KMT: Unity Prior to the Election, Reform Afterwards

KMT: Unity Prior to the Election, Reform Afterwards
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2015

Executive Summary: The chief justification for replacing Hung Hsiu-chu was her "one China, same interpretation" slogan. Many assumed it was beyond the Kuomintang pale. In fact, "one China, same interpretation" is not the least bit radical. It merely reduces the ambiguity within the 1992 consensus. Negative spin control has made current KMT cross-Strait  policy little different from Tsai Ing-wen's.

Full Text Below:

The result of yesterday's KMT plenary session was no surprise. The vast majority of party representatives and Standing Committee members voted to replace Hung Hsiu-chu with Eric Chu as the Kuomintang's presidential candidate. Dissent within and without the venue did not change this fait accompli. Only now has the KMT finally decided on a candidate. It is now less than 100 days away from election day. Time is short. Can the KMT change its grim presidential prospects? Can it save its legislative campaign from imminent disaster? No one knows. But at least Eric Chu is finally assuming responsibility for the crisis.

Understandably, Hung Hsiu-chu, who was replaced in such an unseemly manner, is indignant with her unjust treatment. She was nominated through proper channels, in strict accordance with the party's nominating procedure. Denied support from party comrades, she campaigned alone for months. Yet today, in flagrant violation of the party's own procedures, she has been summarily replaced. She has been denied any opportunity to present her campaign platform in public debate. Naturally she feels aggrieved. What is most admirable about her however, is that despite the revocation of her candidacy, she held the moral high ground in her public statement.

For Hung Hsiu-chu, the battle is over. She fought the good fight. When not a single candidate from the most powerful KMT factions refused to step up to the plate, Hung chose to do battle for the party. She participated in the party primaries. She tackled every challenge. Step by step, she championed her political views. The party provided her scant support and few resources. She failed to generate much momentum. But her sincerity and devotion touched the hearts of many. Now, concerned for the bigger picture, she has stood down with grace, leaving behind a highly favorable personal image.

The question now is, how will Eric Chu proceed. He knows better than anyone else that the ideal time for him to enter the race has long passed. He initially had no intention of running. He campaigned on behalf of Hung Hsiu-chu repeatedly. Now however, he has replaced Hung to prevent a debacle in the legislative elections. This is a responsibility he cannot shirk as party chairman. Never mind that doing so is extremely unfair to Hung Hsiu-chu. All he can do now is assume a low profile and attempt to mollify Hung. Will replacing Hung reverse the KMT's fortunes in the legislative elections? That is hard to say. But Eric Chu has finally assumed responsibility.

Whether the KMT should have replaced Hung with Chu, is debatable. But all that can be done now is to set aside grievances, bury the hatchet, and unite under Eric Chu and the KMT Central Committee. The KMT must form a presentable election team ASAP. It must begin campaign mobilization. It must begin final stage campaigning. After all, less than 100 days remain until election day. The KMT has no time to worry about the past. It must fight the battle in front of it. The rest must wait until after the election.

The public supports peaceful cross-Strait  relations. Eric Chu initially evaded responsibility. He then ruthlessly mistreated Hung Hsiu-chu. This is deeply repugnant. But so far the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen have refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. In 2016 it is likely they will control both the presidency and the legislature. But this means they must be even more cautious. Taiwan needs a political party able to work with the Mainland and check the DPP. Faced with larger considerations as these, blue camp supporters must be willing to set aside their grievances and re-unite.

On core values and cross-Strait  policy, differences exist within the KMT. The party's election procedures and personnel training approach have led to cliquism. This has created a serious brain drain among young people and grass-roots level cadres. These problems must be thoroughly reviewed following the elections, regardless of the final outcome.

The KMT also has structural problems. First, the party “A Listers” were reluctant to enter the race. Party “B Listers” such as Hung Hsiu-chu and Yang Chi-liang collected signatures in strict accordance with party primary requirements. Who knew that with the exception of the Huang Fu-shing party faction, the Kuomintang was merely an empty shell? The party re-registration procedure held a few years ago was an empty gesture. It failed to lead to a presentable party membership roster. The result lacked any organizational structure whatsoever.

Even more serious is the KMT's disconnect with society. The party nomination process has resulted in candidates arbitrarily being replaced at whim. Unless the procedure is revised, the Kuomintang's “intra-party democracy” will remain a joke. The candidate generated by the KMT nomination process for Taipei Mayor during the nine in one elections failed even to win the support of diehard loyalists. This shows how out of touch the KMT's nomination process is from society.

The chief justification for replacing Hung Hsiu-chu was her "one China, same interpretation" slogan. Many assumed it was beyond the Kuomintang pale. In fact, "one China, same interpretation" is not the least bit radical. It merely reduces the ambiguity within the 1992 consensus. Negative spin control has made current KMT cross-Strait  policy little different from Tsai Ing-wen's.

President Ma's "no unification, no independence, no use of force" cross-Strait  policy, based on the 1992 consensus, has served its purpose. Cross-Strait  relations now traverse deeper waters. The 1992 consensus must be taken further. If the KMT refuses to accept "one China, same interpretation”, how can the KMT take the 1992 consensus further? The DPP advocates "maintaining the status quo".  The KMT must clarify its position, and build consensus within the party.

選前先求團結 選後國民黨須改造

2015年10月18日 中國時報

不出意外，在絕大多數出席黨代表和中常委力挺下，昨天國民黨臨全會正式演出「拔柱換朱」戲碼，場內外雖出現若干雜音，但已無礙大局的底定。也是到了此時此刻，國民黨才算最終確定了提名參選人。距離正式投票日已不到一百天了，短短時間內，能否拉抬低迷的總統選情，能否挽救瀕臨崩盤的立委選舉，誰都拿不準，但至少眼前這個危局，朱立倫承擔了！

可以理解，在如此難堪的局面下被撤換，洪秀柱的心境自是非常委屈與不平，她是一路循制度化競爭管道爭取到提名資格，並在缺乏政黨與同志奧援處境下，以孤鳥姿態辛勤奔走數月，如今卻在程序正義顯見瑕疵的操作下，被迅速而有效率的撤換，連爭取政見理念辯論的機會都沒有，她的怨懟自是非常強烈！然而值得敬佩的是，在確定參選人資格被撤銷後，洪的聲明依舊表現了她的高度！

對洪秀柱而言，這場美好的戰役已打過！她是在國民黨內所有實力派全都表態不選窘境下，毅然決然站出來為黨出征，從黨內初選開始，她認真對待每一項挑戰與考驗，一步一腳印宣揚她的政見與理念，儘管黨內給她的支持與資源相當微薄，縱然她並沒有營造起很大的聲勢，但她的真誠與付出還是感動了不少人，如今她以顧全大局的高度選擇退場，已留下漂亮的身影！

接下來的危局，就要看朱立倫怎麼接棒走下去了！他自己其實比誰都清楚，他參選最好的時機已過，他本人並沒有參選意願，已經數度公開為洪秀柱造勢，如今演成必須「拔柱換朱」的局面，並非他又有參選的意念，完全是為了挽救立委崩盤的危局，這是他做黨主席無所逃避的承擔，縱使如此做對洪秀柱極其不公平，也只能放低姿態去安撫，最終究竟能否拉抬早已低迷的立委選情，還很難論斷，但他終究一肩扛起了！

就國民黨立場而言，不論「拔柱換朱」有多少值得非議之處，此時此刻，只能暫時放下所有的恩怨，捐棄所有是非與不平，團結在朱立倫的黨中央指揮下，在最短的時間內組成一個像樣的團隊，啟動政黨規格的選舉動員，展開最後階段的選戰，畢竟只剩下不到一百天，國民黨已沒有任何時間再去計較過去，至少先將眼前這場選戰打完，一切待選後再議。

就支持兩岸和平發展路線的民眾而言，朱立倫逃避責任在先、對洪秀柱無情無義在後，雖然令人深不以為然，但民進黨蔡英文至今拒絕接受九二共識，2016年卻很有可能取得完全執政優勢，卻可能更需要警覺。台灣不能缺少一個有能力與大陸維持善意互動的政黨來制衡民進黨，大是大非考量下，相信藍營支持者願意捐棄成見重新團結起來。

不過，不能否認，國民黨確實存在核心價值與兩岸政策路線分歧問題，黨的選舉與人才培養拔擢機制也有小圈子化現象，已造成嚴重的青年人才流失與基層幹部斷層問題。這些問題在選舉結束後，不論最終的結果為何，都必須進行完整的檢討！

先談黨的結構問題，早先黨內A咖都表態不願參選，B咖的洪秀柱與楊志良循黨內連署方式參選，結果不玩還好，一玩才知道除了黃復興系統，國民黨的黨員結構跟空殼子其實沒有兩樣，數年前玩的黨員重新登記，彷彿白忙一場，連個像樣的黨員名冊都沒有，結構不只是鬆散，根本已經是無組織了。

