Lai Ching-teh: Do Not Exploit Your Public Approval Ratings

Lai Ching-teh: Do Not Exploit Your Public Approval Ratings
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2015

Executive Summary:

Full Text Below: Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has refused to appear before the Tainan City Council, on the grounds that City Council Speaker Lee Chuan-chiao is under suspicion of bribery. This has gone on for nearly six months. The mayor's office insists that Lai's actions have not undermined the functioning of the Tainan city government. But the Tainan City Council has been shut down for six months. Budgets must be reviewed. Lai's conduct has already impacted new construction projects. Lai Ching-teh purports to be "defending the dignity of Tainan". In fact he is undermining the legitimacy of public institutions. He is leaving the city government in an unsupervised state. His conduct is arrogant and anti-democratic.

Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh has refused to appear before the Tainan City Council, on the grounds that City Council Speaker Lee Chuan-chiao is under suspicion of bribery. This has gone on for nearly six months. The mayor's office insists that Lai's actions have not undermined the functioning of the Tainan city government. But the Tainan City Council has been shut down for six months. Budgets must be reviewed. Lai's conduct has already impacted new construction projects. Lai Ching-teh purports to be "defending the dignity of Tainan". In fact he is undermining the legitimacy of public institutions. He is leaving the city government in an unsupervised state. His conduct is arrogant and anti-democratic.

One mayor's arrogance has paralyzed an entire city council. This is something seldom seen in a democracy. Lee Chuan-chiao is under suspicion for bribery. This of course is lamentable. But just how serious is his crime? That must be determined by the justice system. Only then can one conclude whether he is guilty and how he should be punished. Therefore, no matter how disgusted Lai Ching-teh might be with Lee Chuan-chiao, he has no right to vent his spleen on the city council. Lai has not merely expressed anger. He has appointed himself judge, jury, and executioner. He has undermined democracy's system of checks and balances.

Note how these events played out. Lai Ching-teh made three obvious mistakes. First, he projected his hatred of Lee Chuan-chiao onto the city council as a whole. He equated the city council's inquiry results with Lee Chuan-chiao's confession. He equated an individual with an organization. He allowed his personal feelings to run wild. The parliamentary system in a democracy enables the people to oversee the administration of a city. It is a collegial institution. It operates according to a set of established rules. It does not snap to a Speaker of the City Council's commands. Lai Ching-teh is angry at Lee Chuan-chiao. Therefore he refuses to appear before the city council. Lai simply does not understand how the parliamentary system works.

Second, during the nine in one elections Lai Ching-teh triumphed with 72% of the vote. This of course represents a high degree of public support. As a result, Lai has justified his refusal to appear before the city council as "safeguarding the dignity of the people". Lai misunderstands democracy. Mayor Lai received 710,000 votes. But lest we forget, every member of the city council was also elected by the same voters, one vote at a time. The ruling and opposition city council members received 970,000 votes, more than Lai's 710,000 votes. These 970,000 votes also represent public opinion in Tainan, do they not? How can we permit Lai to ignore that? In other words, Lai Ching-teh is using his voter support to trample over the workings of the city council. This reveals a sort of "political narcissism". Lai may be corruption free. But his refusal to submit to city council oversight poses a grave threat to democracy.

Third, the Control Yuan has summoned Lai Ching-teh about this matter. Lai Ching-teh alleges that the dispute between his administration and the city council is a political issue, and not a legal issue. Therefore the Control Yuan has no authority to become involved. Lai's overweening egocentrism reveals his contempt for democracy. In fact this alleged "political issue" has two aspects. The first is institutional. The second is technical. Lai Ching-teh's refusal to appear before the city council is merely a technical maneuver, intended to force Lee Chuan-chiao to surrender. But Lai's refusal to appear before the city council has brought the latter to a grinding halt. The checks and balances in local self-government have been nullified, seriously undermining its democratic institutions and threatening political disaster. Has Lai considered this distinction at all? Lai Ching-teh's populist style has caused provoked numerous conflicts in the Tainan city government. Does he even care? Besides, this is all the excuse Lai needs to ignore city council oversight of his administration. People are now calling him "the Emperor of Tainan". Is this worth it?

A verdict in the Lee Chuan-chiao vote buying case is near impossible in the near term. if Lai Ching-teh continues to use it as a pretext for refusing to appear before the city council, Tainan's democracy and local autonomy will be seriously undermined. Many policies cannot be implemented. Even more seriously, Lai has effectively declared the recent election of ruling and opposition Tainan city counci members null and void. This is unacceptable. Green camp members should refuse to take part in this dog and pony show. The DPP party leadership should persuade Lai to abide by the parliamentary system.

We must remind Lai Ching-teh of three things. First, your opponent is Lee Chuan-chiao, not the Tainan City Council. To teach Lee Chuan-chiao a lesson by refusing to appear before the city council is barking up the wrong tree. Second, all elected officials are obligated to accept legislative oversight. This is part of democracy's system of checks and balances. This is not a matter of individual discretion. This is hardly something an individual elected official can ignore. Thirdly, a mature politician should behave in a manner consistent with proportionality. Any fight against political opponents must employ appropriate means. One may not sacrifice representative institutions. One may not trample over the interests of the voters.

Over the years, Lai Ching-teh has enjoyed high approval ratings. He has a reputation for honesty and diligence. Unfortunately, using Lee Chuan-chao as an excuse to refuse to appear before the city council seriously undermines democracy. Lai Ching-teh remains oblivious to this fact. Besides, Lai was supposed to relent at some point in time. But he has not given either the city council or himself any means of retreat. This political superstar has gradually revealed the dark side of his psyche. He has left serious doubts about his eligibility for higher office. How can someone who does not respect a city council, respect democracy? Suppose he suddenly became Tsai Ing-wen's running mate? Many voters have watched his arrogant behavior in the Tainan city government? How many of them could bring themselves to vote for such a ticket?

賴清德不可假民意之名踐踏民意

2015-06-18聯合報

台南市長賴清德以議長李全教涉賄而拒赴議會，至今已近半年。儘管市府強調此舉並不影響市政推動，可是，台南議會停擺半年，許多預算審查工作無法進行，已影響新的工程發包計畫。更嚴重的是，賴清德假藉「捍衛台南尊嚴」之名，事實上是在踐踏民意機關的正當性，也讓市政處於無監督狀態，這是反民主的傲慢行為。

由於市長一人的傲慢，而讓整個議會陷於癱瘓，在民主國家是罕見的例子。李全教涉嫌賄選固然可鄙可議，但其罪行究竟有多嚴重，必須經由司法機關審理，才能決定是否有罪或如何制裁。因此，無論賴清德對李全教的作為多麼深惡痛絕，他不能將自己的不滿轉而發洩在議會體制上，這不僅是「遷怒」，而且不啻動用「私刑」，更破壞了民主政治的議會制衡體制。

觀察整個事件之發展，人們可以看到賴清德犯了三項嚴重錯誤。第一，他把自己對李全教的痛恨折射為對整個議會的杯葛，把進入議會報告備詢視同為對李全教之臣服，這是對「人」與「機構」的嚴重混淆，也是個人情緒的過度渲染。須知，民主制度的議會設計，是要代表人民來監督市府的行政，它是一個合議機構，運作有一套既定的規則可循，並不聽從「議長」的指揮。因此，賴清德因氣憤李全教而拒赴議會，是他根本曲解了議會設計之精神。

第二，賴清德在九合一選舉中以七成二之高得票率當選，可謂獲有極高的民意支持；也因此，他悍拒出席議會即自稱是為了「維護市民的尊嚴」，這卻是民主認知的謬誤。原因是，賴市長固得到七十一萬張選票的支持，但別忘了，所有議員也是市民一票一票選出來的，朝野議員的得票加總是九十七萬票，大於七十一萬票。這九十七萬票，是台南市所有民意的總合，豈容抹殺？換言之，賴清德以個人的民意支持來踐踏議會的運作，是一種「自我中心」式的政治觀；就算他個人再清廉，但拒絕接受監督、一意孤行，這對民主都是一種可怕的威脅。

第三，日前監察院就此事約詢賴清德，賴清德辯稱府會之爭是政治問題，不是法律問題，監院沒有權力介入此事；這種「唯我獨尊」的態度，暴露出他民主素養缺乏。所謂「政治問題」其實有兩個層次：一是體制層次，二是技術層次。賴清德「拒赴議會」，只是戰略的技術運用，意圖使李全教屈服；但是，由於他拒赴議會而導致議會空轉，更引發地方自治的制衡機制遭到掏空，破壞民主體制，是更嚴重的政治崩壞。這點區別，他沒想過嗎？賴清德目空一切的民粹作風，已引起台南議會內部多次衝突，他於心何忍？再說，用這種藉口將自己所有施政都避開議會監督，因而得到「台南皇帝」的封號，划得來嗎？

目前看來，李全教的賄選案不可能在短時間內定讞，如果賴清德繼續以此為由拒赴議會，將對台南的民主體制和地方自治造成嚴重的傷害，使許多施政無法正常進行。更嚴重的是，由於這樣的僵局，他也形同宣告本屆當選的台南朝野議員暫時「作廢」，這是民主體制難以接受的事，不僅綠營議員不應扮演犬馬供其驅遣，民進黨中央也應該規勸他回歸議會體制。

