Does the US Buy Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Rhetoric?

Does the US Buy Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Rhetoric?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. The probability she will be elected is high. Does the United States buy Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy rhetoric? Does it trust her to deal with cross-Strait issues?

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. The probability she will be elected is high. Does the United States buy Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy rhetoric? Does it trust her to deal with cross-Strait issues?

This question is worth exploring. The trilateral relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing means that whatever one party does affects the others. The person or political party who leads the ROC must be able to maintain balance in the relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. Any imbalance, including instability in the Taiwan Strait, will negatively impact the fate of 23 million people.

Tsai Ing-wen visited the US in her capacity as DPP presidential nominee. She visited the US State Department and met with Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. She received red carpet treatment. That means Washington thinks she may well win. As a result the Taiwan media termed Tsai's visit a "great success". During a dinner reception with overseas Chinese, Joseph Wu, DPP Secretary-General and ROC representative to the US, in a moment of jubilation, described Tsai's visit to Washington as "very successful".

Soon after, President Ma Ying-jeou transited the United States. He returned to his alma mater Harvard University, where he delivered speeches and participated in academic discussions. President Ma's visit attracted little attention in the Taiwan media. He reminisced about his contribution to stable trilateral relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He spoke of how he got the two sides to trust each other during his seven-year term. US officials were unstinting in their praise of President Ma's speech and successful discussion groups.

Washington gave both Tsai Ing-wen and President Ma the red carpet treatment. But when responding to Tsai Ing-wen's speech, US officials merely reiterated that the US position has always been to develop strong unofficial relations with Taiwan, and that the US abides by the One China Policy, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Taiwan Relations Act. The US response was mere pro forma lip service, devoid of real substance.

If the United States bought Tsai's rhetoric, why was it so reluctant to offer a few words of praise? Contrast this with the praise it heaped on Ma Ying-jeou. Why did the United States give people the unmistakable impression of favoritism?

Contrast this with the situation four years ago. The United States did not criticize Tsai Ing-wen. But refraining from criticizing is a long way from heaping unstinting praise. Raymond Burghardt, President of the American Institute in Taiwan, said the United States chose not to criticize Tsai this time. But it listened carefully to what Tsai Ing-wen had to say. There is a big difference between what she says and what she thinks. What Tsai said, the United States heard. But did the United States buy what she said?

The United States listened but said nothing. There are two reasons for this. One. The United States did not want people to think it was taking sides. It was reluctant to criticize a presidential candidate who was likely to win. Two. The DPP did its homework. For example, Tsai Ing-wen submitted an editorial to the Wall Street Journal, saying "My priority is to increase cross-Strait mutual trust and cooperation." The United States is naturally not about to criticize such a statement.

Is Tsai's cross-Strait policy path acceptable to the United States? Consider what Joseph R. Donovan Jr., Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan said recently at a Taiwanese American Conference-East Coast (TAC-EC). The event was sponsored by pro-green overseas Taiwanese. Donovan, the guest speaker, reiterated the United States position. He said the US insists on a cross-Strait relationship acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait, and the peaceful handling of cross-Strait relations.

When referring to cross-Strait policy, US officials sometimes say, "should be acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait". At other times they say, "should be acceptable to the people on Taiwan". Generally speaking, the former is more common when the Republicans are in power, while the latter is more common when Democrats are in power.

Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party was currently in power? Suppose pro-green overseas Taiwanese were the host? Suppose Donovan said, "should be acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait"?  That would have amounted to a declaration to the green camp that "The United States does not support Taiwan independence".  That would have clearly refuted Tsai Ing-wen's longed for "Taiwan independence DNA" thesis.

For Tsai Ing-wen, cross-Strait policy poses a dilemma. She must seek US approval. She must also accomodate the DPP and its long held position. She must bob and weave, and ultimately avoid giving a straight answer. Following a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, three times she was asked what she meant by "maintaining the status quo", and the "1992 consensus". Three times she gave the same answer: "Please read carefully the contents of my speech." Her evasions made that day's BBC headlines, and became the butt of jokes by the news anchor.

Just before Tsai Ing-wen's visit, Susan Thornton, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, heaped praise on the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy, thereby setting the tone for the future of cross-Strait relations. Following Tsai Ing-wen's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou transited the United States. Raymond Burghardt repeatedly reaffirmed the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. On the one hand, the US repeatedly praised the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. On the other hand it remained tight-lipped and refused to affirm Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. Does the United States buy Tsai's cross-Strait rhetoric? Isn't the answer obvious?

The US government position is abundantly clear. It wants cross-Strait peace and stability. Recent US official remarks include the following: "encourage both sides to continue constructive dialogue; encourage Taiwan to continue its zero accident policy, low key maintainence of stability; we want to see this approach continue; the United States clearly looks forward to this." Does Tsai have a clear response? If she cannot offer a clear response, how can she gain the trust of the other side?

In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian's inaugural speech included his "five noes". The United States did more than ask for such a declaration. It demanded such a declaration, Fifteen years have elapsed. The balance of power between the United States and the Mainland has shifted. The United States looks forward peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait even more than before.

ROC presidential candidates must have the determination, the strategy, and the ability to ensure peace in the Taiwan Strait. They most assuredly cannot simply tell people "Read the contents of my speech".

美國接受蔡英文的兩岸主張嗎

2015年07月21日 中國時報

2016大選民進黨總統候選人蔡英文當選機率非常高，美國是不是接受了蔡英文的兩岸政策的論述並信賴她的處理能力呢？

這個問題值得探究，因為台美中三個雙邊關係相互牽扯，未來無論任何人或任何政黨領導台灣，都必須有能力在美中台三邊關係中維持平衡，一旦失衡，輕則台海動盪，重則影響2300萬人命運。

蔡英文這次以民進黨提名候選人身分訪美，進入美國國務院與副國務卿布林肯會談，是非常高規格的安排，顯見美國接受了她當選的可能，因而台灣媒體傳出「大成功」的歡呼，訪美行結束前的僑界晚宴上，民進黨祕書長兼駐美代表吳釗燮更是意氣風發，說華府之行「很成功」。

不久後，馬英九總統過境美國，回到母校哈佛大學演說並與學界座談，馬總統的演說並未引起台灣媒體太多關注，但這場演說的規格，反映了他在7年任期中，對美中台三邊穩定關係的貢獻，獲得雙方的肯定與信賴。美國官方隨後也不吝讚揚馬總統演說的內容與座談的順利舉行。

美國同時給了蔡英文和馬總統高規格接待，但對蔡英文的演說，政府官方在答詢時，只重申美國「立場一貫，與台灣發展強固的非官方關係」、「美國信守一個中國政策，遵循3個聯合公報及《台灣關係法》」等，可謂只有形式而無實質。

如果美國接受了蔡的說法，美國為什麼吝於幾句讚美之詞？相較於不斷讚譽馬英九，美國為什麼予人厚此薄彼的印象？

與4年前相比，美國這回沒有批評蔡英文，但「沒有批評」與「予以肯定」之間，仍存在很大差距。美國在台協會主席薄瑞光事後說，美國這回已決定不批蔡，而是仔細聽聽蔡英文自己怎麼說。但「你怎麼說」與「我怎麼想」之間，存在很大差距。蔡說過了，美國聽到了，但是美國接受蔡的說法嗎？

美國這回聽而不說，有二個原因，一是不願讓人覺得美國選邊，美國尤其不願批判有厚望的總統候選人；二是民進黨的「課前作業」非常周到，例如蔡英文投書美國《華爾街日報》，稱自己「首要工作是…強化兩岸互信與合作」。這樣的說法當然讓美國不好批評。

要辨識蔡的兩岸路線是否得到美國認可，可從美國在台協會執行理事唐若文最近在「美東台灣人夏令會」的談話嗅出端倪。這個活動是由親綠台僑主辦，唐若文應邀演說，其中提及美國「堅持在兩岸人民都接受的方式下，和平處理台海關係。」

兩岸走向，美國官方說法有時是「應得到兩岸人民同意」，有時是「應得到台灣人民同意」。概略而言，前者多見於共和黨當政之時，後者多見於民主黨當政時。

如今是民主黨當政，又是親綠僑團作東，唐若文卻說「應得到兩岸人民同意」，等於再次昭告綠營：「美國不支持台獨」，也明確駁斥了蔡英文念茲在茲的「台獨DNA」之說。

對蔡英文而言，兩岸等於兩難。她要爭取美國人的認可，卻又要顧及民進黨的立場與自己的一貫主張，左支右絀，結果只能避而不答。在華府智庫「戰略暨國際研究中心」（CSIS）演說後，3次有人問她有關「維持現狀」、「九二共識」等事，她每次都是一樣的答案，「請你仔細閱讀我的演說內容」。這個態度當天上了BBC的新聞標題，也當場成了主持人說笑的哏。

蔡英文到訪前，美國國務院東亞副助卿董雲裳以大量的讚譽之詞肯定馬英九政府的兩岸路線，等於為未來的兩岸走向定調。蔡英文離美後，馬英九總統過境美國，輪到薄瑞光多方肯定馬英九政府的兩岸路線。美國一方面反覆讚賞馬的兩岸走向，另一方面則絕口不願肯定蔡的兩岸走向。美國有沒有接受蔡的說法，答案還不明顯嗎？

