Xi-Obama Summit: One Summit, Two Interpretations

Xi-Obama Summit: One Summit, Two Interpretations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 9, 2016

Executive Summary: The Xi-Obama summit was undoubtedly the highlight of bilateral diplomacy at the Hangzhou G20 summit. As in the past, no joint press release was issued for the Sino-US summit. Instead, each side presented its own interpretation of the talks. Comparing the press releases issued by the two sides reveals where the two nations agree and disagree on a wide range of issues.

Full Text Below:

The Xi-Obama summit was undoubtedly the highlight of bilateral diplomacy at the Hangzhou G20 summit. As in the past, no joint press release was issued for the Sino-US summit. Instead, each side presented its own interpretation of the talks. Comparing the press releases issued by the two sides reveals where the two nations agree and disagree on a wide range of issues.

Consider the two sides' official press releases. Both heads of state affirmed the bilateral response to climate change, military confidence building measures. the fight against cyber crime, and challenges to economic development. But they did not hide their differences. One fourth of the Mainland's press release dealt with Xi Jinping's stance on Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, and THAAD. In the White House press release, Obama expressed US concern over Internet security, human rights, the South China Sea, and Mainland political reform. On the South China Sea issue in particular, Obama devoted much ink demanding that Beijing respect international law, and stressed the US commitment its allies' security.

Now consider the two sides' arguments. The Mainland press release contained over 10,000 characters and covered 35 major points. Some major points included myriad minor points. It even included the two sides' exhibition of historical artifacts next year in New York, in painstaking detail. By contrast, the US press release was half as long as the Mainland's. The contrast between the two is intriguing.

For starters, the first item in the Mainland's press relealse was the "New Great Power Relationship between China and the US". Expressions such as these do not appear in the United State press release. This is not the first time this has happened. The United States has a very different view of the nature of Sino-US relations. For both, strategic trust remains inadequate. Secondly, the two sides' positions on major global and regional issues are nearly verbatim translations. These include peacekeeping, refugees, Iraq, Afghanistan, outer space, nuclear safety, maritime cooperation, economic cooperation, particularly with regards the cooperation component of economic development. This shows that the above-mentioned issues go beyond bilateral relations. This is especially true for political issues. They have become a new area for Sino-US cooperation. As Xi Jinping put it, Sino-US relations have strategic and global influence. Sino-US cooperation can benefit many other nations and the world as a whole.

Unfortunately the overlap between the two is relatively small. The United States is concerned about narcotics trafficing, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, Internet security, military relations, and regional cooperation. Not one of these is the result of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. For example, the Mainland wrote "Both China and the US confirmed that significant progress has been achieved on bilateral investment agreements”. This implies that the US side still has reservations about the progress made in bilateral relations.

Fortunately both sides reiterated their desire to handle their differences constructively, and to increase pragmatic cooperation. Despite tit for tat actions in the South China Sea, Obama urged the two sides to reduce tensions and create conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Sino-US cooperation benefits both. Strife will only harm both. Sino-US relations are about to enter a new phase. The Xi-Obama summit has fulfilled its purpose.

The most relevant issue in Mainland and US press releases for Taiwan, was of course the Taiwan issue. According to the Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping has made his position on Taiwan clear. He hoped the US side would adhere to the one China policy and the three Sino-US joint communiques, and take concrete action to safeguard peaceful cross-Straits relations and overall Sino-US cooperation.  Obama responded positively, saying that United States' adherence to the one China policy has not changed, and it opposes any attempt to seek Taiwan independence. But the White House press release made no mention of the Taiwan issue. The media has confirmed that the United States' was merely responding in a low-keyed manner. Its policy has not changed.

There are two possible reasons for the low-keyed US response. One is that the Xinhua News Agency exaggerated the US position. But the United States needs to maintain cooperative relations with the Mainland. Either that, or it considers it inconvenient to argue with Mainland officials. Therefore it responded in a low-keyed manner. Another possibility is that the Xinhua News Agency report was accurate, but the US did not want to exert undue pressure on the Taiwan public and Tsai Ing-wen government. Therefore it deliberately downplayed the success of the Xi-Obama talks. If so, it was naturally in no position to correct the Xinhua News Agency press release.

The Mainland and the US have held "different interpretations" for quite some time. The United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979. Based on its one China policy, the US broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC. Withdrawal of troops was a requirement. But the United States clung to its own "one China" definition. The Mainland side knows the US was being two-faced. But it had no choice but to accept. The Mainland and the US each have their own one China policy. This has maintained stability in the Strait and with Beijing/Washington/Taipei relations for nearly 40 years. It remains valid today. Clearly “different interpretations" is politically astute. It enables two sides who hold different positions to save face, maintain contact, and continue interaction.

The 1992 Consensus is another kind of politically astute “different interpretations”. But the DPP government has foolishly tossed it aside. Does the DPP have the determination to go head to head with the Mainland? If not, then it must find room for "different interpretations". Trust between the CCP and DPP is essentially non-existent. The balance of power between the Mainland and the US is changing. The DPP will eventually pay a high price for its obstinacy.

歐習會「一會各表」的智慧
2016/9/9 中國時報

歐習會無疑是杭州G20峰會雙邊外交的重頭戲，與過去幾次一樣，本次中美峰會也沒有發表聯合聲明或共同新聞稿，而是各自表述會談的過程與成果。比較雙方分別公布的新聞稿與成果清單，可以清楚看出兩國在一系列問題上的共識與分歧。

先看兩國官方各自發布的新聞稿。兩位元首都肯定了雙方在應對氣候變遷、加強兩軍關係、打擊網路犯罪、應對發展挑戰等領域的合作，也都不迴避各種分歧。中方新聞稿中用了四分之一篇幅闡述習近平在台灣、西藏、人權、南海、朝鮮半島核問題，以及「薩德」等議題上的原則立場。在白宮新聞稿中，歐巴馬則表達了美方對網路安全、人權、南海、大陸政治改革等問題上的關切。尤其在南海問題上，歐巴馬用了許多篇幅敦促北京遵守國際法，並強調了美國對盟友安全所承擔的義務。

再看雙方各自梳理的成果清單，中方清單洋洋灑灑1萬多字，涵蓋35個大點（其中一些大點還包括若干小點），連雙方明年計畫在紐約合辦文物展等細節都寫了進去，可謂不厭其煩，面面俱到。反觀美方清單，相比中方縮水一半左右。兩相對照，耐人尋味。

首先，中方清單第一項就是「中美新型大國關係」，但類似表述並沒有出現在美方清單中，並且這不是第一次發生，可側面證明美方對中美關係性質有不同觀點，雙方戰略互信仍然不足。其次，雙方清單的交集主要在全球和地區問題，如維和、難民、伊拉克、阿富汗、外空、核安全、海洋合作、發展合作等，特別是有關發展合作部分，雙方的表述簡直就是中英文對譯。這說明上述超越雙邊層次的議題（尤其是其中的低政治議題），已成為中美合作的新增長點。用習近平的話來說，中美關係具有戰略意義和全球影響，中美合作可以辦成許多有利於兩國和世界的大事。

不過，兩國在雙邊關係成果上的交集相對不多，美方關注的是禁毒、執法、反恐、網路安全、軍事關係、地方合作等內容，清單上甚至沒有任何一項雙邊經貿合作的成果（比如中方宣布的「中美雙方確認，雙邊投資協定談判取得重大成果」），似乎暗示，美方對雙邊關係的實質性進展持相對保留態度。

令人欣慰的是，雙方均重申將繼續建設性管理分歧，拓展務實合作。即使在針鋒相對的南海問題上，歐巴馬也鼓勵各方降低緊張態勢，為和平解決爭端創造有利條件。中美合則兩利，鬥則兩傷。隨著中美關係即將進入新時期，可以說末代「歐習會」已經完成了自己的使命。

