Hu Six Points: Innovations and Regrets
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2012
Summary: Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report. Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
Full Text below:
Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report.
His oral report reiterated "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." He stressed "the promotion the peaceful reunification per Jiang Zemin's Eight Point Proposal." But the written report, which was not read out loud, used milder more rational language. "I hope the two sides [of the Strait] can work together, explore cross-strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, make reasonable arrangements, discuss the creation of a military confidence building mechanism, and negotiate a cross-Strait peace agreement." Hu wrote, "Although the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one China has never changed ... the two sides should continue to oppose Taiwan independence, and continue to affirm the 1992 consensus ... "
The oral presentation and the written report can be compared. The oral report is almost an exact copy of the report to the 17th National Congress. Most of the passages are word for word copies. The standard cited is the old 1995 Jiang Eight Points cross-Strait framework. It issued a coarse declaration. Its theme was "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." The written report showed greater subtlety. It reiterated the Hu Six Points of 2008. Its themes were "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they remain parts of one China," and "[We must] explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
For the moment it is hard to know why Hu Jintao issued two versions of the cross-Strait report, one oral, and one written. Perhaps Hu wanted to distinguish between a "rhetorical edition" and an "operational edition." Perhaps Hu wanted his Hu Six Points to defer to the Jiang Eight Points. Perhaps Hu merely wanted to save time. Perhaps it was akin to the March 26, 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, Hu Jintao spoke of "one China, different interpretations." But afterwards this statement could be found only in the English version of Xinhua News Agency news reports. It was missing from the Chinese version.
Hu Jintao played a key role in changing the cross-Strait strategic scenario. The Hu Six Points is a major innovation. Its impact on cross-Strait relations far exceeds the impact of policies advanced by past CCP leaders. It surpassed the impact of the Jiang Eight Points, never mind the Yeh Nine Articles. Hu Jintao's innovations in cross-strait policy began with "peaceful development" during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. It evolved into "one China, different interpretations"during the March 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, into the Hu Six Points on New Years Eve 2008, and into the "two sides' existing provisions (constitutions)" bottom line during the Wu-Hu meeting if March 2012. Hu's statements reveal a unique and consistent thread. They recognize that the "circumstances are special, and the nation has yet to be reunified." In the past, Beijing did not accept the idea that the nation "has yet to be reunified." They equated "yet to be reunified" with "divided." Hu acknowledged that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they still belong to one China." Hu urged the two sides to "explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," including military confidence building mechanisms and a cross-Strait peace agreement. To use the language of the previous ARATS chairman Wang Daohan, the Hu Six Points can be considered an "in progress form of one China."
The final point in the Hu Six Points is the ending of hostilities, and the signing of a peace agreement. Since 2008, we have yet to end cross-Strait hostilities. We have yet to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. There are two reasons why we have not. One. The Ma administration was hesitant. It failed to do everything it could. It was insufficiently supportive of further improvements in cross-Strait relations. Two. The Hu regime advanced the aforementioned rational perspective on cross-Strait relations. But it failed to implement them at a practical level. For example, the Bush-Hu Hotline reference to "one China, different interpretations" was reported only in English. For example, it remained taboo to refer to "the two sides' existing provisions" as "constitutions." For example, Beijing referred to "exploring cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." But if refused to name political relations under these special circumstances. These political relations were relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. For example, Beijing said "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of one China." But why did it refuse to equate this "in progress form of one China" with the "big roof concept of China?"
The Hu Six Points thought of everything. But it failed to do may of them. In March of this year, during the Wu-Hu meeting, the two sides began discussing the parameters of "current provisions," i.e., the one China constitution. Some members of the DPP even advocated "constitutional consensus." This shows that the two sides can work together and support "one China, different interpretations under a big roof concept of China." If they do, they may be able to establish "political relations under these special circumstances." They may be able to establish a military confidence building mechanism or sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. They may be able to establish an "in progress form of one China." Isn't this what the Hu Six Points were aiming for? So why can't we do it?
Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
胡六點的發明與遺憾
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.09 01:47 am
中共總書記胡錦濤昨日十八大政治報告論及兩岸關係部分，口頭報告與書面報告呈現兩個版本。
口頭報告反覆申論「和平統一，一國兩制」，又強調「推動祖國和平統一進程的八項主張」（江八點）；但在未公開宣讀出來的部分書面報告中，則以比較平緩理智的筆觸寫道：「希望（兩岸）雙方共同努力，探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排；商談建立軍事安全互信機制……協商達成兩岸和平協議。」又道：「大陸和台灣雖然尚未統一，但兩岸同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……兩岸雙方應恪守反對台獨、堅持九二識的共同立場……。」
將口頭報告與書面報告對照可見：口頭報告幾乎完全複製十七大報告的版本，甚至多處原句照抄，所標舉的是儼然「江八點」（一九九五年）以前兩岸政策的陳舊架構，呈現出粗糙的宣示性，而以「和平統一，一國兩制」為軸心；但書面報告則呈現出比較細膩的操作性，主要是在重複演繹「胡六點」（二○○八年），著重在「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」及「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等思維。
目前難悉，胡錦濤為何要將兩岸報告分做口頭及書面兩種版本，也許是「宣示面」與「操作面」的區隔，也許是表示「胡六點」對「江八點」的謙讓，或許只是為了節省時間；這有如二○○八年三月廿六日，胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中宣示了「一中各表」，但事後僅見於新華社的英文稿中，中文版則闕如。
胡錦濤是扭轉兩岸大局的關鍵角色，「胡六點」則是重大發明，對兩岸關係的影響及開展，其作用遠逾過去所有中共領導人的政策主張，勝過「江八點」，更別論「葉九條」。胡錦濤對兩岸政策的發明，由二○○五年「連胡會」的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「雙方現行規定（憲法）底線論」，其中有一獨特且一貫的脈絡，即是接受「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」（過去北京不接受「尚未統一」的事實，認為尚未統一即是分裂），且認為「兩岸雖然尚未統一」，但仍然可以「同屬一個中國」，並主張研議探討對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」作出安排，此一安排可以是《（國家尚未統一的）軍事安全互信機制》，也或許是《（國家尚未統一的）兩岸和平協議》。若以前海協會會長汪道涵的語言來說，「胡六點」的思想可以說也是一種：「現在進行式的一個中國」。
胡六點的最後一點是：結束敵對狀態，簽定和平協議。自二○○八年以來，「結束（兩岸）敵對狀態」差堪作到，但「簽定（兩岸）和平協議」則功虧一簣。原因有二：一、馬政府瞻顧猶豫的風格與未盡人意的治理政績，皆不足支持兩岸關係更進一步；二、胡政權徒有前述理智貫通的思想體系，但在操作層面未見大開大闔，例如「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」僅見英文版，又如已經論及「雙方現行規定」卻諱稱「憲法」，再如研議「國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」卻不直指這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」，即中華民國與中華人民共和國之間的「特殊政治關係」，至於說「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，卻何以不直說這個「現在進行式的一個中國」，即是「大屋頂中國」？
胡六點都想到了，但都做不到。至今年三月「吳胡會」，雙方的論述已經走到「以現行規定（一中憲法）為準則」的地步，而民進黨內亦有「憲法共識」的主張；在在顯示，兩岸若能共同支撐起「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」，即可能建構起「特殊情況下的政治關係」，就可能簽定軍事安全互信機制或兩岸和平協議，也就可能出現「現在進行式的一個中國」。胡六點難道不是這樣想的嗎？但何以做不到？
胡錦濤在卸任的最後一次政治報告中，竟將「胡六點」的重大發明留在書面報告上而未宣讀出來，難道繼任者也將使其徒留空言而成歷史遺憾？
Thursday, November 8, 2012
Obama's Second Term Challenges: Implications for Politics on Taiwan
Obama's Second Term Challenges:
Implications for Politics on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2012
Summary: Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
Full Text below:
Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
The number of incumbent US presidents who have lost their bid for re-election can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Obama waged a hard fought campaign, not because his opponent Romney was too strong, but because he was too cavalier. The Republicans successfully incited discontent with the status quo. During the first TV debate in particular, Obama seemed as if he wasn't even there. He could not clearly outline his economic recovery plan. Many Americans saw his sloppy side. Many woke up and realized little would change over the next four years. Many entrepreneurs began looking to Romney.
High unemployment, low economic growth, and capital outflows, are Obama's worst sore points. The global economy has been a drag on the US economy. But in this respect the US is just like Taiwan. People whose standard of living is declining are not about to swallow "international factors" as an excuse. Romney was all set to issue a concession speech. But when someone intoned "economic downturn," Romney suddenly became more attractive. He suddenly posed a serious threat to Obama. Fortunately Hurricane Sandy disaster relief gave Obama the opportunity to display non-partisanship and to act presidential. This turned the American people's focus away from the economy for several days, and toward Obama's ability to lead the country. Romney meanwhile, who threatened to cut disaster relief funds from the federal budget, lost points.
This U.S. presidential election was a nail-biter. First, the campaign focused almost entirely on fewer than ten "swing states." Both parties deployed massive resources attacking each other and getting out the vote. They threw money at the problem. They fought for every vote. Secondly, people were concerned that a too close race would make it impossible to be sure who won. They feared a repeat of 2000, when Bush's narrow margin over Gore incited a major controversy. The result was a "minority president" who received fewer popular votes, who won only because he received more Electoral College votes.
These two phenomena are the result of the Electoral College's "winner-take-all" arrangement. During the last election, Obama won 53% of the vote. This time he won 68%. Three hundred sixty-five electors voted. This time he and Romney won about the same number of popular votes. But Obama won by over one hundred Electoral College votes. U.S. elections appear to be direct elections, but are in fact indirect elections. This was intended to ensure political stability. But it also reduced the size of the battlefield. During the last few days Obama concentrated his campaign efforts in the largest swing states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Sure enough, he won those states.
The composition of the House and Senate have remained the same. But the situation Obama faces today is very different from the one he faced four years ago. Four years ago, George W. Bush was rude, vulgar, and arrogant. He dispatched troops everywhere. He destroyed the image and ideals of the United States. These urgently need repair. Obama offered a fresh image and a multi-ethnic background. He had eloquence. He offered people healing and comfort. After four years in office, the international community considered Obama's foreign policy friendly and balanced. But at home, he encountered powerful Republican obstructionism. All he could do in terms of policy was to apply patches. It was hard to get anything done. Worse still, he found himself caught between the European debt crisis and the global recession. The United States resorted to quantitative easing, three times, but still could not stop the continued economic decline. In the eyes of the voters, his eloquence was now mere flash. His overseas troop withdrawal and medical reform was merely sacrificing today for the sake of tomorrow. Public attention shifted from abstract notions of national pride to concrete issues of economic livelihood.
Obama operates in an orderly manner. He seldom misspeaks. On issues of ethics and values, he has been consistent. He has not changed with the winds. But in the eyes of the electorate this was not enough. Obama was the first black president. He took an historic step for American democracy. During his second term he must revitalize the U.S. economy. He must help America become an egalitarian utopia. To achieve this, he must challenge himself.
Look at the U.S. presidential election from Taiwan. The public must have a feeling of deja vu. In January of this year, Ma Ying-jeou ran as an incumbent against Tsai Ing-wen. He too was attacked for his political record. The pre-election polls were also evenly matched. But in the end he won by six percentage points. On Taiwan and in the United States, pre-election polls are often misleading. People vote with greater deliberation than they answer telephone polls. Obama and Ma Ying-jeou's re-election reflect this phenomenon.
Leave aside personal factors. A political party's quality and style are also important considerations. During the U.S. presidential election, Romney received high marks as a presidential candidate. Voters appreciated his understanding of the economy. The media praised his non-partisanship during his term as governor. But in recent years the Republican Party has become increasingly conservative. It has become more like the Tea Party. It lacks tolerance for abortion, gays, and immigrants. It resorts to obstructionism in Congress at the drop of a hat, Voters fear that if the Republican Party take over the executive branch, it will lead to extremism. This is very similar to Taiwan. People worry that the DPP's hatred for Mainland China will cause lead to political instability.
After such a fierce battle, many fear that the United States will become even more divided, politically, economically, and socially. They hope Obama will address this problem. His re-election means greater responsibility and greater commitment. Only if one understands this point, will his victory make sense. When Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected earlier this year, he said, "One day of celebration is enough." A mere 10 months later, he was a lame duck. The economy did him in. On this point, Ma Ying-jeou surely knows how Obama feels.
