Abe Should Heed Merkel's Recommendation
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2015
Executive Summary: During a recent visit to Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told the
Abe government something it did not want to hear. Japan should face up
to its past, and resolve the comfort women issue. This is the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan has shirked responsibility
for sowing East Asian discord. Germany, a fellow World War II Axis
Powers aggressor, has urged Japan to repent. If Abe persists in going
his own way, Japan will pay a heavy price.
Full Text Below:
During a recent visit to Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told the Abe government something it did not want to hear. Japan should face up to its past, and resolve the comfort women issue. This is the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan has shirked responsibility for sowing East Asian discord. Germany, a fellow World War II Axis Powers aggressor, has urged Japan to repent. If Abe persists in going his own way, Japan will pay a heavy price.
In 1993, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono admitted that the Japanese military enslaved comfort women. He apologized and atoned. In August 1995, on the 50th anniversary of Japan's surrender, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama acknowledged Japan's past policy errors, including initiating wars, colonial rule, and acts of aggression against numerous countries, especially in Asia, and inflicting immense damage and suffering. Japan must engage in self-retrospection, remember the lessons of history, and educate the younger generation about the tragedies of war, in order to avoid repeating past mistakes. Since then, the statements issued by Murayama and Kono have become the official position of later Japanese governments, and have been accepted by neighboring nations victimized by Japanese aggression.
But no sooner did Abe take office, than he began acting on his own right wing ideology. Step by step, he began reversing the verdict of history, and repudiating past acknowledgments of responsibility. He called for an investigation of the Kono Statement, attempting to deny the enslavement of comfort women. He called for a review of the Murayama Statement as well. On the 70th anniversary of V-J Day, he proposed an "Abe Statement" on Japan's war responsibility, in an attempt to rewrite history. Abe's denial that Japan was the aggressor provoked an intense backlash from Mainland China and Korea.
Japan was soundly defeated during World War II. During the Cold War however, it became a US ally. Since then it has followed the United States' lead in foreign policy. A rare exception was when it established diplomatic relations with Mainland China ahead of the United States. This provoked US dissatisfaction. Otherwise, it has seldom gone its own way in international diplomacy. Since Abe became prime minister however, he has twice veered sharply toward rightism in attempts to rewrite history. This has deeply angered Mainland China and South Korea. It has also affected the United States' long term strategy regarding Japan, Korea and Mainland China, and forced the United States to publicly express its disapproval.
In January of this year, US State Department spokesman Jen Psaki praised the apologies issued by former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama and former Cabinet Minister Kono, saying they were important efforts to improve relations with Japan's neighbors. She said the United States hopes Japan will engage in dialogue with neighboring countries, in order to resolve contradictions and historical grievances in a friendly fashion. The US obviously hopes Abe will acknowledge the Murayama Statement and the Kono Statement. The Abe government initially accepted the its predecessors' positions. Now however, past Japanese government efforts to eliminate historical grievances and promote goodwill, have all been undone.
Abe, naturally, has his own political plans, modeled after former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's right-wing ideology. During his first term as prime minister, Abe threw in the towel halfway. During his second term however, he made a comeback, and proposed “three arrows” to revitalize the economy. He paid a hefty price for partial success. Now he has gotten a second wind, and is determined to achieve his goal. The rapid rise of Mainland China has resulted in frequent Mainland patrols in the East China Sea, a new Mainland air defense identification zone, and a firm Mainland declaration of sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. Japan now feels increasingly threatened. As a result Japan has substantially increased its military budget and island garrisons. The Abe government is aggressively promoting a constitutional amendment, in an attempt to rebuild a "normal nation."
Germany was also an aggressor during World War II. It too was invaded and occupied. It too suffered huge losses in human life. It too suffered ignominious defeat. But Germany's response was totally different from Japan's. Germany has expressed deep remorse for the slaughter of six million Jews. It has hunted down war criminals mercilessly. In 1970, German Chancellor Willi Brandt knelt down before the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. In 1995, Helmut Kohl knelt down before the Monument to Holocaust Victims in Israel. The Auschwitz concentration camp has been turned into a memorial site. The German people retain the memory of their cruelty. They have reminded themselves of the crimes they committed, acknowledged their historical guilt, offered compensation, and reminded themselves never to repeat the same mistakes again.
By contrast, in Japan there has been no in depth soul searching over Japan's own war crimes. Many people feel they are victims of the atomic bomb and American militarism. This has led to the sense that Japan is not responsible for the suffering of people in other countries. Even the United States' post-war peace constitution, which imposes constraints on Japan, are perceived as an injustice that represses Japanese military power and reduces it to an “abnormal nation”. Abe's tactic is to incite ultranationalism and incite Japanese anxiety over a strong China. Alas, denying historical guilt is a major mistake.
Merkel spoke plainly. She said "To completely break with the past is impossible. One must face the past squarely." Japan's Crown Prince Naruhito spoke on his birthday recently. He said Japan must humbly face up to its past. The generation that lived through the war must properly convey the tragic history of Japan to a generation that knows nothing about the war. He underscored the importance of the post-war pacifist constitution, clearly directing his remarks toward the Abe government. Abe needs to listen to these inconvenient truths, and think hard on them.
社論－梅克爾的規勸 安倍要聽進去
2015-03-14 01:28
中國時報
本報訊
德國總理梅克爾最近訪問日本時，對安倍晉三政府發出逆耳諍言，認為日本應正視過去，好好解決慰安婦問題。今年是二次世界大戰結束70周年，日本企圖推卸歷史責任因而引發東亞齟齬，如今同是二戰侵略國的德國提出了規勸，安倍如果仍一意孤行，必將使日本付出沉重代價。
1993年，時任日本內閣官房長官的河野洋平承認日軍強徵慰安婦，並為此表示道歉與反省。1995年8月，當時的首相村山富市在日本投降50周年發表談話，承認日本過去實行錯誤的國策，走了戰爭道路，日本的殖民統治和侵略給許多國家，特別是亞洲各國人民，帶來了巨大的損害和痛苦。日本要深刻反省歷史，記取歷史教訓，必須把戰爭的悲慘告訴年輕一代，以不再重犯過去的錯誤。自此，河野談話與村山談話便成為日本歷屆政府的官方立場，而且也獲得被侵略受害鄰國的接受。
但安倍上任後，卻基於他個人及右翼勢力的意識型態，開始一步步鋪陳布局，試圖對歷史翻案，撤回認錯的態度。除提出要調查河野談話的擬定過程，意圖否定官方有參與強徵慰安婦的行為，也打算檢討「村山談話」，在終戰70周年提出「安倍談話」，為日本的戰爭責任重新作個定義，藉此建立自己的歷史地位。安倍否認日本侵略罪行的意圖呼之欲出，引爆中、韓的激烈反彈。
在二戰中慘敗、接著成為美國冷戰盟友的日本，向來在外交政策上追隨美國，除了和中國建交跑得比美國快而引發老美不滿外，很少在國際外交上特立獨行或自行暴走。但安倍二度出任首相後，大幅走向右傾路線，企圖對歷史罪責翻案，嚴重激怒了中國大陸與南韓，也衝擊美國長期以來與日、韓聯手抗衡中國的基本戰略，逼得美國公開表示不以為然。
美國國務院發言人莎琪今年1月表示，日本前首相村山富市和前官房長河野洋平的謝罪談話，是日本為改善與鄰國關係做出的重要努力之一，美國希望日本透過對話，以友好的方式解決與鄰國之間圍繞歷史問題產生的矛盾。美方話語中明顯希望安倍繼承村山與河野談話，安倍政府第一時間也表示會繼承之前的談話立場，但過去政府消弭歷史恩怨的努力與善意，已經全被勾消。
安倍當然有自己的政治盤算，師承前首相小泉純一郎的他，原本意識型態就朝右傾。第一任首相半途落跑，第二任捲土重來祭出振興經濟三隻箭，付出重大代價才略有成效，但如今卻後繼乏力，必須再端政績。加上中國大陸迅速崛起，以頻繁巡航與劃設東海防空識別區等作為，強力宣示釣魚台主權，讓日本受威脅之感與日俱增，因此日方也大幅提高軍事預算及加強離島駐軍，安倍政府更積極推動修憲，試圖重建一個「正常國家」。
同樣是二戰時的侵略國，同樣造成生靈塗炭，也同樣悽慘落敗，但德國與日本對歷史的反省態度卻完全不同。屠殺了600萬猶太人的德國深切懺悔，追查戰犯毫不手軟，1970年德國總理布蘭特在華沙猶太人殉難紀念碑前下跪，1995年科爾總理也在以色列的猶太人受難紀念碑前下跪，奧許維茲集中營遺址成為紀念館，德國人一一保存並正視自己可怖的殘忍史實，不斷提醒自己曾犯下的罪，持續對歷史過錯心懷愧疚並作出大筆賠償，而且時時警惕自己切勿重蹈覆轍。
相對的，日本卻對自己的戰爭罪責沒有深入靈魂的反省，許多人覺得自己也是軍國主義與美國原子彈的受害者，對侵略造成他國人民的苦難並無責任之感，甚至對戰後美方主導制定的和平憲法對日本的約束感到不公，覺得軍權被壓制的日本不是一個正常的國家。安倍的種種作法，便是想炒作國家主義，以滿足因中國強大而陷入焦慮的日本民心，但以否定及推卸歷史罪責為手段，卻是大錯特錯了。
梅克爾的話講得坦白：「要完全與過去了斷是不可能的，必須經常正視過去才是。」日本皇太子德仁日前發表生日談話時也表示，日本應謙虛回顧過去，經歷過戰爭的一代應將悲慘的經驗以及日本走過的歷史，「正確」地傳達給不知戰爭的一代，並強調戰後和平憲法之重要，頗有向安倍政府勸誡之意味。逆耳忠言，安倍應該聽進去，並深自惕厲。
Sunday, March 15, 2015
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Tsai Ing-wen in 2016: Four Uncertainties
Tsai Ing-wen in 2016: Four Uncertainties
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2015
Executive Summary: Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.
Full Text Below:
As soon as the results of the nine in one elections were announced, DPP momentum surged. It now appears as if victory in next year's presidential election is assured. First of all, the DPP presidential candidate has already been decided. The KMT, by contrast, is stuck. Several potential candidates have prior political commitments, or are dogged by controversy. They are unable to rally Kuomintang supporters behind them, never mind win public support. Tsai Ing-wen only has to play a waiting game.
Secondly, the political winds greatly favor the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Political pundits and ordinary voters alike have concluded that Tsai Ing-wen will unquestionably be the winner in next year's presidential election. Voters on Taiwan have long been "bandwagon jumpers" contemptuous of “born losers”. Therefore the political winds definitely favor Tsai Ing-wen.
Indeed, Tsai Ing-wen has already become smugly complacent. Recently, Tsai Ing-wen said that her presidential campaign strategy “would not spend large sums for advertising, would not resort to traditional organization and mobilization." Instead it would rely on the "cyber army" to "organize and mobilize the biggest defeat ever of the Kuomintang". This is very much how Lai Ching-teh won reelection as mayor. But this strategy overestimates Tsai Ing-wen's online support. It also underestimates the KMT's campaign ability.
Tsai Ing-wen told reporters that "Dealing with interpersonal relationships is important for politicians." She said that she was "quite capable of handling interpersonal relationships, which is why despite many people's pessimism about me, I am still here." Actually, there is a huge gap between Tsai Ing-wen's self-image and her image in political and media circles. This shows just how complacent and self-satisfied she has become. That does not bode well for Tsai Ing-wen.
Should Tsai Ing-wen be optimistic about her election prospects? To answer that question, many objective and subjective factors must be considered. First, there is the Chen Shui-bian factor. Chen and Tsai have unresolved grievances. Their paths differ. Chen's influence is difficult to estimate, and he will be difficult to control. Second, according to various polls, support for the DPP is unquestionably higher than support for the KMT. The gap is also widening. That said, Tsai Ing-wen is not a shoo-in given all possible candidates. Some polls even show her slightly trailing Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng. One pundit says "The presumption is that Tsai Ing-wen is a shoo in. Yet Tsai's poll numbers have never exceeded 50%. They have fluctuated between 42 and 49%."
Former DPP Legislator Julian Kuo noted three major difficulties. He said "During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen faced three major obstacles. Cross-Strait issues undermined support in Taipei and New Taipei. Support in southern Taiwan was lukewarm. Grassroots campaigns in Taoyuan, Xinchu, and Miaoli were inadequate. Today there still remains much room for improvement." Despite six years of Kuomintang ineptitude, support and enthusiasm for Tsai Ing-wen is actually far less than support for Ma Ying-jeou in 2008.
Third, Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is not as easy to negotiate as expected. It is much farther away than previously imagined. People know that Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is all about cross-Strait relations, or more precisely, trilateral relations between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Early this year, it was rumored that Tsai Ing-wen would visit the US. But so far there has been much thunder and little rain. The word is "conditions have not been set." In other words, Washington is still worried about Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.
Meanwhile, the Mainland is not merely "listening to Tsai Ing-wen says and watching what she does.” It is already deeply suspicious of her. It has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding positions held by the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Recently Xi Jinping reiterated, "The 1992 consensus has an irreplaceable role in cross-Strait political trust, dialogue, consultation, and improved relations. If this cross-Strait political foundation is destroyed, cross-Strait trust will be lost. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos." This was the Mainland making its position clear to Tsai Ing-wen and other Taiwan political leaders, ahead of any changes resulting from the upcoming presidential election.
The DPP has not responded vehemently to the Mainland's declaration. It has not posted anything online. But the DPP's "three benefits" and "three constants" failed to answer any of the substantive questions on everyone's mind. Questions such as how a ruling Democratic Progressive Party would maintain, consolidate, and develop the cross-Strait political trust. Washington and Beijing both harbour doubts about Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen is neither willing nor able to reverse the situation. That means her "Final Mile" will be a long one indeed.
Fourth, the KMT is not standing still. Eric Chu has taken over as party chairman. Step by step, he is going his own way. He is reforming party personnel appointments, restructuring and transforming think tanks, establishing an examination system, resolving the Ma Wang controversy, abolishing honorary chairmanships, and gradually revealing his own political style. Recently, Eric Chu visited Hong Kong and Singapore, raising his international profile. More importantly, he is clear about his support for the 1992 consensus. KMT and CCP leaders have expressed strong support. He has met Beijing's expectations and allayed Beijing's concerns. This has greatly enhanced his reputation and image. His father in law Kao Yu-jen has advanced a "Beyond the 1992 Consensus" thesis, leading to public speculation about Eric Chu's cross-Strait stance.
Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.
