentiment on Taiwan. Last September he spoke of a "meeting of minds”. The CCP may need to prepare itself for a "new normal" definition of a “meeting of minds”. It may no longer be able to focus exclusively on materialism. Reintegration may need to include both emotional and material appeals. These may be the identifying characteristics of the new normal.
Consider the problems with the "old normal". The CCP offered Taiwan only economic concessions. It totally ignored emotional factors. For example, the public on Taiwan still feels hemmed in. Ma Ying-jeou has been in office over six years. But he has yet to join a single international organization. Ma Ying-jeou hoped to attend APEC in Beijing. But Xi Jinping promptly put a damper on that hope. Beijing may have allowed direct official contacts across the Strait. It may have addressed Wang Yu-chi by his official title. But it refused to allow the two sides' agencies to interact on an equal footing. Such practices inevitably undermined the old normal. They prevented it from gaining currency among the public on Taiwan.
Therefore we need a more rational "new normal" policy, one that grants Taiwan greater dignity in cross-Strait interaction. One that allows Taiwan to breathe instead choke. After last last year's election, Beijing hawks began urging a harder line on the 1992 consensus. That is precisely the wrong approach. The "new normal" should soften the 1992 consensus. It should encourage the DPP and the Green Camp to change their thinking. It should reward them if they respond by making changes. Beijing should not adopt a tougher policy in a fit of anger.
During the Kinmen talks Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi will discuss trade issues. But the two sides joining the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement" (RCEP) is the most important issue of all. It is not simply an "economic issue". It is an emotional issue involving international breathing space. When Beijing allows Taipei to participate in comprehensive RCEP negotiations, that will be the first act under the "new normal".
Beijing is not the only one that must adjust to the "new normal". Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP may be feeling smug. But they too must abandon the old normal. They must disabuse themselves of their delusions. They must cease their -deception. They must forsake their pipe dream of Taiwan independence. That will reduce the labor pains associated with the new normal. Only then can we look forward to a "new normal".
王張金門會：兩岸新常態的起點
2015-02-05 02:06:53 聯合報 社論
北京以「新常態」一詞形容ＧＤＰ掉得很凶的大陸經濟；同理，國民黨敗選後的兩岸，亦應以「新常態」看待。
國民黨九合一地方大選慘敗後，北京沒有失去節奏，依然讓陳德銘訪台，如期舉行兩岸企業家峰會、貨貿的技術磋商也在北京上場，而選後不過兩個月，張志軍與王郁琦這個周末仍要在金門舉行「王張會」敘舊。中共無疑已認清現實，這些都是「新常態」，是兩岸演化循環中必然要面對的變化。
曾經以為的「常態」是：馬英九高票當選，反映選民對兩岸和解的普遍認同，大多數人鼎力支持兩岸走向更密切的政經連結，它是歷經「兩國論」、「一邊一國」等波濤後的歷史翻轉，更是全新的機遇，藉由搭建兩岸直航、經濟合作框架，將可穩固台灣民眾的情境認知、消弭島內的台獨聲浪。然而，證諸六、七年來的發展，兩岸物質的表土確實夯硬了，但兩岸心理的內核卻一再剝解。
篤信唯物主義的中共當局，勢必曾經相信這個舊常態的物質基礎，以為藉由讓利、契作、採購所撐出來的榮景，會融化台灣的民心。但弔詭的是，去年的太陽花運動，對一紙仍然讓利的《兩岸服貿協議》進行徹底的反對論述，「舊常態」就此戛然而止。
第一次南京的「王張會」在太陽花爆發前一個月舉行，仍在「舊常態」的尾聲之中；但太陽花後，張志軍來台鎖定走訪「三中一青」的第二次「王張會」，儼然已是「新常態」的前奏。這次金門的「王張會」，是在國民黨慘敗之後登場，則是宣告勢必更為久遠的「新常態」啟動。
「新常態」的氛圍將是：台灣內部的台獨聲勢有可能長期居高，國民黨雖未必一蹶不振，但二○一六卻可能再度淪為在野，且不知其盡頭；兩岸必須在民進黨中央執政的情境下，進行不斷地纏鬥與艱困地調整，最終得來台灣確鑿的認知：兩岸統合確是最終歸趨，但在它之前，必須探討出一個可以相互包容的政治協議。這是長期的過程，並且是真正的常態。
將第三次「王張會」視為「新常態」的起點，主要是它乃兩岸官方最高層次接觸機制，卻在國民黨慘敗兩個月後迅速登場，應是中共已具有心理體認下明顯有意識的政策抉擇。這可以視為習近平探索台灣民心的行動起點，而去年九月他提出「心靈契合」說，則是進入「新常態」的理論預備。心靈契合意味著，不再專注於物質，而要尋求心靈與物質的「調和」與「合一」，這是新常態的辨認特徵。
診察「舊常態」的病徵可以發現，中共只圖在經濟上儘可能供應台灣索求，全然忽略台灣在心靈層次的期待，諸如，台灣在國際空間上仍然甚為窒礙，馬英九任內六年多竟無法成功加入某一國際組織，甚至馬英九提議出席北京ＡＰＥＣ，也被習近平快速回絕。北京固然放手實現兩岸官方直接接觸，稱呼王郁琦的官銜，卻又為德不卒地拒讓各個部會比照辦理。這些作法，皆不免消耗舊常態持續的能量，無法為它爭取更長時間的擴散與認同。
故而，進入「新常態」的政策理性應是：更深刻地思考台灣在兩岸互動上必須贏得的尊嚴，它必須採取「呼吸策略」而不是「窒息策略」。去年選後，北京鷹派人士主張「硬化九二共識」恰恰正是錯解，「新常態」反而應該「軟化九二共識」，以鼓勵民進黨與綠營人物的改變為思維主調，並且以獎賞作為回應他們的改變，而絕非搬出更強硬的封殺政策，只逞一時之快。
固然這次金門會談，張志軍跟王郁琦彷彿仍是討論經貿議題，但兩岸共同加入「區域全面經濟夥伴協議」（ＲＣＥＰ）是重中之重，而它絕不僅是一項「經濟議題」，而更是國際空間的「心靈議題」，當中共同意台灣參與ＲＣＥＰ的全面談判，將是「新常態」下的第一件插旗行動。
然而，進入「新常態」的並不單單只有北京，如今躊躇滿志的蔡英文與民進黨也須拋棄舊我，解構妄尊自欺的虛幻台獨，減少新常態下的陣痛，則「新常態」或尚頗可寄眺。
Wednesday, February 4, 2015
Tuesday, February 3, 2015
A Far More Serious Matter than the Four Month “Unattended Window”
A Far More Serious Matter than the Four Month “Unattended Window”
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2015
Executive Summary: Will the 2016 presidential and legislative elections be combined and held simultaneously? That is the Central Election Commission's preference. KMT Chairman Eric Chu thinks that if a ruling party change takes place, a four-month "constitutional unattended window" will appear, and he considers it cause for concern. Tsai Ing-wen mocked this as a case of "yesterday pro, today con." She said the four-month unattended window is not a new problem, since it appeared during the 2012 election. She is only half right. Should the presidential and legislative elections be combined? If one thinks only about saving money, then one is missing the forest for the trees. When the nation has already been paralyzed, what's the point of saving a few hundred million NT?
Full Text Below:
Will the 2016 presidential and legislative elections be combined and held simultaneously? That is the Central Election Commission's preference. KMT Chairman Eric Chu thinks that if a ruling party change takes place, a four-month "constitutional unattended window" will appear, and he considers it cause for concern. Tsai Ing-wen mocked this as a case of "yesterday pro, today con." She said the four-month unattended window is not a new problem, since it appeared during the 2012 election. She is only half right.
Should the presidential election be combined with the legislative elections? Two considerations come to mind. One. Cost and time. Combining the two would indeed lower costs. Voters would not have to return to the polls a second time so soon after the first. The CEC argues that this would both save money and labor. Naturally it advocates combining the two elections. Two. Political considerations. A popular presidential candidate is likely to prefer combining the two elections. A coat tails effect would give his party legislators a boost, and help more of his comrades get elected. Given current momentum, the DPP's advocacy of combined elections, and Eric Chu's opposition to them, are based on political calculations by both parties.
The problem is that legislators are elected in January. According to the constitution, they are sworn in on February 1. But the four year presidential term does not begin until May 20. This is what Eric Chu meant by the "four-month unattended window period". In earlier years, standard practice was to hold presidential and legislative elections separately. Legislative elections were held in mid-January. Presidential elections were held in late March. In 2012 President Ma sought re-election. The CEC combined the two elections for the first time. Ma Ying-jeou was successfully re-elected. Therefore the four month long unattended window problem failed to materialize. Tsai's claim that the unattended window was already a problem is not quite correct. The "constitutional unattended window problem” only appears during a ruling party change. If a president is re-elected for a second term, the problem never materializes.
Lest we forget, in 2012, shortly after Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected, US beef imports controversy, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes, the capital gains tax, and pension reforms all provoked a backlash. By the beginning of his second term, he was already battered and bruised. His popularity had already suffered a serious blow. Public opinion turned against him, so swiftly that people were stunned. This alerted people to the potential drawbacks of the four month unattended window problem. Now go further back. In 2008 a second change in ruling parties took place. Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in late March. On May 20, Chen Shui-bian formally handed over power. The time gap was less than two months. But during this brief gap, the Chen regime purchased a large number of paper shredders. With these he engaged in the wholesale destruction of official documents, including evidence. Over 30,000 documents were destroyed, not counting those we know nothing about. Chen did all this in a mere two months, creating a terrible constitutional discontinuity. Just imagine what a four month long discontinuity might have led to. Aren't the potential consequences worrying?
Moreover, Taiwan's democracy has become "election-oriented" rather than "governance-oriented". Under "election-oriented" politics, the political process is hijacked by the election process. As soon as the ruling and opposition parties finish fighting one election battle, they immediately move to the next one. Politicians care only about whether they win and they can win. Voters care only about who wins and who loses, not about which policy is adopted and how the nation is governed. In short, national development, rational decision-making, social construction, even the people's welfare, all come second. This sort of impatient, rash atmosphere prevailed just before the nine in one elections. Wen-Je Ko, Eric Chu, and Lai Ching-teh were asked every day whether they would run in the 2016 presidential election. Put simply, politicians are the stars in politics. The people are merely election tools. Unfortunately, voters on Taiwan are far less interested in sound governance than they are the worship of political idols. They are happy to serves as their election tools. The pursuit of novelty is the key to this issue.
Take the system in South Korea. To avoid long-term rulers from becoming corrupt and abusing their power, the South Korean Constitution limits the President to a single five year term. No second term is permitted. This encourages politicians to work as hard as they can to realize their goals as soon as they are elected. During President Roh Moo-hyun's term, he proposed amending the term to four years with one additional term allowed. He failed to gain the support he wanted. This shows that, the South Korean people demanded limits on presidential power.
Among Western democracies, those that prohibit second terms for their presidents are in the minority. But consider the situation on Taiwan. Consider the fierce blue vs. green confrontation. Consider the lack of democratic attitudes. Political parties engage in nothing but malicious obstructionism. Chen Shui-bian was scandal-ridden for over two years before his term of office expired. The Ma government's impossible situation has lasted nearly two years. Such vicious political battles and wheel-spinning, are a hundred times more serious than a "four-month unattended window period". They are the reasons why Taiwan remains mired in quicksand. Constitutional issues have been raised. Shouldn't we learn from Korea's presidency and institutions? Shouldn't they be a matter of consideration? Wouldn't they at least provide a reference point for the direction of our own institutional change?
Should the presidential and legislative elections be combined? If one thinks only about saving money, then one is missing the forest for the trees. When the nation has already been paralyzed, what's the point of saving a few hundred million NT?
比四個月空窗期更嚴重的事2015-02-04 01:39:32 聯合報 社論
二○一六總統與立委選舉是否合併舉行，中選會目前傾向併選；
總統大選要不要與立委選舉合併舉行，有兩方面的考慮。一，
問題在，立委在一月中選出後，根據憲法規定，
若人們不健忘的話，二○一二年馬英九當選連任後不久，
時光再往前回溯，二○○八年二次政黨輪替時，
再說，台灣的民主已經變成一種「選舉導向」的政治，而不是一種「
我們不妨看看韓國的制度，當初為了避免長期執政的貪腐濫權，
在西方民主制度中，禁止總統連任的國家，實屬少數。
總統和立委選舉要不要合併舉行，若從「省錢」的角度著眼，
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2015
Executive Summary: Will the 2016 presidential and legislative elections be combined and held simultaneously? That is the Central Election Commission's preference. KMT Chairman Eric Chu thinks that if a ruling party change takes place, a four-month "constitutional unattended window" will appear, and he considers it cause for concern. Tsai Ing-wen mocked this as a case of "yesterday pro, today con." She said the four-month unattended window is not a new problem, since it appeared during the 2012 election. She is only half right. Should the presidential and legislative elections be combined? If one thinks only about saving money, then one is missing the forest for the trees. When the nation has already been paralyzed, what's the point of saving a few hundred million NT?
