Is Tsai Ing-wen Reverting to Scorched Earth Diplomacy?

Is Tsai Ing-wen Reverting to Scorched Earth Diplomacy?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 19, 2016

Executive Summary: Does Tsai Ing-wen intend to revert to the scorched earth diplomacy or checkbook diplomacy of old?  How does she intend to reconcile cross-Strait relations and diplomatic strategy? Tsai needs a better understanding. After all, after May 20, everything will be her responsibility. She will no longer be able to pass the buck to the KMT. Gambia is not worth fretting over. But the remaining 22 diplomatic allies must be retained. How can we maintain our dignity on the international stage? That is not something green camp legislators can ensure by making snide remarks on talk shows.

Full Text Below:

Just when President Ma was visiting Central America, Beijing made a surprise announcement. It was establishing diplomatic relations with Gambia. Observers consider the move a warning from Beijing regarding Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. DPP legislators insist that Beijing "slapped the Ma government in the face". The blue and green camps may have their own particular media spin. But as far as the nation is concerned, this was a warning. The eight year long cross-Strait diplomatic truce has come to an end. Once the two sides renew their diplomatic war, the flames are bound to spread to Central America. Which diplomatic allies can the ROC afford to lose?

In late 2013, Gambia cited “national strategy” as justification for its unilateral severing of relations with the ROC. Beijing however, refrained from immediately establishing diplomatic relations with Gambia. The main reason was the implicit cross-Strait diplomatic truce, and Beijing's desire to show goodwill toward the ROC. Now that Gambia's opportunistic diplomacy has succeeded, the Gambian model will become the way allies will get what they need from us. Therefore, the loss of Gambia is not worth fretting about, but its consequences are.

With the “Gambian Model", Beijing does not lure away our diplomatic allies. Instead, allies who covet Mainland financial aid, sever diplomatic relations with us on their own initiative, as a gesture of goodwill, in the hope that Beijing will acknowledge them. With the rise of the Mainland, many allies seem eager to follow suit. Suppose Beijing had announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Gambia in 2013? Over the past two years, any number of countries might have followed suit, in exchange for foreign aid and trade cooperation. Clearly the Ma administration's eight year long cross-Strait diplomatic truce has benefited us, as has Beijing's goodwill.

For two and a half years, Beijing refused to establish diplomatic relations with Gambia. Today, it has suddenly reversed its position. To claim that it did so to embarrass Ma is absurd. It clearly did it to put pressure on Tsai Ing-wen. One. Gambia severed diplomatic relations with the ROC over two years ago. Beijing establishing relations with Gambia now, has no impact on the Ma government's diplomatic record of achievements. But the Gambian Model is applying immense pressure on the incoming Tsai government. Two. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to relent
and recognize the 1992 Consensus. This makes the Mainland deeply suspicious. Three. This offensive on the diplomatic front is accompanied by a reduction in Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan and a halt to MTA and other negotiations. The goal is to force Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the cross-Strait framework affirmed by the 1992 Consensus.

The DPP has long been contemptuous of the Ma government's diplomatic truce. It claims it is evidence of a deficiency in fighting spirit. During the presidential election debate, Tsai Ing-wen lashed out at Ma, saying that eight years of diplomatic truce have made diplomats afraid to confront the CCP. To be fair, the diplomatic truce may indeed lull our diplomats into a false sense of peace, and make them lose sight of what we are fighting for. But is the Tsai government returning to the Chen government's scorched earth diplomacy, really a superior strategy?

During Lee Teng-hui's 12 years in office, the government squandered a fortune in taxpayer dollars on checkbook diplomacy. It bought five diplomatic allies for exorbitant sums of money. During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office, the government adopted scorched earth diplomacy. The ROC subsequently lost six allies. All Chen did was reveal his own paranoia. During Ma Ying-jeou's eight years of diplomatic truce, all was quiet on the diplomatic front. Tjhat may have been "boring", but so far it only lost Gambia. How is this not a successful strategy? At the very least, the ROC need no longer wage diplomatic war, indiscriminately squander capital, and undermine its national dignity.

Alas, for many on Taiwan, peace has come too easily. They fail to cherish it. They even consider it boring. As a result, instead of appreciating visa-free passport treatment for Republic of China citizens, they apply “Nation of Taiwan” stickers to their passports, making it impossible for them to travel anywhere. Some in the UK have launched a Quixotic petition drive, demanding recognition of Taiwan as a country. The British government was forced to declare that it "does not recognize Taiwan as a state", and give them a slap in the face. During Ma Ying-jeou's trip, many DPP legislators appeared on TV, and openly mocked our allies as backward and corrupt. Do green camp legislators have the slightest appreciation for the importance of diplomacy?

Does Tsai Ing-wen intend to revert to the scorched earth diplomacy or checkbook diplomacy of old?  How does she intend to reconcile cross-Strait relations and diplomatic strategy? Tsai needs a better understanding. After all, after May 20, everything will be her responsibility. She will no longer be able to pass the buck to the KMT. Gambia is not worth fretting over. But the remaining 22 diplomatic allies must be retained. How can we maintain our dignity on the international stage? That is not something green camp legislators can ensure by making snide remarks on talk shows.

蔡英文可有重回烽火外交的準備？

2016-03-19 聯合報

正當馬總統在中美洲訪問，北京與甘比亞迅雷不及掩耳地宣布建交。此舉，外界解讀為北京對蔡英文兩岸路線的示警，民進黨立委則堅稱是北京「打臉馬政府」。無論藍綠如何各說各話，從國家的角度看，這是對八年來兩岸「外交休兵」默契破裂的預警。一旦兩岸外交烽火再起，戰火勢必燒向中美洲，台灣有哪些邦交國可以丟呢？

甘比亞在二○一三年底以「國家戰略為由」片面宣布與我斷交，但北京卻未立即與它建交。其主要原因，正是基於兩岸「外交休兵」的默契和善意，一旦甘比亞的外交投機得逞，「甘比亞模式」將成為我邦交國爭相模仿鑽營的蹊徑。因此，值得擔憂的不是甘比亞，而是它引發的後續效應。

所謂「甘比亞模式」，其特徵是：北京並未挖我牆腳，而是覬覦中國大陸金援的我國友邦主動宣告與台灣斷交，向對岸示好，以此爭取北京的承認。這在中國大陸崛起之後，我不少邦交國已顯得躍躍欲試。試想，如果中共二○一三年即宣布與甘比亞建交，這兩年多來，可能已有若干國家跟進投靠，以換取對岸的經貿援助和合作。從這個觀點看，兩岸近八年在外交戰線相安無事，馬政府的「外交休兵」策略確實發揮了功效，這當然也與北京的善意配合有關。

兩年半前北京拒絕和甘比亞建交，今天突然改變立場，其中緣由，與其說是為了給馬政府難看，不如說是為了向蔡英文施壓。原因是：第一，甘比亞與我國已斷交兩年多，北京與其建交，不影響馬政府邦交成績；但「甘比亞模式」一出，卻對即將就任的蔡英文構成高度壓力。第二，蔡英文迄未鬆口承認九二共識，讓中共深感疑慮與戒懼。第三，配合陸客來台緊縮、貨貿談判擱置等經貿手段，再加上外交陣線的攻勢，目的都在迫使蔡英文就範，回到九二共識的框架上來。

民進黨對於馬政府的「外交休兵」政策一直不以為然，認為太缺乏鬥志。大選辯論期間，蔡英文更質問：八年外交休兵，造成外交人員不知為何而戰，都在看中共臉色。持平而論，「外交休兵」政策確實可能讓我外交人員陷入一種「和平幻覺」，而失去戰鬥意識與戰鬥目標；問題是，蔡英文若不選擇回到扁政府時代的「烽火外交」，是否有更好的戰略？

且看，李登輝時代的十二年，政府以大肆撒錢的「金錢外交」，為我國增加了五個邦交國，所費不貲。而陳水扁時代的八年，則採取四處放火鬧事的「烽火外交」，讓台灣丟了六個邦交國，只彰顯了他個人的偏執心志。馬英九的八年改採「外交休兵」，外交陣線固因西線無戰事而顯得有些「無趣」，但迄今僅丟了一個甘比亞，這難道不是戰略的成功？至少，台灣不必再為邦交爭奪戰而胡亂揮霍金錢，甚至折損國家尊嚴。