在中美各自發布的新聞稿中，最值得台灣重視的一個分歧點，就是台灣問題。據新華社的通稿，習近平對台灣問題有明確表態，希望「美方恪守一個中國政策和中美三個聯合公報原則，以實際行動維護兩岸關係和平發展和中美合作大局」。歐巴馬也作出了積極回應，稱「美方奉行一個中國政策沒有改變，反對任何尋求台灣獨立的做法」，但白宮新聞稿對台灣問題隻字未提。有媒體為此向美方查證，美方只是低調回覆，相關政策沒有改變。

美國低調有兩個可能，一是新華社報導不實，過度擴張解釋美國的立場，但美國基於與大陸維持合作關係的需要，或至少不便就此與大陸官員爭辯，因而低調應對。第二個可能是新華社新聞稿符合實情，但美國不願造成台灣民眾及蔡英文政府的壓力，故意對歐巴馬談話隱而不彰，當然事後不便更正新華社的新聞稿。

中美在台灣問題上「各自表述」其實由來已久，美中1979年建交是以美國承認「一個中國政策」，與中華民國斷交、撤軍為條件，但美國始終堅持自己的「一個中國」定義，中國大陸深知美國的雙面性，但也不得不接受。中美各自以自己的「一中政策」維繫中美台關係及台海穩定將近40年，至今依然有效。可見「各自表述」是一種政治智慧，可以讓不同立場的雙方找到台階，維持交往與互動。

「九二共識」就是一種各自表述的政治智慧，可惜民進黨政府棄如敝屣。民進黨如果沒有決心與中國大陸對衝，就必須重新與大陸找出「各自表述」的空間。只是，以民共之間互信的薄弱與中美兩國實力對比的位移，民進黨勢必付出更高代價。

KMT Must Accelerate Its Transformation

KMT Must Accelerate Its Transformation
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 8, 2016

Executive Summary: The Tsai government is in chaos. This provides the KMT with an opportunity to accelerate blue camp transformation. The KMT must offer a forward-looking vision. It must boldly take a stand on behalf of the Taiwan public. It must offer constructive alternatives to DPP policy in order to win public support. Internally, comrades who take the revitalization of the blue camp seriously, must forsake selfishness and be more willing to consider the Big Picture. Hung Shiu-chu must keep an open mind. Only then will people of talent and constructive suggestions come pouring in.

Full Text Below:

Under the color of the "Articles for the Disposal of Illicit Party Assets", financial institutions have ceased lending funds to the KMT. This has exerted tremendous pressure on the party. The KMT Central Committee has suspended monthly retirement benefits and 18% interest payments. It has been forced to make spending cuts, and adopt a whoe range of austerity measures. Almost all of these have been passive responses to events swirling around it. Following its election debacle, the KMT appears to have lost all drive and direction.

Consider Chairman Hung Shiu-chu's substantial changes to the party's Central Committee. She scored election victories in Hualien City, Tianwei Township, and several other locales. She has officially incorporated the Cross-Strait Peace Agreement into the KMT party platform. These are all positive moves. But the impact of these, both politically and socially, is relatively small. Put simply, these moves are not enough to attract outside attention. Nor are they enough to unify the party from within, never mind revive blue camp morale.

The new government has failed to win peoples' hearts and minds. This provided the KMT a golden opportunity to demonstrate oversight, insight, and tolerance in its role as the political opposition. Unfortunately the KMT dwelt exclusively on its own persecution. It harped on party assets instead of hardships endured by the nation as a whole. The manner in which it expressed itself, with complaints, sarcasm, and bad-mouthing, has not won public sympathy. Therefore the new government's failure to win public support has not led to a corresponding rise in support for the KMT. The KMT has failed to transcend its old stereotypes. It has not given people the impression of change.

Looking forward, the KMT faces three major obstacles. It must overcome these obstacles if the blue camp is to have a real chance at transformation and rebirth. If it busies itself with trivialities, with a war of words and merely goes through the motions, it will not be able to revive itself.

The first of the KMT's three major obstacles, is the lack of an internal party line. Next year's party chairmanship election will apparently be contested only by Hung Shiu-chu and Wu Den-yih. That is not a good sign. Wu and Hung each have their strenghts and weaknesses. But neither has offered a vision for the party attractive enough to inspire the public. Meanwhile, rival party factions are covertly mobilizing. The battle is bound to form along "nativist" and "non-nativist" lines. It amounts to another round in the unfinished battle between Hung and Wu over the party chairmanship earlier this year. If the chairmanship election leads to increased divisions within the party, it will be obtuse beyond belief.

The second major obstacle the KMT faces, is the 2018 county and municipal elections. When Eric Chu was chairman, he demanded that six legislators without portfolio resign after serving only two years, and even sign agreements to that effect. But Hung Shiu-chu apparently has no intention of meekly complying with rules laid down by Eric Chu. She proposed an alternative -- a pre-selection system to nominate more newcomers. In fact, both models have their limitations. The biggest problem is that new or old, there are no strong candidates to be found. So how can the KMT have any winners? The KMT Central Committee must be more aggressive. It must help candidates with potential establish public images. It must provide them with election opportunities. Merely waiting for candidates to emerge from normal work processes, offers little chance of victory.

The third major obstacle the KMT faces, is letting go of its party assets. KMT party assets have become a major political burden. The KMT should use the opportunity to relieve itself of this burden once and for all. It should conduct a thorough inventory of party management and staff. This would help accelerate the downsizing and restructuring of the party. This should be regarded as a blessing in disguise. A party that dwells on the past, that continues to support seven to eight hundred party workers and thousands of retired party workers, can only rest on its laurels. It has no prospects for the future. Currently only Vice Chairman Tsan Chi-hsian has expressed a desire to put an end to this. Others remain filled with resentment. But that only makes it more difficult for the party to make a new beginning. In reality, the KMT must cease defending and start attacking. It must let go of resentments over party assets. It must turn the tables on the DPP, and attack its extortionate and illegal expropriation of public assets. It must demand that party assets be used for public welfare. Only then will divesting itself of its party assets acrue to its own favor, and polish its own public image. Only then can it effectively combat DPP demands for party assets, and force the DPP to abide by the law.

The Tsai government is in chaos. This provides the KMT with an opportunity to accelerate blue camp transformation. The KMT must offer a forward-looking vision. It must boldly take a stand on behalf of the Taiwan public. It must offer constructive alternatives to DPP policy in order to win public support. Internally, comrades who take the revitalization of the blue camp seriously, must forsake selfishness and be more willing to consider the Big Picture. Hung Shiu-chu must keep an open mind. Only then will people of talent and constructive suggestions come pouring in.

國民黨轉型的腳步必須加快
2016-09-08 聯合報

在《不當黨產處理條例》的框限下，金融機構陸續停止與國民黨的借貸合約，使國民黨面臨龐大的周轉壓力。國民黨中央除停發退職黨工月退及十八趴外，也必須緊縮各種支出，並被迫進一步採取裁員措施。這些行動，幾乎全是被形勢推著走的消極因應。整體觀察，國民黨在大選潰敗後，似乎還沒找到重新出發的動力和方向。

觀察洪秀柱出任主席之後的作為，黨中央的人事布局作了相當規模的調整，也打贏花蓮市、田尾鄉等幾場地方補選，並將「兩岸和平協議」正式寫入黨的政策綱領。這些，自有其正面意義；但就政治影響和社會形象而言，仍嫌相對微小。簡言之，這些作為對外不足吸引民眾的目光，對內無法產生強大的凝聚，遑論重振藍軍氣勢。

其實，在新政府執政不得民心的情況下，國民黨原有不少可以發揮的空間，表現出在野監督的見識和氣度。遺憾的是，國民黨卻只專注在自己受到的打壓（如討黨產），而不是提升高度以關注民瘼與國家大局的平衡；此外，選擇以抱怨、嘲諷、唱衰等方式表達異議，亦不易引起社會大眾共鳴。也因此，在新政府民意支持度下墜的同時，並未見國民黨支持度的相對上升，主要就是國民黨並未能超越自己舊有窠臼，無法讓民眾看到它改頭換面之貌。

往前看，國民黨面對的是三座大山，必須要能跨越這些險峻的挑戰，藍軍才有真正轉型重生的可能。否則，如果只是每天忙於因應眼前這些瑣瑣碎碎的口水戰及形式微調，恐怕無助重振氣勢。

