Number Four Nuclear Power Plant Referendum: Process vs. Results
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 12, 2013
Summary: The appeal of the anti-nuclear camp slogan "I am human. I am
anti-nuclear" is simple and powerful. But it condemns anyone who
dissents. It morally impugns anyone who thinks differently. It hinders
debate and communication. It turns the referendum into a war between
"humans" and "sub-humans." This is hardly consistent with respect for
science and reason. The ruling and opposition parties must be
more open-minded. They must not care only about winning. After all, the
consequences must be borne by everyone.
Full text below:
The fate of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) will be determined through a public referendum. This may mislead people into thinking that is the purpose of the referendum. People may conclude that the referendum is merely a showdown between those who favor and oppose the 4NPP, and that whoever has the numbers, will get their way. In fact, the referendum process is more important that the results. Only dissent and debate can lead to a referendum result consistent with the greater good. Only that can ensure that those who failed to get their way will not feel aggrieved and endlessly complain.
Alas, the Ma administration and the anti-nuclear camp have yet to engage in much in-depth debate. Nor have they contributed to rational debate among the public. Taipower's report is still filled with jargon. It fails to answer public doubts in plain language. Anti-nuke activists persist in their monotonous "I am human. I am anti-nuke." rhetoric. They refuse to acknowledge how difficult it is to develop alternative energy sources. The Ma administration's first wave of propaganda reeked of political calculation. It accused Green Camp elders of flip-flopping. This may expose the two-faced nature of the Democratic Progressive Party. But it fails to address larger public concerns.
Concern only for the outcome of the referendum is bound to undermine rational debate. Both the ruling and opposition parties have committed the same mistakes. The Ma administration has yet to offer any framework-oriented talking points. Instead, it blindly attacks the anti-nuclear groups, without any consideration for the results. This approach is unlikely to be effective. Environmental groups or the Mothers League are unlikely to change their positions. Government attempts to reach out have repeatedly been rebuffed. This merely fuels anti-nuclear sentiment. Conversely, the anti-nuclear camp may enjoy considerable public support. They have repeatedly questioned Taipower's moral posture. But they have yet to tour the 4NPP, and refuse to do so. When they hold talks with government officials, they blindly harp on whether the government is "merely patting them on the head." Such attitudes leave the impression that they are preoccupied with moral posturing, and myopically ignoring the need to cope with the harsh realities of Taiwan.
The 4NPP referendum process is more important than the results. Why? Because only rational debate can lead to a rational outcome. Making a choice is easy. Thinking is not. A choice made without thinking is dangerous. This is true regardless of whether one is anti-nuke or pro-nuke.
Before one votes on whether to halt or continue construction on the 4NPP, one should ask a number of questions. One. Security considerations. Can the government and Taipower safely operate the 4NPP for four decades? Have they improved the facilities or increased supervision to ensure safe operation? Two. Alternatives. Taiwan is taking the non-nuclear road. Sooner or later, alternative energy sources must be found. What will the energy supply consist of? Can they realistically be implemented? Three. Responsibility for the consequences. Those who urge continued construction of the 4NPP must assume responsibility for its safety. By the same token, those who demand halting construction on the 4NPP must assume responsibility for electricity rate increases, for power outages, for weakened economic competitiveness, even damage to the environment resulting from the adoption of other forms of power. Can the public on Taiwan withstand the impact of these changes?
A full debate must take place. People must understand what changes the existing energy supply will undergo. They must understand that the percentage of renewable energy will have to be increased. They must understand that their daily lives and industrial development will be impacted. They must accept increased electricity rates, no matter how high. Providing the public understands this before it scraps the 4NPP and takes Taiwan in a new direction, it should be considered a positive development. The fear is that the two sides will resort to fear-mongering and baseless accusations. The fear is that once construction on the 4NPP is halted, no alternative energy sources will be available. The fear is that the public will not be able to tolerate increased electricity rates, and will complain about power shortages. Industries may even need to relocate. In that case, the referendum will be a formula for disaster.
If one cares only about results, Chen Shui-bian could claim to be an "anti-nuclear prophet." When everyone was high on anti-nuke euphoria, he ordered a halt on 4NPP construction. But because construction on the 4NPP was halted and restarted, few believe it is safe. In other words, Chen Shui-bian planted the seeds of disaster -- precisely because he hastily ordered a construction halt. His actions led to punitive damages for breach of contract, added costs, and changes in the design. No one knows how it will end.
The appeal of the anti-nuclear camp slogan "I am human. I am anti-nuclear" is simple and powerful. But it condemns anyone who dissents. It morally impugns anyone who thinks differently. It hinders debate and communication. It turns the referendum into a war between "humans" and "sub-humans." This is hardly consistent with respect for science and reason.
The ruling and opposition parties must be more open-minded. They must not care only about winning. After all, the consequences must be borne by everyone.
核四公投的過程論與目的論
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.12 03:04 am
核四存廢將交由公投決定,很容易讓人產生一種「目的論」的錯覺,以為這無非是正反雙方各自號召群眾一決高下,哪邊人多哪邊得勝。事實上,公投更重要的是在「過程」,唯有經過不同意見的反覆錘煉和思辨,人們才能在公投中得出合乎最大公共利益的選擇,更不致在日後面對非預期變化時懊惱不已或怨天尤人。
然而,觀察最近馬政府與反核團體的互動,卻感受不到多少深度辯論的火花,或有助於人們理性思辨的觀點。台電的報告依舊充滿專業術語,無法用淺白的說明來解答民眾疑惑;反核人士則固守「我是人,我反核」的單調論述,不願直視台灣發展替代能源的困境。馬政府的首波文宣更是充滿政治算計,直接攻擊綠營元老重臣的今是昨非,這雖可點破民進黨的兩張臉孔,卻脫離了向廣大群眾訴求的重點。
若一心只在意公投的勝負,勢必使理性辯論的過程受到侵蝕,但目前看來,朝野似乎都犯了相同的毛病。馬政府至今尚未針對全民提出任何架構性的說帖,卻一味想從反核團體下手,不論其策略考量為何,結局恐將事倍功半。因為,環保團體或媽媽聯盟都是最不可能動搖的一塊,而政府一再溝通碰壁,反將助長反核聲勢。另一方面,反核陣線雖凝聚了可觀的社會支持,但他們一再以道德主義的立場質疑台電,卻連進入核四廠區實地考察也不肯走一趟;與政府官員座談時,又一味掛慮著有無「被摸頭」的問題。這樣的態度,可能使反核論述停留在理想主義的高調,使人們忽略了對台灣現實條件及日後調整因應的關注,恐將留下短視之禍。
之所以說核四公投的「過程」比「結果」更重要,原因正在於此:要有理性的思辨,才有成熟的公投果實。選擇很簡單,但思考則不容易;沒有經過深刻思考的選擇,是危險的,無論反核或擁核都一樣。
從這個觀點看,在投下核四續建或停建的一票前,人們至少必須追問幾個不同層次的問題:第一,安全性的考慮:政府和台電有沒有維持核四廠四十年安全運轉的能力?有否透過設施改良或加強監督以確保安全的手段?第二,替代性的選擇:台灣走向非核之路,就長期或短期而言,在電力供應上有多少替代能源的選項?它們的分配比重如何?有沒有具體實現的可能?第三,後果的承擔:續建核四有安全風險必須承擔,同樣的,停建核四則有電價上漲、電力供應不繼、經濟競爭力削弱的後果,乃至因發展其他形態電力而引發新的環境破壞或景觀改變的問題,台灣社會對這些變動的承受能力如何?
如果經過充分的辯論,人們認知台灣現有電力結構必須逐步調整,再生能源的比重必須調高,日常生活和工業發展的形態必須改變,再高的電價也可以接受;那麼,即使公投廢了核四,卻因而促使台灣走向全新的發展方向,亦應該視為極可貴的一步。怕的是,在過程中雙方一味彼此恐嚇指摘,公投廢核之後卻拿不出替代辦法,最後民眾更因受不了漲價及缺電之苦而怨聲載道,甚至企業紛紛外移;那麼,這場公投將是無邊的災難。
若從「結果論」看,陳水扁大可以「反核先知」自居,因此在眾人皆醉之際,他就率先下令核四停工。但若從「過程論」看,今天核四鬧到停工又復建以致沒人敢信其安全的地步,不正是因為阿扁貿然下令停工種下的災難?遂致違約賠款、追加預算、變更設計,終致不知如何收場。
反核團體的口號「我是人,我反核」,雖是簡單有力的訴求,卻隱含譴責異己、排拒不同思考的道德暗示,也阻礙了雙方的辯論和溝通。把公投上綱為「人」與「非人」之戰,恐怕不符科學理性精神。
請朝野都拿出更開放的態度,進行這場公投辯論。不要一味只想著誰勝誰負,畢竟,所有後果是要全民共同承擔的。
從臺北看天下 . chinese language newspaper editorials . translated by bevin chu . no endorsement of the editorials should be inferred
Thursday, April 11, 2013
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
New Cross-Strait Strategic Scenario: Pragmatic Exchanges, No More Unilateral Concessions
New Cross-Strait Strategic Scenario:
Pragmatic Exchanges, No More Unilateral Concessions
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 11, 2013
Summary: Following the Siew Xi Meeting, Vincent Siew urged the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to Lien Chan's slogan when he met Xi Jinping. "One China, Cross-strait peace, mutually beneficial integration, revitalizing the Chinese nation." The vision is even more far-sighted. It more closely echoes Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream." But the Ma administration must rise above internal political interference and international strategic constraints. It must change its increasingly conservative cross-Strait thinking. Otherwise, as US academic Richard Bush noted about cross-Strait relations, time will not be on Taiwan's side.
Full text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Boao Forum for Asia that attracted widespread attention. Its theme was "Asia and the world work together to create a better future." Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula. Observers are focused on how Mainland China intends to deal with North Korea. They are attempting to ascertain, based on Xi's speech, whether relations between the PRC and the DPRK have changed. Xi stressed that no one should "create regional and global chaos for selfish motives." They wondered whether Xi's statement constituted to a threat to use force against North Korea.
Observers differ on whether Xi Jinping's speech was directed at North Korea. The theme of his speech suggests it was motivated primarily by the desire to establish a mechanism for geopolitical security, including economic and trade cooperation. This obviously, is not something the authorities in North Korea support, especially since Xi urged the international community to promote collective security. Xi said that "When national governments maintain frequent exchanges, collisions are inevitable." He said a mechanism for collective security can resolve differences and conflicts. This was a reminder to the U.S. not to seize the opportunity to stir up trouble on the Korean Peninsula, then use the trouble as a pretext to to resume Cold War containment.
Taipei should be concerned about another aspect of Xi Jinping's speech. Xi repeatedly referred to the "Chinese Dream." He said "I hope that by the year 2020, the gross domestic product will double, creating a moderately prosperous society. I hope that by mid-century we can have a prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country, and achieve a renaissance for the Chinese people." This was not the first time Xi Jinping spoke of the Chinese dream. But it was the first time he affirmed it in an international setting. It was the first time he mentioned it since becoming the highest ranking member of the Mainland government. His reasons for doing so, and the far-reaching consequences for cross-Strait relations, are worth pondering.
First of all, Xi Jinping's speech revealed how the new generation of Mainland leaders' International and strategic vision differs from that of past past leaders. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and other leaders pursued a "low profile" foreign policy. Their policy may survive into the future. But it will gradually include active participation, collective cooperation, openness and inclusiveness. This reflects changes in the Mainland's strength. But it also reflects the psychological background of the Xi Li generation, who received their education during the Cultural Revolution. They experienced unforgettable hardships and a history of humiliation. They are eager to restore national pride among the Chinese people. They want them to have confidence in the future.
Consider the Mainland's strategic interests. The most important issue now, is achieving moderate prosperity, and by the middle of this century, establishing a modern nation. Xi Jinping spoke of a grand renaissance of the Chinese people, of a "Chinese Dream." Absent a peaceful internal and external environment, such an ambitious goal will remain empty talk. That is why Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed the importance of peace. He said peace was "like air and sunlight. If you have it, you are unaware of it. But once you lose it, it is difficult to regain." Altogether, he made a total of 14 references to peace. He said ensuring peace was the responsibility of major nations. He said peace was essential to their long-term prosperity.