然而，不少台灣人民對於得來容易的和平卻不知珍惜，甚至覺得平淡乏味。也因此，在享有一百六十多國免簽的中華民國護照上，有人硬要貼上什麼地方都去不了的「台灣國」貼紙；也因此，不少人對英國某公民發起「承認台灣是一個國家」的連署充滿幻想，最後的結果，卻只得到英政府「不承認台灣是一個國家」的巴掌。在馬英九這次出訪期間，也有不少民進黨立委在電視上發表宏論，開口閉口譏嘲我邦交國多麼落後、腐敗；這樣的綠營民代，真的把外交當一回事嗎？

如果蔡英文不打算走回「烽火外交」或「金錢外交」的老路，她對於台灣的兩岸關係和外交戰略要如何權衡，必須有一套更完整的思維與作法。畢竟，五二○執政之後，一切責任就必須自己承擔，不能再推給國民黨。甘比亞並不足惜，但尚存的廿二個邦交國要如何維繫，台灣的國際尊嚴要如何維持，都不是綠營立委那套連諷帶罵的脫口秀所足以應付。

Stand Firm to Achieve Cross-Strait Meeting of Minds

Stand Firm to Achieve Cross-Strait Meeting of Minds
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 18, 2016

Executive Summary: If the Mainland truly seeks a meeting of the minds, the ball is clearly not in Taiwan's court. Taiwan society has undergone economic modernization and political democratization. It has gradually evolved into a mature civilized society. If the Mainland truly seeks peaceful reunification, it must minimize conflict with Taiwan. It must also follow Xi Jinping's advice: "To be a blacksmith, one must harden oneself”. It must continue to promote reform. Its own progress will promote cross-Strait integration and reunification.

Full Text Below:

People's views on national identity and reunification vs. independence, are key indicators of Taiwan's political evolution. They are also an important indicator of the effectiveness of the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Recent indicators however, may leave the Mainland very disappointed.

This is especially true for the last eight years. Greatly improved cross-Strait relations have not brought about a shift in sentiment regarding reunification vs. independence. Instead they have widened the gap even further. Substantively speaking, fewer and fewer people advocate reunification. They consider themselves Taiwanese only, and hope to eventually move toward independence. At least more and more people hope to maintain the status quo indefinitely.

The most recent polls show that shift at a record high. People who consider themselves Taiwanese only, has increased from 44% over the past 20 years to 73%. People who consider themselves Chinese, on the other hand, have fallen to 11%. Regarding reunification vs. independence, 46% would maintain the status quo indefinitely. Those who advocate immediate independence on the other hand, have increased 8% since 2015.

In the past, observers assumed this was the result of the People's Republic of China government monopolizing the right to represent one China. Many on Taiwan did not identify with the PRC. Therefore they refused to identify with China. But according to recent findings by another publication, even if the two sides were represented by the ROC, those who favor reunification would still be under 30%, while those who oppose reunification, would be as high as 60%. If the two sides were represented by the People's Republic of China, then those who favor reunification would be limited to a mere 9.2%. Obviously, even having the Republic of China represent the whole of China, is no longer a vision on Taiwan. Never mind being unified by the Mainland.

That said, the Mainland need not be utterly discouraged by public opinion on Taiwan. A survey conducted by the Academia Sinica in late 2015 offers another perspective. That poll shows 46.4% of the public favoring independence. But when asked "What do you see in the future? Reunification, or independence?”, most people, 49.7%, expected to be reunified by the Mainland. Only 35.9% expect Taiwan to become independent. Not only that, even 37% of those who favor Taiwan independence, expect to be reunified by the Mainland. Among those who expressed no preference, 51.3% expect to be reunified. In other words, many people may not be willing to be reunified, but rational considerations convince them that reunification is inevitable.

Why did these two polls yield different, even contradictory results? First of course, is the contradiction between ideals and reality. Changes in reunification vs. independence sentiment show that  most people do not share the Mainland's longing for reunification. In the minds of the public, the image of the Mainland is remains largely negative. This may not be solely the consequence of long-term anti-Mainland propaganda. The Mainland's political system is coercive and unstable. This makes people on Taiwan, accustomed to freedom and a democratic way of life, uncomfortable.

Young people in particular, are the most emotionally distant from the Mainland. Part of this is the result of de-Sinicization indoctrination. But part of it is that they are accustomed to living in a democracy. The Mainland has a different political system and lifestyle. It is easy to feel a much greater sense of alienation than the previous generation. They cannot understand or sympathize with the Mainland's way of dealing with social and political problems. Still less can they feel a sense of closeness.

But reason will lead them to make the proper adjustments. When most people on Taiwan expect reunification, they are likely to undergo two stages of psychological conversion. Stage one will of course be resistance –- resistance even greater than revealed in current polls. But if resistance proves ineffective, realistic considerations will lead many to adjust to the Mainland.

In other words, at this stage the percentage of people opposed to reunification may have reached new highs. But if after a period of emotional see-sawing, the Mainland remains attractive, practical considerations will override emotional considerations. People will accept their inevitable fate, and do their best to adapt to them.

In any event, these polls are a warning for the Mainland. On the one hand, they remind it that even if reunification is possible, many problems will still need to be resolved. The impact of concessions at this stage is limited. On the other hand, they should also encourage the Mainland. Do not allow a temporary setback to discourage you. Stick to your guns until the tide of public opinion turns.

If the Mainland truly seeks a meeting of the minds, the ball is clearly not in Taiwan's court. Taiwan society has undergone economic modernization and political democratization. It has gradually evolved into a mature civilized society. If the Mainland truly seeks peaceful reunification, it must minimize conflict with Taiwan. It must also follow Xi Jinping's advice: "To be a blacksmith, one must harden oneself”. It must continue to promote reform. Its own progress will promote cross-Strait integration and reunification.

實現心靈契合 打鐵還需自身硬

2016年03月18日 中國時報

民眾的國家認同和統獨觀，是台灣政治發展的重要指標，也應該是大陸判斷對台政策成效的重要指標，但近年來台灣這項指標的消長，可能讓大陸非常失望。

尤其最近8年來，兩岸關係大幅提升卻沒有帶來統獨觀念的此消彼長，反而進一步拉大了統獨的民意差距。具體來說，認為自己是中國人並主張統一的人越來越少，認為自己只是台灣人，並且希望走向獨立、或者至少永遠維持現狀的人則越來越多。

最新一項民調顯示，此消彼長已經達到歷史新高，民眾自認是台灣人的比率已經從20年前的4成4大幅成長為目前的7成3，覺得自己是中國人的比率，則大降到1成1。統獨立場方面，4成6的民眾主張台灣應永遠維持現狀，同時主張急獨與緩獨的人已較2015年增加8個百分點。

過去外界在解讀這種現象時常說，因為大陸的中華人民共和國已經壟斷了「一中」的代表權，所以許多台灣人因為不願認同PRC而不認同中國。但根據另一份最新公布的調查結果，若兩岸同屬一中指的是中華民國，支持者也還是不到3成，不支持的卻高達6成，至於一中是指中華人民共和國的話，那支持率更是只有9.2%。顯然，即便中華民國一統全中國，也已經不再是台灣人願景，遑論被大陸統一。

不過，大陸也不必對台灣民意取向完全失望，2015年底中央研究院所做的調查提供了另一種檢視的角度，在那份民調中雖有高達46.4%的民眾選擇「獨立」，但在「預期未來統獨走向」的問題上，認為「被統一」卻最多，高達49.7%，認為將來會「獨立」的人則僅剩35.9%。不僅如此，即便是主張獨立的人，其中也有37%認為未來會「被統一」，而選擇中間立場的人，認為會「被統一」的更高達51.3%。換句話說，雖然相當多人不願意統一，但理性評估還是認為未來統一趨勢不可避免。

2份民調為何有截然不同甚至矛盾的結果？首先這當然是理想與現實的矛盾。現在統獨看法的增減變化，顯示大家確實不想跟大陸統一的心理願望。大陸在台灣民眾心中的形象還是以負面為主，這可能不光是台灣長期以來對大陸的負面宣傳所致，大陸體制展現出來的強制性和不穩定性，也讓已經完全習慣自由民主生活方式的台灣人感到不舒服與不適應。

尤其是年輕人，他們與大陸的心理距離最遠，一方面當然跟去中國化教育有關，另一方面，他們從小就生活在民主體制下，面對大陸不同的政治制度和生活方式，很容易表現出遠大於上一代的疏離感，面對大陸的種種社會問題和政治處理手段，完全不會產生同情的理解，更不可能有任何的親近感。