國民黨的三座大山，第一，是黨內的路線問題懸而未決。明年的黨主席選舉，目前看來，似乎仍只有吳敦義和洪秀柱競逐的態勢，這並非好的徵兆。吳、洪兩人各有優劣，但雙方均未就黨的發展提出足夠吸引人的見解，而只是在派系人脈上暗中動員較勁。如此一來，勢必又要落入「本土」與「非本土」的路線之爭，等於將年初因吳臨陣卻步而未完的主席之戰重演一回，勢將重蹈內耗的窠臼。主席選戰，若再度造成黨的傷口撕裂，即愚不可及。

第二，參選二○一八縣市長選舉的人才何在：朱立倫在主席任內，曾要求六名不分區立委只任兩年即必須辭職參選，甚至簽下切結。但洪秀柱顯然無意「朱規洪隨」，她改提「預選制」，想要提前透過選舉產生候選人，以拔擢更多新人。事實上，兩種模式都有其侷限，最大的問題在，不論新人或舊人，放眼都看不到強棒，如何能有勝算？黨中央必須拿出更積極的態度，幫黨內具有潛力的人選製造形象與機會；否則，只是被動跟著作業流程等待人選浮現，是沒有勝算的戰法。

第三，對割捨黨產的態度猶豫難決：黨產已成為國民黨一大政治包袱，趁此機會作一總結，同時對黨的經營和人員重新進行總盤點，其實有益加速黨的瘦身和轉型，不妨視之為「焉知非福」的因素。試想，一個坐困愁城的政黨，卻養著七、八百名黨工和數千退休黨工，除了坐吃山空，前景何在？然而，目前似乎只有副主席詹啟賢清楚表達了斷之意，許多人仍充滿怨念，但越是如此，越不容易重新出發。盱衡現實，國民黨唯有「易守為攻」，放下對黨產歸公的怨嘆，轉而對民進黨強徵民產的不法之處提出嚴格監督與攻擊，甚至提出歸公黨產之公益用途。如此，才能藉著「黨產歸零」重新累積自己的形象資產，進而有效打擊民進黨討黨產的霸道與踰法。

蔡政府執政腳步紊亂，正是藍軍加速轉型重生的契機。國民黨必須拿出有高度的瞻矚，站穩為台灣計議的立場，對民進黨政策提出針砭和積極建議，才能爭取民氣支持。對內而言，那些還把振興藍營當一回事的同志，必須放下私心，多一點大局綢繆。洪秀柱則要打開心胸，人才和建言才進得來。

Xi-Obama Summit and Sino-US Power Politics

Xi-Obama Summit and Sino-US Power Politics
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 7, 2016

Executive Summary: During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese mainland threw open its doors to the outside world. During the Hangzhou G20 summit, it offered an even grander view of the Mainland. The heads of the world's top 20 economies, along with leaders of the major international economic organizations, gathered in Hangzhou. This summit is considered the most important international conference since the CCP founded the PRC. It announced to the world that China had arrived.

Full Text Below:

During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese mainland threw open its doors to the outside world. During the Hangzhou G20 summit, it offered an even grander view of the Mainland. The heads of the world's top 20 economies, along with leaders of the major international economic organizations, gathered in Hangzhou. This summit is considered the most important international conference since the CCP founded the PRC. It announced to the world that China had arrived.

When it first joined the G20, the Mainland merely wanted to be a respected partner. It did not expect to become its leader. At the time, Beijing thought the G20 might be a Western trap, intended to force Mainland China take on more responsibility for global governance, in order to slow its internal development. But in 2012, when Xi Jinping came to power, the Mainland's low profile strategy changed to one of "showing the world what China can do”. This raised eyebrows in neighboring nations and alarmed the United States. It also made Mainland China more actively involved in international affairs. As Xi Jinping said earlier during the Enterprise Summit, China's development has benefited from the international community, therefore China is willing to provide the international community with more public goods.

Consider the international situation. The Mainland government is one of the few governments willing and able to promote global economic and trade relations. The 2008 financial crisis was not that long ago. Global economic growth remains sluggish. This year the projected growth rate is a mere 2.9%. The Mainland is the world's economic engine. It constitutes 26.4% of the world economy. Its development affects the prosperity of the entire world. Therefore the Mainland's development strategy, including the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), the AIIB, RCEP, and FTAs with Japan and South Korea, are matters of global concern. As the host of the Hangzhou summit, the Mainland made economic growth its theme.

The summit sidelines included over 20 bilateral summits. The most notable was Xi Jinping's meeting with Barack Obama. When Obama's plane arrived, negligence on the part of security and ground personnel forced him to exit Air Force One from the rear of the aircraft, leading to a minor flareup. The White House tried to explain that it was a careless mistake. But the media pounced on the issue and alleged that a rising China deliberately "belittled" the US.

In fact, Beijing had no desire to embarrass the United States. On the contrary, the Chinese mainland deliberately avoided giving the impression that an emerging power was challenging a current power. This was why Beijing arranged for an informal meeting between Xi and Obama. It wanted to establish a "new great power relationship”. The Mainland deliberately chose the Xihu State Guest House for the meeting. This was where US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed the Sino-US Joint Communiques in 1972. The Mainland was deliberately reminding everyone that the Cold War between the two nations was over, and that relations between them were already normalized.

Obama is an outgoing president. Therefore the Xi-Obama meeting will be the last meeting between the two. The Mainland hopes to revisit and summarize recent Sino-US relations. More importantly, the United States will have a new president by the end of this year. Beijing hopes to stabilize Sino-US relations before that.

Some think Xi Jinping need not concern himself with an outgoing president. Sino-US issues are complex. They need not be resolved during the summit. By contrast, Obama needs Mainland Chinese cooperation to secure his legacy. That being the case, Beijing need not cooperate with foreign policies not in the Mainland's best interests, such as Asian-Pacific rebalancing and the TPP. But it will certainly be willing to cooperate with policies in both sides' interests, such as the Paris Climate Accord.

As a result, on the eve of the G20 summit, Obama and Xi Jinping each ratified the Paris Climate Accord and submitted it to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. This drew global attention. For this agreement to enter into force, it must be approved by those nations responsible for 55% of the world's carbon emissions. The United States and Mainland China alone contribute 40% of all emissions. This constitutes a giant step forward for global warming. Obama's delight was palpable.

The Hangzhou summit was a golden opportunity for the two major powers to meet. Mainland China set the stage, and gave Asian-Pacific nations the opportunity to make new choices. Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said Australia needs a new foreign policy that responds to China's inevitable rise, and the United States' change from a dominant power, to a power that must compromise. Keating's words echoed the sentiments of many nations.

Taiwan was not invited to the meeting. That may be why the media and the government focused on the Xi-Obama summit. They wondered whether the two men discussed Taiwan. They asked the United States to make clear whether Taiwan's interests were harmed. As everyone knows, the global situation following the Hangzhou summit is significantly changed. Taiwan must look beyond the old Washington/Beijing/Taipei relationship. Only then can it accurately perceive the changing global situation.

