Crisis of Confidence in Tsai Government
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
Full Text Below:
Trust can reduce social costs within a nation, by facilitating cooperative relationships between people. Trust is not easy to establish. When it has been lost, it is often difficult to re-establish. Trust is a form of social capital. If people lose trust in the government, the government loses its mandate to lead the people. This is definitely an uneasy situation for any society.
In contrast to past administrations, the new government had four long months to prepare. Yet only one month after assuming power, the public has reached a reluctant conclusion. This new administration, dominated by a single party, one that enjoys “total government”, is an utterly clueless Rube Goldberg assembly. Tsai Ing-wen's new government now faces a challenge -- not from opposition political parties, but from the general public. This crisis of confidence is the result of structural contradictions and duplicity, of majoritarian arrogance and the betrayal of social justice, of haste and callousness that have led to loose cannon policy formulation.
This crisis of confidence in the new government manifests itself in a number of ways, and on many occasions. These include cross-Strait relations and relations between the ruling and opposition parties during legislative interpolation. They include the new government's distorted representations of history and national identity. This crisis shows no signs of subsiding, but only of worsening. Confidence in the new government's economic and trade strategy, and whether it can protect Taiwan's interests, is also rapidly diminishing.
DPP leaders at the city mayor and county chief level may enjoy popular support. But governing the nation is not the same as governing cities and counties. Local leaders may resort to emotional appeals to whitewash poor governance. They can pass the buck to the central government. But the central government must deal with international realpolitik, where the order of the say is “survival of the fittest”. Foreign competitors are not about to lend it a helping hand. Fail while enjoying “total government” and one must answer for it. Domestically, one will have no one to pass the buck to. Internationally, passing the buck to foreigners will be like shouting into the wind.
Governing a nation can be divided into two parts. One involves international strategic capability. One involves domestic governance. The moment the new government took office, it decided on several strategies. Culturally and educationally, it adopted an "Original Inhabitants History" strategy. It refused to correct fallacies in public school history texts. It distanced itself from Chinese culture. It embarked on wholesale de-Sinicization. Premier Lin Chuan even parroted the "Some comfort women volunteered" line promulgated by “History for Subjects of the Japanese Emperor".
In foreign trade, the new government proposes to "say goodbye to dependence on a single market". It proposes a "New Southern Strategy" that will weaken cross-Strait trade. In foreign policy, it hopes to join Shinzo Abe's "alliance of values", highlighting Taiwan's "anti-China" status.
The impact of the new government's strategy of cultural de-Sinicization, economic weakening of cross-Strait trade, and military alliances against the Mainland, is no longer limited to CCP decision-makers. It now includes the Mainland public. It now undermines their belief in DPP sincerity. This crisis of confidence is more terrifying than anything else imagineable. It will make the Taiwan Affairs Office increasingly wary about future concessions to the DPP government.
In terms of domestic governance, only one month after taking office, the new government is considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant. Tsai Ing-wen put it clearly. She said "We will not force people to choose between power shortages and nuclear power generation”. This constitutes a public admission that the DPP's "nuclear free homeland” pipe dream has bowed to reality. During her election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen vowed not to reduce the number of legal holidays below seven. Now that the DPP is in power however, it is preparing to cut them. As a result labor groups are protesting in front of the Executive Yuan. Nuclear energy issues and labor issues amount to a crisis of confidence, not just for the DPP administration and the legislative caucus. They amount to a crisis of confidence in the DPP among green camp voters.
The DPP treats the affairs of the nation as child's play. The list of examples is endless. The new Minister of Defense minister shipped 40,000 artillery shells to Taiping Island, raising alarms with the United States. The Ministry of Defense immediately covered for him, and said the shells were sent to Dongsha and Nansha instead. This 70-year-old minister told young people “When war comes, you must bravely march onto the battlefield and sacrifice your lives for the nation with a smile on your face”. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs flagrantly violated and conscience and her oath of office. She refused to say that Cong Zi Niao Reef is a reef, but instead claimed that its legal status is undetermined. On matters of national defense and foreign affairs, key officials have already seriously undermined trust in the new government's judgement and honesty.
Tsai Ing-wen's “vow of humility” still echoes in our ears. Yet she has in already given former President Ma Ying-jeou the cold shoulder. She refused to allow him go to Hong Kong to deliver a speech. Instead she granted former DPP president Chen Shui-bian medical parole. She characterized Chen Shui-bian's political fundraising dinner as a "healing”. She even thanked him for “his willingness to sit in a box seat”. If this is what the DPP considers "transitional justice", how the KMT and DPP possibly trust each other?
The crisis of confidence facing Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not confined to any single issue. It involves a chain of connected issues. It is the result of de-Sinicization, of intentionally weakened links to the Mainland, of opposing the Mainland while pretending to “maintain the status quo”. It is the result of meeting the demands of the opposition, while neglecting the demands of one's office. The new government's “transitional justice” rationalizes its failings while concealing its opportunism. Its internal contradictions have led to a crisis of confidence in the new government.
Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
社論－蔡英文政府的信任危機 瀕臨爆發
2016年06月16日 04:10 主筆室
「信任」可以減少社會運作的成本，也可以簡化人與人的合作關係。「信任」建立不易，卻可頃刻瓦解且難以再立。「信任」本身就是一項社會資本，如果人民失去對政府的信任，政府會逐漸喪失其引領社會的正當性，這個社會絕對是處於不安的情境。
相較以往，這次新政府的籌備期有長達4個月之久。但是，上任1個月的表現，卻讓外界感覺到，這個一黨獨大、完全執政的新政府是一輛毫無章法、匆匆上路的拼裝車。蔡英文新政府已經面臨到的，不是來自於在野黨政治權力的挑戰，而是最根本的信任危機。這些信任危機有的來自於結構性的矛盾，致使想法與作為表裡不一；也有的來自於多數權力的傲慢，偏離社會公義；還有的來自於草率地恣意妄為，致使荒腔走板。
新政府的信任危機出現在多方面。有兩岸間、朝野政黨間、立法行政間；在史觀認同、國家認同方面的信任危機，不但未見紓緩，反而更形深化；其對外經貿安全戰略能否確保台灣利益也出現信任危機。
或許在縣市首長層級，民進黨首長可以得到民眾的普遍支持，但是治國與治市畢竟是兩回事。地方首長可以用與人民博感情方式來掩蓋施政的不力，也可以將過失責任推給中央，但是中央卻必須面對優勝劣敗的國際權力競逐事實，外在競爭者不會雪中送炭，也不會錦上添花。完全執政的政府做不好，對內無責可推，對外沒人理會。
國家的治理可以分為兩大部分，一為涉外整體戰略能力，一為對內治理能力。新政府一上任就確定了幾個台灣的戰略方向。在文化教育上，採用「原民史觀」，廢除課綱微調，疏離中華文化，行「去中國」路線。林全院長甚而說出「慰安婦一些是自願」的談話，靠近日本的「皇民史觀」。
在對外經貿上，主張要「告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象」，希望透過「新南向政策」的推動，形成「弱兩岸經貿」的事實。在對外安全上，希望能加入日本安倍晉三所倡導的「價值同盟」，凸顯台灣「抗中」的角色。
這種「文化去中、經貿弱中、安全抗中」的戰略選擇，所衝擊到的已經不只是中共的決策階層，更包括了大陸民間輿論對民進黨政府推動兩岸關係的信任，這種危機比什麼都可怕，也會使得國台辦未來在面對民進黨政府時更為戒慎恐懼，不敢輕率讓步。
在內部治理方面，新政府上任才1個月就考慮重啟「核一」運轉。蔡英文更明白地對外表示，「不會讓人民，只能在『缺電』和『核電』之間二選一」。這等於公開承認民進黨「廢核家園」理想最終可能向現實低頭。蔡英文選前曾承諾不會刪除7天勞工假期，但是民進黨一執政就準備砍假，勞工團體因此到行政院抗議。在核能與勞工議題上，存在的已經不僅是民進黨行政與立法團隊間的信任危機，更是綠營選民對民進黨的信任危機。
一些把國家事當兒戲的例子更是層出不窮。新任國防部長可以自爆要送4萬枚炮彈到南沙太平島，引起美國高度關切後，國防部為了掩過立刻澄清這批炮彈是送去東沙而非南沙，這位已經70多歲的部長還告訴年輕人，當戰爭來臨時，要勇敢走向戰場，「含笑」為國犧牲。新任外交部長也可以公開違背自己的知識與良心，不再說沖之鳥是個礁，反而主張其法律地位未定。國防與外交是國家大事，大政要員如此表現，已經嚴重傷害人民對新政府判斷力與誠實的信任。
蔡英文的「三個謙卑說」言猶在耳，但轉過頭來卻很霸氣地給馬英九前總統一個閉門羹，不讓他去香港發表演說，卻讓同黨的陳水扁前總統保外就醫備受禮遇，將陳水扁「會客」解釋成有益身心的「治療」活動，還感謝他願意委屈在「包廂」中會客。如果這就是民進黨所說的「轉型正義」，國、民兩黨之間還會有什麼信任可言？
蔡英文新政府所面臨的信任危機是環環相扣、節節相連，已經不是單一的一個點，而是由「去中、弱中、抗中／維持現狀」、「貫徹在野訴求／肩負執政責任」、「轉型正義／護短循私」所引發的結構性矛盾，這使得新政府的信任已經有全面崩裂的跡象。
蔡英文新政府要彌補的也不是點的修補，而應全面反思。見微知著，見始知終，蔡英文新政府若不能再有臨深履薄的戒慎，信任必將盡失，失去信任，施政必將失敗，將帶給人民苦難悲怨，遭人唾棄。
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia
The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2016
Executive Summary: Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Full Text Below:
Mainland Chinese and Russian missile destroyers have appeared simultaneously in Diaoyutai Island waters. The Abe Cabinet was taken aback. It concluded that Mainland China and Russia have joined hands to oppose Japan. It held an overnight emergency meeting and lodged a strong protest. But the US merely reiterated that "The US-Japan Security Treaty covers Diaoyutai Island waters". Beijing sternly refuted Japan. Russia denied that the two fleets "acted in unison”. Have Mainland China and Russia joined hands to oppose the US and Japan? More evidence is required. But the global strategic picture is rapidly coming into focus. Mainland China is attempting to ally itself with Russia in order to resist the US and Japan. A strategic triangle involving the US, Mainland China, and Russia is indeed taking shape.
During the Cold War the "strategic triangle" explained the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union. It remains applicable today. Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of strategic triangles have emerged from within the international community. But those involving the US continue to attract the most attention. In recent years, Russia has gradually restored its national power under the leadership of strongman Vladimir Putin. Events in Crimea and Ukraine have made the strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia the most important one in today's world.
The strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, has never been an equal one. During the Cold War, the balance of power involved the US and Mainland China vs. the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Washington attempted to contain not only Russia, but also Mainland China. Hence its "China Threat Theory". Obama's Asian-Pacific rebalancing is clearly aimed at Mainland China's increasing military might. In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US joined with the EU, both to contain Russia, and to resolve South China Sea disputes. The US pressured other nations to join its patrols. It constantly challenged Beijing's territorial sovereignty. The result is today's Sino-Russian anti-US posture. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Moscow in late March, was intended to normalize US-Russian relations. The US is already feeling the pressure of the Sino-Russian strategic alliance.
Within the new US, Mainland China, and Russia strategic triangle, Beijing remains most concerned about Sino-US relations. Xi Jinping has long reiterated his desire for a new "no conflict, no confrontation, cooperation and win-win" big power relationship. Xi is aware of the ups and downs of Sino-US relations. He knows the two sides have differences despite cooperation, conflict despite dialogue. But he also sees potential for cooperation in many areas.
Mainland China-Russia relations are at a historic peak. They are currently limited to a strategic partnership. But they are gradually moving toward "equality and trust, tolerance and learning, cooperation and win-win". As the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the Moscow 2015 "5.9" Beijing Red Square parade, the 70th anniversary War of Resistance "9.3" parade showed, Xi Jinping and Putin have established a strong personal friendship. The Mainland and Russia cooperate closely on international and regional security matters. They enjoy a relatively solid "quasi-allies" relationship. By contrast, the new big power relationship between the Mainland and the US remains a castle in the air.
US-Russian relations are comparatively simple, but also the most complex. After the Cold War, the United States took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union to expand NATO eastward. It incited 'color revolutions". It provoked divisions in the South Caucasus. Its imposed sanctions against Ukraine, forcing Moscow to suffer from Western economic sanctions and a US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. This led Russia to bolster its Asian-Pacific strategy, and ally with Mainland China to oppose the United States and Japan.
The international situation is treacherous and changeable. The interests of the United States, Mainland China, and Russia are constantly in flux. Western economic sanctions have accelerated Sino-Russian energy cooperation and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The two sides have signed or intend to sign economic and trade agreements amounting to three trillion USD. Bilateral trade volume is likely to exceed 200 billion within five years. Bilateral trade includes weapons such as the new S-400 air defense missile systems and Su-35 fighters. It includes energy deals, in the form of a natural gas pipeline. It includes war production, such as wide-body aircraft, helicopter gunships, and navigation systems. It includes joint military exercises, twice last year, once in the Mediterranean, and once in the Sea of Japan. These further enhance bilateral strategic cooperation.
Trust between Mainland China and Russia remains inadequate. Short-term historical grievances have not been forgotten. But realpolitik considerations have led to strategic military cooperation. Putin will visit Beijing again later this month. Mainland China's alliance with Russia is bound to continue. Russia does not want its economic development determined by Mainland China. Its arms sales to Vietnam and India are intended to balance the US-Mainland China-Russia trilateral relationship. By the same token, Beijing's economic assistance to Russia also has limits. In particular, it must consider the potential impact of Mainland China-EU relations on the Sino-Russian alliance. Sino-Russian relations also have their limitations.
Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Kissinger warned Washington in the 1970s. He said that in the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, relations between the US and China, and relations between the US and Russia, must be better than relations between China and Russia. But the current US, Mainland China, Russia strategic triangle is clearly inconsistent with Kissinger's expectations. The 2013 Joint Communique may not contain the words "based on the principles of non-alignment". But the term "non-group" implies an imminent bilateral alliance.
Sino-Russian relations have long involved a high degree of political friendship, a moderate degree of strategic cooperation, and a limited degree of economic cooperation. Even so, the Sino-Russian "quasi-alliance" is strong enough to threaten US global hegemony.