看歐巴馬挑戰連任，反思台灣朝野競合
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.08 01:49 am
比起四年前橫掃全美的超級人氣，歐巴馬在這次大選中贏得艱苦，這說明無論民主的風光多麼美好，仍須在民眾善變的口味中不斷接受挑戰。作為世界的領導者，歐巴馬的表現中規中矩；但作為美國元首，許多民眾不滿意他的施政。在未來四年的第二屆任期中，他勢須在經濟上拿出更多成績，才能使他所承諾的「美國夢」，不致流失破滅。
美國歷來現任總統尋求連任失利的例子屈指可數，而歐巴馬此役打得如此艱辛，原因其實不在對手羅姆尼太強，而在他自己過於輕忽，讓共和黨成功地撩起了人民對現狀不滿的情緒。尤其在首場電視辯論，他近乎失神的表現，甚至無法清晰勾勒重振經濟的藍圖，讓許多美國人目睹其漫不經心的一面。這點，讓不少民眾驚覺未來四年改變的可能性不大，因而轉寄希望於企業家出身的羅姆尼身上。
高失業、低成長及投資外流，是歐巴馬最大的痛腳。儘管是受到全球景氣的牽累，但和台灣一樣，感受生活正在下降的民眾，很難接受「國際因素」這樣的解釋。因此，當「經濟欠佳」這個神祕咒語被啟動後，原已準備撰寫「落選聲明」的羅姆尼突然魅力大增，對歐巴馬構成嚴重威脅。所幸。珊蒂颶風的災後救援工作，讓歐巴馬有機會展現其「跨黨派」的總統高度，在最後數日將美國人民的焦點從經濟拉開，轉向整體治國能力。相形之下，曾揚言要把救災經費從聯邦預算中砍光的羅姆尼，就在此轉為失分。
這次美國大選的選情緊繃：一是選戰幾乎集中在十個不到的所謂「搖擺州」上，兩黨均部署了重兵廝殺及催票，撒下大把銀子，寸土必爭。二是擔心會導致總統難產，重演二○○○年布希對高爾因少數票差引發的爭議，並產生一個選民票得票較少、卻因選舉人團得票多而出線的「少數總統」。
這兩個現象，都是美國「選舉人團」制度中「贏者全拿」的設計造成的結果。上次選舉，歐巴馬拿到五成三的選民投票；換算成高達六成八、共三百六十五張的選舉人當選；這次他獲得的選民票和羅姆尼幾乎不相上下，但他在選舉人團票上卻多出上百張票。亦即，美國大選形式上看似直接選舉，但實質上卻是間接選舉，這是為了維持政治安定的設計，卻也造成了戰區過度集中的弊病。歐巴馬最後幾天在最大搖擺州俄亥俄州及威斯康辛州密集造勢，最後果然成功攻城掠地。
儘管參眾兩院在這次選舉基本維持平盤，但歐巴馬今天面對的形勢，和四年前已經大不相同。四年前，小布希的粗魯、庸俗、自大、四處出兵，讓美國的形象和理想破毀，亟待修補；歐巴馬則以其清新形象、多元族群背景，及雄辯滔滔的口才，提供了美國療傷止痛的安慰。四年的執政，歐巴馬在外交政策上以其友善、均衡，建立了不錯的國際評價；但在國內，他卻遇上共和黨強烈的抵制和杯葛，施政上只能縫縫補補，難有大建樹。更嚴重的是，夾在歐債風暴及世界景氣滑坡之間，美國三度採取量化寬鬆政策，仍阻止不了經濟的持續下滑。在這種情況下，他的好口才在選民眼裡變成了華而不實，他推動海外撤軍及醫療等改革則被視為捨近求遠；因為人們的關注，已經從抽象的國家驕傲轉向更現實的生計問題。
平實而論，歐巴馬的行事穩健，他甚少失言，在一些涉及道德及價值觀的問題上也都能保持一貫，不會隨風搖擺。但從選民的眼光看來，這些仍然不夠。歐巴馬當選首位黑人總統，為美國民主跨越的歷史性一步；他的第二任，則必須為振興美國經濟找到出路，讓美國成為均富而好禮的夢土。要實現這點，他必須對自己提出更嚴格的挑戰。
從台灣看美國大選，民眾一定有一種似曾相識的感覺。今年元月，馬英九以現任總統和蔡英文角逐大位時，也因政績備受攻擊，選前民調幾乎不相上下，最後選舉則以六個百分點之多勝出。不論台美，選前的民調都難稱虛偽，但人們最後的投票行為會比在電話民調上的答覆多出幾分慎思。從歐巴馬或馬英九的連任，都反映了這點。
除了個人因素外，政黨的整體素質及風格，也是選民的重要考量。以這次美國大選為例，羅姆尼作為總統候選人的評價其實不差，選民除看好他對經濟的理解，媒體對他擔任州長時期表現的「超越黨派」立場也頗表稱揚。然而，近些年共和黨的保守化、茶黨化取向，除了對墮胎、同志、移民等議題的缺乏寬容，更不時在國會作無理的杯葛，都使選民擔心共和黨掌政會將美國帶上偏激之路。這和台灣民眾憂慮民進黨的反中傾向會造成國家的不安定，似也如出一轍。
歷經激烈的一戰，很多人擔心美國在政治、經濟、社會各方面將更形分裂；這點，有待歐巴馬去修補。連任，意味著更多的責任及更大的承擔，必須看清這點，勝選才有意義。年初勝選連任時曾說過「高興一天就好」的馬英九，不到十月即瀕臨跛腳，就是敗在經濟；在這個議題上，馬英九儼然與歐巴馬同病相憐。
Implications for Politics on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2012
Summary: Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
Full Text below:
Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
The number of incumbent US presidents who have lost their bid for re-election can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Obama waged a hard fought campaign, not because his opponent Romney was too strong, but because he was too cavalier. The Republicans successfully incited discontent with the status quo. During the first TV debate in particular, Obama seemed as if he wasn't even there. He could not clearly outline his economic recovery plan. Many Americans saw his sloppy side. Many woke up and realized little would change over the next four years. Many entrepreneurs began looking to Romney.
High unemployment, low economic growth, and capital outflows, are Obama's worst sore points. The global economy has been a drag on the US economy. But in this respect the US is just like Taiwan. People whose standard of living is declining are not about to swallow "international factors" as an excuse. Romney was all set to issue a concession speech. But when someone intoned "economic downturn," Romney suddenly became more attractive. He suddenly posed a serious threat to Obama. Fortunately Hurricane Sandy disaster relief gave Obama the opportunity to display non-partisanship and to act presidential. This turned the American people's focus away from the economy for several days, and toward Obama's ability to lead the country. Romney meanwhile, who threatened to cut disaster relief funds from the federal budget, lost points.
This U.S. presidential election was a nail-biter. First, the campaign focused almost entirely on fewer than ten "swing states." Both parties deployed massive resources attacking each other and getting out the vote. They threw money at the problem. They fought for every vote. Secondly, people were concerned that a too close race would make it impossible to be sure who won. They feared a repeat of 2000, when Bush's narrow margin over Gore incited a major controversy. The result was a "minority president" who received fewer popular votes, who won only because he received more Electoral College votes.
These two phenomena are the result of the Electoral College's "winner-take-all" arrangement. During the last election, Obama won 53% of the vote. This time he won 68%. Three hundred sixty-five electors voted. This time he and Romney won about the same number of popular votes. But Obama won by over one hundred Electoral College votes. U.S. elections appear to be direct elections, but are in fact indirect elections. This was intended to ensure political stability. But it also reduced the size of the battlefield. During the last few days Obama concentrated his campaign efforts in the largest swing states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Sure enough, he won those states.
The composition of the House and Senate have remained the same. But the situation Obama faces today is very different from the one he faced four years ago. Four years ago, George W. Bush was rude, vulgar, and arrogant. He dispatched troops everywhere. He destroyed the image and ideals of the United States. These urgently need repair. Obama offered a fresh image and a multi-ethnic background. He had eloquence. He offered people healing and comfort. After four years in office, the international community considered Obama's foreign policy friendly and balanced. But at home, he encountered powerful Republican obstructionism. All he could do in terms of policy was to apply patches. It was hard to get anything done. Worse still, he found himself caught between the European debt crisis and the global recession. The United States resorted to quantitative easing, three times, but still could not stop the continued economic decline. In the eyes of the voters, his eloquence was now mere flash. His overseas troop withdrawal and medical reform was merely sacrificing today for the sake of tomorrow. Public attention shifted from abstract notions of national pride to concrete issues of economic livelihood.
Obama operates in an orderly manner. He seldom misspeaks. On issues of ethics and values, he has been consistent. He has not changed with the winds. But in the eyes of the electorate this was not enough. Obama was the first black president. He took an historic step for American democracy. During his second term he must revitalize the U.S. economy. He must help America become an egalitarian utopia. To achieve this, he must challenge himself.
Look at the U.S. presidential election from Taiwan. The public must have a feeling of deja vu. In January of this year, Ma Ying-jeou ran as an incumbent against Tsai Ing-wen. He too was attacked for his political record. The pre-election polls were also evenly matched. But in the end he won by six percentage points. On Taiwan and in the United States, pre-election polls are often misleading. People vote with greater deliberation than they answer telephone polls. Obama and Ma Ying-jeou's re-election reflect this phenomenon.
Leave aside personal factors. A political party's quality and style are also important considerations. During the U.S. presidential election, Romney received high marks as a presidential candidate. Voters appreciated his understanding of the economy. The media praised his non-partisanship during his term as governor. But in recent years the Republican Party has become increasingly conservative. It has become more like the Tea Party. It lacks tolerance for abortion, gays, and immigrants. It resorts to obstructionism in Congress at the drop of a hat, Voters fear that if the Republican Party take over the executive branch, it will lead to extremism. This is very similar to Taiwan. People worry that the DPP's hatred for Mainland China will cause lead to political instability.
After such a fierce battle, many fear that the United States will become even more divided, politically, economically, and socially. They hope Obama will address this problem. His re-election means greater responsibility and greater commitment. Only if one understands this point, will his victory make sense. When Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected earlier this year, he said, "One day of celebration is enough." A mere 10 months later, he was a lame duck. The economy did him in. On this point, Ma Ying-jeou surely knows how Obama feels.
看歐巴馬挑戰連任，反思台灣朝野競合
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.08 01:49 am
比起四年前橫掃全美的超級人氣，歐巴馬在這次大選中贏得艱苦，這說明無論民主的風光多麼美好，仍須在民眾善變的口味中不斷接受挑戰。作為世界的領導者，歐巴馬的表現中規中矩；但作為美國元首，許多民眾不滿意他的施政。在未來四年的第二屆任期中，他勢須在經濟上拿出更多成績，才能使他所承諾的「美國夢」，不致流失破滅。
美國歷來現任總統尋求連任失利的例子屈指可數，而歐巴馬此役打得如此艱辛，原因其實不在對手羅姆尼太強，而在他自己過於輕忽，讓共和黨成功地撩起了人民對現狀不滿的情緒。尤其在首場電視辯論，他近乎失神的表現，甚至無法清晰勾勒重振經濟的藍圖，讓許多美國人目睹其漫不經心的一面。這點，讓不少民眾驚覺未來四年改變的可能性不大，因而轉寄希望於企業家出身的羅姆尼身上。
高失業、低成長及投資外流，是歐巴馬最大的痛腳。儘管是受到全球景氣的牽累，但和台灣一樣，感受生活正在下降的民眾，很難接受「國際因素」這樣的解釋。因此，當「經濟欠佳」這個神祕咒語被啟動後，原已準備撰寫「落選聲明」的羅姆尼突然魅力大增，對歐巴馬構成嚴重威脅。所幸。珊蒂颶風的災後救援工作，讓歐巴馬有機會展現其「跨黨派」的總統高度，在最後數日將美國人民的焦點從經濟拉開，轉向整體治國能力。相形之下，曾揚言要把救災經費從聯邦預算中砍光的羅姆尼，就在此轉為失分。
這次美國大選的選情緊繃：一是選戰幾乎集中在十個不到的所謂「搖擺州」上，兩黨均部署了重兵廝殺及催票，撒下大把銀子，寸土必爭。二是擔心會導致總統難產，重演二○○○年布希對高爾因少數票差引發的爭議，並產生一個選民票得票較少、卻因選舉人團得票多而出線的「少數總統」。
這兩個現象，都是美國「選舉人團」制度中「贏者全拿」的設計造成的結果。上次選舉，歐巴馬拿到五成三的選民投票；換算成高達六成八、共三百六十五張的選舉人當選；這次他獲得的選民票和羅姆尼幾乎不相上下，但他在選舉人團票上卻多出上百張票。亦即，美國大選形式上看似直接選舉，但實質上卻是間接選舉，這是為了維持政治安定的設計，卻也造成了戰區過度集中的弊病。歐巴馬最後幾天在最大搖擺州俄亥俄州及威斯康辛州密集造勢，最後果然成功攻城掠地。
儘管參眾兩院在這次選舉基本維持平盤，但歐巴馬今天面對的形勢，和四年前已經大不相同。四年前，小布希的粗魯、庸俗、自大、四處出兵，讓美國的形象和理想破毀，亟待修補；歐巴馬則以其清新形象、多元族群背景，及雄辯滔滔的口才，提供了美國療傷止痛的安慰。四年的執政，歐巴馬在外交政策上以其友善、均衡，建立了不錯的國際評價；但在國內，他卻遇上共和黨強烈的抵制和杯葛，施政上只能縫縫補補，難有大建樹。更嚴重的是，夾在歐債風暴及世界景氣滑坡之間，美國三度採取量化寬鬆政策，仍阻止不了經濟的持續下滑。在這種情況下，他的好口才在選民眼裡變成了華而不實，他推動海外撤軍及醫療等改革則被視為捨近求遠；因為人們的關注，已經從抽象的國家驕傲轉向更現實的生計問題。
平實而論，歐巴馬的行事穩健，他甚少失言，在一些涉及道德及價值觀的問題上也都能保持一貫，不會隨風搖擺。但從選民的眼光看來，這些仍然不夠。歐巴馬當選首位黑人總統，為美國民主跨越的歷史性一步；他的第二任，則必須為振興美國經濟找到出路，讓美國成為均富而好禮的夢土。要實現這點，他必須對自己提出更嚴格的挑戰。
從台灣看美國大選，民眾一定有一種似曾相識的感覺。今年元月，馬英九以現任總統和蔡英文角逐大位時，也因政績備受攻擊，選前民調幾乎不相上下，最後選舉則以六個百分點之多勝出。不論台美，選前的民調都難稱虛偽，但人們最後的投票行為會比在電話民調上的答覆多出幾分慎思。從歐巴馬或馬英九的連任，都反映了這點。
除了個人因素外，政黨的整體素質及風格，也是選民的重要考量。以這次美國大選為例，羅姆尼作為總統候選人的評價其實不差，選民除看好他對經濟的理解，媒體對他擔任州長時期表現的「超越黨派」立場也頗表稱揚。然而，近些年共和黨的保守化、茶黨化取向，除了對墮胎、同志、移民等議題的缺乏寬容，更不時在國會作無理的杯葛，都使選民擔心共和黨掌政會將美國帶上偏激之路。這和台灣民眾憂慮民進黨的反中傾向會造成國家的不安定，似也如出一轍。
歷經激烈的一戰，很多人擔心美國在政治、經濟、社會各方面將更形分裂；這點，有待歐巴馬去修補。連任，意味著更多的責任及更大的承擔，必須看清這點，勝選才有意義。年初勝選連任時曾說過「高興一天就好」的馬英九，不到十月即瀕臨跛腳，就是敗在經濟；在這個議題上，馬英九儼然與歐巴馬同病相憐。
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Hu Xi Handover: Peaceful Development Requires Democratic Validation
Hu Xi Handover: Peaceful Development Requires Democratic Validation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 7, 2012
Summary: Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch. Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
Full Text below:
Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch.
The Hu-Wen regime's banner was "peaceful development." Over the past decade, people have begun to refer to Mainland China and the United States as the G2. It has become the world's second largest economy. It is the world's market as well as the world's factory. Economic development has quadrupled. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted above the poverty line. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo freshened up Mainland China's image. Mainland China survived the 2008 global financial tsunami with little fuss. It swiftly rebuilt in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake. It successfully docked the manned Shenzhou Nine with the Tiangong One. The Liaoning aircraft carrier is now operational. These are all evidence of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's record of achievements in "peaceful development," internal and external. It was only in August of this year that the conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands replaced the atmosphere of "peaceful development." The United States and Japan have a clear impression of Mainland China's "development" over the past decade. Most of the world give high marks to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's decade of governance.
But Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have done little in the way of political reform. Economic development and political stability are to some extent mutually contradictory. On the one hand, economic development reduces political conflict. On the other hand, it stores up energy for future political conflict. The 2012 Bo Xilai incident underscores the need for political reform. In 2010 Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize. That underscored the political problems bedeviling the Mainland. Internet censorship cannot suppress awareness of tens of thousands of "mass protests" each year. These constitute a raging volcano. Hong Kong has reacted strongly to Article 23 of the Basic Law and to "national education." These and the highly anticipated direct elections of the Chief Executive in 2017 are seen as more than merely local matters. They remind the Chinese Communist Party that it must be vigilant and clear about its authoritarian rule and its democratic responsibilities. The CCP's "peaceful development" is taking place on the mouth of a volcano. Will the government's economic performance reduce political corruption and conflict? Or will it lead to increased political corruption and precipitate even greater conflict? Will the government be able to maintain a "harmonious society?" These have yet to undergo "democratic validation."