Full Text Below:
Will the 2016 presidential and legislative elections be combined and held simultaneously? That is the Central Election Commission's preference. KMT Chairman Eric Chu thinks that if a ruling party change takes place, a four-month "constitutional unattended window" will appear, and he considers it cause for concern. Tsai Ing-wen mocked this as a case of "yesterday pro, today con." She said the four-month unattended window is not a new problem, since it appeared during the 2012 election. She is only half right.
Should the presidential election be combined with the legislative elections? Two considerations come to mind. One. Cost and time. Combining the two would indeed lower costs. Voters would not have to return to the polls a second time so soon after the first. The CEC argues that this would both save money and labor. Naturally it advocates combining the two elections. Two. Political considerations. A popular presidential candidate is likely to prefer combining the two elections. A coat tails effect would give his party legislators a boost, and help more of his comrades get elected. Given current momentum, the DPP's advocacy of combined elections, and Eric Chu's opposition to them, are based on political calculations by both parties.
The problem is that legislators are elected in January. According to the constitution, they are sworn in on February 1. But the four year presidential term does not begin until May 20. This is what Eric Chu meant by the "four-month unattended window period". In earlier years, standard practice was to hold presidential and legislative elections separately. Legislative elections were held in mid-January. Presidential elections were held in late March. In 2012 President Ma sought re-election. The CEC combined the two elections for the first time. Ma Ying-jeou was successfully re-elected. Therefore the four month long unattended window problem failed to materialize. Tsai's claim that the unattended window was already a problem is not quite correct. The "constitutional unattended window problem” only appears during a ruling party change. If a president is re-elected for a second term, the problem never materializes.
Lest we forget, in 2012, shortly after Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected, US beef imports controversy, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes, the capital gains tax, and pension reforms all provoked a backlash. By the beginning of his second term, he was already battered and bruised. His popularity had already suffered a serious blow. Public opinion turned against him, so swiftly that people were stunned. This alerted people to the potential drawbacks of the four month unattended window problem. Now go further back. In 2008 a second change in ruling parties took place. Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in late March. On May 20, Chen Shui-bian formally handed over power. The time gap was less than two months. But during this brief gap, the Chen regime purchased a large number of paper shredders. With these he engaged in the wholesale destruction of official documents, including evidence. Over 30,000 documents were destroyed, not counting those we know nothing about. Chen did all this in a mere two months, creating a terrible constitutional discontinuity. Just imagine what a four month long discontinuity might have led to. Aren't the potential consequences worrying?
Moreover, Taiwan's democracy has become "election-oriented" rather than "governance-oriented". Under "election-oriented" politics, the political process is hijacked by the election process. As soon as the ruling and opposition parties finish fighting one election battle, they immediately move to the next one. Politicians care only about whether they win and they can win. Voters care only about who wins and who loses, not about which policy is adopted and how the nation is governed. In short, national development, rational decision-making, social construction, even the people's welfare, all come second. This sort of impatient, rash atmosphere prevailed just before the nine in one elections. Wen-Je Ko, Eric Chu, and Lai Ching-teh were asked every day whether they would run in the 2016 presidential election. Put simply, politicians are the stars in politics. The people are merely election tools. Unfortunately, voters on Taiwan are far less interested in sound governance than they are the worship of political idols. They are happy to serves as their election tools. The pursuit of novelty is the key to this issue.
Take the system in South Korea. To avoid long-term rulers from becoming corrupt and abusing their power, the South Korean Constitution limits the President to a single five year term. No second term is permitted. This encourages politicians to work as hard as they can to realize their goals as soon as they are elected. During President Roh Moo-hyun's term, he proposed amending the term to four years with one additional term allowed. He failed to gain the support he wanted. This shows that, the South Korean people demanded limits on presidential power.
Among Western democracies, those that prohibit second terms for their presidents are in the minority. But consider the situation on Taiwan. Consider the fierce blue vs. green confrontation. Consider the lack of democratic attitudes. Political parties engage in nothing but malicious obstructionism. Chen Shui-bian was scandal-ridden for over two years before his term of office expired. The Ma government's impossible situation has lasted nearly two years. Such vicious political battles and wheel-spinning, are a hundred times more serious than a "four-month unattended window period". They are the reasons why Taiwan remains mired in quicksand. Constitutional issues have been raised. Shouldn't we learn from Korea's presidency and institutions? Shouldn't they be a matter of consideration? Wouldn't they at least provide a reference point for the direction of our own institutional change?
Should the presidential and legislative elections be combined? If one thinks only about saving money, then one is missing the forest for the trees. When the nation has already been paralyzed, what's the point of saving a few hundred million NT?
比四個月空窗期更嚴重的事2015-02-04 01:39:32 聯合報 社論
二○一六總統與立委選舉是否合併舉行，中選會目前傾向併選；
總統大選要不要與立委選舉合併舉行，有兩方面的考慮。一，
問題在，立委在一月中選出後，根據憲法規定，
若人們不健忘的話，二○一二年馬英九當選連任後不久，
時光再往前回溯，二○○八年二次政黨輪替時，
再說，台灣的民主已經變成一種「選舉導向」的政治，而不是一種「
我們不妨看看韓國的制度，當初為了避免長期執政的貪腐濫權，
在西方民主制度中，禁止總統連任的國家，實屬少數。
總統和立委選舉要不要合併舉行，若從「省錢」的角度著眼，
Monday, February 2, 2015
Nationality and Nationhood: The Great Debate of 2016
Nationality and Nationhood: The Great Debate of 2016
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2015
Executive Summary: All major national policies are currently deadlocked. A change in the ruling party may take place in 2016, and become a major turning point in Taiwan's future. DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a National Affairs Conference. This could be the perfect occasion for a public debate on possible changes in 2016. We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this national forum.
Full Text Below:
All major national policies are currently deadlocked. A change in the ruling party may take place in 2016, and become a major turning point in Taiwan's future. DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a National Affairs Conference. This could be the perfect occasion for a public debate on possible changes in 2016. We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this national forum.
Perhaps no one will forcibly occupy the podium. But that does not mean that no one will attempt to stage-manage this forum in a one-sided manner. The composition of the forum, the setting, and the issues, should all be decided jointly, in an open and transparent manner. That is the proper way to convene a national policy forum.
Take the composition of the forum. It is Tsai Ing-wen's brainchild. Will it therefore be chaired by the DPP? One. Past national forums were presided over by the president. This elevated the status of the forums. It also linked the forum conclusions directly to the government. Will the president preside over this forum? If not, how will that affect its status? Two. If the president does not preside over this forum, will the president deliver the opening remarks? Three. Should the president and government officials attend in an unofficial capacity? Should they express policy views during the forum? Four. Will the guest list be one-sided? Five. Should groups such as the Sunflower Student Movement, anti-nuclear groups, Taiwan independence groups, and pro-reunification groups be invited?
We feel the conference should be a national level event with diverse representation. Therefore, any role for the president must be handled judiciously. Tsai Ing-wen must not be allowed to turn the forum into her presidential campaign rally. The public should perceive it as a national policy platform for the changes that may unfold in 2016. Tsai Ing-wen may insist on being the conference moderator. That need not be a deal-breaker. But the DPP has a record of attacking or evading national policy issues. If the DPP chairs the forum, then the forum's policy conclusions must be seen as representing the DPP and no one else.
The DPP may refuse to allow the president to preside over the forum. But the president and government officials can still state their policy views and take part in the debate. Forum attendees can attend in an unofficial capacity. But the government, political parties, and civic groups must be represented. In the past, party leaders often found it difficult to convene such debates. The public will surely expect Ma Ying-jeou to attend. They will expect Eric Chu and Tsai Ing-wen to personally participate in a policy debate. By the same token, the forum should not exclude the Sunflower Student Movement, anti-nuclear groups, Taiwan independence groups and others. These groups must be in attendance to ensure the integrity and diversity of the forum. Since the forum is being convened by the DPP, its allies must be allowed to attend.
Take the matter of the forum agenda. The situation may change in 2016. Therefore three major issues are unavoidable. One. Cross-Strait relations. For example, after 2016 should the government repudiate cross-Strait policies based on the 1992 consensus? Should it renew or repudiate the ECFA follow-up agreements? Should the "Taiwan independence party platform" be frozen, abolished, or retained? Such topics are taboo within the DPP. The views of the public should be aired during the forum. Two. The globalization of economic policy. Given globalization, should we rely on Beijing to take care of Taiwan's "Three Smalls and One Young" problem? Problems plague small and medium enterprises, middle and lower income families, citizens in central and southern Taiwan, and young people. Given the impact of globalization, how can we reform Taiwan's industrial structure? How can we ensure globalization-based cross-Strait coopetition? Given globalization, how can we reform Taiwan's energy policy? Globalization has exacerbated the wealth gap. Social justice must address this issue. Three. Amending the constitution. Does the DPP seek to amend the constitution? Does it seek to delete the preface, which reads, "In response to the need for national reunification"? Does it seek to change "one country, two areas" to "one nation on each side"? Does it seek to repudiate the "one China Constitution"? Could such a constitution be the basis for coopetition with the Mainland?
Does the DPP seek a constitutional amendment abolishing presidential elections? Does it seek to restore Legislative Yuan approval of premiership appointments? Does the DPP seek to implement "executive power track change" to avoid minority government impasses? Should the constitutional amendment process be divided into two stages, one pre-2016 and one post-2016? Most importantly, should Legislative Yuan "political consultations" continue?
No topic should be taboo. Not topic should be evaded. Participants must be determied to get to the bottom of things. All cards must be laid on the table. Nothing must be omitted. Only that would constitute an adequate response to potential changes in 2016. National identity, amendments to the constitution, elimination of the one China clause, energy policy, globalization, the 1992 consensus, ECFA, economic development, social justice, and other major issues must all be addressed. The public expects to hear the views of the DPP, the KMT, community representatives, policy experts, and academics. It expects the forum to offer concrete policy recommendations just as other forums have in the past.
Changes may be coming in 2016. People on Taiwan cannot bury their heads in the sand, ostrich fashion. They cannot behave like frogs being cooked alive. We expect the KMT and the DPP to hold a debate on the changes expected in 2106. They must have both the responsibility and the desire to attend such a national conference. We hope that community organizations will share the results of this conference with the public. Therefore the conference should split into small groups addressing specific issues. The conference as a whole should then discuss the findings of these small groups. Participants need not fear complex debates. They should only fear barriers to free expression, and evasion of what is truly important.
We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this forum. This forum should enable a multifaceted debate about potential changes in the nation's circumstances in 2016.
藉國是會議進行二○一六變局大辯論
2015-02-03 02:17:53 聯合報 社論
在幾乎所有重大國政皆陷僵局的此際，二○
沒有人霸占主席台，也是指沒有人可片面操控這場國是會議。
先論會議的組成。此會由蔡英文倡議，是否即由民進黨主持？一、
我們認為，會議的組成應以「國家高度／多元代表」為基準。因此，
我們認為，即使否決了由總統主持，
再論議題的設定。面對二○一六變局，有三大議題不容迴避。一、
再者，是否要修憲廢止總統直選？是否要恢復「
此次國是會議的議題不應再有任何忌諱與閃躲，
面對二○一六的變局，台灣不能再做把頭埋在沙裡的鴕鳥，
這若是一場無人霸占主席台的國是論壇，我們期盼：
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2015
Executive Summary: All major national policies are currently deadlocked. A change in the ruling party may take place in 2016, and become a major turning point in Taiwan's future. DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a National Affairs Conference. This could be the perfect occasion for a public debate on possible changes in 2016. We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this national forum.
Full Text Below:
All major national policies are currently deadlocked. A change in the ruling party may take place in 2016, and become a major turning point in Taiwan's future. DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a National Affairs Conference. This could be the perfect occasion for a public debate on possible changes in 2016. We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this national forum.
Perhaps no one will forcibly occupy the podium. But that does not mean that no one will attempt to stage-manage this forum in a one-sided manner. The composition of the forum, the setting, and the issues, should all be decided jointly, in an open and transparent manner. That is the proper way to convene a national policy forum.
Take the composition of the forum. It is Tsai Ing-wen's brainchild. Will it therefore be chaired by the DPP? One. Past national forums were presided over by the president. This elevated the status of the forums. It also linked the forum conclusions directly to the government. Will the president preside over this forum? If not, how will that affect its status? Two. If the president does not preside over this forum, will the president deliver the opening remarks? Three. Should the president and government officials attend in an unofficial capacity? Should they express policy views during the forum? Four. Will the guest list be one-sided? Five. Should groups such as the Sunflower Student Movement, anti-nuclear groups, Taiwan independence groups, and pro-reunification groups be invited?
We feel the conference should be a national level event with diverse representation. Therefore, any role for the president must be handled judiciously. Tsai Ing-wen must not be allowed to turn the forum into her presidential campaign rally. The public should perceive it as a national policy platform for the changes that may unfold in 2016. Tsai Ing-wen may insist on being the conference moderator. That need not be a deal-breaker. But the DPP has a record of attacking or evading national policy issues. If the DPP chairs the forum, then the forum's policy conclusions must be seen as representing the DPP and no one else.