不過，人的理性還是會迫使自己做出適當的調整。當台灣人大部分預期要被統一時，大概要經歷2個階段的心理轉換，第一階段當然是抗拒，甚至更大程度上的抗拒，呈現在現有民調上就是更多人的台灣認同。不過如果這種抗拒後續證明沒有效果之後，現實考量很多人就會轉換成想辦法趨近中國大陸。

換句話說，雖然現階段抗拒統一的比例達新高，但經一段時間的情感拉鋸後，若大陸的吸引力仍在，現實的考量還是會壓倒情感上的抗拒，選擇接受註定不能避免的命運，並採取積極措施讓自己更好的適應這一結果。

無論如何，對大陸來說，這2份民調都是警訊，一方面提醒他們就算是有可能實現統一，後續還是會有很多難題需要處理，現階段的種種讓利動作產生的作用相當有限。另一方面這也是在鼓勵大陸，不能因為暫時沒有效果就放棄努力，堅持下去就可能等到民意翻轉的一天。

大陸要想真正跟台灣實現心靈契合，球顯然不在台灣這邊，台灣社會歷經經濟現代化和政治民主化，已經逐漸進化成一個成熟的文明社會。大陸如果真心想實現和平統一，除了在跟台灣互動時要盡量減少衝突外，還要具體實踐習近平所說「打鐵還需自身硬」，持續推動改革，通過自身的進步實現兩岸的融合與統一。

Tsai Ing-wen Must Avoid Chen and Ma's Recruiting Blunders

Tsai Ing-wen Must Avoid Chen and Ma's Recruiting Blunders
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 17, 2016

Executive Summary: During the Chen era, political appointee Lin Chuan received more positive evaluations than negative evaluations. He balanced the budget. He reformed the tax system. Tsai praised him for "good communication skills", and for familiarity with her governing approach. She positioned Lin as a "reformist cabinet chief". We hope this is not mere talk. In any event, Tsai Ing-wen must learn from Chen and Ma's recruitment mistakes. She must attempt to create a new political atmosphere. Only then can she enable Taiwan to extricate itself from the quagmire.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen will soon announce her appointment of Lin Chuan as premier. This decision hardly comes as a surprise. Lin Chuan had considerable fiscal management experience under Chen Shui-bian. He worked closely back then with Tsai Ing-wen. More recently, he was responsible for long-term policy formulation. This means that once "total government" is implemented, everyone in the DPP, top to bottom, will treat Tsai Ing-wen's will as the party's will. The success or failure of policy will be borne by president and party leader Tsai Ing-wen alone.

Lin Chuan's emergence has provoked considerable criticism, especially because the new cabinet includes many members of the Chen administration. Many feel the Chen administration has virtually been resurrected. Had Chen Shui-bian's rule been a plus for the DPP, this sort of "legacy" would hardly be a problem. But the Chen administration's eight year history was an embarrassment for Taiwan. Critics are concerned about more than her appointments. They are concerned that her administration will follow in the Chen administration's footsteps.

Lin Chuan's response has been, "Do not tar everyone with the same brush”, "Do not assume that if someone was a member of the Chen administration, he must be bad". The Chen administration cultivated many political appointees. Critics may hold differing opinions of the Ma administration. But one need not assume that all Ma administration heads are no good". This is true. But years of partisan warfare have made it impossible for people on Taiwan to view disputes objectively. Can we take advantage of the change in ruling parties to establish a new political culture? That is something both major parties should ponder.

In fact cabinet ministers come and go for a variety of reasons. Did they perform well? Critics can draw their own conclusions. The Chen administration's failure was not necessarily a failure of all its cabinet members. Criticisms of the Ma administration do not mean that all its officials were worthless. The problem is that with blue vs. green partisan confrontation, smearing a political appointee's job performance has become the norm. No matter how well an individual cabinet member might perform, it all boils down to the president's ability. Chen and Ma both had blind spots in their cabinet appointments. That has become an important factor in the failure of both administrations.

Chen Shui-bian appointed hardly any blue camp or independents to key posts in a gesture of reconciliation. Late in his term, he relied almost exclusively on cronies. Chen political appointees were drawn mainly from elected officials and party staffers, with a smattering of technocrats and academics. Such an administration is of course, well-suited for spreading political propaganda and waging partisan battles. But it can hardly boast of achievements in day to day government.

Worst of all, Chen family corruption set an example for many political appointees to emulate. Some accepted bribes openly. Some visited casino and accepted “free hospitality”. Some abused power to pave the way for life after politics. All in all, corrupt officials left an indelible impression of "bad table manners”. After eight years in power, the DPP found itself bereft of both foot soldiers and generals, and scarred for life.

Ma Ying-jeou came to office in this context. He then enjoyed "total government". Naturally people's expectations were high. Yet after eight years in power, his record was a huge disappointment. Ma administration recruitment practices were narrow-minded, not much better than Chen's. It drew talent from technocrats and academics. It became known as the "Professors Cabinet" or “Ivory Tower Cabinet” because its was so badly out of touch with people at the grass roots. Ma administration decision-making was too conservative and too tardy in responding to public expectations. It lacked the ability to break new ground, and even defend ground already occupied.

The main problem with Ma government recruits, academics and technocrats alike, was their lack of political charisma. They lacked the eloquence to defend their policies. What's worse, they left themselves escape hatches. They were prepared to jump ship and return to their former jobs at any time. As a result, they lacked the will to fight for their beliefs. Meanwhile, KMT elected officials lacked the ability to formulate policy. The result was a disconnect between the executive and legislature. The entire cabinet was demoralized. Late in Ma's term, bureau heads resigning, followed by their deputies taking over had become the norm. The government was deprived of talent, and morale was drained.

To sum up, the Chen administration and the Ma administration failed to use talent wisely. They were too narrow-minded in their recruitment practices. Cronyism and selfishness ruled the roost. Dissent was not tolerated. The result was government inbreeding. Decision making failed to keep up with the times. Their administrations often fell behind the private sector. They were hardly qualified to lead the nation. In the blink of an eye, 16 years elapsed, during which Taiwan's political and economic systems have remained stalled.

During the Chen era, political appointee Lin Chuan received more positive evaluations than negative evaluations. He balanced the budget. He reformed the tax system. Tsai praised him for "good communication skills", and for familiarity with her governing approach. She positioned Lin as a "reformist cabinet chief". We hope this is not mere talk. In any event, Tsai Ing-wen must learn from Chen and Ma's recruitment mistakes. She must attempt to create a new political atmosphere. Only then can she enable Taiwan to extricate itself from the quagmire.

蔡英文應以扁馬的用人缺失為鑑

2016-03-17聯合報

蔡英文宣布將由林全擔任行政院長，這個決定不令人意外。林全在扁政府時代有完整財經歷練，他與蔡英文互動密切，且近年長期為其擘劃政策藍圖。此一布局，也意味在「完全執政」後，民進黨政府上下皆將以蔡英文的意志為意志，施政成敗由總統兼黨魁的蔡英文一肩扛起。

林全出線，外界議論最多之處，是新閣不少成員係「扁朝舊臣」，而有「扁營回朝」之質疑。若陳水扁的執政經驗對民進黨是加分，這項「傳承」當然沒有問題；但外界之所以疑慮，主要是扁朝八年已成台灣民主史上不堪回首的一頁，如今外界關心的不僅是人選如何，而是蔡政府會不會步扁政府後塵？

對此，林全的回應是：「不要一竿子打翻一船人」，「不要認為扁團隊就是不好的」，因為扁政府時期也培養了很多政務官。林全進而談到，儘管今天外界對馬英九政府有不同看法，但也不必因此認為「馬政府閣員都不好」。此一說法，確有道理。問題在，台灣社會「就事論事」的能力因長年政治惡鬥而逐漸流失，如何趁著政黨輪替建立起新的政治文化，朝野都應深思。

事實上，內閣閣員來來去去原因不同，其表現之良窳，外界也自有公評。扁政府的失敗，未必是所有閣員的失敗；馬政府受批評，也不表示所有官員皆一無是處。癥結在，一因藍綠政治對立，政務官的表現被汙名化、標籤化已成常態；二則無論個別閣員的表現如何，最後皆因總統的能力而被化約。而扁、馬用人都有盲點，成了這兩朝政府失敗的重要因素。