美國政府的立場很明確，就是兩岸和平與穩定。綜合最近美國官員談話，有如下述：鼓勵兩岸繼續建設性的對話；鼓勵台灣繼續「零意外」、「低調」以維繫安定；希望看見這樣的作法持續下去（We want to see this approach continue）」。面對美國這樣的明確期待，蔡英文有什麼明確回應？如果不能有明確的回應，如何能贏得對方的信賴？

2000年的時候，陳水扁總統就職演說提出「四不一沒有」。那種立場宣示，不但是美國「需要」的，更可說是美國「索要」的。事隔15年，隨著美、陸實力消長，美國對台海穩定和平的期待更甚。

中華民國的總統候選人，必須展現確保台海和平的決心、策略與能力。這三者絕不是要別人「仔細閱讀我的演說內容」所能達成的。

A Political Process That Cannot Change is Despicable

A Political Process That Cannot Change is Despicable
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2015

Executive Summary: Following wave after wave of chaos, the Kuomintang has finally anointed Hung Shiu-chu its presidential candidate for 2016. Eric Chu has laid the groundwork for Wang Jin-pyng to remain legislator without portfolio. He took advantage of a technicality and dissuaded the "nativist" faction from jumping ship. The 2016 election is a mere six months away. The KMT needs to understand how precarious its situation is. It must unite and see the big picture. Otherwise it should expect a defeat even more catastrophic than the nine in one elections.

Full Text Below:

Following wave after wave of chaos, the Kuomintang has finally anointed Hung Shiu-chu its presidential candidate for 2016. Eric Chu has laid the groundwork for Wang Jin-pyng to remain legislator without portfolio. He took advantage of a technicality and dissuaded the "nativist" faction from jumping ship. The 2016 election is a mere six months away. The KMT needs to understand how precarious its situation is. It must unite and see the big picture. Otherwise it should expect a defeat even more catastrophic than the nine in one elections.

A political process that cannot keep up with the times is despicable. Over the past six months, the KMT has been hijacked and lost all sense of direction. Its leaders lack vision. Supporters lacked initiative. Buffoons have taken over and are raising a ruckus. Cadres are indifferent. Comrades are at loggerheads. The party has apparently given up without a fight. It is all one can do not to avert one's eyes. Only recently, following shuttle diplomacy by key party and government figures, plus Hung Shiu-chu's timely changes, has the situation been stabilized. The anticipated disruptions of yesterday's National Party Conference failed to take place. The anticipated ambush by "Stop Hung" elements failed to materialize. Protests held outside the venue were feeble, and failed to make an impact. Clearly the KMT Central Standing Committee's threats that it would begin slitting throats had an effect. This is the first step the KMT must take in order to rally its forces.

A political process must constantly change with the times. From this perspective, Hung Shiu-chu is not the ideal candidate for the blue camp. But now that she is the candidate, that is no longer the focus.  The KMT has no time for regrets. It has no time to wonder who it should have nominated if it could do it all over again. The KMT cannot turn the clock back. It must find the will to fight. It must rally its supporters, including the disillusioned and the alienated. Even if it loses this battle, it must lose with dignity. If the blue camp is afraid to fight, if it behaves in a cowardly manner, if it remains a "plate of loose sand", how can it expect the public to support it?

Hung Shiu-chu's ringing speech yesterday, was something seldom heard in recent years within the KMT. Hung was decisive, comprehensive, and measured in both her offense and defense. On cross-Strait policy, she reaffirmed the Constitution, the party platform, and the 1992 consensus. She stressed that "Taiwan must come first, the people must be heard, and equality and dignity must prevail". This will ensure peaceful cross-Strait relations and refute McCarthyite red smear allegations. She also stressed empathy and a sense of responsibility, to ensure generational justice, equal treatment for urban and rural, rich and poor, regardless of class, race, or gender. She promised justice and fairness, the unwavering pursuit of national dignity and the achievement of national prosperity.

In an even more moving passage, she spoke in fluent Taiwanese (Minnan dialect) of her impoverished roots. Her father could not find work for 40 years following his release from Green Island Prison. Her mother worked as a laborer. Yet she never nursed a grudge. She never felt afraid. As the saying goes, "Potatoes do not rot because they touch the ground". She struggled relentlessly. She knows the pain of others on the bottom rungs of the economic ladder. Hung Shiu-chu may not be the only one within the blue camp with such a family background. She may not be the only one who pulled herself up by the bootstraps. But her father was a victim of the white terror, yet in an unusual display of character, she refuses to put all the blame on government persecution. The green camp will of course do everything within its power to smear her as a "red", but it may not succeed.

Hung Shiu-chu's appearance yesterday underscored the contrast between herself and Wang Jin-pyng. KMT insiders originally wanted Wang Jin-pyng as their candidate. Eric Chu was apparently happy to oblige. Who knew Wang Jin-pyng would refuse to take part in the primaries. This missed opportunity changed Hung Shiu-chu's candidacy from a lark into the real thing. The two switched roles. This led to unnecessary twists and turns. Hung's appearance was a wake-up call to all politicians. When democracy is subjected to rapidly changing public opinion, those who cling to political deal-making cannot keep up with society, and even less with the voters.

Will Wang Jin-pyng accept the legislator without portfolio position the KMT has custom tailored for him by changing the law? That remains to be seen. The key is whether internal Kuomintang regrouping is enough to give the presidential and legislative elections a boost. Is it enough to ensure a KMT majority in the legislature? Is it enough to ensure that Wang Jin-pyng remains speaker? In Western democracies, unless a speaker has committed a major blunder, he or she is usually eligible for special privileges. During speaker of the parliament elections, the opposition parties deliberately refrain from nominating a candidate, as a show of respect. The KMT nominated Wang Jin-pyng legislator without portfolio on a whim. If doing so boosts the presidental and legislative campaigns, and helps the KMT avoid a breakup, then fine. The problem is the "nativist" faction has been relentlessly making trouble. It has been poor mouthing the party and severely undermining the blue camp image. if the blue camp cannot win an absolute majority, Wang Jin-pyng will be just another legislator without portfolio, rather than speaker. Is Wang Jin-pyng ready for that?

Following the nine in one election debacle, and nearly six months of infighting, the KMT finally approved Hung Shiu-chu as its presidential candidate. The battle has been continuous, with thrills and chills all the way. Now Hung has finally broken out of her encirclement. The KMT finds itself in an embarrassing situation, the result of Taiwan politics, the result of years of ruling vs. opposition party bickering over the same tired issues. Their rhetoric may change based on their current status. But they have never shown any desire to serve the people or solve society's problems. This is what we mean when we say that a political process that never changes is despicable. This is true of the Kuomintang. This is also true of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, which looks on with cold eyes. But has the DPP ever asked itself how much ability it has to promote change?

不能往前推進的政治，是可恥的

2015-07-20聯合報

歷經一波波紛亂和曲折，國民黨全代會昨天正式推舉洪秀柱為二○一六總統參選人。與此同時，朱立倫則留下了王金平可續任不分區立委之伏筆，技術性化解了本土派的分裂危機。距離二○一六大選僅剩半年，國民黨必須認清當前形勢的險峻，若還不能團結面對大局，恐怕要準備迎接一場比九合一更慘烈的敗績。

不能體察時勢、與時俱進的政黨，是可恥的。觀察過去半年，國民黨一直是處於某種自我放棄與自我綁架的形勢中：領導無方、群雄觀望、小丑喧囂、幹部漠然、同志離心離德，舉黨一副未戰先降的姿態，讓人不忍卒睹。直至近日，經黨政關鍵人物穿梭協調，加上洪秀柱及時調整口徑，方才穩住陣腳。從昨天的全代會看，原本磨刀霍霍準備鬧場的戲碼並未上演，原來預謀奇襲「卡柱」的隊伍並未出現，至於場外的各路鬧劇，即不再足道。可見，中常會日前大刀開鍘發揮了威嚇作用。這是國民黨整飭軍容的第一步。

從政治必須不斷「向前推進」的角度看，洪秀柱是不是藍軍最強的人選，在她正式成為候選人後，顯已不再是重點，國民黨也沒有時間再去懊悔「如果一切重來」誰應該如何如何。重點在，國民黨面對這場無路可退的戰役，要如何拿出最大的意志和力量，呼喚那些失望或疏離民眾重新認同與歸心；就算無法贏得這一役，至少要輸得不難看。試想，如果藍軍自己表現得畏戰、懦弱、一盤散沙，要如何號召民眾支持？

洪秀柱昨天的演講，是近年國民黨內難得聽到的鏗鏘之聲，態度果決，結構完整，攻守有致。談到兩岸政策，她回到憲法、黨綱及「九二共識」，強調「台灣優先、民意為本、平等尊嚴」的原則，以此推動兩岸的和平發展，足以駁斥先前的「抹紅」指控。她並強調，要用同理心和責任感，推動實現跨越世代、城鄉、貧富、階級、種族、性別的正義與公平，堅定不移追求國家的尊嚴、實現國民的幸福。