During the Hu-Wen decade, the CCP made major breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. But it also had a major blind spot. The 2005 Lien-Hu Meeting put us on the road to peaceful development in cross-Strait relations. This was a world-changing event. The Hu-Wen regime set its sights on a "cross-Strait peace agreement" to be signed during its term of office. But this was not to be, partly due to hesitation on the part of the Ma administration in Taipei. Partly due to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's failure to make timely changes to their cross-Strait rhetoric. In order to achieve a "peace agreement," the two parties must first be on an equal basis. Without a "big roof China" framework, how can that happen? Over the past decade, the Hu-Wen regime's cross-Strait framework has indeed evolved in a progressive and pragmatic manner. It has evolved from "peaceful development" in 2005, to "one China, different interpretations" during the March 2008 Bush-Hu Hotline conversation. It has evolved from the "Hu Six Points" on New Years Eve 2008, to "relevant current provisions" (constitutional) in March 2012. Sadly it stopped just short of a "cross-Strait peace agreement." If one wishes to see farther, one must ascend to a higher level. The higher level is the "big roof China" concept.
Let us sum up the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao decade. It achieved "peaceful development." But it also enabled Bo Xilai and his ilk. On the one hand, cronyist corruption ran rampant. On the other hand, the "Chongqing mode" reflected the disparity between the rich and the poor, to the point where Maoist thinking almost made a comeback. Add to this the ticking bomb that is the "Wukan Village mode," and Hong Kong's aspirations toward democracy, which have become increasingly national in character. Clearly the Xi-Li regime will not be able to silence dissent the way it silenced Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. It will not be able to prevent Internet users from circumventing the Internet police and the Great Firewall of China. Still less can it detect and prevent hundreds of "mass protests" everywhere. If the Xi-Li regime wants to maintain "peaceful development," and a "harmonious society," then "democratic validation" is unavoidable. As for cross-Strait relations, the core of "peaceful development" is "democratic development." This goes without saying.
Two personality traits of the newly inaugurated General Secretary Xi Jinping are consider highly relevant. One. His father, Xi Zhongxun was purged during the "Liu Zhidan Incident." During the Cultural Revolution, at age 16, Xi Jinping was "sent down" to Yan'an County Liangjiahe Village. Two. Xi Jinping has over 20 years of cross-Strait experience in the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai regions, which were among the first to liberalize. Will his family experience make him more enlightened about political reform? Will his cross-Strait experience enable him to better understand democracy? That remains to be seen. Hu and Wen established new highs for "peaceful development." Xi and Li should be able to begin "democratic validation."
Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
胡習交接：和平發展需要民主驗證
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.07 01:46 am
中共十八大明日揭幕，黨政新舊領導班子將啟動約四個月的交接期，胡溫團隊退場，由習李體制接班。
胡溫體制的歷史標誌是「和平發展」。在過去十年中，中國開始與美國並稱Ｇ２，成為全世界第二大經濟體，以世界工廠兼為世界市場，經濟發展翻了四倍，數億人脫離貧窮線，二○○八年的京奧與二○一○年的上海世博刷新了中國的形象，又相對平順地度過二○○八年全球金融海嘯，再迅速從汶川大地震中復建，又完成神州九號與天宮一號的載人宇航對接，再有遼寧號航空母艦開始服役…；這些紀錄，皆留下了胡溫體制對內及對外「和平發展」的足印。一直到今年八月掀起釣魚台事件，「和平」的氛圍雖已被劍拔弩張所取代，但從美日的因應來看，卻也為這十年來中國的「發展」果實作了鮮明的註腳。因此，實事求是地說，舉世議論大多給了胡溫的十年治理相當正向的評價。
然而，胡溫在政治改革上卻幾乎仍是一張白卷。經濟發展與政治穩定之間存有一個弔詭：一方面經濟發展緩和了政治衝突，但另一方面也積蓄並升高了政治衝突的能量。二○一二年的薄熙來事件正是政治改革大缺口的大暴露，二○一○年劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎，則是從這個大缺口所見到的政治病灶，網路管制的捉襟見肘及全年推估逾十數萬次的「群體性事件」，更是這個大缺口裡猶如火山熔岩奔流飛濺的真實景觀。此外，香港對基本法第二十三條及「國民教育」的強烈反撲，及二○一七年特首直選的預期；皆不能視為只是香港一地之事，而是提醒中共必須對其專制統治的民主債務應有全面的警覺與清償。在這個火山口上的「和平發展」，經濟績效究竟是降低政治腐敗及衝突的因素，或反而將是累積政治腐敗及衝突的成因，以致最後還能否維持「和諧社會」，這些皆是尚待「民主驗證」的未定之數。
胡溫十年，在兩岸關係上有大突破，但亦有大盲點。二○○五年的連胡會，將兩岸關係帶上「和平發展」的道路，這是扭轉乾坤的一手；但胡溫體制原以簽成《兩岸和平協議》為任內目標卻未完成，則一方面是由於台北馬政府的猶豫，另一方面更因胡溫未能及時作出更進一步的論述調整。因為，若欲簽定《和平協議》，勢須首先建立兩造簽約主體的對等地位；則若無「大屋頂中國」的思維，何以成事？十年來，胡溫體制的兩岸思維，由二○○五年的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「現行相關規定（憲法）底線論」，其間確實出現了一種進取且務實的發展思維，惜乎卻止於尚欠臨門一腳的《兩岸和平協議》。欲窮千里目，更上一層樓；其實，樓上即在「大屋頂中國」之下。
總結胡溫十年，固有「和平發展」的成績，但如薄熙來案所反映者，一方面權貴腐敗已至不可思議的程度，另一方面「重慶模式」也反襯出貧富不均甚至已嚴重到民心希望毛式思維回潮的地步；再加上「烏坎村式」的未爆彈所在皆有，香港的民主訴求也愈來愈具全國性的示範作用；因而，舉目所見，習李體制未來不應再用對待劉曉波、陳光誠的方法來壓制異議，用網路警察去防堵翻牆的網民亦是堵不勝堵，每日各地數百起的「群體性事件」更是防不勝防；習李若欲維持「和平發展」、「和諧社會」的成果，「民主驗證」即是無可迴避的過程。至於兩岸關係，「和平發展」的核心思維是在「民主發展」，更是毋庸贅言。
新任總書記習近平的兩項人格烙印最受矚目。一、其父習仲勛因「劉志丹事件」被整肅，習近平則於文革時期在十六歲被下放到延安縣梁家河村。二、習近平在閩浙滬開放先行地區有長達二十餘年的兩岸經驗。因而，其家族經歷會不會使他在政治改革上較具開明思維，其兩岸經驗又會不會使他對民主及主體意識較能領悟省思，皆是可待觀察之處。若謂胡溫創造了「和平發展」的高峰，習李應是站在「民主驗證」的起點。
溫家寶為這十年給習李二人留下了一句話：「沒有政治體制改革的保障，經濟體制改革的成果就會得而復失。」然而，諷刺的是，溫家寶本人也正陷於嚴峻的清廉質疑。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 7, 2012
Summary: Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch. Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
Full Text below:
Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch.
The Hu-Wen regime's banner was "peaceful development." Over the past decade, people have begun to refer to Mainland China and the United States as the G2. It has become the world's second largest economy. It is the world's market as well as the world's factory. Economic development has quadrupled. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted above the poverty line. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo freshened up Mainland China's image. Mainland China survived the 2008 global financial tsunami with little fuss. It swiftly rebuilt in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake. It successfully docked the manned Shenzhou Nine with the Tiangong One. The Liaoning aircraft carrier is now operational. These are all evidence of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's record of achievements in "peaceful development," internal and external. It was only in August of this year that the conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands replaced the atmosphere of "peaceful development." The United States and Japan have a clear impression of Mainland China's "development" over the past decade. Most of the world give high marks to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's decade of governance.
But Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have done little in the way of political reform. Economic development and political stability are to some extent mutually contradictory. On the one hand, economic development reduces political conflict. On the other hand, it stores up energy for future political conflict. The 2012 Bo Xilai incident underscores the need for political reform. In 2010 Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize. That underscored the political problems bedeviling the Mainland. Internet censorship cannot suppress awareness of tens of thousands of "mass protests" each year. These constitute a raging volcano. Hong Kong has reacted strongly to Article 23 of the Basic Law and to "national education." These and the highly anticipated direct elections of the Chief Executive in 2017 are seen as more than merely local matters. They remind the Chinese Communist Party that it must be vigilant and clear about its authoritarian rule and its democratic responsibilities. The CCP's "peaceful development" is taking place on the mouth of a volcano. Will the government's economic performance reduce political corruption and conflict? Or will it lead to increased political corruption and precipitate even greater conflict? Will the government be able to maintain a "harmonious society?" These have yet to undergo "democratic validation."
During the Hu-Wen decade, the CCP made major breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. But it also had a major blind spot. The 2005 Lien-Hu Meeting put us on the road to peaceful development in cross-Strait relations. This was a world-changing event. The Hu-Wen regime set its sights on a "cross-Strait peace agreement" to be signed during its term of office. But this was not to be, partly due to hesitation on the part of the Ma administration in Taipei. Partly due to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's failure to make timely changes to their cross-Strait rhetoric. In order to achieve a "peace agreement," the two parties must first be on an equal basis. Without a "big roof China" framework, how can that happen? Over the past decade, the Hu-Wen regime's cross-Strait framework has indeed evolved in a progressive and pragmatic manner. It has evolved from "peaceful development" in 2005, to "one China, different interpretations" during the March 2008 Bush-Hu Hotline conversation. It has evolved from the "Hu Six Points" on New Years Eve 2008, to "relevant current provisions" (constitutional) in March 2012. Sadly it stopped just short of a "cross-Strait peace agreement." If one wishes to see farther, one must ascend to a higher level. The higher level is the "big roof China" concept.
Let us sum up the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao decade. It achieved "peaceful development." But it also enabled Bo Xilai and his ilk. On the one hand, cronyist corruption ran rampant. On the other hand, the "Chongqing mode" reflected the disparity between the rich and the poor, to the point where Maoist thinking almost made a comeback. Add to this the ticking bomb that is the "Wukan Village mode," and Hong Kong's aspirations toward democracy, which have become increasingly national in character. Clearly the Xi-Li regime will not be able to silence dissent the way it silenced Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. It will not be able to prevent Internet users from circumventing the Internet police and the Great Firewall of China. Still less can it detect and prevent hundreds of "mass protests" everywhere. If the Xi-Li regime wants to maintain "peaceful development," and a "harmonious society," then "democratic validation" is unavoidable. As for cross-Strait relations, the core of "peaceful development" is "democratic development." This goes without saying.
Two personality traits of the newly inaugurated General Secretary Xi Jinping are consider highly relevant. One. His father, Xi Zhongxun was purged during the "Liu Zhidan Incident." During the Cultural Revolution, at age 16, Xi Jinping was "sent down" to Yan'an County Liangjiahe Village. Two. Xi Jinping has over 20 years of cross-Strait experience in the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai regions, which were among the first to liberalize. Will his family experience make him more enlightened about political reform? Will his cross-Strait experience enable him to better understand democracy? That remains to be seen. Hu and Wen established new highs for "peaceful development." Xi and Li should be able to begin "democratic validation."
Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
胡習交接：和平發展需要民主驗證
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.07 01:46 am
中共十八大明日揭幕，黨政新舊領導班子將啟動約四個月的交接期，胡溫團隊退場，由習李體制接班。
胡溫體制的歷史標誌是「和平發展」。在過去十年中，中國開始與美國並稱Ｇ２，成為全世界第二大經濟體，以世界工廠兼為世界市場，經濟發展翻了四倍，數億人脫離貧窮線，二○○八年的京奧與二○一○年的上海世博刷新了中國的形象，又相對平順地度過二○○八年全球金融海嘯，再迅速從汶川大地震中復建，又完成神州九號與天宮一號的載人宇航對接，再有遼寧號航空母艦開始服役…；這些紀錄，皆留下了胡溫體制對內及對外「和平發展」的足印。一直到今年八月掀起釣魚台事件，「和平」的氛圍雖已被劍拔弩張所取代，但從美日的因應來看，卻也為這十年來中國的「發展」果實作了鮮明的註腳。因此，實事求是地說，舉世議論大多給了胡溫的十年治理相當正向的評價。
然而，胡溫在政治改革上卻幾乎仍是一張白卷。經濟發展與政治穩定之間存有一個弔詭：一方面經濟發展緩和了政治衝突，但另一方面也積蓄並升高了政治衝突的能量。二○一二年的薄熙來事件正是政治改革大缺口的大暴露，二○一○年劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎，則是從這個大缺口所見到的政治病灶，網路管制的捉襟見肘及全年推估逾十數萬次的「群體性事件」，更是這個大缺口裡猶如火山熔岩奔流飛濺的真實景觀。此外，香港對基本法第二十三條及「國民教育」的強烈反撲，及二○一七年特首直選的預期；皆不能視為只是香港一地之事，而是提醒中共必須對其專制統治的民主債務應有全面的警覺與清償。在這個火山口上的「和平發展」，經濟績效究竟是降低政治腐敗及衝突的因素，或反而將是累積政治腐敗及衝突的成因，以致最後還能否維持「和諧社會」，這些皆是尚待「民主驗證」的未定之數。
胡溫十年，在兩岸關係上有大突破，但亦有大盲點。二○○五年的連胡會，將兩岸關係帶上「和平發展」的道路，這是扭轉乾坤的一手；但胡溫體制原以簽成《兩岸和平協議》為任內目標卻未完成，則一方面是由於台北馬政府的猶豫，另一方面更因胡溫未能及時作出更進一步的論述調整。因為，若欲簽定《和平協議》，勢須首先建立兩造簽約主體的對等地位；則若無「大屋頂中國」的思維，何以成事？十年來，胡溫體制的兩岸思維，由二○○五年的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「現行相關規定（憲法）底線論」，其間確實出現了一種進取且務實的發展思維，惜乎卻止於尚欠臨門一腳的《兩岸和平協議》。欲窮千里目，更上一層樓；其實，樓上即在「大屋頂中國」之下。
總結胡溫十年，固有「和平發展」的成績，但如薄熙來案所反映者，一方面權貴腐敗已至不可思議的程度，另一方面「重慶模式」也反襯出貧富不均甚至已嚴重到民心希望毛式思維回潮的地步；再加上「烏坎村式」的未爆彈所在皆有，香港的民主訴求也愈來愈具全國性的示範作用；因而，舉目所見，習李體制未來不應再用對待劉曉波、陳光誠的方法來壓制異議，用網路警察去防堵翻牆的網民亦是堵不勝堵，每日各地數百起的「群體性事件」更是防不勝防；習李若欲維持「和平發展」、「和諧社會」的成果，「民主驗證」即是無可迴避的過程。至於兩岸關係，「和平發展」的核心思維是在「民主發展」，更是毋庸贅言。
新任總書記習近平的兩項人格烙印最受矚目。一、其父習仲勛因「劉志丹事件」被整肅，習近平則於文革時期在十六歲被下放到延安縣梁家河村。二、習近平在閩浙滬開放先行地區有長達二十餘年的兩岸經驗。因而，其家族經歷會不會使他在政治改革上較具開明思維，其兩岸經驗又會不會使他對民主及主體意識較能領悟省思，皆是可待觀察之處。若謂胡溫創造了「和平發展」的高峰，習李應是站在「民主驗證」的起點。
溫家寶為這十年給習李二人留下了一句話：「沒有政治體制改革的保障，經濟體制改革的成果就會得而復失。」然而，諷刺的是，溫家寶本人也正陷於嚴峻的清廉質疑。
Tuesday, November 6, 2012
Negative thinking Undermines Political and Economic Evolution
Negative thinking Undermines Political and Economic Evolution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 6, 2012
Summary: Taiwan must extricate itself from political and economic stagnation. People must change their way of thinking. They must reject pessimistic, confrontational, negative thinking. They must adopt optimistic, competitive, cooperative, positive thinking. Whenever they confront a problem they need to think more like engineers and less like politicians. To find solutions, people on Taiwan must not waste energy on unnecessary confrontation. Time is no longer on our side. If we persist in wearing each other down, the legacy bequeathed to us by our predecessors will be utterly squandered.