社論－蔡英文2016必勝的四個不一定
2015年03月13日 04:10
本報訊
九合一地方大選結果揭曉後，民進黨聲勢大漲，目前似乎完全掌握了明年總統大選的先機。首先，民進黨的總統候選人已經定於一尊，國民黨還深陷泥淖之中，幾個檯面上可能的候選人不是有政治承諾在前，就是帶有爭議，無法凝聚全體國民黨支持者的團結，甚或是社會接受度較差，蔡英文可以說是以逸待勞。
其次，政治風向大大有利於民進黨、有利於蔡英文，不管是政治觀察家，還是一般選民，對於明年總統大選的結局幾乎已經有了定論，就是「蔡英文穩贏」。台灣的選民素來有「西瓜偎大邊」、「扶起不扶倒」的政治性格，這樣的政治風向，對於蔡英文絕對是一大利多。
事實上，蔡英文的自滿感、驕傲感已經浮現。日前，蔡英文公開表示，總統大選的策略是「不花大錢作廣告、不走傳統組織動員」，要靠「婉君」、「以有史以來最大組織動員打敗國民黨」，很像賴清德連任市長選戰的風格。但蔡英文這個策略首先是高估自己在網路中的支持度，其次是輕忽國民黨的選舉能量。
在之前，蔡英文接受媒體專訪時還表示：「處理人際關係是政治人物重要的元素」，她自己則「滿會處理人際關係，這也是為什麼以前很多人不看好我，但我到現在還可以在這裡。」蔡英文的自我認定，其實和政治圈、媒體圈的看法有很大差距，這完全流露她的自我感覺良好。凡此種種跡象，實非蔡英文之福。
然而，客觀評估蔡英文的選情是否樂觀，還有更重要的主客觀因素需要掌握。首先是陳水扁因素，扁蔡過去心結已深，未來路線更是有別，陳的能量難以估計更難控制。第二，是民調數據，根據各家民調，民進黨的支持度毫無疑問高過國民黨，差距還有拉大的趨勢，但與此同時，蔡英文並沒有在可能人選間居於遙遙領先的地位，某些民調甚至顯示她的聲望還略遜於朱立倫、王金平。有政治觀察家已經指出，「在一面倒預期蔡英文必將當選總統的氣氛下，蔡民調始終沒過半，只在42%～49%間擺盪」。
民進黨前立委郭正亮也指出，「2012年總統大選蔡英文所面臨的三大困境，不管是兩岸因素衝擊雙北、南部熱情激發不足、桃竹苗基層經營不足，如今看來仍有不少改善空間」。歷經國民黨6年多的失政，目前民眾對蔡英文的支持度與熱情，其實遠不及2008年馬英九所獲得的支持度。
第三，蔡英文的「最後一哩路」比預期中、想像中更漫長、遙遠。人們都清楚蔡英文「最後一哩路」是「兩岸關係」、或者嚴格說來是「台灣、大陸、美國三邊關係」。年初時曾傳出蔡英文預定訪美，但目前為止是雷聲大、雨點小，政壇盛傳是「條件沒談妥」，也就是美國依舊對蔡英文的兩岸政策沒有譜、不放心。
另一方面，大陸對蔡英文已不只是「聽其言、觀其行」，而是高度警惕，也多次表達大陸對民進黨與蔡英文兩岸立場的關注。日前，習近平就再度指出：「九二共識對兩岸建立政治互信、開展對話協商、改善和發展兩岸關係，發揮了不可替代的重要作用。如果兩岸雙方的共同政治基礎遭到破壞，兩岸互信將不復存在，兩岸關係就會重新回到動蕩不安的老路上去」。這是大陸預先對總統大選後台灣與兩岸新政局形勢變化「有言在先」，更是對蔡英文等台灣政黨領袖的提醒。
面對大陸方面的表態，民進黨雖然沒有強力駁斥、上綱上線，但是該黨表達的「三個有利」、「三個堅持」，完全沒回答實質問題，也就是民進黨執政後如何維護、鞏固、發展兩岸的「政治互信」。從華盛頓到北京，都對蔡英文抱持疑慮，蔡英文又不願也無力扭轉局面，這條「最後一哩路」確實是十分漫長。
第四，國民黨並沒有坐以待斃。朱立倫接任黨主席後，一步步走自己的路，黨務人事革新、重整改造智庫、建立考紀制度、處理馬王爭議，加上卸除榮譽主席等，慢慢展現了自己的政治風格。近日朱立倫訪星訪港，除了拉高了國際格局，更重要的是明確對九二共識以及國共雙方領導人會面表達了積極正面的立場與態度，可說是一掃北京的觀望與疑慮，大大提高了朱立倫的聲望與形象，加上其岳父高育仁一番「超越九二共識」的談話，更讓人對朱立倫的兩岸立場有更多想像空間。
朱立倫在兩岸政策上可能出現新的突破，對比蔡英文的裹足不前，如果國民黨能進一步在「團結」、「整合」上有具體、積極的進展，國民黨無論是否由朱立倫代表參選，選情未必始終低盪。未來十個月兩黨領袖都要不斷面對各種政治與政策的考驗，蔡英文面前的難關並不比國民黨少，蔡英文的自我感覺良好與自滿，恐怕來的太早了一些。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 13, 2015
Executive Summary: Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.
Full Text Below:
As soon as the results of the nine in one elections were announced, DPP momentum surged. It now appears as if victory in next year's presidential election is assured. First of all, the DPP presidential candidate has already been decided. The KMT, by contrast, is stuck. Several potential candidates have prior political commitments, or are dogged by controversy. They are unable to rally Kuomintang supporters behind them, never mind win public support. Tsai Ing-wen only has to play a waiting game.
Secondly, the political winds greatly favor the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Political pundits and ordinary voters alike have concluded that Tsai Ing-wen will unquestionably be the winner in next year's presidential election. Voters on Taiwan have long been "bandwagon jumpers" contemptuous of “born losers”. Therefore the political winds definitely favor Tsai Ing-wen.
Indeed, Tsai Ing-wen has already become smugly complacent. Recently, Tsai Ing-wen said that her presidential campaign strategy “would not spend large sums for advertising, would not resort to traditional organization and mobilization." Instead it would rely on the "cyber army" to "organize and mobilize the biggest defeat ever of the Kuomintang". This is very much how Lai Ching-teh won reelection as mayor. But this strategy overestimates Tsai Ing-wen's online support. It also underestimates the KMT's campaign ability.
Tsai Ing-wen told reporters that "Dealing with interpersonal relationships is important for politicians." She said that she was "quite capable of handling interpersonal relationships, which is why despite many people's pessimism about me, I am still here." Actually, there is a huge gap between Tsai Ing-wen's self-image and her image in political and media circles. This shows just how complacent and self-satisfied she has become. That does not bode well for Tsai Ing-wen.
Should Tsai Ing-wen be optimistic about her election prospects? To answer that question, many objective and subjective factors must be considered. First, there is the Chen Shui-bian factor. Chen and Tsai have unresolved grievances. Their paths differ. Chen's influence is difficult to estimate, and he will be difficult to control. Second, according to various polls, support for the DPP is unquestionably higher than support for the KMT. The gap is also widening. That said, Tsai Ing-wen is not a shoo-in given all possible candidates. Some polls even show her slightly trailing Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng. One pundit says "The presumption is that Tsai Ing-wen is a shoo in. Yet Tsai's poll numbers have never exceeded 50%. They have fluctuated between 42 and 49%."
Former DPP Legislator Julian Kuo noted three major difficulties. He said "During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen faced three major obstacles. Cross-Strait issues undermined support in Taipei and New Taipei. Support in southern Taiwan was lukewarm. Grassroots campaigns in Taoyuan, Xinchu, and Miaoli were inadequate. Today there still remains much room for improvement." Despite six years of Kuomintang ineptitude, support and enthusiasm for Tsai Ing-wen is actually far less than support for Ma Ying-jeou in 2008.
Third, Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is not as easy to negotiate as expected. It is much farther away than previously imagined. People know that Tsai Ing-wen's "Final Mile" is all about cross-Strait relations, or more precisely, trilateral relations between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Early this year, it was rumored that Tsai Ing-wen would visit the US. But so far there has been much thunder and little rain. The word is "conditions have not been set." In other words, Washington is still worried about Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.
Meanwhile, the Mainland is not merely "listening to Tsai Ing-wen says and watching what she does.” It is already deeply suspicious of her. It has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding positions held by the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. Recently Xi Jinping reiterated, "The 1992 consensus has an irreplaceable role in cross-Strait political trust, dialogue, consultation, and improved relations. If this cross-Strait political foundation is destroyed, cross-Strait trust will be lost. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos." This was the Mainland making its position clear to Tsai Ing-wen and other Taiwan political leaders, ahead of any changes resulting from the upcoming presidential election.
The DPP has not responded vehemently to the Mainland's declaration. It has not posted anything online. But the DPP's "three benefits" and "three constants" failed to answer any of the substantive questions on everyone's mind. Questions such as how a ruling Democratic Progressive Party would maintain, consolidate, and develop the cross-Strait political trust. Washington and Beijing both harbour doubts about Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen is neither willing nor able to reverse the situation. That means her "Final Mile" will be a long one indeed.
Fourth, the KMT is not standing still. Eric Chu has taken over as party chairman. Step by step, he is going his own way. He is reforming party personnel appointments, restructuring and transforming think tanks, establishing an examination system, resolving the Ma Wang controversy, abolishing honorary chairmanships, and gradually revealing his own political style. Recently, Eric Chu visited Hong Kong and Singapore, raising his international profile. More importantly, he is clear about his support for the 1992 consensus. KMT and CCP leaders have expressed strong support. He has met Beijing's expectations and allayed Beijing's concerns. This has greatly enhanced his reputation and image. His father in law Kao Yu-jen has advanced a "Beyond the 1992 Consensus" thesis, leading to public speculation about Eric Chu's cross-Strait stance.
Eric Chu may offer a breakthrough in cross-Strait policy, Tsai Ing-wen, by contrast, continues to hem and haw. Can the KMT consolidate support behind a single candidate, even if Eric Chu decides not to run? If it can, its election prospects may not remain in the pits. In the coming ten months, leaders of both parties will face an endless string of political and policy challenges. Tsai Ing-wen faces no fewer than the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen's smug complacency is more than a little premature.
社論－蔡英文2016必勝的四個不一定
2015年03月13日 04:10
本報訊
九合一地方大選結果揭曉後，民進黨聲勢大漲，目前似乎完全掌握了明年總統大選的先機。首先，民進黨的總統候選人已經定於一尊，國民黨還深陷泥淖之中，幾個檯面上可能的候選人不是有政治承諾在前，就是帶有爭議，無法凝聚全體國民黨支持者的團結，甚或是社會接受度較差，蔡英文可以說是以逸待勞。
其次，政治風向大大有利於民進黨、有利於蔡英文，不管是政治觀察家，還是一般選民，對於明年總統大選的結局幾乎已經有了定論，就是「蔡英文穩贏」。台灣的選民素來有「西瓜偎大邊」、「扶起不扶倒」的政治性格，這樣的政治風向，對於蔡英文絕對是一大利多。
事實上，蔡英文的自滿感、驕傲感已經浮現。日前，蔡英文公開表示，總統大選的策略是「不花大錢作廣告、不走傳統組織動員」，要靠「婉君」、「以有史以來最大組織動員打敗國民黨」，很像賴清德連任市長選戰的風格。但蔡英文這個策略首先是高估自己在網路中的支持度，其次是輕忽國民黨的選舉能量。
在之前，蔡英文接受媒體專訪時還表示：「處理人際關係是政治人物重要的元素」，她自己則「滿會處理人際關係，這也是為什麼以前很多人不看好我，但我到現在還可以在這裡。」蔡英文的自我認定，其實和政治圈、媒體圈的看法有很大差距，這完全流露她的自我感覺良好。凡此種種跡象，實非蔡英文之福。
然而，客觀評估蔡英文的選情是否樂觀，還有更重要的主客觀因素需要掌握。首先是陳水扁因素，扁蔡過去心結已深，未來路線更是有別，陳的能量難以估計更難控制。第二，是民調數據，根據各家民調，民進黨的支持度毫無疑問高過國民黨，差距還有拉大的趨勢，但與此同時，蔡英文並沒有在可能人選間居於遙遙領先的地位，某些民調甚至顯示她的聲望還略遜於朱立倫、王金平。有政治觀察家已經指出，「在一面倒預期蔡英文必將當選總統的氣氛下，蔡民調始終沒過半，只在42%～49%間擺盪」。
民進黨前立委郭正亮也指出，「2012年總統大選蔡英文所面臨的三大困境，不管是兩岸因素衝擊雙北、南部熱情激發不足、桃竹苗基層經營不足，如今看來仍有不少改善空間」。歷經國民黨6年多的失政，目前民眾對蔡英文的支持度與熱情，其實遠不及2008年馬英九所獲得的支持度。
第三，蔡英文的「最後一哩路」比預期中、想像中更漫長、遙遠。人們都清楚蔡英文「最後一哩路」是「兩岸關係」、或者嚴格說來是「台灣、大陸、美國三邊關係」。年初時曾傳出蔡英文預定訪美，但目前為止是雷聲大、雨點小，政壇盛傳是「條件沒談妥」，也就是美國依舊對蔡英文的兩岸政策沒有譜、不放心。
另一方面，大陸對蔡英文已不只是「聽其言、觀其行」，而是高度警惕，也多次表達大陸對民進黨與蔡英文兩岸立場的關注。日前，習近平就再度指出：「九二共識對兩岸建立政治互信、開展對話協商、改善和發展兩岸關係，發揮了不可替代的重要作用。如果兩岸雙方的共同政治基礎遭到破壞，兩岸互信將不復存在，兩岸關係就會重新回到動蕩不安的老路上去」。這是大陸預先對總統大選後台灣與兩岸新政局形勢變化「有言在先」，更是對蔡英文等台灣政黨領袖的提醒。
面對大陸方面的表態，民進黨雖然沒有強力駁斥、上綱上線，但是該黨表達的「三個有利」、「三個堅持」，完全沒回答實質問題，也就是民進黨執政後如何維護、鞏固、發展兩岸的「政治互信」。從華盛頓到北京，都對蔡英文抱持疑慮，蔡英文又不願也無力扭轉局面，這條「最後一哩路」確實是十分漫長。
第四，國民黨並沒有坐以待斃。朱立倫接任黨主席後，一步步走自己的路，黨務人事革新、重整改造智庫、建立考紀制度、處理馬王爭議，加上卸除榮譽主席等，慢慢展現了自己的政治風格。近日朱立倫訪星訪港，除了拉高了國際格局，更重要的是明確對九二共識以及國共雙方領導人會面表達了積極正面的立場與態度，可說是一掃北京的觀望與疑慮，大大提高了朱立倫的聲望與形象，加上其岳父高育仁一番「超越九二共識」的談話，更讓人對朱立倫的兩岸立場有更多想像空間。
朱立倫在兩岸政策上可能出現新的突破，對比蔡英文的裹足不前，如果國民黨能進一步在「團結」、「整合」上有具體、積極的進展，國民黨無論是否由朱立倫代表參選，選情未必始終低盪。未來十個月兩黨領袖都要不斷面對各種政治與政策的考驗，蔡英文面前的難關並不比國民黨少，蔡英文的自我感覺良好與自滿，恐怕來的太早了一些。
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
How Should the DPP Respond to Earth-Shaking Cross-Strait Changes?
How Should the DPP Respond to Earth-Shaking Cross-Strait Changes?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2015
Executive Summary: Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake." If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.
Full Text Below:
Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake."
Taiwan may well experience a third change in ruling parties in 2016. Xi Jinping laid his cards on the table for the Democratic Progressive Party, which may well return to power. He did this relatively early. On the one hand, he wanted to preempt the DPP's “wait and see” mentality. On the other hand, he wanted to give the DPP more time and more space to maneuver.