國民黨的結構與社會結構脫節現象更是嚴重，一個循黨內機制產生的參選人，竟然會演成被撤換的後果。如果這樣的黨結構再不改造，國民黨所謂黨內民主，只會是個笑話。九合一選舉台北市長提名依循黨內提名機制產生的參選人，竟然連國民黨基本盤都守不住，可知國民黨提名機制與社會真實結構的距離有多麼遙遠？

再談路線問題，這次洪秀柱被撤換主因，是有不少人認為她的「一中同表」逾越了國民黨的路線，事實上「一中同表」一點都不激進，它只是將「九二共識」的模糊降低而已，然而被負面操作的結果，弄到國民黨當下的兩岸政策，已經跟蔡英文沒有太大差異了。

馬總統九二共識下的「不統、不獨、不武」兩岸政策已經達成階段性的貢獻，兩岸關係進入深水區後，九二共識必須深化。如果國民黨不接受「一中同表」，國民黨將如何深化九二共識？或者與民進黨雷同將主張「維持現狀」，國民黨必須釐清並建立黨內共識。

The Official Cross-Strait Communications Channel Must Remain Open

The Official Cross-Strait Communications Channel Must Remain Open
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 165, 2015

Executive Summary: The fourth meeting between cross-Strait affairs directors Hsia and Zhang has concluded. Mainland tourist transit provisions were the issue of greatest concern. Taipei proposed a compromise that straightened out the flight path. Unfortunately it failed to meet with Mainland requirements. Overall however, the Hsia Zhang meeting was highly significant.

Full Text Below:

The fourth meeting between cross-Strait affairs directors Hsia and Zhang has concluded. Mainland tourist transit provisions were the issue of greatest concern. Taipei proposed a compromise that straightened out the flight path. Unfortunately it failed to meet with Mainland requirements. Overall however, the Hsia Zhang meeting was highly significant.

One. Cross-Strait affairs directors meeting is important for cross-Strait relations. Official heads from both sides are able to call on each other, sit down with each other, and negotiate with each other face to face. Such scenes were unthinkable during Cold War era military confrontation. Chiang Ching-kuo's "three noes" policy made them impossible. Lee Teng-hui's “two-states theory”, which froze cross-Strait relations, made them impossible. Chen Shui-bian's “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution”, which aggravated cross-Strait conflict, made them impossible. Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping created this official communications channel, which itself is a guarator of peace. It is an historic achievement for which Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou will be remembered.

Two. The channel is important for communications. Consider the MTP smartcard dispute. The Mainland unilaterally implemented it without communicating with us in advance. Hsia Li-yan raised solemn objections to it during the Hsia Zhang meeting. He hoped that the two sides would discuss such important developments in advance. Zhang Zhijun provided reporters background on the MTP smartcard issue. He explained that it was merely a response to Taiwan compatriots, Taiwan businessmen, and Mainland students who requested a more streamlined form of cross-Strait ID. Rumors arose that the Mainland would reduce the number of Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan before the election. Zhang Zhijun responed during the Hsia Zhang meeting. He said "There is no such policy". Face to face communications clarify news reports much more effectively than pieces of paper.

Three. The most recent Hsia Zhang meeting was much more personal than past meetings. Zhang Zhijun visited Kinmen in May. Hsia Li-yan personally stood at the hotel entrance to greet Zhang. As host, Hsia demonstrated consideration for his guest. During the most recent Hsia Zhang meeting, Zhang again greeted Hsia at the hotel entrance. He also arranged for an evening tour of the Pearl River. The atmosphere was cordial. The two used the opportunity to improve understanding and develop a personal friendship. Increased trust will facilitate future consultations and negotiations.

Green camp red-baiting makes "cozying up to" Mainland officials highly risky. KMT politicians and officials are terrified of being labeld "soft on Communism". They usually draw a clear line between official and private interactions with Mainland officials. In fact, this creates barriers to communication. in fact, personal relationships are often the lubricant during official intergovernmental exchanges. They ensure trust, improve communications, and reduce misunderstandings.

Four. The KMT remains mired in internal struggle. The DPP by contrast, has solid momentum. It is optimistic about its election prospects. Next year, it may well find itself the ruling party. Observers are concerned. Will the current Hsia Zhang meeting be the last cross-Strait directors meeting ever held? The framework Hsia and Zhang established was not based on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election. Hsia personally invited Zhang to visit Taiwan at the appropriate time. Zhang magnanimously accepted. Hsia said the first half of next year would be a good time.

Hsia Li-yan's invitation was correct and necessary. One. It showed that Hsia was concerned about the national interest rather than partisan interest. He was bolstering "institutionalized negotiations" and "official interactions". He did not assume that the channel would be affected by the election outcome. Two. If the KMT wins the election, a third Hsia Zhang meeting is a forgone conclusion. But even if the KMT loses the election, President Ma still has four months left in his term. He must stay the course. He must continue his cross-Strait policy. The KMT is still the ruling party. It has a responsibility to ensure sound cross-Strait relations. It must not abandon this responsibility merely because it loses an election. Three. This gives the Mainland and the DPP a buffer. If Tsai Ing-wen persists in rejecting the 1992 consensus, any meeting between cross-Strait directors under the DPP will be unlikely indeed.

Suppose a Hsia Zhang meeting is convened in the first half of next year? It would give the Mainland another chance to assess the cross-Strait situation in the wake of the election. The DPP could use the Hsia Zhang meeting to test the waters. If this official communications channel is severed because the Democratic Progressive Party has assumed power, Taiwan and the Mainland will both suffer.

After President Ma took office in 2008, consultations between the SEF and ARATS resumed. As many as 11 meetings were held and 23 agreements signed. Cross-Strait relations improved significantly. In February 2014, unofficial talks between the two associations were made official. Progress was made, step by step. As Hsia Li-yan said, "Building a mountain is a monumental task". The KMT has nearly completed the task. Will the DPP destroy the KMT's achievement next year out of petty selfishness? Will it destroy this hard-won official communications channel? If it does, ordinary people on both sides of the Strait will be the biggest losers.

We hope that in the event of a change in ruling parties, the official communications channel will remain open. We hope that the cross-Strait directors convene a fifth Hsia Zhang meeting in the first half of next year, a sixth such meeting in the second half of next year, and a seventh such meeting in the year after.

兩岸官方溝通平台不可斷

2015年10月16日 中國時報

第四次兩岸事務首長會議（夏張二會）落幕，最受關注的陸客中轉問題，我方雖提出了航路截彎取直的折衷安排，但並不能滿足陸方需要，最後依然留下了遺憾。但整體而言，夏張二會仍具有許多重要的意義。

首先，兩岸事務首長會議召開的本身，對兩岸關係即具有重大意義，兩岸官方首長可以官銜互稱、面對面坐下來談判兩岸事務的景象，是冷戰兩岸對峙時代兵凶戰危情勢下所不容；是蔣經國主政時「三不政策」下所不許；是李登輝主政高舉兩國論後封凍兩岸關係所不願；也是陳水扁主政下力推正名制憲、兩岸衝突加劇後所不能。馬英九與習近平卻成功的創造了此官方溝通平台，平台本身就是和平的保證，也是馬英九與習近平將來必會被人們記憶與肯定的歷史成就。

其次，平台確實發揮了重要的溝通功能，卡式台胞證的爭議，我方對陸方未與我充分溝通就片面實施，夏立言在夏張會上表達嚴正立場，並希望未來涉及兩岸重大事情，陸方應事前溝通。張志軍也對媒體說明卡式台胞證的發行背景，是回應台胞、台商與陸生希望兩岸往來證件更簡化的心聲。對於大陸在選前限縮陸客的傳言，張志軍則直接在夏張會中澄清「沒有這樣的政策」。面對面的溝通，遠比一紙新聞澄清的效果要直接而明白。

第三，這次夏張會，表現出較以往更多的人情味，今年5月夏張首會，張志軍訪金門，夏立言親至飯店門口接待，展現了主人的親切親和；而這一次夏張二會，張志軍也到飯店門口親迎，更在晚上安排珠江同遊，氣氛融洽，兩人也趁私人互動的機會培養相互的理解與情誼，當有助於相互間信任關係的累積，及後續的協商與談判。

若以綠營人士的反中邏輯，與大陸官員如此「麻吉」，很容易被扣上紅帽，國民黨的政治人物與政府官員尤其害怕被戴上紅帽，多半刻意畫出「官」、「私」之線，對與大陸官員的私人互動避之唯恐不及。這其實憑添溝通的障礙，事實上，在政府間的官員交往中，私人關係往往是公務關係的潤滑劑與催化劑，可以建立更好的信任關係，增加溝通效能並減少誤會。