Full Text below:
Taiwan's economy faces a difficult battle. There is no assurance it will experience even a 1% growth rate this year. Politics is mired in quicksand. The only feature of democracy that survives is elections. How can Taiwan escape this political and economic predicament? We must examine the problem the structural level. We must consider political interaction and value systems. Only then will we find a solution. One key worth considering is Taiwan society's "Negative thinking."
A vigorous reform movement on Taiwan during the 1980s bequeathed us a democratic miracle. But the glory of the 90s soon came to an end. During the 21st century, Taiwan's democracy led to Blue vs. Green stasis. Social divisions led to an economic nosedive. The result was a permanent state of "non-consensus." This lack of consensus has spread from the political realm into the social, cultural, and economic realms. It has engulfed all areas of public policy. As a result, neither the Blue nor the Green camp is able to govern the country. Worse, Taiwan has become idle, wracked by internal conflict and economic stagnation, without even realizing it.
Youth unemployment did not begin today. Wages on Taiwan have been declining for over a decade. Taiwan has also had a problem with industrial upgrading. Many manufacturers have relocated. This shows that the doubts are real. But these problems have been forgotten amidst the fog generated by a decade of political confrontation. Is this the unavoidable cost of Taiwan's democratization? Possibly. Nevertheless we must attempt to stem the losses. We must correct our course. Otherwise, what will happen to Taiwan down the line?
So-called "negative thinking" refers to political attitudes that are fundamentally obstructionist, that restort to boycotts, and that engage in "opposition merely for the sake of opposition." If Negative thinking has a rational basis, it can play a positive role, as "checks and balances." It can prevent the abuse of power. It can prevent the derailment of the decision-making process. But if it lacks a rational basis, if politicians stubbornly engage in obstructionism, public policy will run into a brick wall. Even measures beneficial to the public will be stalled. The last ten years of political confrontation and economic stagnation are largely result of the latter. This sort of thinking is apparent during ruling vs. opposition party confrontations. It also manifests itself endlesslessly during confrontations between the executive and legislative branches. As a result, the confrontations within civil society are not much better.
Such negative thinking poses a serious danger. Those who engage in such negative thinking need offer no comprehensive solutions of their own. They need only trumpet their opposition. They find it easy to mislead the public. Take education reform. The public wants college admissions to be procedurally fair. But they ignore the problem of how to teach children to learn and how to ensure their competitiveness. Take U.S. beef imports. Politicians talk about imposing "zero tolerance" requirements. They pretend that science is irrelevant. They pretend that Washington-Taipei relations do not matter. Take the fourth nuclear power plant. The DPP flip flopped back and forth between building it and not building it. They avoided any discussion of how to obtain affordable electricy once nuclear power generation was eliminated. Recently some Blue Camp legislators have proposed changing the fourth nuclear power plant to a natural gas plant. But they said nothing about the 300 billion already invested. Will it be written off as a total loss? Take the Wen Lin-yuan controversy. Public attention is focused on a single, isolated case. But 30 or more households approve. What about their interests? What about the system as a whole? Have these been given the same consideration?
In recent years the economy has stalled. Many people are beginning to miss leaders such as Li Kuo-ting, Sun Yun-suan, and Chao Yao-tung. These were the men responsible for Taiwan's economic miracle. Many people miss their vision and boldness. Some say that these fiscal and economic wizards operated under the aegis of authoritarianism. They had more power to get things done. Some say if they were born on today's Taiwan, even they would be bound hand and foot. But lest we forget, these people were trained as engineers. Engineers are trained to be pragmatic when confronted by problems. That, coupled with their own life experiences and insights, enabled them to leave behind a legacy. Contrast that with today's political arena. Government and opposition leaders are mostly trained as lawyers. Their heads are filled with zero sum, confrontational thinking. Instead of thinking about how to solve the problem, they think about how to make the problem more difficult, lest the rival camp receive credit for solving it. Given such selfish reasoning, how can we possibly expect positive thinking about how to make the nation prosper? How can we expect anyone to face problems and solve them?
Recently the public has been debating retirement benefits for military veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. This issue deserves greater attention. Why have salaries within the private sector been stalled for so many years? If we fail to lift low income people out of their poverty, but merely try to hold down high income people, the result will be a race to the bottom. The same is true of educational reform, which relentlessly held down elite schools. This did nothing to enhance next generation competitiveness. It merely prevented smaller schools from increasing their tuitions. As a result even salaries could not be increased.
Taiwan must extricate itself from political and economic stagnation. People must change their way of thinking. They must reject pessimistic, confrontational, negative thinking. They must adopt optimistic, competitive, cooperative, positive thinking. Whenever they confront a problem they need to think more like engineers and less like politicians. To find solutions, people on Taiwan must not waste energy on unnecessary confrontation. Time is no longer on our side. If we persist in wearing each other down, the legacy bequeathed to us by our predecessors will be utterly squandered.
「減法思維」扭曲台灣政經發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.06 03:17 am
台灣的經濟正面臨「保一」的苦戰，政治則陷入「民主只剩下選舉」的泥沼。要擺脫這樣的政經雙困境，恐怕只有從政治互動及價值思考等結構性因素去檢討，才有可能找到出路。其中一個值得探討的關鍵，是台灣社會的「減法思維」。
八○年代的蓬勃改革運動寫下了台灣的民主奇蹟，但經過九○年代的燦爛，廿一世紀的台灣民主卻朝向藍綠僵峙、社會分裂的歧路急轉直下。這種「無共識」狀態，從政治領域一直向社會、文化、經濟蔓延，乃至吞沒所有公共政策領域。其結果，不僅導致主政者（無論藍綠）的施政困難，更嚴重的是，把台灣帶向空轉、內耗、停滯而不自覺的境地。
青年失業並非始自今日，台灣薪資成長倒退也有逾十年的歷史，包括台灣產業升級的問題，在廠商大量外移時即是個存在的疑慮。但這些議題，在過去十多年政治對峙的漫天煙硝中，全遭到淹沒。就算這是台灣民主化的代價，時至今日，我們也該開始設法停損，思考反省修補之道，否則台灣的未來將伊於胡底？
所謂「減法思維」，指的是一種以抗衡、杯葛、否定、反對為本質的政治態度。減法哲學若是出於理性，它能扮演的作用就是積極的「制衡」，可避免決策濫權出軌；但若脫離理性，一味強調阻擋，其結果就是使得公共政策動輒碰壁撞牆，即連有利於民的施政亦無法正常推動。台灣近十多年來的政治對立與經濟停滯，恐怕是後者濫用的因素居多。這種思維不僅見諸朝野對立，在行政與立法部門之間亦層出不窮；影響所及，民間的撕裂對立也不遑多讓。
減法思維最大的危險，是它毋需提出一個完整的「解決方案」，而僅需擺出一個鮮明的「反對姿態」即可，這很容易形成誤導。以教改為例，人們全力要求入學制度的形式平等，卻把如何教導孩子學習和他們的競爭力拋在腦後。以美牛案為例，政治人物口口聲聲要求「零檢出」，假裝科學在此無用武之地，也假裝美台外交毫不重要。以核四為例，民進黨在建與不建之間來回擺盪，卻從不談廢核後的電力供應及價格問題如何解決；近期也有藍委為選舉而主張核四改為天然氣廠，卻不提投入的三千億是否就此付諸流水。再以文林苑之爭為例，人們在關注特殊個案之際，卅多戶同意戶的權益及整個都更制度的未來，似乎未受到等量的對待。
近年因經濟發展困頓，許多民眾都開始懷念當年締造經濟奇蹟的領航者李國鼎、孫運璿、趙耀東等人，懷念他們的遠見與魄力。有人會說，這些財經推手在威權年代從政，因此擁有更大的權力來推動政務，如果他們生在今天的台灣，恐怕也是束手無策。但別忘了一點：這幾位都是工程師出身，而工程師的基本訓練就是在務實面對問題、解決問題，再加上他們自身的歷練和見識，才能造就一番基業。反觀今天的政壇，朝野領導人都是習法出身，多半滿腦子只是零和對抗思維；遇到問題，不是思考解決問題，而是思考如何把問題弄得更難解決，不讓對手陣營得利。在這樣狹隘的杯葛邏輯下，如何產生福國利民的積極思維？又如何能面對問題誠摯解決？
最近社會在檢討軍公教退休俸的沸沸揚揚之際，更值得人們警惕的，其實是民間部門的薪資何以長年止步不前？如果我們不能把低薪資的一方拉上來，而只想把高的一方壓下去，結果只會一路倒向「比低」的後果。就好像教改一路打壓明星學校，其實無助提升下一代競爭力；而夙夜匪懈地盯著不許小店漲價，結果連薪水也漲不動一樣。
台灣要走出今天這種政經同步停滯的局面，必須改變現行的思考模式，從消極的、對抗的「減法思維」，轉向積極的、競合的「加法思維」進化。每次面對問題，只要能多一點「工程師精神」，少一點政客算計，以尋求解決為目的，台灣不必讓那麼多的精力浪費在無謂的對抗上。台灣已經時不我予，再互相消損下去，所有前人留下的傲人資產都會消磨淨盡。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 6, 2012
Summary: Taiwan must extricate itself from political and economic stagnation. People must change their way of thinking. They must reject pessimistic, confrontational, negative thinking. They must adopt optimistic, competitive, cooperative, positive thinking. Whenever they confront a problem they need to think more like engineers and less like politicians. To find solutions, people on Taiwan must not waste energy on unnecessary confrontation. Time is no longer on our side. If we persist in wearing each other down, the legacy bequeathed to us by our predecessors will be utterly squandered.
Full Text below:
Taiwan's economy faces a difficult battle. There is no assurance it will experience even a 1% growth rate this year. Politics is mired in quicksand. The only feature of democracy that survives is elections. How can Taiwan escape this political and economic predicament? We must examine the problem the structural level. We must consider political interaction and value systems. Only then will we find a solution. One key worth considering is Taiwan society's "Negative thinking."
A vigorous reform movement on Taiwan during the 1980s bequeathed us a democratic miracle. But the glory of the 90s soon came to an end. During the 21st century, Taiwan's democracy led to Blue vs. Green stasis. Social divisions led to an economic nosedive. The result was a permanent state of "non-consensus." This lack of consensus has spread from the political realm into the social, cultural, and economic realms. It has engulfed all areas of public policy. As a result, neither the Blue nor the Green camp is able to govern the country. Worse, Taiwan has become idle, wracked by internal conflict and economic stagnation, without even realizing it.
Youth unemployment did not begin today. Wages on Taiwan have been declining for over a decade. Taiwan has also had a problem with industrial upgrading. Many manufacturers have relocated. This shows that the doubts are real. But these problems have been forgotten amidst the fog generated by a decade of political confrontation. Is this the unavoidable cost of Taiwan's democratization? Possibly. Nevertheless we must attempt to stem the losses. We must correct our course. Otherwise, what will happen to Taiwan down the line?
So-called "negative thinking" refers to political attitudes that are fundamentally obstructionist, that restort to boycotts, and that engage in "opposition merely for the sake of opposition." If Negative thinking has a rational basis, it can play a positive role, as "checks and balances." It can prevent the abuse of power. It can prevent the derailment of the decision-making process. But if it lacks a rational basis, if politicians stubbornly engage in obstructionism, public policy will run into a brick wall. Even measures beneficial to the public will be stalled. The last ten years of political confrontation and economic stagnation are largely result of the latter. This sort of thinking is apparent during ruling vs. opposition party confrontations. It also manifests itself endlesslessly during confrontations between the executive and legislative branches. As a result, the confrontations within civil society are not much better.
Such negative thinking poses a serious danger. Those who engage in such negative thinking need offer no comprehensive solutions of their own. They need only trumpet their opposition. They find it easy to mislead the public. Take education reform. The public wants college admissions to be procedurally fair. But they ignore the problem of how to teach children to learn and how to ensure their competitiveness. Take U.S. beef imports. Politicians talk about imposing "zero tolerance" requirements. They pretend that science is irrelevant. They pretend that Washington-Taipei relations do not matter. Take the fourth nuclear power plant. The DPP flip flopped back and forth between building it and not building it. They avoided any discussion of how to obtain affordable electricy once nuclear power generation was eliminated. Recently some Blue Camp legislators have proposed changing the fourth nuclear power plant to a natural gas plant. But they said nothing about the 300 billion already invested. Will it be written off as a total loss? Take the Wen Lin-yuan controversy. Public attention is focused on a single, isolated case. But 30 or more households approve. What about their interests? What about the system as a whole? Have these been given the same consideration?
In recent years the economy has stalled. Many people are beginning to miss leaders such as Li Kuo-ting, Sun Yun-suan, and Chao Yao-tung. These were the men responsible for Taiwan's economic miracle. Many people miss their vision and boldness. Some say that these fiscal and economic wizards operated under the aegis of authoritarianism. They had more power to get things done. Some say if they were born on today's Taiwan, even they would be bound hand and foot. But lest we forget, these people were trained as engineers. Engineers are trained to be pragmatic when confronted by problems. That, coupled with their own life experiences and insights, enabled them to leave behind a legacy. Contrast that with today's political arena. Government and opposition leaders are mostly trained as lawyers. Their heads are filled with zero sum, confrontational thinking. Instead of thinking about how to solve the problem, they think about how to make the problem more difficult, lest the rival camp receive credit for solving it. Given such selfish reasoning, how can we possibly expect positive thinking about how to make the nation prosper? How can we expect anyone to face problems and solve them?
Recently the public has been debating retirement benefits for military veterans, civil servants, and public school teachers. This issue deserves greater attention. Why have salaries within the private sector been stalled for so many years? If we fail to lift low income people out of their poverty, but merely try to hold down high income people, the result will be a race to the bottom. The same is true of educational reform, which relentlessly held down elite schools. This did nothing to enhance next generation competitiveness. It merely prevented smaller schools from increasing their tuitions. As a result even salaries could not be increased.
Taiwan must extricate itself from political and economic stagnation. People must change their way of thinking. They must reject pessimistic, confrontational, negative thinking. They must adopt optimistic, competitive, cooperative, positive thinking. Whenever they confront a problem they need to think more like engineers and less like politicians. To find solutions, people on Taiwan must not waste energy on unnecessary confrontation. Time is no longer on our side. If we persist in wearing each other down, the legacy bequeathed to us by our predecessors will be utterly squandered.