In fact, the DPP's understanding of the 1992 consensus and its response to it, has changed. In 2008, Tsai Ing-wen denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan”, and as “undermining sovereignty and humiliating the nation". She opposed the legalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. On the very eve of the 2012 election, Tsai Ing-wen was still advocating "globalization without China." Back then, she blocked cross-Strait exchanges. She insisted that "There is no 1992 consensus. So how can we accept any alleged 1992 consensus?” But after Xi Jinping said "the earth will shake", Tsai Ing-wen changed her tune. She said cross-Strait relations should not be “labeled” as the 1992 consensus. In other words, she finally acknowledged its existence. Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "three constants". She said "The process of cross-Strait exchanges must ensure equal opportunity and diverse participation. Cross-strait exchanges must ensure public welfare and social benefits." This showed that on cross-Strait policy, her bark was worse than her bite. Seven years of changes have revealed major contradictions in the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Back then, the DPP obstructed exchanges. It insisted that "The 1992 consensus does not exist". Today Tsai Ing-wen talks of “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits". Can she still maintain that the 1992 consensus does not exist?
Tsai Ing-wen recently proposed "three benefits, three constants". These can be summed up as “peace” and "exchanges". But Xi Jinping said peace and cross-Strait exchanges are based on the 1992 consensus, the two sides' "shared political foundation". If the 1992 consensus is destroyed, then "the earth will shake”. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen's call for cross-Straits peace and exchanges without the 1992 consensus, is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
Tsai Ing-wen can no longer say "Basically there is no 1992 consensus". Wen-Je Ko can no longer say, "I do not know what the contents of the 1992 consensus are". They can no longer feign deafness. In fact, the 1992 consensus is a cross-Strait policy framework that still has room for improvement. On the one hand, DPP acceptance of the 1992 consensus would stabilize cross-Strait peace. On the other hand, the DPP can demand that the 1992 consensus be improved. As Ma Ying-jeou noted, "If the 1992 consensus refers to one China, different interpretations, then I support it". The DPP can say, "If the 1992 consensus ensures equal opportunity and diverse participation, public welfare and social benefits, then we support it." In short, the DPP cannot refuse to accept the 1992 consensus. Instead, it must make every effort to improve the 1992 consensus.
Why does the Democratic Progressive Party oppose the 1992 consensus? Put bluntly, because it cannot cast off Taiwan independence. It feels compelled to pander to its supporters, many of whom persist in advocating Taiwan independence. Because the DPP cannot cast off Taiwan independence, it cannot recognize a "constitutional one China". Because it cannot recognize a “constitutional one China", it is reluctant to accept any "one China, different interpretations” style argument. That is why it opposes the 1992 consensus. That is why Beijing regards the DPP's assertion that that "There is no 1992 consensus" as synonymous with advocacy of Taiwan independence. But the global situation has changed. Does the DPP still dare to advocate Taiwan independence? Will the DPP persist in its calls for Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation? If it does, it will continue its opposition to the 1992 consensus. But if cannot and dare not advocate the founding of a Republic of Taiwan, what point is there in rejecting the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations?
Rejecting the 1992 consensus amounts to rejecting the "one China Constitution". It amounts to "backdoor listing" Taiwan independence thinking. Rejecting the "one China Constitution" while upholding "one China, different interpretations", "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence and no use of force” will not fly. The earth will shake. Tsai Ing-wen's “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits" will remain a pipe dream.
Taiwan independence is no longer possible. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot evade the matter of the 1992 consensus. It can only work within the framework of the ROC Constitution. It can only attempt to improve the 1992 consensus. This involves three main points. First, the Republic of China is not a means of achieving Taiwan independence. The Republic of China "one China framework" must be honored. Second, “one China” is currently in the "different interpretations" stage. But it may be possible for the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China to exist side by side, and define that as "one China". Third, if "one China" can be defined as a "big roof China", then the two warring sides can become two separately administered sides. This would enable the DPP to switch from the defensive to the offensive, and the passive to the active, vis a vis the 1992 consensus quagmire, and enable it to undergo transformation.
If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.
聯合／民進黨如何因應「地動山搖」兩岸變局
2015-03-12 01:32:39 聯合報 聯合報社論
習近平說，如果兩岸共同的政治基礎九二共識遭到破壞，兩岸互信不復存在，兩岸關係將重回動盪不安的老路。他說：「基礎不牢，地動山搖。」
台灣政局可能在二○一六年出現政黨輪替，習近平的談話不啻是對可能重返執政的民進黨攤牌。這個攤牌動作較預期出現得早，一方面是在提前抵制民進黨猶豫觀望的心態，另一方面也形同給民進黨預留了較長且較平緩的轉圜空間。
民進黨對「九二共識」的認知與立場，其實已有改變。在二○○八年，蔡英文指ＥＣＦＡ為「傾中賣台／喪權辱國」，反對兩岸經貿交流法制化；甚至在二○一二年大選前夕，蔡英文尚主張「沒有中國的全球化」。在當年那種「抗阻兩岸交流」的論述架構下，蔡英文的主張是，「根本沒有九二共識／如何接受九二共識」？但是，到了此次習近平提出「地動山搖論」後，蔡英文已改口稱，不宜以「九二共識」將兩岸關係「標籤化」，也就是她終究承認了「九二共識」之存在。蔡英文甚至在其「三個堅持」中強調，「兩岸交流的過程必須多元參與機會平等／兩岸交流的成果必須維護公益與社會共享」，暴露了她在兩岸政策上的色厲內荏。七年的變化顯現了民進黨兩岸政策的重大矛盾：當年民進黨抗阻交流，猶可說「九二共識根本不存在」；如今蔡英文已至主張「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」之地步，則豈能再視「九二共識」為無物？
蔡英文最近所提「三個有利／三個堅持」，可以總結為「和平」與「交流」兩大目標。但習近平則指出，兩岸的和平與交流皆以九二共識為「共同政治基礎」；若九二共識遭到破壞，即是「基礎不牢／地動山搖」。因此，蔡英文僅主張兩岸和平交流，卻迴避九二共識，自然被指為仍是一棵「空心菜」。
蔡英文不能再說「根本沒有九二共識」，柯文哲也不能再說「不知九二共識是何內容」，此皆掩耳盜鈴。其實，「九二共識」迄今仍是一個尚在發展及存有改善空間的兩岸政策架構。為今之計，民進黨應一方面接納「九二共識」在穩定兩岸和平發展上的既有績效，另一方面亦可嘗試對「九二共識」的內涵及運作加以發展與改善。也就是說，正如馬英九說的「九二共識若指一中各表／我支持」；民進黨也可提出「九二共識若指向一種存有發展性及改善空間的方向／我可接受」之類的主張。亦即，民進黨既不可能否定九二共識，即應將心力用於發展及改善九二共識。
民進黨因何反對「九二共識」？直白地說，正是因甩不掉台獨，或必須對其支持者作出主張台獨的姿態。民進黨因甩不掉台獨，所以不能承認「憲法一中」；又因不承認「憲法一中」，所以不願接受「一中各表」之類的論述；再由於不願主張「一中各表」，所以反對「九二共識」。正因如此，北京即將民進黨的「否定九二共識」與「台獨」視為同義詞。然而，世局國情發展至今日地步，民進黨還敢或還能主張台獨嗎？若民進黨仍然堅持獨立建國，其反對九二共識尚猶可說；但若不能亦不敢再主張「建立台灣共和國」，則「否定九二共識」與「否定憲法一中」之意義何在？
否定九二共識，即是否定「一中憲法」，亦是「借殼上市」的台獨思維；但若否定「一中憲法」，則連與大陸維持「一中各表」「不統／不獨／不武」的和平發展亦無以為繼，在「地動山搖」中，更如何實現蔡英文「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」的夢想？
台獨已無可能，民進黨若欲重返執政，即無可能迴避九二共識；而只能設法在中華民國憲法的一中架構下，試圖找出「九二共識」的發展及改善空間。其主要張本有三：一、中華民國不是台獨，因此必須尊重中華民國在「一中架構」中的地位；二、一個中國的內涵目前在「各自表述」階段，但應有可能在中華民國及中華人民共和國並立共生的現實下，來定義「一個中國」；三、若「一個中國」能有「大屋頂中國」的定義，則兩岸交戰政府即有轉向分治政府的可能性。這將是民進黨在「九二共識」的困局中反守為攻、化被動為主動的槓桿，並可借力使力為轉型契機。
民進黨若否定九二共識到底，勢將面臨「地動山搖」的後果；因此，努力爭取九二共識內涵與運作的發展及改善，始是因勢利導、趨吉避凶之計。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2015
Executive Summary: Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake." If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.
Full Text Below:
Xi Jinping says that if the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for cross-Strait relations, is destroyed, then cross-Strait trust will cease to exist. Cross-Strait relations will revert to chaos. He said, "Without a solid foundation, the earth will shake."
Taiwan may well experience a third change in ruling parties in 2016. Xi Jinping laid his cards on the table for the Democratic Progressive Party, which may well return to power. He did this relatively early. On the one hand, he wanted to preempt the DPP's “wait and see” mentality. On the other hand, he wanted to give the DPP more time and more space to maneuver.
In fact, the DPP's understanding of the 1992 consensus and its response to it, has changed. In 2008, Tsai Ing-wen denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan”, and as “undermining sovereignty and humiliating the nation". She opposed the legalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. On the very eve of the 2012 election, Tsai Ing-wen was still advocating "globalization without China." Back then, she blocked cross-Strait exchanges. She insisted that "There is no 1992 consensus. So how can we accept any alleged 1992 consensus?” But after Xi Jinping said "the earth will shake", Tsai Ing-wen changed her tune. She said cross-Strait relations should not be “labeled” as the 1992 consensus. In other words, she finally acknowledged its existence. Tsai Ing-wen spoke of "three constants". She said "The process of cross-Strait exchanges must ensure equal opportunity and diverse participation. Cross-strait exchanges must ensure public welfare and social benefits." This showed that on cross-Strait policy, her bark was worse than her bite. Seven years of changes have revealed major contradictions in the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Back then, the DPP obstructed exchanges. It insisted that "The 1992 consensus does not exist". Today Tsai Ing-wen talks of “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits". Can she still maintain that the 1992 consensus does not exist?
Tsai Ing-wen recently proposed "three benefits, three constants". These can be summed up as “peace” and "exchanges". But Xi Jinping said peace and cross-Strait exchanges are based on the 1992 consensus, the two sides' "shared political foundation". If the 1992 consensus is destroyed, then "the earth will shake”. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen's call for cross-Straits peace and exchanges without the 1992 consensus, is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
Tsai Ing-wen can no longer say "Basically there is no 1992 consensus". Wen-Je Ko can no longer say, "I do not know what the contents of the 1992 consensus are". They can no longer feign deafness. In fact, the 1992 consensus is a cross-Strait policy framework that still has room for improvement. On the one hand, DPP acceptance of the 1992 consensus would stabilize cross-Strait peace. On the other hand, the DPP can demand that the 1992 consensus be improved. As Ma Ying-jeou noted, "If the 1992 consensus refers to one China, different interpretations, then I support it". The DPP can say, "If the 1992 consensus ensures equal opportunity and diverse participation, public welfare and social benefits, then we support it." In short, the DPP cannot refuse to accept the 1992 consensus. Instead, it must make every effort to improve the 1992 consensus.
Why does the Democratic Progressive Party oppose the 1992 consensus? Put bluntly, because it cannot cast off Taiwan independence. It feels compelled to pander to its supporters, many of whom persist in advocating Taiwan independence. Because the DPP cannot cast off Taiwan independence, it cannot recognize a "constitutional one China". Because it cannot recognize a “constitutional one China", it is reluctant to accept any "one China, different interpretations” style argument. That is why it opposes the 1992 consensus. That is why Beijing regards the DPP's assertion that that "There is no 1992 consensus" as synonymous with advocacy of Taiwan independence. But the global situation has changed. Does the DPP still dare to advocate Taiwan independence? Will the DPP persist in its calls for Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation? If it does, it will continue its opposition to the 1992 consensus. But if cannot and dare not advocate the founding of a Republic of Taiwan, what point is there in rejecting the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations?
Rejecting the 1992 consensus amounts to rejecting the "one China Constitution". It amounts to "backdoor listing" Taiwan independence thinking. Rejecting the "one China Constitution" while upholding "one China, different interpretations", "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence and no use of force” will not fly. The earth will shake. Tsai Ing-wen's “equal opportunity and diverse participation” and “public welfare and social benefits" will remain a pipe dream.
Taiwan independence is no longer possible. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it cannot evade the matter of the 1992 consensus. It can only work within the framework of the ROC Constitution. It can only attempt to improve the 1992 consensus. This involves three main points. First, the Republic of China is not a means of achieving Taiwan independence. The Republic of China "one China framework" must be honored. Second, “one China” is currently in the "different interpretations" stage. But it may be possible for the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China to exist side by side, and define that as "one China". Third, if "one China" can be defined as a "big roof China", then the two warring sides can become two separately administered sides. This would enable the DPP to switch from the defensive to the offensive, and the passive to the active, vis a vis the 1992 consensus quagmire, and enable it to undergo transformation.
If the DPP rejects the 1992 consensus to the bitter end, it will eventually have to face the consequences. The earth will shake. Therefore it should help the 1992 Consensus to evolve. That is the way to go with the flow and the way to ensure the best outcome.