從杭州歐習會看中美爭鋒的表裡
2016-09-07 聯合報

如果二○○八北京奧運是中國大陸向世界打開門戶，杭州Ｇ20峰會則是另一番勝景。全世界經濟規模前二十名國家之元首，加上各主要國際經濟組織的領導人齊聚杭州，這次峰會被視為中共建政以來最重要的國際會議，向全球發出「中國走向世界」的訊號。

當初加入Ｇ20，中國大陸只希望在其間扮演受尊敬的合作夥伴角色，並未想到引領。當時，北京擔心Ｇ20是西方的「陷阱」，意圖讓中國負擔更多全球治理責任，以拖慢大陸內部的發展。二○一二年習近平上台後，把原先的「韜光養晦」策略轉成「有所作為」，這讓四鄰側目、美國戒慎，卻也讓中國更積極參與國際事務。如同習近平稍早在企業峰會所言：中國的發展得益於國際社會，也願為國際社會提供更多公共產品。

放眼國際，中國大陸是目前少數有能力、也有意願促進全球發展與經貿的經濟體之一。二○○八年的金融危機迄今，全球經濟成長仍然緩慢，今年預估成長率僅二．九％。它也是全球經濟的火車頭，對世界經濟的貢獻率達廿六．四％，其發展攸關全球榮枯。因此，大陸的發展戰略無論是亞投行的一帶一路、ＲＣＥＰ、乃至中日韓自貿區，皆受全球關切。做為杭州峰會的東道主，中國更將發展增長設定為峰會的優先議題。

在這場峰會場邊，還有超過廿場的雙邊高峰會，其中最受矚目的，就是習近平與歐巴馬的會晤。在歐巴馬專機抵達時，由於安全與地勤的疏忽，他被迫從「空軍一號」的機腹下機，引起一場小爭端。白宮雖極力解釋這是無心之失，但所有媒體都藉題發揮，描繪崛起的中國如何刻意「貶低」美國的地位。

事實上，未必是北京有意要給美國難看；相反的，中國刻意避免留下新興大國挑戰傳統大國的印象；這也是北京極力經營不拘形式的「歐習會」，意圖建構「新型大國關係」的原因。這次中方精心安排的歐習會地點，是一九七二年美國總統尼克森與中共總理周恩來簽署《中美聯合公報》的西湖國賓館，便是有意喚醒兩國歷經冷戰對抗走向「關係正常化」的記憶。

由於歐巴馬即將卸任，這次歐習會是兩個領導人最後一次雙邊會晤，大陸希望能對近年中美關係做出回顧和總結。更重要的是，面對美國年底將產生新總統的不確定性，北京希望設法穩住中美關係。

有人認為，習近平其實無需在意一位即將卸任的總統，中美間問題千頭萬緒，本就無法一時三刻解決，有些議題拖過峰會無妨。相對的，反而是歐巴馬更需要中方配合，才能維持其特定政治遺產。在這種思維下，對於不符大陸利益的外交政策，如亞太再平衡與ＴＰＰ等，北京自無必要與對方合作；但對於雙方利益與共的，如《巴黎氣候協定》，中方當然樂於配合。

也因此，在Ｇ20峰會前夕，歐巴馬與習近平分別將《巴黎氣候協定》的批准文書交給聯合國秘書長潘基文，受到全球矚目。這項協定若要生效，必須獲得全球碳排放量五五％以上國家的批准，而美、中兩個排放量最大國家的總量已達四十％，讓全球改善暖化前景邁開大步。歐巴馬的欣喜之情更是溢於言表。

經過杭州峰會，中美兩大強權似乎來到了一個黃金交叉點。中國登上主導的舞台，也讓亞太各國面臨新的選擇關頭。澳洲前總理基亭即表示，澳洲需要全新的外交政策，來因應中國「無可避免」的崛起，以及美國「從主導到妥協」的角色轉變。基亭之言，說出不少國家之心聲。

對台灣而言，或許因未獲邀與會，媒體與政府的關注焦點仍然圍繞在「歐習會」是否談及台灣問題，並汲汲要求美國澄清沒有損及台灣權益。殊不知，杭州峰會後的全球局勢已大幅改觀，台灣必須跨出舊有的美中台視野，才能看清楚變化中的全球大局。

Appointment of Tien Hung-mao and James Huang Reflect Tsai Ing-wen's Strategic Confusion

Appointment of Tien Hung-mao and James Huang 
Reflect Tsai Ing-wen's Strategic Confusion
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 6, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional relations and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. Chiang Shun-nan will not longer be appointed Representative to Singapore, due to his arrest for drunk driving. His position will be filled by New Southern Strategy Office Chief James Huang. Both individuals are experienced, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Full Text Below:

The Tsai government has been in office nearly 100 days. Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional relations and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. Chiang Shun-nan will not longer be appointed Representative to Singapore, due to his arrest for drunk driving. His position will be filled by New Southern Strategy Office Chief James Huang. Both individuals are experienced, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Personnel appointments must be guided by strategic vision. They are the means by which strategic visions are realized. These appointments reflect Tsai Ing-wen's lack of strategic vision.

First take cross-Strait relations. President Tsai refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, yet insists the two sides must maintain the status quo. Her appointees to the MAC and SEF may not be able to break the cross-Strait deadlock. But they must at least avoid worsening cross-Strait relations. The appointment of Katharine Chang as MAC Chairwoman was announced before May 20. Her appointment would not have provoked the Mainland. She was a relatively safe choice. For the same reason, James Soong or Wang Jin-pyng was slated to become SEF Chairman. But Tsai Ing-wen dragged her feet and refused to give the Mainland a straight answer. Eventually both Soong and Wang turned down this figurehead position.

The SEF Chairmanship appointment has been delayed 100 days. Instead of progressing, cross-Strait relations have regressed. A long string of incidents have touched sensitive nerves. They include the launching of a Hsiung Feng III missile in the direction of the Mainland, the South China Sea arbitration “ruling”, the deaths of Mainland tourists in a tour bus fire, and the Kenyan telecommunications fraud controversy. Add to this the new government's plummeting approval ratings and political pressure from Taiwan independence elements. The result was President Tsai promptly caved in and appointed green oriented Tien Hung-mao as SEF Chairman to appease Taiwan independence elements. Years ago, Tien Hung-mao reportedly drove Koo Kuan-min all over the US, helping him promote Taiwan independence. Today, a photo of him with former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin hangs in his office. Katherine Chang called his appointment “a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland”. But whether the other side will see it that way is another matter.

Put bluntly, frozen cross-Strait relations, broken cross-Strait connections, and stalled cross-Strait negotiations, have little to do with SEF and MAC appointments. The real problem is that Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, and hopes the Mainland will allow her to squeak by regardless. Last year Tien Hung-mao said that if Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait communication channels would probably be interrupted. Can Tien Hung-mao mollify Taiwan independence elements? Can he obtain authorization from Tsai Ing-wen to give the Mainland a straight answer? Unless he can, the SEF will remain hanging, and Tien Hung-mao will remain unable to cross the Strait.

Strategic errors are difficult to correct at the level of tactics. Tsai Ing-wen may be attempting to stabilize the current situation. But the reduction in Mainland students, the reduction in Mainland tourists, the cancellation of cross-Strait agreements, and the negative impact on cross-Strait relations, are ongoing. Cross-Strait tensions may soon affect diplomacy and trade, including the New Southern Strategy. James Huang's appointment at this time reflects another strategic dilemma.

Tsai Ing-wen is anxious to promote her New Southern Strategy. That is why she positioned it within the Presidential Office. But for the past several months little has been implemented apart from sloganeering. In mid August, when the government announced the New Southern Strategy, it appeared ready to spring into action. Who knew that half a month later, the political star appointed to the Southern Strategy Office would suddenly be replaced by Chiang Chun-nan, who was forced to resign several months ago for drunk driving. This change sent two messages. The first was that Tsai Ing-wen's bag of tricks is empty. She has no other candidates she can trust, so she mobilized James Huang. The second was that the new government realized its New Southern Strategy was easier said than done. Therefore it decided to take advantage of the opportunity provided by personnel changes to change its policy framework.

James Huang has been appointed Representative to Singapore. The Tsai government can of course indulge in euphemisms. It can refer to Singapore as its “command post” to the New South. But can it really? What government is going to allow foreign diplomats to use their country as a command post? If James Huang wants to use Singapore as command post for the New Southern Strategy, will ROC officials in ASEAN and South Asian countries have to obey his commands? Will the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to obey his commands? When two agencies differ on direction and priorities, whom must overseas officials obey? This is akin to moving the Hengshan Command Post to Kinmen, and moving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Tatan Island to take point. It is simply not feasible.

The delayed appointments of James Huang and Tien Hung-mao reflect Tsai Ing-wen's internal contradictions in foreign strategic thinking. That is why this clash between personnel appointments and harsh reality is so deeply worrisome.