第四，由於國民黨仍陷於內亂風暴，民進黨聲勢看好，明年有可能政黨輪替，外界普遍憂心，這一次的夏張會，會不會是兩岸事務首長會議的絕響？但夏立言並沒有先以總統大選的結果預設框架，仍當面邀請張志軍在適當時機回訪台灣，張也大方表示接受，夏立言並表示，明年上半年是適當時機。

夏立言的邀請是十分正確而且必要的。一則，表示夏立言是從國家利益而非政黨傾向出發，表現出鞏固「制度化協商」及「官方互動」基礎的積極性，先不預設此一機制是否受選舉影響；二則，若是國民黨勝選，則夏張三會當是順理成章，但即便國民黨敗選，馬總統仍有4個月任期，他本該有始有終、一以貫之繼續執行他的兩岸政策，國民黨還是執政黨，對兩岸關係的推進仍有責任，不能以敗選為由自暴自棄；三則，這也同時給陸方與民進黨多一個緩衝，雖然，若蔡英文繼續否定九二共識，則兩岸事務首長會議要在民進黨執政後續開的機會相當渺茫。

但明年上半年夏張若有第三會，可以讓陸方多一次機會，評估選後的兩岸情勢，也可以讓民進黨把夏張三會當成對兩岸關係試水溫，好好想想，若官方溝通平台在民進黨執政後不能繼續，會對台灣、對兩岸帶來什麼傷害。

2008年馬總統上任後恢復海基與海協兩會的協商，舉行了11次會談，簽署了23項協議，使兩岸關係大幅推進。2014年2月更把民間性質的兩岸兩會會談提升為官方層次。一點一滴的成果，有著夏立言所說「為山九仞」的嶮澀艱難，但這好不容易堆起的九仞之山，如果在明年，因為新上台的主政者黨私偏狹而功虧一簣，讓好不容易建立的官方溝通之橋斷毀，那將是兩岸關係與兩岸人民最大的損失。

我們希望，即便政黨輪替，這一個官方的溝通平台也不要因之毀去。我們期盼，不只明年上半年有兩岸事務首長五會（夏張三會），明年下半年、後年、大後年，仍有兩岸事務首長的六會、七會與無數會。

Will Taiwan Be Able to Catch the TPP II Train?

Will Taiwan Be Able to Catch the TPP II Train?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 15, 2015

Executive Summary: Five years of negotiations have finally ended. Twelve nations in the Asian-Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Timor, Chile, Peru, Canada, and Mexico, have negotiated a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). National Development Council Chairman Woody Duh says Taiwan must join the TPP. The DPP promises that if Tsai Ing-wen comes to power, her push to join the TPP will lead to "seamless integration". Will Taiwan actually be able to join? Many difficulties will first have to be overcome.

Full Text Below:

Five years of negotiations have finally ended. Twelve nations in the Asian-Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Timor, Chile, Peru, Canada, and Mexico, have negotiated a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). National Development Council Chairman Woody Duh says Taiwan must join the TPP. The DPP promises that if Tsai Ing-wen comes to power, her push to join the TPP will lead to "seamless integration". Will Taiwan actually be able to join? Many difficulties will first have to be overcome.

The TPP has received such close scrutiny for three reasons.  One. TPP member economies are large in scale. They account for 38% of the world's economic output. That exceeds the EU's 25%, and makes the TPP the world's largest free trade zone. Moreover the TPP ranks first in the world in spending power, cutting edge technology, and the ability to attract foreign investment. The TPP has established new norms for digital trade, e-commerce and other "new generation" trade practices. These could become the new model for world trade. Naturally it has drawn attention.

Two. The TPP has a different purpose than past FTAs. Traditional FTAs eliminate tariffs and investment barriers.  Their emphasis was on upgrading products to make them more competitive abroad. The TPP goes further. It eliminates barriers for raw materials, capital, and talent for member states. It tightens the supply chains between countries and streamlines cooperation. The agreement imposes many requirements on member states. These include transparent regulations and the reform of state owned enterprises. The agreement even includes a section on enhanced competitiveness for SMEs. The TPP is not merely conducive to the growth of trade and investment among member countries. It also improves member states' global economic competitiveness.

Three. The TPP will have a major impact on non-member states. Taiwan has traditionally been part of the Asian-Pacific supply chain. If Taiwan fails to catch the TPP express, exports to the United States, Japan and other major markets may be affected. Even more seriously, industrial cooperation and the supply chain will be affected. Foreign companies may accelerate their move to TPP countries. Tardy economic reforms may lead to reduced competitiveness, lagging foreign investment, and continued stagnation.

The industrial strength of TPP member states varies. Economic integration will intrude heavily on member states' domestic affairs. Patented and generic drug protection, health care pricing, data transmission, and other sensitive topics, including differences over US beef and pork imports to Taiwan, will make negotiations difficult. Take the elimination of traditional tariffs and investment restrictions. Japan hopes to break into other countries' automotive markets. The United States, Japan, and Australia will have to allow the import of rice, pork, and beef. Vietnam hopes the US will grant zero-tariff treatment on apparel. The United States expects Vietnam to relax restrictions on foreign investment in Vietnam. Each of the  12 countries have their own interests. They have conflicts. They gain in some areas, and lose in others. Agreement requires determination. Such determination highlights the conclusion of TPP negotiations.

Increased protection for patent medicines, increased copyright protection, data transmission deregulation, the standardization and liberalization of investment in public utilities, clearly favor the United States, Japan and other leading countries. Malaysia, Vietnam, and other countries may have to pay a price in the short term. They may be forced to upgrade for the sake of long-term competitiveness. Participation in the TPP is about seeking long-term benefits, rather than winning on individual issues. For the sake of long-term benefits, the government must help vulnerable companies, labor, and the economically disadvantaged.

For Taiwan, catching the TPP II express in the second half of next year is critical. Can Taiwan can arrive at an internal consensus? Can it afford the price of a ticket? Those are the questions. In fact, only one question remains. Given all the pros and cons, can the government persuade industry and society to pay a price for the long-term benefits the TPP will bring?  

Unfortunately the timing is bad. Just when we need to make a strong political commitment, Taiwan has entered a dark period. It has entered election season. During election season, no political party will dare to touch any issue that impacts disadvantaged groups for the sake of long-term interests. Also, from January 16 of next year until after the presidential election, when the new administration takes office, we will have a caretaker government. The nature of a caretaker government is a lack of political determination and a don't rock the boat mentality. Furthermore, after May 20, when the new government takes office, it will need several months to grasp the situation.

South Korea, the Philippines, and other countries are lining up to board the TPP express. When the time comes, the train will pull away. Will Taiwan, bound as it is hand and foot, be able to catch the train? That is a deeply worrisome question.

台灣趕得上TPP二號車嗎？

2015-10-15 聯合報

經過五年談判，包含美、日在內的亞太地區十二個國家（美、日、澳、紐、星、馬、越、汶、智、秘、加、墨），完成了「跨太平洋夥伴協定」（ＴＰＰ）的談判。國發會主委杜紫軍認為，台灣非加入ＴＰＰ不可；民進黨也宣稱，蔡英文若執政，推動加入ＴＰＰ可以「無縫接軌」。然而，台灣能否如願加入，有重重難關要過。

ＴＰＰ受到重視的原因有三：第一，ＴＰＰ成員國經濟規模很大，占了全球經濟產值的卅八％，超過歐盟的廿五％，成為世界最大的自由貿易區。而且，包括消費能力、技術領先程度、吸引外資及對外投資能力等各方面，也都是世界第一。尤其，ＴＰＰ對於數位貿易、電子商務等所謂「新世代」貿易行為，均訂出新的規範，可能逐漸成為未來世界貿易的新典範，當然受到注目。

第二，是ＴＰＰ的目的與野心與過去的自貿區不同。傳統自貿區是以消除邊境的關稅及投資障礙為主，強調提升本國產品在國外的競爭力。ＴＰＰ則更進一步，要消除會員國對於原料、資金、人才等生產要素移動的障礙及成本，使得各國彼此間的供應鏈及合作關係更加緊密、也更有效率。因此，在協定有很多深入各國內部的法規透明、公營事業改革要求，也有中小企業與競爭力提升專章。如此，不僅要有利於成員國間的貿易投資成長，也有助於會員國對全球經濟競爭力的提升。

第三，是對「非成員國」的衝擊。以原本就是亞太供應鏈一分子的台灣為例，若無法搭上ＴＰＰ這班列車，不但出口至美、日等主要市場的貿易可能受到影響，更嚴重的是產業合作與供應關係將受到挑戰，企業可能加速外移至ＴＰＰ國家，而且經濟將因改革緩慢而導致競爭力衰退、外人投資持續落後，而陷入困境。

