Monday, February 15, 2016

Establish a New Cross-Strait Relationship: Listen to Each Other

Establish a New Cross-Strait Relationship: Listen to Each Other
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 16, 2016


Executive Summary: Listening to each other is essential. Asking the Mainland to listen to public opinion on Taiwan is not unreasonable. The public on Taiwan should also listen to the views of Mainland academics and the Mainland public. In particular, people on Taiwan must attempt to understand people on the Mainland. They must attempt to understand their desire for national reunification, and their passion for national rejuvenation. People on Taiwan must not adopt the attitude that what happens on the Mainland has nothing to do with them. They must not adopt a sarcastic, mocking attitude toward the Mainland. 

Full Text Below:

As long predicted, Tsai Ing-wen has been elected president. Yet none of the parties are prepared to deal with a Tsai Ing-wen administration. The red and green political camps have no basis on which they can interact. Tsai Ing-wen has no intention of accepting the 1992 Consensus. The Mainland has shut down official communication channels. It is waiting to hear what Tsai Ing-wen says during her 5/20 Inaugural Address. Cross-Strait relations are now deadlocked. Mainland academics concerned with the Taiwan question are issuing stronger calls for reunification, even military reunification. This was unheard of during the last eight years. The public on Taiwan needs to realize what is at stake.

Calls for reunification, even military reunification, prior to the election, may have been merely "the ground will move and the mountains will shake” type warnings. But the election results have shown that these warnings were for naught. Many Mainland academics now call for military reunification. This is a reminder that the gap between public opinion on the two sides is wide. In the past, the Mainland authorities kept a lid on "anti-Taiwan" speech. Will this still be true in the future?

Given current public sentiment on Taiwan, pro-reunification and pro-military reunification rhetoric comes across as especially harsh. It provokes a backlash on Taiwan. The Mainland has long limited Taiwan's international breathing room. It has refused to recognize the Republic of China. Many on Taiwan already feel hostility toward the Mainland. They are unwilling to say anything positive about the Mainland. During the Tainan earthquake, both the Mainland and Japan contributed money and dispatched rescue teams to Taiwan. But Japan got rave reviews, while Mainland goodwill was deliberately ignored. The Mainland is understandably unhappy about this discriminatory treatment. But why was this the case? How can this social psychological bias be changed?

Many members of the public on Taiwan acknowledge the two sides' historical, cultural, and kinship links. They realize the Mainland offers a bright future. But cross-Strait clashes remain frequent. Radical rhetoric from the Mainland makes people unwilling to deal confront the Mainland. It makes them shun the Mainland. These people are not pro-Taiwan independence by nature. They have not adopted radical political stances. Many have high hopes for the Mainland, and harbor goodwill towards the Mainland. But even they are discomfited by such radical rhetoric.

The public on Taiwan has feelings for the Republic of China. It also has a clear sense of national identity. If the Mainland cannot address this, conflicts will constantly arise. They may explode at any time. In other words, if the Mainland truly wishes to win over the public on Taiwan, the most important thing may not be concessions, but merely listening to what the public has to say.

Many on Taiwan hope the Mainland will understand their thinking. They hope the Mainland will understand their sense of identity and their feelings. These directly affect their perception of the Mainland. Mainland academics need to realize that the public on Taiwan longs for peace, and opposes war. Taiwan's democratization and civil society are sources of pride. Taiwan has actively participated in international aid operations. Safeguarding world peace is a national consensus. This social psychology means that the public on Taiwan opposes war as a means for settling disputes. On issues concerning the future of the two sides, the public on Taiwan is even more strenuously opposed to military solutions.

Under the circumstances, if Mainland academics constantly demand military reunification, they will collide head on with mainstream public opinion on Taiwan. This will not be helpful to understanding among people on either side. This proposition may be true or false. But the public on Taiwan already considers it politically incorrect.

Think tanks and academic on both sides have dialogued intensively over the past eight years. But when dealing with basic postures and future prospects, they often talk past each other. They reaffirm their own positions while ignoring each other's. Both Mainland and Taiwan academics reiterate their own arguments, but turn a deaf ear to the other's. Some academics may listen to opposing views. But for the most part they argue their own case, and refuse to accept the other side's ideas. The result is that despite prolonged exchanges, the two sides have not really reached an understanding. Today, calls for military reunification are heard everywhere. This shows that cross-Strait exchanges between academics and think tanks have not enabled the Mainland to understand the Taiwan public's core concerns.

We hope that Mainland think tanks and academics concerned with the Taiwan question will realize the importance of public opinion. Public opinion can overturn political order. In order to win hearts and minds on Taiwan, the Mainland must first understand it. Actually, Mainland academics have greater flexibility. They lack official status. Therefore they can more readily get in touch with grassroots society. They can listen to ordinary people on Taiwan, and translate what they learn directly into policy. If Mainland policy toward Taiwan can address the core concerns of the public on Taiwan, its policies will be more accurate and effective.

Listening to each other is essential. Asking the Mainland to listen to public opinion on Taiwan is not unreasonable. The public on Taiwan should also listen to the views of Mainland academics and the Mainland public. In particular, people on Taiwan must attempt to understand people on the Mainland. They must attempt to understand their desire for national reunification, and their passion for national rejuvenation. People on Taiwan must not adopt the attitude that what happens on the Mainland has nothing to do with them. They must not adopt a sarcastic, mocking attitude toward the Mainland. Hostility between the people on Taiwan and the Mainland may then cool, enabling mutual understanding. If such a give and take between people on the two sides can take place, cross-Strait peace can  be ensured.

彼此傾聽才能開創兩岸新局
20160216 中國時報

蔡英文當選總統早在各方預料之中,但若說各方已做好應對蔡英文時代的準備,則未免過於樂觀。綠紅互動的政治基礎問題至今無解,蔡英文無意接受九二共識,大陸官方則關閉溝通管道,靜待蔡英文520就職演說出牌。在兩岸關係陷入僵局之際,大陸涉台學界與網路卻出現愈來愈緊促的促統言論,甚至熱炒武統論述,這是過去8年所少見,台灣需謹慎以對。

選前出現促統或武統聲音,某種程度可以解讀為配合「地動山搖說」的警告,選舉結果已證明這種警告無濟於事,卻仍有很多人繼續發出武統的聲音,這就不得不提醒人們,兩岸民意落差非常巨大。過去是大陸官方控制了「反台」言論,未來呢?

在當下台灣社會氛圍之下,促統與武統的聲音顯得格外刺耳,對台灣民意的刺激作用也愈發強烈。長久以來,大陸打壓台灣的國際空間以及不承認中華民國的存在,已經讓很多台灣民眾對大陸產生強烈的敵意,甚至不願看到大陸的任何正面訊息,此次台南大地震,同樣是捐款和派遣援助團隊,日本就得到如潮的好評,大陸的善意卻被刻意忽略。這種厚此薄彼的作法,大陸方面當然有理由不滿,但也需要反思的是,為何會出現這種情況?該如何改變這種社會心理傾向?

對很多台灣民眾來說,雖然認同兩岸的歷史、文化和血緣連結,也承認大陸有著廣闊的發展前景,但卻因為常常出現的兩岸衝突,特別是大陸的激進言論,而不願面對大陸,甚至避之唯恐不及。這些人並非天然獨,政治立場也不激進,有很多人甚至對大陸抱持著善意,但即便是這類人群,面對這類激進言論,與大陸交往往往也感到不舒服。

對台灣人來說,他們對中華民國抱有感情,也有明確的國家認同,如果大陸方面不能加以正視,這種衝突就會時時存在,甚至可能隨時引爆衝突。換句話說,大陸要想真正贏得台灣的民心,最重要的可能不是讓利,而是傾聽台灣民間的聲音。

很多台灣民眾希望大陸能夠了解他們的真實想法,更希望大陸能夠理解他們的認同與情感,這直接牽涉到他們對大陸的觀感。除此之外,大陸學界也需意識到台灣社會對和平的嚮往,以及對戰爭的深切厭惡。台灣實現民主化多年,民間社會多以台灣是一個和平之島而驕傲,台灣積極參與國際援助行動,致力於維護世界和平已經是全民共識,在這種社會心理影響下,台灣民眾普遍反對用戰爭手段解決爭端,涉及兩岸未來前景的問題上,台灣民眾更是強烈反對武力解決。

在這種情況下,大陸學界若不斷強調武統,則正好與台灣社會的主流民意背道而馳,對兩岸民間的互諒互讓根本毫無助益。且不論這種言論的道理和邏輯何在,其在台灣民眾看來,已經天然的政治不正確。