更動人的一段，是她以流利的台語談到自己是「艱苦人出身」，父親從綠島回來四十年沒有工作，母親當過女工，但她沒有怨恨，「番薯毋驚落土爛」，一路打拚，因此很能了解基層的甘苦。在藍營，像這樣沒有任何家世背景而孤軍奮起者，洪秀柱也許不是唯一特例；但父親遭遇白色恐怖，她卻未將一切歸咎政府迫害，顯示其品格殊不尋常。綠營即使再千方百計抹紅，也未必能夠得逞。

洪秀柱昨天的出線，隱隱折射了「洪王錯身」的角色對換。本來，國民黨內一心想要角逐總統大位的人是王金平，朱立倫似也頗有意促成；未料，王金平拒絕參加初選，一錯過，竟讓原本玩票的洪秀柱假戲成真，兩人角色旋即易位，也引來後續無謂波折。這一幕，是對所有政治人物的當頭棒喝：當民主政治已進到民意瞬息萬變的時代，還留戀抬轎文化的人，不可能跟得上社會，也跟不上選民。

目前看來，王金平是否接受國民黨為他量身打造修法以續任不分區立委，仍是未定數。其關鍵，在國民黨的內部整合是否順利，足以拉抬總統和立委的選情，使藍軍仍能維持國會的相對多數地位，才足以確保王金平續任院長。在西方民主國家，國會議長除非犯下嚴重錯誤，通常獲有特殊的政治禮遇；議長參選時，在野黨在該選區甚至刻意不提名候選人，以示尊崇與禮讓。國民黨要不要提名王金平為不分區立委，只在一念之間，若有助於總統與立委選情，並可避免國民黨崩裂，未必不可。問題是，經本土派幾度鬧場唱衰，使藍軍形象大受影響，如果國會無法搶得絕對優勢，屆時王金平的不分區將只是一名光桿立委，而非「議長」之尊。那樣的話，是王金平願意面對的形勢嗎？

遭遇九合一的慘敗，再歷經近半年的內訌，國民黨昨天終於通過洪秀柱代表參選，可謂一路且走且戰，驚險萬狀，而終於殺出重圍。國民黨的窘狀，其實也是台灣政治的困境，朝野多年來纏繞在老議題上反覆辯論、廝殺，不斷隨著戰鬥位置的變化改變論述，卻始終無意為人民及社會解決問題。這就是我們說的：不能往前推進的政治，是可恥的。國民黨如是，但民進黨除了占著在野的便宜冷眼冷語，它又思考過自己有多少推進政治的能力嗎？

Recognize The Republic of China, Defuse Anti-China Sentiment

Recognize The Republic of China, Defuse Anti-China Sentiment
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2015

Executive Summary: Former legislator Shen Fu-hsiung has published an article on Hung Hsiu-chu's One China, Same Interpretation. Shen said that "For perhaps the very first time, Beijing realizes it cannot expect the KMT to hold the line (against Taiwan independence) on Taiwan, while simultaneously hoping that the KMT will vanish from the face of the earth." Actually, it would be more accurate to replace the term "KMT" with the term "Republic of China". This newspaper made that point in an editorial entitled "Last Chance to Resolve Anti-China Sentiment", a response to Hung Hsiu-chu's call to "Recognize the Republic of China". This is the last chance to curb the spread of anti-China sentiment on Taiwan.

Full Text Below:

Former legislator Shen Fu-hsiung has published an article on Hung Hsiu-chu's One China, Same Interpretation. Shen said that "For perhaps the very first time, Beijing realizes it cannot expect the KMT to hold the line (against Taiwan independence) on Taiwan, while simultaneously hoping that the KMT will vanish from the face of the earth." Actually, it would be more accurate to replace the term "KMT" with the term "Republic of China". This newspaper made that point in an editorial entitled "Last Chance to Resolve Anti-China Sentiment", a response to Hung Hsiu-chu's call to "Recognize the Republic of China". This is the last chance to curb the spread of anti-China sentiment on Taiwan.

On May 1, Hung Hsiu-chu issued her Cross-Strait Talking Points. She championed One China, Same Interpretation and a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. Two months have elapsed, but Beijing has yet to issue a positive response. There may be several reasons for this.

Reason One. Beijing may remember the lessons of the past. It knows the public on Taiwan often reacts negatively to Mainland interference with elections on Taiwan. It may be deliberately refraining from external intervention, knowing that Mainland support for a particular candidate may well provoke a backlash. But this must not be over-generalized. This sort of backlash is usually directed at a particular person or political party. In other words, If the Mainland attempts to influence voters through concrete or verbal support for Hung Hsiu-chu as a candidate or the Kuomintang as a party, it is likely to invite a backlash.

But recognizing the Republic of China by recognizing its jurisdiction, will not enable the ROC to participate in international activities, or affirm its international status. This is something everyone on Taiwan aspires to, whether blue or green. This is something this newspaper has called for repeatedly. The Mainland should respond positively, not to Hung Hsiu-chu or the KMT, but to the Republic of China and public on Taiwan. This is something the public on Taiwan would welcome with open arms.

In fact, the Republic of China's lack of international status prevents it from participating in normal international activities. The public on Taiwan feels humiliated by this. This in turn becomes the fuel rods that fuel green camp anti-China sentiment.

Drastic action is needed. The fuel rods that fuel anti-China sentiment must be withdrawn. Otherwise no expressions of goodwill toward Taiwan will have any effect. They will be contaminated by the radiation emitted by the nuclear fuel rods.

Reason Two. A second reason Beijing has failed to respond, is that Hung Hsiu-chu remains the underdog. If her election prospects continue to deteriorate, Tsai Ing-wen may become the president elect. The Mainland may not want Tsai. But it may assume it has no choice. Alas, such thinking includes two blind spots.

Blind Spot One. This is the Internet era. The chances of an overnight election upset have increased dramatically. Until the ballots are counted, anything is possible. Hung Hsiu-chu's election prospects are dim, but not because Tsai Ing-wen is so much better. They are dim because Hung is saddled with a heavy tortoise shell of anti-China sentiment. This makes it difficult for her to compete against Tsai Ing-wen, a highly mobile rabbit.

This heavy shell is not something either the Kuomintang or Hung Hsiu-chu can remove on their own. The shell can only be removed by the one who put it there. The shell can only be removed by recognizing the Republic of China. In other words, if the Mainland is willing to remove the shell, Hung Hsiu-chu may well be able to catch up. If she sprints during the coming half year, there is no reason she cannot reverse her political fortunes.

The Mainland need not support Hung Hsiu-chu. It need not help Hung Hsiu-chu win points. It need only remove her biggest handicap. It need only withdraw the fuel rods that supply anti-China sentiment with endless energy. Hung Hsiu-chu and Tsai Ing-wen can then compete on a level playing field. In other words, the more the Mainland hesitates, the heavier the burden on Hung Hsiu-chu. In effect, the Mainland is currently helping the Tsai campaign.

Blind Spot Two. Even if Tsai Ing-wen is eventually elected, the Mainland should recognize the ROC and ROC government jurisdiction. Doing so will make it harder for Tsai Ing-wen to change her tune. It will have an anchoring effect. Tsai Ing-wen has been forced by the requirements of the election to openly recognize the ROC constitutional framework. She has been forced to comply with the ROC constitutional framework. If the Mainland recognizes the ROC, it will lock Tsai Ing-wen into the Republic of China framework. She will be unable to escape its One China Constitution and its restrictions against de jure independence. This is also conducive to cross-Strait peace.

Shen Fu-hsiung said "Hung Hsiu-chu's election prospects are dim. The KMT faces total collapse. If it does collapse, who knows when it can make a comeback?" Strictly speaking, whether a candidate loses an election is not important. Whether a political party collapses is secondary. The real point is that the Republic of China must not fall. The Republic of China is the greatest common denominator on Taiwan. It is the emotional and historical cross-Strait link. It it falls, Taiwan will descend into chaos. If the link is broken, the two side will never know peace.

This is not something only the Mainland authorities must think about. This is not something only blue and green leaders must pay attention to. This is something everyone on Taiwan must understand and contemplate at length before voting in the 2016 elections.