陳水扁用人，除了上任初期曾邀少許藍營或無黨籍人士出任要職，作為和解象徵，到了執政中後期，政府運用幾乎都只依賴「親信」。陳水扁的政務官，主要來自民選首長、民代及黨內幕僚，再穿插少數技術官僚和學者；這樣的結構，固然在政治宣傳及政策辯護上戰鬥力十足，但在實際政務上卻未必拿得出傲人成績。

更糟的是，扁家的貪腐濫權讓若干政務官有樣學樣，公然收賄者有之，赴賭場接受招待者有之，下台前濫權為自己找後路者有之，在在留給政壇「吃相難看」的貪腐印記。八年執政下來，民進黨可謂損兵折將，傷痕累累。

馬英九在這樣的背景下上台，取得「完全執政」，當然受到民眾的深切期待；然而八年執政下來，政績卻令人失望。馬政府用人之褊狹，比起陳水扁毫不遜色；其人才率皆來自技術官僚和學界，號稱「博士內閣」，卻因不接「地氣」而與社會脫節。馬政府不僅決策過於保守，官員對民眾需求反應遲緩，不僅開創性不足，連守成都力有未逮。

馬政府用人的主要癥結在，無論學者或技術官僚都缺乏政治性格，一則拙於為政策辯護，二則因留有後路，隨時皆可回任原職，因而缺乏拚政績之鬥志。相形之下，國民黨的民選公職人員在政策上又幾乎沒有「造血」的功能，導致行政與立法脫節，整個內閣意興闌珊，到執政中後期，「首長下台、副首長接任」已成常態，人才和士氣被消磨殆盡。

總結扁政府和馬政府用人之失，兩人用人眼光皆過於狹隘，加上親信主義及本位主義作祟，甚至不同的聲音均遭排除。其結果，是政府人事「近親繁殖」，決策瞻矚無法與時俱進，甚至常常落後民間部門，更遑論領導國家前行。一眨眼十六年過去，台灣政經卻停滯不前。

在扁政府任官期間，林全算是正面評價高於負面評價的政務官，在財政收支平衡、租稅改革上也可見其功。蔡英文誇他「溝通能力好」，而且熟悉她的治國理念，並將林全組閣定位為「改革內閣」；這一切，希望都不只是說說而已。無論如何，蔡英文和林全應以馬、扁的用人缺失為鑑，進而設法為政治注入新的氣息，才能讓台灣擺脫惡鬥的泥淖。

Do Not Turn the Taiwan Strait into a Powder Keg over Identity Politics

Do Not Turn the Taiwan Strait into a Powder Keg over Identity Politics
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 16, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is wondering how to respond to the 1992 Consensus. We hope she realizes Taiwan's greatest danger is the De-Sinicization Express. Some green camp leaders who revel in their victory would hurtle forward at breakneck speed. We only hope Tsai Ing-wen has the courage to apply the brakes to green camp de-Sinicization. We hope she will honor the spirit of the Constitution, and acknowledge that "I am both Taiwanese and Chinese". We hope she will avoid disaster to Taiwan, and find a way for the two sides to live in peace.

Full Text Below:

"Are Taiwanese Chinese?" This question should never have arisen in the first place. Yet is has mired Taiwan in an identity crisis for over 20 years. It has undermined social cohesion and economic competitiveness. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party has assumed “total government”, it is likely to turn the Taiwan Strait into a powder keg.

No conflict is ever the result of a single factor. Rational factors include disputes over territory, sovereignty, authority, and economic advantage. Irrational factors include race, religion, and ideology. The latter involve identity politics, and are the most difficult to resolve. The DPP is about to implement “total government”. If it refuses to see the error of its ways, the two sides are likely to descend into an intractable conflict over national identity.

After 20 years of de-Sinicization via the educational system, “cultural Taiwan independence” propaganda, and political demagoguery, polls now show six out of ten people identifying themselves as “Taiwanese only”, just over three out of ten identifying themselves as "Taiwanese and also Chinese", and under four out of one hundred identifying themselves as “Chinese only”. Even more seriously, those who refuse to identify as “Chinese”, refuse not because they don't know what it means to be Chinese, but because they harbor intense hatred toward those they consider Chinese. Just as “reunification” has been demonized on Taiwan in recent years, so "being Chinese" has become Politically Incorrect. 

If Taiwan were already an independent nation, such identity crises would be a domestic matter. If Taiwan were located geographically in the vicinity of Hawaii, there will be no external problems. But Taiwan is a mere 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, where everyone agrees that "Taiwanese are Chinese", while on Taiwan six out of ten people agree that "Taiwanese are not Chinese" It is hard to imagine how cross-Strait mutual trust can be established under such conditions. And if conflict erupts, what will be the result?

Being “Taiwanese” was originally nothing more than a regional identity. But in pursuit of Taiwan independence, Lee Teng-hui and the DPP transformed peoples' "Taiwanese" identity into a matter of national identity. In order to achieve their political objectives, politicians extracted "Taiwanese" from "Chinese", and repositioned them opposite each other. They portrayed "Chinese" as uncivilized oppressors of "Taiwanese". If Taiwan independence were still feasible, then Lee Teng-hui and other green camp people might be regarded as "Taiwanese" national heroes. But are they really so ignorant as to imagine that Taiwan independence remains feasible? Do they not know that Taiwan independence is impossible, and can only bring disaster to Taiwan? If they realize this, but persist in de-Sinicization regardless, then their course of action is the height of immorality and irresponsibility.

Many politicians are dishonest and prone to gross exaggeration. They indoctrinate the public, especially youth, telling them that “Taiwan has nothing to do with China”, and that “Taiwanese are not Chinese”. They do so to win votes. Some uninformed people naively affix “Nation of Taiwan” stickers to their ROC passports. As a result they are refused entry and sent home. At such times, one never sees any politicians condemn the nations involved. Nor do the provocateurs who instigated the farce feel any guilt.

dChina, the Government of the Republic of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China are three different things. From 1912 to 1949, the Republic of China was China. Republic of China citizens were of course, Chinese. After 1949, two governments co-existed on Chinese national territory. Both are part of China. The people are of course, Chinese. The only difference is one is under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of China, while the other is under the jurisdiction of the government of the People's Republic of China. Taiwanese live on Taiwan, just as Shanghainese live in Shanghai. These are merely regional identities, nothing more. If the Taiwan independence movement were to succeed and found a nation, then people on Taiwan would of course no longer be Chinese, but “Huaren” or “ethnic Chinese”. But as long as the Republic of China Constitution remains in force, then people on Taiwan are Chinese.

Taiwan is an immigrant society. It may be diverse, but its cultural core remains Chinese. The pan green political parties' strategy has been to trumpet multiculturalism while suppressing Chinese culture. It has been to highlight Japanese colonial contributions in order to demean Chinese civilization. Pan green political parties need to realize that their attempts to de-Sinicize Taiwan's history and culture cannot succeed. They can only pit Taiwan against the Mainland, thereby forfeiting one of Taiwan's most valuable cultural assets. Short term election success does not represent the success of de-Sinicization. Chinese culture is resilient, and not so easily deconstructed.

Taiwan is an tiny island. It cannot afford a divided sense of identity. "I am Taiwanese" is of course a consensus in Taiwan society. But if we persist in identifying ourselves as “naturally not Chinese”, we risk losing the sympathy and support of 1.3 billion Chinese on the Mainland. The DPP snickers with glee when the percentage of people who say "I am Taiwanese, not Chinese" is on the rise. It does not occur to them that the probability of war between Taiwan and the Mainland is therefore also on the rise.

Tsai Ing-wen is wondering how to respond to the 1992 Consensus. We hope she realizes Taiwan's greatest danger is the De-Sinicization Express. Some green camp leaders who revel in their victory would hurtle forward at breakneck speed. We only hope Tsai Ing-wen has the courage to apply the brakes to green camp de-Sinicization. We hope she will honor the spirit of the Constitution, and acknowledge that "I am both Taiwanese and Chinese". We hope she will avoid disaster to Taiwan, and find a way for the two sides to live in peace.