社論－釣島新風雲 牽動美中俄戰略三角
2016年06月15日 04:10 主筆室
中國與俄羅斯導彈驅逐艦同時出現在釣魚台海域，安倍內閣受到強烈震撼，認為是中俄聯手對抗日本，連夜召開緊急會議並提出強烈抗議，美國僅輕描淡寫強調「美日安保範圍包括釣魚台海域」。北京隨即嚴詞駁斥日方，俄羅斯則否認「聯合艦隊」的說法。中俄是否聯手對抗美日可能還需要更多證據，但全球戰略大局正在快速重整，中國企圖拉攏俄羅斯抗衡美日，「美中俄戰略三角」的確儼然成形。
冷戰年代就可以用「戰略三角」概念解讀美中蘇三邊互動，今日似乎依然適用。冷戰結束後國際社會出現各類型的戰略三角關係，但美國參與的戰略三角仍最受矚目。近年俄羅斯在強人普丁領導下國力逐漸恢復，經過克里米亞及烏克蘭事件考驗，「美中俄戰略三角」似漸成為今日世界最重要戰略三角。
美中俄戰略三角從來就不對等。冷戰時代，美國的權力平衡是「聯中制蘇」，後冷戰時期，華府的戰略既圍堵俄羅斯，又散播「中國威脅論」，歐巴馬的亞太再平衡，擺明是針對中國軍事崛起。因應烏克蘭危機，美國聯歐制俄，解決南海爭端，美國慫恿他國共同巡航，不斷挑戰北京護衛領土主權的底線，演變成今日中俄有意聯合抗美的態勢。美國務卿凱瑞3月下旬訪問莫斯科，意在重啟美俄正常化關係，似已感受到中俄戰略聯手的壓力。
美中俄新的戰略三角，北京最在意的還是中美關係。習近平多次重申願與美國建立「不衝突、不對抗、合作共贏」的新型大國關係，就是意識到中美關係起伏不定，雙方分歧中有合作、衝突中有對話，卻不乏多領域的潛在合作空間。
中俄關係正處於歷史巔峰，目前雖僅止於戰略協作夥伴，但逐步走向「平等互信、包容互鑒、合作共贏」。從2014索契冬季奧運、2015莫斯科「5.9」紅場閱兵與至北京紀念抗戰勝利70周年的「9.3」閱兵，習近平與普丁已建立深厚私誼。中俄在國際和區域安全事務的密切合作，已具有「準盟國」的架勢，較中美仍處於空中樓閣的新型大國關係，顯然紮實許多。
美俄關係相對單純，卻也最複雜。冷戰結束後，美國乘蘇聯解體之危，推動北約東擴、點燃「顏色革命」、分化南高加索國家，美國因烏克蘭危機的制裁，讓莫斯科再嘗西方經濟制裁及美國啟動東歐導彈防禦系統的苦果。加強亞太布局與「聯中抗美（日）」，成為其必要的戰略選擇。
國際情勢詭譎多變，美中俄新三角的利益交織亦隨之改變。西方的經濟制裁加速了中俄能源合作與尖端武器交易，雙方已簽訂或準備簽署的經貿協議總額高達3兆美元，5年內的雙邊貿易額更可能突破2000億美元。雙邊不斷就軍售（新型S-400防空導彈系統與蘇愷35型戰機）、能源（天然氣管線）、軍工生產（廣體客機、武裝直升機、導航系統等）尋求合作，去年兩次先後在地中海與日本海舉行的聯合軍演，進一步提升中俄戰略合作的層級。
中俄政治互信依然不足，歷史心結短期內亦難消除，但現實政治的考量，促使雙方走向軍事戰略合作。本月底普丁將再訪北京，勢必延續中俄結盟的態勢。論理，俄方不會樂見經濟發展受到中國牽制，其軍售越南與印度的作法，無非要平衡美中俄三邊關係；同樣，北京經濟援助俄國也有其限度，尤其要考量中俄結盟對中歐關係可能造成的衝擊，中俄關係緊密程度有其限制。
美中俄新三角的現狀是：中美分歧與摩擦不斷、美俄心結根深蒂固、中俄不再為敵。美國不斷塑造全球國家群起對抗中俄，北京與莫斯科自然會聯手。三角形的兩邊相加必然大於第三邊，中俄合作不僅是美國的噩夢，也會打破現有的國際格局。
季辛吉1970年代就警告華府，美中俄三角關係中的美中及美俄互動必須勝於中俄關係，但從現狀看來，美中俄新三角顯然不符季辛吉的預期。2013年中俄總理聯合公報雖未出現「依據不結盟原則」的字眼，但有關「非集團化」的表述暗喻了雙邊關係趨近於結盟。
中俄關係或有一段長時間處於「政治高度友好、戰略中度配合、經濟有限合作」的模式。即便如此，中俄的「準同盟」關係，卻足以威脅到美國獨霸全球的局面。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2016
Executive Summary: Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Full Text Below:
Mainland Chinese and Russian missile destroyers have appeared simultaneously in Diaoyutai Island waters. The Abe Cabinet was taken aback. It concluded that Mainland China and Russia have joined hands to oppose Japan. It held an overnight emergency meeting and lodged a strong protest. But the US merely reiterated that "The US-Japan Security Treaty covers Diaoyutai Island waters". Beijing sternly refuted Japan. Russia denied that the two fleets "acted in unison”. Have Mainland China and Russia joined hands to oppose the US and Japan? More evidence is required. But the global strategic picture is rapidly coming into focus. Mainland China is attempting to ally itself with Russia in order to resist the US and Japan. A strategic triangle involving the US, Mainland China, and Russia is indeed taking shape.
During the Cold War the "strategic triangle" explained the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union. It remains applicable today. Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of strategic triangles have emerged from within the international community. But those involving the US continue to attract the most attention. In recent years, Russia has gradually restored its national power under the leadership of strongman Vladimir Putin. Events in Crimea and Ukraine have made the strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia the most important one in today's world.
The strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, has never been an equal one. During the Cold War, the balance of power involved the US and Mainland China vs. the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Washington attempted to contain not only Russia, but also Mainland China. Hence its "China Threat Theory". Obama's Asian-Pacific rebalancing is clearly aimed at Mainland China's increasing military might. In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US joined with the EU, both to contain Russia, and to resolve South China Sea disputes. The US pressured other nations to join its patrols. It constantly challenged Beijing's territorial sovereignty. The result is today's Sino-Russian anti-US posture. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Moscow in late March, was intended to normalize US-Russian relations. The US is already feeling the pressure of the Sino-Russian strategic alliance.
Within the new US, Mainland China, and Russia strategic triangle, Beijing remains most concerned about Sino-US relations. Xi Jinping has long reiterated his desire for a new "no conflict, no confrontation, cooperation and win-win" big power relationship. Xi is aware of the ups and downs of Sino-US relations. He knows the two sides have differences despite cooperation, conflict despite dialogue. But he also sees potential for cooperation in many areas.
Mainland China-Russia relations are at a historic peak. They are currently limited to a strategic partnership. But they are gradually moving toward "equality and trust, tolerance and learning, cooperation and win-win". As the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the Moscow 2015 "5.9" Beijing Red Square parade, the 70th anniversary War of Resistance "9.3" parade showed, Xi Jinping and Putin have established a strong personal friendship. The Mainland and Russia cooperate closely on international and regional security matters. They enjoy a relatively solid "quasi-allies" relationship. By contrast, the new big power relationship between the Mainland and the US remains a castle in the air.
US-Russian relations are comparatively simple, but also the most complex. After the Cold War, the United States took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union to expand NATO eastward. It incited 'color revolutions". It provoked divisions in the South Caucasus. Its imposed sanctions against Ukraine, forcing Moscow to suffer from Western economic sanctions and a US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. This led Russia to bolster its Asian-Pacific strategy, and ally with Mainland China to oppose the United States and Japan.
The international situation is treacherous and changeable. The interests of the United States, Mainland China, and Russia are constantly in flux. Western economic sanctions have accelerated Sino-Russian energy cooperation and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The two sides have signed or intend to sign economic and trade agreements amounting to three trillion USD. Bilateral trade volume is likely to exceed 200 billion within five years. Bilateral trade includes weapons such as the new S-400 air defense missile systems and Su-35 fighters. It includes energy deals, in the form of a natural gas pipeline. It includes war production, such as wide-body aircraft, helicopter gunships, and navigation systems. It includes joint military exercises, twice last year, once in the Mediterranean, and once in the Sea of Japan. These further enhance bilateral strategic cooperation.
Trust between Mainland China and Russia remains inadequate. Short-term historical grievances have not been forgotten. But realpolitik considerations have led to strategic military cooperation. Putin will visit Beijing again later this month. Mainland China's alliance with Russia is bound to continue. Russia does not want its economic development determined by Mainland China. Its arms sales to Vietnam and India are intended to balance the US-Mainland China-Russia trilateral relationship. By the same token, Beijing's economic assistance to Russia also has limits. In particular, it must consider the potential impact of Mainland China-EU relations on the Sino-Russian alliance. Sino-Russian relations also have their limitations.
Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Kissinger warned Washington in the 1970s. He said that in the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, relations between the US and China, and relations between the US and Russia, must be better than relations between China and Russia. But the current US, Mainland China, Russia strategic triangle is clearly inconsistent with Kissinger's expectations. The 2013 Joint Communique may not contain the words "based on the principles of non-alignment". But the term "non-group" implies an imminent bilateral alliance.
Sino-Russian relations have long involved a high degree of political friendship, a moderate degree of strategic cooperation, and a limited degree of economic cooperation. Even so, the Sino-Russian "quasi-alliance" is strong enough to threaten US global hegemony.
社論－釣島新風雲 牽動美中俄戰略三角
2016年06月15日 04:10 主筆室
中國與俄羅斯導彈驅逐艦同時出現在釣魚台海域，安倍內閣受到強烈震撼，認為是中俄聯手對抗日本，連夜召開緊急會議並提出強烈抗議，美國僅輕描淡寫強調「美日安保範圍包括釣魚台海域」。北京隨即嚴詞駁斥日方，俄羅斯則否認「聯合艦隊」的說法。中俄是否聯手對抗美日可能還需要更多證據，但全球戰略大局正在快速重整，中國企圖拉攏俄羅斯抗衡美日，「美中俄戰略三角」的確儼然成形。
冷戰年代就可以用「戰略三角」概念解讀美中蘇三邊互動，今日似乎依然適用。冷戰結束後國際社會出現各類型的戰略三角關係，但美國參與的戰略三角仍最受矚目。近年俄羅斯在強人普丁領導下國力逐漸恢復，經過克里米亞及烏克蘭事件考驗，「美中俄戰略三角」似漸成為今日世界最重要戰略三角。
美中俄戰略三角從來就不對等。冷戰時代，美國的權力平衡是「聯中制蘇」，後冷戰時期，華府的戰略既圍堵俄羅斯，又散播「中國威脅論」，歐巴馬的亞太再平衡，擺明是針對中國軍事崛起。因應烏克蘭危機，美國聯歐制俄，解決南海爭端，美國慫恿他國共同巡航，不斷挑戰北京護衛領土主權的底線，演變成今日中俄有意聯合抗美的態勢。美國務卿凱瑞3月下旬訪問莫斯科，意在重啟美俄正常化關係，似已感受到中俄戰略聯手的壓力。
美中俄新的戰略三角，北京最在意的還是中美關係。習近平多次重申願與美國建立「不衝突、不對抗、合作共贏」的新型大國關係，就是意識到中美關係起伏不定，雙方分歧中有合作、衝突中有對話，卻不乏多領域的潛在合作空間。
中俄關係正處於歷史巔峰，目前雖僅止於戰略協作夥伴，但逐步走向「平等互信、包容互鑒、合作共贏」。從2014索契冬季奧運、2015莫斯科「5.9」紅場閱兵與至北京紀念抗戰勝利70周年的「9.3」閱兵，習近平與普丁已建立深厚私誼。中俄在國際和區域安全事務的密切合作，已具有「準盟國」的架勢，較中美仍處於空中樓閣的新型大國關係，顯然紮實許多。
美俄關係相對單純，卻也最複雜。冷戰結束後，美國乘蘇聯解體之危，推動北約東擴、點燃「顏色革命」、分化南高加索國家，美國因烏克蘭危機的制裁，讓莫斯科再嘗西方經濟制裁及美國啟動東歐導彈防禦系統的苦果。加強亞太布局與「聯中抗美（日）」，成為其必要的戰略選擇。
國際情勢詭譎多變，美中俄新三角的利益交織亦隨之改變。西方的經濟制裁加速了中俄能源合作與尖端武器交易，雙方已簽訂或準備簽署的經貿協議總額高達3兆美元，5年內的雙邊貿易額更可能突破2000億美元。雙邊不斷就軍售（新型S-400防空導彈系統與蘇愷35型戰機）、能源（天然氣管線）、軍工生產（廣體客機、武裝直升機、導航系統等）尋求合作，去年兩次先後在地中海與日本海舉行的聯合軍演，進一步提升中俄戰略合作的層級。
中俄政治互信依然不足，歷史心結短期內亦難消除，但現實政治的考量，促使雙方走向軍事戰略合作。本月底普丁將再訪北京，勢必延續中俄結盟的態勢。論理，俄方不會樂見經濟發展受到中國牽制，其軍售越南與印度的作法，無非要平衡美中俄三邊關係；同樣，北京經濟援助俄國也有其限度，尤其要考量中俄結盟對中歐關係可能造成的衝擊，中俄關係緊密程度有其限制。
美中俄新三角的現狀是：中美分歧與摩擦不斷、美俄心結根深蒂固、中俄不再為敵。美國不斷塑造全球國家群起對抗中俄，北京與莫斯科自然會聯手。三角形的兩邊相加必然大於第三邊，中俄合作不僅是美國的噩夢，也會打破現有的國際格局。
季辛吉1970年代就警告華府，美中俄三角關係中的美中及美俄互動必須勝於中俄關係，但從現狀看來，美中俄新三角顯然不符季辛吉的預期。2013年中俄總理聯合公報雖未出現「依據不結盟原則」的字眼，但有關「非集團化」的表述暗喻了雙邊關係趨近於結盟。
中俄關係或有一段長時間處於「政治高度友好、戰略中度配合、經濟有限合作」的模式。即便如此，中俄的「準同盟」關係，卻足以威脅到美國獨霸全球的局面。
Monday, June 13, 2016
Taiwan's Primacy Requires Resolute Opposition to Taiwan Independence
Taiwan's Primacy Requires Resolute Opposition to Taiwan Independence
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2016
Executive Summary: Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
Full Text Below:
In recent years, a rising tide of Taiwan independence sentiment suggests that "natural Taiwan independence" has gone mainstream. It suggests that a split between the two sides is a foregone conclusion. But upon closer scrutiny, the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds always seem a little off, and always ring a little hollow. One might even say that the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds are a tree without roots.
Advocates of Taiwan independence adopt an “If not me, who? If not now, when?” attitude. They claim the exclusive right to decide who “loves Taiwan”. They claim the exclusive right to define Taiwan's "sovereignty" and "dignity". Green camp “love for Taiwan” is presumed. The blue camp, conversely, cannot possibly “love Taiwan”. When the ruling DPP uses the term "Chinese Taipei", it has done nothing to demean Taiwan. When the ruling KMT uses the term "Chinese Taipei" however, it has “humiliated the nation”. When DPP city mayors and county chiefs solicit business on the Mainland, they are “rational and pragmatic”. When the KMT increases Mainland tourism to Taiwan, it is “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. Examples of such DPP hypocrisy are too numerous to list. Any rational person can see the absurdity of such DPP rhetoric. Unfortunately such demagoguery sells all too well on Taiwan.