接受中華民國 化解反中情緒

2015年07月16日 中國時報

前立法委員沈富雄，發表文章評論洪秀柱主張的「一中同表」，認為「北京可能首次了解到，他不能既要國民黨撐住台灣的局面，又要國民黨從地球上消失。」其實，「國民黨」三個字換成「中華民國」會更貼切些。這也是本報在《化解反中浪潮的最後機會點》社評中所強調，回應洪秀柱提出的「承認中華民國」，是遏止台灣內部反中氛圍四方蔓延的最後機會。

從洪秀柱自5月1日發表《對於兩岸政治論述的說帖》，提出「一中同表」與「兩岸和平協定」，至今二個多月，北京對此尚未有正面回應。這可能有幾個原因。

第一個原因，北京可能記取過去教訓，深知台灣社會對大陸介入選舉存有「反向情緒」，刻意避免外界大陸介入選舉、支持特定候選人的作文空間，唯恐引發反作用力。但這並非可以一概而論，首先，這種反向情緒的發酵，主要是針對個人或政黨。也就是說，大陸若以具體行動或口頭表達對洪秀柱個人的支持，或對國民黨的支持，試圖干預選民做出的決定，就很容易引起反作用。

但「承認中華民國」，是在治權層次的承認，可以根本解決中華民國參與國際社會的身分定位與適格性問題，這是不分藍綠、台灣人民共同希望的，也是本報一再呼籲的。大陸若做出正面回應，那不是對「洪秀柱」或「國民黨」的支持，而是對「中華民國」與「台灣人民」的善意。這一點，台灣人民必然是樂見與歡迎的。

事實上，也因為少了這一份適格性的定位，中華民國無法正常參與國際社會，讓台灣人民覺得尊嚴感受到剝奪，而成為綠營燃燒反中情緒的核子燃料棒。

若是不釜底抽薪，抽掉這根反中燃料棒，大陸對台灣釋出再多的善意，都會被這根核燃料棒散放的輻射所汙染。

北京迄今未能夠回應的第二個可能原因是，洪秀柱的選情居於劣勢，若情況繼續惡化，最後當選的可能是蔡英文，大陸方面也許不想「為蔡作嫁」。但這樣的思考，其實存在二個盲點。

其一，網路時代的選舉，一夕翻盤的機率大增，沒到開票，任何變化都是可能的。洪秀柱的劣勢，既不在她個人條件不好，也不是因為蔡英文多優秀，而是洪秀柱背著一個社會「反中情緒」的厚殼，無法和蔡英文這隻立場經常跳動的兔子賽跑。

而這個厚殼是無法靠洪秀柱或國民黨單方面就可以卸下的，卸殼還需裝殼人，而這個厚殼，只有「正視中華民國」才有可能解決。換言之，只要大陸願意卸掉殼，洪秀柱就可以以輕盈之身急起直追，半年衝刺，其實未嘗沒有逆轉的機會。

大陸不用支持洪秀柱，也不用想幫洪秀柱加分，只要幫洪秀柱拿掉這最大的「扣分項」，抽掉這根源源不絕提供反中能量的燃料棒，洪秀柱就能與蔡英文「公平」一搏。換言之，躊躇無為，反而加重洪秀柱的選舉負擔，等於變相為蔡英文助選。

其二是，就算最後是蔡英文當選，大陸若願意正視中華民國，承認中華民國的治權，也將拉高蔡英文的轉彎成本，形成另一種「定錨效應」，因為蔡英文為了選舉，已不得不說出「中華民國憲政體制論」，既然她已口頭宣示要遵守中華民國憲政體制，那麼，大陸承諾中華民國，也等於把蔡英文定著在「中華民國」框架內，不能擺脫「一中憲法」對法理台獨的限制，這也有利於維繫兩岸和平。

沈富雄說：「柱姐選情岌岌可危，國民黨更面臨全面崩盤，而且此一崩，更不知何年何月才能翻身。」嚴格來說，一個候選人選情危不危險、一個政黨會不會崩盤，其實是次要問題。真正的關鍵在於，洪秀柱選情陷危無妨，國民黨倒台就罷，但是「中華民國」不能倒，中華民國不只是台灣目前最大的公約數，也是兩岸情感與歷史記憶的連結點，公約數一破，台灣必亂，這個連結點一斷，兩岸無寧日。

這一點，不只是中共當局必須審慎思考的，不只是藍綠領導人不能漠視輕忽的，更重要的，這更是台灣全體民眾必須嚴肅體認，必須在2016選舉投票前要三思再三思的大事。

Is Concern for Severed Diplomatic Relations Mere Alarmism?

Is Concern for Severed Diplomatic Relations Mere Alarmism?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 16, 2015

Executive Summary: President Ma is visiting three Central American allies. He also returned to his alma mater, Harvard University and delivered a speech. Domestic political attention is focused on the 2016 general election. President Ma's 11th overseas visit has been described as a "quasi-farewell journey". It has not attracted much attention. But it has also left people wondering just how long can the diplomatic truce can last.

Full Text Below:

President Ma is visiting three Central American allies. He also returned to his alma mater, Harvard University and delivered a speech. Domestic political attention is focused on the 2016 general election. President Ma's 11th overseas visit has been described as a "quasi-farewell journey". It has not attracted much attention. But it has also left people wondering just how long can the diplomatic truce can last.

One month ago, former Deputy Minister of Defense Lin Chong-pin said that if the DPP wins the presidential election next year, it will probably face "an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations". Later former Vice President Annette Lu also warned that upon taking office, the next president may face "a cataclysm more terrifying than that of the Eight Immortals Dust Explosion". She predicted that a dominoes effect of severed diplomatic relations would ensue. These predictions may strike one as alarmist, but they are anything but groundless.

An "avalanche of severed diplomatic relations" and a "dominoes effect of diplomatic relations" both refer to the new president taking office next year. If cross-Strait relations change, they will affect diplomatic relations, and expand the conflagration everywhere. Contrast the relentless provocations of the Chen era with the stability of the Ma era. Cross-Strait relations and diplomatic relations were confrontational under the former but complementary under the latter. Both form and content, as well as cause and effect, were self-evident. While in Dominica, President Ma told a CNN reporter it matters not which party wins next year. Follow his strategy and cross-Strait relations will not be a problem. Rejct his strategy, and the results will be impossible to predict. Some issues may seem boring. But they are often like ducks paddling across the water. Above the water little seems to be happeningon. But below the water little duck feet are paddling away frantically. Cross-Strait relations and diplomacy are just like this.

For seven years, the Ma government used the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations to improve cross-Strait relations. Meanwhile, a diplomatic truce and flexible diplomacy improved international relations, and facilitated cross-Strait reconciliation and a diplomatic truce. Cross-Strait exchanges and flexible diplomacy proceeded simultaneoulsy. As a result, the two sides signed 21 agreements. Taipei-Washington relations and Taipei-Tokyo relations were the best they have been in decades. The public on Taiwan received visa-free treatment from 142 countries and regions. This was the direct result of a virtuous cycle in cross-Strait and diplomatic relations.

Before President Ma left, he made special reference to warnings repeatedly issued by high-level US State Department officials. Constructive Taipei-Washington relations are closely related to stable cross-Strait relations. For some time Washington-Bejing relations, Washington-Taipei relations, and cross-Strait relations have been changing. Strife in the unequal trilateral relationship has usually enhanced Washington-Beijing relations at the expense of Taipei-Washington relations. This is international realpolitik, and difficult to change. But since President Ma took office, his "peace with China, friendship with Japan, and closeness with the US" policy, and later "peace with the Mainland, friendship with Japan, and valuing of the US" policy, gradually allowed the Washinton-Beijing-Taipei triangular relationship to cease being a zero sum game. It allowed all three relationships to imrove simultaneously.

Stable cross-Strait relations and increased trust have given us a cross-Strait peace dividend that has extended to foreign relations. On the one hand, diplomatic truce and flexible diplomacy are based on stable and peaceful cross-Strait relations. On the other hand, Washington believes that Taipei will not make trouble. It knows that Beijing trusts Taipei to honor the diplomatic truce. Therefore, when cross-Strait relations remain stable, Taipei-Washington relations improve. Washington has also found that stable cross-Strait relations and improved Taipei-Washington relations do not conflict with improved Washington-Beijing relations. Intentionally and unintentionally, they serve as an important bargaining chip that leads to greater regional balance.

From another perspective, Washington has linked cross-Strait relations to Taipei-Washington relations. That means that under certain circumstances, say during the Chen Shui-bian era, Taiwan may suffer the indignity of being "co-managed" by Washington and Beijing. Washington-Beijing co-management of Taiwan is humiliating. But "preventive diplomacy" prevents reckless behavior by Taiwan, and prevents destructive consequences. Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States. She promoted cross-Strait relations "under the ROC constitutional framework". This was why she obtained Washington's approval. Hung Shiu-chu's One China, Same Interpretation is hard to explain. Returning to One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus puts Washington at ease.

But cross-Strait relations and relations with our diplomatic allies lack the competitive nature of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei trilateral relationship. Cross-Strait relations and relations with our diplomatic allies are increasingly influenced by the political and economic strength of the Beijing authorities. Naturally diplomatic relations are even more heavily influenced by cross-Strait relations. Annette Lu suspects that "diplomatic truce" will turn into "diplomatic shock". Over the past seven years mutual trust increased under a shared political premise. This led to a virtuous cycle in cross-Strait and diplomatic relations. But obviously any future loss of cross-Strait trust is bound to impact cross-Strait and diplomatic relations. It is bound to lead to a vicious cycle, to defections, poaching, and the inevitable renewal of checkbook diplomacy. The "avalanche of severed diplomatic relations" may well become reality.