Peace is indispensable for the Mainland's development. Therefore it is indispensable for cross-Strait relations. The past five years of cross-Strait peaceful development have brought the two sides closer together. A shooting war between the two sides is now nearly impossible. Cross-Strait relations have improved. Mainland power has increased. Mainland modernization has accelerated. Mainland authorities are increasingly confident. Cross-Strait peace is now linked to peaceful reunification. This is something the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should take note of. The new generation of Mainland leaders holds different views on cross-Strait issues.
What are those views? Recently the "Wang Bao" interviewed Zhang Nianshi, a Mainland think tank analyst who specializes in Taiwan affairs. Zhang commented on the new generation of Mainland leaders. He thinks that Xi and Li perceive Taiwan differently than Hu JIntao. Hu Jintao hoped to change hearts and minds on Taiwan. He was willing to make generous concessions to Taiwan. Xi and Li may not share his attitude. Li Keqiang once said, "Between brothers, anything is negotiable." The implication was that if we aren't brothers, then you can forget about concessions. As Zhang sees it, cross-Strait economic and trade consultations will require more explicit confirmations that the two sides are in fact brothers. Otherwise, the Mainland will not be making any concessions.
During the Boao Forum Xi Jinping spoke with Vincent Siew. He stressed how compatriots on both sides are one family. They all belong to the same Chinese nation. The cross-Strait economy is part of China's economy. The Mainland will give more consideration to the needs and interests of Taiwan compatriots. This shows that the new generation of Mainland leaders are increasingly confident about the Taiwan issue as they pursue the "Chinese dream." More and more they see compatriates who see themselves as members of the same family, as a necessary precondition to improved cross-Strait cooperation. This illustrates the pragmatic style of the new Mainland leaders. This shows that cross-Strait exchanges will become increasingly pragmatic. The Mainland will no longer grant unilateral concessions. Instead, it will seek truth from facts. Its ritual gesture to Vincent Siew was merely based on VIP protocol. It will no longer make special concessions.
Following the Siew Xi Meeting, Vincent Siew urged the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to Lien Chan's slogan when he met Xi Jinping. "One China, Cross-strait peace, mutually beneficial integration, revitalizing the Chinese nation." The vision is even more far-sighted. It more closely echoes Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream." But the Ma administration must rise above internal political interference and international strategic constraints. It must change its increasingly conservative cross-Strait thinking. Otherwise, as US academic Richard Bush noted about cross-Strait relations, time will not be on Taiwan's side.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.04.11
社論-兩岸新局:務實交流 大陸不再無端讓利
本報訊
大陸國家主席習近平日前在博鰲亞洲論壇,發表題為「共同創造亞洲和世界的美好未來」演說,受到各方關注。正當朝鮮半島情勢緊張之際,外界多聚焦於中方如何應對朝鮮危局,試圖從習的演說中探悉中朝關係是否生變;而習在演說中強調不能「為一己之私把一個地區乃至世界搞亂」,更被形容是針對北韓武嚇舉措而發。
習近平的演說是否針對北韓而發,各界有不同見解;從他的演講主題來看,主要是以倡議建立地緣政治的集體安全,以及包括經濟貿易的合作為主,而這顯然不是北韓所能承擔的。尤其習主張國際社會應該倡導綜合安全、共同安全、合作安全的理念,作為「各國交往頻繁,難免磕磕碰碰」時,解決分歧矛盾的機制;如果說這也是在提醒美國勿趁勢挑起朝鮮半島危局,藉此重建冷戰圍堵結構而來,似乎還更準確些。
對台灣來說,更應該關注的是習近平演說的另一個重點,也就是他再次提到「中國夢」的奮鬥目標─「希望到二○二○年,國內生產總值翻一番,全面建成小康社會,到本世紀中葉建成富強民主文明和諧的社會主義現代化國家,實現中華民族的偉大復興」。這不是習近平第一次談中國夢,卻是他當上大陸最高領導人後,首次在國際場域宣示中國夢的奮鬥目標,箇中深意以及對未來兩岸關係的影響,十分值得探究。
首先,習近平演說充分顯示,大陸新一代領導人的國際視野與戰略格局,已經大大不同於以往;歷經鄧小平、江澤民、胡錦濤等幾代領導人所奉行不逾的「韜光養晦」外交路線,未來即使還存在,也將逐漸被新的積極參與、集體合作、開放包容等內涵所填補。這種轉變當然與大陸整體國力提升有關,但也反映出習李這一代文革知青的心理背景,他們經歷過刻骨銘心的磨難,對過往歷史充滿屈辱感,渴望建立中國人的民族驕傲,面對未來,充滿信心。
從大陸的國家戰略利益來說,眼前最重要課題是如何實現全面小康,進而在本世紀中葉建設成為一個現代化國家,實現習近平所稱的中華民族偉大復興的「中國夢」,倘若沒有一個和平的內外環境,上述遠大目標勢必淪為空談。因此,習近平才會在演說中反覆強調和平的重要,「猶如空氣和陽光,受益而不覺,失之則難存」,前後共十四次提到和平二字,既是用以彰顯大國意識的責任,也是基於長遠圖強之所需。
「和平」既然是大陸國家發展的「硬道理」,兩岸問題自然也離不開這一軌道。毫無疑問,兩岸經過五年來的和平發展,彼此的關係已更趨緊密,雙方炮火相向的可能性近乎於零。而隨著兩岸關係的深化,特別是大陸國力提升與現代化進程的加速推進,大陸當局已越來越有信心把兩岸和平發展與兩岸的和平統一連結一起。這當中最值得台灣朝野關注的,是大陸新一代領導人對兩岸問題的看法已經發生變化。
什麼變化呢?大陸涉台智庫學者章念馳最近接受《旺報》訪問時,提到他對大陸新一代領導人的觀察。他認為習李對台灣的看法與胡錦濤不一樣,胡錦濤希望改變台灣人的認同,願意不計代價對台讓利,習李可能就沒有這種觀念,李克強曾說「兄弟之間什麼都好談」,言外之意,不是兄弟就免談。因此他判斷,未來兩岸經貿協商,除非兄弟關係更加確定,否則大陸不會讓利。
博鰲論壇上習近平與蕭萬長會談時,強調「兩岸同胞都是一家人,同屬中華民族、兩岸經濟同屬中華經濟,大陸會多考慮台灣同胞需求與利益」,足證大陸新一代領導人在實現「中國夢」的使命下,對台灣問題不但越來越有信心,而且是以同胞手足一家人的民族認同,作為雙方深化合作的必要前提。這顯示出大陸新領導人的務實作風,未來兩岸關係因此將走向務實交流,大陸不可能再無端讓利,一切實事求是,即使像蕭萬長座位這種儀式性的動作,也只按照出席貴賓的重要性來安排,不再刻意破格接待。
蕭萬長在蕭習會後的記者會上,提出:「面對新局、共築願景、攜手亞太、振興中華」十六字,相較於之前連戰會見習近平提出的「一個中國、兩岸和平、互利融合、振興中華」,格局更見寬廣,也與習近平的「中國夢」相為呼應;但如果馬政府無法超脫內部政治干擾與國際因素的制約,不去改變近來益趨保守的兩岸思維,那麼未來幾年的兩岸關係發展恐怕就將如美國學者卜睿哲所預見的趨於遲緩,而時間並非站在台灣這一邊。
Pragmatic Exchanges, No More Unilateral Concessions
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 11, 2013
Summary: Following the Siew Xi Meeting, Vincent Siew urged the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to Lien Chan's slogan when he met Xi Jinping. "One China, Cross-strait peace, mutually beneficial integration, revitalizing the Chinese nation." The vision is even more far-sighted. It more closely echoes Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream." But the Ma administration must rise above internal political interference and international strategic constraints. It must change its increasingly conservative cross-Strait thinking. Otherwise, as US academic Richard Bush noted about cross-Strait relations, time will not be on Taiwan's side.
Full text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Boao Forum for Asia that attracted widespread attention. Its theme was "Asia and the world work together to create a better future." Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula. Observers are focused on how Mainland China intends to deal with North Korea. They are attempting to ascertain, based on Xi's speech, whether relations between the PRC and the DPRK have changed. Xi stressed that no one should "create regional and global chaos for selfish motives." They wondered whether Xi's statement constituted to a threat to use force against North Korea.
Observers differ on whether Xi Jinping's speech was directed at North Korea. The theme of his speech suggests it was motivated primarily by the desire to establish a mechanism for geopolitical security, including economic and trade cooperation. This obviously, is not something the authorities in North Korea support, especially since Xi urged the international community to promote collective security. Xi said that "When national governments maintain frequent exchanges, collisions are inevitable." He said a mechanism for collective security can resolve differences and conflicts. This was a reminder to the U.S. not to seize the opportunity to stir up trouble on the Korean Peninsula, then use the trouble as a pretext to to resume Cold War containment.
Taipei should be concerned about another aspect of Xi Jinping's speech. Xi repeatedly referred to the "Chinese Dream." He said "I hope that by the year 2020, the gross domestic product will double, creating a moderately prosperous society. I hope that by mid-century we can have a prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country, and achieve a renaissance for the Chinese people." This was not the first time Xi Jinping spoke of the Chinese dream. But it was the first time he affirmed it in an international setting. It was the first time he mentioned it since becoming the highest ranking member of the Mainland government. His reasons for doing so, and the far-reaching consequences for cross-Strait relations, are worth pondering.
First of all, Xi Jinping's speech revealed how the new generation of Mainland leaders' International and strategic vision differs from that of past past leaders. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and other leaders pursued a "low profile" foreign policy. Their policy may survive into the future. But it will gradually include active participation, collective cooperation, openness and inclusiveness. This reflects changes in the Mainland's strength. But it also reflects the psychological background of the Xi Li generation, who received their education during the Cultural Revolution. They experienced unforgettable hardships and a history of humiliation. They are eager to restore national pride among the Chinese people. They want them to have confidence in the future.
Consider the Mainland's strategic interests. The most important issue now, is achieving moderate prosperity, and by the middle of this century, establishing a modern nation. Xi Jinping spoke of a grand renaissance of the Chinese people, of a "Chinese Dream." Absent a peaceful internal and external environment, such an ambitious goal will remain empty talk. That is why Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed the importance of peace. He said peace was "like air and sunlight. If you have it, you are unaware of it. But once you lose it, it is difficult to regain." Altogether, he made a total of 14 references to peace. He said ensuring peace was the responsibility of major nations. He said peace was essential to their long-term prosperity.
Peace is indispensable for the Mainland's development. Therefore it is indispensable for cross-Strait relations. The past five years of cross-Strait peaceful development have brought the two sides closer together. A shooting war between the two sides is now nearly impossible. Cross-Strait relations have improved. Mainland power has increased. Mainland modernization has accelerated. Mainland authorities are increasingly confident. Cross-Strait peace is now linked to peaceful reunification. This is something the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should take note of. The new generation of Mainland leaders holds different views on cross-Strait issues.
What are those views? Recently the "Wang Bao" interviewed Zhang Nianshi, a Mainland think tank analyst who specializes in Taiwan affairs. Zhang commented on the new generation of Mainland leaders. He thinks that Xi and Li perceive Taiwan differently than Hu JIntao. Hu Jintao hoped to change hearts and minds on Taiwan. He was willing to make generous concessions to Taiwan. Xi and Li may not share his attitude. Li Keqiang once said, "Between brothers, anything is negotiable." The implication was that if we aren't brothers, then you can forget about concessions. As Zhang sees it, cross-Strait economic and trade consultations will require more explicit confirmations that the two sides are in fact brothers. Otherwise, the Mainland will not be making any concessions.
During the Boao Forum Xi Jinping spoke with Vincent Siew. He stressed how compatriots on both sides are one family. They all belong to the same Chinese nation. The cross-Strait economy is part of China's economy. The Mainland will give more consideration to the needs and interests of Taiwan compatriots. This shows that the new generation of Mainland leaders are increasingly confident about the Taiwan issue as they pursue the "Chinese dream." More and more they see compatriates who see themselves as members of the same family, as a necessary precondition to improved cross-Strait cooperation. This illustrates the pragmatic style of the new Mainland leaders. This shows that cross-Strait exchanges will become increasingly pragmatic. The Mainland will no longer grant unilateral concessions. Instead, it will seek truth from facts. Its ritual gesture to Vincent Siew was merely based on VIP protocol. It will no longer make special concessions.