我們必須提醒賴清德的是：第一，站在你對立面的對手是李全教，不是台南市議會；為打擊李全教而拒赴議會，是找錯了敵人。第二，任何民選首長，有接受議會監督的義務，這是基於民主體制的制衡設計，不是個人能夠選擇，遑論拒絕。第三，一個成熟的政治人物，行事要合乎比例原則；為打擊政敵，也必須採取具有正當性的手段，不可任意犧牲代議體制，更不能踐踏選民的權益。

多年來，賴清德一直享有很高的施政滿意度，他的清廉與勤政也素有口碑。遺憾的是，他以李全教為藉口輕率宣布「拒赴議會」，嚴重踐踏了民主體制而不自知；而且，原本應該在某些時間點上選擇轉圜，他也沒有給議會和自己留下任何餘地。至此，這位政治明星便漸漸暴露了他偏執的一面，這點，恐怕在他更上層樓之路將留下一個重大的疑點：一個連代議體制都不尊重的人，會有什麼民主素養？別的不說，如果今天他被選為蔡英文的搭檔副手，許多選民光看到他在台南府會衝突表現的傲慢，票還投得下去嗎？

Cross-Strait Relations: From Reunification vs. Independence to Coopetition

Cross-Strait Relations: From Reunification vs. Independence to Coopetition
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2015

Executive Summary: Hung Hsiu-chu said "I am not pro-unification, I am pro-truth!" She said "We are champions of the Republic of China faction. There is nothing else to champion!" Her blunt remarks highlight a major change in cross-Strait thinking. Cross-Strait relations have changed, from reunification vs. independence, to coopetition.

Full Text Below:

Hung Hsiu-chu said "I am not pro-unification, I am pro-truth!" She said "We are champions of the Republic of China faction. There is nothing else to champion!" Her blunt remarks highlight a major change in cross-Strait thinking. Cross-Strait relations have changed, from reunification vs. independence, to coopetition.

Cross-Strait relations over the past six decades, fall into three stages. Stage One. "Liberate Taiwan" vs. "Retake the Mainland" reunification by military means. Stage Two. Peaceful reunification. "The Three Peoples Principles will reunify China". Stage Three. The provisions in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of China. "For the sake of national unity" the Ma government champions "one China, different interpretations" and "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force". The Beijing government champions "fair and reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified". It champions the 1992 consensus and "seeking common ground while shelving differences". Both sides realize that reunification in the short term is extremely difficult. They know that talk about reunification is premature. Most people, realize that reunification is not yet feasible, and instead emphasize peaceful development. Since 2008, the two sides have signed 21 agreements. Hung Hsiu-chu's remarks show that cross-Strait relations have evolved from reunification vs. independence to coopetition. Reunification vs. independence is goal oriented. Coopetition is process oriented.

In fact, Taiwan's political spectrum now includes only champions of Taiwan independence and champions of the Republic of China. The DPP clings to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. Champions of reunification do not of course advocate unconditional reunification under the People's Republic of China. Few if any advocate that. Hung Hsiu-chu has ripped away the reunification label and replaced it with coopetition oriented thinking. The DPP, by contrast, has gone from advocating the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, to the Five Noes, to One Country on Each Side, to a Constitutional Consensus, to freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. It has flip-flopped repeatedly, again and again. Tsai Ing-wen now assures us that she "affirms the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". She is flip-flopping between championing Taiwan independence and forsaking Taiwan independence

Tsai Ing-wen may "affirm the constitutional framework of the Republic of China" on the eve of the DPP's return to power. She knows she must choose between the constitutional framework of the Republic of China and the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. She knows she must choose between becoming a "traitor to Taiwan independence" and a "sinner against Taiwan". In other words, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are wondering whether their cross-Strait policy should move toward reunification vs. independence or coopetition.

Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have less latitude in their cross-Strait policy advocacy than Hung Hsiu-chu and the Kuomintang. Hung Hsiu-chu can say "I am not a champion of reunification, I am champion of the truth". But Tsai Ing-wen cannot say "I am not a champion of Taiwan independence. I am a champion ofthe truth". Hung Hsiu-chu can say "I am a champion of the Republic of China". Can Tsai Ing-wen do the same? 

Due to strategic concerns, Beijing is not about to forsake the one China framework. Therefore it is not about to forsake reunification. Taipei, also due to strategic thinking, is not about to forsake the one China Constitution. It is not about to challenge the Mainland's rationale concerning "the nation's needs prior to reunification". Both sides know that reunification is not feasible in the short term. They must cope with serious problems prior to eventual reunification. They must conduct political relations under special circumstances. Therefore a shift from reunification vs. independence thinking towards coopetition oriented thinking is in the interest of both sides.

Assuming a framework of coopetition, just what are "fair and reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified"? We must concede that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China both exist and are separately ruled. These special circumstances must be acknowledged before reasonable arrangements can be made. Therefore when Hung Hsiu-chu speaks of "championing the Republic of China" this must not be construed as a unilateral vision of the KMT. As Beijing itself has noted, without the Republic of China it cannot stabilize cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified". Finally, for the DPP, the disappearance of the ROC would mean Taiwan's decline. Therefore the blue, green, and red camps must all champion the Republic of China. They must change from reunification vs. independence thinking, to coopetition oriented thinking.

We hope the 2016 election will be a milestone in cross-Strait relations. We hope reunification vs. independence thinking will become coopetition oriented thinking. Hung Hsiu-chu will of course advance this line of thinking. The key plank in her election campaign after all, is "Champion the Republic of China". Beijing also knows that the Republic of China is essential to cross-Strait relations, and that therefore it must eliminate Taiwan independence before attempting to promote Chinese reunification.

The DPP now finds itself in a worrisome situation. Tsai Ing-wen has one foot in the constitutional framework of the ROC, and the other in the Taiwan independence party platform. As such, she can neither confirm that she is a champion of Chinese reunification, nor deny that she is a champion of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that she is a champion of the Republic of China. She is the only candidate still mired in reunification vs. independence controversy. As such, how can she possibly lead the two sides toward a coopetition oriented relationship?

Reunification is a difficult long range goal. We cannot afford just to talk about it. We must instead manage cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. In other words, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China must enjoy a coopetition oriented relationship under a big roof concept of China.

兩岸關係：由統獨到競合

2015-06-17聯合報

洪秀柱說：「我不是統派，是正派！」「我們只有中華民國派，沒有其他派！」這兩句大白話，點出了兩岸思維的重大變遷，亦即：兩岸關係已經從「統獨關係」，演化為「競合關係」。

六十餘年來，兩岸關係的遞嬗變遷可分三階段：一、「解放台灣」、「反攻大陸」的軍事統一論。二、轉化至「和平統一」、「三民主義統一中國」的和平統一論。三、如今再演化至中華民國憲法增修條文序文的「為因應國家統一前之需要」、馬政府的「一中各表」與「不統／不獨／不武」，及北京的「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」與「九二共識／求同存異」；至此，「統一」的高難度已是兩岸共識，兩岸皆知不能空論統一，因而對「未能統一的特殊情況」之經營轉為主流意識，開始強調「和平發展」，遂有二○○八年以來二十一個協議。洪秀柱的語言，正是點出了兩岸關係由統獨論述轉向競合思維的大趨勢。統獨是目的論，競合則是過程論。

其實，在台灣的政治光譜上，如今只有「獨派」和「中華民國派」，因為民進黨仍保留《台獨黨綱》，但若說「統派」是指「無條件統一於中華人民共和國之下」，恐怕就找不到幾個「統派」了。洪秀柱撕掉「統派」的標籤，將兩岸思維由統獨關係導向競合關係。而民進黨歷經《台獨黨綱》、《台灣前途決議文》、「四不一沒有」、「一邊一國」、「憲法共識」、「凍結台獨黨綱」，反反覆覆，到今日蔡英文又提「中華民國憲政體制推動論」，則是在「保獨／去獨」之間的來回擺盪。

蔡英文在民進黨可能重返執政前夕，提出「中華民國憲政推動論」，應是已經意識到，處此關鍵時刻，她必須在「憲政體制」與「台獨黨綱」之間作一抉擇，亦即必須在「台獨叛徒」與「台灣罪人」兩個角色之間作一抉擇。也就是說，民進黨與蔡英文此刻也在思考，如何將兩岸關係由統獨論述轉向競合關係。

但是，蔡英文及民進黨的兩岸政策腹地及縱深，似乎不如洪秀柱及國民黨。因為，洪秀柱可以說「我不是統派，我是正派」，但蔡英文卻不敢說「我不是獨派，我是正派」。洪秀柱可以說「我是中華民國派」，但蔡英文如何才能跟著說「我是中華民國派」？

基於戰略思維，北京不會放棄「一中框架」的思維，因此也就不會放棄「統一」的標誌；而台灣也因戰略思維，不能放棄「憲法一中」，不可挑戰「為因應國家統一前之需要」的憲法論述。但是，兩岸如今皆知不能「空論統一」，而必須正視如今「未能統一」的現實，認真經營這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」。因而，由統獨掛帥轉向競合思維，是符合兩岸共同利益的。