聯合／民進黨如何因應「地動山搖」兩岸變局
2015-03-12 01:32:39 聯合報 聯合報社論
習近平說，如果兩岸共同的政治基礎九二共識遭到破壞，兩岸互信不復存在，兩岸關係將重回動盪不安的老路。他說：「基礎不牢，地動山搖。」
台灣政局可能在二○一六年出現政黨輪替，習近平的談話不啻是對可能重返執政的民進黨攤牌。這個攤牌動作較預期出現得早，一方面是在提前抵制民進黨猶豫觀望的心態，另一方面也形同給民進黨預留了較長且較平緩的轉圜空間。
民進黨對「九二共識」的認知與立場，其實已有改變。在二○○八年，蔡英文指ＥＣＦＡ為「傾中賣台／喪權辱國」，反對兩岸經貿交流法制化；甚至在二○一二年大選前夕，蔡英文尚主張「沒有中國的全球化」。在當年那種「抗阻兩岸交流」的論述架構下，蔡英文的主張是，「根本沒有九二共識／如何接受九二共識」？但是，到了此次習近平提出「地動山搖論」後，蔡英文已改口稱，不宜以「九二共識」將兩岸關係「標籤化」，也就是她終究承認了「九二共識」之存在。蔡英文甚至在其「三個堅持」中強調，「兩岸交流的過程必須多元參與機會平等／兩岸交流的成果必須維護公益與社會共享」，暴露了她在兩岸政策上的色厲內荏。七年的變化顯現了民進黨兩岸政策的重大矛盾：當年民進黨抗阻交流，猶可說「九二共識根本不存在」；如今蔡英文已至主張「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」之地步，則豈能再視「九二共識」為無物？
蔡英文最近所提「三個有利／三個堅持」，可以總結為「和平」與「交流」兩大目標。但習近平則指出，兩岸的和平與交流皆以九二共識為「共同政治基礎」；若九二共識遭到破壞，即是「基礎不牢／地動山搖」。因此，蔡英文僅主張兩岸和平交流，卻迴避九二共識，自然被指為仍是一棵「空心菜」。
蔡英文不能再說「根本沒有九二共識」，柯文哲也不能再說「不知九二共識是何內容」，此皆掩耳盜鈴。其實，「九二共識」迄今仍是一個尚在發展及存有改善空間的兩岸政策架構。為今之計，民進黨應一方面接納「九二共識」在穩定兩岸和平發展上的既有績效，另一方面亦可嘗試對「九二共識」的內涵及運作加以發展與改善。也就是說，正如馬英九說的「九二共識若指一中各表／我支持」；民進黨也可提出「九二共識若指向一種存有發展性及改善空間的方向／我可接受」之類的主張。亦即，民進黨既不可能否定九二共識，即應將心力用於發展及改善九二共識。
民進黨因何反對「九二共識」？直白地說，正是因甩不掉台獨，或必須對其支持者作出主張台獨的姿態。民進黨因甩不掉台獨，所以不能承認「憲法一中」；又因不承認「憲法一中」，所以不願接受「一中各表」之類的論述；再由於不願主張「一中各表」，所以反對「九二共識」。正因如此，北京即將民進黨的「否定九二共識」與「台獨」視為同義詞。然而，世局國情發展至今日地步，民進黨還敢或還能主張台獨嗎？若民進黨仍然堅持獨立建國，其反對九二共識尚猶可說；但若不能亦不敢再主張「建立台灣共和國」，則「否定九二共識」與「否定憲法一中」之意義何在？
否定九二共識，即是否定「一中憲法」，亦是「借殼上市」的台獨思維；但若否定「一中憲法」，則連與大陸維持「一中各表」「不統／不獨／不武」的和平發展亦無以為繼，在「地動山搖」中，更如何實現蔡英文「多元平等交流／交流利益共享」的夢想？
台獨已無可能，民進黨若欲重返執政，即無可能迴避九二共識；而只能設法在中華民國憲法的一中架構下，試圖找出「九二共識」的發展及改善空間。其主要張本有三：一、中華民國不是台獨，因此必須尊重中華民國在「一中架構」中的地位；二、一個中國的內涵目前在「各自表述」階段，但應有可能在中華民國及中華人民共和國並立共生的現實下，來定義「一個中國」；三、若「一個中國」能有「大屋頂中國」的定義，則兩岸交戰政府即有轉向分治政府的可能性。這將是民進黨在「九二共識」的困局中反守為攻、化被動為主動的槓桿，並可借力使力為轉型契機。
民進黨若否定九二共識到底，勢將面臨「地動山搖」的後果；因此，努力爭取九二共識內涵與運作的發展及改善，始是因勢利導、趨吉避凶之計。
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
PRC and USA: Taiwan's Strategic Options Disappearing
PRC and USA: Taiwan's Strategic Options Disappearing
Want Daily/China Times Group Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2015
Executive Summary: PRC-USA relations pose a challenge for Taiwan, which must change its strategy. It must not become a troublemaker in PRC-USA relations. Balancing the trilateral relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing is in Taiwan's best interests.
Full Text Below:
US President Barack Obama sternly criticized Mainland China's recently drafted anti-terrorism law. The law forces foreign companies, such as Microsoft or Apple, to allow the Mainland government to access to their databases. This enables it to monitor the company's customers. Mainland China however, points out that US intelligence agencies have hacked into mobile phone SIM cards the world over. Mainland China says its move is consistent with international circumstances and domestic counter-terrorism requirements. The PRC and the USA clash constantly. Meanwhile, counter-terrorism measures proliferate day by day.
Sino-US relations are simultaneously competitive and cooperative. It is not a simple matter of friend or foe. The confrontation and conflict is even more complex than the "Thucydides Trap" from Western history. Mainland China and the US clash over geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests. They also clash over ideology and political values, making the problem doubly difficult.
Late last January, Mainland President Xi Jinping told US reporters that Mainland China's rise would inevitably lead to opposition from the United States, Japan and other countries. Fears of another conflict are increasing. But Mainland China will do its best not to fall into the Thucydides Trap. The pursuit of hegemonic power is inconsistent with Mainland China's circumstances. The Chinese people lack the genetic disposition for hegemony and domination. Xi Jinping noted the United States' dualistic worldview. He affirmed the desire to avoid conflict with the United States, since it would result in a lose-lose outcome. He said the realization of the "China Dream" requires international peace and prosperity.
The Thucydides Trap is a theory elaborated by the ancient Greek thinker Thucydides. It refers to the 30-year war between Athens and Sparta in 5th century BC,
which led to a lose-lose outcome. The theory has been applied to current Sino-US relations. Mainland China's rise obviously challenges US hegemony. The result of differences and conflicts might well be war. Paraphrasing Thucydides: Sino-US war may be difficult to avoid because the US fears China's rise to power.
Consider actual cases from the 16th century. The rise of new powers usually led to war. Obvious examples include the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, when Germany replaced Britain as Europe's largest economy. This led to two European wars, one in 1914, and one in 1939. The rise of Japan after World War I challenged the traditional powers. Japan established an Asian order, then launched a war of aggression against China and East Asia.
The international environment in the 21st century is different. Emerging powers have neither the ability nor desire to clash with traditional hegemons. In mid January, at the "China-US Business Forum", Mainland Premier Wang Yangyuan advanced his "America leads the world" theory. He said the United States has been the leader of global systems and standards. Mainland China has no desire or ability to challenge the US. It is willing to join the system and play a constructive role. In Switzerland, at the "World Economic Forum", Li Keqiang pledged that Mainland China would strive to maintain peaceful relations with the international community. He stressed that Mainland China's reforms and development will bring more opportunities to the world. He guaranteed that Mainland China will not shy away from its international responsibilities.
Beijing is attempting to gradually integrate itself into the existing US-dominated global system. It is keeping a low profile to avoid threatening continued US hegemony. It has adopted a global strategy of mutually beneficial relations between nations to avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap.
Meanwhile, the United States has no intention of widening Sino-US differences. Early this year, President Obama delivered a "State of the Union" address, and a "National Security Strategy" report before Congress. He said the US "welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous China", and seeks a constructive relationship with China that promotes security in Asia and the world. He stressed that although the United States and Mainland China are in competition, conflict is not inevitable. This is a new national security strategy for Washington, one that does not emphasize a “China threat”. It reflects the United States' strategic restraint and desire to avoid provoking Mainland China.
Mainland China is guarding against the United States' Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy. But it has not been stampeded into a Thucydides Trap. The US is worried about rapidly increasing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region. But it is also actively promoting Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, high-level consultations, and military exchanges and cooperation. Mainland China and the US maintain a state of jostling with each other without breaking with each other. They are clearly aware of the rise of Athens in the 5th century BC Athens and the rise of Germany in the 19th century. They know that the Thucydides trap would result in an Asian and global tragedy.
Mainland China and the US have different perceptions regarding rising great powers. Mainland China emphasizes mutual respect, mutual trust, restraint over differences, cooperation, and win-win as a foundation for the future. The United States emphasizes utility, the solution of specific problems, pragmatic cooperation, and constructive management of differences, leading to a win-win situation. Sino-US relations will require improved dialogue and cooperation. The Thucydides Trap is merely the product of certain people's imaginations.
PRC-USA relations pose a challenge for Taiwan, which must change its strategy. It must not become a troublemaker in PRC-USA relations. Balancing the trilateral relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing is in Taiwan's best interests.
社評－中美大局下 台灣戰略選擇漸失
2015年03月11日 04:10
本報訊
美國總統歐巴馬最近嚴詞批評中國草擬的第一部《反恐法》，認為強迫外國企業（例如微軟或蘋果科技公司）同意中方進入其數據庫，是北京用來監控客戶的手段；中國則根據美方情報機構曾入侵全球手機SIM卡，指出此舉乃符合當前國際反恐情勢與國內反恐工作需要。中美分歧原本不斷，於今為反恐措施增添新例。
中美關係既競爭又合作，難以簡化為「非敵即友」，雙方對立與衝突的程度，似乎較西方歷史上的「修昔底德陷阱」（Thucydides's trap）更為複雜。地緣政治、經貿與戰略利益衝突之外，中美意識形態與政治價值觀的分歧，尤其難以解決。
去年元月下旬，大陸國家主席習近平接受美國媒體專訪時提到，中國崛起必然會引起美、日等國的防範，擔憂彼此爆發衝突的機率增加，但中國會努力避免陷入「修昔底德陷阱」，因為強權追求霸權的作法並不適合中國國情，中國也不具備爭霸與稱霸的基因。習近平此語不僅點出美國的二元對立觀，期望避免與美國衝突及對抗而造成兩敗俱傷，同時也暗喻「中國夢」的實現需要與外部建立和平共榮之路徑。
歐洲歷史上的「修昔底德陷阱」源於古希臘思想家修昔底德的理論，闡述公元前5世紀雅典和斯巴達間長達30年的戰爭，最終形成雙輸的結果。以此詮釋當下的中美關係，中國崛起顯然會挑戰美國的傳統霸權，分歧與衝突的結果可能是戰爭。若套用修昔底德的名言：中美戰爭難以避免或因中國強大引發美國的恐懼。
就16世紀迄今的實際案例來看，崛起強權多半會造成戰爭。明顯的例子是：1871年普法戰爭後的德國取代英國成為歐洲最大經濟體，隨後引爆1914年及1939年兩次歐戰；一次大戰後崛起的日本，同樣因挑戰傳統強權、建立以其為核心的亞洲秩序，而對中國和東亞發動侵略戰爭。
21世紀的國際環境不同於過去。新興強權與傳統霸權皆無衝突的本錢和意願。大陸副總理汪洋元月中旬在「中美商業論壇」會議上提出的「美國引領世界」論，聲稱美國業已主導全球體系和規範，中國無力也無意挑戰美國，願意加入體系並扮演建設性角色。緊接著，李克強在瑞士「世界經濟論壇」會議上也承諾，中國將致力於與國際社會維持和平關係，強調中國的改革和發展將為世界帶來更多機會，保證中國不會迴避自己應承擔的國際責任。
北京當下的全球布局是採取逐步融入美國主導的現存全球體系、持續韜光養晦避免與美國爭霸、另闢途徑與全球各國互利互惠關係等3項策略，無非是為了避開陷入修昔底德的宿命。
反觀美國亦無意深化中美分歧。歐巴馬總統年初的《國情咨文》與提交國會的《國家安全戰略》報告，都重申「歡迎穩定、和平與繁榮的崛起中國」，尋求與中國發展建設性關係，促進亞洲及世界的安全，強調美中雖有競爭，但衝突並非不可避免。華府的此一國安新戰略，並未強調中國威脅，反映了美國秉持的是「戰略克制」原則，避免挑釁中國。
中國雖嚴防美國的亞太再平衡戰略，但不致於陷入「修昔底德陷阱」的恐慌。美國憂慮中國迅速增強亞太地區的影響力，卻仍積極推動中美戰略暨經濟對話、高層磋商與軍事交流合作。中美維持「鬥而不破」的格局，顯然意識到雙邊若落入公元前5世紀雅典或19世紀末德國崛起後的「修昔底德陷阱」，將會造成亞洲與全球的悲劇。
中美對新型大國關係的概念與內涵有分歧，中方講求原則，強調相互尊重為增進互信、管控分歧、開展合作、共創雙贏、引領未來的基礎。美方則重視功能，要求先解決具體問題，務實合作與建設性處理分歧，就會形成雙贏。加強對話與尋求合作，會是未來中美關係的發展趨勢，「修昔底德陷阱」不過是某些人士的想像。
台灣面對中美關係的丕變，需要適時調整戰略，切勿成為中美關係的「麻煩製造者」。均衡的台、美、中三邊關係，才能最符合台灣的利益。
Want Daily/China Times Group Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2015
Executive Summary: PRC-USA relations pose a challenge for Taiwan, which must change its strategy. It must not become a troublemaker in PRC-USA relations. Balancing the trilateral relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing is in Taiwan's best interests.
Full Text Below:
US President Barack Obama sternly criticized Mainland China's recently drafted anti-terrorism law. The law forces foreign companies, such as Microsoft or Apple, to allow the Mainland government to access to their databases. This enables it to monitor the company's customers. Mainland China however, points out that US intelligence agencies have hacked into mobile phone SIM cards the world over. Mainland China says its move is consistent with international circumstances and domestic counter-terrorism requirements. The PRC and the USA clash constantly. Meanwhile, counter-terrorism measures proliferate day by day.
Sino-US relations are simultaneously competitive and cooperative. It is not a simple matter of friend or foe. The confrontation and conflict is even more complex than the "Thucydides Trap" from Western history. Mainland China and the US clash over geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests. They also clash over ideology and political values, making the problem doubly difficult.
Late last January, Mainland President Xi Jinping told US reporters that Mainland China's rise would inevitably lead to opposition from the United States, Japan and other countries. Fears of another conflict are increasing. But Mainland China will do its best not to fall into the Thucydides Trap. The pursuit of hegemonic power is inconsistent with Mainland China's circumstances. The Chinese people lack the genetic disposition for hegemony and domination. Xi Jinping noted the United States' dualistic worldview. He affirmed the desire to avoid conflict with the United States, since it would result in a lose-lose outcome. He said the realization of the "China Dream" requires international peace and prosperity.
The Thucydides Trap is a theory elaborated by the ancient Greek thinker Thucydides. It refers to the 30-year war between Athens and Sparta in 5th century BC,
which led to a lose-lose outcome. The theory has been applied to current Sino-US relations. Mainland China's rise obviously challenges US hegemony. The result of differences and conflicts might well be war. Paraphrasing Thucydides: Sino-US war may be difficult to avoid because the US fears China's rise to power.
Consider actual cases from the 16th century. The rise of new powers usually led to war. Obvious examples include the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, when Germany replaced Britain as Europe's largest economy. This led to two European wars, one in 1914, and one in 1939. The rise of Japan after World War I challenged the traditional powers. Japan established an Asian order, then launched a war of aggression against China and East Asia.
The international environment in the 21st century is different. Emerging powers have neither the ability nor desire to clash with traditional hegemons. In mid January, at the "China-US Business Forum", Mainland Premier Wang Yangyuan advanced his "America leads the world" theory. He said the United States has been the leader of global systems and standards. Mainland China has no desire or ability to challenge the US. It is willing to join the system and play a constructive role. In Switzerland, at the "World Economic Forum", Li Keqiang pledged that Mainland China would strive to maintain peaceful relations with the international community. He stressed that Mainland China's reforms and development will bring more opportunities to the world. He guaranteed that Mainland China will not shy away from its international responsibilities.
Beijing is attempting to gradually integrate itself into the existing US-dominated global system. It is keeping a low profile to avoid threatening continued US hegemony. It has adopted a global strategy of mutually beneficial relations between nations to avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap.