由於ＴＰＰ會員國間彼此的產業強弱項目不一，再加上經濟整合的義務深入境內各層面，觸及如專利藥／學名藥保護、健保核價及資料傳輸等敏感議題（台灣還有美豬美牛問題！），談判起來當然非常困難。僅在最傳統的關稅及投資限制消除的問題上，例如，日本想要打入各國的汽車市場，美、澳則要日本擴大開放稻米及豬牛肉；越南要求美國給成衣零關稅待遇，美國也期待越南對外人投資繼續鬆綁。十二國都有利益、也有衝擊，在得失之間，需要有強烈的決心才能突破。這種決心的展現，也是ＴＰＰ完成談判的亮點。

尤其，諸如強化對專利藥、著作權的保護，對資料傳輸的鬆綁，到公營事業的規範及投資開放等，明顯都是向美國、日本等領先群國家傾斜；也因此，對於像馬來西亞、越南等國而言，可能就要在短期內付出代價「強迫升級」，以追求長期競爭力的強化。簡單地說，各國決定是否參加ＴＰＰ，其決策考量永遠在尋求「整體、長期」的利益，而不是個別議題的輸贏。同時，政府必須提出有效的對策，協助那些為成就「整體利益」而可能受到衝擊的企業、勞工及經濟弱勢族群。

對台灣而言，能否在明年下半年搭上「ＴＰＰ二號車」，事關至鉅。問題是，台灣內部是否能達成上車的共識，以及是否買得起這張車票，則仍未可知。事實上，真正的挑戰只有一個：在有利有弊的情況下，政府是否有能力說服台灣產業及社會，為了追求ＴＰＰ帶來的長期利益，大家願意付出一定的代價和成本。

時機不巧，就在我們需要拿出強烈政治決心的時候，台灣卻遇上政治黑暗期。目前台灣的政治已全面進入選舉模式，在選舉模式下，任何可能衝擊經濟弱勢族群以達成「整體利益」的議題，沒有任何政黨膽敢觸碰。此外，從明年一月十六日總統大選過後，到五二○新政府就職前，政府又進入漫長的「看守期」；而看守內閣的特徵，絕不在展現強烈政治決心，而是低調再低調。更何況，五二○新政府上任後，至少還需要好幾個月的磨合期，才能真正掌握情況。

ＴＰＰ這班車，還有韓國、菲律賓等國在排隊，時間到了，列車就會開走。那麼，綁手綁腳的台灣能否趕得上車子，實在令人憂心！

How Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu can Touch the Hearts of the People

How Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu can Touch the Hearts of the People
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2015

Executive Summary: It is now time for a showdown. Chu and Hung should participate in frank talks. They should acknowledge their past responsibility and assume future responsibility. They should each bear a share of responsibility. Some think that a Chu-Hung ticket is the answer. But if Chu eventually replaces Hung, we hope Chu will be able to mollify Hung. We hope that Hung will be able to touch the hearts of the public. If Hung Hsiu-chu withdraws with honor, if we see her campaigning enthusiastically on behalf of Chu and her party comrades, that would be a genuine sight to see. That would have quite an emotional impact.

Full Text Below:

The weekend Chu vs. Hung showdown is three and a half days away. No one knows what the outcome will be, or whether there is still room to maneuver.

How did this dilemma arise? How can it be dealt with? Four perspectives should be considered. One. The KMT now finds itself in a precarious situation. Who is to blame? Two. What are the pros and cons of replacing Hung? Three. Should Zhu and Hung meet privately, or hold a public debate? Four. What should happen after the showdown?

As matters stand, the KMT may be in for a major election defeat. Worse, the party could even disintegrate. Who is responsible for this state of affairs? The answer can be divided into two parts: before and after. First, the Ma government failed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The Ma vs. Wang internal power struggle divided the party. This is the reason the Kuomintang is where it is today. Next, Eric Chu left people with the impression he would run for president. But to everyone's astonishment, he backed out. Meanwhile KMT party princes were either fighting each other or too afraid to step up to the plate. Hung Hsiu-chu declared her candidacy to goad the party princes into throwing their hats in the ring. Who knew her campaign would catch fire? Later however, Hung Hsiu-chu's "air and ground campaigns" fell short of expectations. She was unable to fulfill the role of "centrist mainstay". She was unable to offer a coat tails effect. Her numbers remained low. Defeat appeared inevitable. Therefore responsibility falls on Ma Ying-jeou for his failed governance, on Eric Chu for his dithering, and on Hung Hsiu-chu for her campaign performance.

Now consider the pros and cons of replacing Hung. Hung Hsiu-chu must realize that if the situation were not critical, Eric Chu would probably not attempt to replace Hung. Eric Chu must realize that trashing party primary procedures to replace Hung might not resolve the current crisis. But it would definitely leave a black mark on the Republic of China's democratic history. Therefore Hung Hsiu-chu must realize that the KMT Central Committee's move to replace her is actually a last resort. Eric Chu must realize that replacing Hung and substituting himself will undermine both the KMT's election prospects and the nation's democratic values. It will probably not hurt the DPP. But it will probably inflict serious harm on the KMT.

Therefore, to resolve this impasse, both Chu and Hung must assume complete responsibility for this situation of their own making. They must not blame each other and refuse to acknowledge their own complicity. Only then can they begin to discuss whether to "replace Hung". and if so, how. As matters stand, the Kuomintang has no good moves in this chess game. The key remains Chu and Hung. What is in their hearts? What do they see for the future? In other words, what happens next depends on these two, and what they decide to do.

Rumor has it the two have arrived at an impass. Chu wants a dialogue in private. Hung wants a debate in public. She wants an opportunity to explain her cross-Strait policy.

Hung Hsiu-chu's election momentum stalled because her air and ground campaigns lost headway. Controversy denied her the opportunity to explain her cross-Strait policy stance. That is what Hung finds most intolerable.

Blue and green camp thinking on cross-Strait policy cover a broad spectrum. Presidential candidates from both parties seek to appeal to the broadest possible spectrum. They seek to differentiate themselves from the rival party's presidential candidate. Therefore, when they broaden their own appeal, they must seek the greatest consensus, within their own camp and among the public.  Hung Hsiu-chu lost momentum not because her campaign rhetoric fell outside the blue camp spectrum. She lost momentum because how she positioned herself provoked controversy.

The green camp spectrum ranges from championing the Taiwan independence party platform, to citing the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, to "defending the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", to "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform". The blue camp spectrum ranges from championing "eventual unification", to advocating "one China, same interpretation", to adhering to the "1992 consensus" and "one China, different interpretations", to "no unification, no independence, no use of force", to citing a "de jure independent Taiwan". Tsai Ing-wen has chosen to "defend the current ROC constitutional framework". That is how she has positioned herself. That is no accident. But if Hung Hsiu-chu positioned herself as an advocate of "eventual reunification", that was an accident. Because Hung has said on other occasions, that "I am not pro-reunification". That shows that she understands the importance of her own positioning on Taiwan's political spectrum.

Lai Ching-teh can say, "Of course I advocate Taiwan independence!" But Tsai Ing-wen cannot. If at this juncture she were to make "Taiwan independence" her campaign theme, she could inspire a "replace Tsai" wave within the DPP. Lai Ching-teh has not demanded that Tsai Ing-wen wage an election campaign based on Taiwan independence. Nor has he demanded that Tsai debate him over whether Taiwan independence is "mainstream opinion". Hung Hsiu-chu however, has demanded that Eric Chu debate whether "one China, same interpretation" and "eventual reunification" are "mainstream opinion", in public, and have polls determine the winner. This suggests that Hung Hsiu-chu still does not understand her own role in her election plight.

It is now time for a showdown. Chu and Hung should participate in frank talks. They should acknowledge their past responsibility and assume future responsibility. They should each bear a share of responsibility. Some think that a Chu-Hung ticket is the answer. But if Chu eventually replaces Hung, we hope Chu will be able to mollify Hung. We hope that Hung will be able to touch the hearts of the public. If Hung Hsiu-chu withdraws with honor, if we see her campaigning enthusiastically on behalf of Chu and her party comrades, that would be a genuine sight to see. That would have quite an emotional impact.

Chu and Hung must not leave a scene of unbearable devastation in their wake. If they can understand and acknowledge their own responsibility in this affair and reach an accord, they can leave behind a legacy worthy of emulation, and the people of Taiwan will be moved.