那麼，如何在競合思維下，對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」呢？即必須正視「中華民國與中華人民共和國並存分治」的「特殊情況」，始有可能「作出合情合理的安排」。所以，洪秀柱說「只有中華民國派」，這不應視為國民黨片面的戰略觀點；其實，就北京來說，若不能鞏固中華民國，如何能穩定「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」？就民進黨來說，如果中華民國不保，台灣更將伊於胡底？因此，「中華民國」應當是藍綠紅三方最大的交集，亦是將兩岸關係由統獨轉向競合的主要憑藉。

我們期待，二○一六大選能成為兩岸關係由統獨轉向競合的重要節點。洪秀柱當然會持守此一論述，因為她的競選根基即在「中華民國要挺住（柱）」。北京亦深知「不能維持中華民國／即無可能維持兩岸關係」，因此也必然「去獨先於促統」。

如今令人擔憂的是民進黨的處境：蔡英文一腳踏上「中華民國憲政體制」，另一腳卻未能從「台獨黨綱」抽腿，處此情勢，她不能說「我不是統派」，也不能說「我不是獨派」，大概也不好意思說「我是中華民國派」。倘係如此，蔡英文由於不能說「不獨」，所以也失去了說「不統」的空間，她將成為唯一仍陷溺在統獨爭論的一方，又如何能將兩岸論述導向競合關係？

統一是高難度的遠程議題，不能空論統一，而應當認真經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，此即「中華民國與中華人民共和國在大屋頂中國下共存分治」的競合關係。

Beijing Should Affirm Hung Hsiu-chu's Cross-Strait Policy

Beijing Should Affirm Hung Hsiu-chu's Cross-Strait Policy
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2015

Executive Summary: Hung Hsiu-chu has passed the KMT's preliminary candidate poll. She is about to become the KMT presidential candidate. She advocates a "one China, one interpretation" stance that affirms the two sides' political status. She advocates a peace agreement to ensure cross-Strait peace. Early on in the primaries, she published a document entitled, "Hung Hsiu-chu: Discourse on Cross-Strait Politics", laying out her proposals, clearly and responsibly, in black ink on white paper for the world to see. This shows that a peace agreement is the main plank in her campaign platform.

Full Text Below:

Hung Hsiu-chu has passed the KMT's preliminary candidate poll. She is about to become the KMT presidential candidate. She advocates a "one China, one interpretation" stance that affirms the two sides' political status. She advocates a peace agreement to ensure cross-Strait peace. Early on in the primaries, she published a document entitled, "Hung Hsiu-chu: Discourse on Cross-Strait Politics", laying out her proposals, clearly and responsibly, in black ink on white paper for the world to see. This shows that a peace agreement is the main plank in her campaign platform.

Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait policy announcement elicted two different reactions. Some applauded Hung Hsiu-chu, saying she had the courage to confront the core issues in cross-Strait relations and propose solutions. They said Hung Hsiu-chu transcended Ma Ying-jeou's timid "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" stance. Others asked, "What is one China?", and "What are cross-Strait relations?". They said the core issue requires "one interpretation" rather than "different interpretations."

Hung Hsiu-chu's stance on the Republic of China is crystal clear. It reveals Tsai Ing-wen's "backdoor listing" of the ROC constitutional system for what it is, rhetorical deception. Hung upholds our sovereignty over the South China Sea islands inside the 11 Dotted Line. She has sided with Beijing in its dispute with Washington over the South China Sea.

DPP members and KMT supporters of Wang Jin-pying have begun red-baiting Hung Hsiu-chu. They are accusing her of provoking internal strife in order to win the primaries, of reigniting struggles over ethnic identity and reunification vs. independence, of standing outside "mainstream Taiwanese society". They are condemning Hung Hsiu-chu for advocating "eventual reunification". They say her stance cannot win the approval of the public on Taiwan. They say she will become a sinner against history who destroyed the Kuomintang.

These boos and catcalls have a source. Taiwan was under the thumb of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian for nearly 20 years. Their separatist view of history characterized the Mainland as "the other". Their indoctrination of the public was relentless and uninterrupted. Ma Ying-jeou came to office in 2008. He promoted cross-Strait exchanges, but did almost nothing to reaffirm the two sides' shared identity. As a result the gap between the two sides widened, until it was even wider than it had been under Chen Shui-bian.

Ma government timidity led to today's plight, where no one on Taiwan has the courage to discuss political identity and a peace agreement. Most people ar terrified of red-baiting. At most they timidly invoke the 1992 consensus, "maintaining the status quo", or "different interpretations". They dare not go beyond. They know if they do, they will be roundly condemned and may lose their election campaigns. This self-censorship has resulted in blue camp evasion to avoid red-baiting. It has made it easy for opponents of Hung Hsiu-chu to accuse her of being a "Communist sympathizer".

The key plank in Hung Hsiu-chu's campaign platform is the signing of a peace agreement. This is of enormous significance for the future of cross-Strait relations. If Hung is successful, the two sides will be forced to confront this serious issue. If she fails, or is successfully tarred with a red brush during the campaign, a cross-Strait peace agreement will be impossible, and will not become part of rational political dialogue on Taiwan.

If that happens, no politician on Taiwan will ever have the courage to mention a peace agreement again. Any discussion of a peace agreement would be excluded from political dialogue. The two sides will never enjoy a stable political framework, and will continue to be pawns of US East Asian strategy.

The content of Hung Hsiu-chu's One China, One Interpretation policy is crystal clear. In terms of sovereignty, One China does not refer to either side. It means that the two sides combined equal China as a whole. According to the two sides' constitutions, their declared sovereignty overlaps. In terms of jurisdiction, the two sides both claim constitutional and political authority over all of China, and are equal but separate from each other.

Put simply, Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-strait peace agreement includes ensuring undivided sovereignty over the whole of China. But both sides must accept each others' constitutional and political authority.

The ROC government is not merely a legal reality. It is also a political reality. This is a central reality that ruling and opposition parties in Taipei cannot deny. One China, Undivided Sovereignty is Beijing's bottom line. Hung Hsiu-chu's bottom line is One China, One Interpretation. It will enable the two sides to accept each other's core values, and will be an importan factor in the signing of a cross-Strait peace agreement.

Beijing must now ask itself what it wants to do. Will it stand by and watch as Hung Hsiu-chu struggles alone? Or will it seize this rare opportunity to respond appropriately? It all depends on Beijing.

北京應回應洪秀柱兩岸論述

2015-6-15 中國時報

洪秀柱已經通過國民黨的「防磚民調」，即將成為國民黨的總統候選人。她主張兩岸應該在「一中同表」的基礎上，確定兩岸政治定位，簽署和平協議，確保兩岸和平發展。她並在初選的第一時間，就對外公布《洪秀柱對於兩岸政治論述的說帖》，清楚與負責地將主張，以白紙黑字方式公開呈現。這也表示，和平協議是她這次參選的主要訴求。

洪秀柱的兩岸論述一提出，立刻面對兩種不同反應。一是認為洪秀柱能夠勇於面對兩岸的核心問題，並提出解決方案，給予掌聲。洪秀柱超越馬英九偏安一隅的「不統、不獨」消極主張，認為兩岸在「何謂一中」、「兩岸是甚麼關係」核心問題上必須「共同表述」，而不是「各自表述」。

洪秀柱清晰的中華民國立場，讓蔡英文拿中華民國憲政體制做幌子的「借殼上市」把戲現出原形，她堅持南海十一段線內的島嶼主權，等於為北京在與華府就南海爭議上，解除了法理與事實上的後顧之憂。

另一種反應來自民進黨以及國民黨內一些挺王金平的名嘴，他們開始給洪秀柱戴「紅帽子」及「統帽子」，認為她為了贏得初選，不惜挑起台灣內部已經逐漸撫平的族群與統獨之爭，自絕於台灣社會的「主流」價值。他們批評洪秀柱是「終極統一」的統派，不會得到台灣民眾的認同，甚而會成為摧毀國民黨的罪人。

這些噓聲與嘲諷不是沒有基礎。台灣經歷李扁近20年的執政，分離史觀的教育，兩岸為「異己關係」政治論述從未停過，即使馬英九在2008年執政起，推動兩岸大交流，但是在強化兩岸共同認同與互信上卻幾乎沒有著墨，致使兩岸認同的差距，遠遠超過陳水扁時期。

馬政府的消極作為，讓台灣已經沒有人還敢於再討論政治定位與和平協議。大多數人擔心被扣帽子，最多也僅於提出「九二共識」、「維持現狀」、「各自表述」這些消極的主張，而不敢向前跨越，並認為如果跨越會挨罵，並有可能失掉選舉。這些自我設限，讓藍營遇帽子則逃，也讓洪的對手可以輕易給她戴帽子。

對兩岸關係未來發展來說，洪秀柱以簽署和平協議做為其參選的核心政見，有其非常重大的意義。如果她成功，兩岸必然要面對這個重要且嚴肅的問題，但是如果她失敗，或者在參選過程中不斷被抹紅，讓兩岸和平協議無法正確及理性地進入台灣的重要政治議程，而被迫選擇放棄。