The Mainland has risen. Relations with our diplomatic allies are increasingly influenced by cross-Strait relations. President Ma's trip includes transiting the United States. This shows that the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations has sustained cross-Strait relations and facilitated diplomatic relations. Faced with a crisis in diplomatic relations, Hung Shiu-chu knows she must eliminate the danger by adhering to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interrpetations. Tsai Ing-wen, sad to say, remains as "content free" as ever. She merely parrots the mantra, "the ruling and opposition parties must agree to work together". Will that really work?

「雪崩式的斷交」是否危言聳聽？

2015-07-16聯合報

馬總統出訪中美洲三友邦，並返回母校哈佛大學演講。國內政治焦點已轉向二○一六，馬總統的第十一次出訪被形容為「準畢旅」，或許已經吸引不了太多關注。然而，此行卻也留下一個更大的懸念：這種外交陣線無戰事的太平景象，究竟還能維持多久？

一個多月前，國防部前軍政副部長林中斌表示，如果明年民進黨贏得大選，執政後可能將面對「雪崩式斷交」；其後，前副總統呂秀蓮也警告，下屆總統上任後，台灣可能會面臨「比八仙塵爆萬倍可怕」的「骨牌性斷交」危機。這些說法看似危言聳聽，卻非空穴來風。

「雪崩式斷交」或「骨牌性斷交」，都是指明年新總統上任後，若兩岸關係生變，必波及我外交關係，而致烽火遍野。對比扁政府時期的躁動和馬政府任內的穩健，兩岸關係與外交關係相剋相侮或相生相成，表裡因果不言而喻。馬總統在多明尼加接受ＣＮＮ記者訪問時提到，明年不論哪一個黨候選人當選，只要遵循他的策略，兩岸關係不會有問題；但如果不這麼做，結果就很難說。的確，有些事情看似無趣，卻是必須鴨子划水慢慢琢磨，兩岸與外交的布局即是如此。

七年來，馬政府以「九二共識、一中各表」推動兩岸關係，同時以「外交休兵、活路外交」推展國際關係，兩岸和解與外交休兵同步，兩岸交流與活路外交並進。因此，在兩岸陸續簽訂二十一個協議的同時，台美、台日關係也進入數十年來最佳狀態，台灣民眾還享有一百四十二個國家與地區的免簽待遇。這不能不歸功於兩岸關係與外交關係所產生的良性循環。

馬總統出訪前，特別引述美國務院高層不斷提到，台美關係的建設性結果，與兩岸關係的穩健發展有很大的關係。長期以來，美中、美台與兩岸關係已日益發展成一種不等邊的三角關係，而三組關係相互傾軋的結果，美中關係的提升通常是以犧牲台美關係為代價。此一國際政治的現實，迄難改變。但馬總統上任後，不論是第一任提出的「和中、友日、親美」，或第二任強調的「和陸、友日、重美」，七年來逐步讓美中台三角關係打破零和賽局，三組雙邊關係出現同步提升。

可以說，兩岸關係的穩定發展與互信積累，已讓兩岸「和平紅利」溢出到對外關係領域。一方面，外交休兵與活路外交，都建立在兩岸關係穩定和平發展的基礎上；另一方面，華府相信台灣不會製造麻煩，更知道北京信任台北的外交休兵，因此，在兩岸關係穩定發展的同時，台美關係也得以大幅提升。美國更發現，兩岸關係穩定與台美關係改善，非但不影響美中關係的進一步開拓，更能在有意無意間作為平衡區域情勢的重要籌碼。

從另一個角度看，美國把兩岸關係與台美關係連結，也意味著在某種情況下，台灣可能遭遇如扁政府後期難堪的「美中共管」窘境。「美中共管」儘管難堪，但在「預防外交」下，台灣不易暴衝，也就不致演為毀滅式決絕的地步。蔡英文訪美，能以「中華民國憲政體制下推動兩岸關係」之說，贏得美國稱許，道理在此；而洪秀柱從不易解釋的「一中同表」回歸「九二共識、一中各表」，美國自然放心。

但是，在兩岸與我國各邦交國之間，不僅缺乏美中台般的三角競合關係，中共挾其政經實力也早已深入我國友邦，因此我外交關係受兩岸關係的影響當然更深更廣。呂秀蓮質疑「外交休兵」變成「外交休克」，事實上，七年來兩岸在共同政治基礎上累積互信，從而創造了兩岸關係與外交關係的良性循環，卻是顯見的事實。而如果未來兩岸互信基礎流失，兩岸關係與外交關係勢必陷入惡性循環，倒戈、挖牆腳、金錢外交的惡鬥必然再起，則「雪崩式斷交」未始不會成為現實。

隨著大陸崛起，我國與各友邦的邦誼愈來愈難繞過兩岸關係；馬總統此行，包括過境美國，說明「九二共識、一中各表」，撐起了兩岸關係，從而也撐開了外交關係。面對斷交危機，現已知洪秀柱至少有「九二共識、一中各表」解危；蔡英文卻「空心」如故，直呼「朝野一致共同努力」。這樣，就能奏效嗎？

Three Things Wang Jin-pyng Can Do for the KMT

Three Things Wang Jin-pyng Can Do for the KMT
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2015

Executive Summary: Eric Chu went south to persuade "nativist faction" party members not to leave the party. Hung Hsu-chu has reverted to using the low key One China, Different Interpretations phrasing. Wang Jin-pyng has ordered grassroots party members in Kaohsiung not to sign a "Stop Hung Hsiu-chu" petition being circulated. He has said party unity comes first. These three developments show that the KMT is attempting to prevent the party's disintegration, and is attempting to unite behind a common goal. Wang Jin-pyng has finally asked supporters to exercise restraint. This is a development worth noting.

Full Text Below:

Eric Chu went south to persuade "nativist faction" party members not to leave the party. Hung Hsu-chu has reverted to using the low key One China, Different Interpretations phrasing. Wang Jin-pyng has ordered grassroots party members in Kaohsiung not to sign a "Stop Hung Hsiu-chu" petition being circulated. He has said party unity comes first. These three developments show that the KMT is attempting to prevent the party's disintegration, and is attempting to unite behind a common goal. Wang Jin-pyng has finally asked supporters to exercise restraint. This is a development worth noting.

On the 19th, the KMT will hold its National Party Congress. Will Hung Hsiu-chu's nomination be disrupted by internal dissent and physical altercations? The outside world really does not care. If the party descends into chaos, yet presents a united front to the world, it will merely provoke laughter. Are KMT members really indifferent to their own party's image, future, and rise or fall? Do they really think they can capriciously sing a different tune, undermine party unity, or even walk out? If so, do they really think they can still win public support? More importantly, what will happen if they are afraid to fight? If they desert the party? If they undermine party unity? The KMT is hanging on by its nails. If the party can unite, and acknowledge its plight in the larger scheme of things, it might be able to reverse its political fortunes.

The attention of the outside world is focused on the party leaders and Hung Hsu-chu. But Wang Jin-pyng is also in a pickle. Wang Jin-pyng is 74. Yet he still has political ambitions. He has forfeited the opportunity to run for president in 2016. But the KMT is in trouble. If Wang Jin-pyng plays his hand as party unifier well, he can resolve his own embarrassment and also prevent the Kuomintang from disintegrating. If he does this, he can change his political legacy in one stroke of the pen. Given current conditions, Wang Jin-pyng can do at least three things for the KMT.

One. He can publicly call on nativist factions to cease their rebellion and defection from the party. He can call on them to unite in the face of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Some nativist faction members reacted spontaneously. Some expressed dissatisfaction with the Ma government. But Wang Jin-pyng is their leader. If he issues a public statement, this motley crew will inevitably fall in line. Wang Jin-pyng has repeatedly declared his loyalty to the party, even though his party membership was revoked for influence peddling. He remains determined to fight to the end. Now that the KMT finds itself in dire straits, he can issue a clarion call to supporters. A simple task. Is there any reason to hesitate?

Two. Wang Jin-pyng must take part in the regional legislative elections. He must seek a 6th consecutive term as Legislative Yuan Speaker. The Kuomintang Party Constitution stipulates that legislators without portfolio can serve only two consecutive terms. During the last election this rule was amended to make a special exception for Wang Jin-pyng. If this rule is violated again and again, it ceases to be a rule at all. Wang Jin-pyng is Legislative Yuan Speaker. He is familiar with legislative business. No one else compares. If he loses his position as speaker because he is not nominated as legislator without portfolio, that will amount to more than a personal loss. It will also constitute a major loss for the KMT. Under the circumstances, Wang Jin-pyng must run in the regional legislative elections. This will ensure the continuation of his political career. The KMT must respect his wishes. It must make appropriate arrangements for his candidacy and campaign on his behalf. It must ensure that he is re-elected.

Three. Wang Jin-pyng's re-election to the Legislative Yuan is the goal. An even more important goal for the KMT is retaining a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Only then can it succeed. Wang Jin-pyng's next move remains unknown. Will he incite the nativist faction and pro-Wang faction? Will that lead to blue camp members jumping ship? If Wang is involved in regional legislative elections, he should be able to generate a coat tails effect. At the very least he can help the blue camp resolve its internal divisions and overcome its fear of fighting. If the KMT revises its party constitution to ensure that he becomes a legislator without portfolio, it will undermine his presidential dreams. He will yet again miss a golden opportunity.