朱立倫、洪秀柱如何感動台灣人民

2015-10-14  聯合報

本文見報時，距周末國民黨臨全會朱洪攤牌只有三天半。此際，不知是否結論已定，或尚有轉圜空間。

事態何以到此地步，及如何解決，可從四方面討論。一、國民黨之情勢危殆至此，誰的責任？二、換柱操作的利害得失。三、現在，朱洪應當私下會面，或公開辯論？四、攤牌之後。

情勢至此，國民黨不但可能大選慘敗，且有亡黨之虞；誰的責任，可分前後兩段說。先說前段：馬政府的治理未得民心，或未獲人民理解，且發生馬王內鬥等自我撕裂之事，這是國民黨陷於今日劣勢之根源。接著，朱立倫原來予人將出馬競選總統的印象，竟又抽腿，而國民黨內天王因被內鬥羈絆或怯戰，遂使洪秀柱的參選從拋磚引玉轉至弄假成真。至於後段：洪秀柱在空戰及陸戰上的表現不如預期，支撐不起「中流砥柱」的角色，黨則輔選不力，選情趨低不起，甚至可以預見崩盤之敗。因此，論責任，馬英九的治理，朱立倫的猶豫，及洪秀柱的選戰表現皆有責任。

次論換柱操作的利害得失。洪秀柱方面應認知，倘非情勢到了危亡地步，朱立倫應當不至於粗暴換柱。朱立倫方面則應認知，倘以撤銷初選的手段換柱，摧毀了初選，未必能化解當前的危急，且將在中華民國民主發展史上留下一永久傷痕。因而，洪秀柱必須認知，黨中央要換柱實是出自萬不得已；朱立倫亦必須認知，換柱對自己、對選情及對民主價值，皆是未必傷敵反而自傷的「七傷拳」。

因此，若要化解困局，首先朱洪皆必須誠實承擔自己造成今日情勢之責任，不能只怪罪對方而看不到自己的過失；然後，兩人始能對「是否換柱」及「如何換柱」之操作作出正確的因應。眼前的國民黨，雖是千頭萬緒沒有一步是好棋之境，但朱洪兩人的心意及眼界仍是具決定性的推進因素。也就是說，下一步情勢如何發展，仍然繫於兩人的一念之間。

據說，目前雙方卡在朱希望兩人私下會面，洪則主張兩人公開辯論；關鍵在洪秀柱想將她的兩岸政策辯論清楚。

洪秀柱的選情低迷至此，是因空戰陸戰皆不進反退，其中又以兩岸論述引發爭議為主因，但這也是洪秀柱最不服氣處。

藍綠兩個陣營的兩岸思維，各自是相當廣闊的光譜。雙方總統候選人，必須盡量開拓自我陣營光譜的最大容量，並與對方總統候選人形成差異性的市場區隔。因此，在放大己方光譜的同時，亦必須以自己陣營及社會民眾的最大共識，為選舉論述的落點。洪秀柱的失著，並非她的主張不在藍營光譜內，而在她選擇的落點極有爭議。

在綠的光譜上，從台獨黨綱，到台灣前途決議文，到「中華民國現行憲政體制推動論」，到「凍結台獨黨綱」的主張者均有。在藍營的光譜上，「終極統一」、「一中同表」、「九二共識／一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，到「法理獨台」的主張者均有。如今，蔡英文選擇了「現行中華民國憲政體制推動論」作為她的落點，不意外；而洪秀柱若是選擇了「終極統一」為落點，則是意外。因為，洪也說過「我不是統派」，可見她對光譜上落點的選擇並非沒有感覺。

在光譜上，賴清德可說「我當然主張台灣獨立」。但蔡英文若在此時以「台獨」為競選主題，恐怕也會引起民進黨內「換英」的風潮；且也未聞賴清德要迫蔡英文以主張「台獨」來打選戰，亦未聞賴清德要與蔡英文辯論台獨是否「主流民意」。但是，洪秀柱卻主張，要與朱立倫就「一中同表」、「終極統一」是否「主流民意」舉行公開辯論，且就辯論結果辦理民調以分勝負。此事似乎顯示，洪秀柱仍然不知選情至此要在自己身上找原因。

在這攤牌關頭，朱洪二人應當推心置腹好好會一面、談一下。各自承認自己此前的責任，也各自承當此後的責任，並據以相互安排合乎比例的分擔責任角色。有人認為，「朱進柱留」也許仍是較佳方案；但如果仍是「朱進柱去」的結局，我們希望朱立倫能感動洪秀柱，並希望洪秀柱也能感動台灣人民。在洪秀柱「光榮演說」退場後，會再看到她回到大選場中奔走，為朱立倫及她的黨同志熱情助選。這將是何等境界，又將是何等效應？

朱洪二人不要在台灣政治史上留下不堪的一幕，殘酷現實的政治大戲，若能以理解與共同承當收場，會為台灣政治留下值得垂範的一頁，會感動台灣人民。

Weekend Replacement of Hung Hsiu-chu: Three Scenarios

Weekend Replacement of Hung Hsiu-chu: Three Scenarios
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2015

Executive Summary: The Kuomintang Provisional National Party Congress met this Saturday to consider replacing Hung Hsiu-chu as KMT presidential candidate. Those who seek to replace Hung and those who seek to retain Hung now find themselves at loggerheads. Unless Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach some sort of accord, the session will become an embarrassment. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen said the biggest difference between the DPP and the KMT is unity. The DPP is currently the most united it has ever been in history. When the blue camp hears comments like this, one can only wonder how it feels?

Full Text Below:

The Kuomintang Provisional National Party Congress met this Saturday to consider replacing Hung Hsiu-chu as KMT presidential candidate. Those who seek to replace Hung and those who seek to retain Hung now find themselves at loggerheads. Unless Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach some sort of accord, the session will become an embarrassment. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen said the biggest difference between the DPP and the KMT is unity. The DPP is currently the most united it has ever been in history. When the blue camp hears comments like this, one can only wonder how it feels?

The Kuomintang's 2016 election prospects are what they are today because the party lacks unity. For the general public, unity is nothing more than a slogan. But for a political party, lack of unity means the lack of a unified goal. It means the inability to win public support. Consider the blue camp's current plight. One. Ma, Chu, Wang, Wu and other leaders each have their own selfish agendas that trump larger considerations. Two. Local factions flip-flop endlessly. The blue camp is falling to pieces. The Party Central Committee is now at odds with Hung Hsiu-chu, the very candidate it nominated. It is utterly indifferent to the enemy at the gates. The situation resembles the situation in 2000, on the eve of the first change in ruling parties.

The KMT is already in dire straits. Yet it persists in internal power struggles. Apparently it has not woken up from last year's election debacle. Handicapped by internal strife, it has no chance whatsoever of reversing its political fortunes. Any political party that enages in such internecine power struggles will inevitably self-destruct. It hardly needs outside enemies. By contrast, the prospects of the DPP, normally characterized by factionalism and turf fights, are now bright. Its leaders are willing to set aside their differences and unite under the command of Tsai Ing-wen. This temporary harmony may be illusory. But it is a necessary condition for political party development. If the Kuomintang plenary session fails to reach a resolution this weekend, and allows internal strife to persist, it will not matter whether it replaces Hung with someone else. It will not be able to turn the tide. Unless it addresses the root of the problem, its plight will only worsen.

As matters stand, the plenary session's move to replace Hung has three possible outcomes. One.  Full mobilization and arm-twisting by the KMT Central Committee. Eric Chu replaces Hung Hsiu-chu in the 2016 presidential race. This might not reverse the party's fortunes in the presidential election. But it could offer a coat tails effect in the legislative elections. Two. A majority of party representatives reject the call to replace Hung. They cite a lack of legitimacy. Hung retains the KMT candidacy, but loses the support of the KMT Central Committee and those who sought to replace Hung, making her election prospects even dimmer. Three. Those who champion Hung lash back. Outside the venue, they scream in protest. Eventually the move to replace Hung passes, but only barely, provoking serious internal divisions. Chu loses the support of those who championed Hung. The blowback spreads.

How will it all play out? Outsiders have no way of knowing. But the latter two scenarios are not ones that blue camp supporters are eager to see. The KMT is adopting extraordinary measures. Its purpose is to avoid a debacle during next year's presidential and legislative elections. If so, the task must be accomplished in one fell swoop. The discussions held within the plenary session must end the dispute over the nomination, once and for all. They must mark an end to the "replace Hung" controversy. If any faction remains disgruntled, or stage a boycott, the KMT will not merely lose the upcoming election, all the King's horses and all the King's men will not be able to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

To avoid such an outcome, the KMT cannot wait for the Chu Hung duel to play out over the weekend. The KMT must assign someone to engage in shuttle diplomacy. It must ensure that those who wish to replace Hung and those who wish to retain Hung conduct themselves in a gentlemanly fashion. Most importantly, Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu must reach a consensus regarding the big picture. They must exercise restraint, in both word and deed. They must not pay lip service to unity and love for the party, while promoting their selfish interests and harming the party. Ideally, before the session, Chu and Hung should shake hands and jointly declare that whatever the decision, the two will work together selflessly for the nominee's campaign. The blue camp must end its internal strife and return to the job of waging an election campaign.