Following the Siew Xi Meeting, Vincent Siew urged the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to Lien Chan's slogan when he met Xi Jinping. "One China, Cross-strait peace, mutually beneficial integration, revitalizing the Chinese nation." The vision is even more far-sighted. It more closely echoes Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream." But the Ma administration must rise above internal political interference and international strategic constraints. It must change its increasingly conservative cross-Strait thinking. Otherwise, as US academic Richard Bush noted about cross-Strait relations, time will not be on Taiwan's side.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.04.11
社論-兩岸新局:務實交流 大陸不再無端讓利
本報訊
大陸國家主席習近平日前在博鰲亞洲論壇,發表題為「共同創造亞洲和世界的美好未來」演說,受到各方關注。正當朝鮮半島情勢緊張之際,外界多聚焦於中方如何應對朝鮮危局,試圖從習的演說中探悉中朝關係是否生變;而習在演說中強調不能「為一己之私把一個地區乃至世界搞亂」,更被形容是針對北韓武嚇舉措而發。
習近平的演說是否針對北韓而發,各界有不同見解;從他的演講主題來看,主要是以倡議建立地緣政治的集體安全,以及包括經濟貿易的合作為主,而這顯然不是北韓所能承擔的。尤其習主張國際社會應該倡導綜合安全、共同安全、合作安全的理念,作為「各國交往頻繁,難免磕磕碰碰」時,解決分歧矛盾的機制;如果說這也是在提醒美國勿趁勢挑起朝鮮半島危局,藉此重建冷戰圍堵結構而來,似乎還更準確些。
對台灣來說,更應該關注的是習近平演說的另一個重點,也就是他再次提到「中國夢」的奮鬥目標─「希望到二○二○年,國內生產總值翻一番,全面建成小康社會,到本世紀中葉建成富強民主文明和諧的社會主義現代化國家,實現中華民族的偉大復興」。這不是習近平第一次談中國夢,卻是他當上大陸最高領導人後,首次在國際場域宣示中國夢的奮鬥目標,箇中深意以及對未來兩岸關係的影響,十分值得探究。
首先,習近平演說充分顯示,大陸新一代領導人的國際視野與戰略格局,已經大大不同於以往;歷經鄧小平、江澤民、胡錦濤等幾代領導人所奉行不逾的「韜光養晦」外交路線,未來即使還存在,也將逐漸被新的積極參與、集體合作、開放包容等內涵所填補。這種轉變當然與大陸整體國力提升有關,但也反映出習李這一代文革知青的心理背景,他們經歷過刻骨銘心的磨難,對過往歷史充滿屈辱感,渴望建立中國人的民族驕傲,面對未來,充滿信心。
從大陸的國家戰略利益來說,眼前最重要課題是如何實現全面小康,進而在本世紀中葉建設成為一個現代化國家,實現習近平所稱的中華民族偉大復興的「中國夢」,倘若沒有一個和平的內外環境,上述遠大目標勢必淪為空談。因此,習近平才會在演說中反覆強調和平的重要,「猶如空氣和陽光,受益而不覺,失之則難存」,前後共十四次提到和平二字,既是用以彰顯大國意識的責任,也是基於長遠圖強之所需。
「和平」既然是大陸國家發展的「硬道理」,兩岸問題自然也離不開這一軌道。毫無疑問,兩岸經過五年來的和平發展,彼此的關係已更趨緊密,雙方炮火相向的可能性近乎於零。而隨著兩岸關係的深化,特別是大陸國力提升與現代化進程的加速推進,大陸當局已越來越有信心把兩岸和平發展與兩岸的和平統一連結一起。這當中最值得台灣朝野關注的,是大陸新一代領導人對兩岸問題的看法已經發生變化。
什麼變化呢?大陸涉台智庫學者章念馳最近接受《旺報》訪問時,提到他對大陸新一代領導人的觀察。他認為習李對台灣的看法與胡錦濤不一樣,胡錦濤希望改變台灣人的認同,願意不計代價對台讓利,習李可能就沒有這種觀念,李克強曾說「兄弟之間什麼都好談」,言外之意,不是兄弟就免談。因此他判斷,未來兩岸經貿協商,除非兄弟關係更加確定,否則大陸不會讓利。
博鰲論壇上習近平與蕭萬長會談時,強調「兩岸同胞都是一家人,同屬中華民族、兩岸經濟同屬中華經濟,大陸會多考慮台灣同胞需求與利益」,足證大陸新一代領導人在實現「中國夢」的使命下,對台灣問題不但越來越有信心,而且是以同胞手足一家人的民族認同,作為雙方深化合作的必要前提。這顯示出大陸新領導人的務實作風,未來兩岸關係因此將走向務實交流,大陸不可能再無端讓利,一切實事求是,即使像蕭萬長座位這種儀式性的動作,也只按照出席貴賓的重要性來安排,不再刻意破格接待。
蕭萬長在蕭習會後的記者會上,提出:「面對新局、共築願景、攜手亞太、振興中華」十六字,相較於之前連戰會見習近平提出的「一個中國、兩岸和平、互利融合、振興中華」,格局更見寬廣,也與習近平的「中國夢」相為呼應;但如果馬政府無法超脫內部政治干擾與國際因素的制約,不去改變近來益趨保守的兩岸思維,那麼未來幾年的兩岸關係發展恐怕就將如美國學者卜睿哲所預見的趨於遲緩,而時間並非站在台灣這一邊。
Tuesday, April 9, 2013
The Iron Lady: A Grocer's Daughter Who Mounted the World Stage
The Iron Lady:
A Grocer's Daughter Who Mounted the World Stage
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 10, 2013
Summary: Like her or not, Margaret Thatcher was a global leader of far-reaching significance. She championed the free market. She promoted privatization. She opposed meaningless subsidies. She cut public spending. She led with an iron fist. Her influence was felt as far away as Taiwan. It marked the beginning of internationalization and liberalization.
Full text below:
Like her or not, Margaret Thatcher was a global leader of far-reaching significance. She championed the free market. She promoted privatization. She opposed meaningless subsidies. She cut public spending. She led with an iron fist. Her influence was felt as far away as Taiwan. It marked the beginning of internationalization and liberalization.
Without the reforms implemented by Thatcher during her 12 years in office, London today would not be a global financial center. The UK economy would still be mired in labor confrontation and disparities in wealth. The skies over England would still be covered in gray smoke from its sunset industries. The "Iron Lady" stepped down as Prime Minister over 20 years ago. But she left behind massive changes. Since she passed away, her legacy has become increasingly clear with the passage of time.
She was the most noteworthy British Prime Minister of the past half-century. Born the daughter of a small town grocer, she acquired her father's honesty and integrity. She grew up in a small town filled with of hard-working citizens. Her experience in her father's grocery store inculcated in her a pragmatic economic outlook. Her experience made her different from Britain's aristocrats, who were born into wealth and received elite educations. She experienced no Original Sin. She felt no duty to engage in Noblesse Oblige. As a result, she could look at the "British disease" through different eyes. Union struggles paralyzed Britain for thirty years. She dealt with them with an iron fist. Her methods alarmed even her conservative comrades.
Thatcher's opponents often described her as an arbitrary leader "without compassion." When she served as Minister of Education she ordered the cancellation of free milk for elementary school students. This led to taunts of "milk snatcher." When she was prime minister her privatization policy led to a significant increase in unemployment. Unions denounced her as "the blind Prime Minister." But Britain faced a political, economic, and social dilemma. Were it not for this dedicated and decisive Prime Minister, national transformation would have been impossible. Britain would not be where it is today. From this perspective, allegations that she was "without compassion" were gross oversimplifications.
National leaders can be divided into three types. The first type has clear objectives, stands on the front line, leads the charge, and relentlessly advances. The second type stands on the front lines, rattles sabers, and shouts "Charge!" But deep down inside, lacks values and direction. Everything is mere show. The third type lacks direction, dares not stand on the front line and dares not shout "Charge!" and instead changes directions with the political winds. Thatcher was clearly the first type of leader.
Britain's left-wing media frequently criticized her. But even they admitted that her greatest virtue was that she did not care whether people liked her or not. Her liberalization and privatization led to massive changes in economic power and ownership. She defied the politcal currents, at great risk to her political career. In the process, Thatcher demonstrated consistency in her beliefs. As she saw it, only individual liberty could enable a nation to become great. She promoted systemic reform. She championed the individual's right to direct his own life. During Thatcher's 12 years in office, she never indulged any selfish desires or engaged in any cronyist practices.
As Britain's only female prime minister. Thatcher attracted more world attention than any prime minister before or after. She was resolute in her beliefs. She was straightforward and fair-minded in her reforms. She was closer to the common people than the critics who blasted her. She liked to quote Lincoln. "You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong." "You cannot help the poor man by destroying the rich." It was her philosophy of life, acquired from her experience as a grocer's daughter.
Thatcher's 12 years of governance created prosperity. It facilitated economic and social transformation. It narrowed the gap between rich and poor. Alas, the legacy she left the Conservative Party was internal division. This was perhaps inevitable in the wake of a "strongman." It included her opposition to the expansion of the EU, which led to widespread opposition, and may have contributed to her stepping down. Whether her departure was a blessing or a curse remains difficult to determine. In any event, at the end of the Cold War, Thatcher's decisive actions enabled British capitalism to find its way out of the fog. It set an example for other countries. It even helped Mikhail Gorbachev lower the Iron Curtain and open the Soviet Union. These were achievements that cannot be ignored.
The grocer's daughter became an Iron Lady who mounted the world stage, who cast a giant shadow, and wrote her own page in history.
鐵娘子:雜貨商之女走過世界舞台
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.10 02:03 am
不論喜歡她或不喜歡她的人,都無法不承認柴契爾夫人是一個影響深遠的世界級領袖。她鼓吹自由經濟,大力推動民營化,反對無謂的補貼,削減公共支出,以鐵腕引領世界風騷。即使遠如台灣,當時也被這股思潮席捲,邁開了國際化、自由化的旅程。
如果不是柴契爾十二年執政所推動的改革,倫敦不可能取得今天全球金融中心的地位,英國經濟仍將陷於勞資對抗、貧富懸殊的困境,英格蘭的天空仍將在老舊製造業的煙塵籠罩下一片灰濛濛。「鐵娘子」已離開首相職位廿多年,但她留下的巨大改變,在她辭世之後回顧,已被時間洗練得愈顯清晰。
這位半世紀來最出色的英國首相,出身只是一個小鎮雜貨商的女兒。她在家中薰染了父親的誠實和正直,在小鎮看到了勤奮的公民,在雜貨店培養了務實的經濟觀。這些經驗,使她和那些出身貴族階級、受菁英教育的英國統治者不同,她沒有貴族階級的原罪感和教養包袱,所以能以不一樣的眼光看待「英國病」,並向糾纏英國卅年的工會抗爭痛下鐵腕對付。她的作法,讓保守黨的同志都大驚失色。
柴契爾的對手,常把她形容為「毫無同情心」的獨斷獨行領袖。她在擔任教育部長時下令取消國小學童的免費牛奶,引來「牛奶掠奪者」之譏;在擔任首相時推動民營化造成失業率大增,被工會描繪為「盲目首相」。但回顧當時英國所面臨的政經及社會困境,如果不是一個篤信而決斷的首相堅決推動,國家轉型的動力恐將無以為繼,英國也不會是今天這般模樣。從這個角度看,「沒有同情心」的指控,恐怕也不能那麼簡單解讀了。
國家領導人的領導模式大致可分為幾類:一是有明確目標,並站在前面揮軍衝刺,堅定不移前進;二是站在前方揮刀喊衝,心中其實沒有確定的價值或方向,只是裝模作樣;三是既沒有方向感,又不敢站在前線喊衝,只能隨著社會氛圍忽東忽西。柴契爾的領導,應該屬於第一類。
就連對她頗多批評的英國左派媒體都說,柴契爾最大的「美德」,就是不那麼在乎人民喜不喜歡她。她推動自由化和民營化政策,造成經濟權力和所有權的大量移轉,這實在是冒著個人失去政治生命的風險逆勢而為。在這個過程中,柴契爾展現了相當一貫的信念:「只有個體獲得自由,國家才能變得偉大」;而她推動的制度改革,也一直朝向「使個人有權主導自己的生命」的主題前進。尤其,柴契爾任內十二年,人們沒看到她露出過什麼私心私欲,或者親信傳出什麼醜聞。
作為英國唯一的女首相,柴契爾比起她前前後後的多位首相都要更受世界矚目。這不僅是因為她的果決,而是她在改革時所宣揚的那些簡單而中肯的道理,比起各種批評她的滔滔雄辯都要更切近庶民的事理。包括她喜歡引用的林肯名言:「你不可能因把強者變弱,就讓弱者變強」、「你不可能拉下付薪水的人,卻以為可以幫助受薪者」,都是這位雜貨商的女兒從生活實踐中體驗而得的生命哲學。
柴契爾的十二年治理盛世,推動了英國經濟和社會的轉型,縮減了貧富差距。但她留給保守黨的「遺產」,卻是分裂的內部;這恐怕是「強人過後」的必然景象。包括她當年反對歐盟深化一體化的進程,導致反對聲浪四起,甚至因此下台;如今看來,是福是禍仍難斷言。無論如何,在冷戰年代的尾聲,柴契爾以其旗幟鮮明的宣示和果決的行動,幫助英國資本主義走出了進退失據的陰霾,更成功號召許多國家的追隨,甚至親善戈巴契夫而使蘇聯打開鐵幕,都是無法抹滅的光芒。
雜貨商的女兒,以鐵娘子的姿態走過世界舞台,留下如此深刻而巨大的身影,這是一頁傳奇。
A Grocer's Daughter Who Mounted the World Stage
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 10, 2013
Summary: Like her or not, Margaret Thatcher was a global leader of far-reaching significance. She championed the free market. She promoted privatization. She opposed meaningless subsidies. She cut public spending. She led with an iron fist. Her influence was felt as far away as Taiwan. It marked the beginning of internationalization and liberalization.