遺憾的是,兩岸智庫和學界雖然在這8年有了極其深入的互動,但卻涉及在根本立場和兩岸未來前途的問題上,常常還是停留在各說各話、宣示立場階段,無論是大陸還是台灣方面的學者,都不斷陳述己方的論點,卻對對方的觀點充耳不聞。有的學者或許會聽取對方的意見,但更主要的還是從自己的角度做解釋和說服的工作,卻未想過接受對方的想法。其導致的結果就是,交流如此之久,雙方卻並未真正實現互諒互讓。如今武統言論四起,恰恰證明兩岸學界和智庫交流還是沒有從根本上讓大陸了解台灣社會的核心關切。

我們希望大陸涉台學界和智庫,能夠意識到台灣民意的重要性,在這個民意反轉政治的年代,要想贏得台灣民心,必須真正意識到台灣的民意。事實上,大陸學界有更大的靈活性,也因為沒有直接的官方身分可以更為便利的深入台灣社會基層,傾聽台灣普通民眾的想法,並將這些想法轉化成政策形成的直接依據。如果大陸的對台政策能夠更多的觸及台灣民眾的核心關切,那麼其政策效果無疑可以更為精確、高效。

互相傾聽非常重要,只要求大陸傾聽台灣民意並不公平,台灣也應正面看待大陸學界乃至民間社會有關台灣問題的真實想法,尤其是渴望統一、渴望實現民族復興的熾熱情感。如果台灣社會不再抱持事不關己,甚至冷嘲熱諷的態度,台灣民間跟大陸民間的敵意螺旋或許會逐漸消弭,兩岸民間的互諒互讓才會有實現的契機,一旦這種互諒互讓的正向循環啟動,兩岸和平就可確保了。


Sunday, February 14, 2016

Taiwan Cannot Remain Blind to Global Crisis

Taiwan Cannot Remain Blind to Global Crisis
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 15, 2016


Executive Summary: We have no intention of being alarmist. Taiwan does not lack competitive advantages. But we cannot draw lines around ourselves. We cannot assume that we are the center of the world, and that others must revolve around us. The Ma administration used stable cross-Strait relations to engage in pragmatic international diplomacy. The new government turns a blind eye to this. The upstart green regime seems convinced that recognizing the Republic of China constitutional framework was a generous concession, and that the 1992 Consensus is merely a bargaining chip. It assumes it can deal with international issues using domestic political tricks. It will soon learn this is not the case.

Full Text Below:

The nine day Chinese New Year holiday has ended. The rescue effort at the collapsed Weiguan Jinlong housing complex has concluded. Disaster relief and assignment of responsibility have now begun. Nature is ruthless. Man is compassionate. During the rescue all eyes were focused on the earthquake in southern Taiwan. "We were all citizens of Tainan". Every life that was saved, touched the hearts of all 23 million people on Taiwan. Everyone who took part in the search and rescue effort, including emergency medical technicians and volunteers, earned the peoples' admiration.

But the world did not stop turning merely because we experienced a disaster. The world outside continued to change and affect our destiny. Perhaps now is an appropriate time to turn our attention to the world outside Taiwan, especially the political and economic struggles swirling in Taiwan's immediate vicinity. These have never ceased, and are highly detrimental to Taiwan's future. Yet the public on Taiwan remains completely oblivious.

During the brief holiday, North Korea conducted surprise nuclear tests and missile launches. South Korea responded by closing down the Kaesong Industrial Zone jointly operated by the two Koreas. Washington and Seoul seized the opportunity to consult on the Sad anti-missile system, provoking a fierce reaction from Beijing. The US Federal Reserve System warned that the global economy will be plunged into a new recession. Europe and Japan continue to show negative interest rates, hurting banking industry profits. The value of the US Dollar, as well as prices for oil and other raw materials continued to fall. Investors are losing confidence. Stock markets are plunging the world over. Both changes affect the international political and economic picture. Neither is good news for Taiwan.

One bit of news impacts Taiwan directly. Susan A. Thornton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asian-Pacific Affairs, spoke to the US Congress. She said Tsai Ing-wen reiterated her intention to maintain the status quo, and acknowledged her obligation to maintain peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. She said Tsai Ing-wen intend to cooperate with Beijing, and would attempt to deal with cross-Strait relations in the same manner as Ma Ying-jeou. Thornton said that when Secretary of State John Kerry met with Mainland President Xi Jinping in Beijing late last month, he expressed a strong desire to see stable cross-Strait exchanges continue. Mainland officials however, said they first needed to hear what Tsai Ing-wen had to say.

On the surface, the holiday message from Washington contained little of substance. But Washington took the initiative to talk with both Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping. This was unusual. As we all know, Tsai has stressed repeatedly that she hopes to "maintain the status quo". Beijing however, has told Tsai Ing-wen it is still waiting for an unequivocal answer. As several Mainland academics have put it, "The ball is in the DPP's court". The situation is crystal clear. Tsai Ing-wen must recognize the 1992 Consensus or an acceptable alternative. For Beijing, the 1992 Consensus, or "both sides are part of one China" was the basis for cross-Strait interaction over the past eight years. If the new government makes clear its refusal to recognize this, then nothing else will matter. Disingenuous sophistry such as "seeking common ground while shelving differences", "the spirit of 1992", or "historical fact" will be considered unilaterally changing the status quo. Once the one China premise is gone, cross-Strait relations will revert to what they were eight years ago. They will, at the very least, remain uncertain for a very long time.

If the political and economic situation in the world, particularly East Asia, was stable, a little uncertainty in cross-Strait relations would not be so serious. But it is not, therefore everyone is at risk. The confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has escalated. Some predict the emergence of a “New Cold War".  That may sound alarmist. But given the history of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan cannot remain aloof. And we have yet to mention the South China Sea, where disputes have intensified, and where Taiwan has even less chance of remaining apart. In this complex Great Game of Nations, any misstep by Taiwan will result in catastrophe.

Even more troubling is global financial and stock market risk, as well as larger scale international economic competition. This competition is just as brutal. Earlier this month, the trade ministers of 12 nations finally met in Atlanta to discuss the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Taiwan expressed a willingness to participate. But was stopped by the US pork imports issue. A short term breakthrough is unlikely. Meanwhile, economic integration in East Asia is being led by the Mainland. Southeast Asia, Australia, and South Korea have signed one free trade agreement (FTA) after another. FTA negotiations between the Mainland and Japan are also ongoing. The comparative advantages of regional trade have impacted Taiwan. Taiwan is plagued by political turmoil. The Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations face a long legislative process.  The fate of follow-up agreements to ECFA, the STA, and the MTA also remains uncertain. Taiwan cannot join the already started AIIB. Put bluntly, Taiwan has been shut out of several waves of East Asian economic integration. Once the global economy recovers, the rules of the game will be unfavorable to Taiwan. Our competitiveness will probably fall to new lows.
 
We have no intention of being alarmist. Taiwan does not lack competitive advantages. But we cannot draw lines around ourselves. We cannot assume that we are the center of the world, and that others must revolve around us. The Ma administration used stable cross-Strait relations to engage in pragmatic international diplomacy. The new government turns a blind eye to this. The upstart green regime seems convinced that recognizing the Republic of China constitutional framework was a generous concession, and that the 1992 Consensus is merely a bargaining chip. It assumes it can deal with international issues using domestic political tricks. It will soon learn this is not the case.

世局險惡 台灣不能裝沒看見
20160215 中國時報

9天年假結束,台南維冠大樓倒塌現場也搜救完畢,救災進入善後與究責階段,蒼天無情,人間有愛,搶救階段全台目光幾乎都鎖定南台大地震,「我們都是台南人」,每個生命的折損與獲救都牽動台灣2300萬人的心,每一個在現場的搜救、醫護人員與義工都讓人感佩。

不過,世界並不會因我們發生災難而停止運轉,外面仍在繼續變動,並影響你我的命運。現在或許是一個恰當的時機,讓我們把目光轉向台灣四周,關注一下世局,特別是台灣周遭的政經博弈,一刻都未停止,而且都朝對台灣不利的方向發展。但台灣的主流思維,似乎並不在意這種發展。

就在年假這幾天,朝鮮半島形勢因為北韓無預警的啟動核試、射飛彈,導致南韓關閉兩韓合作的開城工業區,美、韓順勢啟動「薩德」反飛彈系統協商議程,激起北京激烈的反應。另一方面,美國聯準會警告全球將陷入新一波的經濟風險,歐洲、日本相繼實施負利率影響銀行業獲利,加上美元下跌、油價等原物料價格續跌等因素,各國投資人信心脆弱,全球股市都慘跌。這兩個涉及國際政治與經濟的變局,對台灣都不是好消息。