勿讓身分認同成兩岸火藥庫

2016年03月16日 中國時報

「台灣人是不是中國人？」一個原本不應該存在的問題，卻讓台灣陷入20多年的認同困境，影響到台灣的社會團結與競爭力。如今，特別是在民進黨完全執政後，它極有可能成為兩岸關係衝突的火藥庫。

任何衝突都不會只有單一的原因，實質性的因素包括領土、主權爭端、政權控制與經濟衝突，理念性的因素則是種族、宗教與意識形態，而後者均涉及自我的身分認同。任何一個衝突如果夾雜了身分認同，這個衝突就難以化解。即將完全執政的民進黨如果再不認真修正，兩岸有可能會陷入最難處理的身分認同衝突問題。

經歷了約20年的「去中國化」的教育、文化、政治操作，現在的民意調查顯示，認同自己只是台灣人的比例已經約有六成，認同自己「是台灣人也是中國人」只有三成多，單單只有中國人認同的不到百分之四。更嚴重的是，不認同自己是「中國人」的原因，不是陌生，而是帶有負面的情緒。如果說，「統一」在台灣已經被妖魔化，這些年來，「中國人」也已經成為「政治不正確」的身分認同。

台灣如果是個已經獨立的國家，這樣的認同自然是內部矛盾而已，或者台灣目前的地理位置在夏威夷附近，也不會有外部問題。但是當與台灣僅隔著百里的大陸，全民幾乎一致認為「台灣人應該就是中國人」，而在台灣「台灣人不是中國人」的認同卻超過六成時，難以想像兩岸互信如何建立？一旦衝突會發生什麼樣的結果？

台灣人原本只是一個地域性的身分認同，但是在李登輝與民進黨追求台獨的政治訴求下，「台灣人」變成一種國族的身分認同象徵。為了遂行其政治目的，政客們把「台灣人」從「中國人」抽離並放在對立面，並將「中國人」塑造成一個不文明且打壓「台灣人」的他群。如果「台獨」尚有成功的機會，李登輝與若干泛綠人士或有機會被視為「台灣人」的民族英雄。但如果愚昧地以為台獨可行，或明知台獨無法做到，而且會給台灣帶來災難時，卻仍然製造「去中國化」，就是不負責任與不道德的政客了。

政治人物有不少是不誠實的，且往往誇大不實。他們告訴民眾，教育年輕人，台灣與中國無關，台灣人不是中國人，以爭取選票。一些不明就裡的人，天真地將中華民國護照外面貼上台灣國貼紙，結果是被拒絕入境，遣送回國。這時候看不到任何一個政治人物會譴責當事國，始作俑者也沒有任何的愧疚。

中國與中華民國政府及中華人民共和國政府是個不同的概念。1912年到1949年，中華民國就是中國，中華民國的國民當然是中國人。1949年以後，中國的土地上有兩個分治政府，它們都是中國的一部分，人民當然還是中國人，差別僅在於一方受中華民國政府管轄，一方受中華人民共和國政府治理。台灣人在台灣，如同上海人在大陸，都只是個地域性的身分名稱而已。如果台灣獨立成為一個國家，台灣人當然就不再屬於中國人，而只能算是華人，但是只要《中華民國憲法》仍然有效，台灣人就是中國人。

台灣是一個移民社會，雖然多元，但其核心仍是中華文化。泛綠政黨這些年的策略是以揚舉多元文化來壓抑中華文化，以凸顯日本殖民貢獻來貶低中華文明。泛綠政黨應該認識到歷史與文化的「去中國化」不可能成功的，反而會讓台灣在與大陸在競爭時，失去最可貴的文化資產。一時選舉的勝利並不代表「去中國化」成功，中華文化的力量不容易如此被推倒。

台灣是一個小島，沒有本錢自我切割社會的集體認同。「我是台灣人」當然是台灣社會的集體身分認同，但是當對中國人的認同愈少愈負面時，也會快速失去同為中國人的13億人民的關心與支持。當民進黨在竊喜「我是台灣人不是中國人」的比率攀升時，他們沒有想到，兩岸衝突可能性的曲線也在上升。

蔡英文正在為如何因應「九二共識」而煩惱。我們希望她查覺，台灣更大的隱憂是「去中國化」的列車正在一些得意於勝選的人士驅使下快速前進。希望即將上任的蔡英文能夠勇敢勸阻泛綠人士「去中國化」的操作，依照憲法精神接受「我是台灣人也是中國人」的認同，如此才能為台灣避免災難，找回兩岸的生機。

KMT Must Not Retreat, Working with CCP is the Right Path

KMT Must Not Retreat, Working with CCP is the Right Path
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 15, 2016

Executive Summary: The KMT chairmanship election debate was a huge let-down. The candidates dwelt on the minutiae behind the KMT's failure. They ignored the central factor in the KMT's election rout -- the “Chinese Connection”. For years, the Ma government backed down the moment it encountered any resistance on cross-Strait issues. This is what led to the eventual KMT debacle. The KMT must build a more distinctive brand. Only then can it win more votes in the next election, and position itself best for a return to power. In short, having the courage to stand behind its Chinese Connection, is the KMT's blueprint for a reversal of fortune.

Full Text Below:

The KMT chairmanship election debate was a huge let-down. The candidates dwelt on the minutiae behind the KMT's failure. They ignored the central factor in the KMT's election rout -- the “Chinese Connection”. For years, the Ma government backed down the moment it encountered any resistance on cross-Strait issues. This is what led to the eventual KMT debacle. Cross-Strait relations may descend into a state of Cold Civil War, putting East Asian regional peace at risk. Why aren't candidates for the KMT chairmanship conducting a thorough review of this?

Unless the DPP repeals its Taiwan independence party platform, the new government cannot expect smooth sailing with Beijing. Maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will be impossible. That is why the Kuomintang owes Taiwan an apology for this election defeat. Taiwan needs the KMT to maintain cross-Strait relations. It needs the KMT to keep the flame of peace alive. The KMT must have the courage to stand behind its "Chinese Connection”. It must have the courage to work with the Mainland. Why aren't candidates for the KMT party chairmanship examining this central factor?

The Ma government habitually backed down whenever it encountered the resistance on Mainland-related issues. Leave that aside for the moment. Following the 2014 nine in one election debacle, the KMT lost confidence its cross-Strait policy stance. Wave upon wave of green camp offensives sent the the KMT leadership fleeing from the battlefront. The most concrete example was the party's legislators at large nominations. For overseas spouses, the party nominated a woman from Cambodia. It dared not nominate a woman from the Mainland, despite the fact that it had the largest constituency. For overseas Taiwan businessmen, the party nominated a man from South America. It dared not nominate a Taiwan businessman from the Mainland, despite the fact that it had the largest constituency.

Such nominations leave the impression that whenever election season rolls around, the KMT keeps the Mainland at arm's length. It is clearly desperate to avoid DPP charges that it is "pandering to the Mainland and selling out Taiwan”. During last year's move to replace Hung Hsiu-chu as the party's presidential candidate, Eric Chu publicly criticized Hung's "one China, same interpretation”. This too diluted the KMT's "Chinese Connection". But no matter how desperately the KMT attempted to dilute the KMT's connection to the CCP, the election results showed its efforts were in vain.

If the newly elected KMT party chairman clings to this timid posture, he or she will be making a serious mistake. Taiwan needs a non-DPP political force to maintain cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. The KMT is the most reliable such force. How can the new KMT chairman throw in the towel, and ignore his or her responsibility to tough it out?

The Mainland does not trust the DPP. The general public wallows in populist hate. Tsai Ing-wen obviously has no intention of recognizing the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural speech. The DPP is even less likely to repeal its Taiwan independence party platform. The East Asian region remains troubled by conflicts in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. The nations involved are antagonistic toward each other. Add tensions in the Taiwan strait to this mix, and cross-Strait relations will inevitably be a rollercoaster ride. Will the two sides be able to conduct official exchanges? Will they react toward each other with suspicion, friction, discord, even conflict? Under such conditions, progress in cross-Strait relations will depend on the private sector. The stronger the opposition Kuomintang, the more it can ensure stable cross-Strait relations.

The KMT should rally members of the public willing to conduct people to people exchanges with the Mainland. It should strengthen its links to the Mainland. It should help the private sector realize its desires. For example, young people on Taiwan may have supported the DPP during this latest election. But many of them also wish to find jobs or found companies on the Mainland. The KMT should actively assist these people. It must of course consult first with the CCP and create employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for young people from Taiwan. It must protect their rights and interests, enabling them to “Go West” with peace of mind. In addition to youth issues, there is much room for cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation in popular culture, education, and religion. Religion in particular is an area where the KMT can have a significant impact on the evolution of civil society on the Mainland.