田弘茂與黃志芳人事案反映的戰略困局
2016-09-06 聯合報

蔡政府上任逾百日，攸關區域發展與兩岸關係的兩項人事布局終告底定。懸缺多時的海基會董事長，倉促敲定由外交部前部長田弘茂接任；因江春男酒駕而空出來的駐新加坡代表，則由新南向辦公室主任黃志芳出任。兩人個別條件皆不差，但不等於適才適所；而整體人事布局則反映了蔡總統用人的窘迫及其戰略構想之凌亂，到了顧此失彼、顧小失大的地步。

戰略構想指導人事布局，人事安排則是實踐戰略構想的起手式。這兩項人事任命，正好反映蔡英文對外戰略布局的左支右絀。

先談兩岸關係。蔡總統拒絕接受「九二共識」，力稱要維持兩岸現狀，因此海、陸兩會的負責人選即使不能打開兩岸僵局，至少要能避免關係進一步惡化。陸委會主委張小月的人事，在五二○前即已出爐，就是一項對大陸不挑釁、對台灣相對安全的人事安排。基於同樣的考量，海基會董事長人選數月來一直鎖定王金平和宋楚瑜二人；但蔡英文對兩岸定位遲遲不願答卷，兩岸僵局難解，王、宋兩人最終拒絕接受此一有名無實之虛職。

在海基會董事長百日懸宕中，兩岸關係有退無進：從雄三誤射、南海仲裁、陸客團火燒車到肯亞電信詐騙案等，不斷挑動兩岸敏感神經。再加上新政府民調急墜，獨派又大動作逼宮，蔡總統因此加速妥協，急急任命了可以安撫獨派情緒的偏綠人士田弘茂。當年，田弘茂據稱曾在美國開車載著辜寬敏到處遊說推動台獨；如今，辦公室裡則掛著與中共前總書記江澤民的合照。他的任命，張小月可以誇稱「對中國大陸釋出善意」，但對岸是否接受是另一回事。

說穿了，目前兩岸關係急凍，聯繫中斷、協商停擺，問題並不在海陸兩會人事，而在蔡英文那份尚未完成的答卷。田弘茂去年曾說，如果蔡英文拒絕接受「九二共識」，極可能導致兩岸溝通機制中斷。而今，除非田弘茂能安撫獨派、取得蔡英文授權，補填答卷，否則海基會恐怕還是只能晾在那裡，田弘茂恐怕再也跨不過海峽。

戰略方向不對，戰術自難能回天。或許蔡英文暫時只想先穩住現況，但陸生縮、陸客減、契作斷，卻是正在不斷發生衝擊效應的兩岸關係進行式。而兩岸關係的未來式，還可能擴及外交與經貿層面，包括新南向政策。而此時黃志芳的人事安排，則反映了另一種戰略困局。

「新南向」是蔡英文亟欲推動的政策，因而在總統府設置了高位階的辦公室；但幾個月來，在執行上始終難有作為，在政策上也未擺脫「喊話」的虛招。更令人困惑的是，政府八月中才公布了新南向政策綱領，一副就要奮起行動之姿；誰料才短短半個月，卻驟然將南向辦公室主帥改派駐星，接替月前因酒駕請辭的江春男。此舉，透露了兩個訊息：其一，蔡英文的錦囊已空，掏不出合適又可以信賴的人選，所以挑來揀去只有調動黃志芳；其二，新政府深切認知新南向之「知易行難」，因此，決定藉此人事異動順勢更動政策架構。

黃志芳出使新加坡，蔡政府當然可以美其名曰，將可利用新加坡作為新南向之指揮站。問題是，這樣的說法，在現實上能成立嗎？別的不談，先問：哪國政府會容許外國使節把自己國家當成一個合縱連橫的指揮基地？再問：如果黃志芳要在新加坡指揮南向政策，我駐東協及南亞各國人員是要聽他指揮，抑或聽外交部指揮？當雙方指令有方向及優先序上的差異時，駐外人員又要聽誰之命？這種作法，就如同把衡山指揮所搬到金門，又把參謀總長送到大膽島擔任前敵指揮一般，是行不通的。

田弘茂和黃志芳的人事安排遲遲底定，反映蔡英文對外戰略思考的架構有內在矛盾，人事和政策現實之難以對應，不禁令人擔憂。

Economic Rejuvenation: Is the Government Applying Force in the Wrong Place?

Economic Rejuvenation: Is the Government Applying Force in the Wrong Place?  
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 5, 2016

Executive Summary: Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation polls show public approval for the new government after 100 days at only 61%, barely making the grade. Nearly 45% are dissatisfied with the government's economic record. Foundation Chairman You Ying-lung said dissatisfaction with the economy is the main reason for the president's swift decline in popularity. It also signals the end of Tsai's honeymoon period. Even pro-green poll results are like this. Polls conducted by others are even more dire. All point to the economy and cross-Strait relations as the main source of dissatisfaction.

Full Text Below:

Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation polls show public approval for the new government after 100 days at only 61%, barely making the grade. Nearly 45% are dissatisfied with the government's economic record. Foundation Chairman You Ying-lung said dissatisfaction with the economy is the main reason for the president's swift decline in popularity. It also signals the end of Tsai's honeymoon period. Even pro-green poll results are like this. Polls conducted by others are even more dire. All point to the economy and cross-Strait relations as the main source of dissatisfaction.

Over the past year and a half, Taiwan's economy has been in a long dark tunnel. Economic indicators call for a blue light. Exports have fallen 17 straight quarters in a row. This is the longest decline in the island's history. People are weary with the recession. They are losing patience. This was reflected in the KMT election rout, and is reflected in disappointment with the DPP. President Tsai made "economic restructuring" one of her five major policy planks. She knows people expect her to revive the economy. But the new government has blundered repeatedly. It is overwhelmed with fighting fires. There is no economic revitalization to be found. Public disappointment is spreading like a wildfire. The diminishing number of Mainland tourists continues to impact the tourism industry. Public dissatisfaction with the Lin Chuan cabinet will probably soon extend to Tsai Ing-wen herself.

Tsai Ing-wen is unable to reconcile the DPP as a political party, with her own presidency. She is unable to change Taiwan's "politics uber alles" value system. This is the chief reason the new government has been unable to grow the economy. Premier Lin Chuan may be an expert in finance. But he is not an expert in economics and industry. Also, he lacks the requisite political instincts. During the first 100 days he found himself besieged by all manner of crises large and small. He has had no time to devote to fiscal matters. As a result, the Lin Chuan cabinet may be a “cabinet of economic experts” in name, but it has been unable to jump start the fiscal engine of the nation.

The Lin Chuan cabinet appointed a number of blue camp officials. They hoped the old veteran would bring with him fresh blood, and achieve seamless integration. The Tsai government vowed “not to suspect those whom it recruited”. But somewhere along the way, it “ceased recruiting those whom it suspected”. Lin Chuan originally hoped that NDC Chairman Chen Tian-jy could establish a "Grand National Development Council", as the Executive Yuan's most authoritative and detail conscious organization. But Chen Tian-jy found himself in an awkward position within the new government. He was stigmatized as "old, blue, male”. He could not rally the troops like other political appointees who were green camp standard bearers. Therefore NDC inter-ministerial coordination of fiscal policy failed. This naturally undermined the economic outcome.

The remaining three economics and finance related ministries, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the FSC, are virtually non-existent. Minister of Economic Affairs Roy S. Lee has been struggling to implement President Tsai's "nuclear-free homeland" policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, from top to bottom, has been revolving around the energy question. Just what is Roy S. Lee? Minister of Energy? Or Minister of Economic Affairs? As a result, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is doing virtually none of the economic restructuring that the public cares about. The heads of the Ministry of Finance and the FSC seldom show their faces. Only when MegaBank was subjected to heavy penalties by the US, was there a public outcry. The two men have yet to stand on the front lines. They have done as little as possible. The result has been deadly.