Why can the DPP unite? Why can't the KMT? Several reasons come to mind. One. The KMT leadership is too selfish. Each goes his own way. Two. The KMT lacks core values, as well as the ability to express them. Three. The KMT lacks grass-roots political support. It is out of touch with the pulse of the community. Four. The KMT party structure is outdated. It lacks fairness. Rushing to convene a provisional session shows just how outdated the system is. The blue camp is in dire  straits. If it refuses to unite but persists in quibbling over minutiae, it will die without a plot to bury itself.

The blue camp controversy over whether to replace Hung involves endless debates over hurt feelings, right and wrong, and due process. The situation must not be allowed to deteriorate. Otherwise, when people look back at 2016, will Eric Chu or Hung Hsiu-chu feel greater regret? Before it is too late, the two must think about what they are doing. They must then make the right choice. After all, history cannot be rewound and replayed. A single mistep could lead to eternal regret.

周末換柱大戲的三種想像

2015-10-13 聯合報

分享國民黨將在本周六召開臨時全國黨代表大會，就「換柱」提案作出取捨。以目前換柱、保柱雙方的角力看，除非朱立倫和洪秀柱在會前達成某種程度的和解，否則會中之難堪將可想而知。蔡英文前天說，民進黨和國民黨最大的不同就是「團結」，現在是民進黨有史以來最團結的時刻；這話聽在藍營耳裡，不知作何感想？

國民黨二○一六選情落到今天的地步，一言以蔽之，就是不團結所致。對一般民眾而言，團結不過是句陳腔濫調；但就一個政黨而言，不團結就不可能有一致的目標，就不可能召喚民眾的認同。今天藍營的情勢正是如此：最初，是馬朱王吳等領導人各有私心盤算，置大局於不顧；然後，是地方派系東搖西擺，藍營分崩離析；如今，則是黨中央與其提名的洪秀柱形成對決，渾然不顧敵營已兵臨城下。這情勢，與二○○○年首度政黨輪替前夕的景象有幾分相似。

面對這場大選，國民黨本就情勢嚴峻之極，卻至今仍處於一種「內戰」狀態，似尚未從去年底的敗選中醒轉，如此對立的氣氛自無可能扭轉頹勢。一個耽於內鬥的政黨，自己就能把自己搞垮鬥臭，還需要敵人動手嗎？反觀民進黨，平日派系林立、各有地盤，今天眼見形勢大好，皆願放下歧見，團結在蔡英文麾下。這種臨時的和諧看似取巧，卻是政黨求取發展的必要條件。從這個角度看，周末國民黨的臨全會若不能作出有助排難解紛的決議，卻讓內部戰火繼續延燒，無論換柱計畫成功與否，都無助於力挽狂瀾，只是治絲益棼。

以目前情勢看，臨全會「換柱」大戲的發展有三種可能的想像：其一，經過黨中央全力動員與勸說，「換柱」提案在臨全會中順利通過，由朱立倫代替洪秀柱出馬角逐二○一六大選，雖未必能逆轉總統選情，卻可藉以帶動立委選情。其二，多數黨代表以缺乏「正當性」為由，否決換柱之提議，依然由洪秀柱披掛上陣；在這種情況下，洪秀柱雖保住候選人身分，卻可能全面失去黨中央及「換柱派」的任何援助，局面反而更艱難。其三，「保柱派」人馬強力反彈，在場內外抗議或叫囂，最後雖勉強通過換柱，卻造成內部嚴重撕裂，朱立倫亦失去目前挺柱民眾的支持，後座力繼續延燒。

局面會如何發展，外界無法預料，但後二者應不是藍營樂見的景象。國民黨採取非常手段，目的無非是為了避免明年總統與立委選情的雙雙崩盤，既然如此，即必須畢其功於一役，藉著臨全會的召開和討論，作為黨內結束提名之爭、共同合力對外的宣示，將「換柱」風波徹底終結。如果任何一方仍有不服，甚至仍意圖發動支持者杯葛抵制，那麼國民黨不僅這場大選將未戰先敗，明年敗戰後將是一片分崩離析無可收拾之局。

要如何避免這樣的殘破局面出現，就不能等到周末任由朱洪對決對撞，黨內必須有人居間穿梭，要求換柱和保柱兩方人馬保持君子之爭。最關鍵的，還是朱立倫和洪秀柱必須要有一個大局共識，節制自己和己方人馬之言行；不能嘴巴上談的是團結與愛黨，實際做的卻是為私心私利而害黨。最美好的想像，是在臨全會之前，朱洪兩人能夠握手言和，並共同宣示：無論臨全會如何決定，兩人都會攜手合作，無私地為黨的提名人助選。如此，藍營才能結束這場內戰，回歸民主選舉與政黨政治。

民進黨能團結而國民黨不能，主要原因為：一，領導階層私心盤算太多，各行其是；二，缺乏核心價值與論述能力；三，基層經營耕耘不足，與社會脈動脫節；四，制度老舊鬆散，無法彰顯公平。此刻，之所以倉卒再召開臨全會，即驗證上述每一個環節都出了差錯。問題是，當藍軍城池一片岌岌可危之聲，再不齊心對外，卻還在爭辯小是小非，難道不怕死無葬身之地嗎？

今天藍營的換柱風波，論感情、論是非、論程序，都有爭論不完的事理。重要的是，不能再袖手任由情勢惡化，否則當人們從二○一六回看此局，試問朱立倫或洪秀柱誰會懊悔更多一點？在太遲之前，這兩個人都必須審慎思考自己的作為，作出正確的抉擇；畢竟歷史不能重來，一失足恐成千古恨。

Political Calculations Must Not Obliterate a History of National Suffering

Political Calculations Must Not Obliterate a History of National Suffering
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 10, 2015

Executive Summary: Happy Birthday Republic of China! Today, during a ceremony held before the presidential palace, military personnel, civilians, and students took part and rejoiced amidst the festive atmosphere of Double Ten. In a rare exception, ruling and opposition party leaders were in full attendance.

Full Text Below:

Happy Birthday Republic of China! Today, during a ceremony held before the presidential palace, military personnel, civilians, and students took part and rejoiced amidst the festive atmosphere of Double Ten. In a rare exception, ruling and opposition party leaders were in full attendance.

But as the history of Double Ten ceremonies shows, whether ruling and opposition leaders attend makes little difference. Political calculations will be difficult to eliminate. The presidential election is less than 100 days away. The campaign process compelled both ruling and opposition party leaders to attend the ceremonies. For this reason many see the ceremonies as pro form lip service to "one ROC, same interpretation" by parties that have different agendas. These parties actually subscribe to "one ROC, different interpretations". Imagine how loyal citizens of the Republic of China must feel? They yearn for a ceremony that bridges the chasm between blue and green.

Double Ten National Day ceremonies held since the ROC government moved to Taiwan, can be divided into two phases. During the first decade, "Oppose Chinese Communism, and resist the Soviet Union" was the watchword. A single party dominated. No real opposition existed. The nation's direction however, was crystal clear. Double Ten was celebrated universally, with jubilation. A consensus prevailed among the ruling and opposition parties. Everyone watched the National Day parade. Every house displayed the national flag. Everyone remembered those days with fond memories.

In 1991, when President Lee Teng-hui assumed power, organizers of the National Day ceremonies issued an unprecedented invitation to Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh. Huang was happy to attend. But alas, he was seated outside the VIP area. This and other factors angered Huang, who refused to attend a second time. This year, Tsai Ing-wen attended the National Day ceremonies. The last time an opposition Democratic Progressive Party Chairperson participated in a National Day ceremony was 24 years ago.

When the DPP came to power during Chen Shui-bian's first term, blue camp party chairpersons boycotted all four National Day ceremonies. The blue camp had difficulty accepting a minority president. Its doubts about green camp "backdoor listing" of the ROC have persisted. The divide between blue and green remains insurmountable. In 2005, Ma Ying-jeou became the first KMT Chairperson to attend the National Day ceremony since the change in ruling parties. In 2006, however, the full extent of Chen Shui-bian's corruption came known. That year the National Day ceremony turned into an arena for political conflict. People First Party legislators made a huge row.  Blue and green camp legislators engaged in physical scuffles, and created an international embarrassment. The following year, during the last National Day ceremony of his term, President Chen actually refused to make mention the "Republic of China". He refused to display the "Celebrate the Republic of China National Day" slogan on the presidential palace tower. He replaced it with a sign that read, "Taiwan must join the United Nations".