Meanwhile, the United States has no intention of widening Sino-US differences. Early this year, President Obama delivered a "State of the Union" address, and a "National Security Strategy" report before Congress. He said the US "welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous China", and seeks a constructive relationship with China that promotes security in Asia and the world. He stressed that although the United States and Mainland China are in competition, conflict is not inevitable. This is a new national security strategy for Washington, one that does not emphasize a “China threat”. It reflects the United States' strategic restraint and desire to avoid provoking Mainland China.
Mainland China is guarding against the United States' Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy. But it has not been stampeded into a Thucydides Trap. The US is worried about rapidly increasing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region. But it is also actively promoting Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, high-level consultations, and military exchanges and cooperation. Mainland China and the US maintain a state of jostling with each other without breaking with each other. They are clearly aware of the rise of Athens in the 5th century BC Athens and the rise of Germany in the 19th century. They know that the Thucydides trap would result in an Asian and global tragedy.
Mainland China and the US have different perceptions regarding rising great powers. Mainland China emphasizes mutual respect, mutual trust, restraint over differences, cooperation, and win-win as a foundation for the future. The United States emphasizes utility, the solution of specific problems, pragmatic cooperation, and constructive management of differences, leading to a win-win situation. Sino-US relations will require improved dialogue and cooperation. The Thucydides Trap is merely the product of certain people's imaginations.
PRC-USA relations pose a challenge for Taiwan, which must change its strategy. It must not become a troublemaker in PRC-USA relations. Balancing the trilateral relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing is in Taiwan's best interests.
社評－中美大局下 台灣戰略選擇漸失
2015年03月11日 04:10
本報訊
美國總統歐巴馬最近嚴詞批評中國草擬的第一部《反恐法》，認為強迫外國企業（例如微軟或蘋果科技公司）同意中方進入其數據庫，是北京用來監控客戶的手段；中國則根據美方情報機構曾入侵全球手機SIM卡，指出此舉乃符合當前國際反恐情勢與國內反恐工作需要。中美分歧原本不斷，於今為反恐措施增添新例。
中美關係既競爭又合作，難以簡化為「非敵即友」，雙方對立與衝突的程度，似乎較西方歷史上的「修昔底德陷阱」（Thucydides's trap）更為複雜。地緣政治、經貿與戰略利益衝突之外，中美意識形態與政治價值觀的分歧，尤其難以解決。
去年元月下旬，大陸國家主席習近平接受美國媒體專訪時提到，中國崛起必然會引起美、日等國的防範，擔憂彼此爆發衝突的機率增加，但中國會努力避免陷入「修昔底德陷阱」，因為強權追求霸權的作法並不適合中國國情，中國也不具備爭霸與稱霸的基因。習近平此語不僅點出美國的二元對立觀，期望避免與美國衝突及對抗而造成兩敗俱傷，同時也暗喻「中國夢」的實現需要與外部建立和平共榮之路徑。
歐洲歷史上的「修昔底德陷阱」源於古希臘思想家修昔底德的理論，闡述公元前5世紀雅典和斯巴達間長達30年的戰爭，最終形成雙輸的結果。以此詮釋當下的中美關係，中國崛起顯然會挑戰美國的傳統霸權，分歧與衝突的結果可能是戰爭。若套用修昔底德的名言：中美戰爭難以避免或因中國強大引發美國的恐懼。
就16世紀迄今的實際案例來看，崛起強權多半會造成戰爭。明顯的例子是：1871年普法戰爭後的德國取代英國成為歐洲最大經濟體，隨後引爆1914年及1939年兩次歐戰；一次大戰後崛起的日本，同樣因挑戰傳統強權、建立以其為核心的亞洲秩序，而對中國和東亞發動侵略戰爭。
21世紀的國際環境不同於過去。新興強權與傳統霸權皆無衝突的本錢和意願。大陸副總理汪洋元月中旬在「中美商業論壇」會議上提出的「美國引領世界」論，聲稱美國業已主導全球體系和規範，中國無力也無意挑戰美國，願意加入體系並扮演建設性角色。緊接著，李克強在瑞士「世界經濟論壇」會議上也承諾，中國將致力於與國際社會維持和平關係，強調中國的改革和發展將為世界帶來更多機會，保證中國不會迴避自己應承擔的國際責任。
北京當下的全球布局是採取逐步融入美國主導的現存全球體系、持續韜光養晦避免與美國爭霸、另闢途徑與全球各國互利互惠關係等3項策略，無非是為了避開陷入修昔底德的宿命。
反觀美國亦無意深化中美分歧。歐巴馬總統年初的《國情咨文》與提交國會的《國家安全戰略》報告，都重申「歡迎穩定、和平與繁榮的崛起中國」，尋求與中國發展建設性關係，促進亞洲及世界的安全，強調美中雖有競爭，但衝突並非不可避免。華府的此一國安新戰略，並未強調中國威脅，反映了美國秉持的是「戰略克制」原則，避免挑釁中國。
中國雖嚴防美國的亞太再平衡戰略，但不致於陷入「修昔底德陷阱」的恐慌。美國憂慮中國迅速增強亞太地區的影響力，卻仍積極推動中美戰略暨經濟對話、高層磋商與軍事交流合作。中美維持「鬥而不破」的格局，顯然意識到雙邊若落入公元前5世紀雅典或19世紀末德國崛起後的「修昔底德陷阱」，將會造成亞洲與全球的悲劇。
中美對新型大國關係的概念與內涵有分歧，中方講求原則，強調相互尊重為增進互信、管控分歧、開展合作、共創雙贏、引領未來的基礎。美方則重視功能，要求先解決具體問題，務實合作與建設性處理分歧，就會形成雙贏。加強對話與尋求合作，會是未來中美關係的發展趨勢，「修昔底德陷阱」不過是某些人士的想像。
台灣面對中美關係的丕變，需要適時調整戰略，切勿成為中美關係的「麻煩製造者」。均衡的台、美、中三邊關係，才能最符合台灣的利益。
Commemorating Victory over Japan Requires Self-Confidence and Ambition
Commemorating Victory over Japan Requires Self-Confidence and Ambition
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 10, 2015
Executive Summary: The commemoration of the war victory has put the ROC government in an awkward and passive position. First, it must address Taiwan's de-colonization and its relationship to the Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, it must address Japanese historical revisionism, despite its own lack of confidence and ambition. Thirdly, it must address Mainland China's changes to anti-Japanese history, despite its own lack of initiative. The government's commemoration of the war victory reveals its weakness and timidity. This awkwardness and passivity, if not reversed, will result in historical amnesia and the Republic of China's eternal regret.
Full Text Below:
This year is the 70th anniversary of the Second War of Resistance Against Japan. To commemorate the victory and the retrocession of Taiwan, the government will sponsor a series of events, beginning on July 7. The event organizers include the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National History Museum. Over a dozen different events will be held. Rumor has it that "It will be an event never attempted in the past." The larger goal of the events is to "shine a light on the facts, and set the record straight."
We know that President Ma Ying-jeou values "setting the record straight". We know that President Ma Ying-jeou strongly identifies with the Republic of China. The government is commemorating the historically significant 70th anniversary victory, and organizing a series of events. We believe it is doing so at Ma Ying-jeou's behest. For this, he deserves recognition. But just because he means well, does not mean the results will be good. Based on existing information, the government-sponsored events are “pro forma" in nature. They evince no sense of ambition or mission.
To begin with, the events are highly introverted. For example, the “Taiwan War of Resistance Symposium” to be held on October 14, and the "Taiwan Compatriots War Forum" to be held on October 25 at the Taiwan Provincial Museum, highlight the relationship between Taiwan society and the Sino-Japanese War. But Taiwan independence groups have blasted this idea. They assert that "The victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is not part of the collective memory of the majority on Taiwan." According to Taiwan independence movement spin on history, the Republic of China was founded in 1912, but Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1895. According to international lawa, it was Japanese territory. During the war between Japan and the Republic of China, the people of Taiwan were Japanese nationals. Their memories are not the Chinese people's memories. Taiwan independence elements accuse the Nationalist government of "endlessly, by hook or by crook, imposing anti-Japanese memories on the majority of Taiwanese who have no anti-Japanese experience."
Taiwan independence history is a highly jaundiced view of history. But refuting it requires more than listing the war experiences of a small number of Taiwanese. One must examine the modern history of East Asia from a macro level perspective. One must rethink the colonial experience on Taiwan, how the victory over Japan liberated Taiwan, and de-colonialized Taiwan. Otherwise one cannot go head to head with Taiwan independence “history”.
Next, the commemoration of the war lacks historical depth. It lacks a broader international perspective. The 'Eight-Year War of Resistance" is the traditional terminology used in Republic of China educational texts. It highlights the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945. According to this traditional view of history, the "Eight-Year War of Resistance" was all about Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government's achievements in the war against Japan. In fact, this is merely one interpretation of history. Taiwan emerged from under the shadow of strongmen long ago. The KMT must extricate itself from the shackles of Chiang Kai-shek's version of history. To deal fully with the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, it must consider at least four points.
One. China's enemy was Japan. The Sino-Japanese war was actually a "15-Year Sino-Japanese War", that began with the September 18, 1931 Mukden Incident, and ended with Japan's defeat in 1945. For East Asia, the war was actually a "15-Year War”. The Japanese embarked on a fascist path of total aggression. This had a lasting impact on today's East Asia and Japan. The modern history of East Asia must be understood as a "15 Year War". Otherwise one cannot understand the history and reality of the "Eight-Year War".
Secondly, the Eight-Year War, or 15-Year War, if one prefers, is considered the Second Sino-Japanese War. To fully understand the fate of Mainland China and Taiwan, colonialism, anti-colonialism, and de-colonialization, we must understand the first Sino-Japanese War, and China and Japan's relationship with the rest of the world.
Three. The Eight-Year War, the Pacific War, and World War II are closely related, but nevertheless independent. The major nations of the world continue to reinterpret this history. The Crown Prince of Japan recently issued a statement. He said that "The 70th anniversary of the end of WWII offers an opportunity to learn the history of the Manchurian Incident (Mukden Incident), the origins of the war, and what Japan should do in the future." US politicians and academics are also concerned about how the Japanese government approaches war history. The United States was not merely a victor of World War II. It was also a victim of the Pacific War.
The Chinese mainland has long commemorated the war as an "anti-fascist war". After reform and liberalization, it has paid increased attention to how the Sino-Japanese War is interpreted. On the one hand, it fought the Nationalist government for control over China. One the other hand, it fought Japan over the interpretation of history, over the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women, and other historical facts. In recent years, the Mainland has shown greater respect for the historical facts surrounding the war, particularly in films and television. It has made many breakthroughs. Taiwan must see the commemoration of the war victory as the desire of the two sides to confront the challenges of history, East Asia, and the world.
Each of the nations that participated in the war is interpreting history in its own way. Historical facts have come to the fore. The commemoration of the war victory has put the ROC government in an awkward and passive position. First, it must address Taiwan's de-colonization and its relationship to the Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, it must address Japanese historical revisionism, despite its own lack of confidence and ambition. Thirdly, it must address Mainland China's changes to anti-Japanese history, despite its own lack of initiative. The government's commemoration of the war victory reveals its weakness and timidity. This awkwardness and passivity, if not reversed, will result in historical amnesia and the Republic of China's eternal regret.
紀念抗戰勝利 要有自信與企圖心
2015年03月10日 中國時報
今年是抗戰勝利70周年，為了紀念抗戰勝利與台灣光復年，政府從7月7日起將舉辦一系列活動，主辦單位包括國防部、外交部、國史館等單位，系列活動達十幾項。據說，「這是過去未曾有的嘗試」，至於整體活動目標，則是在於「彰顯正確的歷史，爭取歷史話語權」。
我們知道，馬英九總統重視「爭取歷史話語權」，更重視歷史的真相，我們更知道，馬英九總統對中華民國的認同與情感，政府願意重視抗戰勝利70周年的歷史性意義，並舉辦系列活動，相信是來自他的指示與推動，這是值得肯定的。然而，立意雖好，卻不代表必然有好的產出。從現有的資訊來看，政府所規畫的這一系列活動可說是一種「應景式」的活動，仍看不出台灣的企圖心與使命感。
首先，活動的「內向性」比較凸顯，例如10月14日舉辦的台灣與抗戰學術研討會與10月25日在台灣省政資料館的「台灣同胞與抗戰座談會」，都是針對台灣社會凸顯台灣與抗日戰爭的關係。但獨派團體早就炮轟這種設想，他們認定「抗戰勝利非多數國人共同記憶」。根據獨派史觀，中華民國成立於1912年，台灣卻早在1895年成為日本殖民地，在國際法已被視為日本領土。當日本與中華民國交戰時，台灣人是日本國民，台灣人的戰爭記憶並非中國人的「抗日」記憶。獨派指控國民政府來台後「不斷透過各式手段，將抗日記憶強加於不具抗日經驗的多數台灣人。」
獨派史觀固然偏頗，但要與之對話與辯論，恐怕就不能只是簡單羅列少數台灣人的抗戰經驗，而必須從東亞近代史的宏觀角度，重新反思台灣的被殖民史與殖民地經驗，並將「抗戰勝利」之於台灣的解放性、去殖民性意義加以彰顯，否則完全無法與獨派史觀交鋒。
其次，關於抗戰本身的紀念與討論，缺乏歷史縱深，也缺乏更寬廣的國際視野。「八年抗戰」，是中華民國教育中傳統使用的語言，它凸顯的是從1937年到1945年的中日戰爭，在傳統史觀中，「八年抗戰論」想要凸顯的是蔣介石與國民政府領導的對日戰爭及其成就。其實這僅只是歷史的一種詮釋，但台灣早已走出強人陰影，國民黨必須自我解禁，走出蔣介石史觀的束縛。完整面對第二次中日戰爭及第二次世界大戰，至少需考慮4個面向。
首先，對中國的敵手─日本來說，這一階段的中日戰爭其實是一部「日中15年戰爭史」，也就是從1931年九一八事變到1945年戰敗的這段歷史。從東亞史的角度來看，「15年戰爭論」也有其重要意義，就是探討日本如何走上法西斯化，走上全面侵略戰爭之路的過程，對於反省今日東亞與日本局勢，有很深的現實意義。不從「15年戰爭論」來認識東亞近代史，就不能弄清楚「八年抗戰」的歷史與現實意義。
其次，八年抗戰也好，15年戰爭也好，都屬近代東亞第二次中日戰爭，要全面了解中國、台灣的命運，探討殖民與反殖民、去殖民，就必須全面理解第一次中日戰爭（甲午戰爭）後，中國與世界、日本與世界關係的歷史。
第三，八年抗戰、太平洋戰爭、二戰是3個彼此密切關聯，又相互獨立、有所分別的概念，世界各主要國家都在繼續書寫、詮釋這段歷史。日本皇太子最近發表談話，強調要「藉著二戰結束70周年的機會，好好學習以滿洲事變（九一八事變）為發端的那場戰爭的歷史，思考日本今後應有的樣子。」美國的政界與學界也高度關注日本政府關於戰爭的談話以及歷史的認識，因為美國不僅是二戰的勝利國，更在太平洋戰爭中付出了極大的代價。
至於中國大陸，長期以來就重視對「反法西斯戰爭」的紀念與詮釋，在改革開放之後，更加重視抗日戰爭的歷史詮釋，一方面與國民政府爭主導權，一方面與日本方面在歷史詮釋，以及南京大屠殺、慰安婦等歷史事實上較勁。近幾年來，大陸方面在尊重抗戰史實方面，開始有了一些調整，尤其在影視史學方面，更有了不少突破，台灣應把紀念抗戰勝利視為兩岸共同面對歷史與東亞及全球挑戰的起點。
面對相關各國在歷史詮釋的交鋒、以及歷史事實的爬梳，中華民國卻在抗戰紀念與詮釋上陷入了尷尬與被動的境地，一方面拙於梳理台灣的去殖民化與中日戰爭的關係，二方面在面對日本的歷史修正與再詮釋上，越來越缺少針鋒相對的底氣與企圖，三方面在面對大陸抗戰史觀的變遷時，更缺乏積極主動出擊的企圖。政府在抗戰勝利紀念活動規畫上的貧弱與侷限，正反映了台灣的尷尬與被動，如果不積極扭轉，歷史的失語與失憶，將是中華民國在台灣一個無可挽回的錯誤與憾事！
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 10, 2015
Executive Summary: The commemoration of the war victory has put the ROC government in an awkward and passive position. First, it must address Taiwan's de-colonization and its relationship to the Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, it must address Japanese historical revisionism, despite its own lack of confidence and ambition. Thirdly, it must address Mainland China's changes to anti-Japanese history, despite its own lack of initiative. The government's commemoration of the war victory reveals its weakness and timidity. This awkwardness and passivity, if not reversed, will result in historical amnesia and the Republic of China's eternal regret.