與台灣直接有關的訊息,則是美國國務院亞太副助理國務卿董雲裳日前在國會眾院聽證會上指出,蔡英文曾向美方重申會持續維持現狀,也了解持續追求讓兩岸關係和平穩定的義務;同時,蔡英文打算和北京當局合作,試著持續馬英九處理兩岸關係的方式。董雲裳同時也提及,國務卿凱瑞於上個月底在北京會晤大陸國家主席習近平時,曾強烈表達希望見到兩岸穩定與交流持續下去;中方官員則表示,要看看蔡英文就此會提出什麼建議。

表面看來,美方在年假期間所釋出的上述訊息,所傳遞的實質內涵並不多,但美方會主動將其與蔡英文及習近平的對話內容對外公布,還是有其不尋常的暗示與提醒。國人都清楚,蔡英文曾不只一次強調會「維持現狀」,北京卻繼續重申,還在等待蔡英文如何表態,正如許多大陸學者明示「球在民進黨手上」。其中關鍵很清楚,就是蔡英文究竟還承不承認九二共識,或有其他可接受的替代方案。對北京當局而言,「九二共識」或「兩岸同屬一中」,是過去8年兩岸互動交流的基礎,一旦新政府表明不承認,無論「求同存異」、「九二精神」、「歷史事實」之類的修辭遊戲,對北京而言,無疑就是片面的「改變現狀」,一旦一中的前提不復存在,兩岸關係就算不會倒回到8年前,恐怕也會陷入一段很長期的不確定階段。

如果目前全球乃至東亞的政經局勢是穩定的,台灣處在兩岸關係不確定的風險中,或許還有些許自主遊走的空間,但目前的全球乃至東亞,全都處在不確定風險中。朝鮮半島形勢激化,有論者預言「新冷戰」將復燃,雖說有些危言聳聽,但證諸歷史只要朝鮮半島出狀況,台灣從來都不可能完全置身事外,更不必說已經激化的南海爭議,台灣更是無所逃於天地之間,在這場複雜的大國博弈中,台灣走錯任何一步,都會陷入進退失據的境地。

更麻煩的是,全球金融與股市風險的背後,還有一場更大規模的國際經濟賽局,這場賽局同樣殘酷。趕在年前亦就是本月初,12國的貿易部長終於在美國亞特蘭大就「跨太平洋夥伴協定」(TPP)達成協議,台灣雖數度表達參與意願,卻卡在美豬議題上,短期內要突破障礙恐不樂觀。與此同時,以大陸為首的東亞經濟整合正逐漸發酵,繼東南亞之後,中韓與中澳自由貿易協定(FTA)陸續洽簽完成,中日FTA談判亦已端上檯面,區域貿易的比較優勢已經衝擊到台灣,偏偏台灣因為政治紛擾,除了得面對「兩岸監督條例」漫長立法進程,後續的服貿、貨貿兩大協定的審查更是面臨高度不確定,加上已經啟動的亞投行根本沒台灣玩的份,講得直白一些,目前東亞刻正在緊密進行的幾波經濟整合賽局,台灣全都被排除在外,嘗試想想,一旦全球景氣復甦,台灣處在不利的遊戲規則下,競爭力恐怕還會再一路探底。

無意危言聳聽,台灣並非全無競爭優勢,問題在於不能畫地自限,錯以為自己是世界的中心,別人都得繞著你轉,馬政府藉由穩健的兩岸關係所打開的活路外交,在新政府眼中彷彿不值一提,綠朝新貴們堅信,承認中華民國憲政體制是最大讓步,九二共識是一個可以討價還價的籌碼,將黨派立場凌駕國際觀思維,恐將很快面臨嚴酷的考驗。

Thursday, February 4, 2016

Whose “Republic of China Constitutional Framework"?

Whose “Republic of China Constitutional Framework"?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2016


Executive Summary: If President Tsai wants to stabilize cross-Strait relations and promote progress, she must prove she is not who she was under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. She must prove she is different from "Chairman Tsai". How will the DPP or Tsai Executive Yuan version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations define cross-Strait relations? How will they respond to radical Taiwan independence demands for “one country on each side”? That will be the acid test.

Full Text Below:

The newly elected legislature has decided to make the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations its top priority. But past green camp proposals, included several versions which used the "two states theory" to define cross-Strait relations. This is clearly unacceptable to the other side. If the DPP, which now holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, presents such a draft, the two-states theory will lead to international and cross-Strait tensions. Is this what will happen?

Just before the presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen promised the public on Taiwan and Washington that she would not provoke a crisis in cross-Strait relations. She promised to "maintain the status quo". Although she deliberately repudiated the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations", she promised to deal with cross-Strait relations according to the "ROC constitutional framework".

These words may appear reassuring. But are they? The ROC Constitution defines the two sides as internal regions within the Republic of China. The two regions are the "Free Area" and the "Mainland Area". The constitution does not preclude future national reunification. Lee Teng-hui's "two-states theory" or Chen Shui-bian's "one country on each side theory" will probably not reappear.

But lest we forget, proponents of the two-states theory have long invoked their own perverse interpretation of the ROC constitutional framework. They define cross-Strait relations as "special state to state relations". In July 1999, President Lee Teng-hui spoke to reporters from Deutsche Welle. He said "Since the 1991 Constitutional Amendment, cross-Strait relations have been defined as nation to nation relations, or at least special state to state relations... Since the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, it has always been an independent and sovereign state. After the 1991 constitutional amendments, cross-Strait relations became relations between countries, therefore it is no longer necessary to declare Taiwan independence."

On August 1, 1999, the MAC stressed that "one China" is "future tense". It said the current situation is a "special state to state relationship". It claimed that President Lee's position "maintains the status quo, and does not change the status quo". As we can see, according to President Lee's definition, the status quo is “two states".

In 2005, the ROC underwent a change in ruling parties. President Chen Shui-bian promised that he "would not incorporate the two-states theory into the constitution". He seemed to be demonstrating good faith toward the Beijing authorities. But he insisted that “the status quo is two nations”. He didn't make any actual concessions. Later, President Chen shouted "one country on each side", and froze the "National Unification Guidelines". That too was unconstitutional.

Then Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-wen, also spoke in May 2005. She said “special state to state relations is a good proposal that creates a new framework for the two sides, but unfortunately remains misunderstood by the Chinese Communist Party. The new government will no longer mention the two-states theory, but that does not change the facts". As we can see, the two-states theory was no longer mentioned, but nevertheless remained the Chen government's obdurate stance. On August 3 that same year, Chairman Tsai said '… based on cultural and economic proximity, the people of Taiwan have only one option – to establish a meaningful political relations with the Chinese mainland, and a five to ten year long system for coexistence and common prosperity, in short, a "future one China". '

This, apparently, is Chairman Tsai's stance on "eventual unification" and a "future one China". Many people may have forgotten Tsai Ing-wen said these things. Closer scrutiny however shows that she has carefully provided herself with several giant loopholes. For example, what are "meaningful political relations", and "systems for coexistence"? Is so-called "meaningful political relations" the same as "one China"? What is the relationship between a "future one China", "meaningful political relations" and a "system of coexistence"? These phrases are giant legal loopholes. They may provide more options in cross-Strait relations. But they also allow Tsai to "transform" or "change directions" upon whim. These purposely equivocal phrases enable the Tsai government to move forward, but also to retreat upon whim. Just how will she ultimately interpret these clearly self-contradictory promises?

Under the Ma administration, the "status quo" was defined as "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force". The "ROC constitutional framework" was defined as "one China equals the Republic of China". Also, the Ma administration reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations”. Tsai Ing-wen by contrast, interprets the status quo as "special state to state relations". She interprets “one China” as a "future one China". This means that currently there is no “one China”, but instead only “one nation on each side". Tsai Ing-wen appears to have made many solemn promises, but in fact she has made no promises whatsoever. Recently the DPP has denounced the 1992 Consensus and "one China" as pure evil. Will the Tsai government really perform an about face after taking office, and abide by the Ma government's interpretation of the constitution?

If President Tsai wants to stabilize cross-Strait relations and promote progress, she must prove she is not who she was under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. She must prove she is different from "Chairman Tsai". How will the DPP or Tsai Executive Yuan version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations define cross-Strait relations? How will they respond to radical Taiwan independence demands for “one country on each side”? That will be the acid test.

Will President Tsai revert to “Chairman Tsai"? Or will she change her position to match President Ma's on “maintaining the status quo"? Will she abandon the "two states theory" and reaffirm a "future one China"? We will have to wait and see.

誰的「中華民國憲政體制」?
2016-02-05聯合報

新國會已決定將「兩岸協議監督條例」當作優先法案。然而,綠營方面先前的提案,有若干版本都是以「兩國論」來定位兩岸關係,顯然不可能為對岸所接受。立法院多數黨若提出這樣的草案,也極可能如當年「兩國論」一般引起國際與兩岸的緊張關係。這種局面會發生嗎?