When the Kuomintang returned to power, the DPP chairperson also refused to attend the National Day ceremony. This year, Tsai Ing-wen eventually decided to attend. With the presidential election approaching, "maintaining the status quo" became an unexpected consensus shared by ruling and opposition parties. Front-runner Tsai Ing-wen once alleged that "The Republic of China is a government in exile". She now postures as a "champion of the ROC constitutional framework". How can she be absent on National Day? Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen has "revised her agenda" and participated in the National Day ceremony. Her attendance was facetiously characterized as "an inauguration ceremony in advance".

Imagine the National Day ceremonies next year. in the event Tsai Ing-wen becomes the star of the show. As New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming said, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, Republic of China flags were piled up like garbage following New Year's Day flag-raising and National Day ceremonies. Will such scenes be reenacted? The Kuomintang is undergoing intraparty strife. No one is asking Tsai Ing-wen how she intends to "maintain the status quo", or even what she means by "maintaining the status quo". Tsai Ing-wen and her fellow Taiwan independence supporters are already see Taiwan independence as "innate" and "natural". Their "defense" of the ROC is mere backdoor listing and expedience. How can they possibly be expected to treat the Republic of China with sincerity? Tsai Ing-wen claims that she attended the National Day ceremonies in order to end blue vs. green opposition, to work toward tolerance, reconciliation, and social unity.

The KMT probably cannot imagine what next year's National Day ceremony will look like. President Ma Ying-jeou could not conceal his embarrassment at the last Double Ten ceremony held during his administration. The impass over "removing Hung and replacing her with Chu" persists. The prospect of a head-on collision remains. Ma has no solution for internal party disunity. Ma has no power to conduct foreign policy. All Ma can do is watch power change hands, while the nation undergoes a changing of the guard. Where will the blue camp party princes who attended this year's National Day ceremonies find themselves next year? Can Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach an understanding? Can they bury the hatchet, fight shoulder to shoulder, share responsibility, and prevent the structure from collapsing? Does the KMT really intend to wait until it loses public support, then create a scene at the National Day ceremony?

The Double Ten National Day ceremony should be an event that does not distinguish between ruling or opposition party affiliation. But for the past twenty years, it has been subject to the rise and fall of ruling vs. opposition party political status, not to mention public support for sundry political stars. They have never allowed the birthday party of the ROC to be a true ceremony that the people as a whole may enjoy.

The theme of this year's National Day ceremony is "Unite in love for Taiwan. Create a new future together". It is inscribed on a gateway straddling Ketagalan Boulevard. A reviewing stand for ruling and opposition leaders has been erected in front of the Presidential Palace. This will be the last National Day ceremony held while Ma Ying-jeou is president. Both ruling and opposition parties will participate. Ruling and opposition party leaders each have their own calculations. But as we watch military personnel, civilians, and students put on their show, remember to wish the nation well.

Happy birthday, Republic of China. Long may it live!

一頁國慶滄桑史，怎堪政治算計百摧磨

2015-10-10 聯合報

中華民國，生日快樂！今天在總統府前的國慶大會上，當軍民學生一起獻上精采表演，展現歡欣鼓舞、齊賀雙十的節慶氛圍之時，朝野政黨領袖也難得齊聚，共同獻上了「全出席」的國慶大禮。

只是，翻開一頁國慶大會史，朝野領袖無論出不出席，都難脫政治考量。明年總統大選投票距今不到百日，選情的發展，催出了今年國慶大會朝野領袖共同出席的盛況。正因如此，許多人認為，那恐怕是一個典禮上「一國同表」行禮如儀，內心裡「一國各表」另有盤算的場景；但這對過生日的中華民國將情何以堪，國民期待的是一個跨越鴻溝、藍綠同慶的盛典。

中華民國政府播遷來台後的雙十國慶大會，大抵可分成兩階段。在前數十年「反共抗俄」時期，雖然一黨獨大，沒有真正像樣的在野黨，但國家方向清楚，雙十時節，「普天同慶、薄海歡騰」就是朝野的共同賀辭；而國慶看閱兵、家戶掛國旗，也早已成為全民共同記憶。

民國八十年國慶，李登輝掌總統大位時，主辦單位首次以黨主席名銜發出邀請函給當時的民進黨主席黃信介，黃也欣然出席。但因座位被安排在貴賓區外圍等原因讓黃信介不滿，此後未再出席。蔡英文今年出席國慶大會，算一算，上次在野的民進黨主席參加國慶大典，竟然已是廿四年前的事了。

至於民進黨執政時期，陳水扁第一個總統任期內的四個國慶，藍營政黨主席全數缺席。面對少數總統，藍營難以心服；中華民國被借殼的疑慮，始終未除；藍綠鴻溝，終究難以跨越。直到民國九十四年，馬英九才成為政黨輪替以來第一個參加國慶大會的國民黨主席。但隨著九十五年陳水扁貪腐案逐漸被揭發，終讓當年國慶大典成了抗爭秀場，親民黨立委大鬧會場、藍綠立委扭打衝突的難堪場面傳遍國際。翌年扁任內最後一次國慶，總統談話竟避提「中華民國」，總統府塔樓更拒掛「慶祝中華民國國慶」標語，改懸「台灣入聯」口號。

國民黨奪回政權後的國慶，民進黨主席也均未參加，今年蔡英文終於出席。隨著總統大選逼近，「維持現狀」意外成為朝野最大共識；明年最有希望入主總統府的蔡英文，縱使曾稱「中華民國是流亡政府」，但既言「中華民國憲政體制」，則中華民國國慶豈能缺席？因此，蔡英文「調整行程」，參加國慶，並被戲稱是「勝券在握、提前見習」。

那麼，想像明年此時的國慶畫面，如果蔡英文成為大典主角，新黨主席郁慕明所說，過去民進黨執政時元旦升旗、國慶大典後，中華民國國旗被參與民眾丟棄在垃圾桶、堆積如山的場景，會再度出現嗎？現在國民黨內亂方殷，已經沒人追問蔡英文要如何「維持現狀」或維持「什麼現狀」了；但蔡英文的重要課題之一，當在思考如何讓自己及其把台獨當「基因」或「天然成分」的支持者，摒棄權宜或借殼心態，真誠對待中華民國。這樣，蔡英文所稱盼藉出席國慶典禮，終結藍綠對立，用包容、和解來團結社會的目的，庶幾能逐漸達成。

至於國民黨，大概已經不敢想像明年此時的國慶畫面了。馬英九總統任內的最後一個雙十慶典，難掩尷尬。「抽柱換朱」僵局未解，火車對撞危機猶存，對內團結無方，對外征戰無力，眼看政權拱手，江山易幟，今年在國慶觀禮台上的藍營天王諸將，明年安在？朱立倫和洪秀柱如果不能相互諒解，放棄前嫌，並肩作戰，共同承擔，扶大廈之將傾，難道要等到社稷不奉，再度以鬧場秀的方式出席國慶大典？

雙十國慶大會，原應是不分黨派、顏色，朝野共同參與的慶祝盛會，但廿多年來，卻始終隨著政局起伏與朝野易位而迭生枝節，更不要說是受這些政治菁英影響的廣大支持群眾，都讓中華民國的生日派對，始終缺乏真正朝野共賀、全民同歡的氣氛。

今年國慶大會「齊心愛台灣、共創新未來」主軸的大牌樓，早在凱達格蘭大道矗立；朝野領袖齊聚的觀禮台，也已在總統府前架好，國慶大會政治大秀舞台準備就緒。難得馬英九執政的最後一次國慶，朝野同賀；雖然朝野領袖各懷政治盤算，但在觀賞軍民學生的歡樂表演時，莫忘國民最誠摯的祝願：

中華民國，生日快樂，國祚延綿！

Inadequate Internationalization Lethal for Higher Education on Taiwan

Inadequate Internationalization Lethal for Higher Education on Taiwan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2015

Executive Summary: A few days ago, The Times "Higher Education" supplement published its global university rankings for 2016. Twenty-four universities on Taiwan made the list. But their overall performance was far from satisfactory, National Taiwan University fell 13 places to 167th.  Tsinghua University, National Chiao Tung University , National Cheng Kung University fell even further, to 41st, 58th, and 73rd places respectively. Only the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, the leading technical and vocational institute on Taiwan, rose 25 places to 333rd, surpassing National Chiao Tung University and National Cheng Kung University. We must of course face the ugly truth. But in doing so, we must also be prudent. Education is a long term project. It must be carefully considered. We must not draw hasty conclusions or make ill-considered decisions.

Full Text Below:

A few days ago, The Times "Higher Education" supplement published its global university rankings for 2016. Twenty-four universities on Taiwan made the list. But their overall performance was far from satisfactory, National Taiwan University fell 13 places to 167th.  Tsinghua University, National Chiao Tung University , National Cheng Kung University fell even further, to 41st, 58th, and 73rd places respectively. Only the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, the leading technical and vocational institute on Taiwan, rose 25 places to 333rd, surpassing National Chiao Tung University and National Cheng Kung University. We must of course face the ugly truth. But in doing so, we must also be prudent. Education is a long term project. It must be carefully considered. We must not draw hasty conclusions or make ill-considered decisions.