Full Text Below:
This year is the 70th anniversary of the Second War of Resistance Against Japan. To commemorate the victory and the retrocession of Taiwan, the government will sponsor a series of events, beginning on July 7. The event organizers include the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National History Museum. Over a dozen different events will be held. Rumor has it that "It will be an event never attempted in the past." The larger goal of the events is to "shine a light on the facts, and set the record straight."
We know that President Ma Ying-jeou values "setting the record straight". We know that President Ma Ying-jeou strongly identifies with the Republic of China. The government is commemorating the historically significant 70th anniversary victory, and organizing a series of events. We believe it is doing so at Ma Ying-jeou's behest. For this, he deserves recognition. But just because he means well, does not mean the results will be good. Based on existing information, the government-sponsored events are “pro forma" in nature. They evince no sense of ambition or mission.
To begin with, the events are highly introverted. For example, the “Taiwan War of Resistance Symposium” to be held on October 14, and the "Taiwan Compatriots War Forum" to be held on October 25 at the Taiwan Provincial Museum, highlight the relationship between Taiwan society and the Sino-Japanese War. But Taiwan independence groups have blasted this idea. They assert that "The victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is not part of the collective memory of the majority on Taiwan." According to Taiwan independence movement spin on history, the Republic of China was founded in 1912, but Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1895. According to international lawa, it was Japanese territory. During the war between Japan and the Republic of China, the people of Taiwan were Japanese nationals. Their memories are not the Chinese people's memories. Taiwan independence elements accuse the Nationalist government of "endlessly, by hook or by crook, imposing anti-Japanese memories on the majority of Taiwanese who have no anti-Japanese experience."
Taiwan independence history is a highly jaundiced view of history. But refuting it requires more than listing the war experiences of a small number of Taiwanese. One must examine the modern history of East Asia from a macro level perspective. One must rethink the colonial experience on Taiwan, how the victory over Japan liberated Taiwan, and de-colonialized Taiwan. Otherwise one cannot go head to head with Taiwan independence “history”.
Next, the commemoration of the war lacks historical depth. It lacks a broader international perspective. The 'Eight-Year War of Resistance" is the traditional terminology used in Republic of China educational texts. It highlights the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945. According to this traditional view of history, the "Eight-Year War of Resistance" was all about Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government's achievements in the war against Japan. In fact, this is merely one interpretation of history. Taiwan emerged from under the shadow of strongmen long ago. The KMT must extricate itself from the shackles of Chiang Kai-shek's version of history. To deal fully with the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, it must consider at least four points.
One. China's enemy was Japan. The Sino-Japanese war was actually a "15-Year Sino-Japanese War", that began with the September 18, 1931 Mukden Incident, and ended with Japan's defeat in 1945. For East Asia, the war was actually a "15-Year War”. The Japanese embarked on a fascist path of total aggression. This had a lasting impact on today's East Asia and Japan. The modern history of East Asia must be understood as a "15 Year War". Otherwise one cannot understand the history and reality of the "Eight-Year War".
Secondly, the Eight-Year War, or 15-Year War, if one prefers, is considered the Second Sino-Japanese War. To fully understand the fate of Mainland China and Taiwan, colonialism, anti-colonialism, and de-colonialization, we must understand the first Sino-Japanese War, and China and Japan's relationship with the rest of the world.
Three. The Eight-Year War, the Pacific War, and World War II are closely related, but nevertheless independent. The major nations of the world continue to reinterpret this history. The Crown Prince of Japan recently issued a statement. He said that "The 70th anniversary of the end of WWII offers an opportunity to learn the history of the Manchurian Incident (Mukden Incident), the origins of the war, and what Japan should do in the future." US politicians and academics are also concerned about how the Japanese government approaches war history. The United States was not merely a victor of World War II. It was also a victim of the Pacific War.
The Chinese mainland has long commemorated the war as an "anti-fascist war". After reform and liberalization, it has paid increased attention to how the Sino-Japanese War is interpreted. On the one hand, it fought the Nationalist government for control over China. One the other hand, it fought Japan over the interpretation of history, over the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women, and other historical facts. In recent years, the Mainland has shown greater respect for the historical facts surrounding the war, particularly in films and television. It has made many breakthroughs. Taiwan must see the commemoration of the war victory as the desire of the two sides to confront the challenges of history, East Asia, and the world.
Each of the nations that participated in the war is interpreting history in its own way. Historical facts have come to the fore. The commemoration of the war victory has put the ROC government in an awkward and passive position. First, it must address Taiwan's de-colonization and its relationship to the Sino-Japanese War. Secondly, it must address Japanese historical revisionism, despite its own lack of confidence and ambition. Thirdly, it must address Mainland China's changes to anti-Japanese history, despite its own lack of initiative. The government's commemoration of the war victory reveals its weakness and timidity. This awkwardness and passivity, if not reversed, will result in historical amnesia and the Republic of China's eternal regret.
紀念抗戰勝利 要有自信與企圖心
2015年03月10日 中國時報
今年是抗戰勝利70周年，為了紀念抗戰勝利與台灣光復年，政府從7月7日起將舉辦一系列活動，主辦單位包括國防部、外交部、國史館等單位，系列活動達十幾項。據說，「這是過去未曾有的嘗試」，至於整體活動目標，則是在於「彰顯正確的歷史，爭取歷史話語權」。
我們知道，馬英九總統重視「爭取歷史話語權」，更重視歷史的真相，我們更知道，馬英九總統對中華民國的認同與情感，政府願意重視抗戰勝利70周年的歷史性意義，並舉辦系列活動，相信是來自他的指示與推動，這是值得肯定的。然而，立意雖好，卻不代表必然有好的產出。從現有的資訊來看，政府所規畫的這一系列活動可說是一種「應景式」的活動，仍看不出台灣的企圖心與使命感。
首先，活動的「內向性」比較凸顯，例如10月14日舉辦的台灣與抗戰學術研討會與10月25日在台灣省政資料館的「台灣同胞與抗戰座談會」，都是針對台灣社會凸顯台灣與抗日戰爭的關係。但獨派團體早就炮轟這種設想，他們認定「抗戰勝利非多數國人共同記憶」。根據獨派史觀，中華民國成立於1912年，台灣卻早在1895年成為日本殖民地，在國際法已被視為日本領土。當日本與中華民國交戰時，台灣人是日本國民，台灣人的戰爭記憶並非中國人的「抗日」記憶。獨派指控國民政府來台後「不斷透過各式手段，將抗日記憶強加於不具抗日經驗的多數台灣人。」
獨派史觀固然偏頗，但要與之對話與辯論，恐怕就不能只是簡單羅列少數台灣人的抗戰經驗，而必須從東亞近代史的宏觀角度，重新反思台灣的被殖民史與殖民地經驗，並將「抗戰勝利」之於台灣的解放性、去殖民性意義加以彰顯，否則完全無法與獨派史觀交鋒。
其次，關於抗戰本身的紀念與討論，缺乏歷史縱深，也缺乏更寬廣的國際視野。「八年抗戰」，是中華民國教育中傳統使用的語言，它凸顯的是從1937年到1945年的中日戰爭，在傳統史觀中，「八年抗戰論」想要凸顯的是蔣介石與國民政府領導的對日戰爭及其成就。其實這僅只是歷史的一種詮釋，但台灣早已走出強人陰影，國民黨必須自我解禁，走出蔣介石史觀的束縛。完整面對第二次中日戰爭及第二次世界大戰，至少需考慮4個面向。
首先，對中國的敵手─日本來說，這一階段的中日戰爭其實是一部「日中15年戰爭史」，也就是從1931年九一八事變到1945年戰敗的這段歷史。從東亞史的角度來看，「15年戰爭論」也有其重要意義，就是探討日本如何走上法西斯化，走上全面侵略戰爭之路的過程，對於反省今日東亞與日本局勢，有很深的現實意義。不從「15年戰爭論」來認識東亞近代史，就不能弄清楚「八年抗戰」的歷史與現實意義。
其次，八年抗戰也好，15年戰爭也好，都屬近代東亞第二次中日戰爭，要全面了解中國、台灣的命運，探討殖民與反殖民、去殖民，就必須全面理解第一次中日戰爭（甲午戰爭）後，中國與世界、日本與世界關係的歷史。
第三，八年抗戰、太平洋戰爭、二戰是3個彼此密切關聯，又相互獨立、有所分別的概念，世界各主要國家都在繼續書寫、詮釋這段歷史。日本皇太子最近發表談話，強調要「藉著二戰結束70周年的機會，好好學習以滿洲事變（九一八事變）為發端的那場戰爭的歷史，思考日本今後應有的樣子。」美國的政界與學界也高度關注日本政府關於戰爭的談話以及歷史的認識，因為美國不僅是二戰的勝利國，更在太平洋戰爭中付出了極大的代價。
至於中國大陸，長期以來就重視對「反法西斯戰爭」的紀念與詮釋，在改革開放之後，更加重視抗日戰爭的歷史詮釋，一方面與國民政府爭主導權，一方面與日本方面在歷史詮釋，以及南京大屠殺、慰安婦等歷史事實上較勁。近幾年來，大陸方面在尊重抗戰史實方面，開始有了一些調整，尤其在影視史學方面，更有了不少突破，台灣應把紀念抗戰勝利視為兩岸共同面對歷史與東亞及全球挑戰的起點。
面對相關各國在歷史詮釋的交鋒、以及歷史事實的爬梳，中華民國卻在抗戰紀念與詮釋上陷入了尷尬與被動的境地，一方面拙於梳理台灣的去殖民化與中日戰爭的關係，二方面在面對日本的歷史修正與再詮釋上，越來越缺少針鋒相對的底氣與企圖，三方面在面對大陸抗戰史觀的變遷時，更缺乏積極主動出擊的企圖。政府在抗戰勝利紀念活動規畫上的貧弱與侷限，正反映了台灣的尷尬與被動，如果不積極扭轉，歷史的失語與失憶，將是中華民國在台灣一個無可挽回的錯誤與憾事！
Sunday, March 8, 2015
M503 Flight Route: Model for Cross-Strait Dispute Resolution
M503 Flight Route: Model for Cross-Strait Dispute Resolution
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2015
Executive Summary: The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.
Full Text Below:
The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.
During this year's Spring Festival, Wang Yu-chi, former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, and Zhang Zhijun, director of the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office, were supposed to meet for the third time in Kinmen. But the Mainland side unilaterally announced the establishment of Flight Route M503, near the midline of the Taiwan Strait. This provoked public criticism on Taiwan. Taipei felt it had been disrespected. National security was also a concern. As a result, our side postponed the high profile Wang Zhang meeting, which had attracted considerable public attention. Now that the furor has died down, the two sides must seize the opportunity to resume high-level official dialogue.
The M503 flight route controversy includes several facets. One. Position and attitude. Two. Process. Three. Practical consequences. As we all know, the two sides of the Strait are diametrically opposed on many matters. They differ in their positions. They differ in their methods. They differ in their substance. The former differences are primarily symbolic in nature. The latter involve real world consequences.
For example, Beijing refers to the cross-Strait meetings as the Zhang Wang meeting and the Wang Koo meeting. Taipei refers to them as the Wang Zhang meeting and the Koo Wang meeting. Beijing talks about a one China framework, Taipei talks about a one China architecture. Such differences in word order and terminology represent different political stances, laden with symbolic differences that both sides consider important.
The latter differences involve trade-offs between political and economic interests. Examples include cross-Strait air traffic rights negotiations, the content of the ECFA early harvest list, the ARATS and the SEF offices, and personal safety for Taiwan compatriots. Significant economic and even political interests are involved. As a result, both sides are extremely cautious. They cross every t and dot every i to protect their political and economic bottom lines, and avoid harming their political and economic interests. They take care to avoid broader repercussions that might cause unnecessary problems or unwanted associations down the line.
Take the Mainland's unilaterally drawn and announced M503 flight route. Ignore for the moment whether it would have much impact on Taiwan's security. Consider only the Mainland's position and attitude. ROC government agencies, including the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation must first express clear opposition. Such expressions may not have much practical effect. Nevertheless they are necessary to clarify our bottom line and prepare our response. Adhering to our bottom line requires adhering to our position and answering to public opinion. It also requires negotiating in the best interests of the nation. Anything less amounts to a dereliction of duty.
According to media reports, the flight route issue was indeed the subject of repeated advance exchanges. But the two sides failed to reach an agreement. No consensus was reached. Yet Beijing unilaterally announced the establishment of the flight route. Taipei expressed its dissatisfaction and concerns. Understandably, it found this difficult to accept. Once Taipei expressed its objections however, Beijing did not dig in its heels. Instead, it urged Taiwan's media to visit Taiwan's air traffic control agency and witness for itself existing airspace congestion. Beijing agreed to delay implementation. It took the initiative to shift the flight route 6 nautical miles to the west of the midline, as a gesture of goodwill. Although Taipei expressed dissatisfaction, it accepted it. The two sides reconsidered their positions. They each took a step back. Their approach deserves affirmation.
Now take the matter of practical consequences, of military considerations, especially those of the Air Force. The M503 flight route over the midline of the Taiwan Strait understandably raises military concerns and provokes psychological insecurities. But Beijing submitted the case to the ICAO in advance. The international community expressed little opposition. Taipei represents a peaceful nation in the East Asian region. If the M503 flight route poses national security concerns, we should respond by enhancing our early warning capabilities, rather than by insisting on own one-sided interests.