The DPP may refuse to allow the president to preside over the forum. But the president and government officials can still state their policy views and take part in the debate. Forum attendees can attend in an unofficial capacity. But the government, political parties, and civic groups must be represented. In the past, party leaders often found it difficult to convene such debates. The public will surely expect Ma Ying-jeou to attend. They will expect Eric Chu and Tsai Ing-wen to personally participate in a policy debate. By the same token, the forum should not exclude the Sunflower Student Movement, anti-nuclear groups, Taiwan independence groups and others. These groups must be in attendance to ensure the integrity and diversity of the forum. Since the forum is being convened by the DPP, its allies must be allowed to attend.
Take the matter of the forum agenda. The situation may change in 2016. Therefore three major issues are unavoidable. One. Cross-Strait relations. For example, after 2016 should the government repudiate cross-Strait policies based on the 1992 consensus? Should it renew or repudiate the ECFA follow-up agreements? Should the "Taiwan independence party platform" be frozen, abolished, or retained? Such topics are taboo within the DPP. The views of the public should be aired during the forum. Two. The globalization of economic policy. Given globalization, should we rely on Beijing to take care of Taiwan's "Three Smalls and One Young" problem? Problems plague small and medium enterprises, middle and lower income families, citizens in central and southern Taiwan, and young people. Given the impact of globalization, how can we reform Taiwan's industrial structure? How can we ensure globalization-based cross-Strait coopetition? Given globalization, how can we reform Taiwan's energy policy? Globalization has exacerbated the wealth gap. Social justice must address this issue. Three. Amending the constitution. Does the DPP seek to amend the constitution? Does it seek to delete the preface, which reads, "In response to the need for national reunification"? Does it seek to change "one country, two areas" to "one nation on each side"? Does it seek to repudiate the "one China Constitution"? Could such a constitution be the basis for coopetition with the Mainland?
Does the DPP seek a constitutional amendment abolishing presidential elections? Does it seek to restore Legislative Yuan approval of premiership appointments? Does the DPP seek to implement "executive power track change" to avoid minority government impasses? Should the constitutional amendment process be divided into two stages, one pre-2016 and one post-2016? Most importantly, should Legislative Yuan "political consultations" continue?
No topic should be taboo. Not topic should be evaded. Participants must be determied to get to the bottom of things. All cards must be laid on the table. Nothing must be omitted. Only that would constitute an adequate response to potential changes in 2016. National identity, amendments to the constitution, elimination of the one China clause, energy policy, globalization, the 1992 consensus, ECFA, economic development, social justice, and other major issues must all be addressed. The public expects to hear the views of the DPP, the KMT, community representatives, policy experts, and academics. It expects the forum to offer concrete policy recommendations just as other forums have in the past.
Changes may be coming in 2016. People on Taiwan cannot bury their heads in the sand, ostrich fashion. They cannot behave like frogs being cooked alive. We expect the KMT and the DPP to hold a debate on the changes expected in 2106. They must have both the responsibility and the desire to attend such a national conference. We hope that community organizations will share the results of this conference with the public. Therefore the conference should split into small groups addressing specific issues. The conference as a whole should then discuss the findings of these small groups. Participants need not fear complex debates. They should only fear barriers to free expression, and evasion of what is truly important.
We hope no one will forcibly occupy the podium during this forum. This forum should enable a multifaceted debate about potential changes in the nation's circumstances in 2016.
藉國是會議進行二○一六變局大辯論
2015-02-03 02:17:53 聯合報 社論
在幾乎所有重大國政皆陷僵局的此際，二○
沒有人霸占主席台，也是指沒有人可片面操控這場國是會議。
先論會議的組成。此會由蔡英文倡議，是否即由民進黨主持？一、
我們認為，會議的組成應以「國家高度／多元代表」為基準。因此，
我們認為，即使否決了由總統主持，
再論議題的設定。面對二○一六變局，有三大議題不容迴避。一、
再者，是否要修憲廢止總統直選？是否要恢復「
此次國是會議的議題不應再有任何忌諱與閃躲，
面對二○一六的變局，台灣不能再做把頭埋在沙裡的鴕鳥，
這若是一場無人霸占主席台的國是論壇，我們期盼：
Sunday, February 1, 2015
Five Keys to KMT Electoral Style Party Reform
Five Keys to KMT Electoral Style Party Reform
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2015
Executive Summary: Eric Chu has taken over as KMT chairman. He has issued several major statements about the future of the party. Two of them are the most crucial. One. He has proposed a constitutional amendment to adopt the cabinet system for the nation. Two. He has proposed that the KMT undergo electoral style party reform. Chu said that "The chairman may be weak, but the party must be strong." This is his strategic vision. The "Cabinet System" and "electoral style party reform" are closely correlated.
Full Text Below:
Eric Chu has taken over as KMT chairman. He has issued several major statements about the future of the party. Two of them are the most crucial. One. He has proposed a constitutional amendment to adopt the cabinet system for the nation. Two. He has proposed that the KMT undergo electoral style party reform. Chu said that "The chairman may be weak, but the party must be strong." This is his strategic vision. The "Cabinet System" and "electoral style party reform" are closely correlated.
Political science generally classifies political parties as either "electoral style" or "cadre style". In the former, political power originates in the legislature. It is the form that most democracies adopt. In the latter, political power originates in the party organization. This is known as the Leninist style. The century-old KMT has undergone repeated restructuring. Yet its organization remains firmly Leninist cadre style. Therefore if Eric Chu's vision for Kuomintang comes true, he won't merely have reformed the party, he will have transformed it.
Eric Chu has taken over as party chairman. He has since made several major decisions. He has decided to introduce a large number of elected representatives and local leaders who enjoy popular support. He has abolished the purely symbolic offices of Honorary Chairman and Vice-Chairman. He has abolished the Chung Shan Conference, which once served as a platform for party to government coordination. He has totally changed the role of think tanks. Chu clearly intends to proceed full speed with electoral style party reform, in step with cabinet system reform. Future decisions by the KMT may become collective leadership group decisions.
Political transformation, of course, is not easy. Can the KMT successfully transform itself into an elector al style party? To do so, it must master at least five keys. Key One. The party must strike a balance between being a party motivated by ideas and a party rooted in reality. In addition to electoral style parties and cadre style parties, there are also philosophically based political parties and brokered power based political parties. Most political parties in democracies belong to the latter category. But to distinguish themselves from other political parties on the ballot, political parties must still offer clear party platforms. Does the KMT wish to become an electoral style political party? If it does, then the policies it promotes must bow to political reality. Proposals have recently been made for lowering the threshold for political party subsidies. Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng have agreed to negotiate with the TSU using a “market price” model. In this model becomes the norm, whether the KMT is an opposition party or the ruling party will not matter. The line between it and other political parties will become increasingly blurred. The distinction between it and other political parties will become less and less significant. Take cross-Strait policy for example, the most significant distinction between the two largest political parties. Will the KMT be able to stand by its convictions? Or will it attempt to adopt the policies of other political parties? This will be one of the first challenges to confront the Kuomintang.
Key Two. Will the KMT be able to strike a balance between old and new forces and thinking? Take the recent reform of the National Think Tank, for example. There appears to be a consensus within the party for reform and the adoption of Eric Chu's policy path. But Chu faces many problems. They include what to do with the National Think Tank, how to assign authority. how to deal with local factions, how to deal with traditional political forces, and how to deal with awakened voters.
Key Three. How should the KMT handle the roles of the executive and legislative branches? Over the past seven years, the Kuomintang has been the ruling party. But the executive and legislative branches often clashed. This posed a major obstacle to Ma government administration. In the short term, a KMT undergoing electoral style party reform will not be able to cover both these sectors. Therefore the KMT party leadership must create a mechanism for coordinating major decisions.
Key Four. How will a KMT undergoing electoral style party reform reshuffle party personnel? Chu is currently implementing electoral style party reform. He is recruiting only elected officials who enjoy broad public support into the Party Central Committee. This of course is the right approach. But more importantly, he must see that party insiders to do more than hold party posts. They must also be ready to do battle by participating in elections, or serve as political appointees. In recent years Kuomintang elected officials, elected representatives, political appointees, and party workers were often members of different systems. During elections or cabinet reshuffles, they often played musical chairs. This obstructed the entry of new talent. Naturally this made attracting people with talent and ability difficult. This situation must change.
And finally, Key Five. How can the KMT avoid the problem of "players doubling as referees"? Once the party has completed electoral style party reform, those who wrote the nomination and campaigning rules may well seek to become candidates themselves. If demand exceeds supply, limited resources are likely to lead to controversy, criticism, and even infighting within the party. Preventive measures must be taken. Time is limited. The rules of the game must be laid out in advance. This is urgent.
In all fairness, the KMT has gotten to the point where it has no choice but to reform. Electoral style party reform may not be enough to get this century-old party back in running order. But all of the major political parties on Taiwan are Leninist style political parties. Transforming the KMT into a truly democratic political party is still worthwhile. If these keys can be mastered, and the right remedy prescribed, the KMT just might be able to rise from the ashes.
國民黨「內造化」成敗的五個關鍵
2015-02-02 02:48:30 聯合報 社論
朱立倫接任國民黨主席後，對國民黨未來的發展有幾項重大宣示。其中最至關緊要者，其一是提出修憲朝內閣制修正，其二是國民黨的內造化方向。朱立倫曾說「主席最弱，但黨要最強」，可看出其戰略構想，「內閣制」和「國民黨內造化」有高度的關聯性。
政治學上一般將政黨分為「內造式」和「外造式」政黨，前者政黨的權力核心來自議會，是多數民主國家政黨的組成形式；後者權力核心來自政黨組織本身，又稱為列寧式政黨。百年老店的國民黨儘管經過多次轉型，組織上仍傾向後者；因此，朱立倫對國民黨未來轉型的構想一旦成真，將不僅僅是「改革」而已，而將是「轉骨」的大變動。
朱立倫接任主席後的若干重大決策，諸如黨內人事大量引進具有民意基礎的民代、地方首長，取消象徵性的榮譽主席、副主席職務，取消原本有黨政協調平台功能的「中山會報」，以及全面改造智庫功能等，在在顯示朱立倫確有意朝「內造化」構想推進。配合「內閣制」的主張，未來國民黨可能將由過去的一人決策，逐漸轉變為集體領導或群體決策。
然而，政黨「轉骨」並不容易，國民黨內造化要成功，至少必須掌握五大關鍵。第一個關鍵，是黨的理念與現實應如何取得平衡。除了「內造」、「外造」之外，政黨還有「理念型政黨」和「掮客型政黨」之分；雖說多數民主國家屬於後者，但要能在選票上與其他政黨有所區分，仍必須有清晰的政黨理念作後盾。國民黨要追求「內造化」，政策的推動恐必須更加遷就與現實的妥協。日前，在政黨補助門檻降低一事上，朱立倫和王金平同意與台聯以「市場喊價」模式取得的協商共識，就是一例。這種情況若成常態，國民黨無論作為在野黨或執政黨，政策主體性將越來越模糊，與其他政黨的區隔也將越來越少。放大到現今最大政黨區隔的兩岸政策領域，國民黨是否仍能有所堅持，或者能否提出其他面向的政黨理念取而代之，將是國民黨首先要面對的挑戰。
第二個關鍵，是如何平衡新舊勢力和思維。以最近國民智庫的改革為例，黨內對於朱立倫的改革方向似乎有一定共識；然而，未來較智庫處理問題更棘手的世代權力分配問題、地方派系問題，以及傳統政治勢力與新興選民覺醒的問題，是朱立倫勢必遇到的難關。
第三個關鍵，是國民黨在行政與立法部門間所扮演的角色如何拿捏。過去七年，國民黨雖是執政黨，但行政與立法部門的扞格時有所聞，並成為馬政府施政的一大障礙。短期內，國民黨內造化的範疇不可能完全囊括這兩大部門，因此如何在現有機制上提供一個協調重大決策制定的平台，也是國民黨中央無法迴避的問題。
第四項關鍵，是如何在內造化的過程中促成黨內人才的流動。目前朱立倫進行的內造化，僅止於吸納具有民意基礎者到黨中央任職；這固然是正確的作法，但更重要的，應該是讓黨內人才除了擔任黨職，也有隨時上戰場參與選舉、出任政務官的能力與準備。近年來的國民黨，民選首長、民代與政務官、黨工往往分屬不同體系，因此每遇選舉或者內閣改組，往往只是老面孔玩大風吹，人才流動管道受阻，當然難以吸引真正有能力或實力的人投入，這勢需改弦更張。
最後一項關鍵，是黨中央如何避免「球員兼裁判」的角色混淆。一旦徹底內造化，黨內提名和輔選的遊戲規則制訂者及執行者，很可能就同時身兼選舉的遊戲參與者。在僧多粥少、資源有限的情況下，稍有爭議，就很可能招致黨內批評甚至內鬥。防微杜漸，如何在有限的時間內，先將公平的遊戲規則訂出，刻不容緩。
平心而論，國民黨的沉痾確實已經到了不得不改革的地步，「內造化」的改革雖未必拖得動這部百年老車，但在國內各重要政黨都是「列寧式政黨」的情況下，國民黨嘗試帶頭成為真正的民主政黨，仍值得肯定。掌握了問題的關鍵，對症下藥，才是國民黨浴火重生的契機。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2015
Executive Summary: Eric Chu has taken over as KMT chairman. He has issued several major statements about the future of the party. Two of them are the most crucial. One. He has proposed a constitutional amendment to adopt the cabinet system for the nation. Two. He has proposed that the KMT undergo electoral style party reform. Chu said that "The chairman may be weak, but the party must be strong." This is his strategic vision. The "Cabinet System" and "electoral style party reform" are closely correlated.