「減法思維」扭曲台灣政經發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.06 03:17 am
台灣的經濟正面臨「保一」的苦戰，政治則陷入「民主只剩下選舉」的泥沼。要擺脫這樣的政經雙困境，恐怕只有從政治互動及價值思考等結構性因素去檢討，才有可能找到出路。其中一個值得探討的關鍵，是台灣社會的「減法思維」。
八○年代的蓬勃改革運動寫下了台灣的民主奇蹟，但經過九○年代的燦爛，廿一世紀的台灣民主卻朝向藍綠僵峙、社會分裂的歧路急轉直下。這種「無共識」狀態，從政治領域一直向社會、文化、經濟蔓延，乃至吞沒所有公共政策領域。其結果，不僅導致主政者（無論藍綠）的施政困難，更嚴重的是，把台灣帶向空轉、內耗、停滯而不自覺的境地。
青年失業並非始自今日，台灣薪資成長倒退也有逾十年的歷史，包括台灣產業升級的問題，在廠商大量外移時即是個存在的疑慮。但這些議題，在過去十多年政治對峙的漫天煙硝中，全遭到淹沒。就算這是台灣民主化的代價，時至今日，我們也該開始設法停損，思考反省修補之道，否則台灣的未來將伊於胡底？
所謂「減法思維」，指的是一種以抗衡、杯葛、否定、反對為本質的政治態度。減法哲學若是出於理性，它能扮演的作用就是積極的「制衡」，可避免決策濫權出軌；但若脫離理性，一味強調阻擋，其結果就是使得公共政策動輒碰壁撞牆，即連有利於民的施政亦無法正常推動。台灣近十多年來的政治對立與經濟停滯，恐怕是後者濫用的因素居多。這種思維不僅見諸朝野對立，在行政與立法部門之間亦層出不窮；影響所及，民間的撕裂對立也不遑多讓。
減法思維最大的危險，是它毋需提出一個完整的「解決方案」，而僅需擺出一個鮮明的「反對姿態」即可，這很容易形成誤導。以教改為例，人們全力要求入學制度的形式平等，卻把如何教導孩子學習和他們的競爭力拋在腦後。以美牛案為例，政治人物口口聲聲要求「零檢出」，假裝科學在此無用武之地，也假裝美台外交毫不重要。以核四為例，民進黨在建與不建之間來回擺盪，卻從不談廢核後的電力供應及價格問題如何解決；近期也有藍委為選舉而主張核四改為天然氣廠，卻不提投入的三千億是否就此付諸流水。再以文林苑之爭為例，人們在關注特殊個案之際，卅多戶同意戶的權益及整個都更制度的未來，似乎未受到等量的對待。
近年因經濟發展困頓，許多民眾都開始懷念當年締造經濟奇蹟的領航者李國鼎、孫運璿、趙耀東等人，懷念他們的遠見與魄力。有人會說，這些財經推手在威權年代從政，因此擁有更大的權力來推動政務，如果他們生在今天的台灣，恐怕也是束手無策。但別忘了一點：這幾位都是工程師出身，而工程師的基本訓練就是在務實面對問題、解決問題，再加上他們自身的歷練和見識，才能造就一番基業。反觀今天的政壇，朝野領導人都是習法出身，多半滿腦子只是零和對抗思維；遇到問題，不是思考解決問題，而是思考如何把問題弄得更難解決，不讓對手陣營得利。在這樣狹隘的杯葛邏輯下，如何產生福國利民的積極思維？又如何能面對問題誠摯解決？
最近社會在檢討軍公教退休俸的沸沸揚揚之際，更值得人們警惕的，其實是民間部門的薪資何以長年止步不前？如果我們不能把低薪資的一方拉上來，而只想把高的一方壓下去，結果只會一路倒向「比低」的後果。就好像教改一路打壓明星學校，其實無助提升下一代競爭力；而夙夜匪懈地盯著不許小店漲價，結果連薪水也漲不動一樣。
台灣要走出今天這種政經同步停滯的局面，必須改變現行的思考模式，從消極的、對抗的「減法思維」，轉向積極的、競合的「加法思維」進化。每次面對問題，只要能多一點「工程師精神」，少一點政客算計，以尋求解決為目的，台灣不必讓那麼多的精力浪費在無謂的對抗上。台灣已經時不我予，再互相消損下去，所有前人留下的傲人資產都會消磨淨盡。
Monday, November 5, 2012
Shelve What Controversy? Develop What Resources? With Whom?
Shelve What Controversy? Develop What Resources? With Whom?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2012
Summary: The ROC government cannot prattle on about "shelving disputes" or "joint development," including fishing rights negotiations. To do so is tantamount to selling out the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. Japan has continually aggressed against China for the past one hundred years. Therefore the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must shelve their dispute over their separate territorial jurisdictions, so that they may defend their common territorial sovereignty.
Full Text below:
Both Taipei and Beijing have adopted three positions regarding the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. Both maintain that "My side has sovereignty." Both maintain that the two sides can "shelve disputes" and engage in "joint development." So far, these three positions have been espoused with reference to Japan.
The three positions complement each other. If we fail to argue that "My side has sovereignty," then the controversy evaporates altogether. Japan will develop the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands on its own. If one fails to advocate "shelving disputes," then one must seek an immediate solution to the question of sovereignty. Troops must immediately confront each other on the battlefield. If one fails to advocate "joint development," then one cannot shelve the dispute. Therefore we must advocate all three positions.
In 1972, Japan was attempting to normalize relations with the Chinese mainland. During the third summit between the two sides, held on September 27, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka raised the "Senkaku Islands" (Diaoyutai Islands) issue on his own, without any prompting. Mainland Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said: "I do not wish to talk about this issue at the moment. Talking about it now will do no good. We should resolve whatever larger issues we can first, such as the normalization of relations between the two countries. Other issues we can talk about later." Tanaka agreed. He said, "I had to raise the issue at this time, otherwise I would not be able to answer to the Japanese public."
As we can see, the Japanese government acknowledged that the issue was "controversial." Otherwise why would it have raised the issue to begin with? It also agreed to to shelve disputes. That is why it raised the issue, but avoided any mention of specifics. Later on however, Japan went back on its word. It alleged that "There is no dispute over the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands." It avoided mentioning the fact that Kakuei Tanaka raised the issue on his own. It denied that the two sides had agreed to "shelve disputes." It merely said that during negotiations "there was no discussion of this issue."
Until September of this year, the Mainland authorities continued to abide by the agreement to "shelve disputes." It exercised restraint. It avoided conflict. It even attempted to suppress widespread anti-Japanese sentiment among the public. It refused to support private sector Diaoyutai Islands defense movement activities. It refused to support fishermen who traveled to Diaoyutai Island waters to catch fish. It refrained from conducting maritime surveillance. It seldom dispatched fisheries boats to Diaoyutai Island waters. But on September 10, the Japanese government decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. It reneged on its agreement to "shelve disputes." It crossed the Mainland's line in the sand regarding sovereignty. It transformed the nature of the issue.
The Mainland was forced to proclaim that "Our side has sovereignty." It published the names of the islands and their geographical coordinates. It delineated its territorial waters. It dispatched warships, maritime surveillance ships, and fisheries ships to Diaoyutai Island waters. This restored the Diaoyutai Islands issue to its former status as an ongoing controvery in which the two sides "shelved disputes." On October 30, Mainland ocean surveillance ships went even further. They expelled Japanese vessels from the territory, unequivocally declaring China's sovereignty.
Sad to say, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan are unwilling to take part in consultations with the Mainland under the "one China principle." They are unwilling to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. Taiwan and the Mainland should participate in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This is something expressly provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China, under "reunification." But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan choose to spin this as a loss of dignity and as "annexation." In order to resist reunification, they prefer to kowtow to the United States and Japan. They prefer to "de-Sinicize" themselves. They have long lived under this identity confusion. When confronted by Japan's aggression against the Diaoyutai Islands, it is hardly surprising that their words and deeds are so perversely inappropriate. Lee Teng-hui, the instigator of "de-Sinicization," even alleged that "The Diaoyutai Islands were Japan's to begin with!" President Ma Ying-jeou is seeking an historical legacy. He is the person who championed the aforementioned three positions. Yet he told the Japanese, "Taiwan has no intention of joining hands with Mainland China to fight Japan." He told the Japanese, "I hope our Japanese friends know that we attach great importance to relations with Japan." When Mainland ocean surveillance ships expelled Japanese ships from the region, some Taiwan media even denounced it as a hostile act. They complained that "Mainland ships expelled Japanese ships from Republic of China territorial waters."
In fact, in 1992 the Mainland announced its "People's Republic of China Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act." It stipulated that the Diaoyutai Islands are offshore islets belonging to Taiwan. Mainland ocean surveillance ships entered Diaoyutai Island waters to expel Japanese ships and safeguard China's territorial sovereignty. This includes the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. They were simultaneously upholding the rights of the public on Taiwan. The two are not mutually contradictory. Japan has long treated Taiwan with contempt. Suppose the Mainland had not acted? Would Japan have suddenly become so deferential toward Taiwan? Mainland China took action. It expelled Japanese ships. It did not harm to Taiwan's interests. This fact can not be ignored. It must not be distorted.
By contrast, Japan flagrantly violated its agreement with the Mainland to "shelve disputes." It even attempted to induce the Ma administration to abandon sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands in exchange for "joint development," i.e., so-called fishing rights, on condition that it agree "there is no dispute over sovereignty." Clearly Japan is determined to exploit Taiwan's identity confusion. It is attempting to drive a wedge between the Mainland and Taiwan by offering to negotiate with Taiwan on fishing rights. It is attempting to play the same game against the Chinese people that it has for the past century. It is attempting to divide and conquer. Japan has suddenly become deferential to Taiwan. But this newfound deference hides an ugly agenda.
According to both the ROC and PRC Constitutions, China's sovereignty is indivisible. The only thing currently divided is jurisdiction. Jurisdiction has yet to be reunified. The Diaoyutai Islands belong to the Republic of China. That is not something we can casually relinquish. Japan has the temerity to claim that there is no controversy over the islands' sovereignty. The ROC government cannot prattle on about "shelving disputes" or "joint development," including fishing rights negotiations. To do so is tantamount to selling out the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. Japan has continually aggressed against China for the past one hundred years. Therefore the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must shelve their dispute over their separate territorial jurisdictions, so that they may defend their common territorial sovereignty.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.11.05
社論－擱置什麼爭議？與誰共同開發？
本報訊
在釣魚台列嶼問題上，兩岸的處理原則都是「主權在我」、「擱置爭議」、「共同開發」。迄今為止，這三項原則的對象都是日本。
此三原則互為表裡：若不主張「主權在我」，則爭議消失，日本將單獨開發釣魚台附近海域資源；若不主張「擱置爭議」，就必須立即解決主權爭端，則兵凶戰危，誰也無法進行開發；若不主張「共同開發」，則爭議無從擱置。因此，三項原則缺一不可。
一九七二年日本與大陸談判「關係正常化」時，日相田中角榮在九月二十七日舉行的第三次首腦會談中主動提出「尖閣列島（即釣魚台列嶼）問題」。大陸的周恩來總理說：「我這次不想談這個問題，現在談沒有好處。我們把能解決的大問題─兩國關係正常化問題─先解決。…有些問題要隨著時間的推移才好去談。」當時田中表示同意，並說「這次來訪問，不問一下，回去不好向（日本）國民交代」。
可見，當時日本政府承認「爭議」存在（否則不用主動提出）、並同意擱置爭議（因此只是提出而未具體談判）。但是，後來日本言而無信，一直宣稱「尖閣群島不存在領土主權之爭」，並且避談田中角榮曾主動提出此一問題的事實，否認雙方曾有「擱置爭議」的共識，只說在談判中「完全沒有談論這個問題」。
直到今年九月以前，大陸當局信守「擱置爭議」的共識，採克制態度，避免衝突，也壓著社會上普遍的反日情緒，不支持民間保釣行動，不組織漁民到釣魚台海域捕魚，海監、漁政船也很少到釣魚台海域巡視。然而，九月十日日本政府決定把釣魚台列嶼「國有化」，徹底推翻了「擱置爭議」的共識，觸犯了大陸主權的底線，也改變了問題的性質。
為使釣魚台問題至少回到「擱置爭議」的原狀，大陸不得不改採突出「主權在我」的作為，於是乃有公布標準地名和地理坐標、劃定領海基點基線，以及海監、漁政船常態巡航釣魚台海域等作法。十月三十日，大陸海監船更對日方船隻實施驅離措施，旗幟鮮明地宣示其主權立場。
反之，台灣朝野因為不願在「一中」原則下協商、簽署兩岸和平協議，並且一再把使雙方可共同參與中華民族復興、也是中華民國憲法明文規定的「統一」，曲解為失去尊嚴的「被併吞」。於是，為了拒統，寧可屈居美、日附庸，也要「去中國化」。久處這種認同錯亂的氛圍之下，面對日本對釣魚台的侵略惡行，自然言行乖謬、舉措失當。「去中國化」的始作俑者李登輝說：「釣魚台本來就是日本的」；追求歷史定位的馬英九總統雖也提出前述三原則，但是卻又對日本表態：「台灣無意與中國大陸聯手對抗日本」，「希望日本朋友們知道，我們非常重視與日本的關係」；還有媒體把近日大陸海監船驅離日船的措施視為「陸船在『中華民國領海』驅逐日船」的不友善行為。
其實，大陸在一九九二年公布的「中華人民共和國領海及毗連區法」中明定「釣魚島」是台灣的附屬島嶼。大陸海監船在釣魚台海域驅離日船固然是維護中國（包含台灣和大陸）的領土主權，但同時就是在維護台灣人民的權利，其間並無衝突。若非大陸出手，以往對台一向傲慢的日本，最近怎會對我前倨後恭？大陸雖然出手，但驅趕的是日船，並未損傷任何台灣實質利益。此一事實不能漠視，不該扭曲。
反之，日本不但徹底違反了兩岸共同主張的「擱置爭議」，甚至想在「不存在主權爭議」的前提下，以「共同開發」（所謂「漁權」）誘使馬政府放棄對釣魚台的「主權在我」原則。顯然，日本已看準了台灣的認同錯亂，試圖以漁權談判離間兩岸，重演一百多年來中國人鷸蚌相爭、日本人漁翁得利的戲碼。日本對我前倨後恭，實包藏禍心。
按照兩岸各自的憲法，中國的「主權」只有一個，只是「治權」尚未統一。而釣魚台列嶼是中華民國的主權所及，豈可輕言放棄？現在日本既已否認了「主權爭議」的存在，我方若還對日侈談「擱置爭議」，或甚至與其協商「共同開發」（包括「漁權談判」），就等於出賣中華民國的領土主權。因此，在釣魚台問題上，面對一百多年來不斷侵略中國的日本，兩岸中國人應擱置彼此間的「治權」爭議，團結起來，共同開發雙方共有的「主權」權益！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2012
Summary: The ROC government cannot prattle on about "shelving disputes" or "joint development," including fishing rights negotiations. To do so is tantamount to selling out the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. Japan has continually aggressed against China for the past one hundred years. Therefore the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must shelve their dispute over their separate territorial jurisdictions, so that they may defend their common territorial sovereignty.
Full Text below:
Both Taipei and Beijing have adopted three positions regarding the Diaoyutai Islands conflict. Both maintain that "My side has sovereignty." Both maintain that the two sides can "shelve disputes" and engage in "joint development." So far, these three positions have been espoused with reference to Japan.
The three positions complement each other. If we fail to argue that "My side has sovereignty," then the controversy evaporates altogether. Japan will develop the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands on its own. If one fails to advocate "shelving disputes," then one must seek an immediate solution to the question of sovereignty. Troops must immediately confront each other on the battlefield. If one fails to advocate "joint development," then one cannot shelve the dispute. Therefore we must advocate all three positions.