The Ministry of Finance has performed poorly. The new government has been indecisive in dealing with official holidays, labor strikes, and other issues. It has attempted to please everyone, only to increase labor vs. management opposition, and instill labor and management doubts about the government's position. As approval ratings plummeted, the Executive Yuan hastily proposed "expanding investments", hoping to boost economic performance. But its core business plan was to provide SOEs with 345 billion NT in subsidies. It is not addressing what ails the nation. Too much private sector hot money is seeking a destination. Government policy should lead private investment in the right direction. So why is it increasing investment in state-owned enterprises? A closer look reveals that even Taipower's "renting" of emergency power generation equipment is classified as part of the new government's investment plan. This reveals not only a lack of vision, but number inflation.

To boost domestic investment, the government should focus on short-term policy that optimizes the investment environment, encourages private investment, and reduces the impact of the weak international economy of Taiwan. Long-term policy must solve the structural problems of our industrial structure and aging population. But the moment President Tsai took office, she put labor disputes first. She personally encouraged strikes and protests. She adopted exactly the opposite approach. This was particularly unwise. Besides, economic restructuring is a huge project. One can devote ten years to it and still have nothing to show.

The new government faces widespread discontent. As it attempts to grow the economy, it must ask itself: Is it applying force in the wrong place?

政府拚經濟是否用錯洪荒之力？
2016-09-05 聯合報

台灣民意基金會的民調顯示，民眾對新政府執政百日的整體評分僅六十一分，勉強及格，其中逾四成五對政府經濟成績不滿意。該基金會董事長游盈隆說，不滿意經濟表現，是總統聲望急速下滑的主因，也意味蜜月期將結束。親綠的民調結果尚且如此，其他機構民調則更嚴重，皆直指經濟、兩岸是民眾最感不滿之處。

過去一年半，台灣的經濟猶如困在見不到光的長長隧道中，景氣燈號一直難脫藍燈，出口連十七衰，是史上最長衰退期。國人對經濟衰疲的不耐，已直接投射在國民黨選情的大崩壞上，現在又逐漸轉向對民進黨的失望。蔡總統把「經濟結構轉型」列為五大施政項目之首，顯示她深知人民對重振經濟的期盼；但新政府連連突槌，忙於收拾危機，民眾幾乎看不到任何拚經濟的作為。以民眾失望情緒的膨脹速度，以陸客衰退對觀光產業衝擊的不斷擴大，人們對林全內閣的不滿，恐怕很快會直撲蔡英文而去。

蔡英文無法有效統合「黨」和「政」這兩匹馬車，又不能改變台灣長期以來「政治掛帥」的文化，這是新政府拚經濟難有起色的主因。閣揆林全本身雖是財金專家，但他對經濟、產業並不熟稔；加上政治手感欠缺，百日來他一直困陷在四面八方而來的大小事件中，與各項爭議糾纏奮戰，根本無暇回神照顧財經事務。也因此，林全內閣雖有「財經內閣」之名，但財經發動機始終未能點火。

此外，林內閣任命不少藍營官員，原是寄望「老將帶新人」，做到政策無縫接軌；然而，蔡政府的路線卻從「用人不疑」一路向「勿用疑人」傾倒。林全原寄望國發會主委陳添枝打造「大國發會」，成為行政院最權威、縝密的幕僚機構；但陳添枝在新政府角色尷尬，「老藍男」的指指點點，使他無法像其他「正綠旗」的政委般有效號令各部會。也因此，國發會跨部會協調財經政策的功能未能彰顯，拚經濟的成果自然大打折扣。

其餘三個財金部會——經濟部、財政部與金管會，則是「若有似無」的存在。經濟部長李世光一直忙著替蔡總統的「非核家園」政策找尋實踐路徑，經濟部從上到下一直圍繞著能源議題打轉，讓外界質疑李世光究竟是「能源部長」還是「經濟部長」？也因此，對於民眾關切的「經濟結構轉型」問題，經濟部反而毫無著墨。財政部與金管會兩位首長則始終罕見露臉，直到兆豐銀遭美國重罰後引發輿論譁然，兩人仍未站上第一線積極處理，「把官做小了」是其致命傷。

財金部會表現不佳，加上新政府在處理勞工七天例休及罷工等議題上的瞻前顧後，想要兩面討好卻反而加劇了勞資對立，勞、資雙方都對政府的立場打了大問號。更值得注意的是，在民調直落之際，行政院倉促提出「擴大投資方案」，希望提振經濟表現；但其核心計畫是提出三千四百億元的國營事業擴大投資方案，卻顯有「不對症下藥」之憂。原因是，目前是民間游資太多，找不到去處，政府政策應該引領民間投資方向才對，怎麼反而回頭擴大國營事業投資？再仔細檢視其計畫內容，連台電向國外「租用」緊急發電設備都列為投資計畫之一，可見此方案不僅缺乏遠見，更有灌水之嫌。

要提振國內投資，政府短期施政主軸應著重於優化投資環境，鼓勵民間投資，減少國際景氣疲弱對台灣的衝擊；中長期施政，則是要解決我國產業結構與人口老化等結構性問題。但蔡總統一上台，就先把勞資爭議推上檯面，親自鼓勵罷工和抗爭，都是反其道而行的作法，殊為不智。更別提，經濟結構轉型是鉅大工程，耗費十年都未必能有所成。

面對民怨之海，新政府首要檢討：拚經濟的「洪荒之力」是否用錯了地方？

President Tsai Must Confront Cross-Strait Differences

President Tsai Must Confront Cross-Strait Differences
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 2, 2016

Executive Summary: The government has announced the appointment of a new SEF chairman. We hope President Tsai will make a genuine effort to improve cross-Strait relations, and enable the two sides to coexist. She must not keep Taiwan mired in hostility and self-pity. She must seize the opportunity to expand onto the Mainland. Unless Taiwan finds its own path toward prosperity, it can only continue its current decline.

Full Text Below:

Taiwan Independence sentiment is on the rise. President Tsai has characterized the younger generation as "naturally inclined towards Taiwan independence". But a closer look at Taiwan independence history reveals that it is an entirely artificial development. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have bee separated from each other for over half a century. Economic growth and institutional differences have inevitably distanced the two sides psychologically. But lest we forget, the differences in economic development and culture between the northern and southern regions of the Mainland, or between the eastern and western regions of the Mainland, far exceed the differences between Xiamen and central and southern Taiwan, or Shanghai and northern Taiwan.

In other words, cross-Strait cultural and economic differences, along with psychological barriers, do not constitute a sufficient condition for separation, nor do they support the legitimacy of Taiwan independence. Those who trumpet “natural Taiwan independence” deliberately ignore far greater differences on the Mainland. They cherry pick the most prominent cross-Strait differences. What they term “natural”, is entirely artificial.

As for the conflict between the two sides, it is much ado about nothing. Cross-Strait conflict was never the result of hostility between the people on Taiwan and the people on the Mainland. It was the result of the Chinese Civil War. Even Taiwan independence advocates admit that when Japan was defeated in 1945, people on Taiwan eagerly looked forward to Taiwan's return to the motherland.

Unfortunately, the 2/28 Incident and the White Terror on Taiwan provoked hatred against the Kuomintang. But even then, the conflict was merely a clash between the people and an authoritarian regime. It was not an “ethnic conflict” between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Still less was it a conflict with the Mainland, or people on the Mainland. The hostility and hatred is totally misdirected.

In 1949, the Republic of China central government retreated to Taiwan. It hoped to retake the Mainland by force. Taiwan became its anti-Communist base of operations in a continuation of the Chinese Civil War. It was not a conflict between the Mainland and Taiwan. During this period, the Mainland and Taiwan may have clashed militarily. But the military action was not directed against the people of Taiwan. It was directed against the Kuomintang regime.

If history were reenacted on another playing field, such as Hainan Island, the confrontation between the KMT and the CCP would still have played out. But the conflict between the Mainland and Taiwan would not have materialized. That is indisputable fact.

More importantly, during the authoritarian era, the KMT relentlessly blasted the CCP, and turned the CCP into an object of hatred on Taiwan. Following democratization, this artificially incited hostility should have died down, as the KMT progressively reconciled with the Mainland. Unfortunately some people on Taiwan intensified this hatred of the CCP. They even expanded it to include the entire Mainland and everyone living on the Mainland. This is a cruel historical irony. But it was clearly created artificially.