In recent months rumors have emerged regarding a Soong/Wang ticket or Wang/Soong ticket. Wang Jin-pyng is too shrewd to believe either. Once he takes that step, Wang Jin-pyng will self-destruct. His vows of "party loyalty" will be discredited. He is likely to blacken the final four decades of his political career. Such a move would obviously not be worth the price paid

Despite four decades in politics, Wang Jin-pyng's legacy remains unsettled, mainly due to suspicions of black gold corruption, his nativist orientation, and his politlcal trickery. The result? His image remains that of a stereotypical nativist politician. He may be able to win the support of nativist factions within the Kuomintang. He may even win friends across the blue-green divide. But his love of ambiguity makes it difficult for the new generation of comrades with political principles to identify with him. In any event, time is running out. Wang Jin-pying's choices are limited. The Kuomintang has its back to the cliff. This is a critical moment. Wang Jin-pyng can change not just his own image, but his legacy within the KMT. It's ironic. Wang Jin-pyng now has a chance to contribute to the party, even more than Ma Ying-jeou. The question is whether he realizes it.

In February, Eric Chu decided not to continue his lawsuit against Wang Jin-pyng. He did so for the sake of party unity. This stopped the hemorraging. Wang Jin-pyng now has a chance to repay this goodwill gesture. As a veteran politician, he should behave accordingly. He should facilitate rather than attempt to obstruct Hung, especially after shouting so many times that "Duty commands me!"

王金平可以為國民黨做的三件事

2015-07-15聯合報

朱立倫南下會晤本土派安撫退黨潮，洪秀柱兩岸立場低調回到一中各表，王金平則對高雄基層黨員發動「卡柱連署書」下達禁簽令，要求以團結為重。這三線發展，說明國民黨正在分頭收拾崩散的局面，設法凝聚共同的目標。王金平終於出手要求支持者克制，值得矚目。

國民黨十九日的全代會，是否能在沒有雜音及鬧場的情況下通過洪秀柱的提名，外界其實並不在意。如果黨內離心離德，對外卻要強作團結一心狀，反而讓人覺得可笑。如果國民黨員對自己政黨的形象、前途、興衰絲毫不以為意，覺得可以任意唱反調、扯後腿、甚至拂袖而去，這樣的政黨如何贏得人民支持？重要的是，歷經怯戰、退黨、磨合數波衝擊，國民黨已處在危崖邊緣，此時，黨員若能齊心正視大局，未來才有止跌回升的可能。

正當外界把所有焦點放在黨中央和洪秀柱身上，其實，王金平也處於一個特殊的「解鈴」位置。今年七十四歲的王金平，仍有廉頗未老之志。儘管角逐二○一六總統大位的機會已失，但以今天國民黨的處境，王金平若能善用他的圓熟手腕扮演黨內的黏著劑，不僅能化解自己找不到戰場的尷尬，也能挽救國民黨分崩離析的處境；果真如此的話，自將有助於為王金平的爭議政治生涯寫下決定性的一筆。以目前的情勢看，王金平可以為國民黨做的事情至少有三：

第一，公開呼籲本土派停止造反或退黨行動，團結面對二○一六的總統及立委選舉。儘管有些本土派的造反是出於個人自發行為，或者是針對馬政府之不滿而來，但以王金平本土派的龍頭地位，一旦公開喊話，各路散兵游勇必然聽命歸隊。王金平屢次宣示是忠誠黨員，即使因關說案遭到撤銷黨籍，也不惜一切要力爭到底；如今國民黨面臨危殆，他站出來向支持者登高一呼，不過是舉手之勞，還有什麼好猶豫的？

第二，王金平應該選擇參加區域立委選舉，並藉此尋求立法院長的六連任。依國民黨黨章規定，不分區立委只能連任一次；上屆選舉，這條規則已經為王金平破例作了修改，此例若一破再破，即不成規定。然而，以王金平久任議長之尊，嫻熟議事、縱橫捭闔無人能及；若因未獲不分區提名而失去院長寶座，不僅是他個人損失，對國民黨更是重大損失。在這種情況下，王金平唯有參加區域立委選舉，才能延續政治生命；而國民黨必須尊重王金平的意願，為他作出最適當的選區安排並傾力輔選，務必助其當選。

第三，王金平的參選除以爭取連任立法院長為目標，更應爭取維持國民黨在立法院的多數席次，才有可能達陣。王金平的動向至今不明，除引發本土派及擁王派的騷動，更造成藍軍的跳船潮；他若參與區域立委選舉，應能發揮不少「母雞帶小雞」的作用，至少化解藍軍當下的分裂及怯戰危機。但他如果依然要等國民黨為他再修黨綱以便參與不分區，其結局，可能和他的總統夢一樣，再度毀於錯失良機。

近月來幾度傳出「宋王配」或「王宋配」的消息，以王金平的智慧，傳聞應無可能成真。因為，只要跨出那一步，王金平不僅將自毀「忠黨」的誓言，最後更可能使他縱橫政壇四十年的英名以長黑作收，顯然得不償失。

四十年的政治生涯，王金平的角色至今仍然爭議未定。主要原因是，他的黑金傳聞、本土色彩及長袖善舞，使他的形象一直無法從傳統鄉土政治人物的窠臼中破繭而出。即使是在國民黨內，他雖獲有本土派的全力支持，甚至以超乎尋常的交友手段贏得跨藍綠的人和，但他喜好行走於曖昧地帶的作風，讓懷有現代政黨政治理念的新世代同志對他難以認同。但無論如何，時間能給王金平的選擇已經不多，而形勢對國民黨的壓迫也已來到懸崖邊上；在這關鍵時刻，王金平可以做點真實的事改變自己的形象，也改變自己在國民黨的歷史定位。說來諷刺，王金平此刻可以為黨貢獻力氣的機會，似乎還比馬英九多一點，問題就在他懂不懂得把握。

二月間，朱立倫決定王金平的黨籍案不再上訴，這是為了黨的團結，至少是為了止血；這個善意，王金平今天也許有機會回報一下。作為一個身經百戰的政治人物，要顯示自己真正的分量，應該是用來「促成」，而不是用來「阻擋」；尤其，在喊了那麼多次「義不容辭」之後。

Three Things the KMT and Hung Hsiu-chu Must Do

Three Things the KMT and Hung Hsiu-chu Must Do
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2015

Executive Summary: After some haggling, Hung Hsiu-chu has agreed to stop using the expression "One China, Same Interpretation" and to revert to using the party's "One China, Different Interpretations" and "1992 consensus". She will then become the official KMT presidential nominee at the National Party Congress, on July 19. The storm has temporarily subsided. Hung Hsiu-chu must now rally supporters inside and outside the party. The KMT must provide firm organizational backing. It must do so as soon as possible. It must not continue to "wait and see" .

Full Text Below:

After some haggling, Hung Hsiu-chu has agreed to stop using the expression "One China, Same Interpretation" and to revert to using the party's "One China, Different Interpretations" and "1992 consensus". She will then become the official KMT presidential nominee at the National Party Congress, on July 19. The storm has temporarily subsided. Hung Hsiu-chu must now rally supporters inside and outside the party. The KMT must provide firm organizational backing. It must do so as soon as possible. It must not continue to "wait and see" .

At the moment, the KMT is doing little to prepare. Its policy seems to be "Let's wait until Hung Hsiu-chu is officially nominated, then we'll see". Nor has the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign taken advantage of its momentum to win over rural blue camp and centrist voters. It has wasted a great deal of time. The election campaign is actually being waged on two levels. Dissent within the party is rampant. Under the circumstances, Hung can take advantage of outside support to force party dissidents to toe the line. If Hung lacks outside support, she will be forced to concede defeat. For now KMT leaders have adopted a "wait and see" posture. Hung Hsiu-chu's campaign strategy is unclear. But some naysayers are acting like buffoons, and stabbing Hung Hsiu-chi in the back. They are the main reason Hung Hsiu-chu has lost momentum.

Does the KMT want to build momentum? Does Hung Hsiu-chu want her campaign to get on track and make a breakthrough? If so, the KMT and the Hung campaign must do at least three things before the National Party Congress.

One. Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT must establish a clearer and more effective division of labor to avoid a repeat of the One China, Same Interpretation dispute. Cross-Strait policy has long been a key issue in blue vs. green national elections. Ma Ying-jeou won twice because voters approved of his cross-Strait policy. Hung Hsiu-chu's One China, Same Interpretation policy is not wrong. But it is untested and hard to explain. This presents problems. Hung Hsiu-chu will cease using the term One China, Same Interpretation. That is a pragmatic compromise. But once Hung has taken a firm stand, she must go on the offensive. She must not permit herself to be caught defending a position. That is no way to win points.