In 1972, Japan was attempting to normalize relations with the Chinese mainland. During the third summit between the two sides, held on September 27, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka raised the "Senkaku Islands" (Diaoyutai Islands) issue on his own, without any prompting. Mainland Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said: "I do not wish to talk about this issue at the moment. Talking about it now will do no good. We should resolve whatever larger issues we can first, such as the normalization of relations between the two countries. Other issues we can talk about later." Tanaka agreed. He said, "I had to raise the issue at this time, otherwise I would not be able to answer to the Japanese public."
As we can see, the Japanese government acknowledged that the issue was "controversial." Otherwise why would it have raised the issue to begin with? It also agreed to to shelve disputes. That is why it raised the issue, but avoided any mention of specifics. Later on however, Japan went back on its word. It alleged that "There is no dispute over the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands." It avoided mentioning the fact that Kakuei Tanaka raised the issue on his own. It denied that the two sides had agreed to "shelve disputes." It merely said that during negotiations "there was no discussion of this issue."
Until September of this year, the Mainland authorities continued to abide by the agreement to "shelve disputes." It exercised restraint. It avoided conflict. It even attempted to suppress widespread anti-Japanese sentiment among the public. It refused to support private sector Diaoyutai Islands defense movement activities. It refused to support fishermen who traveled to Diaoyutai Island waters to catch fish. It refrained from conducting maritime surveillance. It seldom dispatched fisheries boats to Diaoyutai Island waters. But on September 10, the Japanese government decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. It reneged on its agreement to "shelve disputes." It crossed the Mainland's line in the sand regarding sovereignty. It transformed the nature of the issue.
The Mainland was forced to proclaim that "Our side has sovereignty." It published the names of the islands and their geographical coordinates. It delineated its territorial waters. It dispatched warships, maritime surveillance ships, and fisheries ships to Diaoyutai Island waters. This restored the Diaoyutai Islands issue to its former status as an ongoing controvery in which the two sides "shelved disputes." On October 30, Mainland ocean surveillance ships went even further. They expelled Japanese vessels from the territory, unequivocally declaring China's sovereignty.
Sad to say, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan are unwilling to take part in consultations with the Mainland under the "one China principle." They are unwilling to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. Taiwan and the Mainland should participate in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This is something expressly provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China, under "reunification." But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan choose to spin this as a loss of dignity and as "annexation." In order to resist reunification, they prefer to kowtow to the United States and Japan. They prefer to "de-Sinicize" themselves. They have long lived under this identity confusion. When confronted by Japan's aggression against the Diaoyutai Islands, it is hardly surprising that their words and deeds are so perversely inappropriate. Lee Teng-hui, the instigator of "de-Sinicization," even alleged that "The Diaoyutai Islands were Japan's to begin with!" President Ma Ying-jeou is seeking an historical legacy. He is the person who championed the aforementioned three positions. Yet he told the Japanese, "Taiwan has no intention of joining hands with Mainland China to fight Japan." He told the Japanese, "I hope our Japanese friends know that we attach great importance to relations with Japan." When Mainland ocean surveillance ships expelled Japanese ships from the region, some Taiwan media even denounced it as a hostile act. They complained that "Mainland ships expelled Japanese ships from Republic of China territorial waters."
In fact, in 1992 the Mainland announced its "People's Republic of China Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act." It stipulated that the Diaoyutai Islands are offshore islets belonging to Taiwan. Mainland ocean surveillance ships entered Diaoyutai Island waters to expel Japanese ships and safeguard China's territorial sovereignty. This includes the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. They were simultaneously upholding the rights of the public on Taiwan. The two are not mutually contradictory. Japan has long treated Taiwan with contempt. Suppose the Mainland had not acted? Would Japan have suddenly become so deferential toward Taiwan? Mainland China took action. It expelled Japanese ships. It did not harm to Taiwan's interests. This fact can not be ignored. It must not be distorted.
By contrast, Japan flagrantly violated its agreement with the Mainland to "shelve disputes." It even attempted to induce the Ma administration to abandon sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands in exchange for "joint development," i.e., so-called fishing rights, on condition that it agree "there is no dispute over sovereignty." Clearly Japan is determined to exploit Taiwan's identity confusion. It is attempting to drive a wedge between the Mainland and Taiwan by offering to negotiate with Taiwan on fishing rights. It is attempting to play the same game against the Chinese people that it has for the past century. It is attempting to divide and conquer. Japan has suddenly become deferential to Taiwan. But this newfound deference hides an ugly agenda.
According to both the ROC and PRC Constitutions, China's sovereignty is indivisible. The only thing currently divided is jurisdiction. Jurisdiction has yet to be reunified. The Diaoyutai Islands belong to the Republic of China. That is not something we can casually relinquish. Japan has the temerity to claim that there is no controversy over the islands' sovereignty. The ROC government cannot prattle on about "shelving disputes" or "joint development," including fishing rights negotiations. To do so is tantamount to selling out the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. Japan has continually aggressed against China for the past one hundred years. Therefore the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must shelve their dispute over their separate territorial jurisdictions, so that they may defend their common territorial sovereignty.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.11.05
社論－擱置什麼爭議？與誰共同開發？
本報訊
在釣魚台列嶼問題上，兩岸的處理原則都是「主權在我」、「擱置爭議」、「共同開發」。迄今為止，這三項原則的對象都是日本。
此三原則互為表裡：若不主張「主權在我」，則爭議消失，日本將單獨開發釣魚台附近海域資源；若不主張「擱置爭議」，就必須立即解決主權爭端，則兵凶戰危，誰也無法進行開發；若不主張「共同開發」，則爭議無從擱置。因此，三項原則缺一不可。
一九七二年日本與大陸談判「關係正常化」時，日相田中角榮在九月二十七日舉行的第三次首腦會談中主動提出「尖閣列島（即釣魚台列嶼）問題」。大陸的周恩來總理說：「我這次不想談這個問題，現在談沒有好處。我們把能解決的大問題─兩國關係正常化問題─先解決。…有些問題要隨著時間的推移才好去談。」當時田中表示同意，並說「這次來訪問，不問一下，回去不好向（日本）國民交代」。
可見，當時日本政府承認「爭議」存在（否則不用主動提出）、並同意擱置爭議（因此只是提出而未具體談判）。但是，後來日本言而無信，一直宣稱「尖閣群島不存在領土主權之爭」，並且避談田中角榮曾主動提出此一問題的事實，否認雙方曾有「擱置爭議」的共識，只說在談判中「完全沒有談論這個問題」。
直到今年九月以前，大陸當局信守「擱置爭議」的共識，採克制態度，避免衝突，也壓著社會上普遍的反日情緒，不支持民間保釣行動，不組織漁民到釣魚台海域捕魚，海監、漁政船也很少到釣魚台海域巡視。然而，九月十日日本政府決定把釣魚台列嶼「國有化」，徹底推翻了「擱置爭議」的共識，觸犯了大陸主權的底線，也改變了問題的性質。
為使釣魚台問題至少回到「擱置爭議」的原狀，大陸不得不改採突出「主權在我」的作為，於是乃有公布標準地名和地理坐標、劃定領海基點基線，以及海監、漁政船常態巡航釣魚台海域等作法。十月三十日，大陸海監船更對日方船隻實施驅離措施，旗幟鮮明地宣示其主權立場。
反之，台灣朝野因為不願在「一中」原則下協商、簽署兩岸和平協議，並且一再把使雙方可共同參與中華民族復興、也是中華民國憲法明文規定的「統一」，曲解為失去尊嚴的「被併吞」。於是，為了拒統，寧可屈居美、日附庸，也要「去中國化」。久處這種認同錯亂的氛圍之下，面對日本對釣魚台的侵略惡行，自然言行乖謬、舉措失當。「去中國化」的始作俑者李登輝說：「釣魚台本來就是日本的」；追求歷史定位的馬英九總統雖也提出前述三原則，但是卻又對日本表態：「台灣無意與中國大陸聯手對抗日本」，「希望日本朋友們知道，我們非常重視與日本的關係」；還有媒體把近日大陸海監船驅離日船的措施視為「陸船在『中華民國領海』驅逐日船」的不友善行為。
其實，大陸在一九九二年公布的「中華人民共和國領海及毗連區法」中明定「釣魚島」是台灣的附屬島嶼。大陸海監船在釣魚台海域驅離日船固然是維護中國（包含台灣和大陸）的領土主權，但同時就是在維護台灣人民的權利，其間並無衝突。若非大陸出手，以往對台一向傲慢的日本，最近怎會對我前倨後恭？大陸雖然出手，但驅趕的是日船，並未損傷任何台灣實質利益。此一事實不能漠視，不該扭曲。
反之，日本不但徹底違反了兩岸共同主張的「擱置爭議」，甚至想在「不存在主權爭議」的前提下，以「共同開發」（所謂「漁權」）誘使馬政府放棄對釣魚台的「主權在我」原則。顯然，日本已看準了台灣的認同錯亂，試圖以漁權談判離間兩岸，重演一百多年來中國人鷸蚌相爭、日本人漁翁得利的戲碼。日本對我前倨後恭，實包藏禍心。
按照兩岸各自的憲法，中國的「主權」只有一個，只是「治權」尚未統一。而釣魚台列嶼是中華民國的主權所及，豈可輕言放棄？現在日本既已否認了「主權爭議」的存在，我方若還對日侈談「擱置爭議」，或甚至與其協商「共同開發」（包括「漁權談判」），就等於出賣中華民國的領土主權。因此，在釣魚台問題上，面對一百多年來不斷侵略中國的日本，兩岸中國人應擱置彼此間的「治權」爭議，團結起來，共同開發雙方共有的「主權」權益！
Thursday, November 1, 2012
Diaoyutai Status Quo Shattered: Taipei Must Speak Up
Diaoyutai Status Quo Shattered: Taipei Must Speak Up
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2012
Summary: The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.
Full Text below:
The dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands has reached an apparent impasse. Forces maintaining the status quo and forces effecting change are tugging at each other.
Initially Japan wanted to maintain the status quo. It exercised de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands. Therefore it established three bottom lines. These include the maintenance of a 12 nautical mile limit, long term occupation of territory within the 12 nautical mile limit, and organized large-scale landings on the islands. Mainland China has long wanted to change this status quo, one in which Japan alone exercised control over the Diaoyutai Islands. To do this, Mainland China dispatched fishery boats, ocean surveillance ships, and naval fleets into the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. It constantly tried to break through Japan's defenses, to test Japan's resolve.
Japan's defenses do not consist of its own military forces. Instead it is based on the US-Japan alliance. When Japan loses support from the United States, its defenses are weakened. The pendulum will then swing toward Mainland China. With Mainland China constantly challenging the status quo, the situation has been reversed.
Recently Mainland China ocean surveillance ships sailed within 12 nautical miles of Diaoyutai Island waters. It began expelling Japanese Coast Guard vessels. Mainland China has changed the status quo. The next step is to establish its own de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands, and maintain a new status quo. Of course the Mainland is also using the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands to break through the first line of defense established by the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific island chain.
Mainland China has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. Will this lead to a further escalation of conflict between Mainland China and Japan? The future of relations between Mainland China and Japan will be determined by both catalysts and constraints. One catalyst is the United States' return to Asia as a strong backer for Japan. Another catalyst is Mainland China's determination to break through the first island chain in the Western Pacific. One constraint is the high degree of economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan, and Mainland China's strategy of "engaged struggle." Consider the status quo. The U.S. government cancelled its plans for joint island landing exercises between the United States and Japan. The United States apparently did not want to become caught up in a dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has already changed the status quo regarding Diaoyutai. It has already achieved its military goal by breaking through the Western Pacific island chain.
Now consider the constraints. Mainland China is Japan's largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's third largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's largest source of investments and technology. Economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan is both deep and wide. Anti-Japanese sentiment on Mainland China has cost Japanese companies heavily. The Japanese government has begun looking for alternative markets. Japanese companies have begun large-scale divestments and halted technology sharing. This is not conducive to the economic development of the Chinese mainland. Secondly, Mainland China and Japan may have engaged in economic warfare, trade warfare, and actual military warfare. But Mainland China continues to maintain high-level diplomatic contacts with Japan. Mainland China hopes the Japanese government will change its policy of nationalizing Diaoyutai. It does not want to expand the military conflict between Mainland China and Japan.
Clearly the constraints outweigh the catalysts. The conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands will eventually cool down. The two sides need to find a way to step down at the appropriate time.
Beijing has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. This has impacted Taipei in two wasys. Beijing has exercised its political influence in the Diaoyutai Islands. It will now intervene in fishing rights talks between Taipei and Tokyo. Beijing opposes any Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights negotiations that might bear on the sovereignty of the two parties. Secondly, Mainland Chinese military forces have entered waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. The Diaoyutai Islands are less than 20 nautical miles from the main island of Taiwan. This will have a significant impact on the ROC's coastal defenses and air defenses.
Tensions between the Mainland and Japan are gradually cooling. Taipei must be wary of changes in the Japanese government's position regarding Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights talks. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Tokyo will not continue making concessions to Taipei during fishing rights negotiations. Therefore, we recommend that Taipei hold fishing rights talks with Tokyo before high level talks are held between Beijing and Tokyo. Taipei will then have more chips to play with during fishing rights negotiations with Tokyo. .
Secondly, we must beware of the ROC's marginalization on the international stage. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Beijing and Tokyo have excluded Taipei from the bargaining table. Therefore Taipei must take precautions. It must follow-up on the "East China Sea Peace Initiative ." It must make public the "East China Sea Code of Conduct" or "East China Sea Declaration on Conduct." It must bolster the ROC's position on the Diaoyutai issue.
The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.