Full Text Below:
Eric Chu has taken over as KMT chairman. He has issued several major statements about the future of the party. Two of them are the most crucial. One. He has proposed a constitutional amendment to adopt the cabinet system for the nation. Two. He has proposed that the KMT undergo electoral style party reform. Chu said that "The chairman may be weak, but the party must be strong." This is his strategic vision. The "Cabinet System" and "electoral style party reform" are closely correlated.
Political science generally classifies political parties as either "electoral style" or "cadre style". In the former, political power originates in the legislature. It is the form that most democracies adopt. In the latter, political power originates in the party organization. This is known as the Leninist style. The century-old KMT has undergone repeated restructuring. Yet its organization remains firmly Leninist cadre style. Therefore if Eric Chu's vision for Kuomintang comes true, he won't merely have reformed the party, he will have transformed it.
Eric Chu has taken over as party chairman. He has since made several major decisions. He has decided to introduce a large number of elected representatives and local leaders who enjoy popular support. He has abolished the purely symbolic offices of Honorary Chairman and Vice-Chairman. He has abolished the Chung Shan Conference, which once served as a platform for party to government coordination. He has totally changed the role of think tanks. Chu clearly intends to proceed full speed with electoral style party reform, in step with cabinet system reform. Future decisions by the KMT may become collective leadership group decisions.
Political transformation, of course, is not easy. Can the KMT successfully transform itself into an elector al style party? To do so, it must master at least five keys. Key One. The party must strike a balance between being a party motivated by ideas and a party rooted in reality. In addition to electoral style parties and cadre style parties, there are also philosophically based political parties and brokered power based political parties. Most political parties in democracies belong to the latter category. But to distinguish themselves from other political parties on the ballot, political parties must still offer clear party platforms. Does the KMT wish to become an electoral style political party? If it does, then the policies it promotes must bow to political reality. Proposals have recently been made for lowering the threshold for political party subsidies. Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng have agreed to negotiate with the TSU using a “market price” model. In this model becomes the norm, whether the KMT is an opposition party or the ruling party will not matter. The line between it and other political parties will become increasingly blurred. The distinction between it and other political parties will become less and less significant. Take cross-Strait policy for example, the most significant distinction between the two largest political parties. Will the KMT be able to stand by its convictions? Or will it attempt to adopt the policies of other political parties? This will be one of the first challenges to confront the Kuomintang.
Key Two. Will the KMT be able to strike a balance between old and new forces and thinking? Take the recent reform of the National Think Tank, for example. There appears to be a consensus within the party for reform and the adoption of Eric Chu's policy path. But Chu faces many problems. They include what to do with the National Think Tank, how to assign authority. how to deal with local factions, how to deal with traditional political forces, and how to deal with awakened voters.
Key Three. How should the KMT handle the roles of the executive and legislative branches? Over the past seven years, the Kuomintang has been the ruling party. But the executive and legislative branches often clashed. This posed a major obstacle to Ma government administration. In the short term, a KMT undergoing electoral style party reform will not be able to cover both these sectors. Therefore the KMT party leadership must create a mechanism for coordinating major decisions.
Key Four. How will a KMT undergoing electoral style party reform reshuffle party personnel? Chu is currently implementing electoral style party reform. He is recruiting only elected officials who enjoy broad public support into the Party Central Committee. This of course is the right approach. But more importantly, he must see that party insiders to do more than hold party posts. They must also be ready to do battle by participating in elections, or serve as political appointees. In recent years Kuomintang elected officials, elected representatives, political appointees, and party workers were often members of different systems. During elections or cabinet reshuffles, they often played musical chairs. This obstructed the entry of new talent. Naturally this made attracting people with talent and ability difficult. This situation must change.
And finally, Key Five. How can the KMT avoid the problem of "players doubling as referees"? Once the party has completed electoral style party reform, those who wrote the nomination and campaigning rules may well seek to become candidates themselves. If demand exceeds supply, limited resources are likely to lead to controversy, criticism, and even infighting within the party. Preventive measures must be taken. Time is limited. The rules of the game must be laid out in advance. This is urgent.
In all fairness, the KMT has gotten to the point where it has no choice but to reform. Electoral style party reform may not be enough to get this century-old party back in running order. But all of the major political parties on Taiwan are Leninist style political parties. Transforming the KMT into a truly democratic political party is still worthwhile. If these keys can be mastered, and the right remedy prescribed, the KMT just might be able to rise from the ashes.
國民黨「內造化」成敗的五個關鍵
2015-02-02 02:48:30 聯合報 社論
朱立倫接任國民黨主席後，對國民黨未來的發展有幾項重大宣示。其中最至關緊要者，其一是提出修憲朝內閣制修正，其二是國民黨的內造化方向。朱立倫曾說「主席最弱，但黨要最強」，可看出其戰略構想，「內閣制」和「國民黨內造化」有高度的關聯性。
政治學上一般將政黨分為「內造式」和「外造式」政黨，前者政黨的權力核心來自議會，是多數民主國家政黨的組成形式；後者權力核心來自政黨組織本身，又稱為列寧式政黨。百年老店的國民黨儘管經過多次轉型，組織上仍傾向後者；因此，朱立倫對國民黨未來轉型的構想一旦成真，將不僅僅是「改革」而已，而將是「轉骨」的大變動。
朱立倫接任主席後的若干重大決策，諸如黨內人事大量引進具有民意基礎的民代、地方首長，取消象徵性的榮譽主席、副主席職務，取消原本有黨政協調平台功能的「中山會報」，以及全面改造智庫功能等，在在顯示朱立倫確有意朝「內造化」構想推進。配合「內閣制」的主張，未來國民黨可能將由過去的一人決策，逐漸轉變為集體領導或群體決策。
然而，政黨「轉骨」並不容易，國民黨內造化要成功，至少必須掌握五大關鍵。第一個關鍵，是黨的理念與現實應如何取得平衡。除了「內造」、「外造」之外，政黨還有「理念型政黨」和「掮客型政黨」之分；雖說多數民主國家屬於後者，但要能在選票上與其他政黨有所區分，仍必須有清晰的政黨理念作後盾。國民黨要追求「內造化」，政策的推動恐必須更加遷就與現實的妥協。日前，在政黨補助門檻降低一事上，朱立倫和王金平同意與台聯以「市場喊價」模式取得的協商共識，就是一例。這種情況若成常態，國民黨無論作為在野黨或執政黨，政策主體性將越來越模糊，與其他政黨的區隔也將越來越少。放大到現今最大政黨區隔的兩岸政策領域，國民黨是否仍能有所堅持，或者能否提出其他面向的政黨理念取而代之，將是國民黨首先要面對的挑戰。
第二個關鍵，是如何平衡新舊勢力和思維。以最近國民智庫的改革為例，黨內對於朱立倫的改革方向似乎有一定共識；然而，未來較智庫處理問題更棘手的世代權力分配問題、地方派系問題，以及傳統政治勢力與新興選民覺醒的問題，是朱立倫勢必遇到的難關。
第三個關鍵，是國民黨在行政與立法部門間所扮演的角色如何拿捏。過去七年，國民黨雖是執政黨，但行政與立法部門的扞格時有所聞，並成為馬政府施政的一大障礙。短期內，國民黨內造化的範疇不可能完全囊括這兩大部門，因此如何在現有機制上提供一個協調重大決策制定的平台，也是國民黨中央無法迴避的問題。
第四項關鍵，是如何在內造化的過程中促成黨內人才的流動。目前朱立倫進行的內造化，僅止於吸納具有民意基礎者到黨中央任職；這固然是正確的作法，但更重要的，應該是讓黨內人才除了擔任黨職，也有隨時上戰場參與選舉、出任政務官的能力與準備。近年來的國民黨，民選首長、民代與政務官、黨工往往分屬不同體系，因此每遇選舉或者內閣改組，往往只是老面孔玩大風吹，人才流動管道受阻，當然難以吸引真正有能力或實力的人投入，這勢需改弦更張。
最後一項關鍵，是黨中央如何避免「球員兼裁判」的角色混淆。一旦徹底內造化，黨內提名和輔選的遊戲規則制訂者及執行者，很可能就同時身兼選舉的遊戲參與者。在僧多粥少、資源有限的情況下，稍有爭議，就很可能招致黨內批評甚至內鬥。防微杜漸，如何在有限的時間內，先將公平的遊戲規則訂出，刻不容緩。
平心而論，國民黨的沉痾確實已經到了不得不改革的地步，「內造化」的改革雖未必拖得動這部百年老車，但在國內各重要政黨都是「列寧式政黨」的情況下，國民黨嘗試帶頭成為真正的民主政黨，仍值得肯定。掌握了問題的關鍵，對症下藥，才是國民黨浴火重生的契機。
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Brain Drain Detrimental to Taiwan's Future
Brain Drain Detrimental to Taiwan's Future
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30 2015
Executive Summary: Market sentiment has improved. The job market has followed suit. Quitting one's job is increasingly commonplace, and viewed positively by the public. But Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are all recruiting young people from Taiwan. Many young people, lured by higher salaries, have moved overseas. This brain drain is a major problem. It is unfavorable to Taiwan's future. The government must deal with it wisely.
Full Text Below:
Market sentiment has improved. The job market has followed suit. Quitting one's job is increasingly commonplace, and viewed positively by the public. But Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are all recruiting young people from Taiwan. Many young people, lured by higher salaries, have moved overseas. This brain drain is a major problem. It is unfavorable to Taiwan's future. The government must deal with it wisely.
Last year, the economy began to recover. Employment opportunities increased. The unemployment rate gradually declined. The December unemployment rate was 3.79%. This was 0.29 percentage points lower than the same period last year. It was the lowest in nearly 14 years. Last year, 457,000 people were unemployed. This year that number fell by 21,000. They were unemployed for an average of 25.9 weeks. That is 0.3 weeks shorter than last year. The job market was the best it has been in years. Payroll Statistics show that by November last year, the average salary (including overtime, bonuses) was 47,377 NT, a 3.89% increase. This was the highest salary level for the calendar year. But prices rose 1.26% over the same period. As a result, the actual level remains where it was 15 years ago.
The public has begun to respond. According to a Yes123 employment agency survey, the company and staff were optimistic about the first quarter of this year. The Lunar New Year is approaching. As many as 68% of all office workers are ready to quit this season. The 1111 employment agency found that over 94% of all workers plan to change jobs after the New Year. Clearly many people are changing jobs. This is an international phenomenon. On January 11, CNN Money issued a report on the situation in the United States. The career website Glassdoor.com gave 900 respondents a questionnaire. As many as 35% said that if employers did not give them a raise, they would resign and seek employment elsewhere.
This is the era of self-help. Taking the initiative to find a better job is right and proper. Quitting, even going abroad to earn money, should be encouraged. We should not cling to the outmoded concept of lifetime employment, and require employees to remain in one place. When companies cannot provide employees with better remuneration, bosses should ask themselves why they cannot provide employees with higher incomes. If employees leave and find other jobs, they should be congratulated, not condemned. Bosses should have a sense of corporate responsibility, or noblesse oblige. They should not pocket all the profits. They should give employees better dividends. Greater incentives enable companies to reach greater heights.
Alas, in-depth studies have revealed a phenomenon unique to Taiwan. Many career changers boldly abandon their field of past expertise. They make a blind leap into entirely different industries and jobs. This phenomenon is expected to manifest itself after the New Years holiday. According to 1111 employment agency statistics, 26.7% of all career changer took just such a leap. As a result, salaries declined nearly 1% from the previous quarter. Clearly job seekers are desperate, and willing to leave a familiar environment. They would rather seek change, and sacrifice their current salaries, in pursuit of greater future rewards.
Young people seeking adventure or life experiences should be encouraged. But more and more are leaving home for employment abroad. This is detrimental to the nation's prosperity. Many of them are high-tech and management talent. Data shows that up to 61.1% of those who relocated were professionals. The massive outflow of high-end manpower from Taiwan is particularly serious. Meanwhile, foreign workers on Taiwan are not high-end talent. As a result, Taiwan has become a net exporter of high-end labor. Department of Labor statistics indicate that over the past 10 years, 27,000 people with high-end talent have moved abroad.
Oxford Economics, a British economic research institute, and several multinational corporations have just released their “Global Talent 2021” resport. They estimate that by 2021, Taiwan's brain drain, in combination with its failure to attract foreign talent, will make it the most talent deficient region in the world. This is a huge warning sign for Taiwan. Advanced Western countries and the three other Asian dragons, have inflows of talent as well as outflows. They, unlike Taiwan, do not suffer a serious imbalance.
We lag far behind in the international bidding wars. But why? Because after-tax salaries on Taiwan are too low. As the saying goes, “The temple is too small for the Buddha.” People with ability prefer to be in the international market. So they vote with their feet, and leave Taiwan. Low-incomes and regulatory restrictions prevent the introduction of foreign high-level white-collar workers.
What is the answer to this problem? First of all, the government must abandon the notion of "control" and adopt a spirit of "growth”. This would encourage business executives. Government control is all about avoiding mistakes. But this limits the possibility of progress. Only the spirit of growth can retain talent. One of the key factors is the maximum marginal income tax rate of 40%, which may be raised to 45%. This is highly detrimental to retaining or attracting high-end talent.