On other public issues, the KMT can adopt a multifront attack strategy. Breakthroughs should be spearheaded by Hung Hsiu-chu. But during policy debates the party headquarters and think tanks can play the role of flankers and guards, providing her with ammunition and support. Hung Hsiu-chu's style is incisive, straightforward, and heartfelt. It is highly effective against "Content Free Tsai's" mealy mouthed equivocations and evasions. But when green camp spokespersons lash out at Hung, the party headquarters and think tanks must stand behind her. This division of labor must be quickly established and put into action.

Two. The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must establish its own "command and control center" as soon as possible. Before her official nomination, her campaign was led by ad hoc campaign manager Lee Sichuan. But Lee is also KMT Secretary-General. He cannot devote all of his time to her campaign. Also, he may be adept at administration but he is not an experienced campaign manager. His time is limited. One cannot expect him to juggle party and campaign responsibilities.

The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign was in chaos following her breakthrough in the polls, mainly because it lacked a command and control center. As a result, it could not set the agenda. Hung Hsiu-chu must regroup as soon as possible. She must establish a command and control center that can locate resources and plan strategies. She must recruit someone with extensive campaign experience, as well as communication and coordination skills. That someone must communicate not just with KMT leaders, but also with the Ma administration, with KMT legislators, and even local KMT officials. Only then can the Hung campaign get back on track in the shortest possible time and resume battle stations.

Three. The Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must broaden participation. In particular, it must allow those with different voices to join the team. So far the Hung campaign has added only two spokespersons. The rest are all old faces from the primaries. Elected representatives inside and outside the party who support Hung Hsiu-chu can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The Hung campaign is too incestuous. It is unable to recruit outside talent. Hung Hsiu-chu has been criticized for drawing support solely from northern Taiwan. Hung's expertise is limited to educational issues. She even lacks the ability to communicate policy. This is the reason why.

Hung Hsiu-chu is Deputy Legislative Speaker. She is running for president, a much higher office. Past talent pools and social circles are insufficient to meet her needs. She desperately needs a swift infusion of new blood. Decision-making requires diversity. The Hung campaign must not be a one-man show. It must be tolerant and attentive to different points of view. This will minimize poor decisions attributable to blind spots. As a leader, Hung must enable people from different realms and different ideologies to take part in her campaign. Only this will convince voters that she has the character to be president.

Accomplishing these three things in short order will not be easy. Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen is playing a waiting game. She has the DPP at her beck and call, and can use it in service of her presidential campaign. If the KMT and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign cannot cooperate, the election will be lost without a fight. This is why Hung Hsiu-chu and Kuomintang leaders must cooperate. Blue camp cooperation may not ensure victory. But if the blue camp falls apart, will it even survive?

國民黨和洪秀柱立即該做的三件事 2015-07-14聯合報 經過一番協商，洪秀柱不再提「一中同表」，並同意回歸黨的「一中各表」和「九二共識」立場；接下來，她將在七月十九日全國黨代表大會成為國民黨正式的總統提名人。風波雖暫平息，但洪秀柱要如何重新凝聚黨內外民意支持，國民黨要如何提供她有力的組織後援，則必須快馬加鞭進行，不可再觀望猶疑。 國民黨目前其實看不到太多備戰氣氛，各方態勢，似乎抱著一切「等洪秀柱正式提名再說」的心情。至於洪秀柱陣營，也未把握此一空檔積極造勢，主動下鄉爭取藍營及中間選民的支持，平白浪費了不少時間。事實上，選舉造勢是兩個不同層次的經營：在黨內雜音很多的情況下，候選人可以藉外部支持力量的營造，來促迫黨內異議者的歸附；否則，如果缺乏外部支持，就只好自己向反對者稱臣。但目前看來，國民黨中央心存觀望，洪秀柱陣營戰略不清，倒是一些唱反調的跳樑小丑眉飛色舞，見縫插針，這是洪秀柱氣勢下墜的主因。 從大局著眼，國民黨若希望打出一場有氣勢的選戰，洪秀柱若希望選戰能有節奏地開展和突破，至少有三件事，是國民黨和洪營在全代會前必須先努力做到的。 第一件事，在戰略上，洪秀柱和國民黨必須建立比較清楚有效的攻守分工，避免重演「一中同表」的類似爭執。兩岸政策的攻防，一直是藍綠在全國性選舉的重要議題，馬英九兩次勝選都與兩岸政策較受選民肯定有關。洪秀柱的「一中同表」主張，並非不可取，但可行性未經驗證及不易說明清楚，都是問題。洪秀柱不再提「一中同表」，是務實的妥協；但站穩立場之後，應適時向對手發動攻勢，不要一味陷於自辯，那無助於加分。 在其他民眾關心的公共議題上，洪營和國民黨可以採取「分進合擊」的方式：在點的突破上，由洪秀柱扮演先鋒；在政策架構的論辯上，則由黨部和智庫扮演側翼及後衛，提供彈藥支援。洪秀柱的特色是潑辣、直白、感性，用來戳破空心蔡的模糊、閃躲，頗有作用；但當綠營辯士出動時，就需要黨部和智庫的聲援。這類分工模式，必須設法建立，且迅速啟動。 第二件事，是洪秀柱的團隊必須盡快找到自己的「大腦中樞」。在正式提名前，是由李四川「暫代」競選辦公室總幹事。但李四川一則身兼國民黨秘書長，不可能全力投入辦公室事務；二則他長於行政事務，並非選戰老手，在短時間內要黨務和選戰兩頭兼顧，恐怕力有未逮。 民調破磚後，洪秀柱的選戰節奏顯得雜亂無章，主因就在缺乏作戰「大腦」，因此缺乏創造話題的能力。洪秀柱必須盡快覓得能夠整合各項競選資源，並且規劃選戰策略、步驟的「大腦」。這樣的人選，除了必須有豐富的選戰經驗，也須具備溝通、協調能力。而溝通的對象，不能只限於黨中央，更包括府院執政團隊、黨籍立委乃至地方人士。如此，才能讓選舉團隊在最短的時間內步入正軌，就作戰位置。 第三件事，是擴大團隊的參與，尤其是要容納「不一樣的聲音」到團隊內。到目前為止，洪秀柱的團隊除了加進兩位發言人，其餘幾乎都仍是初選階段的老面孔，黨內外為洪秀柱衝鋒陷陣的民代、同志屈指可數。主要原因，就是其團隊過於封閉，未能積極覓才使然。有人批評洪秀柱支持者「只限北部」、洪的專精領域「只限教育議題」，甚至「政策缺乏溝通」等，原因皆在此。 洪秀柱由立法院副院長躍居準總統參選人，層次大不相同，過去的人才庫、社交圈顯已不敷所需，必須快速大量注入新血。從決策的多元性考量，團隊不應該是一言堂，要有傾聽不同意見的氣度，才能降低決策盲點。從領導者的高度考量，必須要能夠吸納不同領域甚至意識形態者加入團隊，才能夠說服所有的選民，自己具有當總統的格局。 要在短時間內完成這三件事，並不容易。尤其別忘了，蔡英文不僅是以逸待勞，而且是手握舉黨之力為自己輔選；如果國民黨和洪秀柱無法迅速擺脫磨合不順的困境，這場選戰可以說已未戰先衰。正因如此，洪秀柱和國民黨中央更應開誠布公，攜手合作。試想：藍軍合作都未必打得贏，分裂的話，豈有活路？

Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT: An Anti-Sinophobia Alliance

Hung Hsiu-chu and the KMT: An Anti-Sinophobia Alliance
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2015

Executive Summary:
Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have revolved around reunification vs. independence. They have undergone three stages: war, cease fire, and peace. Prior to the 1990s the two sides were at war. During the early 1990s, cross-Strait relations improved. The result was a "fragile stability". In 1994 however, Lee Teng-hui published his "Sorrow of the Taiwanese", inciting separatist sentiment. Lee distorted history, and misrepresented One China in all respects: history, geography, culture, descent. It repudiated the Republic of China. He shattered the fragile stability. Lee Teng-hui adopted a "covert conflict" policy. His successor Chen Shui-bian adopted an "overt conflict" strategy.

Full Text Below:

Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have revolved around reunification vs. independence. They have undergone three stages: war, cease fire, and peace. Prior to the 1990s the two sides were at war. During the early 1990s, cross-Strait relations improved. The result was a "fragile stability". In 1994 however, Lee Teng-hui published his "Sorrow of the Taiwanese", inciting separatist sentiment. Lee distorted history, and misrepresented One China in all respects: history, geography, culture, descent. It repudiated the Republic of China. He shattered the fragile stability. Lee Teng-hui adopted a "covert conflict" policy. His successor Chen Shui-bian adopted an "overt conflict" strategy.

Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. He adopted the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations as the basis of his cross-Strait policy. Cross-Strait exchanges returned to their former "fragile stability". In 2011 Ma tried to take cross-Strait relations a step further, toward peace. He proposed a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. But internal concerns on Taiwan increased, and his approval ratings plummeted. Ma responded with his Ten Major Assurances, and retracted his proposal for a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. Since then Ma Ying-jeou has reverted to a "Go Slow" strategy.