果真如此，從此以後，在台灣的政壇，大概將沒有人還有意願、勇氣與能力討論和平協議。和平協議的討論可能就被迫退出台灣的政治議程，兩岸關係從此以後不會有穩定的政治結構或框架，而繼續淪為美國東亞戰略的棋子。

洪秀柱的「一中同表」內容非常清楚，即在主權方面，「一中」不單指兩岸任何一方，而是兩個加起來的「整個中國」，兩岸政府依其憲法對於主權的宣示是重疊的。在治權方面，兩岸都是整個中國內部的兩個憲政治權，彼此是平等分立的。

簡單地說，洪秀柱主張的「兩岸和平協議」版本裡面包括兩岸應該保證不分裂整個中國的主權，但是兩岸也必須接受彼此為憲政治權。

中華民國政府的存在不僅是法理事實，也是政治現實，更是台北方面朝野各黨均不可能退讓的核心堅持；「一個中國、主權完整」也是北京不可能讓步的核心底線。現在洪秀柱用「一中同表」讓兩岸共同接受彼此的核心堅持與底線，並用以做為兩岸和平協議的簽署重要內涵。

此時此刻，北京必須認真思考，選擇袖手旁觀，讓洪秀柱自唱自演，還是抓住這個難得的機遇做出適當回應，全在北京一念之間。

Brickbats to Jade: Hung Hsiu-chu's Rise from Obscurity

Brickbats to Jade: Hung Hsiu-chu's Rise from Obscurity
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2015

Executive Summary: Hung Hsiu-chu has received a high 46.2% public approval rating. She has overcome the 30% threshold required for a KMT primary candidate. Such high poll numbers prove that she is a credible candidate for the KMT in the 2016 presidential election. Those who have attempted to sabotage her candidacy no longer have any hope of success. Especially inspiring was the fact that Hung Hsiu-chu was pegged as a mere B Lister. Yet she exhibited more character than the party's A listers. She successfully reached the hearts and minds of grassroots blue camp supporters. Everyone in the KMT, from top to bottom, must now throw their support behind Hung Hsiu-chu and fight the mother of all battles.

Full Text Below:

Hung Hsiu-chu has received a high 46.2% public approval rating. She has overcome the 30% threshold required for a KMT primary candidate. Such high poll numbers prove that she is a credible candidate for the KMT in the 2016 presidential election. Those who have attempted to sabotage her candidacy no longer have any hope of success. Especially inspiring was the fact that Hung Hsiu-chu was pegged as a mere B Lister. Yet she exhibited more character than the party's A listers. She successfully reached the hearts and minds of grassroots blue camp supporters. Everyone in the KMT, from top to bottom, must now throw their support behind Hung Hsiu-chu and fight the mother of all battles.

The initial concern was that Hung Hsiu-chu might just meet the low 30% threshold. Had that happened, schemers within her party would have claimed that "The green camp deliberately inflated her numbers", or that "Hung lacks the charisma to create a coattails effect in the Legislative Yuan elections". They would have invoked these and other justifications for their continued obstructionism. They would have demanded that the party abandon Hung Hsiu-chu and nominate another candidate. The July 19 Party Congress will officially announce the KMT presidential nominees. The party will endure an entire month of internal strife. It will be increasingly divided. Its election campaign will lose momentum. Now however, the sky has cleared and the sun has emerged. Hung Hsiu-chu's high poll numbers have effectively silenced any doubts about her support, within and without. Compare the numbers announced by three polling organizations. Even assuming the green camp maliciously inflated her numbers, their contribution was limited.

Last month Eric Chu's announcement that he would not run left observers stunned and frustrated. But in one short month, Hung Hsiu-chu went from dark horse to favorite daughter. She went from brickbat to jade. This was a huge surprise. Did Hung Hsiu-chu inspire enthusiasm within the blue camp? Or were supporters so disappointed in KMT leaders that they seized the initiative and came together to remedy the Kuomintang's contemptible cowardice, dishonesty, pretense, coyness, and refusal to change. Hung Hsiu-chu's supporters have given the KMT a kick in the pants and brought it into the modern era.

Hung Hsiu-chu was not a KMT star. She was a blade of grass that grew in the cracks between Kuomintang factions. She rose to Vice Premier and Deputy KMT Chairperson only because she lacked an obsession with power. She never belonged to any faction. She never posed a threat to others. As a result, she was able to survive between the cracks. With the DPP arrayed against the KMT full force, the men in the blue camp were afraid to do battle. In a fit of anger, Hung Hsiu-chu threw down the gauntlet. Initially she may have been pinch hitting. But lo and behold, the harder she fought,, the more resolute she became. Her words carried weight. Her character communicated conviction. The public rallied behind her. The reason was simple. Political fortunes took an unexpected turn. Hung Hsiu-chu crossed the threshold. She was no longer merely a blade of grass, but a towering oak.

Hung Hsiu-chu's meteoric rise is closely related to the KMT's lack of leadership for the past half year. The KMT was traumatized last year by its rout in the nine in one elections. Neither the party nor the government found the resolve to turn the tide. Instead, they hesitatated and procrastinated. They were indolent and passive. The Ma government and Mao cabinet remained dejected. Wang Jin-pyng initially said he "did not fell he was up to the task". Later he reversed himself and said "this is a duty I cannot shirk". The political calculation was obvious. Eric Chu held forth about transforming the party, but failed to act, and refused to lead the party into battle. He came across as all show and no go, leaving the party spinning its wheels. Blue camp supporters became fed up with these party and govenment leaders whose mouths were filled with empty talk but whose hearts were filled with selfish ambition. They switched their allegiance to Hung Hsiu-chu, a woman unafraid to speak her mind and to lead the charge. Therefore let us hope the KMT can avoid infighting and self-destruction.

Hung Hsiu-chu's primary candidacy came as a surprise, but a pleasant one. Internally, the KMT can now end the endless fighting between nativists and non-nativists, and launch an early counterattack. Also, given bottom-up popular support, the KMT can rid itself of its medieval candidate selection traditions. It can take advantage of the break in the chain to reform the party's beliefs and values. Externally, Hung Hsiu-chu was a victim of the white terror and an impoverished background. Contrast her with Tsai Ing-wen, the pampered princess of a wealthy industrial family. Hung is far more appealing and persuasive as a candidate. Her straight talk, her sense of justice, and her social background enable her to counterattack and refute any red-baiting by the DPP. Party princes Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, and Wu Dun-yi would have difficulty matching her in this.

Hung Hsiu-chu's approval rating has shot through the roof. But Hung Hsiu-chu's conduct yesterday showed that none of this has gone to her head. Just the opposite. Her remarks showed greater modesty and self-introspection. She is clearly aware of her shortcomings. She is willing to humble herself to seek greater support and unity within the party. She must be wise in her choice of running mate. She must fill any gaps in her national policy platform. She must craft a more comprehensive political and economic policy framework. She must avoid extreme rhetoric. The KMT must back her 100%. This is a duty it cannot shirk. The DPP will of course ridicule the potential threat Hung Hsiu-chu poses. But blue camp voters have seized the initiative. They are gaining strength. Tsai Ing-wen's final mile to the presidency may not be the cakewalk she imagined it would be.

During the nine in one elections, the KMT lost many voters. KMT supporters have now returned, but with different mindsets. Does the Kuomintang understand where they are coming from?

破磚成玉：洪秀柱喚起了由下而上的奮起
2015-06-15聯合報

洪 秀柱以四六．二％的高支持度跨過三成防磚門檻。如此高的民調，顯示她代表國民黨出征二○一六總統大選的正當性已無可質疑，企圖扯後腿的人將不可能再有操作 的空間。最可貴的是，洪秀柱以B咖之姿奮起，不僅表現出超越A咖的氣度和質地，也成功帶動了藍營基層支持者的向心和士氣。至此，國民黨上下應別無懸念地一 致支持洪秀柱，打一場不同的絕地之戰。

原先令人擔心的是，洪秀柱若僅以剛過三成的民調低空掠過門檻，那樣的話，黨內野心人士勢必以「民調 遭綠營灌水」、「洪帶不動立委選情」等各種理由繼續杯葛，要求黨中央拋棄洪秀柱，另行徵召。如此一來，在七月十九日黨代表大會正式通過總統提名人選之前， 國民黨將會有一個月的內亂及忐忑期，黨愈發分裂，選情也愈發低迷。如今情勢撥雲見日，洪秀柱的高民調有效駁斥了黨內外對於其實力的質疑；比較三家民調數 字，就算有綠營惡意灌水，其影響似可不必太過重視。

從上月朱立倫等人宣布拒選留給外界的錯愕和失落，短短不到一個月，洪秀柱從一名不被期 待的人選「破磚而出」脫胎成了一塊美玉，這是一個莫大的驚奇。與其說是洪秀柱喚起了藍營群眾的熱情，不如說是許多支持者因為對國民黨領導者失望而主動靠 攏、凝聚，希望由下而上打破國民黨懦弱怯戰、欲拒還迎、惺惺作態、坐等徵召、不思改變等可鄙習氣；這點，對國民黨的現代化轉型，其實是重要的助力。