The "Industrial Innovation Articles" have yet to be passed. It should be fast tracked. It includes research and development investment tax credits, the formalization of technology shares taxation, five major tax free employee incentives, and three changes to the tax laws. The amendment may encourage continued investment in innovation and research, promote innovation, strengthen domestic enterprises, and retain talent. Legislators have questioned the enterprise tax concessions. They say that they may help enterprises to reduce costs and increase after tax profits. But in the long-term they may be detrimental to international competitiveness and corporate responsibility. Now is a time of extraordinary economic turbulence. Extraordinary measures are required to promote economic and social progress.
社論－人才外流不利台灣發展
2015年01月30日 04:10
本報訊
最近景氣改善，就業市場隨之回溫，「跳槽」風氣逐漸盛行，社會多以正面看待。但中國大陸、香港、新加坡也擴大對台灣青年徵才，很多年輕人在高薪利誘下跳槽海外，人才外流是大問題，不利台灣發展，政府應小心面對。
去年經濟開始復甦，就業機會增多，失業率逐步下降。12月失業率為3.79%，不僅較前年同期減0.29個百分點，也是近14年來同期最低。去年全年平均失業人數45.7萬人，年減2.1萬人，平均失業周數25.9周，也較前年縮短0.3周，這是近年來就業市場的最佳表現。薪資統計顯示，去年1到11月薪資平均（含加班、獎金）4萬7377元，年增3.89%，薪資雖為歷年最高水準，但若扣除同期物價上漲1.26%，仍不及15年前水準。
有鑑於此，社會已經開始有所反應。根據人力銀行業者Yes123調查，公司行號與員工對今年第1季經濟均抱持樂觀看法，加上進入農曆年尾，有68%上班族準備於本季跳槽。而1111人力銀行發現，超過9成4的上班族計畫年後轉職，顯示轉職潮即將湧現。無獨有偶，這也是國際現象。跟據CNN Money1月11日報導美國狀況，由職業網站Glassdoor.com對900名受訪者做出的問卷顯示，35%的人表示如果現僱主不給自己加薪，他們將辭職，另謀蹊徑。
自力救濟的時代，用自己的力量尋找更好機會是天經地義。跳槽，乃至於到國外賺外國人的錢，都應該被鼓勵。我們不應停留在終生僱用制老觀念，要求員工從一而終。當企業無法給員工更好的報酬，老闆就應該檢討，為什麼不能給員工更好的收入。員工離職另謀高就，應該受到祝福，而不是詛咒。老闆應該有企業責任的觀念或是企業王國的胸襟，不要一切利益據為己有，而是能給員工更好的分紅，藉此建立的激勵機制，也可使公司的營運更上層樓。
但深入研究對比，卻發現台灣一種獨有的現象，不少跳槽者大膽放棄過去的領域與經驗，「裸跳」至不同的產業及職務，預計將成為今年年後轉職潮的特殊現象。1111人力銀行統計，「裸跳」占26.7%，造成期望月薪反較上季下滑逾1成。顯示求職者，是斷尾求生，離開熟悉的環境，求新求變，寧可犧牲一時的薪水，追求未來更高的報償。
年輕人冒險或拓展人生經驗值得鼓勵，可是離鄉背井到海外求職就業者越來越多，就不利國家社會的發展。因為這其中有很多都是高科技及管理人才，數據顯示外移人口中專業人才占比高達61.1%，造成台灣高端人力大量外流特別嚴重。可是與此同時，來台就業的外國高端人才卻沒有增加，台灣成為高端勞力淨輸出國。勞動部統計指出，過去10年都維持每年2.7萬人的高端人力流動逆差。
英國經濟研究機構牛津經濟公司和多家跨國企業最新的集體研究《全球天資 2021》（Global Talent 2021）更預估，台灣到2021年時，因人才外流，加上吸引不到國際人才，恐將成為全球最缺乏人才國家。這對台灣未來的發展是很大的警訊。西方先進國家及亞洲其他三小龍，人才有流出也有流入，不像台灣如此嚴重的失衡。
面對國際搶人大戰，我們是遙遙落後。究其原因，台灣的稅後薪水實在太低，小廟容不了菩薩，有能力的人士寧可在國際市場被選才，因此用腳投票，離開台灣。而因為我們社會的低薪及法規的限制，外籍高階白領人力引進卻呈現停滯現象。
如何解決此嚴重的問題？首先，政府應該揚棄「管制」的中心思想，改以「發展」的精神，來促進主管業務的興旺。管制是求不出錯，卻限制了向前的可能性。相反的，透過發展觀念的實踐，引才留人就更容易推動。其中關鍵因素綜合所得稅的最高邊際稅率40%，未來有可能還要拉高到45%，這都非常不利高端人才的選擇。
本會期未竟其功的「產業創新條例」修正案，應加速通過，因為這包括企業研發投資抵減二擇一、技術入股課稅制度化，以及五大員工獎酬工具緩課稅等三大修正方向。修正案可以鼓勵公司持續投入創新研究、推動創新技術產業化及強化國內企業留才攬才。雖然有立委質疑提供企業租稅優惠或許有利於企業降低成本及增加稅後利潤，長期反而不利國際競爭力及企業責任。但現在已經是經濟興衰的非常時期，應該有非常藥方來促進經濟社會進步。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 30 2015
Executive Summary: Market sentiment has improved. The job market has followed suit. Quitting one's job is increasingly commonplace, and viewed positively by the public. But Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are all recruiting young people from Taiwan. Many young people, lured by higher salaries, have moved overseas. This brain drain is a major problem. It is unfavorable to Taiwan's future. The government must deal with it wisely.
Full Text Below:
Market sentiment has improved. The job market has followed suit. Quitting one's job is increasingly commonplace, and viewed positively by the public. But Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are all recruiting young people from Taiwan. Many young people, lured by higher salaries, have moved overseas. This brain drain is a major problem. It is unfavorable to Taiwan's future. The government must deal with it wisely.
Last year, the economy began to recover. Employment opportunities increased. The unemployment rate gradually declined. The December unemployment rate was 3.79%. This was 0.29 percentage points lower than the same period last year. It was the lowest in nearly 14 years. Last year, 457,000 people were unemployed. This year that number fell by 21,000. They were unemployed for an average of 25.9 weeks. That is 0.3 weeks shorter than last year. The job market was the best it has been in years. Payroll Statistics show that by November last year, the average salary (including overtime, bonuses) was 47,377 NT, a 3.89% increase. This was the highest salary level for the calendar year. But prices rose 1.26% over the same period. As a result, the actual level remains where it was 15 years ago.
The public has begun to respond. According to a Yes123 employment agency survey, the company and staff were optimistic about the first quarter of this year. The Lunar New Year is approaching. As many as 68% of all office workers are ready to quit this season. The 1111 employment agency found that over 94% of all workers plan to change jobs after the New Year. Clearly many people are changing jobs. This is an international phenomenon. On January 11, CNN Money issued a report on the situation in the United States. The career website Glassdoor.com gave 900 respondents a questionnaire. As many as 35% said that if employers did not give them a raise, they would resign and seek employment elsewhere.
This is the era of self-help. Taking the initiative to find a better job is right and proper. Quitting, even going abroad to earn money, should be encouraged. We should not cling to the outmoded concept of lifetime employment, and require employees to remain in one place. When companies cannot provide employees with better remuneration, bosses should ask themselves why they cannot provide employees with higher incomes. If employees leave and find other jobs, they should be congratulated, not condemned. Bosses should have a sense of corporate responsibility, or noblesse oblige. They should not pocket all the profits. They should give employees better dividends. Greater incentives enable companies to reach greater heights.
Alas, in-depth studies have revealed a phenomenon unique to Taiwan. Many career changers boldly abandon their field of past expertise. They make a blind leap into entirely different industries and jobs. This phenomenon is expected to manifest itself after the New Years holiday. According to 1111 employment agency statistics, 26.7% of all career changer took just such a leap. As a result, salaries declined nearly 1% from the previous quarter. Clearly job seekers are desperate, and willing to leave a familiar environment. They would rather seek change, and sacrifice their current salaries, in pursuit of greater future rewards.
Young people seeking adventure or life experiences should be encouraged. But more and more are leaving home for employment abroad. This is detrimental to the nation's prosperity. Many of them are high-tech and management talent. Data shows that up to 61.1% of those who relocated were professionals. The massive outflow of high-end manpower from Taiwan is particularly serious. Meanwhile, foreign workers on Taiwan are not high-end talent. As a result, Taiwan has become a net exporter of high-end labor. Department of Labor statistics indicate that over the past 10 years, 27,000 people with high-end talent have moved abroad.
Oxford Economics, a British economic research institute, and several multinational corporations have just released their “Global Talent 2021” resport. They estimate that by 2021, Taiwan's brain drain, in combination with its failure to attract foreign talent, will make it the most talent deficient region in the world. This is a huge warning sign for Taiwan. Advanced Western countries and the three other Asian dragons, have inflows of talent as well as outflows. They, unlike Taiwan, do not suffer a serious imbalance.
We lag far behind in the international bidding wars. But why? Because after-tax salaries on Taiwan are too low. As the saying goes, “The temple is too small for the Buddha.” People with ability prefer to be in the international market. So they vote with their feet, and leave Taiwan. Low-incomes and regulatory restrictions prevent the introduction of foreign high-level white-collar workers.
What is the answer to this problem? First of all, the government must abandon the notion of "control" and adopt a spirit of "growth”. This would encourage business executives. Government control is all about avoiding mistakes. But this limits the possibility of progress. Only the spirit of growth can retain talent. One of the key factors is the maximum marginal income tax rate of 40%, which may be raised to 45%. This is highly detrimental to retaining or attracting high-end talent.
The "Industrial Innovation Articles" have yet to be passed. It should be fast tracked. It includes research and development investment tax credits, the formalization of technology shares taxation, five major tax free employee incentives, and three changes to the tax laws. The amendment may encourage continued investment in innovation and research, promote innovation, strengthen domestic enterprises, and retain talent. Legislators have questioned the enterprise tax concessions. They say that they may help enterprises to reduce costs and increase after tax profits. But in the long-term they may be detrimental to international competitiveness and corporate responsibility. Now is a time of extraordinary economic turbulence. Extraordinary measures are required to promote economic and social progress.
社論－人才外流不利台灣發展
2015年01月30日 04:10
本報訊
最近景氣改善，就業市場隨之回溫，「跳槽」風氣逐漸盛行，社會多以正面看待。但中國大陸、香港、新加坡也擴大對台灣青年徵才，很多年輕人在高薪利誘下跳槽海外，人才外流是大問題，不利台灣發展，政府應小心面對。
去年經濟開始復甦，就業機會增多，失業率逐步下降。12月失業率為3.79%，不僅較前年同期減0.29個百分點，也是近14年來同期最低。去年全年平均失業人數45.7萬人，年減2.1萬人，平均失業周數25.9周，也較前年縮短0.3周，這是近年來就業市場的最佳表現。薪資統計顯示，去年1到11月薪資平均（含加班、獎金）4萬7377元，年增3.89%，薪資雖為歷年最高水準，但若扣除同期物價上漲1.26%，仍不及15年前水準。
有鑑於此，社會已經開始有所反應。根據人力銀行業者Yes123調查，公司行號與員工對今年第1季經濟均抱持樂觀看法，加上進入農曆年尾，有68%上班族準備於本季跳槽。而1111人力銀行發現，超過9成4的上班族計畫年後轉職，顯示轉職潮即將湧現。無獨有偶，這也是國際現象。跟據CNN Money1月11日報導美國狀況，由職業網站Glassdoor.com對900名受訪者做出的問卷顯示，35%的人表示如果現僱主不給自己加薪，他們將辭職，另謀蹊徑。
自力救濟的時代，用自己的力量尋找更好機會是天經地義。跳槽，乃至於到國外賺外國人的錢，都應該被鼓勵。我們不應停留在終生僱用制老觀念，要求員工從一而終。當企業無法給員工更好的報酬，老闆就應該檢討，為什麼不能給員工更好的收入。員工離職另謀高就，應該受到祝福，而不是詛咒。老闆應該有企業責任的觀念或是企業王國的胸襟，不要一切利益據為己有，而是能給員工更好的分紅，藉此建立的激勵機制，也可使公司的營運更上層樓。
但深入研究對比，卻發現台灣一種獨有的現象，不少跳槽者大膽放棄過去的領域與經驗，「裸跳」至不同的產業及職務，預計將成為今年年後轉職潮的特殊現象。1111人力銀行統計，「裸跳」占26.7%，造成期望月薪反較上季下滑逾1成。顯示求職者，是斷尾求生，離開熟悉的環境，求新求變，寧可犧牲一時的薪水，追求未來更高的報償。
年輕人冒險或拓展人生經驗值得鼓勵，可是離鄉背井到海外求職就業者越來越多，就不利國家社會的發展。因為這其中有很多都是高科技及管理人才，數據顯示外移人口中專業人才占比高達61.1%，造成台灣高端人力大量外流特別嚴重。可是與此同時，來台就業的外國高端人才卻沒有增加，台灣成為高端勞力淨輸出國。勞動部統計指出，過去10年都維持每年2.7萬人的高端人力流動逆差。
英國經濟研究機構牛津經濟公司和多家跨國企業最新的集體研究《全球天資 2021》（Global Talent 2021）更預估，台灣到2021年時，因人才外流，加上吸引不到國際人才，恐將成為全球最缺乏人才國家。這對台灣未來的發展是很大的警訊。西方先進國家及亞洲其他三小龍，人才有流出也有流入，不像台灣如此嚴重的失衡。
面對國際搶人大戰，我們是遙遙落後。究其原因，台灣的稅後薪水實在太低，小廟容不了菩薩，有能力的人士寧可在國際市場被選才，因此用腳投票，離開台灣。而因為我們社會的低薪及法規的限制，外籍高階白領人力引進卻呈現停滯現象。
如何解決此嚴重的問題？首先，政府應該揚棄「管制」的中心思想，改以「發展」的精神，來促進主管業務的興旺。管制是求不出錯，卻限制了向前的可能性。相反的，透過發展觀念的實踐，引才留人就更容易推動。其中關鍵因素綜合所得稅的最高邊際稅率40%，未來有可能還要拉高到45%，這都非常不利高端人才的選擇。
本會期未竟其功的「產業創新條例」修正案，應加速通過，因為這包括企業研發投資抵減二擇一、技術入股課稅制度化，以及五大員工獎酬工具緩課稅等三大修正方向。修正案可以鼓勵公司持續投入創新研究、推動創新技術產業化及強化國內企業留才攬才。雖然有立委質疑提供企業租稅優惠或許有利於企業降低成本及增加稅後利潤，長期反而不利國際競爭力及企業責任。但現在已經是經濟興衰的非常時期，應該有非常藥方來促進經濟社會進步。
Wednesday, January 28, 2015
Burn Your Bridges: Eric Chu's Four Levers
Burn Your Bridges: Eric Chu's Four Levers
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2015
Executive Summary: The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections. Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.