Those inclined toward Taiwan independence consider “Taiwanese primacy” and “Taiwanese dignity” as matters of major importance. They scrutinize every exchange with the Mainland with a magnifying glass. Anything that can be perceived as a slight is cited as evidence that the Mainland has "demeaned Taiwan". Meanwhile, they themselves constantly taunt the Mainland. They constantly accuse the Mainland of having a "glass heart". They constantly boast that “Taiwan is Number One!” In their refusal to bow before the Mainland, one might imagine that they embody the Hakka spirit of defiance.
Sadly, that is not the whole picture. There is another, paradoxical phenomenon. Even the Japanese admit they imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. Yet many on Taiwan insist that their motherland is Japan. Really? Were these people in fact classified as Japanese during Japan's colonial occupation? When asked whether the comfort women volunteered or were forced, they say “Some were but some were not”. Opponents of school textbook corrections even argue that claims that the comfort women were forced hurts the feelings of the Japanese. When the Japanese expel Taiwan fishing boats from Cong Zi Niao Reef, these same advocates of Taiwan independence dare not utter a peep about whether Cong Zi Niao is a reef or an island. They dare not criticize Japan, yest insist they alone are qualified to deal with the fishing rights dispute. These advocates of Taiwan independence cannot even defend the dignity of their own countrymen. The Japanese spit in their faces, and they respond by meekly wiping the spittle away. How exactly have they defended Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity? What exactly has become of Taiwan's primacy?
For too many years Taiwan has paid too a high price on behalf of these advocates of Taiwan independence. Taiwan has sacrificed its sovereignty and dignity. It has suffered other more tangible losses as well. This is especially true since the new government came to power and allied with the US and Japan to oppose the Mainland. It has abandoned many positions long held by the Ma government. The importation of US pork was merely a matter of time. The new government is about to allow food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster region. Arms purchases from the US will soon be on its agenda. US lawmakers have even come calling, and demanded that arms purchases be increased to 3% of GDP. Many of these moves were intended to buy US and Japanese support in resisting pressure from the Mainland. Chen Shui-bian era checkbook diplomacy is still fresh in people's memories. Yet the new government yearns to become the next sucker?
In order to rid itself of so-called “dependence on the Mainland”, the new government is pushing its New Southern Strategy full force. It is even subsidizing descendants of immigrants if they return to Taiwan. It is calling for increased awareness of the mother country, and closer contacts. New immigrants and their descendants were subject to discrimination in the past. Taking care of new immigrants is the right thing to do, and something we support. But isn't the new government's discriminatory policy just a tad too flagrant? What about Mainland spouses and their children? Aren't they Republic of China citizens? Don't they need to strengthen ties with the Mainland? Or does anyone who has any connection to the Mainland vilified as “The Other”?
If we truly love Taiwan, if we truly believe in Taiwan's primacy, we must punch holes in the Taiwan independence movement's hypocrisy. We must resolutely oppose all words and deeds that incite hatred against our Chinese origins and Chinese heritage. We must confidently oppose Taiwan independence. As long as one lives on Taiwan, one is qualified to “love Taiwan”. Whether one was born on Taiwan, born on the Mainland, or an indigenous person is of no importance. Nor does it matter whether one is blue or green. Taiwanese are also Chinese. One can love Taiwan while supporting reunification. None of these should be cause for conflict.
We hope everyone on Taiwan will realize that Taiwan's dignity cannot be achieved by groveling. Still less can it be achieved by means of media deception. If we wish to win the world's respect, we must first determine who is really Taiwanese. Taiwan clearly cannot sever its links with the Mainland. The two sides share the same Chinese culture and Chinese civilization. Also, the Mainland has become a world-class nation with international influence.
Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
社論－堅持台灣主體性 就要反台獨
2016年06月14日 04:10 主筆室
這些年來台獨思潮甚囂塵上，給人感覺就是「天然獨」已成主流、兩岸分裂也幾成定局。但仔細推敲現在檯面上這些台獨言行，又總讓人感覺有些奇怪，給人一種強烈的虛無之感，若再進一步言，則可說現在的這些台獨言行，根本是無本之木。
具體而言，現在的台獨主張者擺出一副捨我其誰的架勢，壟斷了「愛台灣」的詮釋權，也壟斷了所謂「主權」與「尊嚴」的界定權。綠營愛台灣是天經地義，藍營卻注定沒權利愛台灣；民進黨政府使用「中華台北」叫沒有矮化，國民黨政府使用「中華台北」卻叫喪權辱國；民進黨縣市長登陸行銷叫理性務實，國民黨推動陸客來台叫親中賣台；舉凡種種，不敢說罄竹難書，也只能是族繁不及備載。任何理性的人都會看出這種說辭的荒謬，但現實就是這類說法還十分有市場。
傾向獨立的人將台灣人的主體性、台灣人的尊嚴視為一大事，在與大陸交往拿著放大鏡檢視，任何一件小事都能找到大陸「矮化」台灣的證據，與此同時，還處處挑釁大陸，動輒就說大陸是「玻璃心」，而台灣則是NO.1。看起來這些人確實都具備了客家人的「硬頸」精神，面對大陸絲毫不會低頭。
但我們同時也看到一個弔詭的現象，日本人都承認是對台灣殖民統治，卻有很多台灣人說當年自己的祖國是日本，問題是當年你也配當日本人？當問到慰安婦是自願還是強迫時，他們會說兩者都有，反課綱的抗議者甚至還說，不能說慰安婦是被強迫的，不然會傷害日本人的感情。我們還會看到，當日本人在沖之鳥礁驅趕台灣漁船時，這些人竟然連沖之鳥是礁還是島，都不敢說出個立場來，甚至還敢批評前朝，自誇自己才有能力處理漁權爭議。主張台獨到連同胞都保護不了，自己的尊嚴被隨便踐踏也可以唾面自乾，這豈是維護主權和尊嚴，台灣主體性又放在哪裡？
這些年來台灣為了這些人所主張的台獨已經付出太多代價，不光是主權和尊嚴，更有實實在在的利益。尤其是新政府上台之後，為了推行聯美日制大陸的政策，馬政府原本堅持的各種立場紛紛棄守，美豬開放進口只是時間問題，日本核災區食品也即將要開放進口，對美軍事採購也必須迅速提上議事日程，美國議員甚至直接來到家門口要求軍費提升到GDP的3%。如此種種，無非就是為了讓美日繼續支持台灣，抗拒來自大陸的壓力。陳水扁時代的凱子外交還未從人們的記憶中消失，現在新政府又打算來當新凱子？
為了擺脫對大陸的所謂依賴，新政府現在如火如荼地推行新南向政策，甚至還要補助新移民後代回到母國，美其名曰增加對母國的認識，加深彼此的聯繫。過去新移民及其後代在台灣社會或多或少受到歧視，現在政府要照顧新移民當然無可厚非，我們當然全力支持，但政府如此直接的進行差別待遇，是否過分了一些？陸配和他們的子女難道就不是中華民國的國民？難道他們就不需要加強與大陸的聯繫？還是說他們只要跟大陸沾到邊，就注定是非我族類？
如果我們真心愛台灣，真誠堅持台灣主體性，就要戳破這些說辭的虛偽本質，要堅決反對一切否定兩岸血緣與文化連結的言行，要理直氣壯反對台獨。只要是台灣人，就有權力愛台灣，不分本省人、外省人以及原住民，更不分藍營還是綠營。台灣人也是中國人、愛台灣也可以支持統一，這些都不應該是衝突的概念。
我們也希望所有台灣人都能意識到，台灣人的尊嚴不能靠搖尾乞憐來獲得，更不應拿一些新聞事件來自欺欺人，台灣要贏得世人的尊重，就必須真正弄清楚台灣人到底是誰。顯然，台灣不可能擺脫與大陸的連結，不光是因為兩岸共享中華文化與文明，更因為現在的大陸早已成為具國際影響力的世界級大國。
我們看到許多台灣人為了台獨主張，不惜自甘為其他大國制衡大陸的棋子，卻大言不慚是為了維護台灣的主權與尊嚴，實在是滑天下之大稽。誰都不能否認，21世紀中國已非鴉片戰爭後的中國，許多人認為世界已進入中美共同治理的2G格局，也有人相信21世紀東風將壓倒西風。誠然，中國正待轉型，前瞻未來充滿挑戰，但世界也在快速改變，西方治理模式也出現重大危機。對台灣來說，堅持台灣主體，虛心理解大陸、走好中華文化與西方體制價值觀的融合之路，以此利基與中國大陸攜手實現中國人共同的復興，才是正確的抉擇。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2016
Executive Summary: Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
Full Text Below:
In recent years, a rising tide of Taiwan independence sentiment suggests that "natural Taiwan independence" has gone mainstream. It suggests that a split between the two sides is a foregone conclusion. But upon closer scrutiny, the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds always seem a little off, and always ring a little hollow. One might even say that the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds are a tree without roots.
Advocates of Taiwan independence adopt an “If not me, who? If not now, when?” attitude. They claim the exclusive right to decide who “loves Taiwan”. They claim the exclusive right to define Taiwan's "sovereignty" and "dignity". Green camp “love for Taiwan” is presumed. The blue camp, conversely, cannot possibly “love Taiwan”. When the ruling DPP uses the term "Chinese Taipei", it has done nothing to demean Taiwan. When the ruling KMT uses the term "Chinese Taipei" however, it has “humiliated the nation”. When DPP city mayors and county chiefs solicit business on the Mainland, they are “rational and pragmatic”. When the KMT increases Mainland tourism to Taiwan, it is “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. Examples of such DPP hypocrisy are too numerous to list. Any rational person can see the absurdity of such DPP rhetoric. Unfortunately such demagoguery sells all too well on Taiwan.
Those inclined toward Taiwan independence consider “Taiwanese primacy” and “Taiwanese dignity” as matters of major importance. They scrutinize every exchange with the Mainland with a magnifying glass. Anything that can be perceived as a slight is cited as evidence that the Mainland has "demeaned Taiwan". Meanwhile, they themselves constantly taunt the Mainland. They constantly accuse the Mainland of having a "glass heart". They constantly boast that “Taiwan is Number One!” In their refusal to bow before the Mainland, one might imagine that they embody the Hakka spirit of defiance.
Sadly, that is not the whole picture. There is another, paradoxical phenomenon. Even the Japanese admit they imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. Yet many on Taiwan insist that their motherland is Japan. Really? Were these people in fact classified as Japanese during Japan's colonial occupation? When asked whether the comfort women volunteered or were forced, they say “Some were but some were not”. Opponents of school textbook corrections even argue that claims that the comfort women were forced hurts the feelings of the Japanese. When the Japanese expel Taiwan fishing boats from Cong Zi Niao Reef, these same advocates of Taiwan independence dare not utter a peep about whether Cong Zi Niao is a reef or an island. They dare not criticize Japan, yest insist they alone are qualified to deal with the fishing rights dispute. These advocates of Taiwan independence cannot even defend the dignity of their own countrymen. The Japanese spit in their faces, and they respond by meekly wiping the spittle away. How exactly have they defended Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity? What exactly has become of Taiwan's primacy?
For too many years Taiwan has paid too a high price on behalf of these advocates of Taiwan independence. Taiwan has sacrificed its sovereignty and dignity. It has suffered other more tangible losses as well. This is especially true since the new government came to power and allied with the US and Japan to oppose the Mainland. It has abandoned many positions long held by the Ma government. The importation of US pork was merely a matter of time. The new government is about to allow food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster region. Arms purchases from the US will soon be on its agenda. US lawmakers have even come calling, and demanded that arms purchases be increased to 3% of GDP. Many of these moves were intended to buy US and Japanese support in resisting pressure from the Mainland. Chen Shui-bian era checkbook diplomacy is still fresh in people's memories. Yet the new government yearns to become the next sucker?
In order to rid itself of so-called “dependence on the Mainland”, the new government is pushing its New Southern Strategy full force. It is even subsidizing descendants of immigrants if they return to Taiwan. It is calling for increased awareness of the mother country, and closer contacts. New immigrants and their descendants were subject to discrimination in the past. Taking care of new immigrants is the right thing to do, and something we support. But isn't the new government's discriminatory policy just a tad too flagrant? What about Mainland spouses and their children? Aren't they Republic of China citizens? Don't they need to strengthen ties with the Mainland? Or does anyone who has any connection to the Mainland vilified as “The Other”?
If we truly love Taiwan, if we truly believe in Taiwan's primacy, we must punch holes in the Taiwan independence movement's hypocrisy. We must resolutely oppose all words and deeds that incite hatred against our Chinese origins and Chinese heritage. We must confidently oppose Taiwan independence. As long as one lives on Taiwan, one is qualified to “love Taiwan”. Whether one was born on Taiwan, born on the Mainland, or an indigenous person is of no importance. Nor does it matter whether one is blue or green. Taiwanese are also Chinese. One can love Taiwan while supporting reunification. None of these should be cause for conflict.
We hope everyone on Taiwan will realize that Taiwan's dignity cannot be achieved by groveling. Still less can it be achieved by means of media deception. If we wish to win the world's respect, we must first determine who is really Taiwanese. Taiwan clearly cannot sever its links with the Mainland. The two sides share the same Chinese culture and Chinese civilization. Also, the Mainland has become a world-class nation with international influence.
Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
社論－堅持台灣主體性 就要反台獨
2016年06月14日 04:10 主筆室
這些年來台獨思潮甚囂塵上，給人感覺就是「天然獨」已成主流、兩岸分裂也幾成定局。但仔細推敲現在檯面上這些台獨言行，又總讓人感覺有些奇怪，給人一種強烈的虛無之感，若再進一步言，則可說現在的這些台獨言行，根本是無本之木。
具體而言，現在的台獨主張者擺出一副捨我其誰的架勢，壟斷了「愛台灣」的詮釋權，也壟斷了所謂「主權」與「尊嚴」的界定權。綠營愛台灣是天經地義，藍營卻注定沒權利愛台灣；民進黨政府使用「中華台北」叫沒有矮化，國民黨政府使用「中華台北」卻叫喪權辱國；民進黨縣市長登陸行銷叫理性務實，國民黨推動陸客來台叫親中賣台；舉凡種種，不敢說罄竹難書，也只能是族繁不及備載。任何理性的人都會看出這種說辭的荒謬，但現實就是這類說法還十分有市場。
傾向獨立的人將台灣人的主體性、台灣人的尊嚴視為一大事，在與大陸交往拿著放大鏡檢視，任何一件小事都能找到大陸「矮化」台灣的證據，與此同時，還處處挑釁大陸，動輒就說大陸是「玻璃心」，而台灣則是NO.1。看起來這些人確實都具備了客家人的「硬頸」精神，面對大陸絲毫不會低頭。
但我們同時也看到一個弔詭的現象，日本人都承認是對台灣殖民統治，卻有很多台灣人說當年自己的祖國是日本，問題是當年你也配當日本人？當問到慰安婦是自願還是強迫時，他們會說兩者都有，反課綱的抗議者甚至還說，不能說慰安婦是被強迫的，不然會傷害日本人的感情。我們還會看到，當日本人在沖之鳥礁驅趕台灣漁船時，這些人竟然連沖之鳥是礁還是島，都不敢說出個立場來，甚至還敢批評前朝，自誇自己才有能力處理漁權爭議。主張台獨到連同胞都保護不了，自己的尊嚴被隨便踐踏也可以唾面自乾，這豈是維護主權和尊嚴，台灣主體性又放在哪裡？
這些年來台灣為了這些人所主張的台獨已經付出太多代價，不光是主權和尊嚴，更有實實在在的利益。尤其是新政府上台之後，為了推行聯美日制大陸的政策，馬政府原本堅持的各種立場紛紛棄守，美豬開放進口只是時間問題，日本核災區食品也即將要開放進口，對美軍事採購也必須迅速提上議事日程，美國議員甚至直接來到家門口要求軍費提升到GDP的3%。如此種種，無非就是為了讓美日繼續支持台灣，抗拒來自大陸的壓力。陳水扁時代的凱子外交還未從人們的記憶中消失，現在新政府又打算來當新凱子？
為了擺脫對大陸的所謂依賴，新政府現在如火如荼地推行新南向政策，甚至還要補助新移民後代回到母國，美其名曰增加對母國的認識，加深彼此的聯繫。過去新移民及其後代在台灣社會或多或少受到歧視，現在政府要照顧新移民當然無可厚非，我們當然全力支持，但政府如此直接的進行差別待遇，是否過分了一些？陸配和他們的子女難道就不是中華民國的國民？難道他們就不需要加強與大陸的聯繫？還是說他們只要跟大陸沾到邊，就注定是非我族類？
如果我們真心愛台灣，真誠堅持台灣主體性，就要戳破這些說辭的虛偽本質，要堅決反對一切否定兩岸血緣與文化連結的言行，要理直氣壯反對台獨。只要是台灣人，就有權力愛台灣，不分本省人、外省人以及原住民，更不分藍營還是綠營。台灣人也是中國人、愛台灣也可以支持統一，這些都不應該是衝突的概念。
我們也希望所有台灣人都能意識到，台灣人的尊嚴不能靠搖尾乞憐來獲得，更不應拿一些新聞事件來自欺欺人，台灣要贏得世人的尊重，就必須真正弄清楚台灣人到底是誰。顯然，台灣不可能擺脫與大陸的連結，不光是因為兩岸共享中華文化與文明，更因為現在的大陸早已成為具國際影響力的世界級大國。
我們看到許多台灣人為了台獨主張，不惜自甘為其他大國制衡大陸的棋子，卻大言不慚是為了維護台灣的主權與尊嚴，實在是滑天下之大稽。誰都不能否認，21世紀中國已非鴉片戰爭後的中國，許多人認為世界已進入中美共同治理的2G格局，也有人相信21世紀東風將壓倒西風。誠然，中國正待轉型，前瞻未來充滿挑戰，但世界也在快速改變，西方治理模式也出現重大危機。對台灣來說，堅持台灣主體，虛心理解大陸、走好中華文化與西方體制價值觀的融合之路，以此利基與中國大陸攜手實現中國人共同的復興，才是正確的抉擇。
Taiwan Japan Relations: Dangerously Dazzling Fireworks
Taiwan Japan Relations: Dangerously Dazzling Fireworks
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2016
Executive Summary: Only the United States and Mainland hold the power of life and death over Taiwan. Only they can determine Taiwan's long-term stability. Japan has never been a major factor. Japan wants Taiwan to join its anti-China coalition. That is something that can be considered. But Japan must have the strength and strategies to provide Taiwan with strategic guarantees. It must demonstrate its trustworthiness. The Tsai government must not trade illusory Japanese fireworks displays, only to risk our national security in return.
Full Text Below:
A stable nation requires a stable national security strategy. If its strategic framework develops problems or becomes distorted, the nation will experience internal divisions and encounter external conflict.
During the Ma era, the government maintained a policy of being “close to the US, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly with Japan”. Consequently despite its one China policy, the US defended the cross-Strait status quo. Despite its one China policy, the Mainland promoted cross-Strait peace. Based on the 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations, Taipei maintained relations with both the United States and the Mainland. Despite the three sides' different perspectives, Taipei was able to maintain the “status quo” that the Tsai regime currently enjoys and benefits from.
The new government asserts that it is "maintaining the status quo", even as it dismantles the existing national security framework. First, the new government is abandoning the 1992 Consensus. It is rejecting the "Two Sides, One China" premise embodied in the Constitution. It asserts that it is doing its utmost to “be at peace with China”, even though it has turned a deaf ear to political signals from the Mainland. Communications have been severed between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Communications between the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office have been severed as well. Official government to government contacts no longer exist. Communications through ECFA have also reportedly ceased. The consequences extend far beyond the initially anticipated reduction in Mainland tourism and short-term cessation in exchange students.
Meanwhile, the Tsai government has stepped up its efforts to "be close to the US" and "friendly with Japan". President Tsai has repeatedly begged the US to support Taiwan's membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The cabinet is preparing to allow the importation of US pork containing Ractopamine. The Minister of Defense has informed the Legislative Yuan of the transport of 40,000 artillery shells to Taiping Island. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has been forced to apologize to the AIT and offer an explanation. Six former AIT Taipei Office Directors have given current US-Taiwan relations a thumbs up. The Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, led by John McCain, will lead the largest congressional delegation to Taiwan in recent years. As we can see, we have sacrificed real benefits in exchang for a fireworks display from the US. Once the fireworks are over, there will be nothing left to see.
Being "friendly with Japan" is even more baffling.
Since the Tsai government came to power, it has issued reckless statements about the status of Cong Zi Niao Reef, all the way from "Its status is undetermined" to "It's a reef". It has promised that negotiations in July will settle the matter satisfactorily, and that "The Cong Zi Niao Reef issue is no longer a fashionable topic". Does the new government even give a damn about Taiwan fishermen and their survival? It intends to permit the importation of irradiated foodstuffs from Fukushima, but has yet to formulate a credible policy. The Tsai government has assigned DPP heavyweights Chiou I-jen and Frank Hsieh to handle relations with Japan. The Tsai government has, intentionally or otherwise, leaked word that bilateral relations may be revised. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sent his younger brother Nobuo Kishi to meet with President Tsai. These developments clearly show that Tsai Ing-wen intends to chummy up to Japan. We have yet to mention the photo op with Abe's mother seated next to President Tsai, deliberately intended to underscore friendly relations. To the Taiwan public, this was a dazzling fireworks display.
But national interests are not fireworks displays. Fireworks displays may catch our eye, but once they are over, nothing of substance remains. Among nations, friendship is fleeting, interests alone are enduring. If we give Japan what it wants, what will Japan give us in return? What can Japan give us in return? Abe has long hoped to draw Taiwan into Japan's anti-China coalition. But it has not been willing to pay a price. Now the Tsai government has sacrificed Taiwan fishermens' fishing rights and Taiwan consumers' right to food safety -- merely to curry favor with Japan, in return for what?
From a larger national security perspective, the Tsai government has departed from the status quo. It is moving step by step toward a whole new state of affairs, one lacking any corresponding security framework. In other words, the Tsai government may have promised to "maintain the status quo". It then put on a dazzling fireworks display. But amidst all the fireworks, one finds nothing of substance. What, amidst all the fireworks, happened to our national interests?
Taiwan's historical origins and geographical location mean that economically and culturally we must deal with the Mainland, Japan, and the United States. Relations with all three are unavoidable. Taiwan must understand its political and security relationship with the United States and the Mainland. Japan can do no more than negotiate the middle ground between the United States and the Mainland. That is not something Taiwan can change.
As the above shows, only the United States and Mainland hold the power of life and death over Taiwan. Only they can determine Taiwan's long-term stability. Japan has never been a major factor. Japan wants Taiwan to join its anti-China coalition. That is something that can be considered. But Japan must have the strength and strategies to provide Taiwan with strategic guarantees. It must demonstrate its trustworthiness. The Tsai government must not trade illusory Japanese fireworks displays, only to risk our national security in return.
如耀眼煙花的台日關係 非常危險
2016年06月13日 中國時報
要有穩定的國家，先要有穩定的國家大戰略，一旦大戰略架構出現問題或傾斜，國家就會出現內部對峙與外部緊張。
馬政府時代，大致維持親美、和中、友日的大架構；與此相應的外部環境是：美國在自己定義的一中政策下維持兩岸現狀；大陸也在其定義的一中政策下推動兩岸和平發展；台北則依據「九二共識、一中各表」推動對美國與中國大陸的關係，三方定義不同，仍然搭建起一個迄今蔡政府仍然受惠的「現狀」。
新政府宣稱「維持現狀」，卻開始實質改變國家安全大戰略架構。首先，可以看到新政府放棄了原先的九二共識，也不接受「兩岸一中」的憲法定位，宣稱將致力「和中」，卻峻拒大陸釋出的所有政治訊號。我們看到海基、海協兩會斷訊，陸委會和中共國台辦失聯，原先眾多的小兩會也紛紛音訊不通，政府間的實際功能已然歸零，ECFA下的兩岸經合會也告停。這還不算原先的契作停止、陸客驟減、短期交換生終止等。
與此同時，蔡英文政府卻加大「親美」、「友日」力度。蔡總統一再呼籲美方支持台灣加入《跨太平洋夥伴協定》（TPP），內閣閣員則放話準備開啟重大爭議的含萊克多巴胺的美豬進口；國防部長在立法院宣布運送4萬枚炮彈往太平島，外交部長立即被迫前往在台協會道歉解釋。我們同時也看到6任的在台協會台北辦事處處長豎起大姆指稱讚當前的美台關係；美國參院軍事委員會主席麥侃率領近年來最大的議員團訪台；在這一幅圖像中，我們看到的是，我們付出實際利益作代價，但美國所給予的卻是過年節時的煙火，煙花過後，什麼都沒有留下。
至於在「友日」方面，更是令人納悶。
蔡政府從上台起，在沖之鳥礁定位上的發言就是荒腔走板，從「未定」到「是礁」，到7月談判必能滿意，再到「沖之鳥話題不流行了」；真不知道政府把漁民賴以維生的漁權問題，當成什麼來看？意圖開放福島含輻射食品進口，卻也不見一個可信的處理方式。從蔡政府先後派出邱義仁和謝長廷這些民進黨籍的重量級大員處理對日關係來看，再加上蔡政府有意無意間釋出的「修補」雙方關係的說法，以及日本派出首相安倍之弟岸信夫與蔡總統會面一事上，都充分顯示出，蔡英文政府的政策是要向日本方面靠攏，這還不包括安倍之母與蔡總統兩人刻意比鄰而坐，以顯示雙方關係的友好。看在台灣人民的眼中，這又是一個美麗的煙花。
國家利益不是放煙火，不能看時很美，看過後什麼都不留下；國家的友情是短暫的，利益才是永遠的。如果我們給了日本想要的，日本會給我們什麼？日本能給我們什麼？日本長期以來，一直希望拉攏台灣進入日本安倍政府意圖架構的反中聯盟，卻不願支付任何代價；在這一點上，尤其是蔡政府願意捨棄諸如漁民捕魚權、民眾食物免於恐懼權等實質利益，只為拉攏日本，那麼，日本的回報是什麼？
從廣義的國家安全角度來看，蔡政府已經偏離了現狀，正一步步走向新情勢。但我們仍然看不見一個可以維持安全的相應架構出現。換言之，蔡政府離開了她先前所承諾的「現狀」，帶來了一片耀眼的煙花，可是我們卻無法在這片煙花中，找到我們所希望的實質東西；我們要問的是，在這片煙花中，國家利益到底在哪裡？
台灣的歷史淵源及地理位置，決定我們在經濟與社會文化上必須和中國大陸、日本及美國交往，缺一不可；國際權力結構又注定，台灣在政治上必須和美國與大陸相關連，台灣只需要掌握與美國、中國大陸的政治與安全關係，日本只能、也只會在美國和中國大陸所構成的兩極中遊走，不足為台灣慮。
從上面描述中，我們可以了解，只有美國和中國大陸對台灣有生死影響力，才是長治久安要追求的結構，日本從來不是主要因素。日本希望台灣加入其抗中聯盟，不是不可以考慮，但日本必須先擁有足夠的國家實力、能對台灣提出充分的戰略保證，更要展現其可信賴度。蔡英文政府千萬不能用日本的煙花式利益，換來國家安全的風險。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2016
Executive Summary: Only the United States and Mainland hold the power of life and death over Taiwan. Only they can determine Taiwan's long-term stability. Japan has never been a major factor. Japan wants Taiwan to join its anti-China coalition. That is something that can be considered. But Japan must have the strength and strategies to provide Taiwan with strategic guarantees. It must demonstrate its trustworthiness. The Tsai government must not trade illusory Japanese fireworks displays, only to risk our national security in return.
Full Text Below:
A stable nation requires a stable national security strategy. If its strategic framework develops problems or becomes distorted, the nation will experience internal divisions and encounter external conflict.
During the Ma era, the government maintained a policy of being “close to the US, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly with Japan”. Consequently despite its one China policy, the US defended the cross-Strait status quo. Despite its one China policy, the Mainland promoted cross-Strait peace. Based on the 1992 Consensus and one China, different interpretations, Taipei maintained relations with both the United States and the Mainland. Despite the three sides' different perspectives, Taipei was able to maintain the “status quo” that the Tsai regime currently enjoys and benefits from.
The new government asserts that it is "maintaining the status quo", even as it dismantles the existing national security framework. First, the new government is abandoning the 1992 Consensus. It is rejecting the "Two Sides, One China" premise embodied in the Constitution. It asserts that it is doing its utmost to “be at peace with China”, even though it has turned a deaf ear to political signals from the Mainland. Communications have been severed between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Communications between the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office have been severed as well. Official government to government contacts no longer exist. Communications through ECFA have also reportedly ceased. The consequences extend far beyond the initially anticipated reduction in Mainland tourism and short-term cessation in exchange students.
Meanwhile, the Tsai government has stepped up its efforts to "be close to the US" and "friendly with Japan". President Tsai has repeatedly begged the US to support Taiwan's membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The cabinet is preparing to allow the importation of US pork containing Ractopamine. The Minister of Defense has informed the Legislative Yuan of the transport of 40,000 artillery shells to Taiping Island. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has been forced to apologize to the AIT and offer an explanation. Six former AIT Taipei Office Directors have given current US-Taiwan relations a thumbs up. The Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, led by John McCain, will lead the largest congressional delegation to Taiwan in recent years. As we can see, we have sacrificed real benefits in exchang for a fireworks display from the US. Once the fireworks are over, there will be nothing left to see.
Being "friendly with Japan" is even more baffling.