Full text below:
Like her or not, Margaret Thatcher was a global leader of far-reaching significance. She championed the free market. She promoted privatization. She opposed meaningless subsidies. She cut public spending. She led with an iron fist. Her influence was felt as far away as Taiwan. It marked the beginning of internationalization and liberalization.
Without the reforms implemented by Thatcher during her 12 years in office, London today would not be a global financial center. The UK economy would still be mired in labor confrontation and disparities in wealth. The skies over England would still be covered in gray smoke from its sunset industries. The "Iron Lady" stepped down as Prime Minister over 20 years ago. But she left behind massive changes. Since she passed away, her legacy has become increasingly clear with the passage of time.
She was the most noteworthy British Prime Minister of the past half-century. Born the daughter of a small town grocer, she acquired her father's honesty and integrity. She grew up in a small town filled with of hard-working citizens. Her experience in her father's grocery store inculcated in her a pragmatic economic outlook. Her experience made her different from Britain's aristocrats, who were born into wealth and received elite educations. She experienced no Original Sin. She felt no duty to engage in Noblesse Oblige. As a result, she could look at the "British disease" through different eyes. Union struggles paralyzed Britain for thirty years. She dealt with them with an iron fist. Her methods alarmed even her conservative comrades.
Thatcher's opponents often described her as an arbitrary leader "without compassion." When she served as Minister of Education she ordered the cancellation of free milk for elementary school students. This led to taunts of "milk snatcher." When she was prime minister her privatization policy led to a significant increase in unemployment. Unions denounced her as "the blind Prime Minister." But Britain faced a political, economic, and social dilemma. Were it not for this dedicated and decisive Prime Minister, national transformation would have been impossible. Britain would not be where it is today. From this perspective, allegations that she was "without compassion" were gross oversimplifications.
National leaders can be divided into three types. The first type has clear objectives, stands on the front line, leads the charge, and relentlessly advances. The second type stands on the front lines, rattles sabers, and shouts "Charge!" But deep down inside, lacks values and direction. Everything is mere show. The third type lacks direction, dares not stand on the front line and dares not shout "Charge!" and instead changes directions with the political winds. Thatcher was clearly the first type of leader.
Britain's left-wing media frequently criticized her. But even they admitted that her greatest virtue was that she did not care whether people liked her or not. Her liberalization and privatization led to massive changes in economic power and ownership. She defied the politcal currents, at great risk to her political career. In the process, Thatcher demonstrated consistency in her beliefs. As she saw it, only individual liberty could enable a nation to become great. She promoted systemic reform. She championed the individual's right to direct his own life. During Thatcher's 12 years in office, she never indulged any selfish desires or engaged in any cronyist practices.
As Britain's only female prime minister. Thatcher attracted more world attention than any prime minister before or after. She was resolute in her beliefs. She was straightforward and fair-minded in her reforms. She was closer to the common people than the critics who blasted her. She liked to quote Lincoln. "You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong." "You cannot help the poor man by destroying the rich." It was her philosophy of life, acquired from her experience as a grocer's daughter.
Thatcher's 12 years of governance created prosperity. It facilitated economic and social transformation. It narrowed the gap between rich and poor. Alas, the legacy she left the Conservative Party was internal division. This was perhaps inevitable in the wake of a "strongman." It included her opposition to the expansion of the EU, which led to widespread opposition, and may have contributed to her stepping down. Whether her departure was a blessing or a curse remains difficult to determine. In any event, at the end of the Cold War, Thatcher's decisive actions enabled British capitalism to find its way out of the fog. It set an example for other countries. It even helped Mikhail Gorbachev lower the Iron Curtain and open the Soviet Union. These were achievements that cannot be ignored.
The grocer's daughter became an Iron Lady who mounted the world stage, who cast a giant shadow, and wrote her own page in history.
鐵娘子:雜貨商之女走過世界舞台
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.10 02:03 am
不論喜歡她或不喜歡她的人,都無法不承認柴契爾夫人是一個影響深遠的世界級領袖。她鼓吹自由經濟,大力推動民營化,反對無謂的補貼,削減公共支出,以鐵腕引領世界風騷。即使遠如台灣,當時也被這股思潮席捲,邁開了國際化、自由化的旅程。
如果不是柴契爾十二年執政所推動的改革,倫敦不可能取得今天全球金融中心的地位,英國經濟仍將陷於勞資對抗、貧富懸殊的困境,英格蘭的天空仍將在老舊製造業的煙塵籠罩下一片灰濛濛。「鐵娘子」已離開首相職位廿多年,但她留下的巨大改變,在她辭世之後回顧,已被時間洗練得愈顯清晰。
這位半世紀來最出色的英國首相,出身只是一個小鎮雜貨商的女兒。她在家中薰染了父親的誠實和正直,在小鎮看到了勤奮的公民,在雜貨店培養了務實的經濟觀。這些經驗,使她和那些出身貴族階級、受菁英教育的英國統治者不同,她沒有貴族階級的原罪感和教養包袱,所以能以不一樣的眼光看待「英國病」,並向糾纏英國卅年的工會抗爭痛下鐵腕對付。她的作法,讓保守黨的同志都大驚失色。
柴契爾的對手,常把她形容為「毫無同情心」的獨斷獨行領袖。她在擔任教育部長時下令取消國小學童的免費牛奶,引來「牛奶掠奪者」之譏;在擔任首相時推動民營化造成失業率大增,被工會描繪為「盲目首相」。但回顧當時英國所面臨的政經及社會困境,如果不是一個篤信而決斷的首相堅決推動,國家轉型的動力恐將無以為繼,英國也不會是今天這般模樣。從這個角度看,「沒有同情心」的指控,恐怕也不能那麼簡單解讀了。
國家領導人的領導模式大致可分為幾類:一是有明確目標,並站在前面揮軍衝刺,堅定不移前進;二是站在前方揮刀喊衝,心中其實沒有確定的價值或方向,只是裝模作樣;三是既沒有方向感,又不敢站在前線喊衝,只能隨著社會氛圍忽東忽西。柴契爾的領導,應該屬於第一類。
就連對她頗多批評的英國左派媒體都說,柴契爾最大的「美德」,就是不那麼在乎人民喜不喜歡她。她推動自由化和民營化政策,造成經濟權力和所有權的大量移轉,這實在是冒著個人失去政治生命的風險逆勢而為。在這個過程中,柴契爾展現了相當一貫的信念:「只有個體獲得自由,國家才能變得偉大」;而她推動的制度改革,也一直朝向「使個人有權主導自己的生命」的主題前進。尤其,柴契爾任內十二年,人們沒看到她露出過什麼私心私欲,或者親信傳出什麼醜聞。
作為英國唯一的女首相,柴契爾比起她前前後後的多位首相都要更受世界矚目。這不僅是因為她的果決,而是她在改革時所宣揚的那些簡單而中肯的道理,比起各種批評她的滔滔雄辯都要更切近庶民的事理。包括她喜歡引用的林肯名言:「你不可能因把強者變弱,就讓弱者變強」、「你不可能拉下付薪水的人,卻以為可以幫助受薪者」,都是這位雜貨商的女兒從生活實踐中體驗而得的生命哲學。
柴契爾的十二年治理盛世,推動了英國經濟和社會的轉型,縮減了貧富差距。但她留給保守黨的「遺產」,卻是分裂的內部;這恐怕是「強人過後」的必然景象。包括她當年反對歐盟深化一體化的進程,導致反對聲浪四起,甚至因此下台;如今看來,是福是禍仍難斷言。無論如何,在冷戰年代的尾聲,柴契爾以其旗幟鮮明的宣示和果決的行動,幫助英國資本主義走出了進退失據的陰霾,更成功號召許多國家的追隨,甚至親善戈巴契夫而使蘇聯打開鐵幕,都是無法抹滅的光芒。
雜貨商的女兒,以鐵娘子的姿態走過世界舞台,留下如此深刻而巨大的身影,這是一頁傳奇。
A Politically and Economically Secure Cross-Strait Common Market
A Politically and Economically Secure Cross-Strait Common Market
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2013
Summary: The 2013 Boao Forum for Asia has significance for Taiwan. Newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping and former ROC vice president Siew were the first to enshrine the concept of a cross-strait common market. At Boao, Xi Jinping spoke of a "win/win trend consistent with peaceful development and cooperation." He said the two sides must increase mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote cross-strait peaceful development. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP authorities should respect Taipei's views, and ensure Taipei's autonomy. The CCP must respect Taipei's political and economic security, promote cross-Strait cooperation in trade, customs, and currency. The CCP must promote the ideal of a cross-Strait common market, and lay a solid foundation for the two sides' further integration.
Full text below:
A Siew Xi Summit took place in Boao, Hainan on the 8th. Once again, political leaders from Taipei introduced business leaders to newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping. This is of considerable importance to cross-Strait relations. During the Siew Xi Summit, former Vice President Siew urged the two sides to confront the new strategic picture. He urged the two sides to take part in regional economic integration, and increase cross-Strait cooperation. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed satisfaction with cross-Strait cooperation and exchanges. He praised former Vice President Siew for his long-standing and far-sighted advocacy of a cross-Strait common market.
During the Siew Xi Summit, former Vice President Siew called on the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to former General Secretary Hu Jintao's slogan during the April, 2008 Boao Forum. Hu urged the two sides to "confront reality head on, create the future, set aside disputes, pursue a win-win scenario." The current slogan is more explicit about the cross-Strait situation. It urges the two sides to work together to broaden their horizons. By implication, Taiwan businesses hope to relocate. They hope to participate more in Asian-Pacific regional economic cooperation.
The Boao Forum for Asia is dominated by the Chinese mainland. It enables Asian-Pacific government leaders and business leaders to engage in economic cooperation and dialogue. It enables the two sides' top officials to meet and communicate. It enables Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland to voice their concerns about the investment environment.
The ROC delegation made these advanced declarations. Nevertheless the Siew Xi Summit urges "Less politics, more economics and trade," in other words, the avoidance of sensitive political issues. The CCP however, did not create the Boao Forum for Asia as a purely economic forum. The forum also serves a political and diplomatic function. CCP academics and the media, such as Xinhua, consider Xi Jinping's Boao Forum address a declaration of the CCP's new foreign policy, one that reflects current conditions in Asia and the world as a whole. The Boao Forum remains an important mechanism through which the CCP can expand its political and economic relations.