Unfortunately a Go Slow strategy is no longer adequate. Cross-Strait relations are in the deep end of the pool. His appeals has lost their freshness. Especially after last year's 3/18 Sunflower Student Movement. The STA was blocked. Agreement on the MTA and cross-Strait representative offices could not be reached. Internal opposition to cross-Strait agreements grew. Even people on the Mainland expressed dissatisfaction. All of these developments negatively impacted the future of cross-Strait relations. The seven year long fragile stability between the two sides was now at risk.

Hung Hsiu-chu resolved to run for president. She proposed a One China, Same Interpretation and a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement as the main plank in her cross-Strait policy platform. A closer look reveals the constructive vision of its internal logic. Basically it is an attempt to accelerate Ma Ying-jeou's Go Slow cross-Strait policy. It is an attempt to strengthen the peace in the hope that cross-Straits political relations can successfully negotiate the deep end of the pool.

Unfortunately the use of the term "same" in One China, Same Interpretation, has raised concerns within the KMT. Add to this Hung Hsiu-chu's remark that "the Republic of China does not exist", which was misinterpreted and taken out of context by the media. These gave KMT leaders superficial justifications for opposing Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait policy, and for demanding that she cease talking about One China, Same Interpretation. The Kuomintang and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign are now deadlocked.

One China, Same Interpretation, and One China, Different Interpretations, both affirm One China. But One China, Same Interpretation affirms that One China is neither the Mainland nor Taiwan. As the US State Department put it: The United States accepts the One China Principle, but the United States has its own definition. One China, Different Interpretations and One China, Same Interpretations are not incompatible. The KMT and the Hung campaign need not get stuck on the wording. They should return to the essence of the concept.

President Ma's cross-Strait policy is based on "noit repudiating each other's sovereignty and acknowledging each other's jurisdiction." President Ma said that the two sides' sovereignty claims overlap. They include areas the other side claims. Therefore they cannot recognize each other's sovereignty. But they need not repudiate each other's jurisidiction. This amounts to a pragmatic recognition of the status quo. This means that President Ma does not reject the future recognition of each other's sovereignty. In fact, based on comments he made on other occasions, he would like to see recognition of each other's jurisdiction. This is precisely what One China, Same Interpretation proposes. It proposes overlapping sovereignty with separate constitutional jurisdictions. It is essentially a clearer representation of the goal pursued by One China, Different Interpretations: the non-repudiation of each other's sovereignty and the recognition of each other's jurisdiction. Hung Hsiu-chu need not insist on One China, Same Interpretation. She can simply stress substance and specific goals. The KMT meanwhile, should cease its pettiness and help Hung Hsiu-chu establish firm principles on which the KMT can operate.

Both sides should take a step back. Doing so would lead to three results. One. It would enable the KMT to finally reach internal agreement. Once it has done so and regrouped, it can then lead public opinion. It can persuade the public on Taiwan to identify with the rise of Mainland China. It can persuade the public on Taiwan to examine cross-Strait relations and compare the two sides' relative strength. It can demand that Tsai Ing-wen explain her deliberately incomprehensible, covertly confronational cross-Strait policy. It can demand that Tsai Ing-wen explain how she intends to ensure cross-Strait peace when she rejects the 1992 Consensus and clings to Sinophobia. 

Two. It can further persuade Beijing to recognize the Republic of China's jurisdiction. Meanwhile, those of us on Taiwan may wish to adopt the same attitude towards the People's Republic of China. This would promote political dialogue, remove obstacles to the resolution of more sensitive cross-Strait issues. Successful dialogue would win public support. The two sides could then sign a peace agreement, as equals in their jurisdictional authority. Given the Republic of China's jurisdictional authority, it could participate in international activities. These objectives once achieved, would lead to a third result, the long-held desire of the public on Taiwan to experience international dignity. In one fell swoop, this would remove the key reason for Sinophobia on Taiwan.

As a June 27 editorial in the China Times pointed out, Hung Hsiu-chu's 2016 election campaign must have a higher purpose. It must rally the forces opposed to Sinophobia. Same Interpretation or Different Interpretation makes no difference. The Kuomintang and the Hung Hsiu-chu campaign must sort out their cross-Strait policy differences. Time is short. They cannot afford to fall apart. They cannot afford to become an object of outside ridicule. They have already settled on the nomination procedure. They must not allow internal dissent to undermine their opposition to Tsai Ing-wen's Sinophobia.

洪秀柱、國民黨應號召「反反中」聯盟

2015年07月13日 中國時報

從1949年起，兩岸關係始終以所謂「統獨」問題為主軸，並存在「鬥、緩、和」3種戰略路線。1990年代以前是「鬥」的階段，1990年代初期，兩岸關係一度朝向良性發展，形成「脆弱的穩定」。但1994年李登輝發表「生為台灣人的悲哀」，挑動分離意識，將「一個中國」異化為「歷史、地理、文化、血緣」概念，而不再是中華民國。自此，兩岸的「脆弱穩定」實質結束。李登輝採取「暗鬥」策略，接下來執政的陳水扁則採取「明鬥」策略。

馬英九在2008年上台以後，以「九二共識、一中各表」為兩岸論述核心，兩岸交流大開，兩岸關係回到「脆弱的穩定」。2011年馬英九曾嘗試讓兩岸關係推向「和」的階段，提議簽署「兩岸和平協議」，但台灣內部疑慮升起、民調下滑，遂提出了「十大保證」，收回兩岸和平協議主張。自此，馬英九重回「緩」的策略。

「緩」的策略顯然無法因應進入深水區的兩岸關係，論述號召力也出現疲乏現象。特別是去年318的太陽花運動後，服貿協議受阻、貨貿及互設辦事處均難定案。不只台灣內部產生了阻礙兩岸協議簽署的力量，大陸民間也開始出現不滿聲浪，這些都對未來兩岸關係的續進，產生了負面因子。兩岸7年以來的「脆弱穩定」似乎難保。

洪秀柱決心參選，提出「一中同表」及「兩岸和平協議」作為兩岸政策主調。細究其內在邏輯與概念理路，有其宏觀性與建設性，基本上，是企圖在馬英九「緩」的兩岸政策路線上，強化「和」的積極因子，希望未來有利兩岸共渡政治深水區。

然而，一中同表中的「同」字引起國民黨內部疑慮，加上洪秀柱談話中一句不周延的「中華民國不存在」，被媒體斷章取義曲解及綠營的抹紅操作，給了國民黨對洪秀柱兩岸政策開槍的正當理由。要不要續談「一中同表」，國民黨與洪秀柱似乎卡住了。

「一中各表」與「一中同表」都是在表述「一中」，只是「一中同表」進一步表述了兩岸相同的「一中」，但這個 「一中」既不是大陸的，也不是台灣的，正如美國國務院中國政策的表述：美國接受「一中原則」，但美國有自己的定義。「一中各表」與「一中同表」並非不相容的對立概念，國民黨與洪陣營不需要執著於文字，應回歸到理念的本質。

馬總統的兩岸政策核心是「主權互不承認、治權互不否認」，馬總統曾說，這是因為兩岸主權主張相互重疊，涵蓋彼此全部領域，無法相互承認主權；但互不否認對方的治權，則是務實的承認現狀。言下之意，馬總統並未排斥更進一步的「主權互不否認」，而觀諸其在多個場合的談話，他其實樂見「治權相互承認」。這正是「一中同表」主張：「主權宣示重疊、憲政治權分立」的精髓。可以這麼說，一中同表更清楚表述了一中各表想要追求的目標：「主權互不否認，治權相互承認。」因此，洪秀柱不需要繼續堅持滿分的「一中同表」，可以回到實質面去闡述具體目標。國民黨也應收起小鼻子小眼睛，協助洪秀柱建立其與國民黨核心理念的強固銜接。

「各退一步」將可以帶來三個效果。第一，可以在國民黨內部找到論述交集點，融一整合後，就可以帶動社會對中國的崛起、兩岸實力的對比及兩岸關係的再思考，並以此要求與蔡英文「表面模糊、隱含對抗」的兩岸立場進行辯論，質問蔡英文，不接受九二共識、不放棄仇中反中思維，要如何維持兩岸和平發展。

第二，可以進一步要求大陸承認中華民國治權。同時，我方可承諾願採取同樣的態度，承認中華人民共和國的治權。這不但可以順利開啟政治對話、掃除兩岸深水區障礙。對話順利、獲得人民支持，兩岸可以平等的治權實體身分簽訂和平協議，並共議如何在中華民國治權基礎上，共同參與國際社會。這些目標一旦達成，將帶來第三個效果：實現台灣民眾長久的心願，找回台灣人民參與國際的尊嚴後，一舉拆掉台灣反中氛圍的核心燃料。

《中國時報》6月27日社論曾指出，洪秀柱打2016年大選應該有一個更高的定位，就是號召「反反中」大聯盟。同表、各表本無大異，國民黨與洪秀柱陣營要好好整合兩岸論述，時間無多，不要再「庸人自亂」，不但讓外界看笑話，更不值得的是，好不容易確定提名程序後，卻因內部整合不足而減損了「反反中」、「反仇中」聯盟對蔡英文的戰力。