Since the Tsai government came to power, it has issued reckless statements about the status of Cong Zi Niao Reef, all the way from "Its status is undetermined" to "It's a reef". It has promised that negotiations in July will settle the matter satisfactorily, and that "The Cong Zi Niao Reef issue is no longer a fashionable topic". Does the new government even give a damn about Taiwan fishermen and their survival? It intends to permit the importation of irradiated foodstuffs from Fukushima, but has yet to formulate a credible policy. The Tsai government has assigned DPP heavyweights Chiou I-jen and Frank Hsieh to handle relations with Japan. The Tsai government has, intentionally or otherwise, leaked word that bilateral relations may be revised. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sent his younger brother Nobuo Kishi to meet with President Tsai. These developments clearly show that Tsai Ing-wen intends to chummy up to Japan. We have yet to mention the photo op with Abe's mother seated next to President Tsai, deliberately intended to underscore friendly relations. To the Taiwan public, this was a dazzling fireworks display.
But national interests are not fireworks displays. Fireworks displays may catch our eye, but once they are over, nothing of substance remains. Among nations, friendship is fleeting, interests alone are enduring. If we give Japan what it wants, what will Japan give us in return? What can Japan give us in return? Abe has long hoped to draw Taiwan into Japan's anti-China coalition. But it has not been willing to pay a price. Now the Tsai government has sacrificed Taiwan fishermens' fishing rights and Taiwan consumers' right to food safety -- merely to curry favor with Japan, in return for what?
From a larger national security perspective, the Tsai government has departed from the status quo. It is moving step by step toward a whole new state of affairs, one lacking any corresponding security framework. In other words, the Tsai government may have promised to "maintain the status quo". It then put on a dazzling fireworks display. But amidst all the fireworks, one finds nothing of substance. What, amidst all the fireworks, happened to our national interests?
Taiwan's historical origins and geographical location mean that economically and culturally we must deal with the Mainland, Japan, and the United States. Relations with all three are unavoidable. Taiwan must understand its political and security relationship with the United States and the Mainland. Japan can do no more than negotiate the middle ground between the United States and the Mainland. That is not something Taiwan can change.
As the above shows, only the United States and Mainland hold the power of life and death over Taiwan. Only they can determine Taiwan's long-term stability. Japan has never been a major factor. Japan wants Taiwan to join its anti-China coalition. That is something that can be considered. But Japan must have the strength and strategies to provide Taiwan with strategic guarantees. It must demonstrate its trustworthiness. The Tsai government must not trade illusory Japanese fireworks displays, only to risk our national security in return.
如耀眼煙花的台日關係 非常危險
2016年06月13日 中國時報
要有穩定的國家，先要有穩定的國家大戰略，一旦大戰略架構出現問題或傾斜，國家就會出現內部對峙與外部緊張。
馬政府時代，大致維持親美、和中、友日的大架構；與此相應的外部環境是：美國在自己定義的一中政策下維持兩岸現狀；大陸也在其定義的一中政策下推動兩岸和平發展；台北則依據「九二共識、一中各表」推動對美國與中國大陸的關係，三方定義不同，仍然搭建起一個迄今蔡政府仍然受惠的「現狀」。
新政府宣稱「維持現狀」，卻開始實質改變國家安全大戰略架構。首先，可以看到新政府放棄了原先的九二共識，也不接受「兩岸一中」的憲法定位，宣稱將致力「和中」，卻峻拒大陸釋出的所有政治訊號。我們看到海基、海協兩會斷訊，陸委會和中共國台辦失聯，原先眾多的小兩會也紛紛音訊不通，政府間的實際功能已然歸零，ECFA下的兩岸經合會也告停。這還不算原先的契作停止、陸客驟減、短期交換生終止等。
與此同時，蔡英文政府卻加大「親美」、「友日」力度。蔡總統一再呼籲美方支持台灣加入《跨太平洋夥伴協定》（TPP），內閣閣員則放話準備開啟重大爭議的含萊克多巴胺的美豬進口；國防部長在立法院宣布運送4萬枚炮彈往太平島，外交部長立即被迫前往在台協會道歉解釋。我們同時也看到6任的在台協會台北辦事處處長豎起大姆指稱讚當前的美台關係；美國參院軍事委員會主席麥侃率領近年來最大的議員團訪台；在這一幅圖像中，我們看到的是，我們付出實際利益作代價，但美國所給予的卻是過年節時的煙火，煙花過後，什麼都沒有留下。
至於在「友日」方面，更是令人納悶。
蔡政府從上台起，在沖之鳥礁定位上的發言就是荒腔走板，從「未定」到「是礁」，到7月談判必能滿意，再到「沖之鳥話題不流行了」；真不知道政府把漁民賴以維生的漁權問題，當成什麼來看？意圖開放福島含輻射食品進口，卻也不見一個可信的處理方式。從蔡政府先後派出邱義仁和謝長廷這些民進黨籍的重量級大員處理對日關係來看，再加上蔡政府有意無意間釋出的「修補」雙方關係的說法，以及日本派出首相安倍之弟岸信夫與蔡總統會面一事上，都充分顯示出，蔡英文政府的政策是要向日本方面靠攏，這還不包括安倍之母與蔡總統兩人刻意比鄰而坐，以顯示雙方關係的友好。看在台灣人民的眼中，這又是一個美麗的煙花。
國家利益不是放煙火，不能看時很美，看過後什麼都不留下；國家的友情是短暫的，利益才是永遠的。如果我們給了日本想要的，日本會給我們什麼？日本能給我們什麼？日本長期以來，一直希望拉攏台灣進入日本安倍政府意圖架構的反中聯盟，卻不願支付任何代價；在這一點上，尤其是蔡政府願意捨棄諸如漁民捕魚權、民眾食物免於恐懼權等實質利益，只為拉攏日本，那麼，日本的回報是什麼？
從廣義的國家安全角度來看，蔡政府已經偏離了現狀，正一步步走向新情勢。但我們仍然看不見一個可以維持安全的相應架構出現。換言之，蔡政府離開了她先前所承諾的「現狀」，帶來了一片耀眼的煙花，可是我們卻無法在這片煙花中，找到我們所希望的實質東西；我們要問的是，在這片煙花中，國家利益到底在哪裡？
台灣的歷史淵源及地理位置，決定我們在經濟與社會文化上必須和中國大陸、日本及美國交往，缺一不可；國際權力結構又注定，台灣在政治上必須和美國與大陸相關連，台灣只需要掌握與美國、中國大陸的政治與安全關係，日本只能、也只會在美國和中國大陸所構成的兩極中遊走，不足為台灣慮。
從上面描述中，我們可以了解，只有美國和中國大陸對台灣有生死影響力，才是長治久安要追求的結構，日本從來不是主要因素。日本希望台灣加入其抗中聯盟，不是不可以考慮，但日本必須先擁有足夠的國家實力、能對台灣提出充分的戰略保證，更要展現其可信賴度。蔡英文政府千萬不能用日本的煙花式利益，換來國家安全的風險。
Tuesday, June 7, 2016
Fear Blind Alleys, Not Hairpin Turns
Fear Blind Alleys, Not Hairpin Turns
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2016
Executive Summary: Premier Lin is "considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator”. This shows he has a clear understanding of the reality of domestic supply. The public must not blame him or mock him for telling the truth. Instead it should applaud him. In fact, those who are taking pot shots at Lin Chuan are reckless fools charging headlong toward a precipice. Energy policy hairpin turns are nothing to fear. The only thing one must fear is energy policy blind alleys.
Full Text Below:
Premier Lin Chuan recently said the need for electricity may require the reactivation of the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, provided it is adjudged safe. It would be reactivated but not expanded. No sooner had he spoken, than a public outcry erupted. The new government swore that the elimination of nuclear power plants would not lead to power shortages. Yet not long after taking office, it completely reversed itself. Within two days, the green camp's own legislators and a former chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission expressed opposition. The Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator was once again stillborn. The new government totally reversed its energy policy twice in two days. The new government's commitment to its own policies is so feeble, even cabinet members are unwilling to stand behind the Premier. As a result the public is deeply concerned.
The new government's energy policy reversal was the result of high temperatures increasing electricity consumption, and a malfunction in the Number Six Thermal Power Plant in Taichung. By May 31, the standby capacity transfer rate had fallen to a mere 1.64%, the lowest in a decade. Another major plant failure, and Taiwan will immediately experience power shortages and brownouts. In order to meet power demands that day, Taipower even ordered thermal power plants operated above their rated capacities. The new Number One Thermal Power Plant in Linkou, which is not even officially in service, was “test run”. Only by adding its generating capacity were demands for power met, and then just barely.
This wave of power shortages was hardly a bolt out of the blue. This newspaper's editorials have warned about the danger for two years. Taiwan's stable power supply is disintegrating. With nuclear power or without, the government must respond, ASAP. Unfortunately, the Ma government failed to prevent the mothballing of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. It also failed to solve the problem of waste disposal for the Number One and Number Two plants. Before taking office, the DPP swore that the closing of nuclear power plants would not lead to power shortages. It coordinated with local governments to limit construction of thermal power plants in order to reduce air pollution. This string of evens has led Taiwan to the edge of a precipice.
Premier Lin wants to restart the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator. The new government's energy policy has now come full circle. But what is the alternative? Force the public and industry to suffer power shortages?
The new government's energy policy has been condemned by domestic experts and the business community. A few days ago the American Chamber of Commerce issued its 2016 Taiwan White Paper. The paper reminded the new government of the need for a detailed energy plan to ensure a stable and affordable power supply. The report said that Taiwan relies almost entirely on imported energy. The abolition of nuclear power generation would lead to power shortages. Can the shortages be made up by renewable energy? The government must provide clear data to support its case.
Energy policy requires a clear recognition of reality. Only then are solutions possible. Only then can one achieve a balance between safe energy generation, stable power supplies, environmental protection, and affordable electricity rates. Lin Chuan performed a reality check. That was why he proposed restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator. Alas, such a glaringly apparent policy reversal gored the party's anti-nuclear sacred cow. Therefore the only thing it could do was slam on the brakes and reverse its policy a second time.
The proposal to restart the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator met with widespread resistance. But the Executive Yuan had a way out. It reaffirmed its goal of a “nuclear-free homeland by 2025”. It ordered Taipower to issue a transparent electricity supply report, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to implement energy-saving measures. Can the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator really be restarted? The Nuclear Energy Commission would issue an assessment for public evaluation. But these were merely delaying tactics, means by which to avoid confroting problems rather than adopt a pragmatic approach.
First of all, Taipower publishes long-term energy plans and domestic energy supply assessments on an annual basis. Over the past two years, the nation's generating equipment transfer capacity rate has ranged between 14.7% and 11.5%. This year the estimated rate is 9.2%. This is the first time in seventeen years it has fallen below 10%. Last year the government repeatedly warned about inadequate power supplies. This year's situation will only be worse. The information issued by Taipower is already crystal clear. The DPP is deliberately being evasive, pretending not to see. Roy S. Lee recently assured the business community that “there will be no power shortages this year". A few days later, upon assuming office, he changed his tune, saying "We cannot guarantee that there will be no power shortages". Cleary he realized the problem was not so simple.
Besides, the Nuclear Energy Commission only recently issued a press release. It said the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator has already undergone "Taiwan Power Company safety checks, confirming its operational safety, and the information has already been made available to the public". In other words, the Nuclear Eneregy Commission has already acknowledged that the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator, is safe and can operated without fear. Yet Nuclear Energy Commission Chairman Hsieh Hsiao-hsin said doubts remain, and the Executive Yuan wants the Nuclear Energy Commission to issue a safety report. What is this, if not flagrant evasion?
Premier Lin is "considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator”. This shows he has a clear understanding of the reality of domestic supply. The public must not blame him or mock him for telling the truth. Instead it should applaud him. In fact, those who are taking pot shots at Lin Chuan are reckless fools charging headlong toward a precipice. Energy policy hairpin turns are nothing to fear. The only thing one must fear is energy policy blind alleys.
政策不怕髮夾彎，只怕開進死胡同
2016-06-08 聯合報
閣揆林全日前說，考量電力需求，核一廠一號機若經評估安全，可思考在不延役的情況下重新啟用。此話一出，輿論譁然，認為強調反核也不缺電的新政府上任未久即如此政策大轉彎不可思議。短短兩天內，綠營自家立委與原能會主委都表態反對，核一一號機重啟案又幾乎瀕於胎死腹中。新政府能源政策兩天內兩度髮夾彎，政策脆弱到連閣員都不挺閣揆，讓人看得膽戰心驚。
此次能源政策急轉彎，緣於上月底氣溫飆高帶動用電量，加上台中火力發電廠六號機故障停機，卅一日當天備轉容量率僅剩一．六四％，創十年新低。只要再有一部大型發電機組故障，台灣立刻面臨缺電與限電。當天，為了撐過燃眉之急，台電甚至要求部分火力電廠「超載運轉」，連尚未正式服役的林口火力發電廠新一號機都以「試運轉」名義併聯發電，才勉強因應。
這波供電緊張，事前並非毫無跡象。本報兩年來社論多次警告：台灣穩定供電的優勢正在崩解，無論要不要核電，政府都必須及早因應。遺憾的是，馬政府擋不住核四封存，對核一、核二核廢料爆滿問題也拿不出魄力解決；此外，民進黨執政前強調反核也不會缺電，並串聯各地方政府要求限縮火力電廠以降低空汙。一連串的變化，將台灣推向缺電的懸崖。
林揆思考重啟核一一號機，確使新政府能源政策繞了一個極大的髮夾彎；但是，若不轉彎，難道要全民與企業墜入缺電的深谷？
新政府的能源政策，不僅國內專家和工商界看衰，日前美國商會發表二○一六年台灣白皮書，也特地提醒新政府應提出詳細的能源計畫，確保台灣享有穩定且具成本競爭力的電力供應。美國商會說，台灣幾乎所有能源皆仰賴進口，廢核之後的缺口是否能靠節電與再生能源補足，政府必須提出明確且有數據佐證的能源計畫。
能源計畫的制訂，首須認清現實，再尋求各種可以運用的方案，最後在能源安全、供電穩定、環境保護、和電價成本四個面向中找到一個平衡方案。林全因為「認清現實」，所以說出「思考重啟核一一號機」；問題是，這個髮夾彎轉彎轉得太大，立刻牴觸黨內的反核神主牌，只好再轉一次髮夾彎，緊急煞車。
對於重啟核一一號機的阻力橫生，行政院的下台階，除了重申二○二五非核家園目標不變外，並要求台電提出透明公開的供電與用電狀況，並請經濟部努力落實節能措施；至於核一一號機是否真能重啟，則由原能會提供評估報告供社會檢驗。這些作法，其實都是緩兵之計，而不是面對問題的務實作法。
首先，台電每年都會公布中長期電源開發方案，對國內供電情況預作評估。過去兩年，我國供電備轉容量率分別是十四．七％與十一．五％，今年的預測值則是九．二％，是十七年來首度低於十％。去年，我國已多次出現供電不足警訊，今年情況只會比去年更糟。因此，台電的資訊其實已經很清楚，而是民進黨刻意迴避問題，裝作看不到。經長李世光就任前曾向企業界保證「今年不缺電」，上任沒幾天即改口「不保證不缺電」，應該就是意識到問題不簡單。
再者，原能會日前才發布新聞稿說，一號機「已完成審查台電公司安全分析和處理措施，確認繼續運轉之安全性，相關資訊均對外公布」。換言之，原能會已確認一號機運轉安全性無虞，但原能會主委謝曉星卻說重啟核一有疑慮，而政院還要原能會公布安全報告，這難道不是推託之詞？
林揆「思考核一一號機重啟」，顯示他已認清國內供電現實，各界不應苛責、挖苦，反而應給予正面看待。事實上，那些砲打林全的人，恐怕才是直衝懸崖的莽夫。能源政策不怕髮夾彎，就怕駛進死胡同。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2016
Executive Summary: Premier Lin is "considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator”. This shows he has a clear understanding of the reality of domestic supply. The public must not blame him or mock him for telling the truth. Instead it should applaud him. In fact, those who are taking pot shots at Lin Chuan are reckless fools charging headlong toward a precipice. Energy policy hairpin turns are nothing to fear. The only thing one must fear is energy policy blind alleys.