The ROC delegation, led by former Vice President Siew, spoke with CCP leaders. They vowed to take on major political and economic challenges. They informed CCP leaders what they were hoping for. They told CCP leaders they hoped to accelerate follow-up consultations on the cross-strait economic cooperation agreement framework (ECFA). They told CCP leaders that the people and the government on Taiwan want to join international economic and trade organizations. They told CCP leaders that they want to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. They politely and indirectly told Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders, that they hoped the CCP would not interfere with Taipei's overseas trade activities out of political considerations. In particular, they told CCP leaders they hoped the CCP would not impose a diplomatic blockade on Taipei's foreign trade and economic activities.
Xi Jinping responded. He spoke of the need to increase cross-Strait communication, coordination, and to actively explore how Taipei might participate. He hoped arrangments could be made that would provide new vitality and dynamism to Taiwan's economic development. This was Xi Jinping's first act as leader of the Chinese Communist Party. It was the first time the two sides attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation mechanism and offered a response. Nevertheless Taipei cannot help but worry that the CCP was were merely going through the motions, in order to delay Taipei's membership in regional economic cooperation organizations.
It is now easier for the two sides to talk about the cross-Strait situation. But overcoming the actual obstacles remains difficult. In recent years, the Boao Forum has become the occasion for political leaders and business leaders in Asian-Pacific countries to meet and exchange ideas. High-level talks take place between the two sides of the Strait at this annual meeting. But hammering out a forceful response to cross-Strait relations remains difficult.
Fortunately, former Vice President Siew spoke directly to CCP leaders. He told them that Taipei hopes to join regional economic cooperation organizations. This does not mean that Taipei will immediately enjoy greater international breathing space. But Taipei must strike a balance in its relations with Beijing and Washington. It must use SEF, ARATS, and other mechanisms to communicate and coordinate. This will complement follow-up consultations on ECFA. By adopting a multi-pronged approach, Taipei may be able to join regional economic and trade organizations in the near future.
The ROC government used the appropriate channels. It encouraged the appointment of Taiwan experts. CCP leaders, government leaders, and foreign policy leaders, began paying attention to the political views of the public on Taiwan. They realized that the public on Taiwan wants to join regional economic organizations. They realized that this affects the development of Taiwan businesses, and that this is a major issue that affects the livelihood of the people.
The 2013 Boao Forum for Asia has significance for Taiwan. Newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping and former ROC vice president Siew were the first to enshrine the concept of a cross-strait common market. At Boao, Xi Jinping spoke of a "win/win trend consistent with peaceful development and cooperation." He said the two sides must increase mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote cross-strait peaceful development. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP authorities should respect Taipei's views, and ensure Taipei's autonomy. The CCP must respect Taipei's political and economic security, promote cross-Strait cooperation in trade, customs, and currency. The CCP must promote the ideal of a cross-Strait common market, and lay a solid foundation for the two sides' further integration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.04.09
社論-確保台灣政經安全 實現兩岸共同市場
本報訊
「蕭習會」八日在海南博鰲登場,這是台灣政治領袖再一次率企業菁英與中共新領導人習近平見面會談,對兩岸關係發展具有相當的重要性。此次蕭習會中,蕭前副總統主張迎向全球挑戰新局,宜由兩岸共同參與區域經濟整合,促進兩岸合作的全面升級;中共總書記習近平則對近年來的兩岸合作交流予以肯定並感滿意,同時稱許蕭前副總統多年來所倡議的兩岸共同市場的概念至有遠見。
蕭習會中,蕭前副總統提出:「面對新局,共築願景,攜手亞太,振興中華」十六字言,較之二○○八年四月他在博鰲和胡錦濤前總書記會面時提出的「正視現實,開創未來,擱置爭議,追求雙贏」十六字原則,此次更明確地點出了兩岸所面對的已是全新局面,應攜手合作、擴大格局,而其中更隱含了台灣企盼走出去、在亞太區域經濟合作中有更多參與機會的願望。
博鰲亞洲論壇由中國大陸所主導,不僅提供亞太各國政府領袖和企業菁英彼此間進行經濟合作、對話的交流機制,也是兩岸高層直接會面溝通的重要場合;同時,也是台灣企業爭取在大陸地區獲得得更好投資經營環境與條件的發聲管道。
不過,必須注意的是,雖然我方代表團先前表示,在蕭習會中將以「少政治、多經貿」為基本原則,不會觸及敏感的政治議題;但是,中共創建和舉辦博鰲亞洲論壇,本來就不僅設定為純然的經濟論壇,而更帶有政治和外交的目的。中共學者和傳媒,如新華網,也都將習近平此次博鰲講話解讀為「就當前亞洲和世界的發展形勢,闡明了中國外交政策的新理念」,顯示博鰲論壇是中共拓展對外政經關係的重要機制之一。
因此,以蕭前副總統為首的我方代表團在與中共領導人會談時,也確實承擔起重大的政治經濟的任務:除向中共高層表達希望加速完成兩岸經濟合作協議架構(ECFA)後續協商之外,同時也堅定地表達了台灣人民和政府參與國際經貿組織,以及與其他國家簽訂自由貿易協定(FTA)的強烈意願,這不啻是間接而委婉地告訴習近平等領導高層,希望中共方面不要因為政治因素干擾台灣對外經貿活動,尤其不要以外交手段封鎖台灣對外的經貿活動空間。
對此,習近平則回以:「加強兩岸相互溝通、協調,並積極探討參與的方式,希望能夠在提供台灣經濟發展新的活力與動能,做出安排。」雖然這是習近平作為中共新領導人以來,首度對兩岸共同參與亞太經濟合作機制所作出的回應,但台灣方面不免擔心這只是虛應故事的說法,用以推遲和迴避台灣參與區域經濟合作組織。
當前兩岸情勢是雙方容易談的議題已逐步處理,但困難的議題依舊難解。而博鰲論壇近年來逐漸成為亞太各國政商菁英聯誼交流的場合,在這樣的例行年會中,即使有兩岸高層會談,恐怕也不易為兩岸關係激盪出有力的回響。
幸而蕭前副總統仍直接向中共高層傳達了台灣方面希望參與區域經濟合作組織的願望,雖然未必真能很快地有助於台灣達成拓展國際經貿空間的目標,但只要我國政府努力在美中關係中取得平衡,並運用既有的兩岸兩會機制及其他互動平台繼續溝通協調,再配合落實ECFA的後續協商,多管齊下,或能在不久的將來實現台灣參與區域經貿組織的構想。
也因此,我方亦宜透過適當的管道,促使初上任的「知台派」中共黨政體系和外交系統領導人正視台灣人民的想法和各個政治勢力的立場,務使其認知到台灣方面認為參與區域經濟組織乃是攸關台灣企業發展、人民生計的重大議題。
對台灣而言,二○一三年博鰲亞洲論壇的重要意義就在於,中共新領導人習近平與台灣最早揭櫫兩岸共同市場理念的蕭前副總統的共同與會和對談。習近平在此次博鰲講話中提出了「順應和平發展、合作共贏的時代潮流」,要採取進一步深化兩岸互利合作,促進兩岸和平發展,未來在習近平領導下,中共當局也應尊重台灣的想法,在確保台灣自主性、維護台灣政經安全的前提下,推展兩岸在貿易、關稅、貨幣等領域的全面合作,才能逐步實現兩岸共同市場的理想,為兩岸進一步整合的遠景奠定堅實的基礎。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2013
Summary: The 2013 Boao Forum for Asia has significance for Taiwan. Newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping and former ROC vice president Siew were the first to enshrine the concept of a cross-strait common market. At Boao, Xi Jinping spoke of a "win/win trend consistent with peaceful development and cooperation." He said the two sides must increase mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote cross-strait peaceful development. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP authorities should respect Taipei's views, and ensure Taipei's autonomy. The CCP must respect Taipei's political and economic security, promote cross-Strait cooperation in trade, customs, and currency. The CCP must promote the ideal of a cross-Strait common market, and lay a solid foundation for the two sides' further integration.
Full text below:
A Siew Xi Summit took place in Boao, Hainan on the 8th. Once again, political leaders from Taipei introduced business leaders to newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping. This is of considerable importance to cross-Strait relations. During the Siew Xi Summit, former Vice President Siew urged the two sides to confront the new strategic picture. He urged the two sides to take part in regional economic integration, and increase cross-Strait cooperation. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed satisfaction with cross-Strait cooperation and exchanges. He praised former Vice President Siew for his long-standing and far-sighted advocacy of a cross-Strait common market.
During the Siew Xi Summit, former Vice President Siew called on the two sides to "confront the new situation, agree on a common vision, connect with Asia and the Pacific, and revitalize the Chinese nation." Compare this slogan to former General Secretary Hu Jintao's slogan during the April, 2008 Boao Forum. Hu urged the two sides to "confront reality head on, create the future, set aside disputes, pursue a win-win scenario." The current slogan is more explicit about the cross-Strait situation. It urges the two sides to work together to broaden their horizons. By implication, Taiwan businesses hope to relocate. They hope to participate more in Asian-Pacific regional economic cooperation.
The Boao Forum for Asia is dominated by the Chinese mainland. It enables Asian-Pacific government leaders and business leaders to engage in economic cooperation and dialogue. It enables the two sides' top officials to meet and communicate. It enables Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland to voice their concerns about the investment environment.
The ROC delegation made these advanced declarations. Nevertheless the Siew Xi Summit urges "Less politics, more economics and trade," in other words, the avoidance of sensitive political issues. The CCP however, did not create the Boao Forum for Asia as a purely economic forum. The forum also serves a political and diplomatic function. CCP academics and the media, such as Xinhua, consider Xi Jinping's Boao Forum address a declaration of the CCP's new foreign policy, one that reflects current conditions in Asia and the world as a whole. The Boao Forum remains an important mechanism through which the CCP can expand its political and economic relations.
The ROC delegation, led by former Vice President Siew, spoke with CCP leaders. They vowed to take on major political and economic challenges. They informed CCP leaders what they were hoping for. They told CCP leaders they hoped to accelerate follow-up consultations on the cross-strait economic cooperation agreement framework (ECFA). They told CCP leaders that the people and the government on Taiwan want to join international economic and trade organizations. They told CCP leaders that they want to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. They politely and indirectly told Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders, that they hoped the CCP would not interfere with Taipei's overseas trade activities out of political considerations. In particular, they told CCP leaders they hoped the CCP would not impose a diplomatic blockade on Taipei's foreign trade and economic activities.
Xi Jinping responded. He spoke of the need to increase cross-Strait communication, coordination, and to actively explore how Taipei might participate. He hoped arrangments could be made that would provide new vitality and dynamism to Taiwan's economic development. This was Xi Jinping's first act as leader of the Chinese Communist Party. It was the first time the two sides attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation mechanism and offered a response. Nevertheless Taipei cannot help but worry that the CCP was were merely going through the motions, in order to delay Taipei's membership in regional economic cooperation organizations.
It is now easier for the two sides to talk about the cross-Strait situation. But overcoming the actual obstacles remains difficult. In recent years, the Boao Forum has become the occasion for political leaders and business leaders in Asian-Pacific countries to meet and exchange ideas. High-level talks take place between the two sides of the Strait at this annual meeting. But hammering out a forceful response to cross-Strait relations remains difficult.
Fortunately, former Vice President Siew spoke directly to CCP leaders. He told them that Taipei hopes to join regional economic cooperation organizations. This does not mean that Taipei will immediately enjoy greater international breathing space. But Taipei must strike a balance in its relations with Beijing and Washington. It must use SEF, ARATS, and other mechanisms to communicate and coordinate. This will complement follow-up consultations on ECFA. By adopting a multi-pronged approach, Taipei may be able to join regional economic and trade organizations in the near future.
The ROC government used the appropriate channels. It encouraged the appointment of Taiwan experts. CCP leaders, government leaders, and foreign policy leaders, began paying attention to the political views of the public on Taiwan. They realized that the public on Taiwan wants to join regional economic organizations. They realized that this affects the development of Taiwan businesses, and that this is a major issue that affects the livelihood of the people.