洪 秀柱並不是國民黨的明星級人物，她是從國民黨的派系勢力夾縫中冒出來的小草。之所以能晉升至副院長、副主席之職，主要是她一直以來並未對權勢表現出強烈的 欲望，亦從未結黨營派，因而未對其他人物構成威脅；也因此，反而能在夾縫地帶自由伸展。這次，在民進黨大軍壓境下，藍營一軍男性全部怯戰，洪秀柱憑著一股 義憤主動叫陣迎戰，或許原本有幾分「代打」、「墊檔」的意味；不料她愈戰愈勇，言之有物，格局宏大，民眾反而願意奉她為主將。原因無他，政治的神奇酵素已 經發作，而今跨過這道防磚界碑，洪秀柱不再是株小草，而變成了一棵大樹。

談洪秀柱的異軍突起，不能不與國民黨半年多來的無領導狀態交互對 照。去年九合一敗選後，國民黨受到重創，但不論在「黨」或「政」的體系都沒有拿出力挽狂瀾的決心與行動，反而陷在猶疑、觀望、怯怠的情緒中，消極以對。馬 政府和毛內閣的委靡，顯得可悲；王金平先稱「不足擔當重任」後又表態「義不容辭」，顯得陰謀算計；朱立倫奢談黨的改造卻缺乏行動又十足拒戰，顯得華而不 實，且陷黨於空轉。在藍營支持者的心情，與其繼續期待這些滿口空話、卻滿腹私心的黨政領導人，還不如寄望快人快語、勇往直前的「柱姐」領軍衝鋒；如此，國 民黨至少不必再經歷一次內鬥、撕裂的摧折。

從這個角度看，洪秀柱的出線雖然是初選制度的意外，卻也是個美麗的意外。對內，國民黨可以提前 結束本土派與非本土派沒完沒了的鬥爭輪迴，及早定於一尊展開反攻；同時，藉著由下而上的群眾支持力量，國民黨至少有機會擺脫抬轎、徵召、矯詞那一套封建文 化，藉由選舉的淬鍊提升黨的進步信念和價值。對外，洪秀柱的白色恐怖背景和貧苦成長出身，對照富家千金女的蔡英文，其實更具親和力和說服力；同時，她的正 義直言和豐厚社會歷練，也能對民進黨的攻擊抹紅展開直接而有效的反擊和對話，那恐怕將是朱王吳等人所難企及。

對於自己暴得高民意支持，洪 秀柱昨天並未表現得意忘形，反而語多謙退與反省。可見，她知道自己的不足，也願意放下身段，尋求黨內更大的支持和團結。除了必須慎選副手，她必須加緊補強 其治國理念的周延性，形塑更完整的政經架構，避免出現過度偏激及偏斜的言論；這點，國民黨須傾全力為其輔選，義不容辭。至於民進黨，雖然一向只以訕笑的態 度看待洪秀柱可能帶來的威脅，但是，只要想想藍軍選民主動集結的腳步，蔡英文的最後一哩恐怕未必是笑傲過關。

國民黨在九合一選舉失去了大量選民，如今支持者正以不同的方式回潮，國民黨聽得懂這些由下而上的聲音嗎？

South China Sea Crisis: Tsai Ing-wen's Rewards and Risks

South China Sea Crisis: Tsai Ing-wen's Rewards and Risks
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 12, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has concluded her visit to Washington. Her deliberately equivocal pledges to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations, along with her pro forma lip service to "affirm the Republic of China's constitutional framework" have enabled her to squeak by. But her act passed muster not because Tsai Ing-wen is such a wonderful showman. It passed muster because Sino-US relations are strained by tensions in the South China Sea. Tsai Ing-wen's anti-Mainland stance yielded short term rewards. But her stance on the South China Sea could endanger the Republic of China.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has concluded her visit to Washington. Her deliberately equivocal pledges to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations, along with her pro forma lip service to "affirm the Republic of China's constitutional framework" have enabled her to squeak by. But her act passed muster not because Tsai Ing-wen is such a wonderful showman. It passed muster because Sino-US relations are strained by tensions in the South China Sea. Tsai Ing-wen's anti-Mainland stance yielded short term rewards. But her stance on the South China Sea could endanger the Republic of China.

For years now, the United States, the Chinese mainland, and six ASEAN countries, have been engaged in a military buildup in the South China Sea. Before the Guang Da Xin incident, the Mainland and the Philippines clashed over the Nansha Islands. The Philippines even demanded arbitration by the International Arbitration Tribunal. In the wake of US military intervention, the Mainland accelerated local construction. It said the dispute involved territorial matters, therefore it would not accept arbitration. It rejected the Philippines' attempt to internationalize the South China Sea dispute.

The Mainland rejected the US government's legal pretext for intervention. It cited in evidence the Republic of China government's 1947 "11 Dotted Line". This U-shaped national boundary in South China Sea waters clearly delineates China's jurisdiction and sovereignty over the islands. In recent years, the United States has hoped the KMT government would renounce the 11 Dotted Line, forsake its sovereignty, or even abandon these islands. This would enable the US to pressure Mainland China into accepting dispute settlement in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The US has recently dealt with the South China Sea issue in a high-handed manner. This is no accident. It is the inevitable result of the United States' determination to maintain US hegemony over Asia. Mainland China's economic strength poses the greatest threat to American domination over Asia.  Washington's Asian rebalancing policy emphasizes military and regional security. It attempts to contain the Mainland's One Belt, One Road, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other economic alliance strategies. The Mainland and the US have clashed repeatedly. One. Early this year, Washington and Tokyo revised the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. They globalized the guidelines. They included the Diaoyutai Islands. Two. Xi Jinping visited Russia. Together with Putin, they reviewed the largest military parade in modern history. Mainland China has allied itself with Russia against the US and Japan. In August of this year the two countries will hold more joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan.

The US has responded to Mainland China's expanded naval power. The US still adheres to its Cold War era "first island chain" strategy. The United States and Japan are confronting Mainland China and Russia in Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, the US is using Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries as pawns, as pretexts to inject itself into the South China Seas conflict. Earlier this year, the United States twice asked senior officials of the ROC security directorate to visit the United States to discuss the 11 Dotted Line. Washington later revealed its position through think tanks. It urging the ROC to renounce the 11 Dotted Line and engage in dialogue with other claimants. The proposals were attempts to use Taiwan to extert pressure on the Mainland.

President Ma eventually responded with his "South China Sea Peace Initiative". In a compromise between the Mainland and the US, he stressed shelving the sovereignty dispute while respecting the spirit of international law, maintaining freedom of navigation in the region, and ensuring sea and air safety. This declaration coincided with US reconnaissance aircraft overflying artificial reefs constructed by the Mainland. This US "Shangri-La Dialogue" in late May was pre-arranged. The timing of Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the United States was no coincidence. Mainland China and the US have repeatedly clashed, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea. This saber rattling is motivated by the desire to empower oneself and disempower the other. It remains in a preliminary stage. During the Sino-US summit in September Xi Jinping and Barack Obama will play a game on this chessboard.

The South China Sea dispute has once again highlighted Taiwan's strategic status. Diaoyutai is different. Taiping Island is currently under our direct jurisdiction. Responsibility has been transferred to the Coast Guard. This has reduced any military connotations or exhorbitant expenditures. The discovery of natural gas has renewed government interest, and has led to the resumption of military deployments. Ma government moves in the South China Sea have been suppressed by the US. The most recent affirmation of sovereignty was in 2009. Intense confrontations have taken place among various countries over the past two years. The ROC government, paradoxically, has remained silent and kept a low profile. The Mainland knows the US hopes to undermine Mainland sovereignty in the South China Sea by turning the screws on Taiwan. It has decided therefore to take matters into its own hands. The United States could not persuade Ma to play along. Therefore it decided to work on the DPP instead. The South China Sea dispute has provided Tsai Ing-wen an opportunity to reverse her fortunes. It has enhanced the strategic status of Taiwan. But what impact will it have on our national prosperity?

The DPP characterizes Ma Ying-jeou's South China Sea peace initiative as "singing the same tune as [Mainland] China". But what about the DPP's South China Sea policy? What is that exactly? The DPP refuses to say. Tsai Ing-wen held several closed door meetings with the US in Washington. Just exactly what position did she take on the South China Sea disputes? Did she make any secret commitments to the US in exchange for supporting her? The DPP has declared that it will not give up Taiping Island. But the Republic of China's sovereignty in the South China Sea is hardly limited to a single island. What position did Tsai Ing-wen take on the 11 Dotted Line? Did she promise to abandon the islands in accordance with United States wishes? Did she stand by our position of 1947? Before the election, she has been blurring her position in an effort to pander to all parties. But after the election, she will have to say what she really meant. Will a DPP government ally with the US to contain [Mainland] China? Or will it continue the Ma government's policy of maintaining an equidistant posture from the United States and Mainland China, and remain out of the dispute?

Sino-US rivalry is changing the status quo in Asia. The Japanese media described the confrontation between the US and Japan one one side, and Mainland China and Russia on the other, as the beginning of a New Cold War. Is that an exaggeration? Taiwan and the Mainland are already on the road to reconciliation. We must not turn back the clock. Politicians who aspire to greatness, blue or green, have a responsibility to explain clearly how they intend to deal with issues concerning our nation's sovereignty. They may not treat such matters as bargaining chips to advance their selfish political ambitions. Tsai Ing-wen's position on cross-Strait issues is already far too ambiguous. Her position on the South China Sea issue must be far more transparent, if she hopes to become president.