Full Text Below:
Premier Lin Chuan recently said the need for electricity may require the reactivation of the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, provided it is adjudged safe. It would be reactivated but not expanded. No sooner had he spoken, than a public outcry erupted. The new government swore that the elimination of nuclear power plants would not lead to power shortages. Yet not long after taking office, it completely reversed itself. Within two days, the green camp's own legislators and a former chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission expressed opposition. The Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator was once again stillborn. The new government totally reversed its energy policy twice in two days. The new government's commitment to its own policies is so feeble, even cabinet members are unwilling to stand behind the Premier. As a result the public is deeply concerned.
The new government's energy policy reversal was the result of high temperatures increasing electricity consumption, and a malfunction in the Number Six Thermal Power Plant in Taichung. By May 31, the standby capacity transfer rate had fallen to a mere 1.64%, the lowest in a decade. Another major plant failure, and Taiwan will immediately experience power shortages and brownouts. In order to meet power demands that day, Taipower even ordered thermal power plants operated above their rated capacities. The new Number One Thermal Power Plant in Linkou, which is not even officially in service, was “test run”. Only by adding its generating capacity were demands for power met, and then just barely.
This wave of power shortages was hardly a bolt out of the blue. This newspaper's editorials have warned about the danger for two years. Taiwan's stable power supply is disintegrating. With nuclear power or without, the government must respond, ASAP. Unfortunately, the Ma government failed to prevent the mothballing of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. It also failed to solve the problem of waste disposal for the Number One and Number Two plants. Before taking office, the DPP swore that the closing of nuclear power plants would not lead to power shortages. It coordinated with local governments to limit construction of thermal power plants in order to reduce air pollution. This string of evens has led Taiwan to the edge of a precipice.
Premier Lin wants to restart the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator. The new government's energy policy has now come full circle. But what is the alternative? Force the public and industry to suffer power shortages?
The new government's energy policy has been condemned by domestic experts and the business community. A few days ago the American Chamber of Commerce issued its 2016 Taiwan White Paper. The paper reminded the new government of the need for a detailed energy plan to ensure a stable and affordable power supply. The report said that Taiwan relies almost entirely on imported energy. The abolition of nuclear power generation would lead to power shortages. Can the shortages be made up by renewable energy? The government must provide clear data to support its case.
Energy policy requires a clear recognition of reality. Only then are solutions possible. Only then can one achieve a balance between safe energy generation, stable power supplies, environmental protection, and affordable electricity rates. Lin Chuan performed a reality check. That was why he proposed restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator. Alas, such a glaringly apparent policy reversal gored the party's anti-nuclear sacred cow. Therefore the only thing it could do was slam on the brakes and reverse its policy a second time.
The proposal to restart the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator met with widespread resistance. But the Executive Yuan had a way out. It reaffirmed its goal of a “nuclear-free homeland by 2025”. It ordered Taipower to issue a transparent electricity supply report, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to implement energy-saving measures. Can the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator really be restarted? The Nuclear Energy Commission would issue an assessment for public evaluation. But these were merely delaying tactics, means by which to avoid confroting problems rather than adopt a pragmatic approach.
First of all, Taipower publishes long-term energy plans and domestic energy supply assessments on an annual basis. Over the past two years, the nation's generating equipment transfer capacity rate has ranged between 14.7% and 11.5%. This year the estimated rate is 9.2%. This is the first time in seventeen years it has fallen below 10%. Last year the government repeatedly warned about inadequate power supplies. This year's situation will only be worse. The information issued by Taipower is already crystal clear. The DPP is deliberately being evasive, pretending not to see. Roy S. Lee recently assured the business community that “there will be no power shortages this year". A few days later, upon assuming office, he changed his tune, saying "We cannot guarantee that there will be no power shortages". Cleary he realized the problem was not so simple.
Besides, the Nuclear Energy Commission only recently issued a press release. It said the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator has already undergone "Taiwan Power Company safety checks, confirming its operational safety, and the information has already been made available to the public". In other words, the Nuclear Eneregy Commission has already acknowledged that the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator, is safe and can operated without fear. Yet Nuclear Energy Commission Chairman Hsieh Hsiao-hsin said doubts remain, and the Executive Yuan wants the Nuclear Energy Commission to issue a safety report. What is this, if not flagrant evasion?
Premier Lin is "considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant, Number One Generator”. This shows he has a clear understanding of the reality of domestic supply. The public must not blame him or mock him for telling the truth. Instead it should applaud him. In fact, those who are taking pot shots at Lin Chuan are reckless fools charging headlong toward a precipice. Energy policy hairpin turns are nothing to fear. The only thing one must fear is energy policy blind alleys.
政策不怕髮夾彎，只怕開進死胡同
2016-06-08 聯合報
閣揆林全日前說，考量電力需求，核一廠一號機若經評估安全，可思考在不延役的情況下重新啟用。此話一出，輿論譁然，認為強調反核也不缺電的新政府上任未久即如此政策大轉彎不可思議。短短兩天內，綠營自家立委與原能會主委都表態反對，核一一號機重啟案又幾乎瀕於胎死腹中。新政府能源政策兩天內兩度髮夾彎，政策脆弱到連閣員都不挺閣揆，讓人看得膽戰心驚。
此次能源政策急轉彎，緣於上月底氣溫飆高帶動用電量，加上台中火力發電廠六號機故障停機，卅一日當天備轉容量率僅剩一．六四％，創十年新低。只要再有一部大型發電機組故障，台灣立刻面臨缺電與限電。當天，為了撐過燃眉之急，台電甚至要求部分火力電廠「超載運轉」，連尚未正式服役的林口火力發電廠新一號機都以「試運轉」名義併聯發電，才勉強因應。
這波供電緊張，事前並非毫無跡象。本報兩年來社論多次警告：台灣穩定供電的優勢正在崩解，無論要不要核電，政府都必須及早因應。遺憾的是，馬政府擋不住核四封存，對核一、核二核廢料爆滿問題也拿不出魄力解決；此外，民進黨執政前強調反核也不會缺電，並串聯各地方政府要求限縮火力電廠以降低空汙。一連串的變化，將台灣推向缺電的懸崖。
林揆思考重啟核一一號機，確使新政府能源政策繞了一個極大的髮夾彎；但是，若不轉彎，難道要全民與企業墜入缺電的深谷？
新政府的能源政策，不僅國內專家和工商界看衰，日前美國商會發表二○一六年台灣白皮書，也特地提醒新政府應提出詳細的能源計畫，確保台灣享有穩定且具成本競爭力的電力供應。美國商會說，台灣幾乎所有能源皆仰賴進口，廢核之後的缺口是否能靠節電與再生能源補足，政府必須提出明確且有數據佐證的能源計畫。
能源計畫的制訂，首須認清現實，再尋求各種可以運用的方案，最後在能源安全、供電穩定、環境保護、和電價成本四個面向中找到一個平衡方案。林全因為「認清現實」，所以說出「思考重啟核一一號機」；問題是，這個髮夾彎轉彎轉得太大，立刻牴觸黨內的反核神主牌，只好再轉一次髮夾彎，緊急煞車。
對於重啟核一一號機的阻力橫生，行政院的下台階，除了重申二○二五非核家園目標不變外，並要求台電提出透明公開的供電與用電狀況，並請經濟部努力落實節能措施；至於核一一號機是否真能重啟，則由原能會提供評估報告供社會檢驗。這些作法，其實都是緩兵之計，而不是面對問題的務實作法。
首先，台電每年都會公布中長期電源開發方案，對國內供電情況預作評估。過去兩年，我國供電備轉容量率分別是十四．七％與十一．五％，今年的預測值則是九．二％，是十七年來首度低於十％。去年，我國已多次出現供電不足警訊，今年情況只會比去年更糟。因此，台電的資訊其實已經很清楚，而是民進黨刻意迴避問題，裝作看不到。經長李世光就任前曾向企業界保證「今年不缺電」，上任沒幾天即改口「不保證不缺電」，應該就是意識到問題不簡單。
再者，原能會日前才發布新聞稿說，一號機「已完成審查台電公司安全分析和處理措施，確認繼續運轉之安全性，相關資訊均對外公布」。換言之，原能會已確認一號機運轉安全性無虞，但原能會主委謝曉星卻說重啟核一有疑慮，而政院還要原能會公布安全報告，這難道不是推託之詞？
林揆「思考核一一號機重啟」，顯示他已認清國內供電現實，各界不應苛責、挖苦，反而應給予正面看待。事實上，那些砲打林全的人，恐怕才是直衝懸崖的莽夫。能源政策不怕髮夾彎，就怕駛進死胡同。
Monday, June 6, 2016
Tsai Ing-wen's Gratitude toward Chen Shui-bian
Tsai Ing-wen's Gratitude toward Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2016
Executive Summary: Yesterday Taichung Prison officials announced that that Chen Shui-bian's “attendance” at a June 4 fundraising dinner did not violate the terms of his release. In other words, Chen will probably continue to enjoy his "medical parole". This comes as no surprise, given the “box seat” provided him earlier by the Ministry of Justice. Add to this Tsai spokesman Li Chun-yi's dinner speech thanking Chen for “taking into consideration the big picture”. The picture should be crystal clear.
Full Text Below:
Yesterday Taichung Prison officials announced that that Chen Shui-bian's “attendance” at a June 4 fundraising dinner did not violate the terms of his release. In other words, Chen will probably continue to enjoy his "medical parole". This comes as no surprise, given the “box seat” provided him earlier by the Ministry of Justice. Add to this Tsai spokesman Li Chun-yi's dinner speech thanking Chen for “taking into consideration the big picture”. The picture should be crystal clear.
The June 4 fundraising dinner was packed. Over 2000 Chen fans attended. Everyone who was anyone in the green camp was present. Legislative Yuan President Su Chia-chuan, Chen Chu, Lai Ching-teh and other mayors and county chiefs, as well as green camp talking heads, all showed up. Li Chun-yi apologized to Chen on behalf of Tsai Ing-wen, saying the new government was in an awkward position, therefore could not attend. He expressed gratitude, saying "As long as Chen needs our help, we are here for him". Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min boasted that "The world is now ours". Suppose Chen had taken part in the dinner proceedings? Would anyone have dared to arrest and detain him?
At first Taichung Prison officials warned Chen that if he traveled north to Taipei, his medical parole would be revoked. Later they allowed him to return to his Minsheng East Road home. Eventually they allowed him to attend the fundraising dinner. These three changes revealed the degree to which the rule of law was set back as Chen Shui-bian tested the will of prison officials. It showed that Justice Minister Chiu Tai-san's incantation, "We respect the decisions made by Taichung Prison officials", was mere lip service. In fact, under pressure from Taiwan independence zealots and Ko Chien-min, even the Ministry of Justice was force to bow before politics. Even Tsai Ing-wen was forced to send a representative to express her gratitude. How could lowly Taichung Prison officials possibly withstand this sort of pressure?
When Chen Shui-bian sat in his “box seat” and his fan club regaled him with tributes, he shattered the first window pane in the new government's “rule of law” showcase. When Tsai Ing-wen expressed gratitude towards Chen Shui-bian for “considering the big picture”, she shattered a second window pane. And this was merely the beginning. Chen lost power as a consequence of political corruption, and was imprisoned for his crime. The DPP has never apologized to the people of Taiwan for this. Now that it has returned to power, the DPP is kowtowing before Chen and thanking him. What must the public be feeling as it gazes upon such a spectacle?
The most flagrant example of Taiwan independence arrogance was Koo Kuan-min's boast that "The world is now ours", the premise being that once one is in power, one can do as one pleases, after all, who will stop me? Koo Kuan-min sees himself as a conquering hero. He has revealed his feudalistic mentality. If someone of his ilk, who makes no distinction between public and private, can threaten or even hijack the new government, the harm inflicted upon Taiwan will be endless. Even more nauseating were the green camp talking heads who blasted Chiu Tai-san for being “ungrateful for Chen Shui-bian's promotion." They care only about power. They care nothing about the rule of law or moral standards. Politically their appeal is limited to the home market. How can they possibly advance Taiwan's democracy?
Viewed positively, Tsai Ing-wen's expression of gratitude to Chen Shui-bian involved practical considerations. Chen refrained from making trouble during the election process. He did not hinder her, thereby enabling her to win handily. He was willing to abide by the "three noes". He did not directly participate the dinner ceremonies. He did not openly challenge the law. He took into consideration the new government's awkward position. Viewed negatively however, the president was handed a new mandate. Yet she is unable to boldly follow the law. She must express humble gratitude toward her corrupt predecessor. She must offer quid pro quos to Taiwan independence extremists before she can follow the law. She must send a representative to a fundraising dinner to appease Chen fans. A government such as this has already undermined its image, compromised its principles, and revealed its cowardice.
In short, Tsai Ing-wen failed to use her mandate to draw a bright line between herself and Taiwan independence extremists. She succumbed instead to their pressure, and publicly surrendered her authority. This was her first wrong move. Therefore when Taiwan independence extremists demand a presidential pardon for Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen will lose the support of moderate voters. This will be the next major challenge to her administration.
In fact, "The world is now ours" sounds more like something a Mafia capo would say. Tsai Ing-wen must guard against this tendency to inflate the importance of the new government and the ruling DPP. She must not allow the government or political parties to walk in the shadow of organized crime. DPP legislators plan to pass an "Amnesty Law" tailor made for Chen Shui-bian. Once they succeed, the new government's highly touted transitional justice and judicial reform will sputter to a halt. In any case, Tsai Ing-wen must not deal with Chen Shui-bian the way that Lin Chuan dealt with Sunflower Student Movement rioters, by withdrawing the charges against them. She must not undermine the credibility of the justice system by pandering to the demands of a few. The result is certain to be self-inflicted injury.