回顧總統大選前,蔡英文極力向台灣社會與美國擔保,絕不在兩岸關係上挑釁,一切都會「維持現狀」。雖然她刻意諱言「九二共識」與「一中各表」,但會依「中華民國憲政體制」來處理兩岸關係。

這些話語,聽似讓人放心。因為中華民國憲法將兩岸界定為「中華民國」內部的「自由地區」與「大陸地區」,並且不排斥將來的國家統一。就此而言,李登輝時期的「兩國論」或陳水扁所宣稱的「一邊一國」應該不會重現。

但別忘了,當年兩國論的倡議者,本來就是依據他們對「中華民國憲政體制」的特殊解釋,將兩岸定位為「特殊國與國關係」。李登輝總統於一九九九年七月接受「德國之聲」專訪時,有以下表示:「一九九一年修憲以來,已將兩岸關係定位在國家與國家,至少是特殊的國與國的關係 ……中華民國從一九一二年建立以來,一直都是主權獨立的國家,又在一九九一年的修憲後,兩岸關係定位在特殊的國與國關係,所以並沒有再宣布台灣獨立的必要。」

其後,陸委會在一九九九年八月一日強調,「一個中國」乃是指「未來」;至於現狀,則是「特殊國與國關係」。其更指出,李總統的立場乃是「陳述現狀,不是改變現狀」。可見,在當年李總統的定義下,「現狀」就是「兩國」。

二○○○年五月政權輪替,陳水扁總統宣示「不推動兩國論入憲」,看似對中共釋出善意,但在「現狀就是兩國」上,並無任何退讓。後來陳總統喊出「一邊一國」,並終止「國統綱領」,也都沒有修憲。

而時任陸委會主委的蔡英文,也在二○○○年五月表示,「特殊國與國關係是為開創兩岸新架構的好提議,但很遺憾遭到中共誤解,新政府未來將不再提兩國論,但不代表事實不存在。」可見兩國論只是「不再提」,但仍屬政府的堅定立場。然而,同年八月三日,蔡主委卻表示:「……基於文化與經濟的接近性,台灣人民未來只有一種選項,就是與中國大陸建立一個有意義的政治關係,一個在未來五到十年裡共存共榮的體系,簡化地說就是『未來的一個中國』」。

這似乎是蔡主委「終極統一」、「未來一中」的立場,很多人可能都忘了蔡英文說過這些話。仔細分析,這些字詞仍留下許多解釋空間。例如,「有意義的政治關係」或「共存共榮的體系」是什麼?所謂「有意義的政治關係」就是「一個中國」嗎?「未來的一個中國」、「有意義的政治關係」與「共存共榮的體系」,三者之間的關係為何?但無論如何,這些話語留有很大的發展空間。一方面可說讓兩岸發展有更多的想像可能,但也留給自己隨時「變身」「轉向」的空間。在這些含糊語句下,蔡英文政府隨時可以往前走,但也可以隨時退縮。她到底會怎樣詮釋當年這些看來矛盾的語言?

同樣的「現狀」與「中華民國憲政體制」,在馬政府的解釋下,是「不統不獨不武」,是「一個中國=中華民國」,並且承認九二共識與一中各表。但在蔡英文的解讀下,也可以是「特殊國與國關係」、「未來一中」(表示現在沒有一中)以及「一邊一國」。蔡英文看似做出承諾,但其實什麼承諾也沒有做。加上近年來民進黨對「九二共識」與「一中」簡直視若讎寇。蔡政府上任後,會大轉彎而遵從馬政府的憲法解釋嗎?

如果蔡英文就任總統後,想要兩岸關係穩定,乃至有良性進展,就必須在實質上證明她與當年的李登輝、陳水扁、乃至「蔡主委」之間有所不同。相信民進黨版(或未來蔡政府的行政院版)的《兩岸協議監督條例》對兩岸關係的定位,還有他們將來如何回應激進獨派對一邊一國的呼求,將是一個重要觀察點。

蔡總統會回到當年那位「蔡主委」的立場?或是會自我調整,維持馬總統之「現狀」,捨棄「兩國論」而強化「未來一中」?就讓我們拭目以待。


Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Will the KMT Survive or Perish?

Will the KMT Survive or Perish?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2016


Executive Summary: There is a popular term on the Internet: "xiu xia xian". It means "hitting rock bottom". It refers to a person or organization sinking so low, it cannot possibly sink any lower. The term comes to mind when describing the KMT. The Kuomintang may remain an opposition party for the next four years, eight years, or even twenty years. No matter what, the road will be a difficult one. Will the KMT survive or perish? If it survives, how long will it take before it can return to power? This will not be determined by the DPP, but by the KMT itself. Can the KMT engage in self-introspection? Can it prove it is capable? Can it touch the hearts of voters?

Full Text Below:

There is a popular term on the Internet: "xiu xia xian". It means "hitting rock bottom". It refers to a person or organization sinking so low, it cannot possibly sink any lower. The term comes to mind when describing the KMT. The KMT hit rock bottom during the presidential and legislative elections. It hit rock bottom when chaos erupted from within following its rout at the polls. It sank until it could sink no further. If intraparty strife continues, the collapse of the KMT will not be far off. Momentary defeat is one thing. This is another matter altogether, and will determine whether the KMT survives or perishes.

Consider the current party chairperson election. Internal competition is inevitable. But this competition has degenerated into a "support Hung" vs. "Stop Hung", "native" vs. "non-native" struggle. The sorry fact is that the current election is being fought on the basis of provincial origin.

During Taiwan's democratization, provincial origin based demagoguery was something people detested the most. Repeated elections have led to a more mature democracy, greater voter independence, and rejection of provincial origin based demagoguery. This already constitutes a public consensus. The DPP has long ceased to rely on so-called "ethnic group" demaoguery to mobilize voters.

Differences over reunification and independence remain. Tsai Ing-wen recently used the term "natural Taiwan independence" to describe the younger generation. But those who advocate reunification and those who advocate independence have gradually reached an understanding. The most clearest evidence of this understanding is reflected in universal identification with the Republic of China flag. Even the pro-independence DPP "defends the Republic of China". The public on Taiwan has no problem identifying with the "Republic of China". This ensures social cohesion, and is the bedrock that provides social stability.

In the wake of the KMT's election defeat however, democracy has regressed. It has reverted to "native" vs. "non-native" opposition in the party chairperson election. For the KMT, this is a genuine tragedy. 

Tragedy Number One. Historically speaking, the KMT has usually been the victim of the "provincial origin card". Today however, it is not other parties that are playing the "provincial origin card" against the KMT. Instead, it is the KMT playing the "ethnic origin card" against itself.

Taiwan society is sufficiently mature. If the KMT plays the "provincial origin card" within the party, that will not worsen society wide antagonisms. This leads us to Tragedy Number Two. If the KMT plays the "provincial origin card", it will not succeed in leading the public down the wrong path. But it will succeed in making the public abandon the KMT.

This reveals the KMT leadership's low self-esteem and deficient wisdom. The fact is many people are looking to the KMT in the wake of the election. They hope it can regroup. They hope it can refashion itself into an opposition party with ideals and fighting spirit. They hope it can remake itself into a political party able to check and balance the ruling DPP.

Younger generation KMT members have founded the "Grassroots Alliance". Some of the alliance's proposals may be simplistic. But they show that the younger generation has not given up on the KMT. Middle aged and young KMT members have gone online to discuss opposition strategy. They have swiftly gained considerable popularity. This shows that many people worry about a DPP monopoly on power. They think it will be detrimental to Taiwan's democracy. The KMT must accurately gauge the mood of society, and respond appropriately to its expectations.

The public expects the KMT to effectively check and balance the DPP, and prevent suicidal DPP confrontation with the Mainland. The public hopes the KMT will check DPP arrogance of power, and prevent the resurgence of DPP corruption. Therefore we have several suggestions for the KMT.

Suggestion One. When the KMT sounds the clarion call for pan-blue unity, it must not divide candidates for the party chairmanship into "native" and "non-native" categories. To do so is both politically immoral and politically suicidal.

Suggestion Two. All who take part in the party chairperson election, particularly Hung Shiu-chu and Huang Ming-hui, held high office when the KMT was in the ruling party. They must share responsibility for the election defeat. They must demonstrate commitment. If elected, they must be willing to assume responsibility during the transfer of power. They must also assume responsibility for the transformation of the party. In other words, they may serve only their by-election term and no more. They may not succeed themselves. During the party chairperson election, they must debate the party's future. All who care about the future of the Kuomintang must be allowed to participate. This will enable the KMT to set its direction as an opposition party.