This historical irony began with Lee Teng-hui, who drove out the old Kuomintang forces in an attempt to reshape the KMT and Taiwan. He began a campaign of "de-Sinicization". He drove out the old KMT and Mainland forces to consolidate his own power. The Qiandaohu Incident provided a perfect opportunity for him to incite hatred on Taiwan against the Mainland. People who once identified with the Mainland and the CCP, now began to feel alienated. Chen Shui-bian added fuel to the fire, and Ma Ying-jeou passively allowed the trend to continue. This allowed the spark of Taiwan independence to develop into a prairie fire.

Over the long term, the two sides must reconcile. Taiwan must find a way to coexist with the Mainland. Anything else will merely accelerate capital flight and the brain drain, and Taiwan's future will be grim. As Frank Hsieh noted, the DPP has no historical grievances with the CCP. If anything, they should be better able to establish a new cross-Strait relationship. Unfortunately DPP leaders lack historical vision. They lack the capacity to right wrongs. They remain mired in old hostilities. They are unable to break free from their distorted and outdated view of Taiwan independence history. They dare not share their views with their supporters. Instead they allow themselves to be hijacked by lies, and remain the biggest obstacle to progress.

Since the Tsai government took office, differences between the CCP and the DPP over the nature of cross-Strait relations have led to new Cold War style confrontation. In fact, the gap between the two sides is not unbridgeable. The controversy between the two sides is not unresolvable. President Tsai pledged publicly that she would deal with cross-Strait issues on the basis of the historical fact of the 1992 talks, the Republic of China Constitution, and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. She should be free from the conflict between the KMT and the CCP, free from the conflict between people from different provinces, and should be able to settle cross-Strait issues based on constitutional logic.

The Mainland adheres to One China the 1992 Consensus. It expects the DPP government to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Only then can the two sides resume official exchanges. Recently however, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun spoke to young people from Taiwan. He said the Taiwan side tends to stress the “different interpretations” part of the 1992 Consensus. He said this is something the two sides can talk about. He later clarified, so we cannot read too much into an offhand remark. But as long as the DPP is willing to speak clearly, the Mainland is willing to keep an open mind, and preserve cross-Strait peace.

The government has announced the appointment of a new SEF chairman. We hope President Tsai will make a genuine effort to improve cross-Strait relations, and enable the two sides to coexist. She must not keep Taiwan mired in hostility and self-pity. She must seize the opportunity to expand onto the Mainland. Unless Taiwan finds its own path toward prosperity, it can only continue its current decline.

期待蔡總統積極面對兩岸分歧
2016/9/2 中國時報

台獨日盛，蔡總統更以「天然獨」稱呼年輕世代，但細究台獨的歷史脈絡，不難發現其中人造的性質。固然兩岸長達半世紀隔絕，加上經濟發展先後與制度上的差異，彼此在心理上難免存在疏離。但別忘了，大陸南北方或東西部之間，經濟發展程度及文化的差異，要遠比廈門與台灣中南部，或上海與台灣北部的差距更大。

換句話說，兩岸文化、經濟的差異和心理隔閡，並不構成分離的充分條件，也不足以支撐台獨的正當性。更何況台獨原生論者，還刻意忽視大陸的多元性，只揀取差異較大的部分來形塑兩岸差異。所謂原生，不過還是人為建構。

至於兩岸之間的矛盾衝突，更是庸人自擾。兩岸之所以會有矛盾衝突，並非台灣人與大陸人之間的敵對，而是國共內戰的結果。台獨主張者也承認，1945年日本戰敗之際，台灣人曾熱切歡呼回歸祖國懷抱。

只可惜後來二二八事件乃至白色恐怖激化了台灣本省人對國民黨的痛恨。但即便如此，這種矛盾的本質也應該是人民與威權政府間的矛盾，而不應該被詮釋成為本省人和外省人間的族群衝突，更不是與中國大陸和大陸人之間的衝突，這許多敵意和仇恨是找錯了對象。

進一步說，1949年中華民國中央政府撤退來台，一直希望武力反攻大陸，並以台灣為反共建國基地，其本質仍然是國共內戰的延續，而非大陸與台灣間的矛盾。在此期間，大陸雖然與台灣存在軍事衝突，但並不是針對台灣人的軍事行動，而是針對國民黨政權。

假若歷史可以變換發生的場域，譬如海南島，那麼國共對抗仍會存在，但中共、中國大陸和台灣間的矛盾就不會出現，其道理也就在此。

更值得台灣人反思的是，威權時代國民黨長期對中共進行批判，讓台灣人對中共產生敵意。民主化之後這種人為建構的敵意本應就此解構，國民黨就逐漸與大陸和解，反而是一些台灣人更加強化對中共的仇視，甚至將之擴大到對整個大陸乃至中國的敵意，不得不說是歷史的弔詭，但顯然也是人為因素所導致。

歷史的弔詭從李登輝開始，他在排除舊國民黨力量後，企圖重新塑造國民黨與台灣，他採取了「去中國」的路線，同時擠壓並排出老國民黨與大陸的影響力，以鞏固自己的權力。千島湖事件給了他良機，可以挑動台灣民眾對大陸的敵意，讓原本只是敵視中共，但對大陸和中國仍有認同感和歸屬感的台灣人開始產生疏離感。此後經歷扁時代的推波助瀾以及馬時代的放任自流，台獨星星之火才發展成為燎原之勢。

就長期發展而言，兩岸必須和解，台灣也要找出與大陸長治久安之道，否則資金與人才將加速外流，前景必定困頓。正如謝長廷所言，民共之間並無歷史情仇，應該擁有更廣闊的空間來開創兩岸新局。無奈民進黨領導者欠缺歷史視野，更沒有撥亂反正的心胸，只能讓自己沉陷於舊有的敵意結構中，既不敢擺脫老台獨的錯誤史觀，也不敢跟自己的支持者溝通，讓自己被錯誤綁架，成為前進的最大障礙。

蔡英文政府執政以來，由於民共在兩岸關係性質問題上的差異，兩岸進入冷對抗關係，但實際上，民共雙方的差距並非遙不可及，爭議亦非不可解。蔡總統公開表示，將在九二會談的歷史事實，及《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》的政治基礎上處理兩岸問題。這代表她已跳脫出國共矛盾、省籍衝突等陳舊的干擾因素，讓兩岸問題回歸憲政邏輯。

大陸固然堅持兩岸一中與九二共識，要求民進黨政府承認九二共識，兩岸官方交流才可能恢復。不過，最近國台辦主任張志軍在與台灣青年會談時曾口頭表達，台灣對九二共識強調的「各表」，兩岸應該談起來。雖然後來做了澄清，我們也不能過度解釋口頭的隨性談話，但只要民進黨在兩岸一個國家有較清楚的表達，我們深信大陸會願意抱持開放的態度，盡量維繫兩岸的和平發展。

新任海基會董事長已經發布，期待蔡總統以積極態度面對兩岸關係，表達願以進取態度，與大陸協商出兩岸相處之道。不要讓台灣繼續深陷在人為塑造的敵對氛圍中自怨自艾，既抓不住大陸的發展機會，又找不出真正屬於自己的發展道路，最終只能不斷沉淪。

Help the Green Camp Assess Tsai-Lin Government Successes and Failures

Help the Green Camp Assess Tsai-Lin Government Successes and Failures
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Green Camp criticism of the Tsai government has intensified. Green camp members are even referring to Tsai Ing-wen as a “hun jun”, i.e., a “fatuous and self-indulgent ruler”. Taiwan independence elder Wu Li-pei is livid. He says that "If Lin Chuan does not step down, Tsai Ing-wen is done for". He echoed the sentiments of many green camp members. But would replacing Lin Chuan really cure what ails the Tsai government? That is far too naive.

Full Text Below:

Green Camp criticism of the Tsai government has intensified. Green camp members are even referring to Tsai Ing-wen as a “hun jun”, i.e., a “fatuous and self-indulgent ruler”. Taiwan independence elder Wu Li-pei is livid. He says that "If Lin Chuan does not step down, Tsai Ing-wen is done for". He echoed the sentiments of many green camp members. But would replacing Lin Chuan really cure what ails the Tsai government? That is far too naive.