The 2013 Boao Forum for Asia has significance for Taiwan. Newly installed CCP leader Xi Jinping and former ROC vice president Siew were the first to enshrine the concept of a cross-strait common market. At Boao, Xi Jinping spoke of a "win/win trend consistent with peaceful development and cooperation." He said the two sides must increase mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote cross-strait peaceful development. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP authorities should respect Taipei's views, and ensure Taipei's autonomy. The CCP must respect Taipei's political and economic security, promote cross-Strait cooperation in trade, customs, and currency. The CCP must promote the ideal of a cross-Strait common market, and lay a solid foundation for the two sides' further integration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.04.09
社論-確保台灣政經安全 實現兩岸共同市場
本報訊
「蕭習會」八日在海南博鰲登場,這是台灣政治領袖再一次率企業菁英與中共新領導人習近平見面會談,對兩岸關係發展具有相當的重要性。此次蕭習會中,蕭前副總統主張迎向全球挑戰新局,宜由兩岸共同參與區域經濟整合,促進兩岸合作的全面升級;中共總書記習近平則對近年來的兩岸合作交流予以肯定並感滿意,同時稱許蕭前副總統多年來所倡議的兩岸共同市場的概念至有遠見。
蕭習會中,蕭前副總統提出:「面對新局,共築願景,攜手亞太,振興中華」十六字言,較之二○○八年四月他在博鰲和胡錦濤前總書記會面時提出的「正視現實,開創未來,擱置爭議,追求雙贏」十六字原則,此次更明確地點出了兩岸所面對的已是全新局面,應攜手合作、擴大格局,而其中更隱含了台灣企盼走出去、在亞太區域經濟合作中有更多參與機會的願望。
博鰲亞洲論壇由中國大陸所主導,不僅提供亞太各國政府領袖和企業菁英彼此間進行經濟合作、對話的交流機制,也是兩岸高層直接會面溝通的重要場合;同時,也是台灣企業爭取在大陸地區獲得得更好投資經營環境與條件的發聲管道。
不過,必須注意的是,雖然我方代表團先前表示,在蕭習會中將以「少政治、多經貿」為基本原則,不會觸及敏感的政治議題;但是,中共創建和舉辦博鰲亞洲論壇,本來就不僅設定為純然的經濟論壇,而更帶有政治和外交的目的。中共學者和傳媒,如新華網,也都將習近平此次博鰲講話解讀為「就當前亞洲和世界的發展形勢,闡明了中國外交政策的新理念」,顯示博鰲論壇是中共拓展對外政經關係的重要機制之一。
因此,以蕭前副總統為首的我方代表團在與中共領導人會談時,也確實承擔起重大的政治經濟的任務:除向中共高層表達希望加速完成兩岸經濟合作協議架構(ECFA)後續協商之外,同時也堅定地表達了台灣人民和政府參與國際經貿組織,以及與其他國家簽訂自由貿易協定(FTA)的強烈意願,這不啻是間接而委婉地告訴習近平等領導高層,希望中共方面不要因為政治因素干擾台灣對外經貿活動,尤其不要以外交手段封鎖台灣對外的經貿活動空間。
對此,習近平則回以:「加強兩岸相互溝通、協調,並積極探討參與的方式,希望能夠在提供台灣經濟發展新的活力與動能,做出安排。」雖然這是習近平作為中共新領導人以來,首度對兩岸共同參與亞太經濟合作機制所作出的回應,但台灣方面不免擔心這只是虛應故事的說法,用以推遲和迴避台灣參與區域經濟合作組織。
當前兩岸情勢是雙方容易談的議題已逐步處理,但困難的議題依舊難解。而博鰲論壇近年來逐漸成為亞太各國政商菁英聯誼交流的場合,在這樣的例行年會中,即使有兩岸高層會談,恐怕也不易為兩岸關係激盪出有力的回響。
幸而蕭前副總統仍直接向中共高層傳達了台灣方面希望參與區域經濟合作組織的願望,雖然未必真能很快地有助於台灣達成拓展國際經貿空間的目標,但只要我國政府努力在美中關係中取得平衡,並運用既有的兩岸兩會機制及其他互動平台繼續溝通協調,再配合落實ECFA的後續協商,多管齊下,或能在不久的將來實現台灣參與區域經貿組織的構想。
也因此,我方亦宜透過適當的管道,促使初上任的「知台派」中共黨政體系和外交系統領導人正視台灣人民的想法和各個政治勢力的立場,務使其認知到台灣方面認為參與區域經濟組織乃是攸關台灣企業發展、人民生計的重大議題。
對台灣而言,二○一三年博鰲亞洲論壇的重要意義就在於,中共新領導人習近平與台灣最早揭櫫兩岸共同市場理念的蕭前副總統的共同與會和對談。習近平在此次博鰲講話中提出了「順應和平發展、合作共贏的時代潮流」,要採取進一步深化兩岸互利合作,促進兩岸和平發展,未來在習近平領導下,中共當局也應尊重台灣的想法,在確保台灣自主性、維護台灣政經安全的前提下,推展兩岸在貿易、關稅、貨幣等領域的全面合作,才能逐步實現兩岸共同市場的理想,為兩岸進一步整合的遠景奠定堅實的基礎。
Monday, April 8, 2013
Civil War Justifications Vanish, Cross-Strait Relations Flourish
Civil War Justifications Vanish, Cross-Strait Relations Flourish
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2013
Summary: Cross-strait relations must be redefined. They were once understood as part of a KMT vs. CCP Civil War. They must now be understood as an issue of human civilization. Xi Jinping said that "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path." The civil war of 1949 determined our path. But future cross-Strait relations will be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
Full text below:
Beijing policy advisor Zheng Bijian commented on cross-strait relations. He said "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path."
Cross-strait relations must be redefined. They were once understood as part of a KMT vs. CCP Civil War. They must now be understood as an issue of human civilization.
In a previous editorial, we said the civil war was a zero sum game. It was an either/or, you or me proposition. Human civilization, on the other hand, is inclusive. Human civilization is like a string of pearls on a necklace.
There were two main reasons for the 1949 civil war. 1. The KMT government was exhausted by the War of Resistance against Japan. When the war ended, it fell prey to corruption and misgovernance. 2. The Chinese Communist Party made the Chinese people promises. It painted an ideal, it offered them a vision. In other words, the civil war was fought over "Whither China?" In this fight, the KMT lost to the CCP.
Alas, once the CCP assumed power, the Mainland fell victim to the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, the Three Red Flags, and the Cultural Revolution. One might say that the CCP won the civil war, but lost its ideals. Suppose the Chinese Communist Party had proclaimed from the outset that its "idealism" required waging the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, the Three Red Flags, and the Cultural Revolution? Would it still would have won the civil war? Conversely, by the time the government of the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan, it had already implemented the White Terror and martial law. These were hardly the Three Peoples Principles that it trumpeted during the civil war.
In other words, the civil war was fought over the question, "Whither China?" Leave aside the matter of which side won or lost. The civil war did not achieve the desired results. On the contrary, the civil war merely cost people on both sides more blood and tears. In particular, the Chinese mainland nearly collapsed during the 1970s.
Sixty-four years ago, in 1949, on this very day, the very first liberal democracy in China's history made its debut. The People's Republic of China, a rising great power, also made its debut that year. These debuts were not the result of the 1949 civil war. They were the result of a national rebirth that took place on both sides of the Strait in the wake of the civil war -- a rebirth paid for in blood and tears.
The Republic of China is no longer a symbol of the debacle and humiliation of 1949. The People's Republic of China is no longer the embodiment of the ideals and vision of 1949. "Whither China" remains the question. But civil war is no longer the answer. Therefore no one can say that 64 years later, the justifications for the civil war of 1949 remain.
In other words, today, 64 years later, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, can no longer use the justifications cited in 1949 to continue waging civil war. The question for both sides remains "Whither China?" But the answer is no longer civil war. Leave aside the justifications and consequences of the civil war of 1949. From today's perspective, everything above is subject to criticism. The justifications offered were deceptive and false. The consequences were painful and bitter.
The justifications for the civil war have vanished. Cross-Strait relations should no longer be seen as a zero sum game, asn an either/or, life or death proposition. Instead, we should perceive it as a string of pearls. Today the civil war has one remaining value. It can teach. The two sides have been governed separately as a result of the civil war of 1949. A peace agreement can now be signed, with the civil war as a cautionary tale. A "democratic China/Republic of China" and a "socialist China/People's Republic of China" can now be regarded as pearls on a string. This is the answer to the question, "Whither China?" This peace agreement can be rooted in the "big roof concept of China." The relationship between the two sides need not be a zero sum game. It need not be an either/or, life or death proposition. It should be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
Today, the justification for the civil war has vanished. The substance of the civil war has vanished along with it. The children of Taiwan businessmen who attend the Dongguan Elementary School, read Republic of China textbooks. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists return to the Mainland with pineapple cakes made on Taiwan. This pearl to pearl relationship is not a zero sum game. It is not an either/or, life or death proposition. The title of this article underscores why the justifications for the civil war have vanished, and why cross-Strait relations are flourishing. Flourishing cross-Strait relations is not merely a vision. It is a concrete reality on the streets of Taipei and Beijing.
Many nations have been divided. Such scenes were unknown in East and West Germany. They are even rarer in North and South Korea. But East and West Germany never regarded each other as a foreign country. North and South Korea are both members of the UN. The "big roof" theory works. Should cross-strait relations be an exception? Why must we cling to this either/or, life or death, zero sum game "civil war" relationship? Have we still not learned a lesson from the 1949 civil war? Do people still cling to an either/or, life or death, zero sum game relationship?
Xi Jinping said that "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path." The civil war of 1949 determined our path. But future cross-Strait relations will be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
內戰理由消失 兩岸關係昇華
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.08 02:47 am
北京智囊鄭必堅論兩岸關係說:「眼界決定境界,思路決定出路。」
兩岸關係必須從「國共內戰關係」的眼界與思路,轉向「人類文明課題」的境界與出路。
上篇社論說:「內戰關係」是有我無你、你死我活的「榔頭與珍珠」眼界,「文明課題」則是兼容並蓄、包羅涵泳的「珍珠項鍊」境界。
一九四九年國共內戰的主要原因是:一、國民黨政府抗日耗盡元氣,戰後腐敗失政。二、共產黨給中國一個許諾,描繪理想,楬櫫願景。也就是說,內戰的主題是:「中國往何處去?」在這個題目下,國民黨輸給了共產黨。
但是,中共建政後,隨而經歷了三反五反、三面紅旗、文化大革命等,可謂贏了內戰,卻輸了理想;試想,倘若中共當初是以三反五反、三面紅旗及文化大革命的「理想」來號召內戰,不知尚能贏得這場內戰的勝利否。相對而言,中華民國政府敗退台灣,亦經白色恐怖、戒嚴統治等,這當然亦非內戰時倡議的三民主義。
也就是說,內戰是因「中國往何處去」的題目而起,但不論勝敗雙方,其實皆未因內戰而作出正確答案。相反的,這場內戰反而使兩岸人民付出了更多的血淚代價,尤使中國大陸在上世紀七○年代一度陷入幾乎瀕於崩潰的慘禍。
一九四九年過後第六十四年的今日,中華民國實現了中國歷史上首見的自由民主體制,而中華人民共和國則成為蒸騰日上的崛起中大國。這與其說是一九四九年內戰的果實,不如說是吞下了內戰的惡果之後,又以兩岸人民的血淚代價換來的民族新生命。
此時的中華民國不能再視為一九四九年時中國災禍與恥辱的象徵,此時的中華人民共和國亦不能視為一九四九年時中國理想與願景的化身。「中國往何處去」的題目仍在,但那場內戰既無人對此提供正確答案,所以沒有人能說,在六十四年後,一九四九年內戰的理由迄今仍然存在。
也就是說,在六十四年後的今日,中華人民共和國與中華民國,若要延續「內戰」,已不能再用一九四九年的理由;而兩岸的題目如果仍是「中國往何處去」,但作答的方法顯然已不能再訴諸「內戰」。因為,一九四九年的內戰,不論從理由到後果,在今天看來,皆非但不是無可批評的,甚至是欺世愚民的假理由,與不堪回首的大苦果。
內戰的理由已經消失,中國不應再出現「榔頭與珍珠」的惡果,而應朝往「珍珠項鍊」的境界與出路去探索。時至今日,這場內戰所剩下的最後價值,只是在證明兩岸因一九四九年的內戰而隔海分治,並可為這場內戰議簽一紙《和平協議》;協議的主文應以一九四九年的內戰惡果為戒,並將「民主中國/中華民國」與「社會主義中國/中華人民共和國」視為珍珠與珍珠,共同為「中國往何處去」找尋答案。在這一紙基於「大屋頂中國」的《和平協議》中,希望沒有人扮演榔頭,只有珍珠與珍珠。
今天,不但內戰的理由已經消失,且內戰的實質也早已消失。東莞台商小學子弟唸著中華民國的教本,成千成萬陸客從台灣提著鳳梨酥返鄉;這是一個「珍珠與珍珠」的景象,而不是「榔頭與珍珠」的「內戰」。所以,本文標題所揭「內戰理由消失/兩岸關係昇華」,不僅是一個憧憬,其實已然是台北與北京的真實街景。
看世界上的分裂國家,東西德未曾有過這種街景,南北韓則更無論矣;但是,東西德可以互視為「不是外國的國家」,南北韓亦均為聯合國的會員國,此皆「大屋頂」使然。然而,何以唯獨兩岸街景如此,卻仍要死抱著有我無你、你死我活的「內戰」;難道四九年那場內戰的痛苦代價,仍不知記取,竟仍有人主張「榔頭主義」?