當釣魚台現狀被打破 我須掌握話語權
2012-11-02
中國時報
最近中日釣魚台主權爭議似乎陷入了對峙的僵局，形成一種「維持現狀」與「改變現狀」兩大力量的相互拉鋸戰。
首先是日本政府積極想要維持其實質控制釣魚台的現狀，因此，日本為釣魚台主權爭議設下了「常態性的進入十二浬、長時間的停留在十二浬以及有組織性的大規模登島」等三道底線；而中國大陸則是頻頻想要改變由日本單獨控制釣魚台的現狀，為此，中國大陸陸續派出漁政船、海監船及海軍艦隊進入了釣魚台海域，不斷地在突破日本的防線，更不停地在測試日本的底線。
日本的防線不在本身的軍事力量，而是建構在美日同盟的基礎上，而當日本在逐漸失去美國的有力支持之後，它的防線只能不停地往後移，鐘擺也不斷地向中國大陸傾斜；而就在中國大陸不斷地衝撞「現狀」下，現在的情況似乎已經是主客易位了。
前日中國大陸海監船已經在釣魚台十二浬的海域內，開始執行驅離日本海上保安廳船隻的任務，這便是中國大陸在改變現狀之後，進一步開始想要製造、維持是由其實質控制釣魚台的「現狀」；當然大陸本身的軍事力量也藉由釣魚台主權爭議，一舉突破由美日所共同布下的西太平洋第一島鏈防線。
而在中國大陸改變了釣魚台的現狀之後，未來中日兩國的衝突是否會進一步升高呢？影響今後中日關係走向的因素有催化因素與制約因素兩大類型。催化因素是美國重返亞洲成為日本強而有力的後盾，其次是中國想要突破西太平洋第一島鏈的決心；而制約因素則是中日兩國緊密的經濟互賴關係，以及中國大陸「鬥而不破」的大戰略。以當前的情勢來看，在美國政府決定取消美日奪島演習計畫之後，美國似乎不希望被捲入中日的釣魚台主權爭議當中；而中國大陸在改變釣魚台現狀之後，早就已經達成突破西太平洋島鏈的軍事目的。
反觀在制約因素方面，中國大陸是日本的最大貿易國家，而日本也是中國大陸的第三大貿易國，日本是中國大陸最主要的投資國及技術來源國，中日兩國之間的經濟互賴不但深而且廣，中國大陸的反日情緒讓日本企業蒙受極大的損失，日本政府已經開始在尋找替代的市場，而日本企業的大規模撤資與停止技術輸入，同樣不利於中國大陸的經濟發展；其次中國大陸雖然對日本進行一連串的經濟戰、貿易戰及軍事戰，但是中國大陸卻還是維繫著與日本之間的高層外交對話管道，因此，中國大陸只是希望日本政府能夠改變釣魚台的國有化政策，而並非要擴大中日之間的軍事衝突。
由此可見，在制約因素大於催化因素之下，中日釣魚台主權爭議終將會逐漸降溫，現在就看雙方如何在適當的時間找到彼此的下台階。
而當中國大陸改變了釣魚台現狀，將會對我國產生兩項衝擊。首先是中國大陸對釣魚台議題產生政治影響力之後，中國大陸將會開始介入我國與日本之間的漁權談判，例如中國大陸政府之前便明白反對台日漁權談判談到涉及雙方主權的議題；其次，中國大陸軍事力量進入了釣魚台海域之後，由於釣魚台離我國本島只有不到一百二十浬，這將對我國的海防與空防造成相當大的衝擊與影響。
另外當中日兩國緊張關係逐漸降溫之後，我國必須慎防日本政府對於台日漁業會談態度的轉向，也就是說，當中日兩國關係漸趨於緩和之後，日本政府將不會繼續在漁業談判問題對台灣讓利，因此，建議台灣政府若要和日本進行漁業會談，最好的時機應該要選擇在中日高層會談之前，這樣台灣將會有更多的籌碼與日本政府就漁業會談議題進行協商。
其次是慎防台灣的國際話語權被邊緣化，若中日關係逐漸趨於緩和，中日兩國同意以外交談判的手段來解決釣魚台主權爭議，我國將會被排除在中日的談判桌之外，因此，我國政府應該要未雨綢繆，在近期內盡快推動「東海和平倡議」的後續行動，例如對外發表「東海行為準則」或是「東海行為宣言」，以持續強化我國在釣魚台議題的話語權。
當釣魚台現狀被改變之後，我國如何在和中、親美、友日的大戰略下，尋求台灣利益的最大化，將會是馬政府第二任期的當務之急。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2012
Summary: The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.
Full Text below:
The dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands has reached an apparent impasse. Forces maintaining the status quo and forces effecting change are tugging at each other.
Initially Japan wanted to maintain the status quo. It exercised de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands. Therefore it established three bottom lines. These include the maintenance of a 12 nautical mile limit, long term occupation of territory within the 12 nautical mile limit, and organized large-scale landings on the islands. Mainland China has long wanted to change this status quo, one in which Japan alone exercised control over the Diaoyutai Islands. To do this, Mainland China dispatched fishery boats, ocean surveillance ships, and naval fleets into the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. It constantly tried to break through Japan's defenses, to test Japan's resolve.
Japan's defenses do not consist of its own military forces. Instead it is based on the US-Japan alliance. When Japan loses support from the United States, its defenses are weakened. The pendulum will then swing toward Mainland China. With Mainland China constantly challenging the status quo, the situation has been reversed.
Recently Mainland China ocean surveillance ships sailed within 12 nautical miles of Diaoyutai Island waters. It began expelling Japanese Coast Guard vessels. Mainland China has changed the status quo. The next step is to establish its own de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands, and maintain a new status quo. Of course the Mainland is also using the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands to break through the first line of defense established by the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific island chain.
Mainland China has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. Will this lead to a further escalation of conflict between Mainland China and Japan? The future of relations between Mainland China and Japan will be determined by both catalysts and constraints. One catalyst is the United States' return to Asia as a strong backer for Japan. Another catalyst is Mainland China's determination to break through the first island chain in the Western Pacific. One constraint is the high degree of economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan, and Mainland China's strategy of "engaged struggle." Consider the status quo. The U.S. government cancelled its plans for joint island landing exercises between the United States and Japan. The United States apparently did not want to become caught up in a dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has already changed the status quo regarding Diaoyutai. It has already achieved its military goal by breaking through the Western Pacific island chain.
Now consider the constraints. Mainland China is Japan's largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's third largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's largest source of investments and technology. Economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan is both deep and wide. Anti-Japanese sentiment on Mainland China has cost Japanese companies heavily. The Japanese government has begun looking for alternative markets. Japanese companies have begun large-scale divestments and halted technology sharing. This is not conducive to the economic development of the Chinese mainland. Secondly, Mainland China and Japan may have engaged in economic warfare, trade warfare, and actual military warfare. But Mainland China continues to maintain high-level diplomatic contacts with Japan. Mainland China hopes the Japanese government will change its policy of nationalizing Diaoyutai. It does not want to expand the military conflict between Mainland China and Japan.
Clearly the constraints outweigh the catalysts. The conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands will eventually cool down. The two sides need to find a way to step down at the appropriate time.
Beijing has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. This has impacted Taipei in two wasys. Beijing has exercised its political influence in the Diaoyutai Islands. It will now intervene in fishing rights talks between Taipei and Tokyo. Beijing opposes any Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights negotiations that might bear on the sovereignty of the two parties. Secondly, Mainland Chinese military forces have entered waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. The Diaoyutai Islands are less than 20 nautical miles from the main island of Taiwan. This will have a significant impact on the ROC's coastal defenses and air defenses.
Tensions between the Mainland and Japan are gradually cooling. Taipei must be wary of changes in the Japanese government's position regarding Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights talks. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Tokyo will not continue making concessions to Taipei during fishing rights negotiations. Therefore, we recommend that Taipei hold fishing rights talks with Tokyo before high level talks are held between Beijing and Tokyo. Taipei will then have more chips to play with during fishing rights negotiations with Tokyo. .
Secondly, we must beware of the ROC's marginalization on the international stage. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Beijing and Tokyo have excluded Taipei from the bargaining table. Therefore Taipei must take precautions. It must follow-up on the "East China Sea Peace Initiative ." It must make public the "East China Sea Code of Conduct" or "East China Sea Declaration on Conduct." It must bolster the ROC's position on the Diaoyutai issue.
The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.
當釣魚台現狀被打破 我須掌握話語權
2012-11-02
中國時報
最近中日釣魚台主權爭議似乎陷入了對峙的僵局，形成一種「維持現狀」與「改變現狀」兩大力量的相互拉鋸戰。
首先是日本政府積極想要維持其實質控制釣魚台的現狀，因此，日本為釣魚台主權爭議設下了「常態性的進入十二浬、長時間的停留在十二浬以及有組織性的大規模登島」等三道底線；而中國大陸則是頻頻想要改變由日本單獨控制釣魚台的現狀，為此，中國大陸陸續派出漁政船、海監船及海軍艦隊進入了釣魚台海域，不斷地在突破日本的防線，更不停地在測試日本的底線。
日本的防線不在本身的軍事力量，而是建構在美日同盟的基礎上，而當日本在逐漸失去美國的有力支持之後，它的防線只能不停地往後移，鐘擺也不斷地向中國大陸傾斜；而就在中國大陸不斷地衝撞「現狀」下，現在的情況似乎已經是主客易位了。
前日中國大陸海監船已經在釣魚台十二浬的海域內，開始執行驅離日本海上保安廳船隻的任務，這便是中國大陸在改變現狀之後，進一步開始想要製造、維持是由其實質控制釣魚台的「現狀」；當然大陸本身的軍事力量也藉由釣魚台主權爭議，一舉突破由美日所共同布下的西太平洋第一島鏈防線。
而在中國大陸改變了釣魚台的現狀之後，未來中日兩國的衝突是否會進一步升高呢？影響今後中日關係走向的因素有催化因素與制約因素兩大類型。催化因素是美國重返亞洲成為日本強而有力的後盾，其次是中國想要突破西太平洋第一島鏈的決心；而制約因素則是中日兩國緊密的經濟互賴關係，以及中國大陸「鬥而不破」的大戰略。以當前的情勢來看，在美國政府決定取消美日奪島演習計畫之後，美國似乎不希望被捲入中日的釣魚台主權爭議當中；而中國大陸在改變釣魚台現狀之後，早就已經達成突破西太平洋島鏈的軍事目的。
反觀在制約因素方面，中國大陸是日本的最大貿易國家，而日本也是中國大陸的第三大貿易國，日本是中國大陸最主要的投資國及技術來源國，中日兩國之間的經濟互賴不但深而且廣，中國大陸的反日情緒讓日本企業蒙受極大的損失，日本政府已經開始在尋找替代的市場，而日本企業的大規模撤資與停止技術輸入，同樣不利於中國大陸的經濟發展；其次中國大陸雖然對日本進行一連串的經濟戰、貿易戰及軍事戰，但是中國大陸卻還是維繫著與日本之間的高層外交對話管道，因此，中國大陸只是希望日本政府能夠改變釣魚台的國有化政策，而並非要擴大中日之間的軍事衝突。
由此可見，在制約因素大於催化因素之下，中日釣魚台主權爭議終將會逐漸降溫，現在就看雙方如何在適當的時間找到彼此的下台階。
而當中國大陸改變了釣魚台現狀，將會對我國產生兩項衝擊。首先是中國大陸對釣魚台議題產生政治影響力之後，中國大陸將會開始介入我國與日本之間的漁權談判，例如中國大陸政府之前便明白反對台日漁權談判談到涉及雙方主權的議題；其次，中國大陸軍事力量進入了釣魚台海域之後，由於釣魚台離我國本島只有不到一百二十浬，這將對我國的海防與空防造成相當大的衝擊與影響。
另外當中日兩國緊張關係逐漸降溫之後，我國必須慎防日本政府對於台日漁業會談態度的轉向，也就是說，當中日兩國關係漸趨於緩和之後，日本政府將不會繼續在漁業談判問題對台灣讓利，因此，建議台灣政府若要和日本進行漁業會談，最好的時機應該要選擇在中日高層會談之前，這樣台灣將會有更多的籌碼與日本政府就漁業會談議題進行協商。
其次是慎防台灣的國際話語權被邊緣化，若中日關係逐漸趨於緩和，中日兩國同意以外交談判的手段來解決釣魚台主權爭議，我國將會被排除在中日的談判桌之外，因此，我國政府應該要未雨綢繆，在近期內盡快推動「東海和平倡議」的後續行動，例如對外發表「東海行為準則」或是「東海行為宣言」，以持續強化我國在釣魚台議題的話語權。
當釣魚台現狀被改變之後，我國如何在和中、親美、友日的大戰略下，尋求台灣利益的最大化，將會是馬政府第二任期的當務之急。
Legislative Yuan Benefits: No Legal Basis, No Benefits
Legislative Yuan Benefits: No Legal Basis, No Benefits
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2012
Summary: Legislators have been receiving "nine illegal fringe benefits." What's worse, legislators have been haggling over which of these benefits they must give up. A just solution will only be found in the moral high ground, in constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Full Text below:
Legislators have been receiving "nine illegal fringe benefits." What's worse, legislators have been haggling over which of these benefits they must give up. A just solution will only be found in the moral high ground, in constitutionalism and the rule of law.
This newspaper has stressed this from the very beginning. This particular scandal involves two major issues. One. The lack of any legal basis for these fringe benefits. Legislative Yuan President Wang Jinping cited Article 32 of the Legislative Yuan Organization Law. But Wang was "pointing at a deer and calling it a horse." He was confounding right and wrong. He dismissed his blunder as a legal technicality. But these same legislators have been mercilessly slashing condolence payments for military veterans, civil service employees, and public school teachers. They essentially hoist themselves on their own petard. Two. The illegal benefits are misnamed. For example, legislators who do not live at the Taan Hostel receive a 18,000 NT monthly subsidy. They receive at least three different transportation allowances, under three different names. This is not an isolated case.
From a constitutional law perspective, we can hardly remain silent. The Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making body in the land. Can it look people in the eye and tell them the law means nothing? Can members of the highest law-making body in the land really be allowed to pocket such huge subsidies? How can they explain themselves to the people? How can they look themselves in the eye? The Legislative Yuan is supposed to provide checks and balances on the Executive Yuan. It is the main battlefield for party politics. Legislators question members of the Executive. But as the saying goes, "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" Is there any constitutionalism or rule of law left to speak of?
Consider the moral high ground of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making body in the land. It must be the champion of justice, both substantively and procedurally. Yet every member of the Legislative Yuan has been illegally pocketing huge sums of illegal benefts. Justice, substantive or procedural, no longer exists. This scandal represents a decline in official ethics. Worse, it represents a gross violation of the constitution. But no one from the President of the Legislative Yuan on down has shown any sense of shame. Instead they have been haggling over which benefits they need not relinquish. They have been attempting to legalize their conduct, after the fact. In their eyes, the constitution is irrelevant. In their eyes, the law is irrelevant. In their eyes, the nationwide outrage is irrelevant. Is this conduct becoming of the nation's highest legislative body? Just how far do the 113 legislators of the KMT, DPP and other parties intend to go in their destruction of the constitution? Just how badly do they intend to undermine the dignity of the constitution and the credibility of the legislature?
Do legislators want to uphold constitutionism and the rule of law? Do they want the public to respect the rule of law? If they do, the Legislative Yuan has no alternative. Any benefits they have been pocketing without a legal basis must be relinquished, unconditionally. First these benefits must be relinquished. Only then may legislators begin anew. The President of the Legislative Yuan must rally the major party caucuses and offer a public apology. Current legislators must show that they still have consciences, that they still have a sense of shame. They must demonstrate their determination to uphold constitutionalism and the rule of law.