President Tsai has been in office 100 days. But no one is happy. Most people think she has departed from mainstream consensus. The blue camp accuses her of carrying out a political vendetta. The green camp disapproves of her "old, blue, male" cabinet appointments. Beijing is unhappy with her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Everyone is displeased with her. The Tsai Lin government's response is either too slow or too self-contradictory. The new government's halo has already lost its luster. A government cannot please everyone. No government can stonewall indefinitely. That much is abundantly clear.

Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to take a different path than Chen Shui-bian. But the problem is, she cannot decide what path to take. As a result, she is encountering obstacles all along the way. Many green camp members wax nostalgic over the early days of Chen Shui-bian's rule. They want Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the old green camp path. They assume only that can restore the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's prestige. Chen Shui-bian's path has been proven a failure. Nevertheless it haunts many green camp members like an apparition. Even younger generation green camp members recall Chen Shui-bian's political trickery with fondness. It now remains to be seen whether Tsai Ing-wen possesses the vision and wisdom to change course. If she doesn't, then all she can do is follow meekly in Chen Shui-bian's footsteps, and lead Taiwan to an even greater disaster.

The first indicator is Lin Chuan. Will he become "Tang Fei the Second"? Taiwan independence elements are blasting Lin Chuan. But Tsai Ing-wen is unlikely to throw Lin Chuan to the wolves. At least not immediately. Lin Chuan is more like a partner to Tsai Ying-wen. Tang Fei was more a “guest” and “shield” to Chen Shui-bian. The relationships are quite different. Also, dumping Lin Chuan would probably leave Tsai Ing-wen without a hand to play. Her plight would be even more desperate. When Chen Shui-bian pushed "giant rock" Tang Fei out of his way, all his rhetoric about "a government for all the people", and "a new centrist path" fell by the wayside. Tsai Ing-wen is unlikely to make the same mistake.

The second indicator is whether Tsai can reconcile the differences between the “Tsai-Lin government” and a “DPP government”. Since taking office, Tsai Ing-wen has been struggling to maintain a relationship between the party and the government, but with little success. Differences between the party and the government remain and often lead to clashes. Tsai Ing-wen has given many younger people government jobs. But this has not eased frictions. In short, current Tsai government personnel appointments have not moved the machinery of state. They have failed to meet public expectations. Even if Tsai fails to replace Lin Chuan, she must appoint better people to the cabinet. Otherwise the tail will continue to wag the dog, and the Tsai government will continue to be hijacked by extremist forces.

The third indicator is Tsai Ing-wen's ability to reflect on her own path. The Lin Chuan cabinet has disappointed the public. But those whom the green camp wants to step down, include the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of MAC. All of them are under the President's direct command. Is this a matter of politics, or a matter of decision-making ability? That has yet to be determined. In fact, during the her first 100 days, Tsai Ying-wen directly or indirectly intervened in affairs large and small. Her micro-management has led to confusion over authority and responsibility. Pressure groups have overreached and undermined the rule of law. On the surface, the government has resolved a whole host of problems. But endless complications will ensue, making it ever more difficult to implement fair policies. Tsai Ing-wen relied on pressure groups to seize power. She is now returning the favor. But if one's goal is a sound civil society, one cannot afford to shoot holes in the rule of law. Otherwise one is bound to fall short.

Wu Li-pei's fate will not be Tsai Ing-wen's fate. Tsai Ing-wen's fate will not be determined by whether Lin Chuan goes or stays. Just what sort of government do the green camp and Taiwan independence forces want? Even they cannot say. But careful review of the Tsai government's first 100 days, shows that "green camp ecumenism" is not the answer. If Tsai Ing-wen does not want her administration to go down the tubes, she had better be clear on who is leading her around by the nose.

聯合／幫綠營重新盤點蔡林政府功過
2016-09-01 03:41 聯合報 聯合報社論

最近，綠營對蔡政府的批評聲浪越拉越高，連「昏君」的重話都脫口而出。獨派大老吳澧培更是怒火沖天，指名道姓「林全不下台，蔡英文沒有明天」；此話，恐怕道出了許多綠營人士的心聲。但是，換掉林全，蔡政府的病症就能霍然而癒嗎？這種想法未免太過天真。

蔡英文總統執政百日，其實各方都不滿意。一般民眾認為她偏離了全民的主軸，藍營批評她專搞鬥爭清算，綠營認為「老藍男」內閣所用非人，北京則不滿她拒絕承認九二共識。面對這四面八方紛來沓至的不滿，蔡林政府的因應不是過於緩慢，就是陷入髮夾彎，新政光環因此快速磨損。施政不能一味討好，也不能光靠硬拗，由此可見。

目前主要的問題是，蔡英文企圖走一條不同於陳水扁的執政路線，卻不知路徑何在，因此一路摸索頻遇荊棘。另一方面，許多綠營人士則仍迷戀陳水扁執政早期的「風光」，希望把蔡英文拉回以綠營為中心的老路，以為如此才能光大民進黨的執政威望。事實上，陳水扁路線早已證明是失敗，但它仍像鬼魅般盤踞在綠營人士心頭，連年輕一代幕僚也還在懷念陳水扁耍點小技即能讓全國傾倒的輝煌時光。現在，就看蔡英文能否有足夠的瞻矚和智慧自我調整，如果不能，她恐怕只能選擇向陳水扁路線偏倚，而那恐怕就是台灣更大的災厄。

第一項指標，是林全會不會變成「唐飛第二」。儘管獨派連續砲打林全，蔡英文應不至於立即將林全當成犧牲供品；原因是，其一，林全和蔡英文比較像是夥伴關係，與唐飛之於陳水扁是「客卿」及「擋箭牌」關係大不相同；其二，拋棄林全，蔡英文手中恐怕也沒有第二張好牌可打，情況只會更為棘手。何況，當年陳水扁搬開唐飛這塊「大石頭」之後，他夸夸其談的「全民政府」和「新中間路線」也就圖窮匕現，一路破功。蔡英文大概不會奉這種失敗的經驗為師。

第二個指標，是蔡英文有沒有能力解決「蔡林政府」和「民進黨政府」之間「形影脫離」的關係。上任以來，蔡英文試圖在「黨」和「政」之間維持一定的並駕關係，但顯然並不成功；黨和政的扞格不僅始終存在，而且時常互相牽制。蔡英文雖安排了相當數量的年輕世代進入政府擔任機要職位，卻未發揮潤滑效用。簡言之，目前蔡政府的人事結構，無法順利推動偌大的國家機器，因此難以滿足人民的期待。就這點而言，即使不撤換林全，內閣人事也有必要再作結構上的強化；否則，蔡政府就會不斷出現「尾巴搖狗」現象，一直被極端勢力牽著走。

第三個指標，是蔡英文對自己路線和能力的反省。林全內閣表現雖然讓人失望，但綠營點名應該下台的首長，包括國防部、外交部、陸委會等，其實都是總統直接指揮的部會。這究竟是政治屬性的問題，還是元首決策品質欠佳，必須加以區辨。事實上，上任百日來，蔡英文直接或間接地插手各種大小事務，不僅導致權責混淆，更是治絲益棼。其中，包括對若干公民團體或社運團體的過度傾俯，已到了踰越法治及破壞體制的地步；表面上雖收拾了一個眼前問題，卻可能帶來無窮後遺症，也讓施政公平愈發難以落實。蔡英文在相當程度上是靠著公民運動之助而取得政權，因此願意勤於回饋；然而，如果要塑造健全的公民社會，卻不斷向法制鑿洞，結果必將功虧一簣。

吳澧培的明天，當然不會是蔡英文的明天；而蔡英文的明天，當然也不僅繫於林全的去留。綠營或獨派到底想要什麼樣的政府，他們其實也說不清楚；但是，仔細盤點一下蔡英文執政百日的功過，這顯然不是走回「綠色大一統」的路線即能解決。蔡英文如果不想執政顛顛簸簸一路下滑，她得想清楚誰在牽著自己的鼻子走。