習近平說,道路決定命運。一九四九年的內戰由榔頭決定命運,但希望今後的兩岸關係能由相互珍惜的珍珠來決定。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2013
Summary: Cross-strait relations must be redefined. They were once understood as part of a KMT vs. CCP Civil War. They must now be understood as an issue of human civilization. Xi Jinping said that "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path." The civil war of 1949 determined our path. But future cross-Strait relations will be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
Full text below:
Beijing policy advisor Zheng Bijian commented on cross-strait relations. He said "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path."
Cross-strait relations must be redefined. They were once understood as part of a KMT vs. CCP Civil War. They must now be understood as an issue of human civilization.
In a previous editorial, we said the civil war was a zero sum game. It was an either/or, you or me proposition. Human civilization, on the other hand, is inclusive. Human civilization is like a string of pearls on a necklace.
There were two main reasons for the 1949 civil war. 1. The KMT government was exhausted by the War of Resistance against Japan. When the war ended, it fell prey to corruption and misgovernance. 2. The Chinese Communist Party made the Chinese people promises. It painted an ideal, it offered them a vision. In other words, the civil war was fought over "Whither China?" In this fight, the KMT lost to the CCP.
Alas, once the CCP assumed power, the Mainland fell victim to the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, the Three Red Flags, and the Cultural Revolution. One might say that the CCP won the civil war, but lost its ideals. Suppose the Chinese Communist Party had proclaimed from the outset that its "idealism" required waging the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, the Three Red Flags, and the Cultural Revolution? Would it still would have won the civil war? Conversely, by the time the government of the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan, it had already implemented the White Terror and martial law. These were hardly the Three Peoples Principles that it trumpeted during the civil war.
In other words, the civil war was fought over the question, "Whither China?" Leave aside the matter of which side won or lost. The civil war did not achieve the desired results. On the contrary, the civil war merely cost people on both sides more blood and tears. In particular, the Chinese mainland nearly collapsed during the 1970s.
Sixty-four years ago, in 1949, on this very day, the very first liberal democracy in China's history made its debut. The People's Republic of China, a rising great power, also made its debut that year. These debuts were not the result of the 1949 civil war. They were the result of a national rebirth that took place on both sides of the Strait in the wake of the civil war -- a rebirth paid for in blood and tears.
The Republic of China is no longer a symbol of the debacle and humiliation of 1949. The People's Republic of China is no longer the embodiment of the ideals and vision of 1949. "Whither China" remains the question. But civil war is no longer the answer. Therefore no one can say that 64 years later, the justifications for the civil war of 1949 remain.
In other words, today, 64 years later, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, can no longer use the justifications cited in 1949 to continue waging civil war. The question for both sides remains "Whither China?" But the answer is no longer civil war. Leave aside the justifications and consequences of the civil war of 1949. From today's perspective, everything above is subject to criticism. The justifications offered were deceptive and false. The consequences were painful and bitter.
The justifications for the civil war have vanished. Cross-Strait relations should no longer be seen as a zero sum game, asn an either/or, life or death proposition. Instead, we should perceive it as a string of pearls. Today the civil war has one remaining value. It can teach. The two sides have been governed separately as a result of the civil war of 1949. A peace agreement can now be signed, with the civil war as a cautionary tale. A "democratic China/Republic of China" and a "socialist China/People's Republic of China" can now be regarded as pearls on a string. This is the answer to the question, "Whither China?" This peace agreement can be rooted in the "big roof concept of China." The relationship between the two sides need not be a zero sum game. It need not be an either/or, life or death proposition. It should be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
Today, the justification for the civil war has vanished. The substance of the civil war has vanished along with it. The children of Taiwan businessmen who attend the Dongguan Elementary School, read Republic of China textbooks. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists return to the Mainland with pineapple cakes made on Taiwan. This pearl to pearl relationship is not a zero sum game. It is not an either/or, life or death proposition. The title of this article underscores why the justifications for the civil war have vanished, and why cross-Strait relations are flourishing. Flourishing cross-Strait relations is not merely a vision. It is a concrete reality on the streets of Taipei and Beijing.
Many nations have been divided. Such scenes were unknown in East and West Germany. They are even rarer in North and South Korea. But East and West Germany never regarded each other as a foreign country. North and South Korea are both members of the UN. The "big roof" theory works. Should cross-strait relations be an exception? Why must we cling to this either/or, life or death, zero sum game "civil war" relationship? Have we still not learned a lesson from the 1949 civil war? Do people still cling to an either/or, life or death, zero sum game relationship?
Xi Jinping said that "One's vision determines one's horizons, one's thinking determines one's path." The civil war of 1949 determined our path. But future cross-Strait relations will be the relationship between pearls on the same string.
內戰理由消失 兩岸關係昇華
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.08 02:47 am
北京智囊鄭必堅論兩岸關係說:「眼界決定境界,思路決定出路。」
兩岸關係必須從「國共內戰關係」的眼界與思路,轉向「人類文明課題」的境界與出路。
上篇社論說:「內戰關係」是有我無你、你死我活的「榔頭與珍珠」眼界,「文明課題」則是兼容並蓄、包羅涵泳的「珍珠項鍊」境界。
一九四九年國共內戰的主要原因是:一、國民黨政府抗日耗盡元氣,戰後腐敗失政。二、共產黨給中國一個許諾,描繪理想,楬櫫願景。也就是說,內戰的主題是:「中國往何處去?」在這個題目下,國民黨輸給了共產黨。
但是,中共建政後,隨而經歷了三反五反、三面紅旗、文化大革命等,可謂贏了內戰,卻輸了理想;試想,倘若中共當初是以三反五反、三面紅旗及文化大革命的「理想」來號召內戰,不知尚能贏得這場內戰的勝利否。相對而言,中華民國政府敗退台灣,亦經白色恐怖、戒嚴統治等,這當然亦非內戰時倡議的三民主義。
也就是說,內戰是因「中國往何處去」的題目而起,但不論勝敗雙方,其實皆未因內戰而作出正確答案。相反的,這場內戰反而使兩岸人民付出了更多的血淚代價,尤使中國大陸在上世紀七○年代一度陷入幾乎瀕於崩潰的慘禍。
一九四九年過後第六十四年的今日,中華民國實現了中國歷史上首見的自由民主體制,而中華人民共和國則成為蒸騰日上的崛起中大國。這與其說是一九四九年內戰的果實,不如說是吞下了內戰的惡果之後,又以兩岸人民的血淚代價換來的民族新生命。
此時的中華民國不能再視為一九四九年時中國災禍與恥辱的象徵,此時的中華人民共和國亦不能視為一九四九年時中國理想與願景的化身。「中國往何處去」的題目仍在,但那場內戰既無人對此提供正確答案,所以沒有人能說,在六十四年後,一九四九年內戰的理由迄今仍然存在。
也就是說,在六十四年後的今日,中華人民共和國與中華民國,若要延續「內戰」,已不能再用一九四九年的理由;而兩岸的題目如果仍是「中國往何處去」,但作答的方法顯然已不能再訴諸「內戰」。因為,一九四九年的內戰,不論從理由到後果,在今天看來,皆非但不是無可批評的,甚至是欺世愚民的假理由,與不堪回首的大苦果。
內戰的理由已經消失,中國不應再出現「榔頭與珍珠」的惡果,而應朝往「珍珠項鍊」的境界與出路去探索。時至今日,這場內戰所剩下的最後價值,只是在證明兩岸因一九四九年的內戰而隔海分治,並可為這場內戰議簽一紙《和平協議》;協議的主文應以一九四九年的內戰惡果為戒,並將「民主中國/中華民國」與「社會主義中國/中華人民共和國」視為珍珠與珍珠,共同為「中國往何處去」找尋答案。在這一紙基於「大屋頂中國」的《和平協議》中,希望沒有人扮演榔頭,只有珍珠與珍珠。
今天,不但內戰的理由已經消失,且內戰的實質也早已消失。東莞台商小學子弟唸著中華民國的教本,成千成萬陸客從台灣提著鳳梨酥返鄉;這是一個「珍珠與珍珠」的景象,而不是「榔頭與珍珠」的「內戰」。所以,本文標題所揭「內戰理由消失/兩岸關係昇華」,不僅是一個憧憬,其實已然是台北與北京的真實街景。
看世界上的分裂國家,東西德未曾有過這種街景,南北韓則更無論矣;但是,東西德可以互視為「不是外國的國家」,南北韓亦均為聯合國的會員國,此皆「大屋頂」使然。然而,何以唯獨兩岸街景如此,卻仍要死抱著有我無你、你死我活的「內戰」;難道四九年那場內戰的痛苦代價,仍不知記取,竟仍有人主張「榔頭主義」?
習近平說,道路決定命運。一九四九年的內戰由榔頭決定命運,但希望今後的兩岸關係能由相互珍惜的珍珠來決定。
Tuesday, April 2, 2013
Medical Treatment or Medical Parole: What does Chen Shui-bian Want?
Medical Treatment or Medical Parole:
What does Chen Shui-bian Want?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 3, 2013
Summary: Chou Yuan-hua, a Veterans General Hospital Special Medical Team member, told the Legislative Yuan that if Chen Shui-bian is returned to prison, the risk of suicide is high. Most members of the public feel that whoever requires medical parole should receive it. But they are afraid of being deceived, yet again, by Chen and his doctors.
Full text below:
Chou Yuan-hua, a Veterans General Hospital Special Medical Team member, told the Legislative Yuan that Chen Shui-bian should not be returned to Taipei Prison. He said Chen should be discharged from the hospital, and allowed to convalesce at home, or be transferred to a hospital closer to home, either a general hospital with a psychiatric department or a psychiatric hospital. When questioned by legislators, he said that if Chen Shui-bian is returned to prison, the risk of suicide is high.
This was the official report of the Special Medical Team to the Legislative Yuan. Naturally it carries a certain amount of weight. As a result, Chen Shui-bian's situation has once again attracted attention.
Chou Yuan-hua said Chen Shui-bian is suffering from severe depression and exhibits five other symptoms. Therefore, Chen Shui-bian should receive treatment. He said the public should not oppose this. The question however, is where Chen Shui-bian should be treated. Chou Yuan-hua contradicts himself. He said that, 1. Chen should not be returned to Taipei Prison. 2. Chen should be discharged. 3. Chen should perhaps be returned home to convalesce. 4. If Chen is returned to Taipei Prison, the risk of suicide is high. But Chen could also commit suicide at home. 6, Therefore, he added, perhaps Chen should be transferred to another hospital.
Basically Chou Yuan-hua talked in circles. What he said underscored a key concept. Just exactly what does Chen Shui-bian want? Medical treatment, or medical parole?