As far as position and attitude are concerned, Taipei must of course express opposition. But as far as practical consequences are concerned, assuming the flight route does not pose a danger, a compromise would be timely and appropriate. Beijing was motivated by practical concerns. It wanted the M503 flight route. It followed applicable procedures. It notified international organizations. Once it understood Taipei's concerns, it modified its position appropriately. This led to a win-win outcome. We hope the two sides will maintain such attitudes and practices in the future. Bilateral relations can be improved. We hope future disputes will be settled through rational communications. This will benefit all the people.
社評－M503航路創兩岸爭議解決典範
2015年03月09日 04:10
本報訊
擾嚷多時的M503航路爭議終於在兩岸雙方雖不全然滿意，但都還能小接受，或至少是願意容忍情況下達成共識，稍得到緩解。此事說明，只要雙方本著理性、務實的態度，願意透過溝通、對話，以相互理解，增加互信的方式討論彼此之間的問題與歧見，兩岸其實沒有不能解決的問題。這種合作、互利、包容的作法值得肯定與鼓勵，也證明一切事在人為。
今年春節前夕，陸委會前主委王郁琦與大陸國台辦主任張志軍本來要在金門舉行第3次會談，但是由於大陸片面宣布要在緊鄰海峽中線處開通新的M503航路，引起台灣輿論批評，我方一來覺得未受尊重，二來還有國安疑慮，所以主動推遲眾所矚目的王張會，自然引起各方關注。如今問題得到緩解，兩岸似乎都應把握機遇，早日重啟制度性的雙方高層互動與對話。
回頭檢討M503航路事件，可由幾個不同的面向切入。首先是立場和態度的考量，其次是操作處理的方式，最後才是實質影響的問題。一如所知，兩岸雙方對於很多事情都有南轅北轍，截然不同的立場，其中有形式的不同，也有實質的差異，前者帶有象徵的意義，後者則有實際利害考量。
比如說中共慣稱張王會、汪辜會，台灣方面一定堅持王張會與辜汪會，北京主張一中框架，台北就提出一中架構。這種不同的順序排列和文字表述都代表政治上的立場問題，有政治上的象徵意涵，雙方都相當在意。
後者則牽涉實際政治和經濟利益的取捨和分配問題，比如說兩岸對於航權的談判，關於ECFA早收清單的內容，兩岸兩會辦事機構，台商台胞的人身保護問題等等。由於事涉巨大的經濟、甚或政治利益，雙方都是步步為營，字斟句酌的務求守住政治及經濟底線，輕要避免有損自己的政、經利益，重要避免造成擴散效應，引發不必要的問題或聯想，免得日後造成更大的困擾及後遺症。
就陸方單方畫設、宣布、開通M503航路而言，先不管其是否真的會對台灣的安全造成多大的實質影響，光從立場和態度而言，中華民國政府的有關單位，從國安會到國防部到交通部，首先就要拿出明確的態度，表達台灣方面反對的立場。即使這樣的抗議與反對不會發生實際效果，但還是要把態度講清楚，並畫定底線，準備各種因應劇本，堅守底線，既要堅持立場，能對民意有所交待，更要做好談判準備，爭取國家最大利益，否則就有虧職守。
檢討此次操作處理的方式，至少就媒體披露的消息來看，兩岸雙方確實曾就本案於事前進行多次溝通。但在雙方未能達成協議，還沒有共識的情況下，北京片面宣布此事，台北方面表達不滿、疑慮、難以接受的立場事屬合理。北京在台北表達反對之後，並未堅持己見，卻主動邀請台灣媒體參觀航管機構，實地證明現行空域擁塞的實際情況，並且同意延後實施，同時又主動再往中線以西偏移6浬，釋出善意。台北隨即表達雖不滿意，但勉予接受的立場，雙方這種易位思考、各退一步、莫為己甚的作法應予肯定。
再談實質影響問題，從國軍，尤其是空軍的角度來看，M503航路過度接近海峽中線，加深軍方的疑慮和心理上的不安全感，言之成理；但中共曾將本案先行照會國際民航組織，國際社會對此並無太大反對聲浪，我方作為一個東亞區域和平主義國家，如果M503航路確實對國家安全造成疑慮，應該以充實國防力量、強化預警能力因應，而非堅持自己片面利益。
從立場上，台灣必須表明反對的態度，但在實務上，台灣又能在不損及原則和安全的前提下，適時、適度的妥協；同樣的，北京出於現實的需要，一方面要實施M503航路，也按照相關程序，照會國際組織及公告周知，但在理解台灣的疑慮後，又能從善如流，適度的加以調整。這就是一種雙贏、多贏的結果，我們樂見兩岸當局今後秉持這樣的心態與作法，讓雙邊關係進一步往良性的方向發展，更希望未來所有爭議都能理性溝通，這才是全民之福。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2015
Executive Summary: The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.
Full Text Below:
The long dispute over the M503 flight route has finally been resolved. Neither side is completely happy with the result, but both sides find it acceptable, or at least tolerable. This shows that as long as the two sides remain rational and pragmatic, and are willing to communicate with each other, they can reach an understanding, enhance mutual trust, and settle their differences. In fact, there are no insoluble cross-Strait problems. Such mutually beneficial cooperation deserves recognition and encouragement. It proves that “where there is a will, there is a way”.
During this year's Spring Festival, Wang Yu-chi, former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, and Zhang Zhijun, director of the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office, were supposed to meet for the third time in Kinmen. But the Mainland side unilaterally announced the establishment of Flight Route M503, near the midline of the Taiwan Strait. This provoked public criticism on Taiwan. Taipei felt it had been disrespected. National security was also a concern. As a result, our side postponed the high profile Wang Zhang meeting, which had attracted considerable public attention. Now that the furor has died down, the two sides must seize the opportunity to resume high-level official dialogue.
The M503 flight route controversy includes several facets. One. Position and attitude. Two. Process. Three. Practical consequences. As we all know, the two sides of the Strait are diametrically opposed on many matters. They differ in their positions. They differ in their methods. They differ in their substance. The former differences are primarily symbolic in nature. The latter involve real world consequences.
For example, Beijing refers to the cross-Strait meetings as the Zhang Wang meeting and the Wang Koo meeting. Taipei refers to them as the Wang Zhang meeting and the Koo Wang meeting. Beijing talks about a one China framework, Taipei talks about a one China architecture. Such differences in word order and terminology represent different political stances, laden with symbolic differences that both sides consider important.
The latter differences involve trade-offs between political and economic interests. Examples include cross-Strait air traffic rights negotiations, the content of the ECFA early harvest list, the ARATS and the SEF offices, and personal safety for Taiwan compatriots. Significant economic and even political interests are involved. As a result, both sides are extremely cautious. They cross every t and dot every i to protect their political and economic bottom lines, and avoid harming their political and economic interests. They take care to avoid broader repercussions that might cause unnecessary problems or unwanted associations down the line.
Take the Mainland's unilaterally drawn and announced M503 flight route. Ignore for the moment whether it would have much impact on Taiwan's security. Consider only the Mainland's position and attitude. ROC government agencies, including the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation must first express clear opposition. Such expressions may not have much practical effect. Nevertheless they are necessary to clarify our bottom line and prepare our response. Adhering to our bottom line requires adhering to our position and answering to public opinion. It also requires negotiating in the best interests of the nation. Anything less amounts to a dereliction of duty.
According to media reports, the flight route issue was indeed the subject of repeated advance exchanges. But the two sides failed to reach an agreement. No consensus was reached. Yet Beijing unilaterally announced the establishment of the flight route. Taipei expressed its dissatisfaction and concerns. Understandably, it found this difficult to accept. Once Taipei expressed its objections however, Beijing did not dig in its heels. Instead, it urged Taiwan's media to visit Taiwan's air traffic control agency and witness for itself existing airspace congestion. Beijing agreed to delay implementation. It took the initiative to shift the flight route 6 nautical miles to the west of the midline, as a gesture of goodwill. Although Taipei expressed dissatisfaction, it accepted it. The two sides reconsidered their positions. They each took a step back. Their approach deserves affirmation.
Now take the matter of practical consequences, of military considerations, especially those of the Air Force. The M503 flight route over the midline of the Taiwan Strait understandably raises military concerns and provokes psychological insecurities. But Beijing submitted the case to the ICAO in advance. The international community expressed little opposition. Taipei represents a peaceful nation in the East Asian region. If the M503 flight route poses national security concerns, we should respond by enhancing our early warning capabilities, rather than by insisting on own one-sided interests.
As far as position and attitude are concerned, Taipei must of course express opposition. But as far as practical consequences are concerned, assuming the flight route does not pose a danger, a compromise would be timely and appropriate. Beijing was motivated by practical concerns. It wanted the M503 flight route. It followed applicable procedures. It notified international organizations. Once it understood Taipei's concerns, it modified its position appropriately. This led to a win-win outcome. We hope the two sides will maintain such attitudes and practices in the future. Bilateral relations can be improved. We hope future disputes will be settled through rational communications. This will benefit all the people.
社評－M503航路創兩岸爭議解決典範
2015年03月09日 04:10
本報訊
擾嚷多時的M503航路爭議終於在兩岸雙方雖不全然滿意，但都還能小接受，或至少是願意容忍情況下達成共識，稍得到緩解。此事說明，只要雙方本著理性、務實的態度，願意透過溝通、對話，以相互理解，增加互信的方式討論彼此之間的問題與歧見，兩岸其實沒有不能解決的問題。這種合作、互利、包容的作法值得肯定與鼓勵，也證明一切事在人為。
今年春節前夕，陸委會前主委王郁琦與大陸國台辦主任張志軍本來要在金門舉行第3次會談，但是由於大陸片面宣布要在緊鄰海峽中線處開通新的M503航路，引起台灣輿論批評，我方一來覺得未受尊重，二來還有國安疑慮，所以主動推遲眾所矚目的王張會，自然引起各方關注。如今問題得到緩解，兩岸似乎都應把握機遇，早日重啟制度性的雙方高層互動與對話。
回頭檢討M503航路事件，可由幾個不同的面向切入。首先是立場和態度的考量，其次是操作處理的方式，最後才是實質影響的問題。一如所知，兩岸雙方對於很多事情都有南轅北轍，截然不同的立場，其中有形式的不同，也有實質的差異，前者帶有象徵的意義，後者則有實際利害考量。
比如說中共慣稱張王會、汪辜會，台灣方面一定堅持王張會與辜汪會，北京主張一中框架，台北就提出一中架構。這種不同的順序排列和文字表述都代表政治上的立場問題，有政治上的象徵意涵，雙方都相當在意。
後者則牽涉實際政治和經濟利益的取捨和分配問題，比如說兩岸對於航權的談判，關於ECFA早收清單的內容，兩岸兩會辦事機構，台商台胞的人身保護問題等等。由於事涉巨大的經濟、甚或政治利益，雙方都是步步為營，字斟句酌的務求守住政治及經濟底線，輕要避免有損自己的政、經利益，重要避免造成擴散效應，引發不必要的問題或聯想，免得日後造成更大的困擾及後遺症。
就陸方單方畫設、宣布、開通M503航路而言，先不管其是否真的會對台灣的安全造成多大的實質影響，光從立場和態度而言，中華民國政府的有關單位，從國安會到國防部到交通部，首先就要拿出明確的態度，表達台灣方面反對的立場。即使這樣的抗議與反對不會發生實際效果，但還是要把態度講清楚，並畫定底線，準備各種因應劇本，堅守底線，既要堅持立場，能對民意有所交待，更要做好談判準備，爭取國家最大利益，否則就有虧職守。
檢討此次操作處理的方式，至少就媒體披露的消息來看，兩岸雙方確實曾就本案於事前進行多次溝通。但在雙方未能達成協議，還沒有共識的情況下，北京片面宣布此事，台北方面表達不滿、疑慮、難以接受的立場事屬合理。北京在台北表達反對之後，並未堅持己見，卻主動邀請台灣媒體參觀航管機構，實地證明現行空域擁塞的實際情況，並且同意延後實施，同時又主動再往中線以西偏移6浬，釋出善意。台北隨即表達雖不滿意，但勉予接受的立場，雙方這種易位思考、各退一步、莫為己甚的作法應予肯定。
再談實質影響問題，從國軍，尤其是空軍的角度來看，M503航路過度接近海峽中線，加深軍方的疑慮和心理上的不安全感，言之成理；但中共曾將本案先行照會國際民航組織，國際社會對此並無太大反對聲浪，我方作為一個東亞區域和平主義國家，如果M503航路確實對國家安全造成疑慮，應該以充實國防力量、強化預警能力因應，而非堅持自己片面利益。
從立場上，台灣必須表明反對的態度，但在實務上，台灣又能在不損及原則和安全的前提下，適時、適度的妥協；同樣的，北京出於現實的需要，一方面要實施M503航路，也按照相關程序，照會國際組織及公告周知，但在理解台灣的疑慮後，又能從善如流，適度的加以調整。這就是一種雙贏、多贏的結果，我們樂見兩岸當局今後秉持這樣的心態與作法，讓雙邊關係進一步往良性的方向發展，更希望未來所有爭議都能理性溝通，這才是全民之福。
Thursday, March 5, 2015
Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen: Tit for Tat
Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen: Tit for Tat
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2015
Executive Summary: Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan? People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.
Full Text Below:
On March 4th, Mainland President Xi Jinping took part in the 12th Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He met with the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union. The topic was the current state of cross-Strait relations. The outcome was four affirmations. One. Affirm the path of peaceful development. Two. Adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence as the political basis for cross-Strait relations. Three. Work for the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. Four. Work together to achieve national rejuvenation.
Taiwan is about to begin its quadrennial elections. The DPP, favored to win in 2016, still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. Xi Jinping's four affirmations clearly called for a response. How should we on Taiwan interpret them, and how should we respond?
Over the years, Mainland policy toward Taiwan has changed in some respects, but remained the same in others. It remains the same in its pursuit of national unity and its unwavering opposition to Taiwan independence. It has changed in response to changing times, changing points of emphasis, and changing strategies.
For example, the Mainland sometimes emphasizes preventing Taiwan indepencence more than promoting Chinese reunification. Sometimes it emphasizes both equally. Sometimes it resorts to verbal or military threats. Sometimes it emphasizes PRC-USA “joint mangagement” of Taiwan independence “troublemakers”. Sometimes it emphasizes legal constraints against independence. Sometimes it uses both the carrot and the stick. Sometimes the carrot is bigger. At other times the stick is bigger.
A variety of methods are used. In short, CCP policy toward Taiwan is firm on principles, but flexibile on strategy, and changes with the times.
Where and what Xi Jinping said were carefully calculated. Clearly the target of his remarks was not merely those in attendance. The NPC and CPPCC are the CCP's most important annual events. For Xi to address the Taiwan issue before the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union, was entirely appropos, and calculated not raise any red flags with the outside world.
The upcoming ROC presidential election is still sometime away. The mobilization of political passions has yet to begin. Beijing is appealing to both emotions and reason. It is saying what needs to be said up front, clearly and comprehensively. This is not a bad thing.
When Xi Jinping said the things he did, he had certain considerations. He began at the strategic level. He implied that despite repeated twists and turns, Beijing would continue down the path toward peaceful development. Peaceful development safeguards cross-Strait peace. It is the correct path, one that promotes shared development and benefits compatriots on both sides of the Strait.