解讀蔡英文對扁的「感謝」
2016-06-07 聯合報
台中監獄昨日評估陳水扁參加六四募款餐會的表現，認為未違反相關規定；換言之，扁應該可以維持現有的「保外就醫」待遇。此一結論，其實是想當然耳的結局，這從稍早法務部給予他「設包廂」的通融，加上當天餐會上李俊毅代表蔡英文致詞感謝扁「顧全大局」，即可一目了然。
六四募款餐會當夜爆桌，二千多挺扁人士參與；綠營更是「群賢畢至」，立法院長蘇嘉全、陳菊、賴清德等縣市首長、乃至親綠名嘴全都到齊。李俊毅代蔡英文致詞時，對陳水扁考慮新政府立場而未能親臨餐會現場的「委屈」表示感謝，並稱「只要能幫助扁的需要，我們都願意協助」。獨派大老辜寬敏更在餐會中放言，「現在是我們的天下」，如果扁參加餐會，有人敢把他捉去關嗎？
從最初台中監獄警告陳水扁北上將遭取消保外就醫，到後來放寬為准許北上返回民生東路老家，到最後准許以「三不」原則在餐會旁的包廂會客，這三部曲的變化，顯示台灣的法治防線已在陳水扁的測試下一步步後退。這同時顯示，法務部長邱太三口口聲聲「尊重中監」的說法，無非飾詞而已。事實上，在獨派的施壓和柯建銘的穿梭下，就連法務部也不得不向政治低頭，就連蔡英文都得派代表致詞感謝，這股壓力又豈是小小的中監所能抵擋？
於是，當陳水扁坐在餐會旁的包廂內接受扁迷致敬，新政府的法治櫥窗已經被他打破了一扇；當蔡英文派代表感謝陳水扁「顧全大局」，形同她自己又拿石頭砸壞了一扇。而這些，都只是剛開始而已。陳水扁因貪腐失政入獄，民進黨從來未曾為此向台灣人民道歉；而如今，政權方才失而復得，民進黨卻反而要向他頂禮叩謝，這看在民眾眼裡，又是什麼滋味？
最赤裸裸的是辜寬敏那句「現在是我們的天下」，彷彿一朝大權在握，咱們自己人要幹什麼就幹什麼，誰能阻擋？辜寬敏把自己當成「得天下」的功臣，是其封建思想使然；但是，如果像他這種目無公私界際的人以此要脅新政府，而政府竟然也為其所挾持，那對台灣的傷害將沒完沒了。更令人反胃的是，竟有親綠名嘴在會中點名批判邱太三，指他忘記陳水扁的「提拔」。試想，像這樣眼中只有權力的取予關係，卻完全不在乎法治、道德的規範，政治只能在「家天下」的小圈圈裡轉售，台灣的民主如何進步？
從正面看，蔡英文對陳水扁的感謝，或許有一些現實涵義。例如：感謝阿扁在大選過程中沒有鬧事、沒「幫倒忙」，使她順利當選；感謝他願意配合「三不」不出席餐會，未公然率眾挑戰法律底線，顧及了新政府顏面。但反過來看，一個握有新民意的總統，若不能理直氣壯地依法行事，卻向貪腐者低聲下氣稱謝，拿執法之退讓和獨派交換條件，甚至派代表在餐會向扁迷致詞示好；這些作法，恐怕都賠上了自己的形象和原則，使新政府的施政魄力打了折扣。
簡言之，蔡英文沒有善用自己的民意支持向獨派宣示自己的界線，卻反而屈從對方的壓力，而宣告了公權力的退讓，這是她錯誤的第一步。接下來，當挺扁獨派要求「特赦」陳水扁的壓力源源湧至，蔡英文會因此失去多少中間選民的支持，將是她未來執政之路的大挑戰。
「現在是我們的天下」，這句話其實更像一個「幫派」的炫耀豪語；蔡英文恐怕要慎防這種風潮吹入新政府與民進黨，絕對不要放任政府或政黨走入幫派化陰影。民進黨立委正在串連修改《特赦法》，要為陳水扁量身定作脫身解套的條件；一旦得逞，新政府的轉型正義、司法改革等等宣示，恐怕也要付諸一炬了。無論如何，蔡英文處理陳水扁，絕不能像林全處理太陽花撤告，用損害公權力尊嚴的方式來滿足少數人的利益，結果勢必是自傷自殘。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2016
Executive Summary: Yesterday Taichung Prison officials announced that that Chen Shui-bian's “attendance” at a June 4 fundraising dinner did not violate the terms of his release. In other words, Chen will probably continue to enjoy his "medical parole". This comes as no surprise, given the “box seat” provided him earlier by the Ministry of Justice. Add to this Tsai spokesman Li Chun-yi's dinner speech thanking Chen for “taking into consideration the big picture”. The picture should be crystal clear.
Full Text Below:
Yesterday Taichung Prison officials announced that that Chen Shui-bian's “attendance” at a June 4 fundraising dinner did not violate the terms of his release. In other words, Chen will probably continue to enjoy his "medical parole". This comes as no surprise, given the “box seat” provided him earlier by the Ministry of Justice. Add to this Tsai spokesman Li Chun-yi's dinner speech thanking Chen for “taking into consideration the big picture”. The picture should be crystal clear.
The June 4 fundraising dinner was packed. Over 2000 Chen fans attended. Everyone who was anyone in the green camp was present. Legislative Yuan President Su Chia-chuan, Chen Chu, Lai Ching-teh and other mayors and county chiefs, as well as green camp talking heads, all showed up. Li Chun-yi apologized to Chen on behalf of Tsai Ing-wen, saying the new government was in an awkward position, therefore could not attend. He expressed gratitude, saying "As long as Chen needs our help, we are here for him". Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min boasted that "The world is now ours". Suppose Chen had taken part in the dinner proceedings? Would anyone have dared to arrest and detain him?
At first Taichung Prison officials warned Chen that if he traveled north to Taipei, his medical parole would be revoked. Later they allowed him to return to his Minsheng East Road home. Eventually they allowed him to attend the fundraising dinner. These three changes revealed the degree to which the rule of law was set back as Chen Shui-bian tested the will of prison officials. It showed that Justice Minister Chiu Tai-san's incantation, "We respect the decisions made by Taichung Prison officials", was mere lip service. In fact, under pressure from Taiwan independence zealots and Ko Chien-min, even the Ministry of Justice was force to bow before politics. Even Tsai Ing-wen was forced to send a representative to express her gratitude. How could lowly Taichung Prison officials possibly withstand this sort of pressure?
When Chen Shui-bian sat in his “box seat” and his fan club regaled him with tributes, he shattered the first window pane in the new government's “rule of law” showcase. When Tsai Ing-wen expressed gratitude towards Chen Shui-bian for “considering the big picture”, she shattered a second window pane. And this was merely the beginning. Chen lost power as a consequence of political corruption, and was imprisoned for his crime. The DPP has never apologized to the people of Taiwan for this. Now that it has returned to power, the DPP is kowtowing before Chen and thanking him. What must the public be feeling as it gazes upon such a spectacle?
The most flagrant example of Taiwan independence arrogance was Koo Kuan-min's boast that "The world is now ours", the premise being that once one is in power, one can do as one pleases, after all, who will stop me? Koo Kuan-min sees himself as a conquering hero. He has revealed his feudalistic mentality. If someone of his ilk, who makes no distinction between public and private, can threaten or even hijack the new government, the harm inflicted upon Taiwan will be endless. Even more nauseating were the green camp talking heads who blasted Chiu Tai-san for being “ungrateful for Chen Shui-bian's promotion." They care only about power. They care nothing about the rule of law or moral standards. Politically their appeal is limited to the home market. How can they possibly advance Taiwan's democracy?
Viewed positively, Tsai Ing-wen's expression of gratitude to Chen Shui-bian involved practical considerations. Chen refrained from making trouble during the election process. He did not hinder her, thereby enabling her to win handily. He was willing to abide by the "three noes". He did not directly participate the dinner ceremonies. He did not openly challenge the law. He took into consideration the new government's awkward position. Viewed negatively however, the president was handed a new mandate. Yet she is unable to boldly follow the law. She must express humble gratitude toward her corrupt predecessor. She must offer quid pro quos to Taiwan independence extremists before she can follow the law. She must send a representative to a fundraising dinner to appease Chen fans. A government such as this has already undermined its image, compromised its principles, and revealed its cowardice.
In short, Tsai Ing-wen failed to use her mandate to draw a bright line between herself and Taiwan independence extremists. She succumbed instead to their pressure, and publicly surrendered her authority. This was her first wrong move. Therefore when Taiwan independence extremists demand a presidential pardon for Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen will lose the support of moderate voters. This will be the next major challenge to her administration.
In fact, "The world is now ours" sounds more like something a Mafia capo would say. Tsai Ing-wen must guard against this tendency to inflate the importance of the new government and the ruling DPP. She must not allow the government or political parties to walk in the shadow of organized crime. DPP legislators plan to pass an "Amnesty Law" tailor made for Chen Shui-bian. Once they succeed, the new government's highly touted transitional justice and judicial reform will sputter to a halt. In any case, Tsai Ing-wen must not deal with Chen Shui-bian the way that Lin Chuan dealt with Sunflower Student Movement rioters, by withdrawing the charges against them. She must not undermine the credibility of the justice system by pandering to the demands of a few. The result is certain to be self-inflicted injury.
解讀蔡英文對扁的「感謝」
2016-06-07 聯合報
台中監獄昨日評估陳水扁參加六四募款餐會的表現，認為未違反相關規定；換言之，扁應該可以維持現有的「保外就醫」待遇。此一結論，其實是想當然耳的結局，這從稍早法務部給予他「設包廂」的通融，加上當天餐會上李俊毅代表蔡英文致詞感謝扁「顧全大局」，即可一目了然。
六四募款餐會當夜爆桌，二千多挺扁人士參與；綠營更是「群賢畢至」，立法院長蘇嘉全、陳菊、賴清德等縣市首長、乃至親綠名嘴全都到齊。李俊毅代蔡英文致詞時，對陳水扁考慮新政府立場而未能親臨餐會現場的「委屈」表示感謝，並稱「只要能幫助扁的需要，我們都願意協助」。獨派大老辜寬敏更在餐會中放言，「現在是我們的天下」，如果扁參加餐會，有人敢把他捉去關嗎？
從最初台中監獄警告陳水扁北上將遭取消保外就醫，到後來放寬為准許北上返回民生東路老家，到最後准許以「三不」原則在餐會旁的包廂會客，這三部曲的變化，顯示台灣的法治防線已在陳水扁的測試下一步步後退。這同時顯示，法務部長邱太三口口聲聲「尊重中監」的說法，無非飾詞而已。事實上，在獨派的施壓和柯建銘的穿梭下，就連法務部也不得不向政治低頭，就連蔡英文都得派代表致詞感謝，這股壓力又豈是小小的中監所能抵擋？
於是，當陳水扁坐在餐會旁的包廂內接受扁迷致敬，新政府的法治櫥窗已經被他打破了一扇；當蔡英文派代表感謝陳水扁「顧全大局」，形同她自己又拿石頭砸壞了一扇。而這些，都只是剛開始而已。陳水扁因貪腐失政入獄，民進黨從來未曾為此向台灣人民道歉；而如今，政權方才失而復得，民進黨卻反而要向他頂禮叩謝，這看在民眾眼裡，又是什麼滋味？
最赤裸裸的是辜寬敏那句「現在是我們的天下」，彷彿一朝大權在握，咱們自己人要幹什麼就幹什麼，誰能阻擋？辜寬敏把自己當成「得天下」的功臣，是其封建思想使然；但是，如果像他這種目無公私界際的人以此要脅新政府，而政府竟然也為其所挾持，那對台灣的傷害將沒完沒了。更令人反胃的是，竟有親綠名嘴在會中點名批判邱太三，指他忘記陳水扁的「提拔」。試想，像這樣眼中只有權力的取予關係，卻完全不在乎法治、道德的規範，政治只能在「家天下」的小圈圈裡轉售，台灣的民主如何進步？
從正面看，蔡英文對陳水扁的感謝，或許有一些現實涵義。例如：感謝阿扁在大選過程中沒有鬧事、沒「幫倒忙」，使她順利當選；感謝他願意配合「三不」不出席餐會，未公然率眾挑戰法律底線，顧及了新政府顏面。但反過來看，一個握有新民意的總統，若不能理直氣壯地依法行事，卻向貪腐者低聲下氣稱謝，拿執法之退讓和獨派交換條件，甚至派代表在餐會向扁迷致詞示好；這些作法，恐怕都賠上了自己的形象和原則，使新政府的施政魄力打了折扣。
簡言之，蔡英文沒有善用自己的民意支持向獨派宣示自己的界線，卻反而屈從對方的壓力，而宣告了公權力的退讓，這是她錯誤的第一步。接下來，當挺扁獨派要求「特赦」陳水扁的壓力源源湧至，蔡英文會因此失去多少中間選民的支持，將是她未來執政之路的大挑戰。
「現在是我們的天下」，這句話其實更像一個「幫派」的炫耀豪語；蔡英文恐怕要慎防這種風潮吹入新政府與民進黨，絕對不要放任政府或政黨走入幫派化陰影。民進黨立委正在串連修改《特赦法》，要為陳水扁量身定作脫身解套的條件；一旦得逞，新政府的轉型正義、司法改革等等宣示，恐怕也要付諸一炬了。無論如何，蔡英文處理陳水扁，絕不能像林全處理太陽花撤告，用損害公權力尊嚴的方式來滿足少數人的利益，結果勢必是自傷自殘。
Sunday, June 5, 2016
Cross-Strait Crisis Management during Cold Confrontation
Cross-Strait Crisis Management during Cold Confrontation
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2016
Executive Summary: President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.
Full Text Below:
President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.
That is not all. The Mainland has also interrupted cross-Strait exchanges and official communications. ARATS and the Taiwan Affairs Office no longer respond to MAC and SEF fax communications. It has taken concrete action to show the new government that it is serious. Mainland provincial delegations have ceased coming to Taiwan. Mainland group and corporate incentive group tours have also been suspended. Mainland inspections and quarantines of fruit imports from Taiwan have been tightened. Produce is frequently returned to Taiwan, provoking industry concern.
In other words, the cross-Strait situation is worse than the “Cold Peace" widely predicted. It has gone directly to "Cold Confrontation". Cross-Strait tensions are high, especially on the Mainland. Official declarations issued through various channels, have essentially left the Mainland "riding a tiger, and unable to dismount". There is no room for compromise or change whatsoever, unless Tsai is willing to compromise. Otherwise the Mainland authorities cannot back down.
If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to do so, then the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" will probably continue for a very long time. If the crux of the disagreement is not resolved, if conflict and stress escalates to a certain level, we could go from "Cold Confrontation" directly to "Hot Confrontation". Cross-Strait relations would then revert to what they were during the Chen era. This is something people on both sides cannot evade.
The Mainland is too big, and Taiwan is too small. The cross-Strait imbalance in power has increased. Tsai Ing-wen must actively seek solutions to problems. She cannot react passively. She cannot assume that as long as she offers no provocations, and makes no trouble, the Mainland will remain helpless. On the 1992 Consensus, the Mainland can make no concessions. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize it explicitly, she must offer an alternative, and seek consensus with the Mainland.