Suggestion Three. The new chairperson's first duty must be to rally the opposition. In her capacity as chairperson of the largest opposition party, she should invite James Soong of the People First Party, Yok Mu-ming of the New Party, and whoever becomes the chairperson of the Republican Party, to co-chair a Pan-Blue Alliance. Together they must provide oversight of the ruling DPP. The new KMT chairperson must reform the KMT chairman election system, lower the unreasonably high threshold for chairperson elections, enabling more people to run for party chairperson. Local party chairpersons should also be directly elected. This will enable the KMT to become a political party created from the outside in. This will enable the KMT to broaden its appeal, introduce new blood, and increase party diversity.

The Kuomintang may remain an opposition party for the next four years, eight years, or even twenty years. No matter what, the road will be a difficult one. Will the KMT survive or perish? If it survives, how long will it take before it can return to power? This will not be determined by the DPP, but by the KMT itself. Can the KMT engage in self-introspection? Can it prove it is capable? Can it touch the hearts of voters?

國民黨的生與死
20160204 中國時報

網路社群PTT上有一個流行用語:「秀下限」,大意是形容某個人、某個組織的表現差到無以復加,幾乎達到最爛的程度。這3字用來形容國民黨,可謂貼切。國民黨不但在總統與立委選舉上「秀下限」,敗選後黨內一片混亂、持續內耗,可以說是「持續秀下限」。照這種內耗速度繼續下去,國民黨土崩瓦解之日,只怕不遠矣。比起一時的敗選,現在才是國民黨生死存亡的關鍵時刻。

以這一次黨主席補選為例,內部競爭本就在所難免,但現在卻演變成「挺柱」與「防洪」之爭,「本土」與「非本土」之鬥。而其鬥爭核心,讓人齒冷者,其實就是省籍情結的操弄。

在台灣民主政治發展的過程中,操弄省籍可說是最讓人痛惡的。經過一次又一次民主選舉的洗禮後,民主品質提升,選民自主意識深化,否定、斥責操弄省籍,已經成為台灣社會最重要的公約數,民進黨也早已不再以族群議題操弄政治動員。

統獨雖仍時有紛歧,蔡英文更以「天然獨」形容年輕世代,但台灣內部統獨立場的逐漸接近與相互尊重,也漸漸成為社會潛在公約數。最明顯的表現,就反映在對青天白日滿地紅國旗的認同上,即便被視為傾獨的民進黨,也要「捍衛中華民國」。在在顯示台灣人民對「中華民國」的符號認同沒有障礙。這也是台灣凝聚向心力、保持社會穩定的地基磐石。

然而,大選慘敗後的國民黨,竟然走民主回頭路,赤裸裸以「本土」、「非本土」做為黨主席補選的二分法切割依據。這才真是「國民黨的悲哀」。

悲哀者一,過去,國民黨大多數時候都是「族群牌」的受害者,今天不是別的政黨拿族群牌鬥國民黨,而是國民黨自己拿「族群牌」內鬥。

事實上,台灣的社會已經足夠成熟,不會因為國民黨在內部玩「族群套頭」遊戲,因而激化社會的族群對立。這正是國民黨第二個悲哀的地方,社會的主流節奏不會被國民黨自玩省籍而走岔,但卻會加速社會主流對國民黨的否定甚至放棄。

從這也可以看出,國民黨掌握權力者的自暴自棄與智慮淺薄,事實上,選後的台灣社會,逐漸浮出一股強大的聲音,期待國民黨好好振作,當一個有理念、有戰力的稱職在野黨,做好監督執政、民主制衡的工作。

國民黨的年輕一代,成立了草協聯盟,雖然其有些提議未必成熟,但反映了國民黨年輕世代仍不放棄發聲的積極動能;國民黨的中青代,也有部分在網路上發起在野論述平台,在選後的極短時間,即凝聚相當的人氣。這些都反映了許多人擔心民進黨一黨獨大後的失衡,將對台灣民主發展不利。國民黨對這股社會脈動應有精確的掌握與認識,也應該對這樣的社會期許做出正確的回應。

社會對國民黨重建有效的民主制衡力量,防止民進黨走上對抗中國的死亡之路,及慣性的權力傲慢與貪腐惡疾復發有很深的期許,基於此,我們對國民黨有幾點建議。

第一,號召泛藍選民大團結,不要再以「本土」與「非本土」做為黨主席補選的動員,這既不符政治道德,更是政治自殺的行為。

第二,所有參加這次黨主席補選者,尤其洪秀柱與黃敏惠二人,都曾在國民黨執政體系擔任要職,理應共同承擔敗選責任。她們必須承諾,當選後願擔當「過渡」與「改造」的責任。換句話說,她們只能做到補選任期屆滿,絕不連任。在黨主席補選期間,應舉行路線辯論,讓所有的候選人及關心國民黨前途者都可以參與,辯明理念才能為在野的國民黨指引方向。

第三,新任黨主席的首務是整合在野力量,應以最大在野黨立場邀請親民黨宋楚瑜、新黨郁慕明以及民國黨新任主席,擔任泛藍聯盟共同主席,共商監督政府合作定位。同時改造國民黨主席選舉制度,打破不合理的參選高門檻,讓有志者均有機會參選黨主席,地方黨部主委也應採取直選,讓國民黨成為一個外造政黨,以擴大理念同盟,並引新血活水,豐富國民黨的多元性。

國民黨在野的路不管是4年、8年還是20年,都會是一條艱鉅的路。國民黨存續或傾覆?要花多久的時間重新贏回執政?最重要的決定者不是民進黨,而是國民黨自己,能不能反省、拿不拿得出行動好好表現,感動選民。

Tuesday, February 2, 2016

Mainland Tourists Transit Taiwan: Red and Green Face Off over the Chessboard

Mainland Tourists Transit Taiwan:
Red and Green Face Off over the Chessboard
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2016


Executive Summary: Eight mainland tourists have finally been allowed to transit Taoyuan Airport. This is a happy event. Yet Beijing failed to give Taipei prior notification. This failure can be interpreted in many ways. It shows that Tsai Ing-wen coming to power no longer worries Beijing. Beijing is very sure of itself, and unconcerned about whether it must be hard or soft on new regime. Xi Jinping knows full well a new era has begun, one in which cross-Strait relations do not involve the KMT. Red and green now face each other across the chess board. Last year's M503 airline route and smart card format MTPs were previews of coming attractions. Mainland passengers transiting Taiwan means Xi Jinping is ready to make his move.

Full Text Below:

Eight mainland tourists have finally been allowed to transit Taoyuan Airport. This is a happy event. Yet Beijing failed to give Taipei prior notification. This failure can be interpreted in many ways. It shows that Tsai Ing-wen coming to power no longer worries Beijing. Beijing is very sure of itself, and unconcerned about whether it must be hard or soft on new regime.

Mainland tourists transiting through Taiwan is a fruit of the Ma Xi summit. Xi Jinping delinked it from route optimization. Beijing no longer quibbles over the details every step of the way. Once the Gordian Knot was cut, the result was a forgone conclusion. The commencement however, was sparsely attended. It was accompanied by little fanfare. Scant effort was made to spread the word. The Mainland media reported it several days ago, but in a deliberately low-key manner. As a result, the entire affair feels odd.

Beijing's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) recently underwent reorganization. Observers think the Taiwan Affairs Office is under review because of the Taiwan election. The media reported the arrival of Mainland tourists. But the day before, the MAC and the SEF had yet to receive confirmation. As a result speculation ran wild. The Taiwan Affairs Office may deny it, but it definitely appears to have fallen down on the job.

During the recent election, the KMT lost by a landslide. For Beijing, this was more than the decline and fall of the Kuomintang. It was a major setback for its Taiwan Policy. Beijing may complain that the Taiwan Affairs Office did not have its finger on the pulse of Taiwan public opinion. But it at least noticed an anti-Mainland trend within Taiwan, especially among the younger generation. A single spark was all that was necessary to touch off a prairie fire.

Three days after the ROC general election, Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Gong Qinggai was subjected to serious disciplinary action. This too is seen as a sign that past conduct will be reviewed. Xi Jinping obviously could not understand why years of generous concessions to Taiwan failed to benefit the people, and was instead interpreted as comprador collusion. Does a comprador class even exist? If so, what brought it into existence?

Did eight years of generous concessions paradoxically lose the hearts and minds of people on Taiwan? If it did, that is downright embarrassing. Beijing's failure to win over the public on Taiwan, can be attributed to the KMT's inability to make its case. Xi Jinping must now clean up the mess. He must reorganize and transform Taiwan policy. He must cure this incurable disease. He must go head to head with Tsai Ing-wen's so-called "natural independence".