This is not a trivial matter that they can gloss over. This is landmark case that bears on constitutionalism and the rule of law. All benefits without a legal basis must be relinquished, in toto. This is substantive justice. After they have been relinquished the legislature can review them item by item. This is procedural justice. Starting over this way will uphold constitutionalism and the rule of law. How much in benefits should legislators receive? Legislators must not knowingly violate the law. They must not be allowed to enrich themselves. Only then can they rehabilitate the image of the Legislative Yuan. Only then can they ensure the survival of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
If we scrutinize the legislature's account books, we find that illegal benefts far exceed the 1.72 million NT in "nine illegal fringe benefits" per year. Altogether they amount to over 2 million NT per year. Legislators even receive "birthday gift certificates" worth 2000 NT. These too are illegal. This is not merely lawless. It is shameless. Therefore these benefits must all be relinquished. The legislature must start over, from scratch. At a minimum, it must abide by three principles. One. They cannot engage in "all you can eat." Even meals for the legislators' chauffeurs are part of the 1.7 million NT a year illegal fringe benefits. This is a case of "all you can eat" and "taking home leftovers." This is something even ordinary restaurant owners would never allow. Two. They cannot convert their illegal benefits into a slush fund. Some have proposed combining all their illegal benefits into one lump sum, with no itemization. This amounts to a slush fund with no standards whatsoever. Others have proposed passing new laws to legitimize their past and current violations. A variety of legislators have proposed a variety of ploys by which to legitimize their illegal fringe benefits. This too amounts to a slush fund. Neither of these two slush fund ploys is appropriate. Some other framework must be found that is objective and fair. Three. The solution must be transparent. Take high-speed rail tickets. Some legislators have allowed others to use their tickets on the sly. This amounts to corruption. Therefore, such write-offs must be made transparent, to prevent unscrupulous persons from misusing them. In short, ethical standards within the legislature cannot be allowed to sink to this level. Constitutionalism and the rule of law cannot be allowed to perish in this manner.
This is landmark case relevant to constitutionalism and the rule of law. The Legislative Yuan cannot treat the matter with contempt. The public must pay close attention to the matter. We look forward to the Legislative Yuan apologizing to the people. We are unwilling to see the Legislative Yuan reduced to the level of a crime syndicate engaged in embezzlement. The Legislative Yuan is the nation's highest law-making body. We call upon President Wang and every member of the legislature who cares about constitutionalism and the rule of law to solemnly confront the issue of the "nine illegal fringe benefits."
立院應示範自宮 沒有法源先全刪
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.01
九Ａ立委事件，竟陷入立委之間討價還價的醜態；我們認為，必須從憲政正義的高度切入，始能得到正確的解決方案。
本報自始指出，此案的兩大爭議在於：一、沒有法源依據。王金平院長後來引據的法源，如《立法委員行為法》第十三條、《立法院組織法》第卅二條，皆是指鹿為馬；至於說是「措施性法律」，則與立委據此大砍軍公教慰問金對照，更是自批其頰。二、名不副實。例如，不住大安會館者每月有一‧八萬元的補貼，及交通津貼至少用不同名目重複Ａ了三次等等，不一而足。
從憲政正義的高度來看，我們要問：立法院是國家最高立法機關，能否在此案中告訴國人，法律為何物？而最高立法機關的國會議員，居然支領如此巨額的「非法津貼」，如何向國人交代？更如何向自己的廉恥交代？也要問：立法院一方面為行政機關的監督制衡部門，另一方面又是政黨政治的主要戰場，立委在質詢問政時，連對方的頭髮及恥毛都恨不得要剃光，若竟不刮自己滿臉的騷鬍子，豈有憲政正義可言？
就憲政正義的高度言，立法院既是國家最高立法機關，當然亦應是法律「實質正義」及「程序正義」的護持者；今日發生全院委員一同盜領全無法源依據的巨額「非法」津貼，「實質正義」不存，「程序正義」蕩然，這不僅是政風沉淪的大醜聞，更是無以復加的憲政罪行。然而，自院長以下竟似全無憲政廉恥，猶在共謀討價還價、就地合法的勾當；這是視憲法若無物、視法律若無物，亦視全國憤恨傷痛的民心若無物。試問：這是國家最高立法機關應有的精神與形象嗎？國民兩大黨及本屆一一三名立法委員欲將憲政正義糟蹋至何地？又欲將立法院的憲政尊嚴及公信力踐踏至何地？
若要維護憲政正義，若欲讓國人知道法律為何物，立法院現在其實沒有第二個選擇，那就是凡無法源的津貼一律全刪，待刪光之後，再從頭循立法途徑救濟。而且，在此之前，應由院長率領主要黨團公開向國人表達歉悔之意，以示本屆立委尚是明廉知恥之徒，不敢玷汙毀傷憲政正義。
這不是一件可以和稀泥的小事，而應視為攸關憲政正義的典範事件。沒有法源的津貼應當一律全刪，過去種種譬如昨日死，這是「實質正義」；刪完之後，再循立法運作逐項檢討，往後種種譬如今日生，這是「程序正義」。如此始是這件憲政公案的正確解決之方，立委該領多少津貼已是其次的問題，問題的核心在立法者不可知法犯法，尤不容非法自肥。亦唯如此，始能重建立法院的形象，並維護憲政正義於不墜。
掀開立法院的地毯，發現立委津貼的浮濫遠遠不僅九Ａ每年一七二萬元而已，加總起來當破每年二百萬元，例如立委甚至領有「生日禮券」二千元，亦由非法津貼支付；這不僅是「無法無天」，亦簡直是「忝不知恥」了。因而，全刪，重新立法，至少應當遵循三項原則：一、不可「吃到飽」。連立委司機的會期餐費每年一‧六萬元也用非法津貼支付，這簡直是「吃到飽」還要打包，恐怕連一般餐廳老闆也不答應吧。二、不能「大水庫」。有人主張化零為整，不分細目，給筆總數，這是漫無標準的「大水庫」；另有人主張，巧立名目，聽由各別立委在不同名目間挪移運用，這也是「大水庫」。這兩種「大水庫」皆非所宜，而必須有一分項別目的架構，以求客觀公允。三、必須「透明化」。例如高鐵票，竟有立委盜供他人使用，此已與貪瀆無異；因此，對此類項目應有一核銷及徵信的透明設計，以防不肖者。總之，國會政風不可沉淪至此，憲政正義尤不可毀敗至此。
這是一個憲政正義的典範事件。立法院不可輕視此事，國人尤應重視此事。我們期待立法院對國人道歉，因為我們不願見立法院淪為監守自盜的不法集團。應知，立法院是國家最高立法機關，籲請王院長率全體委員以憲政正義的品味及高度面對九A立委的嚴正質疑。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2012
Summary: Legislators have been receiving "nine illegal fringe benefits." What's worse, legislators have been haggling over which of these benefits they must give up. A just solution will only be found in the moral high ground, in constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Full Text below:
Legislators have been receiving "nine illegal fringe benefits." What's worse, legislators have been haggling over which of these benefits they must give up. A just solution will only be found in the moral high ground, in constitutionalism and the rule of law.
This newspaper has stressed this from the very beginning. This particular scandal involves two major issues. One. The lack of any legal basis for these fringe benefits. Legislative Yuan President Wang Jinping cited Article 32 of the Legislative Yuan Organization Law. But Wang was "pointing at a deer and calling it a horse." He was confounding right and wrong. He dismissed his blunder as a legal technicality. But these same legislators have been mercilessly slashing condolence payments for military veterans, civil service employees, and public school teachers. They essentially hoist themselves on their own petard. Two. The illegal benefits are misnamed. For example, legislators who do not live at the Taan Hostel receive a 18,000 NT monthly subsidy. They receive at least three different transportation allowances, under three different names. This is not an isolated case.
From a constitutional law perspective, we can hardly remain silent. The Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making body in the land. Can it look people in the eye and tell them the law means nothing? Can members of the highest law-making body in the land really be allowed to pocket such huge subsidies? How can they explain themselves to the people? How can they look themselves in the eye? The Legislative Yuan is supposed to provide checks and balances on the Executive Yuan. It is the main battlefield for party politics. Legislators question members of the Executive. But as the saying goes, "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" Is there any constitutionalism or rule of law left to speak of?
Consider the moral high ground of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The Legislative Yuan is the highest law-making body in the land. It must be the champion of justice, both substantively and procedurally. Yet every member of the Legislative Yuan has been illegally pocketing huge sums of illegal benefts. Justice, substantive or procedural, no longer exists. This scandal represents a decline in official ethics. Worse, it represents a gross violation of the constitution. But no one from the President of the Legislative Yuan on down has shown any sense of shame. Instead they have been haggling over which benefits they need not relinquish. They have been attempting to legalize their conduct, after the fact. In their eyes, the constitution is irrelevant. In their eyes, the law is irrelevant. In their eyes, the nationwide outrage is irrelevant. Is this conduct becoming of the nation's highest legislative body? Just how far do the 113 legislators of the KMT, DPP and other parties intend to go in their destruction of the constitution? Just how badly do they intend to undermine the dignity of the constitution and the credibility of the legislature?
Do legislators want to uphold constitutionism and the rule of law? Do they want the public to respect the rule of law? If they do, the Legislative Yuan has no alternative. Any benefits they have been pocketing without a legal basis must be relinquished, unconditionally. First these benefits must be relinquished. Only then may legislators begin anew. The President of the Legislative Yuan must rally the major party caucuses and offer a public apology. Current legislators must show that they still have consciences, that they still have a sense of shame. They must demonstrate their determination to uphold constitutionalism and the rule of law.
This is not a trivial matter that they can gloss over. This is landmark case that bears on constitutionalism and the rule of law. All benefits without a legal basis must be relinquished, in toto. This is substantive justice. After they have been relinquished the legislature can review them item by item. This is procedural justice. Starting over this way will uphold constitutionalism and the rule of law. How much in benefits should legislators receive? Legislators must not knowingly violate the law. They must not be allowed to enrich themselves. Only then can they rehabilitate the image of the Legislative Yuan. Only then can they ensure the survival of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
If we scrutinize the legislature's account books, we find that illegal benefts far exceed the 1.72 million NT in "nine illegal fringe benefits" per year. Altogether they amount to over 2 million NT per year. Legislators even receive "birthday gift certificates" worth 2000 NT. These too are illegal. This is not merely lawless. It is shameless. Therefore these benefits must all be relinquished. The legislature must start over, from scratch. At a minimum, it must abide by three principles. One. They cannot engage in "all you can eat." Even meals for the legislators' chauffeurs are part of the 1.7 million NT a year illegal fringe benefits. This is a case of "all you can eat" and "taking home leftovers." This is something even ordinary restaurant owners would never allow. Two. They cannot convert their illegal benefits into a slush fund. Some have proposed combining all their illegal benefits into one lump sum, with no itemization. This amounts to a slush fund with no standards whatsoever. Others have proposed passing new laws to legitimize their past and current violations. A variety of legislators have proposed a variety of ploys by which to legitimize their illegal fringe benefits. This too amounts to a slush fund. Neither of these two slush fund ploys is appropriate. Some other framework must be found that is objective and fair. Three. The solution must be transparent. Take high-speed rail tickets. Some legislators have allowed others to use their tickets on the sly. This amounts to corruption. Therefore, such write-offs must be made transparent, to prevent unscrupulous persons from misusing them. In short, ethical standards within the legislature cannot be allowed to sink to this level. Constitutionalism and the rule of law cannot be allowed to perish in this manner.
This is landmark case relevant to constitutionalism and the rule of law. The Legislative Yuan cannot treat the matter with contempt. The public must pay close attention to the matter. We look forward to the Legislative Yuan apologizing to the people. We are unwilling to see the Legislative Yuan reduced to the level of a crime syndicate engaged in embezzlement. The Legislative Yuan is the nation's highest law-making body. We call upon President Wang and every member of the legislature who cares about constitutionalism and the rule of law to solemnly confront the issue of the "nine illegal fringe benefits."
立院應示範自宮 沒有法源先全刪
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.01
九Ａ立委事件，竟陷入立委之間討價還價的醜態；我們認為，必須從憲政正義的高度切入，始能得到正確的解決方案。
本報自始指出，此案的兩大爭議在於：一、沒有法源依據。王金平院長後來引據的法源，如《立法委員行為法》第十三條、《立法院組織法》第卅二條，皆是指鹿為馬；至於說是「措施性法律」，則與立委據此大砍軍公教慰問金對照，更是自批其頰。二、名不副實。例如，不住大安會館者每月有一‧八萬元的補貼，及交通津貼至少用不同名目重複Ａ了三次等等，不一而足。
從憲政正義的高度來看，我們要問：立法院是國家最高立法機關，能否在此案中告訴國人，法律為何物？而最高立法機關的國會議員，居然支領如此巨額的「非法津貼」，如何向國人交代？更如何向自己的廉恥交代？也要問：立法院一方面為行政機關的監督制衡部門，另一方面又是政黨政治的主要戰場，立委在質詢問政時，連對方的頭髮及恥毛都恨不得要剃光，若竟不刮自己滿臉的騷鬍子，豈有憲政正義可言？
就憲政正義的高度言，立法院既是國家最高立法機關，當然亦應是法律「實質正義」及「程序正義」的護持者；今日發生全院委員一同盜領全無法源依據的巨額「非法」津貼，「實質正義」不存，「程序正義」蕩然，這不僅是政風沉淪的大醜聞，更是無以復加的憲政罪行。然而，自院長以下竟似全無憲政廉恥，猶在共謀討價還價、就地合法的勾當；這是視憲法若無物、視法律若無物，亦視全國憤恨傷痛的民心若無物。試問：這是國家最高立法機關應有的精神與形象嗎？國民兩大黨及本屆一一三名立法委員欲將憲政正義糟蹋至何地？又欲將立法院的憲政尊嚴及公信力踐踏至何地？
若要維護憲政正義，若欲讓國人知道法律為何物，立法院現在其實沒有第二個選擇，那就是凡無法源的津貼一律全刪，待刪光之後，再從頭循立法途徑救濟。而且，在此之前，應由院長率領主要黨團公開向國人表達歉悔之意，以示本屆立委尚是明廉知恥之徒，不敢玷汙毀傷憲政正義。
這不是一件可以和稀泥的小事，而應視為攸關憲政正義的典範事件。沒有法源的津貼應當一律全刪，過去種種譬如昨日死，這是「實質正義」；刪完之後，再循立法運作逐項檢討，往後種種譬如今日生，這是「程序正義」。如此始是這件憲政公案的正確解決之方，立委該領多少津貼已是其次的問題，問題的核心在立法者不可知法犯法，尤不容非法自肥。亦唯如此，始能重建立法院的形象，並維護憲政正義於不墜。
掀開立法院的地毯，發現立委津貼的浮濫遠遠不僅九Ａ每年一七二萬元而已，加總起來當破每年二百萬元，例如立委甚至領有「生日禮券」二千元，亦由非法津貼支付；這不僅是「無法無天」，亦簡直是「忝不知恥」了。因而，全刪，重新立法，至少應當遵循三項原則：一、不可「吃到飽」。連立委司機的會期餐費每年一‧六萬元也用非法津貼支付，這簡直是「吃到飽」還要打包，恐怕連一般餐廳老闆也不答應吧。二、不能「大水庫」。有人主張化零為整，不分細目，給筆總數，這是漫無標準的「大水庫」；另有人主張，巧立名目，聽由各別立委在不同名目間挪移運用，這也是「大水庫」。這兩種「大水庫」皆非所宜，而必須有一分項別目的架構，以求客觀公允。三、必須「透明化」。例如高鐵票，竟有立委盜供他人使用，此已與貪瀆無異；因此，對此類項目應有一核銷及徵信的透明設計，以防不肖者。總之，國會政風不可沉淪至此，憲政正義尤不可毀敗至此。
這是一個憲政正義的典範事件。立法院不可輕視此事，國人尤應重視此事。我們期待立法院對國人道歉，因為我們不願見立法院淪為監守自盜的不法集團。應知，立法院是國家最高立法機關，籲請王院長率全體委員以憲政正義的品味及高度面對九A立委的嚴正質疑。
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