Full Text Below:
The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections.
These four levers are complementary. Although 2016 is the target, 2020 is also a possibility. Based on current trends, the KMT would find it difficult to win the presidential election in 2016. But Eric Chu must use the election to slow the KMT's fall. The Kuomintang cannot remain in free fall until 2016. Even if it expects to be defeated, the KMT must discuss its policy platform. It must formulate a strategy for a comeback in 2020.
Eric Chu must have a strategic goal for 2016. The DPP may win the election, but lose the policy path debate. The KMT must continue its struggle. Although it is likely to lose the election, it must win the policy path battle.
Take the National Affairs Conference. Chu has indicated a willingness to participate. But he must not allow himself to become one of Tsai Ing-wen's props. The organization of the conference must meet with KMT satisfaction. There must be a proper role for the Ma government, and equal status for the political parties. There must be diversity and balance among the participants. There must be clarity in the agenda, particularly on issues of national identity, amendments to the Constitution, globalization, energy policy, cross-Strait relations, the 1992 consensus, ECFA follow-up negotiations, and other issues troubling Taiwan The Kuomintang must not pass up this opportunity. It must use the conference as a basis for consensus-building.
Tsai Ing-wen wants the National Affairs Conference to serve as a stepping stone in her presidential campaign. Following the nine in one election victory, she has been either silent or highly selective about the issues she is willing to address. But Eric Chu must insist that the conference be a genuine, in depth debate. The KMT must set the agenda. It must have the determination to get to the bottom of things. If Tsai Ing-wen ducks the issues, the KMT must hold her feet to the fire, then turn them into 2016 election issues.
A constitutional amendment is imminent. Tsai Ing-wen apparently has reservations. The KMT, however, must not miss the opportunity to force the nation to hold a constitutional debate. Three themes should be addressed: National identity, cross-Strait relations, and government institutions. None of these should be overlooked. If these issues are not made crystal clear, constitutional reform will be impossible. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must not be allowed to duck these issues again and again. What would the constitutional amendment include? It could include a referendum on whether 18 year olds may vote in the 2016 election, and whether the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve of premier appointments should be restored. Once the 2016 elections are over, the KMT should demand further constitutional amendments, and a public referendum during the 2018 county and municipal elections. By then, the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve premier appointments may have been restored, and serve as a benchmark. If the KMT can maintain the momentum for constitutional reform from 2016, even if it loses the presidential election, it will retain access to the bully pulpit.
The Chu Xi meeting is the most crucial of the four levers. The KMT may lose the 2016 election. Beijing may not be happy. Any Chu Xi meeting should therefore reaffirm the 1992 Consensus and even go beyond the 1992 Consensus.It should establish a new benchmark for cross-Strait relations. It should establish a new "divided rule but not a divided nation” concept. On the one hand, the KMT could break new ground for 2016. On the other hand it could pressure the DPP to reform. During the Chu Xi meeting, Eric Chu should encourage Beijing to help the DPP reform. The Chu Xi meeting should echo, then surpass the cross-Strait achievements of the National Affairs Conference.
Now take the 2016 presidential election. As mentioned above, the KMT may well lose the election. But it must not allow it to become a crushing defeat. It must make full use of these four levers, rhetorically and strategically. It may lose the election, but it must win the policy path high ground. Eric Chu must be willing to burn his bridges. The National Affairs Conference, the constitutional amendment process, and the Chu Xi meeting will allow him to shrug off the albatross on his back. They will allow him to plan for 2020. Should Eric Chu throw his hat in the ring for 2016? That can be debated. But if the KMT fields another candidate, one unable to wage a respectable campaign, it might never rise again.
For Taiwan, 2016 is a crisis and an opportunity. As mentioned earlier, the shock waves from 2016 will soon buffet Taiwan. A consensus must be reached on national identity, constitutional amendments. energy policy, globalization, the 1992 consensus, cross-Strait relations, and ECFA. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot dodge these issues. Otherwise it may win the election, but lose the national policy debate. The KMT may indeed lose the election. But it need not shrink from the prospect. It must take an even tougher line, and remind itself that even though it lost the election, it won the national policy debate.
Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.
釜破舟沉：朱立倫的四支槓桿
2015-01-29 01:40:30 聯合報 社論
扶大廈之將傾，挽狂瀾於既倒。朱立倫出任國民黨主席，情勢艱危，必須審慎操持四支槓桿：一、朱習會。二、國是會議。三、修憲。四、二○一六立委及總統選舉。
這四支槓桿相因相成，雖將以二○一六大選為總結，但也可能穿越二○二○年。就當前趨勢看，國民黨很難贏得二○一六總統大選，但朱立倫至少必須使國民黨在此次大選中出現煞車甩尾的情勢；也就是說，不能聽任國民黨繼續在二○一六如自由落體般墜落，縱使敗選，也須透過大選為國民黨在論述及戰略上重建一個能夠指向二○二○年的制高點。
朱立倫二○一六年的戰略目標應是：民進黨可能贏了選舉，卻輸在路線；國民黨即應力爭，雖可能輸了選舉，但必須贏在路線。
先論國是會議。朱立倫雖表示願意參與，但不可能只是扮演蔡英文的道具。因此，國民黨對於主辦單位的組成（如馬政府在此會中的角色如何、政黨的對等地位如何），及與會人員之多元及平衡，還有議題設定的高度及深廣度等，皆應爭取到國民黨的話語權。尤其關於國家認同、修憲方案、全球化、能源政策、兩岸關係、九二共識及ＥＣＦＡ後續工程等長期嚴重困擾台灣的議題，國民黨皆不可任其錯失，務必促使大會成為建立共識的平台。
蔡英文似想將國是會議做為她競選總統的政治嫁妝，九合一大勝後，已見她對議題有選擇性並冷處理。但朱立倫必須堅持此會為一個真正深廣辯論的場域，國民黨須成為議題的發動機，要有打破砂鍋問到底的決戰心志。倘若蔡英文有所迴避閃躲，國民黨即應強勢回應，並延伸為二○一六大選的議題。
修憲儼已箭在弦上。蔡英文對修憲似有保留，但國民黨不能錯失藉國是會議進行憲政大辯論的機會，對於憲政的三大主題，國家認同、兩岸關係及政府體制，均不應有所遺漏。因為，若不徹底談清楚這些問題，憲政改革即根本不可能完成，因而亦不容蔡英文對這些問題再閃避。至於實際的修憲方案，二○一六大選或許只將十八歲投票權及恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權兩案付諸公民複決；但待二○一六選後，國民黨應主張在新民意上繼續深化修憲方案，以交付二○一八縣市長選舉時公民複決為目標。屆時，修憲方案若以「恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權」為基準，則國民黨若操持了二○一六後的修憲動能，即使輸掉總統大選，也不致話語權盡失。
朱習會是四支槓桿中最具關鍵效應的一支。由於國民黨可能輸掉二○一六大選，而北京也未必樂見此結果；因此，朱立倫應設法在朱習會上爭取到「延續九二共識／超越九二共識」的兩岸關係新基準。此一新基準應在營造「分治而不分裂」的新思維，一方面可做為國民黨在二○一六年的先驅性主張，另一方面也可使民進黨更感受到轉型的壓力。朱立倫應設法在朱習會中，努力發揮引導北京思維昇華及協助民進黨轉型的功能；而朱習會的成果，在兩岸關係上應以呼應並超越國是會議的政治成就為目標。
再回頭談二○一六總統大選。如前所述，國民黨即使可能輸掉大選，但不可任其一敗塗地，而必須在論述及戰略上透過四支槓桿，建立「雖可能輸掉選舉，但必須贏在路線」的制高點。朱立倫若抱持破釜沉舟的決志，即更有在國是會議、修憲及朱習會中擺脫現實羈絆的操作空間，並將目標指向二○二○年。在這樣的思考下，朱立倫應否當仁不讓親自參選二○一六年總統大選，即有再作考慮的空間；因為，二○一六如果國民黨由其他人參選而打不出一場至少能止滑甩尾的選戰，恐怕就再也站不起來了。
對台灣而言，二○一六年是危機中存有轉機。如前所述，台灣經歷了二○一六年的震盪後，必須在國家認同、修憲方案、能源政策、全球化及九二共識、兩岸關係、ＥＣＦＡ架構等國政綱領上真正建立起共識。民進黨若重返執政，已不能閃躲，否則就可能「贏了選舉／輸了路線」；國民黨則縱使輸掉了選舉，亦無須退縮，而更應對「若輸了選舉，也要贏得路線」有所堅持。
兵法曰：「甚陷則不懼，不得已則鬥。」朱立倫若能正確操持這四支槓桿，或許可改善二○一六的國民黨選情；即使輸掉了選舉，但若能促成整個台灣回到正確的路線與軌道，那也將是國民黨對台灣的貢獻，亦可能是國民黨再起的資產。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 29, 2015
Executive Summary: The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections. Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.
Full Text Below:
The edifice is on the verge of collapse. It is time to save the day. Eric Chu is now KMT chairman. The party's circumstances are dire. He must make full use of four levers. One. The Chu Xi meeting. Two. The National Affairs Conference. Three. The constitutional amendment process. Four. The 2016 legislative and presidential elections.
These four levers are complementary. Although 2016 is the target, 2020 is also a possibility. Based on current trends, the KMT would find it difficult to win the presidential election in 2016. But Eric Chu must use the election to slow the KMT's fall. The Kuomintang cannot remain in free fall until 2016. Even if it expects to be defeated, the KMT must discuss its policy platform. It must formulate a strategy for a comeback in 2020.
Eric Chu must have a strategic goal for 2016. The DPP may win the election, but lose the policy path debate. The KMT must continue its struggle. Although it is likely to lose the election, it must win the policy path battle.
Take the National Affairs Conference. Chu has indicated a willingness to participate. But he must not allow himself to become one of Tsai Ing-wen's props. The organization of the conference must meet with KMT satisfaction. There must be a proper role for the Ma government, and equal status for the political parties. There must be diversity and balance among the participants. There must be clarity in the agenda, particularly on issues of national identity, amendments to the Constitution, globalization, energy policy, cross-Strait relations, the 1992 consensus, ECFA follow-up negotiations, and other issues troubling Taiwan The Kuomintang must not pass up this opportunity. It must use the conference as a basis for consensus-building.
Tsai Ing-wen wants the National Affairs Conference to serve as a stepping stone in her presidential campaign. Following the nine in one election victory, she has been either silent or highly selective about the issues she is willing to address. But Eric Chu must insist that the conference be a genuine, in depth debate. The KMT must set the agenda. It must have the determination to get to the bottom of things. If Tsai Ing-wen ducks the issues, the KMT must hold her feet to the fire, then turn them into 2016 election issues.
A constitutional amendment is imminent. Tsai Ing-wen apparently has reservations. The KMT, however, must not miss the opportunity to force the nation to hold a constitutional debate. Three themes should be addressed: National identity, cross-Strait relations, and government institutions. None of these should be overlooked. If these issues are not made crystal clear, constitutional reform will be impossible. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must not be allowed to duck these issues again and again. What would the constitutional amendment include? It could include a referendum on whether 18 year olds may vote in the 2016 election, and whether the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve of premier appointments should be restored. Once the 2016 elections are over, the KMT should demand further constitutional amendments, and a public referendum during the 2018 county and municipal elections. By then, the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve premier appointments may have been restored, and serve as a benchmark. If the KMT can maintain the momentum for constitutional reform from 2016, even if it loses the presidential election, it will retain access to the bully pulpit.