According to The TImes official website, the survey adopted five criterion: teaching, research, dissertations, internationalization, and corporate sponsorship. The first three criteria accounted for 30% of the score. The latter two criteria accounted for 7.5% and 2.5% of the score respectively. Taiwan performed poorly according to all criteria. Only NTU received over 50 points for education, and 100 points for corporate contributions. National Chiao Tung University and Tai Keda received over 90 points. But 2.5% in weighted rankings failed to raise its final standing. Taiwan ranked lowest overal in internationalization. National Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University scored 38.1 points and 27.7 points. The University of Singapore ranked first in Asia for internationalization. It received 96.2 points. The University of Hong Kong received 99.5 points, a near perfect score. The shortfall between Taiwan and others is excessive. The same problem plagues Japan. The University of Tsukuba received 34.4 points. The University of Tokyo received 30.3 points. Japan's ranking also fell.

The internationalization index was only 7.5%. It was divided into three categories: internationalization of faculty, internationalization of students, and internationalization of cooperation. These indices put a non-English-speaking society and an island "nation" with limited resources at a disadvantage. But these bear on the previous categories. Teaching, research, and dissertations conducted in languages other than English suffer. For example, the colonial experience of Hong Kong and Singapore make English the most widely used language in society. Large numbers of English textbooks and books in other original languages are used. Internationalization is much easier to implement there than on Taiwan. English research is published in international journals. This enables much greater internationalization than on Taiwan. Rankings for many traditional schools in Japan, Korea and other countries have fallen over the years for this reason. If our government no longer values university internationalization, Taiwan's ranking will fall even more.

Last September, Japan's Ministry of Education declared that 13 schools would implement key reforms. Entrance exams would include TOEFL aptitude tests. The ratio of foreign teachers would be increased to 50%. The ratio of foreign language classes would be increased to 20%. Annual salaries for teachers would be increased as well. Outstanding teachers would receive special awards. These measures constitute responses to crises in internationalization. They warrant our consideration.

The provision and creation of internationalized education are closely related. The international battle for international scholars is especially critical. University professor salaries on Taiwan lag far behind international standards. Last year Saudi-Arabia offered 10 million NT annual salaries. This, plus dormitories and laboratories, lured several professors away from National Taiwan University. Mainland China spent lavishly to attract international talent. In fact, Peking University and Tsinghua University have recruited hundreds of talented teachers since 2001. They introduced Yang Chen-ning and other Nobel Prize winners to Tsinghua and Peking. They invited more than a dozen Nobel Prize winners to act as lecturers. These are critical to high scores in internationalization.

In recent years famous schools on the Mainland have received full government support. They have also been provided abundant external resources. The the ENN Group donated 300 million RMB to Peking University this year. It provided incentives to outstanding teachers for industry academia cooperation. No wonder Peking University has scored 100 points for two consecutive years for corporate contributions.

By contrast, Taiwan is stretched to the limit. As NTU Vice President Chen Liang-chi said, "International exchanges require us to actually go out, or others to actually come in. If we lack funds, then phone calls and emails will not lead to true internationalization. As an old addage advises, "Upon encountering a man of virtue, strive to become his equal." Taiwan must provide government resources. It must establish corporate foundations. Corporate resources will attract world-class teachers and raise the academic standing of our universities.

The government once established world-class universities. It invested 50 billion dollars over five years. It enabled key domestic universities to enage in leading edge research and teaching. But in recent years, Ministry of Education funding has been slashed. Generous financial support once enabled the world to participate in University Union conferences. Now only a handful are able to participate. Our international prestige and academic exposure have naturally declined.

Society is responsible for our inadequate internationalization. We must ask ourselves why people have neglected the need for internationalization. Singapore's high degree of internationalization is attributable to its use of English as an official language. It is also the result of television coverage of international news in English, and Singaporean society concern for political, economic, and social developments the world over.

Taiwan television cares only about "native" tempests in teapots. The public lacks exposure to international news. Society lacks appreciation for the vital importance of internationalization.

國際化不足 害慘台灣高等教育

2015年10月08日 中國時報

日前《泰晤士報》高等教育特刊（Times Higher Education）公布2016年最新全球大學排名，台灣雖然高達24所大學進入排名，但整體表現並不理想，台大倒退13名，成為第167名，清華、交大、成大排名下滑速度更是驚人，分別退步41、58、73名。表現較為優異的只有技職龍頭台科大，逆勢上揚25名，排名333，超越交大及成大。面對殘酷事實當然必須檢討，但檢討時要審慎，教育為國家百年基業，必須慎思明辨，避免即興式藥方與決策。

根據官方網站指出，該項調查主要是以各校教學、研究、論文引用、國際化程度、企業捐贈共5項指標來進行分析。前3項各占30%，後兩項分別占7.5%及2.5%。台灣在各項評比中，表現都不好。教學只有台大超過50分，企業捐贈雖然成大拿100分，交大與台科大都超過90分，但評比權重僅有2.5%，並無法大幅拉升排名。整體來看，台灣最差的是國際化程度，最好是台師大的38.1分，台大只有27.7分。相對亞洲排名第一的新加坡大學國際化程度為96.2分，香港大學逼近滿分水準（99.5分），差距實在很大。同樣問題也出現在日本，國際化表現最好的是筑波大學34.4分，東京大學則僅有30.3分，日本的排名也上不去。

雖然國際化指標占比才7.5%，且又分為國際教師、國際學生、國際合作等三部分。這些項目對非英語系社會且資源有限的島國的確不利。但這些部分其實都會影響到前面3項的評比。因為教學、研究、論文引用，若不是使用英語，都會吃大虧。例如在教學方面，由於香港及新加坡本身的殖民歷史與經驗，英語是社會廣泛使用的語言。大量的英語授課及原文書使用，也讓其國際化程度明顯優於台灣。研究成果在英文的國際期刊刊登，成果展示及學界互相引用自然多有幫助。日、韓等國的許多傳統名校，這幾年排名下滑，都是此原因。我國若不再加以重視提升大學國際化，未來可能會讓台灣的排名持續落後。

日本文部科學省去年9月宣示政策，鎖定13所名校進行重點改革，如要將入學考增加TOEFL等能力測驗，外國教師比率提高到半數，外語授課比率五分之一，提高年薪制教師比率，對表現優異教師特別獎勵，都是反映對國際化危機的對策，值得我們學習。

因為給予學生國際化教育，誰來創造國際化教育，都息息相關。這其中最關鍵的更是國際間互相搶國際學者的問題。台灣的大學教授薪水遠低於國際水準，去年沙烏地阿拉伯就開出年薪千萬、外加宿舍及實驗室建置條件，挖走數名台大教授。對比對岸的中國大陸挖掘國際人才是花錢不手軟。事實上北京大學、清華大學聘任大師，自2001年清華大學啟動百名人才引進計畫，聘請楊振寧等諾貝爾大師級人物進駐清華園，而北京大學也邀請十多位諾貝爾獎得主擔任講座，這都是讓國際化得分的重要關鍵。

這幾年大陸的重點學校，不僅政府全力支援，外界也提供相當豐沛的資源。例如大陸新奧集團今年就一口氣捐贈3億人民幣給北京大學，提供獎勵給北京大學優秀教師用於產學合作。難怪北京大學已連續兩年在企業捐贈上得分100分。

相形之下，我們社會實在捉襟見肘。誠如台大副校長陳良基所言：「國際交流需要實際走出去，或邀請對方走進來，沒錢的話，光靠打電話、寫E-mail，不可能達到真正國際化。」見賢思齊，未來台灣除了政府資源挹注外，也應該積極透過企業設立基金會，透過企業的資源與力量，吸引國際級大師，提升國內大學學術地位與聲望。

過去政府為建設世界級的頂尖大學，投入5年500億資源，讓國內重點大學有較多的資源做拔尖的研究與教學。但近年教育部大砍頂尖大學經費，過去在頂大經費支持下，幾乎世界所有大學聯盟會議都能參加，如今只能選擇性參加，國際聲望和學術曝光自然下滑。

國際化不足，社會也有責任。我們必須檢討國人長期忽略國際化的原因。新加坡之所以國際化程度高，除了英語為官方語言外，電視媒體也經常報導國際新聞，關注各國在政治、經濟、社會的重大議題，凸顯出新加坡重視國際化的程度。

台灣電視只關心本土茶壺風暴的談話節目，民眾自然無法吸收到國際性相關新聞。社會就不會體會國際化的重要性。