Xi Jinping has few remaining options. He can continue past Beijing's "warm sun strategy". If so, he must correct past mistakes. He must embark upon thorough and painstaking identification of friend and foe, and deal with them one level at a time. On the other hand, he can switch to a "north wind strategy". He can conclude that it is already too late to win over the public on Taiwan. He can conclude that peaceful relations paradoxically lead to disaster, and that taking a hammer to the problem might just wake "natural Taiwan independence" from its pipe dream. Last March Xi Jinping twice mentioned that "the earth will move and the mountains will shake".  During the November Ma Xi summit, he spoke of "terrifying waves". A "north wind strategy" is apparently already an option. If Tsai Ing-wen crosses the line, Xi will did not hesitate to end peaceful relations, and the two sides will sail straight into the storm.

The DPP has officially taken control of the legislature. Xi Jinping nevertheless allowed eight Mainland tourists to transit Taiwan. This was a subtle message. It was a feather gently drifting across the Strait. It was a last gesture of peace and friendship. It wsa an attempt to nudge the DPP in the direction of the 1992 Consensus. It was also an expression of iron determination. Beijing will leave no stone unturned in its fight against separatism.

By allowing Mainland tourists to transit Taiwan, Xi Jinping revealed a third option. This is neither the warm sun strategy, nor the north wind strategy, but a blend of both. For the sake of Taiwan's economy and the livelihood of its people, Beijing wants to retain its warm sun strategy. As a result, Mainland tourists may still come, albeit in reduced numbers. Direct airline flights may continue as before. With transits through Taiwan, they may even increase in number. But the DPP, which refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, must brace itself against the bitter cold of the north wind, against an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations, aainst mounting international pressure, and even against military intimidation. All of these are on Beijing's menu.

Mainland tourists are transiting Taiwan. Xi Jinping knows full well a new era has begun, one in which cross-Strait relations do not involve the KMT. Red and green now face each other across the chess board. Last year's M503 airline route and smart card format MTPs were previews of coming attractions. Mainland passengers transiting Taiwan means Xi Jinping is ready to make his move.

陸客中轉:紅綠對弈的嚆矢
2016-02-03聯合報

引頸翹望多時,終於有八位陸客來到桃園中轉。這偌大的喜事,北京卻不事前通知台北,其中有多層意涵可解。它也隱約透露,對於蔡英文上台後的兩岸,北京已不再糾結,究竟該寬該嚴、是緊是鬆,想法已十分篤定。

陸客中轉算是「馬習會」的禮物。習近平將它與航路優化脫鉤,不再秤斤論兩、步步為營,癥結一旦解開,成果唾手即得。然而觀察它如今的開場,卻是稀稀落落,既不鑼鼓喧天,也未奔相走告;大陸媒體早幾天雖有零散報導,卻刻意低調,讓整件事情透著蹊蹺。

最近中紀委的整頓,外界也在揣測台辦系統是否因台灣選舉而被檢討。在媒體已報導中轉陸客翌日就要抵台的前夕,我方的陸委會與海基會仍然無法肯定確認訊息,更讓這種揣測甚囂塵上。台辦儘管否認,但對台工作有缺失似乎也是事實。

這次大選國民黨以懸殊差距慘敗,對於北京而言,並不單單只是國民黨今後的潦倒落魄,點滴在心頭的更在於,這是對台政策的重大挫折。北京中央可能會抱怨,國台辦就算不能召喚台灣民意的走向,至少應及早偵知台灣內部尤其年輕世代中彷彿有一股反中燃油,只需星星之火,即可熊熊燎原。

國台辦副主任龔清概在台灣大選後三天即因嚴重違紀被查,也被視為政治燈號,要對過去的作風究責。習近平顯然不能了解,大陸多年的惠台政策,不能春風化雨般地澤被百姓人家,反而一夕間悉數被解讀或化為買辦勾結的利益。若是買辦階級確實存在,孰令致之?

對台八年慨然讓利,若竟換來台灣人心愈發背離的結局,無論如何都是徹頭徹尾的難堪。對台系統經營台灣的不力,應該也在於對國民黨無力自我辯解的軟弱。習近平如今得在這等殘局中力挽狂瀾,他一方面必須整理與改造對台策略,改變過去的沉痾;另一方面,他也必須直接與蔡英文所謂的「天然獨」世代較量。

習近平手中剩下的選項不多。一方面,是繼續以往的太陽放暖策略,但要檢討改正過去的各項弊害,將它做深、做細,鑑別敵友,分層對待;另一方面,則是改吹北風,認定台灣民意已無從挽回,和平發展反而養癰為患,必須直接用鐵錘重擊,才能驚醒天然獨的昏昏美夢。習近平去年三月兩會上提及的「地動山搖」,與十一月馬習會上的「驚濤駭浪」,似乎都在暗示「北風政策」已經進入他的思維,蔡英文一旦越過界線,他將毫不猶豫地結束和平發展階段,讓兩岸變成風狂雨驟。

然而,就在民進黨正式掌控了國會的歷史時刻,習近平卻放出了八位陸客來台灣中轉。這個訊號,當然是婉轉而輕柔的,它猶如一根輕輕飄過海峽的羽毛,依然吐露了和平友善的願望。它也像是一種撩撥,循循誘領民進黨向著「九二共識」趨近,它更是一種不懈的意志展示,表明北京將窮盡一切與分離主義纏鬥到底。

藉著讓陸客中轉上路,習近平實際上已展示了第三個選項,它既不是一片和煦的太陽,亦非全然凜冽的北風,而是揉合了兩者。對於人民的經濟民生,北京仍然要以太陽照拂,因此陸客雖然減少,仍然照舊要來,航班照舊要飛,如今甚至加碼中轉略略示好。但對於堅拒承認「九二共識」的民進黨,則備妥北風伺候,雪崩斷交、國際擠壓,乃至軍事威嚇,都是點菜的方案。

陸客中轉試點率爾上路,當中真正的蹊蹺就在於,習近平已深切體認:一個新的時代已經展開,它是一個沒有國民黨的兩岸關係,此時此刻是紅綠對弈的真正嚆矢。去年M五○三航路、卡式台胞證皆已有跡可循,耐人尋味;而陸客中轉,無疑是習近平蹲好馬步,畫出的第一招起手式。

Monday, February 1, 2016

The National Legislature is not a Local Town Hall

The National Legislature is not a Local Town Hall
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2016


Executive Summary: Everyone wants legislative reform. But merely reforming legislative protocol is insufficient. The DPP must also reform its political style and personal manners. Unless legislators behave in a civilized manner, standards of conduct in the legislature will not improve. Taiwan's harsh political environment will not improve.

Full Text Below:

Yesterday, under Tsai Ing-wen's guidance, the DPP made Su Chia-chuan and Tsai Chi-chang Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. This came as no surprise. Wang Jin-pyng's 17 year long rein in the legislature came to an end. Tsai Ing-wen took her first step toward "Total Rule". This also marked the beginning of new challenges for the DPP. The Legislative Yuan has long been regarded as the least efficient branch of government. A full 67% of the public is unhappy with the Legislative Yuan's performance. One reason was opposition DPP obstructionism. Once Tsai is in power, she must focus not on controlling the Legislative Yuan, but on raising the standards of conduct for ruling DPP legislators.

Before the election, the ruling and opposition parties discussed legislative reform. They advanced a number of ideas. Basically, the two largets parties' proposals were remarkably similar. Both advocated raising standards of conduct for legislators, eliminating secret deals, increasing the transparency of interparty negotiations, and ensuring legislative speaker neutrality. These issues are nothing new. Wang Jin-pyng and Ko Chien-min, the biggest beneficiaries of secret deals, opposed reform. Nearly everyone else however, supported it. Wang Jin-pyng has now been reduced to the level of an ordinary legislator. The KMT has become a minority party. This has resulted in an opportunity for reform. Alas, Ko Chien-min remains the leader of the DPP legislative caucus. He remains responsible for DPP legislative caucus strategy. Will he relinquish his habit of political manipulation? That remains to be seen.

Improving standards of conduct for legislators requires  professionalism and efficiency. Equally important to legislative reform is an individual legislators' political style and cultural sophistication. Legislators' standard of conduct has long remained at the level of a local town hall. Here are some concrete examples that may refresh our readers' memories.

Example One. When DPP legislator Chen Ting-fei interpolated Academia Sinica Vice President Liu Tsui-jung, the president was on leave. Vice President Liu could not answer certain technical questions. Chen Ting-fei excoriated Liu relentlessly, until she was reduced to tears. Other legislators humiliate officials, scream personal insults, and pound tables as a matter of routine. Neither sitting nor retired officials are spared. Occasionally someone like former Minister of Education Huang Jung-tsun will resign in protest. But most sit in silence in order to survive. Legislators humiliate officials as a matter of routine. Shouldn't their parties restrain them? Shouldn't their parties subject them to disciplinary action?