The Chu Xi meeting is the most crucial of the four levers. The KMT may lose the 2016 election. Beijing may not be happy. Any Chu Xi meeting should therefore reaffirm the 1992 Consensus and even go beyond the 1992 Consensus.It should establish a new benchmark for cross-Strait relations. It should establish a new "divided rule but not a divided nation” concept. On the one hand, the KMT could break new ground for 2016. On the other hand it could pressure the DPP to reform. During the Chu Xi meeting, Eric Chu should encourage Beijing to help the DPP reform. The Chu Xi meeting should echo, then surpass the cross-Strait achievements of the National Affairs Conference.
Now take the 2016 presidential election. As mentioned above, the KMT may well lose the election. But it must not allow it to become a crushing defeat. It must make full use of these four levers, rhetorically and strategically. It may lose the election, but it must win the policy path high ground. Eric Chu must be willing to burn his bridges. The National Affairs Conference, the constitutional amendment process, and the Chu Xi meeting will allow him to shrug off the albatross on his back. They will allow him to plan for 2020. Should Eric Chu throw his hat in the ring for 2016? That can be debated. But if the KMT fields another candidate, one unable to wage a respectable campaign, it might never rise again.
For Taiwan, 2016 is a crisis and an opportunity. As mentioned earlier, the shock waves from 2016 will soon buffet Taiwan. A consensus must be reached on national identity, constitutional amendments. energy policy, globalization, the 1992 consensus, cross-Strait relations, and ECFA. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot dodge these issues. Otherwise it may win the election, but lose the national policy debate. The KMT may indeed lose the election. But it need not shrink from the prospect. It must take an even tougher line, and remind itself that even though it lost the election, it won the national policy debate.
Sunzi's Art of War says: "If soldiers have their backs to the wall, they will not fear, they will fight to the death.” If Chu controls these four levers, he could improve the KMT's chances in 2016. But even if the party loses the election, it may be able to lead Taiwan back onto the right path. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. It might even enable the KMT to make a comeback.
釜破舟沉：朱立倫的四支槓桿
2015-01-29 01:40:30 聯合報 社論
扶大廈之將傾，挽狂瀾於既倒。朱立倫出任國民黨主席，情勢艱危，必須審慎操持四支槓桿：一、朱習會。二、國是會議。三、修憲。四、二○一六立委及總統選舉。
這四支槓桿相因相成，雖將以二○一六大選為總結，但也可能穿越二○二○年。就當前趨勢看，國民黨很難贏得二○一六總統大選，但朱立倫至少必須使國民黨在此次大選中出現煞車甩尾的情勢；也就是說，不能聽任國民黨繼續在二○一六如自由落體般墜落，縱使敗選，也須透過大選為國民黨在論述及戰略上重建一個能夠指向二○二○年的制高點。
朱立倫二○一六年的戰略目標應是：民進黨可能贏了選舉，卻輸在路線；國民黨即應力爭，雖可能輸了選舉，但必須贏在路線。
先論國是會議。朱立倫雖表示願意參與，但不可能只是扮演蔡英文的道具。因此，國民黨對於主辦單位的組成（如馬政府在此會中的角色如何、政黨的對等地位如何），及與會人員之多元及平衡，還有議題設定的高度及深廣度等，皆應爭取到國民黨的話語權。尤其關於國家認同、修憲方案、全球化、能源政策、兩岸關係、九二共識及ＥＣＦＡ後續工程等長期嚴重困擾台灣的議題，國民黨皆不可任其錯失，務必促使大會成為建立共識的平台。
蔡英文似想將國是會議做為她競選總統的政治嫁妝，九合一大勝後，已見她對議題有選擇性並冷處理。但朱立倫必須堅持此會為一個真正深廣辯論的場域，國民黨須成為議題的發動機，要有打破砂鍋問到底的決戰心志。倘若蔡英文有所迴避閃躲，國民黨即應強勢回應，並延伸為二○一六大選的議題。
修憲儼已箭在弦上。蔡英文對修憲似有保留，但國民黨不能錯失藉國是會議進行憲政大辯論的機會，對於憲政的三大主題，國家認同、兩岸關係及政府體制，均不應有所遺漏。因為，若不徹底談清楚這些問題，憲政改革即根本不可能完成，因而亦不容蔡英文對這些問題再閃避。至於實際的修憲方案，二○一六大選或許只將十八歲投票權及恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權兩案付諸公民複決；但待二○一六選後，國民黨應主張在新民意上繼續深化修憲方案，以交付二○一八縣市長選舉時公民複決為目標。屆時，修憲方案若以「恢復立院的閣揆任命同意權」為基準，則國民黨若操持了二○一六後的修憲動能，即使輸掉總統大選，也不致話語權盡失。
朱習會是四支槓桿中最具關鍵效應的一支。由於國民黨可能輸掉二○一六大選，而北京也未必樂見此結果；因此，朱立倫應設法在朱習會上爭取到「延續九二共識／超越九二共識」的兩岸關係新基準。此一新基準應在營造「分治而不分裂」的新思維，一方面可做為國民黨在二○一六年的先驅性主張，另一方面也可使民進黨更感受到轉型的壓力。朱立倫應設法在朱習會中，努力發揮引導北京思維昇華及協助民進黨轉型的功能；而朱習會的成果，在兩岸關係上應以呼應並超越國是會議的政治成就為目標。
再回頭談二○一六總統大選。如前所述，國民黨即使可能輸掉大選，但不可任其一敗塗地，而必須在論述及戰略上透過四支槓桿，建立「雖可能輸掉選舉，但必須贏在路線」的制高點。朱立倫若抱持破釜沉舟的決志，即更有在國是會議、修憲及朱習會中擺脫現實羈絆的操作空間，並將目標指向二○二○年。在這樣的思考下，朱立倫應否當仁不讓親自參選二○一六年總統大選，即有再作考慮的空間；因為，二○一六如果國民黨由其他人參選而打不出一場至少能止滑甩尾的選戰，恐怕就再也站不起來了。
對台灣而言，二○一六年是危機中存有轉機。如前所述，台灣經歷了二○一六年的震盪後，必須在國家認同、修憲方案、能源政策、全球化及九二共識、兩岸關係、ＥＣＦＡ架構等國政綱領上真正建立起共識。民進黨若重返執政，已不能閃躲，否則就可能「贏了選舉／輸了路線」；國民黨則縱使輸掉了選舉，亦無須退縮，而更應對「若輸了選舉，也要贏得路線」有所堅持。
兵法曰：「甚陷則不懼，不得已則鬥。」朱立倫若能正確操持這四支槓桿，或許可改善二○一六的國民黨選情；即使輸掉了選舉，但若能促成整個台灣回到正確的路線與軌道，那也將是國民黨對台灣的貢獻，亦可能是國民黨再起的資產。
Tuesday, January 27, 2015
To Rescue the KMT Eric Chu Must Think Like a Player
To Rescue the KMT Eric Chu Must Think Like a Player
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2015
Executive Summary: The groundswell of support for Professor Ko has swept the island. Ruling and opposition party leaders are in danger of being marginalized. Eric Chu is probably in a tougher spot than Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai's political party after all, has just scored a major victory. She and the DPP may well return to power in 2016. This gives her more room to maneuver. Eric Chu's situation is different. The Kuomintang he inherited is experiencing a leadership crisis. Morale at the grassroots is non-existent. Chu has even made a tactical withdrawal. He has chosen not to run in 2016. But who else among the party elite is qualified to fight this battle?
Full Text Below:
The groundswell of support for Professor Ko has swept the island. Ruling and opposition party leaders are in danger of being marginalized. Eric Chu is probably in a tougher spot than Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai's political party after all, has just scored a major victory. She and the DPP may well return to power in 2016. This gives her more room to maneuver. Eric Chu's situation is different. The Kuomintang he inherited is experiencing a leadership crisis. Morale at the grassroots is non-existent. Chu has even made a tactical withdrawal. He has chosen not to run in 2016. But who else among the party elite is qualified to fight this battle?
The groundswell of support for Professor Ko may provide some indicators. Chu should pay attention to the finer points behind the phenomenon. Professor Ko does have charisma. But he is reckless. He is hostile toward the wealthy political elites. He reflects the society's collective discontent over six years of Kuomintang rule. The KMT's policy path may be correct. But its political style is timid and conservative. Its leaders are indecisive. They try too hard to please everyone. They only wind up pleasing no one and alienating everyone. They try to display moderation. But they only wind up taking one step forward and two steps back. They clearly enjoyed a ruling majority. Yet they allowed themselves to be hijacked by a radical minority.
The people probably could not countenance this style of governance. Professor Ko is outspoken. He lacks political calculation. He refuse to present a pleasing image. Suddenly many people who were unhappy with the status quo, who were depressed and could find no outlet for their frustration found their answer. Professor Ko's mythology is a product of the times. This is the same thing that happened six years ago. People were fed up with Ah-Bian's style of governance, with his incitement of hatred. Ma Ying-jeou's moderate image suited the times. There is no enduring rule that one can follow. What matters the most important is the ability to read the writing on the wall.
In other words, Eric Chu must think like a “player”. He must not perpetuate the Kuomintang's current style of governance. He must not be timid and indecisive. His “cabinet system” must not remain distant from the public. Otherwise, in this rapidly changing era, he will swiftly be marginalized, if not elbowed aside entirely.
In recent years political stars have been swiftly replaced one after another. Once the page has been turned, there is no going back. The new generation of voters has no patience. It will not wait for you to sort things out. You say you are aiming for 2020. But if you have nothing to offer in 2016, no one will care what you have to offer in 2020.
Eric Chu must get back to basics. He must honestly assess his situation. The nine in one election debacle put the KMT in the hospital. Today the party is a critically ill patient in the intensive care unit. President Ma has a full year left in his term. But in fact his era has ended. The party elders have all retired. This is the first time the KMT has been in this situation since retreating to Taiwan. Meanwhile, grassroots party members have deserted. Blue camp supporter morale has hit rock bottom. Put bluntly, this is the most unfavorable the KMT's circumstances have been in decades. Could this be an unprecedented opportunity for Chu to remake the KMT? That is of course not the real question. The real question is how can he remake the KMT?
Our suggestion is that he must first of all cast aside the image of timidity and indecisiveness. He must set aside those issues that ordinary people simply do not understand. They include such issues as a cabinet system constitutional amendment. He must appeal to the grassroots. He must discover what the public really thinks. He must not blindly parrot the populist rhetoric of the cyber army. He must proceed according to political party evolution. He must remember that the KMT's traditional ideology of peoples livelihood began at the grassroots. He must remember that the party's original ideal was a society in which wealth was distributed equitably. In recent years, the party's policy has favored wealthy consortia. This widened the gap between rich and poor. Accumulated grievances have run deep, and ultimately led to the collapse of its support base. Therefore Eric Chu must think clearly. He must not allow a handful of political stars to play power games and engage in internecine warfare. The public has long ago tired of these antics.
Eric Chu must clearly state where the party stands. The KMT and DPP represent different ideologies and policy paths. Between the two, there is no room for ambiguity. The KMT must stand by its principles. It must affirm the righteousness of its stance. It must wage a forthright battle with the opposition. It must not permit the opposition to set the agenda or seize the bully pulpit. It must not allow itself to be hijacked by populist sentiment, only to end up with nothing. This is how President Ma came to his end. If you replicate his path, your fate will be even more tragic than his.
Finally, you must stop dodging cross-Strait issues. Dodging these issues will not win you any green camp supporters. It will only weaken cohesion within the blue camp. Cross-Strait relations have always been an asset for the KMT, not a burden, especially at this moment, when the DPP is complacent and hesitant about cross-Strait relations. You must seize the initiative and establish a new model for dialogue between Washington and Beijing. You have much room to maneuver on this issue. But you cannot afford to miss the opportunity. If you allow the opposition to hijack the issue, then the game will already be over.