蔡英文從南海危機撈到的便宜和風險

2015-06-12聯合報

蔡英文完成訪美之行，她對兩岸關係曖昧的「維持現況」說，也以「中華民國憲政體制」為掩護順利過關。此行之成功，原因其實不在蔡英文的表現多麼傑出，而在中美關係正因南海局勢緊張受到挑戰，蔡英文的反中立場在此際撈到了一些便宜；但她對南海的立場，對中華民國卻可能是風險。

美中及東協六國相繼在南海擴軍，已有數年。廣大興號事件前，中菲就為了南沙群島數個島礁的所有權發生衝突，菲國甚至向國際海洋法庭提出南海爭端仲裁。美國軍事力量介入後，大陸則加緊在當地建設，並強調事涉領土與權益問題，不接受仲裁，抵制菲國將南海爭端國際化。

大陸抵制美國介入的法理依據，就是中華民國政府在一九四七年公布的「十一段線」，這個Ｕ型的國界線明確主張我國在南海水域的管轄範圍及島嶼主權。近年美國一直希望國民黨政府能捨棄十一段線，縮小為主張實質管轄的太平島主權或者完全棄島，以迫使大陸接受聯合國根據海洋法公約處理爭端。

美國最近高調處理南海問題，並非單一事件，這是美中在亞洲爭霸的必然發展。中國經濟實力已威脅美國在亞洲的領導地位，華府的亞洲再平衡政策決定強調軍事與區域安全，以牽制中國一帶一路、亞投行等經濟同盟戰略。幾件事可作為觀察美中交鋒指標：一是今年初美日著手修正防衛合作指針，將安保合作推向全球，包括敏感的釣魚台；二是習近平訪俄，陪同普丁檢閱現代史上最大規模的閱兵，中國攏俄劍指美日，今年八月兩國將在日本海再次舉行聯合軍演。

美中在亞洲過招，因應中國近年積極在海洋擴展國力，美國仍循著冷戰時的第一島鏈布局攻防，東北亞形成美日對中俄的格局；在東南亞，美國則以台、菲、越等國為棋子，切入南海問題。今年初，美方兩度要求我國安高層首長赴美，討論南海十一段線處理，華府態度後來透過智庫學者釋出，從放棄主張到參與各聲索國的對話，各種建議都企圖透過台灣對大陸發揮阻力。

馬總統最後決定以「南海和平倡議」回應，在美中之間選擇折衷，強調擱置主權爭議，但尊重國際法精神維護該區海空航行自由與安全。這番宣示，和美國派出偵察機飛經大陸人造島礁上空一樣，都是美方在五月底的「香格里拉對話」前的預先籌謀；而安排此時讓蔡英文赴美訪問，自然不是巧合。中美從東海到南海連番叫陣，鎮逼封斷只為擴己抑彼，這都還是布局階段，九月中美峰會習近平與歐巴馬才會在這棋枰上進一步緊氣征子。

南海爭端再次凸顯台灣的戰略地位。和釣魚台不同的是，太平島是我方實質管轄，移交海巡署接管後，軍事色彩降低，發展也受到預算限制。直至附近探勘到天然油氣，政府才再度重視此地，恢復軍事部署。馬政府的南海行動受到美方相當壓制，最近一次重申主權是在二○○九年，面對這兩年各國激烈的對峙奪礁，我國反而噤聲低調。大陸深知美方要從台灣下手削弱中國在南海的主權聲張根據，乾脆自己動手提升戰力。美方無法藉馬英九提子，只好改從民進黨下手，這便是南海爭端為蔡英文製造的轉機。然而，台灣戰略地位提升，對國家發展是轉機還是風險呢？

民進黨稱，馬英九的南海和平倡議是與中國「唱和」，但民進黨自己的南海政策是什麼，卻是始終沒說清楚的事。尤其蔡英文在華府數場與美方的閉門會議，究竟對南海爭端表達何種立場，是否有交換美方支持的密室承諾？民進黨僅聲明不放棄太平島，但中華民國對南海的主權不只此島，蔡英文對於十一段線的立場是迎合美方期待棄海就島，還是延續我國一九四七年以來的一貫主張呢？選前模糊以討好各方，選後仍必須清楚表態：民進黨政府是「聯美制中」以加強戰略夥伴關係，還是「延續馬規」在美中之間保持等距，不捲入爭端？

中美的競爭正在改變亞洲現況，日本媒體則形容，以中俄對抗美日的格局正為新冷戰時代揭開序幕。無論此說是否誇大，我們應該知道兩岸已走上和解之路，不能也不該走回頭路。有意問鼎大位的政治人物，無論藍綠都有責任向人民清楚交代如何處理涉及主權爭議的問題，更不能將此當成個人政治利益之籌碼。除了兩岸問題的曖昧，蔡英文對南海問題的立場也必須更透明才行！

Does the Red-Baiting DPP Still Have Any Credibility?

Does the Red-Baiting DPP Still Have Any Credibility?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2015

Executive Summary: As matters stand, Tsai Ing-wen may well be elected. She clearly knows that her Achilles Heel is cross-Strait relations. If she fails to handle this matter, she cannot complete her final mile to the presidency. Everyone knows her position is not about to change. Therefore the only she can win is to use clever word games. She knows that some people are easy to deceive. First get elected. Once she is in power, everything will be defined as she decides anyway, right?

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen, who will be representing the DPP in the 2016 presidential election, ended her visit to the US and returned to Taiwan yesterday. DPP supporters were ecstatic. She passed her oral exam with Uncle Sam with flying colors. The DPP has overcome the biggest hurdle in the way of assuming power. Indeed, she has received the blessing of Uncle Sam and the support of pale green and pale blue voters. She has mastered campaign rhetoric spin control. Since publicly "affirming the Republic of China", she has been repeating the mantra, "maintaining the status quo". More recently, in response to questions about the 1992 consensus, she has been repeating the mantra, "seeking common ground while shelving differences". She will apparently have no problem negotiating the final mile on the path to the presidency. After all, as the chairperson of a party dedicated to the realization of Taiwan independence, she has said just about all she can say, hasn't she?

The question of course is, do her recent remarks represent an ideological transformation, or were they merely a way to slip past the gatekeepers? Unfortunately the overall picture suggests it is the latter. If Tsai Ing-wen is willing to give straight answers to three questions, the answer will be crystal clear. One. Does her "affirmation of the Republic of China" mean the Taiwan Independence Party Platform is no longer in effect? Is the "two states theory" no longer a problem? Two. Does "maintaining the status quo" mean she accepts the realities of the cross-Strait status quo created by the Ma Government? Three. Does her "seeking of common ground, and shelving of differences" mean she has accepted the 1992 consensus?

As one can imagine, Tsai Ing-wen will never give a straight answer to any of the above questions. After all, if her answer was "All of the above", why would she even bother to run for office? Why would she even bother blasting the Ma government? Wouldn't the Ma government be doing exactly what she says she wants? She would not need to say whether she was opposed to Taiwan independence. Conversely, if the answer was "None of the above", would that not be a public admission that her position has not changed, and that she has merely been playing word games to get elected?

Put simply, this "moderate" position she has adopted leaves enormous room for interpretation. After all, she will say whatever you want to hear. How should her terms be defined? How should they be interpreted? Doesn't she have the final say on what she meant? Affirm the Republic of China? Of course! After all, she is not affirming Ma Ying-jeou's Republic of China, the one founded in 1912. She is affirming the "Republic of China" as defined under her own "two states theory". Maintain the status quo? But what is the "status quo"? Who defines what it is and is not? Who says Tsai Ing-wen can't define it any way she wishes? She won't tell you now how she defines it of course. She will tell you only after she is elected. The pursuit of common ground, and the shelving of differences? Who says she cannot take your "common ground" and redefine that as her "differences"?

Tsai Ing-wen's recent wave of word games recalls 2000, when Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" included pledges not to declare independence, not to change the name of the nation, not to incorporate the two-states theory into the constitution, not to promote a referendum to change the status quo on reunification vs. independence, not to repeal the National Unification Guidelines or the National Unification Council. His pledge cooled the looming cross-Strait crisis. But upon taking office he continued to incite cross-Strait conflict, engage in scorched earth diplomacy, and demand a popular referendum to purchase missiles. He forced Washington and Beijing to come forward and "jointly govern Taiwan". Even after stepping down, he claimed that the "Cape 700 million" was a Taiwan independence "nation building fund". Chen Shui-bian's political rhetoric was actually clearer than Tsai Ing-wen's at the time.

In other words, when we seek assurances from politicians, we cannot simply listen to what they say. We must look at what they doe. When Tsai Ing-wen was DPP Vice Premier, she called for the resumption of work on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Now however, she opposes the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant more vehemently than anyone. Back then, she recruited a whole bunch of people to study direct air links across the Taiwan Strait. In the end however, she found a bunch of reasons not to open direct air links. Put bluntly, if the DPP had been in power over the past few years, the current status quo, with warm people to people exchanges, would not even exist. When the Chen regime repudiated the 1992 consensus back then, the rhetoric was authored by none other than Tsai Ing-wen herself. Are we to believe she has suddenly changed her mind and is "seeking common ground while shelving differences"? Are we to believe she is willing to publicly admit that her past behavior was dead wrong?