The key to the cross-Strait dispute is the nature of cross-Strait relations. Just what is the relationship between the two sides? The Mainland considers it a state of civil war within one China. The current DPP government's traditional position has been that it is “one nation on each side”. The DPP government has not repudiated its “one nation on each side” position. It has declared that it will handle cross-Strait affairs according to the Republic of China Constitution and
the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. The implication is that cross-Strait relations are relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. But what is the relationship between these two? Tsai Ing-wen declared that she would preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. But within the international community, the People's Republic of China is commonly perceived as “China”. So is their sovereignty overlapping, or unrelated?
During the Ma Ying-jeou era, the 1992 Consensus left significant room for “different interpretations”. But the Tsai government rejects the 1992 Consensus. Therefore there is no longer any room for different interpretations. On the third of this month, the Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its sovereignty over Taiping Island, for the very first time. It said "China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters, including Taiping Island”. It clearly asserted People's Republic of China sovereignty over Taiping Island, and repudiated Republic of China sovereignty. This was unheard of during the Ma Ying-jeou era. The Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs implied that the two sides might well revert to the “Hot Confrontation” diplomatic war of the Chen Shui-bian era.
The DPP government is dependent upon the Republic of China. The best way to cope is to go beyond the sovereignty dispute, and expand Taipei's claim of sovereignty to include the whole of China. It should declare that relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and not relations between independent nations, but rather betweeen two governments within a single nation. Tsai Ing-wen should also affirm that "People on both sides of the Strait are members of the same family". She must not perceive people on the Mainland as “The Other”. She must also make a genuine effort to help people know each other, understand each other, benefit each other, and trust each other.
The new government must learn from Lee Teng-ui era experience. Premier Lin Chuan could make the above two points in the legislature. He could lead the way for the government's handling of cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait policy. President Tsai could endorse Lin Chuan's statement through a spokesperson. That way the Mainland would no longer have any reason to continue pressuring Taiwan. Instead it would have to deal with the new government on practical matters. This would alleviate the cross-Strait crisis.
Next, it should consider how the Mainland can restore cross-Strait consultations communication channels. In any case, the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" would be eased. It would not develop into a “Hot Confrontation”. It would revert to the status of "Cold Peace", or even “peaceful exchange”.
Appointing an SEF chairman is urgent. Tsai government national security personnel appointments, including its MAC chairman, have all been one-sidedly pro-American. This will increase cross-Strait instability. A timely chairmanship appointment acceptable to the Mainland would undoubtedly help the Tsai government ease cross-Strait hostility.
冷對抗時代的兩岸危機管理
2016年06月06日 中國時報
蔡英文總統在就職演講中沒有對「九二共識」做出明確論述，各界原本預期兩岸將進入「冷和平」狀態，但民進黨政府相關人事安排及首波政策推動，令大陸對民進黨企圖以中華民國之名行「隱性台獨」之實大感憂心，因而加大批判力度，並透過國台辦、海協會及《人民日報》等官方管道要求蔡英文接受「九二共識」。
不僅如此，大陸還中斷了兩岸官方交流與溝通管道，國台辦與海協會不再回應陸委會與海基會的傳真來函，以實際行動向新政府展示態度堅決。大陸省市代表團已完全停止來台，原本常見的大陸團體或企業獎勵旅遊團也宣告暫停。至於貨物貿易領域，大陸也加強進口台灣水果的檢驗檢疫，動輒整箱退貨，引發業者疑慮。
換句話說，兩岸現況低於原預期的「冷和平」，直接墜入「冷對抗」，雙方互動處於緊繃狀態，特別是大陸方面，接連通過官方管道宣示立場，幾乎等同於讓自己「騎虎難下」，根本沒有轉圜或者妥協的空間，除非蔡英文能夠先行做出妥協，否則大陸官方也無法再往後退。
若蔡英文拒絕，那麼兩岸「冷對抗」恐怕將持續很長一段時間，若歧見癥結得不到解決，矛盾和壓力累積到一定程度，也可能升級兩岸衝突，讓「冷對抗」狀態演變成「正面對抗」，兩岸關係將重回扁時代的劍拔弩張，這恐怕將是兩岸民眾的不可承受之重。
大陸太大台灣太小，兩岸實力對比更已失衡，蔡英文必須主動思考問題的解決辦法，不能以保守思維被動應對，更不要錯誤認為只要自己「不挑釁」、「不惹事」就可以讓大陸束手無策。「九二共識」大陸無可退讓，縱使蔡英文不正面接受，也得主動提出替代方案，與大陸謀求共識。
兩岸關係最核心爭議是兩岸關係的性質，也就是兩岸到底是什麼關係？大陸認為是「一個中國的內戰關係」，民進黨傳統立場認為是一邊一國關係，現在的民進黨政府並未否定一邊一國關係，但宣告將以《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸事務，隱含兩岸是中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係，那麼這兩個中國又是什麼關係？蔡英文宣示將維護中華民國的領土與主權，而中華人民共和國是國際普遍認知的中國，那麼二者到底是主權重疊關係還是互不隸屬關係？
這個問題在馬英九時代「九二共識」涵蓋下有很大的「各表」空間，但蔡英文政府不接受「九二共識」，各表的模糊空間不再。大陸外交部3日首次針對太平島主權問題發言，稱「中國對包括太平島在內的南沙群島及其附近海域擁有無可爭辯的主權」，明確主張中華人民共和國主權涵蓋太平島，是對中華民國主權的明示否定，這是馬英九政府時代所未見。大陸外交部的表態預示兩岸外交戰可能復燃，那就是陳水扁時代「熱對抗」的最壞情況了。
民進黨政府站在中華民國基礎上，最好的因應方式是超越主權紛爭，將主權主張拉高至整個中國，宣示中華民國與中華人民共和國不是國與國關係，而是一個中國下的不同政權與制度分立。蔡英文還應就「兩岸同屬一家人」提出論述，一方面不將大陸人民視為他者，另一方面也要提出具體政策致力實現兩岸人民的互知、互諒、互利與互信。
借鏡李登輝時代經驗，可由林全院長在立法院就上述兩點做出宣示，並將之引為未來政府處理兩岸關係和兩岸事務的政策基調。同時，蔡總統可透過發表談話為林全院長背書，如此一來，大陸就不再有理由繼續對台灣施壓，反而必須面對與新政府正面溝通的現實問題，兩岸危機得以解除。
接下來就看大陸能在多大程度上恢復兩岸協商的既有溝通管道，但無論如何，兩岸「冷對抗」將大為降溫，不僅不至於發展成正面對抗，而且會回到「冷和平」狀態，甚至有重回和平交流狀態的可能。
當務之急是海基會董事長人選，蔡政府的府院國安人事布局，包括陸委會在內，一面倒偏向對美關係，加深當前兩岸風雲詭譎情勢，適當時機提出一個能為大陸接受的董事長人選，無疑可以為蔡英文政府化解兩岸敵意的努力提供助力。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2016
Executive Summary: President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.
Full Text Below:
President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.
That is not all. The Mainland has also interrupted cross-Strait exchanges and official communications. ARATS and the Taiwan Affairs Office no longer respond to MAC and SEF fax communications. It has taken concrete action to show the new government that it is serious. Mainland provincial delegations have ceased coming to Taiwan. Mainland group and corporate incentive group tours have also been suspended. Mainland inspections and quarantines of fruit imports from Taiwan have been tightened. Produce is frequently returned to Taiwan, provoking industry concern.
In other words, the cross-Strait situation is worse than the “Cold Peace" widely predicted. It has gone directly to "Cold Confrontation". Cross-Strait tensions are high, especially on the Mainland. Official declarations issued through various channels, have essentially left the Mainland "riding a tiger, and unable to dismount". There is no room for compromise or change whatsoever, unless Tsai is willing to compromise. Otherwise the Mainland authorities cannot back down.
If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to do so, then the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" will probably continue for a very long time. If the crux of the disagreement is not resolved, if conflict and stress escalates to a certain level, we could go from "Cold Confrontation" directly to "Hot Confrontation". Cross-Strait relations would then revert to what they were during the Chen era. This is something people on both sides cannot evade.
The Mainland is too big, and Taiwan is too small. The cross-Strait imbalance in power has increased. Tsai Ing-wen must actively seek solutions to problems. She cannot react passively. She cannot assume that as long as she offers no provocations, and makes no trouble, the Mainland will remain helpless. On the 1992 Consensus, the Mainland can make no concessions. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize it explicitly, she must offer an alternative, and seek consensus with the Mainland.
The key to the cross-Strait dispute is the nature of cross-Strait relations. Just what is the relationship between the two sides? The Mainland considers it a state of civil war within one China. The current DPP government's traditional position has been that it is “one nation on each side”. The DPP government has not repudiated its “one nation on each side” position. It has declared that it will handle cross-Strait affairs according to the Republic of China Constitution and
the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. The implication is that cross-Strait relations are relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. But what is the relationship between these two? Tsai Ing-wen declared that she would preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. But within the international community, the People's Republic of China is commonly perceived as “China”. So is their sovereignty overlapping, or unrelated?
During the Ma Ying-jeou era, the 1992 Consensus left significant room for “different interpretations”. But the Tsai government rejects the 1992 Consensus. Therefore there is no longer any room for different interpretations. On the third of this month, the Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its sovereignty over Taiping Island, for the very first time. It said "China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters, including Taiping Island”. It clearly asserted People's Republic of China sovereignty over Taiping Island, and repudiated Republic of China sovereignty. This was unheard of during the Ma Ying-jeou era. The Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs implied that the two sides might well revert to the “Hot Confrontation” diplomatic war of the Chen Shui-bian era.
The DPP government is dependent upon the Republic of China. The best way to cope is to go beyond the sovereignty dispute, and expand Taipei's claim of sovereignty to include the whole of China. It should declare that relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and not relations between independent nations, but rather betweeen two governments within a single nation. Tsai Ing-wen should also affirm that "People on both sides of the Strait are members of the same family". She must not perceive people on the Mainland as “The Other”. She must also make a genuine effort to help people know each other, understand each other, benefit each other, and trust each other.
The new government must learn from Lee Teng-ui era experience. Premier Lin Chuan could make the above two points in the legislature. He could lead the way for the government's handling of cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait policy. President Tsai could endorse Lin Chuan's statement through a spokesperson. That way the Mainland would no longer have any reason to continue pressuring Taiwan. Instead it would have to deal with the new government on practical matters. This would alleviate the cross-Strait crisis.
Next, it should consider how the Mainland can restore cross-Strait consultations communication channels. In any case, the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" would be eased. It would not develop into a “Hot Confrontation”. It would revert to the status of "Cold Peace", or even “peaceful exchange”.
Appointing an SEF chairman is urgent. Tsai government national security personnel appointments, including its MAC chairman, have all been one-sidedly pro-American. This will increase cross-Strait instability. A timely chairmanship appointment acceptable to the Mainland would undoubtedly help the Tsai government ease cross-Strait hostility.
冷對抗時代的兩岸危機管理
2016年06月06日 中國時報
蔡英文總統在就職演講中沒有對「九二共識」做出明確論述，各界原本預期兩岸將進入「冷和平」狀態，但民進黨政府相關人事安排及首波政策推動，令大陸對民進黨企圖以中華民國之名行「隱性台獨」之實大感憂心，因而加大批判力度，並透過國台辦、海協會及《人民日報》等官方管道要求蔡英文接受「九二共識」。
不僅如此，大陸還中斷了兩岸官方交流與溝通管道，國台辦與海協會不再回應陸委會與海基會的傳真來函，以實際行動向新政府展示態度堅決。大陸省市代表團已完全停止來台，原本常見的大陸團體或企業獎勵旅遊團也宣告暫停。至於貨物貿易領域，大陸也加強進口台灣水果的檢驗檢疫，動輒整箱退貨，引發業者疑慮。
換句話說，兩岸現況低於原預期的「冷和平」，直接墜入「冷對抗」，雙方互動處於緊繃狀態，特別是大陸方面，接連通過官方管道宣示立場，幾乎等同於讓自己「騎虎難下」，根本沒有轉圜或者妥協的空間，除非蔡英文能夠先行做出妥協，否則大陸官方也無法再往後退。
若蔡英文拒絕，那麼兩岸「冷對抗」恐怕將持續很長一段時間，若歧見癥結得不到解決，矛盾和壓力累積到一定程度，也可能升級兩岸衝突，讓「冷對抗」狀態演變成「正面對抗」，兩岸關係將重回扁時代的劍拔弩張，這恐怕將是兩岸民眾的不可承受之重。
大陸太大台灣太小，兩岸實力對比更已失衡，蔡英文必須主動思考問題的解決辦法，不能以保守思維被動應對，更不要錯誤認為只要自己「不挑釁」、「不惹事」就可以讓大陸束手無策。「九二共識」大陸無可退讓，縱使蔡英文不正面接受，也得主動提出替代方案，與大陸謀求共識。
兩岸關係最核心爭議是兩岸關係的性質，也就是兩岸到底是什麼關係？大陸認為是「一個中國的內戰關係」，民進黨傳統立場認為是一邊一國關係，現在的民進黨政府並未否定一邊一國關係，但宣告將以《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸事務，隱含兩岸是中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係，那麼這兩個中國又是什麼關係？蔡英文宣示將維護中華民國的領土與主權，而中華人民共和國是國際普遍認知的中國，那麼二者到底是主權重疊關係還是互不隸屬關係？
這個問題在馬英九時代「九二共識」涵蓋下有很大的「各表」空間，但蔡英文政府不接受「九二共識」，各表的模糊空間不再。大陸外交部3日首次針對太平島主權問題發言，稱「中國對包括太平島在內的南沙群島及其附近海域擁有無可爭辯的主權」，明確主張中華人民共和國主權涵蓋太平島，是對中華民國主權的明示否定，這是馬英九政府時代所未見。大陸外交部的表態預示兩岸外交戰可能復燃，那就是陳水扁時代「熱對抗」的最壞情況了。
民進黨政府站在中華民國基礎上，最好的因應方式是超越主權紛爭，將主權主張拉高至整個中國，宣示中華民國與中華人民共和國不是國與國關係，而是一個中國下的不同政權與制度分立。蔡英文還應就「兩岸同屬一家人」提出論述，一方面不將大陸人民視為他者，另一方面也要提出具體政策致力實現兩岸人民的互知、互諒、互利與互信。
借鏡李登輝時代經驗，可由林全院長在立法院就上述兩點做出宣示，並將之引為未來政府處理兩岸關係和兩岸事務的政策基調。同時，蔡總統可透過發表談話為林全院長背書，如此一來，大陸就不再有理由繼續對台灣施壓，反而必須面對與新政府正面溝通的現實問題，兩岸危機得以解除。
接下來就看大陸能在多大程度上恢復兩岸協商的既有溝通管道，但無論如何，兩岸「冷對抗」將大為降溫，不僅不至於發展成正面對抗，而且會回到「冷和平」狀態，甚至有重回和平交流狀態的可能。
當務之急是海基會董事長人選，蔡政府的府院國安人事布局，包括陸委會在內，一面倒偏向對美關係，加深當前兩岸風雲詭譎情勢，適當時機提出一個能為大陸接受的董事長人選，無疑可以為蔡英文政府化解兩岸敵意的努力提供助力。
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)