社論－搶救國民黨 朱立倫需梟雄思維
2015年01月28日 04:10
本報訊
在柯P旋風鋪天蓋地的浪潮下，朝野兩黨的領袖似乎都有被邊緣化之虞。這中間朱立倫的處境恐怕比蔡英文還要更艱困，小英最起碼還領導一個剛獲得大勝的政黨，加上2016年重回執政的想像空間，讓她有更多的餘裕去布局；朱立倫則完全不同，他所接掌的國民黨，現階段根本是一個領導群潰散，基層士氣全面崩解的爛攤子，他縱然以退為進，放棄角逐2016，但放眼黨內剩餘菁英，他又能挺誰去打這場硬仗呢？
如果柯P的旋風可以提供若干啟示，那麼朱立倫或許應心領神會這背後的若干奧祕。是的，柯P有他的魅力，但這種率性直言、敵視權貴的特質，更多反映的其實是台灣集體社會心理的苦悶。執政6年多的國民黨，或許執政大方向是對的，但整個治理風格卻是溫吞保守、瞻前顧後的氣息，想討好所有人，最後弄得所有人都不領情，想表現溫良恭儉讓，結果什麼政策都是進一步退兩步，讓局面弄到明明是執政多數，卻硬生陷入被激進少數綁架的窘境。
也或許是這種治理氛圍讓人民悶得受不了，柯P這種直言不諱，沒有刻意政治算計，不願屈顏討好的形象，竟突然讓許多不滿現狀，鬱悶情緒得不到紓解的人們獲得釋放。不諱言說，柯P神話的塑造，其實更多是時代的產物。這正好像6年多前，當人們已經厭倦了阿扁激化對立的治理風格，馬英九的溫和形象得以適時崛起原因，這中間其實沒有什麼常規可循，最重要的是能否識讀出這中間微妙的變化。
換言之，朱立倫要有梟雄思維，假如他繼續複製國民黨目前的執政風格，還在處處謹言慎行，溫吞低調，機關算盡，成天盡扯些距離民眾遙遠的「內閣制」論調云云，那麼不客氣的說，在這個十倍速的年代中，甭說立即被邊緣化，立馬被淘汰出局都有可能。
這幾年政治菁英的消耗與替換難道還不夠快嗎？一頁翻過了就再翻不回來了，新世代的選民根本沒有什麼耐心等你慢慢布局，說什麼瞄準2020，如果2016都拿不出勇氣捨我其誰，2020又有誰會在乎你呢？
所以此刻的朱立倫，何妨就回歸基本面，誠實審度自己處境。沒錯，九合一的敗選，讓國民黨重傷到宛如送進加護病房急救重症患者，馬總統的任期還有一年多，但他的時代其實已經結束，黨內的公公老老也全數隱退，這是遷台後國民黨很少見的大人皆不管事的景況；另一方面，基層黨員大量流失，藍營支持者普遍士氣低落，講得直白一點，這是近十年來國民黨所面臨的最壞年代，但或許也是朱立倫重塑新國民黨最佳的歷史契機，只不過重點在於，他究竟要怎麼做！
我們的建議是，首先請拋掉那些優雅溫吞、瞻前顧後的身段，丟開那些尋常百姓根本搞不懂的議題（如內閣制修憲），真正走向草根，探問當下民間的實在心聲（絕不是盲從網軍的民粹），據以制定政黨發展的走向。要知道國民黨傳統民生主義的意識型態，本來就是從草根出發的，也本來就是要塑造均富社會理想的，只不過近幾年政策取向太過偏向財團，讓貧富差距日益擴大，民怨積累過深，終致支持基盤瓦解！所以，朱立倫得想清楚，千萬別再讓少數一二菁英閉著門玩權謀，成天搞鬥爭內耗，民眾對這些戲碼早就煩透了。
再者，朱立倫必須弄清楚政黨定位的區隔，國民黨與民進黨本來就代表著不同的意識型態與政策路線，這中間沒有任何混淆模糊的空間，國民黨必須堅持的理念，就應該理直氣壯，與在野黨光明正大的進行博弈，絕不能聽任在野黨為其設定話語權的框架，最後淪為民粹的俘虜，終至一事無成！馬總統就是這樣潰敗的，朱立倫如果還要持續複製，局面只會更壞。
最後，也寄語朱立倫別再閃躲兩岸議題，閃躲這個議題討好不了任何綠營的支持者，反而削弱了藍營的向心力！兩岸關係的現況與發展，從來就是國民黨的資產而不是包袱，特別是在此時此刻，民進黨還在兩岸議題故步自封且猶疑不定之際，朱立倫更該掌握發球權，在華府與北京之間打造一個新的對話模式，要知道在這個議題上，朱立倫的活動空間是很大的，但如果錯失了機遇，讓話語權被在野黨搶去，就什麼都不必提了！
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 28, 2015
Executive Summary: The groundswell of support for Professor Ko has swept the island. Ruling and opposition party leaders are in danger of being marginalized. Eric Chu is probably in a tougher spot than Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai's political party after all, has just scored a major victory. She and the DPP may well return to power in 2016. This gives her more room to maneuver. Eric Chu's situation is different. The Kuomintang he inherited is experiencing a leadership crisis. Morale at the grassroots is non-existent. Chu has even made a tactical withdrawal. He has chosen not to run in 2016. But who else among the party elite is qualified to fight this battle?
Full Text Below:
The groundswell of support for Professor Ko has swept the island. Ruling and opposition party leaders are in danger of being marginalized. Eric Chu is probably in a tougher spot than Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai's political party after all, has just scored a major victory. She and the DPP may well return to power in 2016. This gives her more room to maneuver. Eric Chu's situation is different. The Kuomintang he inherited is experiencing a leadership crisis. Morale at the grassroots is non-existent. Chu has even made a tactical withdrawal. He has chosen not to run in 2016. But who else among the party elite is qualified to fight this battle?
The groundswell of support for Professor Ko may provide some indicators. Chu should pay attention to the finer points behind the phenomenon. Professor Ko does have charisma. But he is reckless. He is hostile toward the wealthy political elites. He reflects the society's collective discontent over six years of Kuomintang rule. The KMT's policy path may be correct. But its political style is timid and conservative. Its leaders are indecisive. They try too hard to please everyone. They only wind up pleasing no one and alienating everyone. They try to display moderation. But they only wind up taking one step forward and two steps back. They clearly enjoyed a ruling majority. Yet they allowed themselves to be hijacked by a radical minority.
The people probably could not countenance this style of governance. Professor Ko is outspoken. He lacks political calculation. He refuse to present a pleasing image. Suddenly many people who were unhappy with the status quo, who were depressed and could find no outlet for their frustration found their answer. Professor Ko's mythology is a product of the times. This is the same thing that happened six years ago. People were fed up with Ah-Bian's style of governance, with his incitement of hatred. Ma Ying-jeou's moderate image suited the times. There is no enduring rule that one can follow. What matters the most important is the ability to read the writing on the wall.
In other words, Eric Chu must think like a “player”. He must not perpetuate the Kuomintang's current style of governance. He must not be timid and indecisive. His “cabinet system” must not remain distant from the public. Otherwise, in this rapidly changing era, he will swiftly be marginalized, if not elbowed aside entirely.
In recent years political stars have been swiftly replaced one after another. Once the page has been turned, there is no going back. The new generation of voters has no patience. It will not wait for you to sort things out. You say you are aiming for 2020. But if you have nothing to offer in 2016, no one will care what you have to offer in 2020.
Eric Chu must get back to basics. He must honestly assess his situation. The nine in one election debacle put the KMT in the hospital. Today the party is a critically ill patient in the intensive care unit. President Ma has a full year left in his term. But in fact his era has ended. The party elders have all retired. This is the first time the KMT has been in this situation since retreating to Taiwan. Meanwhile, grassroots party members have deserted. Blue camp supporter morale has hit rock bottom. Put bluntly, this is the most unfavorable the KMT's circumstances have been in decades. Could this be an unprecedented opportunity for Chu to remake the KMT? That is of course not the real question. The real question is how can he remake the KMT?
Our suggestion is that he must first of all cast aside the image of timidity and indecisiveness. He must set aside those issues that ordinary people simply do not understand. They include such issues as a cabinet system constitutional amendment. He must appeal to the grassroots. He must discover what the public really thinks. He must not blindly parrot the populist rhetoric of the cyber army. He must proceed according to political party evolution. He must remember that the KMT's traditional ideology of peoples livelihood began at the grassroots. He must remember that the party's original ideal was a society in which wealth was distributed equitably. In recent years, the party's policy has favored wealthy consortia. This widened the gap between rich and poor. Accumulated grievances have run deep, and ultimately led to the collapse of its support base. Therefore Eric Chu must think clearly. He must not allow a handful of political stars to play power games and engage in internecine warfare. The public has long ago tired of these antics.
Eric Chu must clearly state where the party stands. The KMT and DPP represent different ideologies and policy paths. Between the two, there is no room for ambiguity. The KMT must stand by its principles. It must affirm the righteousness of its stance. It must wage a forthright battle with the opposition. It must not permit the opposition to set the agenda or seize the bully pulpit. It must not allow itself to be hijacked by populist sentiment, only to end up with nothing. This is how President Ma came to his end. If you replicate his path, your fate will be even more tragic than his.
Finally, you must stop dodging cross-Strait issues. Dodging these issues will not win you any green camp supporters. It will only weaken cohesion within the blue camp. Cross-Strait relations have always been an asset for the KMT, not a burden, especially at this moment, when the DPP is complacent and hesitant about cross-Strait relations. You must seize the initiative and establish a new model for dialogue between Washington and Beijing. You have much room to maneuver on this issue. But you cannot afford to miss the opportunity. If you allow the opposition to hijack the issue, then the game will already be over.
社論－搶救國民黨 朱立倫需梟雄思維
2015年01月28日 04:10
本報訊
在柯P旋風鋪天蓋地的浪潮下，朝野兩黨的領袖似乎都有被邊緣化之虞。這中間朱立倫的處境恐怕比蔡英文還要更艱困，小英最起碼還領導一個剛獲得大勝的政黨，加上2016年重回執政的想像空間，讓她有更多的餘裕去布局；朱立倫則完全不同，他所接掌的國民黨，現階段根本是一個領導群潰散，基層士氣全面崩解的爛攤子，他縱然以退為進，放棄角逐2016，但放眼黨內剩餘菁英，他又能挺誰去打這場硬仗呢？
如果柯P的旋風可以提供若干啟示，那麼朱立倫或許應心領神會這背後的若干奧祕。是的，柯P有他的魅力，但這種率性直言、敵視權貴的特質，更多反映的其實是台灣集體社會心理的苦悶。執政6年多的國民黨，或許執政大方向是對的，但整個治理風格卻是溫吞保守、瞻前顧後的氣息，想討好所有人，最後弄得所有人都不領情，想表現溫良恭儉讓，結果什麼政策都是進一步退兩步，讓局面弄到明明是執政多數，卻硬生陷入被激進少數綁架的窘境。
也或許是這種治理氛圍讓人民悶得受不了，柯P這種直言不諱，沒有刻意政治算計，不願屈顏討好的形象，竟突然讓許多不滿現狀，鬱悶情緒得不到紓解的人們獲得釋放。不諱言說，柯P神話的塑造，其實更多是時代的產物。這正好像6年多前，當人們已經厭倦了阿扁激化對立的治理風格，馬英九的溫和形象得以適時崛起原因，這中間其實沒有什麼常規可循，最重要的是能否識讀出這中間微妙的變化。
換言之，朱立倫要有梟雄思維，假如他繼續複製國民黨目前的執政風格，還在處處謹言慎行，溫吞低調，機關算盡，成天盡扯些距離民眾遙遠的「內閣制」論調云云，那麼不客氣的說，在這個十倍速的年代中，甭說立即被邊緣化，立馬被淘汰出局都有可能。
這幾年政治菁英的消耗與替換難道還不夠快嗎？一頁翻過了就再翻不回來了，新世代的選民根本沒有什麼耐心等你慢慢布局，說什麼瞄準2020，如果2016都拿不出勇氣捨我其誰，2020又有誰會在乎你呢？
所以此刻的朱立倫，何妨就回歸基本面，誠實審度自己處境。沒錯，九合一的敗選，讓國民黨重傷到宛如送進加護病房急救重症患者，馬總統的任期還有一年多，但他的時代其實已經結束，黨內的公公老老也全數隱退，這是遷台後國民黨很少見的大人皆不管事的景況；另一方面，基層黨員大量流失，藍營支持者普遍士氣低落，講得直白一點，這是近十年來國民黨所面臨的最壞年代，但或許也是朱立倫重塑新國民黨最佳的歷史契機，只不過重點在於，他究竟要怎麼做！
我們的建議是，首先請拋掉那些優雅溫吞、瞻前顧後的身段，丟開那些尋常百姓根本搞不懂的議題（如內閣制修憲），真正走向草根，探問當下民間的實在心聲（絕不是盲從網軍的民粹），據以制定政黨發展的走向。要知道國民黨傳統民生主義的意識型態，本來就是從草根出發的，也本來就是要塑造均富社會理想的，只不過近幾年政策取向太過偏向財團，讓貧富差距日益擴大，民怨積累過深，終致支持基盤瓦解！所以，朱立倫得想清楚，千萬別再讓少數一二菁英閉著門玩權謀，成天搞鬥爭內耗，民眾對這些戲碼早就煩透了。
再者，朱立倫必須弄清楚政黨定位的區隔，國民黨與民進黨本來就代表著不同的意識型態與政策路線，這中間沒有任何混淆模糊的空間，國民黨必須堅持的理念，就應該理直氣壯，與在野黨光明正大的進行博弈，絕不能聽任在野黨為其設定話語權的框架，最後淪為民粹的俘虜，終至一事無成！馬總統就是這樣潰敗的，朱立倫如果還要持續複製，局面只會更壞。
最後，也寄語朱立倫別再閃躲兩岸議題，閃躲這個議題討好不了任何綠營的支持者，反而削弱了藍營的向心力！兩岸關係的現況與發展，從來就是國民黨的資產而不是包袱，特別是在此時此刻，民進黨還在兩岸議題故步自封且猶疑不定之際，朱立倫更該掌握發球權，在華府與北京之間打造一個新的對話模式，要知道在這個議題上，朱立倫的活動空間是很大的，但如果錯失了機遇，讓話語權被在野黨搶去，就什麼都不必提了！
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)