Most importantly, the party she leads today is still engaging in indiscriminate red baiting. It continues to obstruct all bills affecting the two sides shared future. It continues to block the STA. The MTA? Don't ask! Many Mainland students who came to Taiwan to study remain under onerous "three limits, six noes" constraints. They remain subject to discriminatory treatment. These are all consequences of Tsai Ing-wen's leadership of the DPP. Are her "maintaining the status quo" and "seeking common ground while shelving differences" nothing more than word games? 

As matters stand, Tsai Ing-wen may well be elected. She clearly knows that her Achilles Heel is cross-Strait relations. If she fails to handle this matter, she cannot complete her final mile to the presidency. Everyone knows her position is not about to change. Therefore the only she can win is to use clever word games. She knows that some people are easy to deceive. First get elected. Once she is in power, everything will be defined as she decides anyway, right?

還在扣人紅帽子的政黨可信賴嗎

2015年06月11日 中國時報

將代表民進黨競選2016年總統的蔡英文昨天結束美國行返台，民進黨支持者歡心鼓舞，認為她已通過美國「口試」，為民進黨取得政權克服了最艱困的障礙。確實，她為了爭取美國的認同及淺綠與淺藍民眾的支持，已將政治修辭語言藝術發揮到極致。繼公開表態「認同中華民國」後，一路追加倡議要「維持現狀」，日前更針對兩岸「九二共識」議題，表達要持續追求「求同存異」，看來她應該可以跨過上次大選的最後一哩路魔障，畢竟以一個實現台獨建國為理念的政黨主席而言，她能表達的都表達了，不是嗎？

問題是，她這一連串的發言，應該被視為一種立場的轉彎？還是企圖達成「頭過身過」目標的語言遊戲？很遺憾，綜合研判起來，好像是更接近後者。請蔡英文直接回答3個問題，答案就很清楚。第一，所謂的「認同中華民國」，是否表示「台獨黨綱」已不復存？再也沒有「兩國論」的問題？第二，所謂的「維持現狀」，是表示接受馬政府所推動的兩岸現狀發展的所有現實嗎？第三，所謂的對「九二共識」持續追求「求同存異」，可以理解為是接受或承認兩岸之間的「九二共識」嗎？

可想而知，蔡英文永遠不會直接回答上述問題，因為她若是回答「以上皆是」，那她還何必出來選？還何必猛批馬政府？馬政府所做的不就是她所主張的？更不必說她是否「反獨」了。而如果答案是「以上皆非」，那不就是公開承認她的立場一點都沒變，這一切的一切不過是為了當選所設計的一組語言遊戲罷了！

講白了，這中間的她每一次表態，都存在著極大的詮釋空間，反正話是說給你聽的，怎麼定義？怎麼解釋？照樣可以是我說了算，不是嗎？「認同中華民國」！當然不是你馬英九那個「1912年成立的中華民國」，而是我蔡英文設計「兩國論」下的「中華民國」。「維持現狀」？重點是「現狀」究竟是歸誰定義，不是嗎？誰說我蔡英文不能有個定義？只不過現在不能說，等當選後再告訴你！追求「求同存異」？誰說不可以拿你的「同」來將就我的「異」？

蔡英文這一波語言遊戲的搬演，讓人想起了2000年時陳水扁針對兩岸關係所提出的「四不一沒有」，所謂「不宣布獨立，不更改國號，不推動兩國論入憲，不會推動改變現狀的統獨公投，也沒有廢除《國統綱領》與國統會的問題」，那時節這段政治表述有效緩和了一觸即發的兩岸危機，然而他上任後卻不斷激化兩岸關係，烽火外交、買飛彈公投，逼得美中出面「共管台灣」，甚至到卸任後被追出的「海角七億」，都公開宣稱是所謂「建國基金」。陳水扁當時的政治語言，較之此刻的蔡英文的政治表述，還要立場清晰得許多啊！

換言之，檢視一個政治人物的保證，真的不能只看他說什麼，得要看他做什麼。蔡英文當年在民進黨執政年代擔任副閣揆時，積極推動核四復建，如今她反核四比誰都大聲；她當年找一堆人研究兩岸直航，最後找了一堆理由就是不願開放，講直白一些，若是這幾年還是民進黨執政，根本不可能出現當下兩岸民間熱絡交往的「現狀」！扁政府當年全盤否定「九二共識」之際，整個論述的主導人就是她，如今她突然改口為「求同存異」了！她難道願意公開坦承，過往的言行，其實都是錯的嗎？

最重要的是，她所領導的政黨，至今還在給人到處扣紅帽子，還在持續擋下所有攸關兩岸前景的法案，服貿被擋下了，貨貿法案談都不必談，迄今為止這麼多來到台灣留學、遊學的陸生，還在「三限六不」的限制下，面臨被歧視的待遇，這一切的一切，都是蔡英文所領導的民進黨所為，如果她所謂的「維持現狀」，所謂的「求同存異」，其實就是這樣，那麼試問：這一切的話語，不就是結結實實的一場語言遊戲的搬演嗎？

以現今的形勢，蔡英文確實最有機會當選，她清楚知道她的罩門是在「兩岸」，這個議題不搞定，她總統之路的最後一哩走不完，但誰都知道她的立場不會改，所以唯一的法門，就是發展一套精心設計的語言遊戲！因為她知道，有些人就是好騙，反正先當選再說，只要贏得政權，一切都是我說了算，不是嗎？

Hung Hsiu-chu must have the Courage to visit the Mainland

Hung Hsiu-chu must have the Courage to visit the Mainland
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2015

Executive Summary: Since Hung Hsiu-chu announced her candidacy for the KMT presidential primaries, support for her has soared. Mainstream newspaper and television polls show public support swiftly rising. This has forced the Kuomintang to adopt a polling method more favorable to Hung Hsiu-chu. In fact, Hung Hsiu-chu's support on the Internet has also risen rapidly. She will soon become Tsai Ing-wen's most powerful opponent. It appears the 2016 race will be between two women, one of which is pro-US, and the other of which is pro-Mainland China. 

Full Text Below:

Since Hung Hsiu-chu announced her candidacy for the KMT presidential primaries, support for her has soared. Mainstream newspaper and television polls show public support swiftly rising. This has forced the Kuomintang to adopt a polling method more favorable to Hung Hsiu-chu. In fact, Hung Hsiu-chu's support on the Internet has also risen rapidly. She will soon become Tsai Ing-wen's most powerful opponent. It appears the 2016 race will be between two women, one of which is pro-US, and the other of which is pro-Mainland China. 

This is evident from supporter activity on Google Trends and Facebook. On June 8 Google Trends examined the month from May 8 to June 6. Before May 14, support for Hung Hsiu-chu was virtually non-existent. Most of the time, Tsai Ing-wen led, followed by Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng. But after May 14, support for Hung Hsiu-chu skyrocketed. On May 18, Hung lept to number one, ahead of Tsai Ing-wen. Between May 17 and June 6, Hung Hsiu-chu and Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly swapped the lead. Hung ranked first for nine days, more than Tsai, who ranked first for eight days. Only when Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US became the focus of news reports, between June 3 and June 6, did Tsai Ing-wen regain her lead over Hung Hsiu-chu for four days.

Supporter activity on Facebook shows that June 4 Hung Hsiu-chu's friends numbered 54,584, lower than Tsai Ing-wen's 1,316,276. This was because Hung got a very late start, and did not have enough time to accumulate supporters. But between May 29 and June 4, Hung's "likes" grew 29.7%. Tsai's grew only 0.3%. Currently the number of Tsai Ing-wen's friends still outnumber Hung's. But Hung Hsiu-chu is closing in fast. Tsai Ing-wen received the most likes for her May 29 comment about a young girl at Wen Hua Elementary School who died of injuries sustained. Hung Hsiu-chu received the most likes for her June 1 comment "I will take responsibility. I will give it my all. We will win".

Time and tide create heroes. Google Trends and Facebook data show that Hung Hsiu-chu's political rallies and commentary have had a palpable effect. Her visibility has soared. It is no exaggeration to say that Hung Hsiu-chu has replicated Ko Wen-che's election miracle. But visibility is not support. Hung Hsiu-chu's challenge will be to turn her visibility into support. 

Hung Hsiu-chu's key to success is the big picture in East Asian and cross-Strait relations. The United States is returning to Asia in an attempt to contain the rise of Mainland China. Yesterday the Want Daily published an editorial entitled, "US Proxy War Moves Toward [Mainland] China". It noted that US East Asia strategy puts Taiwan right in the crossfire. Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the White House and the State Department established new precedents. The US allowed the ROC Chief of Staff to attend the swearing in ceremony for the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet. The US made a show of patting Tsai Ing-wen on the head, just so the Mainland could see. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she and the DPP will pander to the US and become its pawn in its attempt to contain Mainland China. The Democratic Progressive Party hopes that by doing this it can win US support.