Xi then spoke about the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. This is the basis for cross-Strait peace, political dialogue, and mutual trust. He said “If the foundation is not sound, the ground will shake." He then returned to the well-being of Taiwan compatriots. He said compatriots on both sides should join hands in the pursuit of national revival, to realize the Chinese dream.
Clearly, the Mainland has learned from the mistakes of the past, and respects the wishes of the people on Taiwan to be their own masters. That includes having their own politics and lifestyles.
Xi Jinping spoke dispassionately. He eschwed intimidation. He wanted to avoid provoking any backlash. His words were not directed exclusively at the DPP, but also at the KMT and the public on Taiwan. If cross-strait trust is lost, then the basis for dialogue will be as well. Without the skin, how can there be any hair?
Beijing hopes that everyone on Taiwan will understand where the CCP stands, and what its policies are. It does not want anyone to harbor any illusions. It wants to avoid any misunderstandings or miscalculations about the CCP's bottom line.
For Beijing, adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence are two sides of the same coin. Therefore the public on Taiwan does not need to about whether the 1992 consensus means “one China, no interpretations”, “one China, two interpretations”, or a “shared interpretation of one China”. It does however include the "one China concept". That is beyond dispute. Opposition to Taiwan independence is the inevitable result of the one China concept. No person or political party can accept the one China concept, yet insist on Taiwan independence.
Beijing is clearly telling everyone on Taiwan, especially the DPP and its supporters, that departing from the 1992 consensus, and advocating and implementing Taiwan independence, will inevitably undermine cross-Strait relations
The Democratic Progressive Party, which may return to power in 2016, is using “three advantages” and “three affirmations” to promote cross-Strait relations. Superficially they sound reasonable. But the DPP has long insisted on Taiwan independence. It does more than repudiate the 1992 consensus. It demonizes it. Political reality has forced the DPP to face this problem and seek ways to work around it. Hence, the “spirit of 1992”, the “one five consensus”, the “Taiwan consensus”, and the “ROC constitutional consensus”.
Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan?
People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.
社評－習近平與蔡英文的針鋒相對
2015年03月06日 04:10
本報訊
大陸國家主席習近平4日參加今年全國政協12屆3次會議的民革、台盟、台聯小組聯組會，針對當前兩岸關係形勢，言簡意賅提出四個堅定：一、走和平發展道路，二、堅持九二共識與反台獨是兩岸關係政治基礎，三、為兩岸同胞謀福祉，四、攜手實現民族復興。
台灣即將進入4年一次的大選年，迄今依然否定九二共識的民進黨，似乎勝券在握，習近平最新提出的四個堅持，顯然有針鋒相對的意味，台灣應如何解讀並回應？
多年來，大陸的對台政策有所變，也有所不變：不變的是追求國家統一的目標，反對台獨的堅定立場，變的是不同時期有不同的訴求重點或鬥爭策略。
比如說，大陸有的時候是防獨重於促統，或兩者並重。有的時候又是文攻武嚇，強調中美共管台獨，或側重依法制獨，有時則是軟硬兼施，或是軟的更軟，硬的更硬。
各種方法不一而足。簡單的說，中共的對台政策是既有原則的堅定性，也有策略的靈活性，更有其與時俱進的一面。
習近平這次發表談話的時間、場合與內容顯然都經過精心的設計與評估，其談話的對象顯然也不是僅僅針對小組會上的出席成員而已。人大、政協兩會是中共的年度政治大事，習在政協的台聯、台盟與民革小組會上談論台灣問題名正言順，合情合理，不會讓外界覺得突兀。
而且此時距離台灣即將到來的總統大選還有一段時間，在台灣還未進入激情的政治動員旺季之前，北京先用動之以情，訴之以理的方式，把該講的話，完整、全面的表達一遍，其實不是一件壞事。
從習近平談話的具體內容來看，其鋪陳的方式有一定的考量，先是由戰略及大局的層面出發，間接表明儘管過去一段時間兩岸之間發生不少波折，但北京仍將堅持和平發展的道路，而兩岸關係和平發展是一條維護兩岸和平、促進共同發展、造福兩岸同胞的正確道路。
接著習才談到九二共識與反對台獨，而這是兩岸和平發展與政治對話和政治互信的基礎，如果「基礎不牢，地動山搖」，然後他才又回到為台灣同胞謀福祉，兩岸同胞攜手追求民族復興，共圓中國夢的訴求上來。
顯然，大陸已從過去的錯誤經驗中學到教訓，北京當然尊重台灣民眾當家作主的願望，包括政治活動在內的不同生活方式。
習近平的談話內容沒有任何一句激情或威嚇的用語，以避免產生負面的作用，但其內容不只是說給民進黨聽，也同時是講給國民黨和台灣民眾聽的，如果兩岸互信、對話的基礎受到傷害，皮之不存，毛將焉附。
北京希望台灣各界對於中共的立場和政策有個清晰而且明確的認知，不要再有任何不切實際的幻想，或誤解、誤判中共可能的作法。
應該強調的是，從北京的角度來看，堅持九二共識與反對台獨應該被視為一體的兩面。於此，台灣各界其實不必再去爭論九二共識到底是一中不表，一中各表或共表一中，但九二共識中確實包含「一中概念」則是不爭的事實，反對台獨則是一中概念下必然的結果，沒有任何人或政黨能夠接受一中，但又堅持台獨的道理。
北京的話是明確的告訴台灣民眾，尤其是民進黨及其支持者，只要悖離九二共識，堅持台獨的主張和行動，兩岸關係必然將會動盪起伏。
2016執政有望的民進黨主張用三個有利與三個堅持來推動兩岸關係，表面頗能言之成理，但它又向來以追求台灣獨立為職志，不但拒絕，而且妖魔化九二共識，雖然政治的現實迫使民進黨必須面對這個問題，嘗試提出種種不同的解套方案，從九二精神、一五共識、台灣共識、憲法共識到中華民國共識等等。
但這種模稜兩可的政治語言或許能夠一時唬弄部分台灣民眾，但民進黨主席蔡英文最後仍然必須進一步澄清，她所說的鞏固國家主權究竟意指為何，中華民國的主權範圍如何，中華民國與台灣的關係究竟如何？
台灣民眾應該要以什麼樣的態度和立場來面對、處理新局面下的兩岸關係，而不被少數的政客和政黨所操弄，確實是個大家必須冷靜思考、嚴肅的選擇問題。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2015
Executive Summary: Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan? People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.
Full Text Below:
On March 4th, Mainland President Xi Jinping took part in the 12th Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). He met with the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union. The topic was the current state of cross-Strait relations. The outcome was four affirmations. One. Affirm the path of peaceful development. Two. Adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence as the political basis for cross-Strait relations. Three. Work for the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. Four. Work together to achieve national rejuvenation.
Taiwan is about to begin its quadrennial elections. The DPP, favored to win in 2016, still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. Xi Jinping's four affirmations clearly called for a response. How should we on Taiwan interpret them, and how should we respond?
Over the years, Mainland policy toward Taiwan has changed in some respects, but remained the same in others. It remains the same in its pursuit of national unity and its unwavering opposition to Taiwan independence. It has changed in response to changing times, changing points of emphasis, and changing strategies.
For example, the Mainland sometimes emphasizes preventing Taiwan indepencence more than promoting Chinese reunification. Sometimes it emphasizes both equally. Sometimes it resorts to verbal or military threats. Sometimes it emphasizes PRC-USA “joint mangagement” of Taiwan independence “troublemakers”. Sometimes it emphasizes legal constraints against independence. Sometimes it uses both the carrot and the stick. Sometimes the carrot is bigger. At other times the stick is bigger.
A variety of methods are used. In short, CCP policy toward Taiwan is firm on principles, but flexibile on strategy, and changes with the times.
Where and what Xi Jinping said were carefully calculated. Clearly the target of his remarks was not merely those in attendance. The NPC and CPPCC are the CCP's most important annual events. For Xi to address the Taiwan issue before the National Revolutionary Committee, the Taiwan League, and the Taiwan Union, was entirely appropos, and calculated not raise any red flags with the outside world.
The upcoming ROC presidential election is still sometime away. The mobilization of political passions has yet to begin. Beijing is appealing to both emotions and reason. It is saying what needs to be said up front, clearly and comprehensively. This is not a bad thing.
When Xi Jinping said the things he did, he had certain considerations. He began at the strategic level. He implied that despite repeated twists and turns, Beijing would continue down the path toward peaceful development. Peaceful development safeguards cross-Strait peace. It is the correct path, one that promotes shared development and benefits compatriots on both sides of the Strait.
Xi then spoke about the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. This is the basis for cross-Strait peace, political dialogue, and mutual trust. He said “If the foundation is not sound, the ground will shake." He then returned to the well-being of Taiwan compatriots. He said compatriots on both sides should join hands in the pursuit of national revival, to realize the Chinese dream.
Clearly, the Mainland has learned from the mistakes of the past, and respects the wishes of the people on Taiwan to be their own masters. That includes having their own politics and lifestyles.
Xi Jinping spoke dispassionately. He eschwed intimidation. He wanted to avoid provoking any backlash. His words were not directed exclusively at the DPP, but also at the KMT and the public on Taiwan. If cross-strait trust is lost, then the basis for dialogue will be as well. Without the skin, how can there be any hair?
Beijing hopes that everyone on Taiwan will understand where the CCP stands, and what its policies are. It does not want anyone to harbor any illusions. It wants to avoid any misunderstandings or miscalculations about the CCP's bottom line.
For Beijing, adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence are two sides of the same coin. Therefore the public on Taiwan does not need to about whether the 1992 consensus means “one China, no interpretations”, “one China, two interpretations”, or a “shared interpretation of one China”. It does however include the "one China concept". That is beyond dispute. Opposition to Taiwan independence is the inevitable result of the one China concept. No person or political party can accept the one China concept, yet insist on Taiwan independence.
Beijing is clearly telling everyone on Taiwan, especially the DPP and its supporters, that departing from the 1992 consensus, and advocating and implementing Taiwan independence, will inevitably undermine cross-Strait relations
The Democratic Progressive Party, which may return to power in 2016, is using “three advantages” and “three affirmations” to promote cross-Strait relations. Superficially they sound reasonable. But the DPP has long insisted on Taiwan independence. It does more than repudiate the 1992 consensus. It demonizes it. Political reality has forced the DPP to face this problem and seek ways to work around it. Hence, the “spirit of 1992”, the “one five consensus”, the “Taiwan consensus”, and the “ROC constitutional consensus”.
Ambiguous political language may temporarily fool some of people on Taiwan. But in the end, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen must come clean. She must explain just exactly what she means by “affirmation of our national sovereignty”. She must tell us how far the sovereignty of the Republic of China extends. She must tell us what relationship the Republic of China has to Taiwan?
People on Taiwan must decide how to deal with the new cross-Strait relationship. They must not allow themselves to be manipulated by a handful of politicians and political parties. They must remain cool and choose wisely.
社評－習近平與蔡英文的針鋒相對
2015年03月06日 04:10
本報訊
大陸國家主席習近平4日參加今年全國政協12屆3次會議的民革、台盟、台聯小組聯組會，針對當前兩岸關係形勢，言簡意賅提出四個堅定：一、走和平發展道路，二、堅持九二共識與反台獨是兩岸關係政治基礎，三、為兩岸同胞謀福祉，四、攜手實現民族復興。
台灣即將進入4年一次的大選年，迄今依然否定九二共識的民進黨，似乎勝券在握，習近平最新提出的四個堅持，顯然有針鋒相對的意味，台灣應如何解讀並回應？
多年來，大陸的對台政策有所變，也有所不變：不變的是追求國家統一的目標，反對台獨的堅定立場，變的是不同時期有不同的訴求重點或鬥爭策略。
比如說，大陸有的時候是防獨重於促統，或兩者並重。有的時候又是文攻武嚇，強調中美共管台獨，或側重依法制獨，有時則是軟硬兼施，或是軟的更軟，硬的更硬。
各種方法不一而足。簡單的說，中共的對台政策是既有原則的堅定性，也有策略的靈活性，更有其與時俱進的一面。
習近平這次發表談話的時間、場合與內容顯然都經過精心的設計與評估，其談話的對象顯然也不是僅僅針對小組會上的出席成員而已。人大、政協兩會是中共的年度政治大事，習在政協的台聯、台盟與民革小組會上談論台灣問題名正言順，合情合理，不會讓外界覺得突兀。
而且此時距離台灣即將到來的總統大選還有一段時間，在台灣還未進入激情的政治動員旺季之前，北京先用動之以情，訴之以理的方式，把該講的話，完整、全面的表達一遍，其實不是一件壞事。
從習近平談話的具體內容來看，其鋪陳的方式有一定的考量，先是由戰略及大局的層面出發，間接表明儘管過去一段時間兩岸之間發生不少波折，但北京仍將堅持和平發展的道路，而兩岸關係和平發展是一條維護兩岸和平、促進共同發展、造福兩岸同胞的正確道路。
接著習才談到九二共識與反對台獨，而這是兩岸和平發展與政治對話和政治互信的基礎，如果「基礎不牢，地動山搖」，然後他才又回到為台灣同胞謀福祉，兩岸同胞攜手追求民族復興，共圓中國夢的訴求上來。
顯然，大陸已從過去的錯誤經驗中學到教訓，北京當然尊重台灣民眾當家作主的願望，包括政治活動在內的不同生活方式。
習近平的談話內容沒有任何一句激情或威嚇的用語，以避免產生負面的作用，但其內容不只是說給民進黨聽，也同時是講給國民黨和台灣民眾聽的，如果兩岸互信、對話的基礎受到傷害，皮之不存，毛將焉附。
北京希望台灣各界對於中共的立場和政策有個清晰而且明確的認知，不要再有任何不切實際的幻想，或誤解、誤判中共可能的作法。
應該強調的是，從北京的角度來看，堅持九二共識與反對台獨應該被視為一體的兩面。於此，台灣各界其實不必再去爭論九二共識到底是一中不表，一中各表或共表一中，但九二共識中確實包含「一中概念」則是不爭的事實，反對台獨則是一中概念下必然的結果，沒有任何人或政黨能夠接受一中，但又堅持台獨的道理。
北京的話是明確的告訴台灣民眾，尤其是民進黨及其支持者，只要悖離九二共識，堅持台獨的主張和行動，兩岸關係必然將會動盪起伏。
2016執政有望的民進黨主張用三個有利與三個堅持來推動兩岸關係，表面頗能言之成理，但它又向來以追求台灣獨立為職志，不但拒絕，而且妖魔化九二共識，雖然政治的現實迫使民進黨必須面對這個問題，嘗試提出種種不同的解套方案，從九二精神、一五共識、台灣共識、憲法共識到中華民國共識等等。
但這種模稜兩可的政治語言或許能夠一時唬弄部分台灣民眾，但民進黨主席蔡英文最後仍然必須進一步澄清，她所說的鞏固國家主權究竟意指為何，中華民國的主權範圍如何，中華民國與台灣的關係究竟如何？
台灣民眾應該要以什麼樣的態度和立場來面對、處理新局面下的兩岸關係，而不被少數的政客和政黨所操弄，確實是個大家必須冷靜思考、嚴肅的選擇問題。
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