Even more important are cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. The KMT should help Taiwan business firms negotiate cross-Strait economic and trade-related issues with the CCP. When the DPP government is unable to communicate with the CCP, the KMT can step up to the plate. The Kuomintang may be an opposition party, unable to sign cross-Strait economic and trade agreements. But it can still deal with many practical problems that arise.

For example, the “mini three links” trade in goods was once severed, severely impacting Taiwan businesses. If this happens again, the KMT can inject itself and help Taiwan businessmen resolve their problems. After all, the KMT and CPP have abundant experience conducting exchanges and cooperation. Existing modes of communication will still be usable in the future, especially since the CCP has expressed willingness to continue cooperating with the KMT following the election, and even continue holding KMT CCP Forums. The KMT still has a role in future cross-Strait affairs.

The KMT must build a more distinctive brand. Only then can it win more votes in the next election, and position itself best for a return to power. In short, having the courage to stand behind its Chinese Connection, is the KMT's blueprint for a reversal of fortune.

國民黨莫退縮 連結中國是正道

2016年03月15日 中國時報

老實講，國民黨主席選舉政見發表會令人失望，幾位候選人依然纏繞著國民黨執政失敗的枝節因素叨絮不休，卻忽略了造成崩盤式敗選的核心因素─明明國民黨社會生命力在「中國元素」、在連結大陸的兩岸關係，但多年來馬政府在兩岸議題上卻「逢反中必退」，終於釀成敗選、甚至兩岸關係很可能墜入「冷內戰」、陷台灣與東亞和平於不確定風險中的苦果，國民黨不該徹底檢討嗎？

幾乎可以確定，除非民進黨廢除台獨黨綱，未來新政府和中共間的互動不可能順暢，兩岸也很難維持現狀，這是國民黨敗選真正對不起台灣的地方。面對未來，台灣還是需要國民黨來維繫兩岸關係，避免和平的火種熄滅。國民黨應如何捍衛「中國元素」，勇於「連結中國」，這難道不是黨主席選舉真正該檢討的核心問題嗎？

先不談馬政府執政「逢反中必退」，從2014年九合一選舉敗選後，國民黨就對兩岸議題喪失信心，面對綠營一波波綿密攻勢，黨中央竟然表現出畏戰、避戰的心態。最具體的事例，該黨提名不分區立法委員，外籍配偶名額提名一位來自柬埔寨的女士，而不敢提名外配人數最多的陸配代表；海外台商代表的名額，也提名一位南美洲台商，而非台商人數最多的大陸台商代表。

這樣的提名，讓人感覺國民黨一碰到選舉，就刻意和大陸「保持距離」，明顯是要躲避民進黨拋給國民黨的「親中賣台」帽子。去年國民黨「換柱」時，接棒做該黨總統候選人的朱立倫，曾公開批評洪秀柱「一中同表」主張，亦是為了淡化國民黨的「中國連結」。但無論國民黨在選戰中如何淡化國共關係，開票結果證明根本徒勞無功。

如果國民黨即將選出的新任黨主席，還是抱著這種消極思維，則我們要不客氣指出，這是大錯特錯的。因為台灣絕對需要一股非民進黨的政治力量，來維繫既有的兩岸交流合作關係於不墜；而國民黨是最可靠的力量，該黨新任主席豈能自暴自棄，無視於應勇敢承擔的責任呢？

大陸對民進黨全無信賴感，民間社會甚至不乏抱著仇視對立的民粹心態，蔡英文顯然不會在就職演說中承認九二共識，民進黨更不可能廢棄台獨黨綱，東亞區域戰略在黃海、東海、南海議題上，相關國家已充斥高度對抗情緒與緊張態勢，台海議題夾雜其中，兩岸關係難免跌宕起伏，屆時兩岸官方即便能對上話，互動態勢仍將是猜疑、磨擦、齟齬不斷，甚至出現意見對立、衝突。在這種情況下，兩岸關係的前行，將倚賴民間因素發揮作用，國民黨在野力量愈強，對不確定的兩岸關係愈能產生穩定的作用。

國民黨應致力凝聚民間願與大陸交流合作的所有力量，並藉此加強連結大陸，使民間意願得以實現。譬如，台灣青年雖在這次大選中較支持民進黨，但很多青年意願調查與相關大數據均顯示，還是有一定比例的年輕人有志前往大陸就業或創業。對這些人，國民黨宜積極協助，當然要先和中共協商，為台青創造具體可行的就業、創業機會，並形成保障台青權益機制，使有志的台青能安心前往。除了青年事項，將來兩岸民間文化、教育、宗教信仰等方面的交流合作空間非常大，尤其宗教交流是國民黨使得上力，且為大陸發展文明社會所需，當能達致顯著成果。

更重要的是兩岸經貿交流，國民黨應出面邀集台灣工商團體，和中共協商解決兩岸經貿相關問題。當民進黨政府和中共溝通不良，國民黨就有了補位空間。儘管國民黨以在野身分，無法和中共簽署制度性的兩岸經貿協議，但一些實務面的問題，還是可以處理。

類似以往小三通貨品貿易一度斷絕，而嚴重衝擊台商經營的問題，未來若再發生，國民黨就插得上手，也能有效地為台商排憂解難。畢竟，國民黨和中共交流合作經驗已很豐富，既有的溝通模式將來也可以沿用。更何況，台灣這次大選後，中共仍表示願意持續與國民黨交流合作，及繼續舉辦「國共論壇」；這是國民黨未來發揮兩岸事務長才的契機。

國民黨要形塑出更鮮明的「品牌特色」，才有條件在下次選舉爭取較多選票，為重新執政取得最好戰略位置。總之，勇於連結大陸，是國民黨從谷底翻升的張本。

Tsai Ing-wen Must Change DPP Relationship with the Mainland

Tsai Ing-wen Must Change DPP Relationship with the Mainland
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 14, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen must narrow the gap between herself and Beijing on one China. She must rein in the DPP legislative caucus, and prevent them from passing legislation or resolutions that severely impact cross-Strait relations. She must prevent the DPP from using transitional justice to promote cultural and historical Taiwan independence. She must be cautious about Washington, Tokyo, Taipei relations, and East Asian regional strategic issues, particular freedom of navigation and disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Cross-Strait relations may then enjoy some breathing room. will not lead to disaster.

Full Text Below:

The DPP and the CCP are two freight trains on a collision course. Unless one of them changes course, the cross-Strait status quo will be unsustainable after May 20. Neither Beijing, Washington, nor Taipei want the change in ruling parties to harm strategic relations, or increase uncertainty in East Asian regional security. But if Tsai Ing-wen's May 20 inaugural speech fails to meet with the other side's satisfaction, cross-Strait relations will descend into “Cold Peace”, or even “Cold Civil War”. This would be detrimental to all parties involved. This would be detrimental to Taiwan, which needs to make an economic breakthrough, reestablish stability, and ensure prosperity.

DPP cross-Strait policy is subject to internal political pressures. It is subject to pressure from Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. It is hampered by a lack of trust and communications between itself and Beijing. The January 16 two in one election is over. The two sides have demonstrated a modicum of goodwill. But on the 1992 Consensus, the two sides continue talking past each other. They are parrying each others' thrusts, and anger seems to be mounting.

The DPP argues that the Ma administration's eight year old cross-Strait policy is a failure. It argues that under ECFA, the Mainland benefited more from the peace divident than Taiwan. It argues that the public on Taiwan failed to experience any benefits, that cross-Strait economic integration failed to facilitate economic restructuring, or increase our breathing room on the international stage. It argues that the DPP won by a landslide, therefore Beijing cannot ignore majority public opinion on Taiwan. It cannot insist that Tsai Ing-wen follow in Ma Ying-jeou's footsteps.

Moreover, many believe that since the DPP is the ruling party, it must mark the end of an era. It must implement "transitional justice" and complete the final mile to democratization. Certain members of the new legislature have begun a “running of the bulls”. They have sponsored bills pertaining to sensitive issues such as national identity and reunification vs. independence. These however, do not represent the ideas of the DPP leadership. The DPP thinks Beijing is mistaken. Tsai Ing-wen will not take the same Taiwan independence path as Chen Shui-bian when he came to power.