In the past, Sino-US interactions have been coordinated. But the Mainland has actively been promoting its One Belt, One Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The United States feels threatened by Mainland China's rise. Add to this frequent clashes over the South China Sea, and the gradual rise of the "China threat theory" within the US. Sino-US friction has turned Taiwan into a battlefield.

When Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, she vowed to uphold "the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". She remains too fuzzy and non-specific. But she is now more specific than when she promised to "maintain the status quo". This has allowed the US to save face and respond with goodwill. Did the US roll out the red carpet for Tsai Ing-wen because she made all the right sounds? Or did the US use Tsai Ing-wen to send Mainland China a message? Did the United States decide to roll out the red carpet for Tsai in advance? Did Tsai Ing-wen tailor her remarks to help the United States, so that the United States could respond positively?

Tsai Ing-wen's altered rhetoric was pragmatic. But it also surrendered the nation's sovereignty and turned it into a pawn of a major power. Her rhetoric was cautious and defensive. It was utterly deficient in boldness and risk-taking. In this, Tsai Ing-wen is no match for Hung Hsiu-chu. This is why Hung Hsiu-chu could go from the B List of political candidates, surpass Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng, then catch up with A List political candidate Tsai Ing-wen in a single month. Whether the issue is one China, different interpretations or a cross-strait peace agreement, Hung Hsiu-chu is unafraid of being tarred with a red brush. The KMT has long been vacillating and pusillanimous. Hung is not. She has the guts to defend blue camp core values. Internally this distinguishes her from KMT cowardice. Externally this distinguishes her from Tsai Ing-wen's vacuousness. This distinguishes her in two ways, and allows her to offer a way out of a political dead end.

Consider the big picture for Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou's "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" has been KMT policy for the past seven years. It has improved cross-Strait relations. But its usefulness is now at an end. Ma's three noes lack vision. They cannot catalyze KMT transformation. They cannot help Taiwan overcome its economic difficulties.

This is why KMT rhetoric has led to defeat upon defeat -- because it lacks vision and fails to touch people's hearts. Chen Chang-wen hit the nail on the head when he said, "Taiwan independence is a belief. But opposition to Taiwan independence is not. Belief is persuasive. Belief is powerful. When belief and non-belief clash, belief is more powerful than non-belief."

A loss of conviction, a loss of faith, has led to the KMT's defeat upon defeat in nearly all public policy debates. This has undermined the KMT's mandate to rule. It has also deprived the Mainland and Taiwan of countless opportunities for shared prosperity. Kuomintang A List political stars are powerless to ensure these opportunites. Hung Hsiu-chu seeks the presidency. She must have the courage to break new ground. She must have the vision to fling open doors. She must visit the Mainland. She must offer a new vision. She must propose an effective national strategy and a synergistic cross-Strait policy.

Taiwan must acknowledge its Chinese cultural heritage. It must combine this with the Mainland's economic momentum, then enter the global market. Only then will the public on Taiwan not be reduced to pawns of the major powers. Only then can they hold their heads high, and seek their own destiny. This is the real meaning of Hung Hsiu-chu's candidacy for president

Hung Hsiu-chu has vowed eternal loyalty to the KMT. She must be loyal to KMT ideals and KMT supporters, not KMT big shots such as Ma, Chu, Wang, and Wu. We hope Hung Hsiu-chu will cast aside Kuomintang spinelessness and communicate directly with the 97% of the public who are neither KMT nor DPP members.

洪秀柱應勇敢訪問大陸

2015年06月09日 中國時報

洪秀柱宣布角逐國民黨總統初選後聲勢鵲起，不但主流媒體的報紙電視民調支持度快速攀升，迫使國民黨改採較有利洪秀柱的民調模式。其實洪秀柱的網路熱度也正在快速攀升中，將成為蔡英文最強有力的對手。看來2016打一場兩位女性候選人的親美與親中路線選戰，似已逐漸成型。

從Google Trends的熱度走勢及臉書的粉絲活動都可以看見此一趨勢。Google Trends6月8日查詢過去近1個月（5月8日到6月6日）的熱度趨勢顯示，5月14日之前洪秀柱的熱度一直是0，大多時間蔡英文最高，朱立倫次之，王金平居3。但5月14日後洪秀柱熱度暴升，5月18日甚至竄升為第1，超過蔡英文。大體而言5月17日到6月6日，洪秀柱與蔡英文呈現熱度拉鋸，洪有9天居第1，還高過蔡英文的8天。直到蔡英文訪美新聞成為焦點，才又在6月3到6月6日連4天熱度超越洪秀柱。

從臉書粉絲活動相關數據觀察，6月4日洪秀柱粉絲數為54584，低於蔡英文1316276，這是因為洪起步非常晚，累積不足，但從5月29到6月4日洪的「讚」成長達29.7%，蔡只有0.3%，顯見洪後勢可畏。就粉絲參與度觀察，蔡英文的粉絲參與度仍是最高的，洪秀柱則緊追在後。近期蔡英文最被認同的主題是「5/29文化國小女童受傷不治的關懷發文」，洪秀柱則是6/1「我承擔，我努力，我們會勝利」的文章最受認同。

時勢造英雄，Google Trends與臉書的數據結果顯示，洪的造勢與論述確實出現效果，能見度與受關注度都呈現飛升現象。如果我們預測洪秀柱可能是台灣選舉史上另一個創造奇蹟的柯文哲，已不能說離譜。但能見度不是支持度，如何把能見度轉為支持度，會是洪秀柱下一個挑戰。

洪秀柱成敗關鍵在兩岸及東亞大局，美國企圖重返亞洲圍堵中國崛起，旺報昨天社評〈美國代理人戰爭步步進逼中國〉已指出美國的東亞大戰略，台灣置身其中不能倖免。這次蔡英文訪美不但破例進入白宮與國務院，美方更釋出台灣參謀總長參加美軍太平洋總司令交接典禮的訊息，美方對蔡友善的動作顯然是做給大陸看的。顯示蔡當選後，將帶領民進黨走親美路線，企圖作美國圍堵中國的棋子，換取美國支持民進黨執政。

這與過去一段時間中美的互動有連動關係，大陸積極推動一帶一路與亞投行等大國布局，美國感受到中國崛起的壓力，加上雙方在南海問題上頻頻放話，美國內部「中國威脅論」漸漸抬頭。中美磨擦，台灣就成為角力場。

蔡英文此行訪美，提出「中華民國憲政體制」說，雖然仍有內涵不足、方法闕如的模糊問題，但已經比「維持現狀」相對具體。這一點，也讓美國的「善意回應」有了著力點，可謂給了美國面子。但與其說是因為蔡英文說了什麼讓美方滿意，所以美方給了蔡高規格待遇與正面回應，不如反過來說是，為了向大陸傳遞手上有牌的訊息，美方先決定給蔡英文高規格待遇，蔡英文再研究要說什麼才能幫美方找台階，讓美方正面回應「師出有名」。

只是蔡英文的「修正」論述雖有其務實性，卻也顯示失去主體性、淪為大國棋子的困境，她的訪美論述充滿著防守性的謹小慎微，少了開拓性的宏觀大器。這一點是蔡英文不如洪秀柱的地方，也可以說，這也是洪秀柱以政壇B咖，在1個月內超朱趕王，直追蔡英文等明星A咖的重要原因。因為，不論在「一中同表」或者「兩岸和平協定」的倡議上，洪秀柱不怕被扣紅帽，打破了國民黨的瞻前顧後的慣性虛矯，勇於堅守藍軍理念，這不僅對內區隔了國民黨的怯懦，更對外區隔了蔡英文的空洞，形成雙區隔效果，終能在死局中開出活路。

從台灣發展與兩岸大局觀，馬英九的不統不獨不武在過去7年主導了國民黨的核心思路，帶來兩岸關係的改善，但其效果已達於極致，連三個消極的「不」，也欠缺格局，不足以成為領導國民黨大步轉型的大論述，也不足以成為帶動台灣突破經濟困局的大戰略。

這也是國民黨的論述戰節節敗退的最主要原因，因為找不到遠景，就找不到感動人心的論述。陳長文就曾一針見血地點出：「台獨是信仰，但反台獨不是；信仰產生說服、信仰產生力量，當信仰與非信仰對決，信仰的力量會大於非信仰。」

「論述失落」、「信仰不具」，使得國民黨幾乎在所有公共政策戰場都陷入潰敗，不但掏空了國民黨的執政根基，也貽誤了台灣本可與中國大陸雙贏共榮的契機。這契機，國民黨的A咖既無力保守，洪秀柱有志於總統大位，就應勇敢開創，秉持一貫大開大闔的個性與思維理路，透過訪問大陸，提出更宏觀前瞻、有效可行的國家大方略、兩岸新主張，帶動兩岸良性循環。

台灣要有以中華文化的深度、台灣的人文厚度，加上大陸豐沛的經濟動能，進而以全球市場為縱橫疆域，這才是台灣人不當大國棋子，昂首走自己命運之路的宏圖大策，這也是洪秀柱參選總統的最大意義。

洪秀柱曾說她永遠忠於國民黨，她效忠的應該是國民黨的創黨理念與國民黨支持者，而不是馬朱王吳等國民黨大咖，我們期待洪秀柱跳脫國民黨虛矯的醬缸，直接與97%非國民黨、非民進黨黨員的大眾對話。