Example Two. DPP legislators routinely engage in obstructionism. During caucus consultations, when the speaker announces a rest period, nearly 50 government heads and hundreds of aides are forced to sit and do nothing. The executive branch of the entire nation is virtually shut down. Take the previous legislative session for example. Legislators frequently engaged in obstructionism over issues such as nuclear power, food safety, and the STA. Officials were forced to sit and do nothing the entire time. According to High Court Constitutional Interpretation Number 342, if the Legislative Yuan engages in "self-destructive behavior", no one may intervene. But anyone who cares about his nation and society, should not engage in self-destructive behavior that also harms the nation. The legislature could easily wait until a consensus has been reached before summoning officials. It could require them to return half an hour after receiving a notification from the speaker. That would be a reasonable reform. Why doesn't the legislature pass it? Why shouldn't both the ruling and opposition party caucuses support it?

Example Three. Legislators must demonstrate respect for fellow legislators as well as officials. Legislators have the right of interpolation, along with budget and oversight powers. But these are powers delegated to them by the people. They do not mean that legislators and officials are unequal. They do not mean that legislators may treat officials with contempt. Male officials summoned to the legislature are required to wear "official clothing". This includes a suit and tie and leather shoes. Legislators have refused to allow officials to remove their suits in response to energy conservation requirements. But what do our legislators wear? Tennis shoes, blue jeans, pullovers, golf jackets, and other casual wear. What do Duan Yi-kang, Liu Chien-kuo, and other legislators wear? Compare that with what Members of Parliament in the Anglo-American countries, in Japan and in France wear. The dress code for the Legislative Yuan is grossly unfair. This reflects the unequal manner in which legislators and officials are treated.

Legislators' attitudes and manners are as important as operational efficiency. This is because an "official environment" is important. For years, the atmosphere in the Legislative Yuan has been one of contempt for officials. Over time this has led to a situation in which "those who come are men of evil, because men of virtue are no longer willing to come”. Men of character and dignity flatly refuse cabinet appointments to avoid undeserved humiliation in the Legislative Yuan. This leads to the “survival of the unfittest”, and to inexorable decline in the quality of governance. The executive branch's poor performance, then provides legislators with genuine justification for their contempt. Shouted humiliation and table pounding merely lowers the standards of government officials. This vicious cycle is a key reason for decline in Taiwan's governance. Tsai Ing-wen trumpets “new politics” and “fundamental reform”. If she is serious, she must demand that DPP legislators change their political style, personal manners, and habits of speech.

Everyone wants legislative reform. But merely reforming legislative protocol is insufficient. The DPP must also reform its political style and personal manners. Unless legislators behave in a civilized manner, standards of conduct in the legislature will not improve. Taiwan's harsh political environment will not improve.

聯合/立委問政不能停在「鄉民」水準

在蔡英文的強勢主導下,民進黨推出的候選人蘇嘉全和蔡其昌,昨天一如預期地順利當選立法院 正副院長,為王金平主導十七年的國會時代劃下句點,也讓蔡英文的「完全執政」跨出第一步。然而,這也是民進黨新政治挑戰的起點:立法院一向被視為最沒有效 率的機關,有六成七的民眾不滿意立法院的表現,其中民進黨在野之杯葛更是一大因素;蔡英文執政後,不應只著眼於掌控立法院,而應設法提升最大黨立委的問政 文化。

大選前,朝野即對國會改革有過一番辯論,並提出各自主張。基本上,兩黨對議事改革的方向相當接近:都主張要提升委員會的審議功能、 廢除密室協商而提升協商透明度、國會議長必須超越黨派等。這些問題已是老生常談,除了王金平與柯建銘兩位「密室最大受益人」反對外,幾乎人人贊成。如今, 王金平變成陽春立委,國民黨淪為小黨,不失為一個改革契機。問題在,柯建銘仍擔任黨團總召,握有運籌帷幄的大權;他能不能一改政治操弄的惡習,有待觀察。

談立委問政文化的提升,除了專業、協商及議事效率外,另一個同等重要、亦關乎國會運作的改革面向,就是立委的問政風格與文明風範。長久以來,立法院的問政文化幾乎是處於俗稱「鄉民」的水準。我們且舉幾個具體事例幫讀者回溯記憶。

其 一,是立委陳亭妃對中央研究院副院長劉翠溶的質詢,當時,只不過因為院長請假,而代理的副院長無法回答若干專業問題,陳亭妃就以咄咄逼人的蠻橫態度把劉翠 溶當場罵哭。其他立委對官員羞辱、厲聲斥責、人身攻擊、咆哮拍桌者,則是無日無之。卸任或現任官員被掃中者,除了偶有如前教育部長黃榮村能辭職以示抗議之 外,絕大多數都只能「忍辱偷生」。這種立委羞辱官員的近乎常態,政黨該不該約束?該不該有紀律處分?

其 二,是總質詢期間所有議事杯葛、黨團協商、主席宣布「休息」的時間,立法院把近五十位政務首長及上百位幕僚綁在議場呆坐,讓全國行政部門幾近停擺。以上屆 立委為例,立委動輒因為核四、食安、服貿等大小事件杯葛議事,官員往往枯坐整個會期。根據大法官三四二號解釋,立法院要自主或「自殘」,別人無法過問;但 是,如果心存國家社稷,就不該在自殘時也殘害國家機器的運作。立法院大可在委員未達開會共識前將官員請回,並要求在接到議長通知半小時內返抵議場。這樣的 合理改革,立法院該不該做?朝野黨團該不該支持?

其三,是立委與官員之間的彼此尊重。立法委員雖然有質詢權、預算權、監督權,但這些都是 人民賦予的代理權,並不表示立委與官員在人格上、禮貌上具有不對等關係。男性官員進入國會,都是「正式服裝」,包括西裝領帶皮鞋;而立委甚至不同意官員為 了節約能源卸下西裝外套備詢。反觀我們的立委,又是什麼穿著呢?球鞋、牛仔褲、套頭衫、高球夾克等,全部隨興。如果拿段宜康、劉建國等立委的穿著與英美日 法等國的議員相比,大家都會同意:立法院裡的服裝準則(dress code)是極端不對等,其背後代表著人格和禮儀的不對等。

立委的態 度、禮儀和國會運作效率之所以一樣重要,主要是著眼於「為官環境」。且看立法院長年以來的氛圍,充滿對官員的鄙夷與羞辱,久而久之則「來者不善、善者不 來」,有骨氣、有尊嚴的人根本不願意入閣,以免在立法院受到無理的羞辱。其結果,當然造成行政部門的反淘汰,執政品質弱化。而行政部門的孱弱表現,又使得 立委更看不起官員,於是咆哮責罵拍桌,更惡化了為官環境。如此惡性循環,絕對是當前台灣政治敗壞的主要原因之一。蔡英文要談新政治,究其根本,必須要求民 進黨立委問政的態度、禮儀、談吐徹底改變。

國會議事改革,大家都贊成;但單單改革議事不足以竟其功,我們希望各黨各派都能對議事禮儀、問政風範、人格尊重投予關注。立委缺乏禮儀與風範,國會不可能有議事品質,而台灣惡劣的政治環境也就不可能改善。

Sunday, January 31, 2016

DPP Total Rule Means Total Accountability and Total Responsibility

DPP Total Rule Means Total Accountability and Total Responsibility
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 1, 2016


Executive Summary: Total Rule means the DPP must assume total responsibility for any future political developments. Tsai Ing-wen must be psychologically prepared for this. Tsai Ing-wen must expressly declare that according to the Constitution, cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. Only this can allay Mainland concerns about her advocacy of the "two states theory”. Only this will enable her to ensure cross-Strait peace.

Full Text Below:

The DPP legislative caucus has approved, by clear acclamation without objection, legislator elect Su Chia-chuan's appointment as Legislative Speaker, and Tsai Chi-chang's appointment as Deputy Legislative Speaker. Party favorite Ko Chien-min, who was endorsed by the New Tide faction, and who fully expected to win the post, was washed away by the rushing waters. This of course was the result of Tsai Ing-wen's last minute intervention.

Su Chia-chuan pledged to abide by the three principles of legislative speaker neutrality. He would refrain from participation in party activities, refrain from assuming any party posts, and refrain from participating in any party-administration coordination activities. He would resign from the DPP Central Standing Committee. He would refrain from taking part in DPP party activities. He promised to comply fully with Tsai Ing-wen's legislative reform blueprint. He clearly demonstrated Tsai Ing-wen's determination. Ko Chien-min has stepped down. Su Chia-chuan has taken his place. This sends an important message regarding Tsai Ing-wen's future rule.