Now consider the Mainland. The State Council Taiwan Affairs Office has held numerous press conferences urging the DPP to clarify its stance on the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may have declared that she "acknowledges the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus”. She may have pledged to “abide by the existing Republic of China constitutional framework”. But she has yet to make the most critical declaration of all. She has yet to declare that "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China". Mainland Foreign Minister Wang Yi even stated, "We hope that the new rulers on Taiwan will accept the premise of their own constitution, that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China". Beijing merely wants Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the ROC Constitution. This should not be difficult. She should then take the next step forward. But the green camp has played word games with Wang Yi. They have argued that Wang Yi's remarks meant Beijing had accepted Tsai Ing-wen's statement of position. Beijing eventually lost patience, became angry, and expressed its position more forcefully than ever. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun clarified. He said that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus amounted to changing the status quo. The two sides no longer have room for compromise. Mutual resentment and hostility are greater than ever.

Now that the DPP has come to power, cross-Strait relations will inevitably be affected. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing respond to Beijing's three points in her inaugural speech? Xi Jinping repeatedly referred to "two sides, one family". This should be sufficient to maintain the status quo, at least to some degree. It should be enough to ensure the Cold Peace that prevailed in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian came to power. ARATS and the SEF may terminate official contacts and economic and trade negotiations. The number of Mainland tourists allowed to visit Taiwan may be reduced. But if Tsai Ing-wen's inaugural speech fails to go beyond what she has already put out, the two sides could descend directly into Cold Civil War.

How will the new government handle high level personnel appointments for ARATS and the SEF? How  will the new legislature handle bills pertaining to cross-Strait relations and sensitive national identity issues? How will it handle Taiwan's participation in United Nations related organizations? How will it handle internal matters, such as de-Sinicization in education? Beijing may use these to decide whether the new government is hostile, whether it is moving towards one China, one Taiwan, two Chinas, or Taiwan independence. The two sides could then descend into a Cold Civil War.

Cross-Strait relations descending into a Cold Civil War or even military reunification, is the worst possible scenario for both sides. Both sides face pressure from the current economic downturn and restructuring. The Mainland's "Ten Three Five Plan" touts supply side reforms. Economic growth in 2016 is expected to reach 6.5% to 7%. But if it fails to maintain 6.5%, the Mainland then faces serious challenges. Taiwan's economic situation is equally grim. Will cross-Strait relations result in "the earth moving and the mountains shaking”? They might not. But if cross-Strait official contacts and trade exchanges are severed, Taiwan businesses are likely to exit en masse, the way they did under the Chen regime. The new government could not sustain the impact. Tsai Ing-wen must be willing to move in the same direction as the Mainland in order to minimize any such impact.

She must narrow the gap between herself and Beijing on one China. She must rein in the DPP legislative caucus, and prevent them from passing legislation or resolutions that severely impact cross-Strait relations. She must prevent the DPP from using transitional justice to promote cultural and historical Taiwan independence. She must be cautious about Washington, Tokyo, Taipei relations, and East Asian regional strategic issues, particular freedom of navigation and disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Cross-Strait relations may then enjoy some breathing room. will not lead to disaster.

調整與大陸關係 蔡英文責無旁貸
2016年03月14日 中國時報

民、共兩列火車正以對撞態勢加速前進，兩岸若無一方願意轉轍，520後兩岸關係就不可能維持現狀。固然中、美、台三方都不希望因台灣政黨輪替而釀成戰略關係的重大損害，更加深東亞區域安全的不確定情勢，但如果520就職演說不能滿足對岸的底線，兩岸關係勢必進入「冷和平」僵局，甚至墜入「冷內戰」，這對任何一方都不利，對台灣亟欲突破經濟困境、再造人民安定繁榮生活更是不利。

民進黨兩岸政策受到台灣內部政治壓縮、美日中關係牽動，以及欠缺和北京當局的互信和有效的溝通管道等三重不利因素影響，自116二合一選舉落幕至今，雙方雖然都展現了一定程度的善意，但關於化解「九二共識」分歧的隔空對話，只是見招拆招，而且火氣似乎愈拆愈大。

民進黨認為，馬政府8年來的兩岸政策是失敗的，在ECFA經貿合作交流機制下，大陸受惠遠比台灣更多，所謂「和平紅利」台灣民眾無感。兩岸經濟整合不利台灣經濟轉型，也無助拓展國際空間。民進黨是在多數民眾支持下才獲得壓倒性勝利，北京不能無視台灣多數民意，硬要民進黨「馬規蔡隨」。

而且，許多民進黨人認為，民進黨既已執政就必須總結歷史，熱切期待完成「轉型正義」，走完民主化的最後一哩路。個別黨員在立法院新會期相關提案如奔牛出閘；其中若干法案涉及敏感的國家定位與統獨意識，但並不代表民進黨的黨意。民進黨認為，北京若據此認定蔡英文上台後將走回陳水扁的台獨衝撞舊路，顯然是誤解。

反觀大陸，已多次透過國台辦、國務院新聞發布會等場合，希望民進黨把如何化解「九二共識」分歧說得更清楚。北京認為，蔡英文雖然宣示「承認『九二共識』的歷史事實」、「遵守中華民國現行憲政體制」，卻缺少最關鍵的一味：「大陸台灣同屬一中」。大陸外長王毅甚至提出：「希望台灣新執政者接受自己憲法規定的大陸、台灣同屬一個中國」，反襯北京認為蔡英文只是回到自己的憲法規定，這一點都不困難，應該再往前走一步。因此，當泛綠營擴大解讀王毅的談話，認為是接受了蔡英文的主張時，北京終於失去耐心，甚至動怒，直接把話越挑越清楚。國台辦主任張志軍明確表示，不認九二共識就是改變現狀；雙方已無妥協的空間，彼此的怨氣和敵意更難消解。

看來兩岸關係在民進黨上台後難免受到衝擊，假設蔡英文願意在就職演說中，對北京提出的三選項做出最低程度的正面回應，譬如習近平多次談及的「兩岸一家親」理念，應該能夠讓兩岸關係一定程度維持現狀，至少可以維持「冷和平」，大致回到2000年陳水扁執政初期，兩岸兩會的官方接觸和經貿談判等可能中斷，陸客來台人數可能減少。但如果蔡英文就職演說的內涵未超過她已經提出的詮釋和承諾，兩岸就可能直接進入「冷內戰」了。

如果新政府在海陸兩會的高層人事安排上，在立法院相關涉及兩岸關係和國家定位的敏感政治性法案的審議上，在台灣參與聯合國功能性組織的動作上，或者繼續在內政、教育採取「去中國化」政策，北京就可能視為新政府是不友善的，是朝「一中一台」、「二個中國」或「台獨化」的敵對操作，兩岸不是不可能由「冷內戰」繼續倒退。

當然，兩岸關係走向冷內戰，甚至「武統」，對雙方都是最壞的選擇，畢竟當前兩岸同樣面臨經濟下行和轉型的雙重壓力。大陸「十三五計畫」吹響供給側改革，2016年經濟增長預期目標6.5%～7%，但能不能保住6.5%是非常嚴峻的挑戰。同樣地，台灣整體經濟形勢仍然嚴峻，新政府上台，就算兩岸關係不「地動山搖」，僅只是兩岸官方接觸中斷，經貿交流開倒車，扁政府執政時的台企出走潮都有可能再次上演，這將是新政府難以承受的打擊。蔡英文至少應表現願意與大陸相向而行的誠意，讓可能的影響降到最低。

一方面她可以繼續努力縮小與北京有關「一中」問題的差距，二方面應責成立院黨團，要約束立法院制定可能造成兩岸嚴重衝撞的法案或決議；也要適當約束民進黨推動的「轉型正義」，不能變成轉向推動文化和歷史台獨，在美、日、台三邊關係與東亞區域戰略問題上，尤其南海主權與自由航行權爭議的表態務必謹慎；這樣，兩岸關係至少還可以保留若干緩衝空間，不至於翻覆釀災。

No Increase in Electricity Rates for Ten Years: A Red Herring

No Increase in Electricity Rates for Ten Years: A Red Herring
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2016

Executive Summary: When President Ma raised gasoline prices and electricity rates, he provoked widespread public resentment. The DPP is afraid of making the same mistake. Electricity rates have a major impact on our livelihood. They must be handled with care. The declaration that "Electricity rates will not increase for 10 years" is a red herring, one that could stand in the way of long-term energy development on Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen's energy policy must be pragmatic. She must not fail to see the forest for the trees.

Full Text Below:

During Tsai Ing-wen's recent "Tour of Industry", she said that in her estimation “There is no possibility of a major increase [in electricity rates for ten years]”.  This is a far cry from ringing campaign declaration that "Electricity rates will not increase for ten years". When questioned, Tsai said she did not blame the media for oversimplifying her electricity rate policy. She assured them that the DPP has a comprehensive electricity rate strategy.

During her presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen set forth a number of policy programs. But few rivals challenged them. They were being cautious. Tsai seldom proposes any policy about which she is uncertain. But many challenged Tsai Ing-wen's energy policies. In particular, they challenged her proposal to increase green energy production to 50 billion kWh within ten years. Her promise to “surpass Japan and catch up to Germany” aroused considerable skepticism. Criticisms that her green energy policy would lead to massive increases in electricity rates forced her to promise that "Electricity rates will not increase for ten years".

Tsai has gone from promising that "Electricity rates will not increase for ten years”, to “Electricity rates will not increase by much in ten years”. Clearly her promises were nothing but campaign rhetoric. The issue for her is not preventing rate increases, but appeasing voters. The media quoted Tsai Ing-wen as saying “Electricity rates will not increase for ten years”. She says the media oversimplified her position. But reports that electricity rates would not increase if the DPP won impressed voters. Therefore when Tsai changes her tune, from "no increase" to "no major increase", people naturally reach for their magnifying glasses.

Tsai Ing-wen promised no major electricity rate increases for ten years. She gave three reasons. One. Energy-saving measures will mitigate the need for electricity. Two. Green energy prices are high, but costs will fall in the future. Three. The DPP will amend the "Electrical Power Industry Act" and promote separation of the power grid. This will increase Taipower business efficiency, make electrical power generation more transparent, and prices more reasonable.

None of this will be as easy as Tsai Ing-wen imagines. One. Energy-saving measures may let people use less electricity, but they may not prevent unit cost from rising. Imported energy accounts for as much as 98% of Taiwan's energy capacity. Energy prices on Taiwan may be out of our hands.

Taipower has decided to lower electricity rates this April. It has reduced electricity rates three times over the past year, all because prices for imported coal and natural gas have fallen. Electricity rates can fall repeatedly because nearly 80% of our electricity is generated thermally. Over the past few years, fuel prices have fluctuated greatly. Oil prices could climb to nearly 50 dollars per barrel. They could also drop to less than 30 dollars a barrel. With such drastic price fluctuations, how can the DPP possibly guarantee domestic rates will not rise?

Two. Capital costs for green power generation will fall as the technology matures and market penetration increases. This is a mega trend. But development of green energy on Taiwan is limited by natural conditions. This is something for which the DPP can offer no solution. The northern part of the island will experience electricity shortages when the sun fails to shine. The terrain is unfavorable to development of solar energy. There is no power shortage in winter, but that is the peak season for wind power. Last year, our renewable energy capacity accounted for 7.7% of Taipower's system. But actual Taipower generating capacity was limited to 2.8%. Take "power generation" and "actual scheduling". Renewable energy cannot achieve the same base load power scheduling as nuclear energy and thermal energy.

Tsai Ing-wen proposes to make Taiwan a “nuclear free homeland” by 2025. But given the pace of domestic green energy development, replacing nuclear energy in the short term is impossible. Even Germany and Japan cannot do it. How can Taiwan? Compare possible development routes. Substituting thermal power may be feasible. In the run up to 2019, new units will begin operation in Linkou, Daelim, and other locations. These can compensate for the decommissioning of the Number One Nuclear Plant. But carbon emissions from thermal power will undermine Taiwan's efforts to reduce carbon emissions and air pollution harmful to people's health.

Given current domestic and international energy supply, Taiwan may not endure rate increases or lack electricity in the short term. But energy policy requires three to five year development plans, not short-term speculation. Recently, while examining a hydrogen powered car, Tsai immediately exclaimed, "Hydrogen energy is Taiwan's choice for strategic energy transformation!" In fact, Taiwan has yet to map out its path for denuclearization. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is already talking about developing hydrogen energy. This is like expecting a toddler just learning to walk, to take part in a hundred meter dash. How can anyone believe any of this?

When President Ma raised gasoline prices and electricity rates, he provoked widespread public resentment. The DPP is afraid of making the same mistake. Electricity rates have a major impact on our livelihood. They must be handled with care. The declaration that "Electricity rates will not increase for 10 years" is a red herring, one that could stand in the way of long-term energy development on Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen's energy policy must be pragmatic. She must not fail to see the forest for the trees.

「十年電價不漲」是假議題
2016-03-11 聯合報

蔡英文在其「產業之旅」中說，電價在我們預估的十年內「不會有大幅上漲的可能」；這與先前她在大選期間承諾選民「十年電價不漲」的印象頗有落差，因而遭外界質疑。蔡英文坦言，她不怪媒體過度簡化其電價政策，唯強調民進黨的電價策略有完整思考。

蔡英文在大選期間提出許多政見，卻少見對手挑戰，這多少與其謹慎的個性有關，她甚少提出自己毫無把握的主張。但在能源政策上，蔡英文受到各方的挑戰卻不小。尤其，她提出十年要推升綠能發電到五百億度的「超日趕德」野心，質疑聲浪很大，這又間接迫使她提出「十年電價不漲」的論調，以反駁外界指她發展綠能將導致電價大漲的批評。

從「十年電價不漲」修正為「十年電價不大漲」，說明這只是選舉語言；重點不在如何「不漲」，而在如何打動選民。蔡英文說，「十年電價不漲」是媒體過度簡化之詞；但就競選效果看，民進黨執政後「不漲電價」的印象已深印民心。因此，當蔡英文改口，說「不漲」其實是「不大漲」，外界自然要用放大鏡檢視。

蔡英文說，她對十年內電價不會大幅上漲有把握，是基於三個理由：一是落實節能，就不需要繳那麼多的電費；二是綠能價格現在雖高，但未來成本會降；三是民進黨要修《電業法》，推動電網分離，提高台電營業效率，電價會更透明合理。

這些理由，從現實面檢視，恐怕未必如蔡英文說的輕鬆。首先，落實節能可以讓民眾使用的電量減少，卻未必能使單位電價不漲。以台灣進口能源占總九十八％的高水位，台灣能源價格漲與不漲完全不操之在我。

包括台電決定今年四月降電價在內，過去一年台灣電價連三降，都是因為進口煤炭與天然氣價格大跌所致；而我國火力發電比重將近八成，電價才有連降空間。過去幾年國際燃料價格波動極大，油價可以攀升到每桶近一五○美元的天價，也可以跌至不及卅美元一桶；以如此大的變動，民進黨如何保證國內電價一定不大漲？

其次，綠能發電成本將隨著技術成熟與普及率提升而走低，這是大趨勢；問題在，台灣天然條件上發展綠能之限制，民進黨至今無解。諸如：缺電的北部日照天數不足，土地因素不利發展太陽能；不缺電的冬天，卻是風力發電的高峰。去年我國再生能源系統裝置容量占台電系統的七．七％，但實際發電量卻只占台電總發電量的二．八％，原因在此。就「發電」與「實際調度」而言，再生能源並無法達到如核能、火力等基載電力般的調度效率。

蔡英文主張台灣要在二○二五年成為「非核家園」，但以目前國內綠能發展的速度，要在短期內取代核能，連德國、日本都辦不到，台灣豈有可能？比較可能的途徑，還是用火力取代或作為過渡。國內林口、大林等新火力機組將在二○一九年前陸續上線，可彌補核一等核電廠除役的空缺；但火力發電的碳排放將影響台灣的減碳努力，其空汙隱憂也可能損害國人健康。

從當前國內供電情勢與國際能源價格走勢看，在短期內，台灣確實有可能「電價不大漲，也不會缺電」。然而，能源政策是國家三、五十年的發展大計，不能一味炒短線。日前蔡英文參訪氫能汽車，立刻喊出「氫能是台灣能源轉型的戰略選項」；事實上，台灣連廢核路徑都沒畫好，就要跳到發展氫能，這無異奢談要正在學步的嬰孩去跑百米，如何讓民眾信服？

馬總統任內因油電雙漲政策引發民怨，民進黨因而戒慎恐懼，唯恐重蹈覆轍。電價是關係民生之大事，確應謹慎處理，但一味在「十年不漲電價」的假議題中糾纏，反而可能錯失台灣長期能源發展的規畫契機。蔡英文在能源政策上必須務實，千萬不要見樹不見林。