Ma Ying-jeou was never able to implement the reforms he wanted in the Legislative Yuan. He was often unable to even impose his will upon the Executive Yuan. Tsai hopes to avoid the pitfalls of Ma vs. Wang confrontation. Tsai Ing-wen has a totally different leadership style than Ma Ying-jeou. At this critical moment she has forced the New Tide faction to retreat, mollified party elders, and laid down the law for legislative speaker appointments. Her moves have been measured, and reminiscent of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This, along with Tsai's three principles of legislative neutrality, amounts to a double victory, in image as well as substance. This is important for Tsai Ing-wen. It is also the right thing to do. To this, we give her our blessings. Tsai Ing-wen has already prepped herself for Total Rule.

For Total Rule to be successful however, a right first step is not enough. If Tsai Ing-wen wants Total Rule, her next step must be total commitment and assumption of total responsibility. This is essential. Only then will Tsai Ing-wen's achievements be hers. Only then can her regime rank among those of Merkel and Thatcher.

Take the assumption of total responsibility. The Democratic Progressive Party won both the presidency and the legislature. At the local level, it won 13 counties and municipalities. Its jurisdiction encompasses a population of over 14 million, more than 60% of the entire population. From the central to the local, from the executive to the legislature, the Democratic Progressive Party has achieved Total Rule over Taiwan. Internally, it is unchallengeable. It has absolute power. Therefore it must assume total responsibility and lead Taiwan in the right direction.

Total commitment must also be reflected in domestic and foreign policy. Internally, Tsai Ing-wen must do two things. One. She must take advantage of Total Rule to liberate government policies from mob sentiment. She must restore rationality to policy debates. She must not allow Taiwan to remain a victim of populist sentiment and endless wheel-spinning. Two. She must practice the true spirit of democracy. She must implement majority rule, in order to rectify the mistakes made by past governments. She must show respect for the minority.

Only respect for the minority can mollify the losing party and its supporters, enable Taiwan to avoid vicious blue vs. green tit for tat retaliation, and end the prolonged democratic civil war.

Respect for the minority will be the acid test for Democratic Progressive Party Total Rule. The DPP must swiftly transform its opposition party defects into ruling party virtues. It must not succumb to the temptation to accuse opponents of “selling out Taiwan”, or launch personal attacks. The KMT has suffered a crushing defeat. But the DPP must not seize the opportunity to engage in “search and destroy”. The KMT and DPP are political competitors, not enemies. A robust opposition is indispensable to Taiwan's democracy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must exercise wisdom in their treatment of political opposition and private dissident.

Now consider external policy, the most important of which is cross-Strait policy. This has long been Tsai Ing-wen's Achilles Heel, and most dangerous challenge. Tsai Ing-wen must do everything possible to ensure peace with the Mainland. Otherwise, even Total Rule will result in a debacle in the event cross-Strait exchanges collapse. Total Rule will become total collapse.

The first obstacle in the way of cross-Strait peace remains the 1992 Consensus. Its historical origins and DPP supporters' emotional baggage make it difficult for the DPP to accept the 1992 Consensus. But none of Tsai Ing-wen's 1992 Consensus word games have succeeded in replacing it. None of her substitutes have won Mainland acceptance. The problem is that Tsai Ing-wen has never addressed the core issue. Just what are cross-Strait relations? Tsai Ing-wen must clearly and unequivocally declare that according to the Constitution of the Republic of China, cross-Strait relations are not international relations. This is enshrined not only in the text of the constitution, but also in the text of the Council of Grand Justices' Constitutional Interpretation No. 329.

Tsai Ing-wen must expressly declare that according to the Constitution, cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. Only this can allay Mainland concerns about her advocacy of the "two states theory”. Only this will enable her to ensure cross-Strait peace.

Finally, Total Rule means the DPP must assume total responsibility for any future political developments. Tsai Ing-wen must be psychologically prepared for this. In the past, central and local governments passed the buck to each other. The executive and the legislature passed the buck to each other. In the future, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will not be able to shirk responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen might as well roll the dice and go all out to create a political legacy for herself.

社論-全面執政就要全面承擔、全面負責
2016年02月01日 04:10 主筆室

民進黨團無異議鼓掌推舉準立委蘇嘉全、蔡其昌角逐立法院正副院長。已取得新潮流系支持、做好參選萬全準備、聲勢最被看好的柯建銘最後急流湧退,這當然與蔡英文在最後關頭強力介入有關。

緊 接著,蘇嘉全宣示將遵守國會議長中立化三原則,不參加政黨活動、不擔任黨職、不參與黨政協調平台,當選後並辭去民進黨中常委,不介入任何民進黨的活動。完 全照著蔡英文的國會改革藍本照本宣科,其顯現的也是清晰的蔡英文意志。柯建銘與蘇嘉全2人的進退,傳遞出蔡英文未來執政的重要訊息。

鑒於 過去馬英九的意志始終無法在立法院貫徹,以致經常發生「令不出行政院」的困境,為了避免馬王互卡的失敗經驗重演,蔡英文採用了和馬英九截然不同的領導風 格,在關鍵時刻勸退新潮流系,擺平黨內大老,強勢決定國會議長的人事。其出手精準確實,頗有德國總理梅克爾與英國前首相柴契爾的魄力身影,再加上新的議長 宣示了蔡英文主張的議長中立化三原則,在立法院長的布局上,可謂裡子面子雙贏。這是蔡英文重要的、也正確的執政起手式,對此,我們給予祝福也給予肯定。蔡 英文已經做好了「全面執政」的準備。

然而,執政要成功,邁出全面執政的正確第一步是不夠的。蔡英文既已做到全面執政,接下來就要做到全面承擔,並負起全面責任。這兩步做到,蔡英文才有可能成就專屬於她、與梅克爾和柴契爾相輝映的治理傳奇。

以全面承擔言,民進黨不只總統國會雙勝,地方也拿下13個執政縣市,所轄人口超過1400萬人,占總人口也超過6成。可謂從中央到地方、從行政到立法全面主導。民進黨既然掌握了台灣內部已經無人能及的絕對權力,就必須全面承擔,帶領台灣走向正確的國家發展方向。

所 謂全面承擔,必須同時反映在對內與對外的兩個面向。對內的部分,蔡英文要做到兩件事。其一,要運用全面執政的優勢,打破台灣過去民粹綁架政府施政的亂象, 引導台灣回到理性的政策之辯,不要讓台灣繼續被民粹情緒拖進無止盡的虛耗與空轉。其二,則要真正實踐民主精神,除了貫徹多數治理以匡正過去政府部門的失能 外,更要能做到「尊重少數」。

唯有落實對少數的尊重,才有可能讓落敗方與其支持者心服,才有可能避免台灣繼續陷在藍綠相互報復的惡性循環,終結長期的民主內戰。

「尊 重少數」對全面執政的民進黨來說是最關鍵,也是最艱鉅的考驗。民進黨得在短時間內把「在野者的慣性」,轉型為「執政者的格局」,首先不能再動輒扣異議者賣 台帽子或進行人身攻擊。同時雖然國民黨慘敗,但不能存著所謂「乘勝追剿」的傲慢。國民黨是民進黨政治上競爭的對手,不是敵人。一個足夠強健的在野黨,更是 台灣民主政治不可或缺的一隻手、一條腿。蔡英文與民進黨必須擁有這樣的高度去看待在野黨,以及民間的異議者。

在對外的部分,最重要的還是兩岸,這始終是蔡英文未來執政最大的罩門、最險的挑戰,蔡英文務必窮盡一切方法,建立與大陸最起碼的和平互動。否則,即便掌握全面執政的巨大權力,兩岸一崩,全面執政將會變成全面崩盤。

兩 岸和平互動的第一道鎖,仍是九二共識之結。民進黨雖有其歷史淵源與支持者情感的包袱,以至於遲遲不肯正面接受九二共識。但蔡英文到目前為止對九二共識的擦 邊或繞彎,仍未能發揮取代九二共識、取得大陸認同的積極作用。關鍵就在蔡英文並沒有一步到位直指核心問題,也就是兩岸關係究竟是什麼關係?蔡英文應清楚、 斷然宣示,依照中華民國憲法,兩岸不是國與國的關係。這一點不但載於憲法文字,也為憲法的解釋機關大法官會議於釋字第329號解釋文所闡明。

只有明確地依憲宣示兩岸不是國與國關係,蔡英文才有可能化解大陸方面對蔡英文是否主張「兩國論」的疑慮。兩岸的和平互動,才有續保的可能。

最後,全面執政,就必須全面承擔,在未來新政局裡,民進黨要負的將是全面責任,蔡英文要有心理準備,過去中央地方互推責任、行政立法相互怪罪的時代結束了,接下來,發生任何問題,蔡英文與民進黨都將無責可推,也無可迴避。就放手一搏,努力建立蔡英文的執政傳奇吧。