If what Chen wants is medical treatment, the Taipei Veterans General Hospital is recognized for its psychiatric expertise. This includes Chou Yuan-hua. The recommendation that Chen be transferred to a "hospital with a psychiatric department, or a psychiatric hospital closer to home" was medical boilerplate. Was it merely a compromise solution? What's more, this would amount to a "transfer," not the "discharge" or "home convalescence" that Chou Yuan-hua wanted. Therefore if "medical treatment" is the highest priority, the Taipei Veterans General Hospital boasts the highest standard of suicide watch medical care in the nation. If family members pay Chen regular visits, it is no different than "home convalescence."
Chou Yuan-hua recommends "home convalescence." But the law makes no such provisions. Since Chou thinks that if Chen returns home he could be a suicide risk, this leads to another concern. Therefore, we are back to whether to grant Chen "medical parole?"
Chou Yuan-hua said he does not oppose medical parole. But the family must bear responsibility. Medical parole has a pre-condition. Once one is cured, one must return to prison to serve out one's sentence. This really sounds like something a doctor would say.
In fact, according to existing laws, "bao wai jiu yi" is the same as "yi liao jia shi," i.e., "medical parole." It is release from prison so that one may visit one's doctor. One enjoys almost the same freedom as a parolee. But Chen Shui-bian is not paralyzed and lying in a bed. If he were to convene political meetings at home behind closed doors, no family member would assume responsibility. Also, medical parole also carries a suicide risk. Moreover, who will decide when Chen Shui-bian is "cured?" Who will decide when he must return to prison, to serve out his sentence? Suppose he is "cured," but refuses to return to prison? What then?
If Chen Shui-bian is paroled, there is no guarantee that he will not host political activities or participate in political meetings. Who can guaranteed that Chen Shui-bian will not commit suicide at home? From the perspective of legality, justice, or medical treatment, "medical parole" is highly problematic.
An even more critical issue is public mistrust. This mistrust has two dimensions. 1. The Chen family cannot be trusted. When Chen Shui-bian was running for county chief, he falsely claimed he had been poisoned. When Wu Shu-cheng was struck by a truck, she falsely claimed it was politically motivated. Chen Shui-bian is known for his dazzling variety of political tricks. As a result the Chen family simply cannot be trusted. Have we forgotten Wu Shu-chen's record of 17 court absences under the pretext of illness? Two. The credibility of the health care system has also been compromised. When Wu Shu-chen called in sick 17 times, National Taiwan University Hospital doctors backed her lies. No one really believes these physicians have any personal integrity or medical ethics. Since even physicians say Chen Shui-bian is a suicide risk, will family members really assume responsibility?
We are not opposed to medical parole. The law makes provisions for medical parole. If anyone qualifies for medical parole, the Ministry of Justice will assume responsibility. Inmates have the right to medical parole. Chen Shui-bian is no exception. He need merely meet the requirements for medical parole. This means he must not be a suicide risk in the event he is granted medical parole.
Should Chen Shui-bian be granted medical parole? There ought to be three pre-conditions. 1. One must first determine whether Chen Shui-bian is receiving medical treatment or being paroled. 2. His illness must be real. We must not permit a replay of the National Taiwan University Hospitial scandal, during which Wu Shu-chen called in sick 17 times, and the doctors backed her lies. 3. If the alleged illnesses are later found to be fabrications, or if Chen Shui-bian engages in outrageous behavior while on parole, someone must bear responsibility. The Chen family members cannot be trusted to bear responsibility. Nor can Chou Yuan-hua, from a legal standpoint.
Most members of the public feel that whoever requires medical parole should receive it. But they are afraid of being deceived, yet again, by Chen and his doctors.
就醫或保外:陳水扁要的是什麼?
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.03 04:21 am
榮總專案醫療小組周元華醫師在立法院報告指出,陳水扁不適合再回台北監獄,應該出院,可考慮居家療養,或轉介到離家較近設有精神科的綜合醫院或精神專科醫院安置;他在答覆立委詢問時且說,陳水扁若回到監獄,自殺風險肯定非常高。
這是專案醫療小組在立法院所作的正式報告,自然具有不同的分量,因而也使陳水扁的處遇問題再度成為視聽焦點。
周元華醫師說,陳水扁患有重度憂鬱症等五種病症。因此,陳水扁應當接受治療,對此應無社會異議。爭議的問題是在陳水扁應在何處接受治療,這卻連周元華的主張也自相矛盾。他說:一、扁不適合再回北監;二、應當出院;三、可考慮居家療養;四、他說,扁若回北監,自殺風險肯定非常高;五、但他也不排除若居家照護,亦有自殺死在家裡的可能性;六、於是,他又補充說,亦可轉介其他醫院安置。
周元華繞了一圈的論述,其實點出了一個關鍵性的概念,那就是:陳水扁要的究竟是「就醫」或「保外」?
如果重點在「就醫」,則北榮公認是精神科的權威,包括周元華醫師在內亦是此中菁英;則謂建議轉介到「離家較近設有精神科的綜合醫院或精神專科醫院」,就醫療水準言,是否倒有退而求其次之虞?何況,這只是「轉院」,而非周元華所主張的「出院」,或「居家療養」。因而,倘是以「就醫」為最高的目標,目前在北榮「戒護就醫」,可能即是國內醫療水準所能提供的最佳處遇;且若家屬勤於探病,實已無異於「居家療養」。
至於周元華建議的「居家療養」,則一方面是現行法律無此規制,另一方面扁既被認為有自殺風險而有死在家中的可能,因而亦多出一層顧慮。於是,又回到是否可以「保外就醫」?
周元華說,他不反對保外就醫,但責任須由家屬自負;且保外就醫的前提是,如果病好了,仍要回到監所服刑。這段話聽起來,真是醫生之見。
其實,依現行法制,「保外就醫」就是「醫療假釋」;也就是從獄中釋放去就醫,享有與假釋犯幾乎無異的自由。然而,陳水扁並非癱臥在床,即使在家關起門來召集政治會議恐亦找不到「家屬負責」,遑論保外就醫仍有自殺風險;更何況,要由誰來決定陳水扁何時「病好了」,又由誰來決定陳水扁「病好了,仍要回到監所服刑」?若「病好了」,卻不肯回監,將如何?
倘若「保外」不能保證陳水扁出來後不主持或參加政治性會議等活動,而又不能排除陳水扁在家中自殺;則就法律正義言,或醫療安排言,「保外就醫」似乎皆有顧慮。
更關鍵的問題是在社會信任的問題,可分兩個層次:一、陳家不可信任,陳水扁從選縣長詐稱被下毒、吳淑珍詐稱政治車禍,到陳水扁花樣百出的政治操作,皆使這一家人不可信任,何況吳淑珍還有十七次詐病不出庭的紀錄。二、醫療系統的公信力也已受傷,前述吳淑珍十七次詐病尚曾得到台大醫院的背書,實在令人無法相信這些醫師的人品與醫德。現在,如果連醫師都說陳水扁非常可能自殺,難道卻要家屬去負這個責任?
此文絕非反對「保外就醫」。既然法律定有「保外就醫」的體制,任何符合「保外就醫」條件者,法務部皆有准其「保外就醫」的責任,而相關受刑人亦有「保外就醫」的權利;當然亦絕不可視陳水扁為例外,只要他真正符合保外就醫的條件,包括不要在保外後自殺。
考慮陳水扁是否「保外就醫」,應有三個前提:一、必須確定陳水扁要的是「就醫」或「保外」?二、病情必須是真的,不可再出現類似台大醫院為吳淑珍十七次不出庭背書的醜事;三、如果後來證實其中作假,或阿扁保外後又鬧出不可思議的怪事,必須要有人「負責」,因為陳家的「家屬」照例不會「負責」,屆時周元華也是依法不必「負責」。
我們認為,多數的民意皆會認為,「有保外就醫必要者,應予保外就醫」。但是,國人畢竟被陳家及醫師們騙怕了。
What does Chen Shui-bian Want?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 3, 2013
Summary: Chou Yuan-hua, a Veterans General Hospital Special Medical Team member, told the Legislative Yuan that if Chen Shui-bian is returned to prison, the risk of suicide is high. Most members of the public feel that whoever requires medical parole should receive it. But they are afraid of being deceived, yet again, by Chen and his doctors.
Full text below:
Chou Yuan-hua, a Veterans General Hospital Special Medical Team member, told the Legislative Yuan that Chen Shui-bian should not be returned to Taipei Prison. He said Chen should be discharged from the hospital, and allowed to convalesce at home, or be transferred to a hospital closer to home, either a general hospital with a psychiatric department or a psychiatric hospital. When questioned by legislators, he said that if Chen Shui-bian is returned to prison, the risk of suicide is high.
This was the official report of the Special Medical Team to the Legislative Yuan. Naturally it carries a certain amount of weight. As a result, Chen Shui-bian's situation has once again attracted attention.
Chou Yuan-hua said Chen Shui-bian is suffering from severe depression and exhibits five other symptoms. Therefore, Chen Shui-bian should receive treatment. He said the public should not oppose this. The question however, is where Chen Shui-bian should be treated. Chou Yuan-hua contradicts himself. He said that, 1. Chen should not be returned to Taipei Prison. 2. Chen should be discharged. 3. Chen should perhaps be returned home to convalesce. 4. If Chen is returned to Taipei Prison, the risk of suicide is high. But Chen could also commit suicide at home. 6, Therefore, he added, perhaps Chen should be transferred to another hospital.
Basically Chou Yuan-hua talked in circles. What he said underscored a key concept. Just exactly what does Chen Shui-bian want? Medical treatment, or medical parole?
If what Chen wants is medical treatment, the Taipei Veterans General Hospital is recognized for its psychiatric expertise. This includes Chou Yuan-hua. The recommendation that Chen be transferred to a "hospital with a psychiatric department, or a psychiatric hospital closer to home" was medical boilerplate. Was it merely a compromise solution? What's more, this would amount to a "transfer," not the "discharge" or "home convalescence" that Chou Yuan-hua wanted. Therefore if "medical treatment" is the highest priority, the Taipei Veterans General Hospital boasts the highest standard of suicide watch medical care in the nation. If family members pay Chen regular visits, it is no different than "home convalescence."
Chou Yuan-hua recommends "home convalescence." But the law makes no such provisions. Since Chou thinks that if Chen returns home he could be a suicide risk, this leads to another concern. Therefore, we are back to whether to grant Chen "medical parole?"
Chou Yuan-hua said he does not oppose medical parole. But the family must bear responsibility. Medical parole has a pre-condition. Once one is cured, one must return to prison to serve out one's sentence. This really sounds like something a doctor would say.
In fact, according to existing laws, "bao wai jiu yi" is the same as "yi liao jia shi," i.e., "medical parole." It is release from prison so that one may visit one's doctor. One enjoys almost the same freedom as a parolee. But Chen Shui-bian is not paralyzed and lying in a bed. If he were to convene political meetings at home behind closed doors, no family member would assume responsibility. Also, medical parole also carries a suicide risk. Moreover, who will decide when Chen Shui-bian is "cured?" Who will decide when he must return to prison, to serve out his sentence? Suppose he is "cured," but refuses to return to prison? What then?
If Chen Shui-bian is paroled, there is no guarantee that he will not host political activities or participate in political meetings. Who can guaranteed that Chen Shui-bian will not commit suicide at home? From the perspective of legality, justice, or medical treatment, "medical parole" is highly problematic.
An even more critical issue is public mistrust. This mistrust has two dimensions. 1. The Chen family cannot be trusted. When Chen Shui-bian was running for county chief, he falsely claimed he had been poisoned. When Wu Shu-cheng was struck by a truck, she falsely claimed it was politically motivated. Chen Shui-bian is known for his dazzling variety of political tricks. As a result the Chen family simply cannot be trusted. Have we forgotten Wu Shu-chen's record of 17 court absences under the pretext of illness? Two. The credibility of the health care system has also been compromised. When Wu Shu-chen called in sick 17 times, National Taiwan University Hospital doctors backed her lies. No one really believes these physicians have any personal integrity or medical ethics. Since even physicians say Chen Shui-bian is a suicide risk, will family members really assume responsibility?
We are not opposed to medical parole. The law makes provisions for medical parole. If anyone qualifies for medical parole, the Ministry of Justice will assume responsibility. Inmates have the right to medical parole. Chen Shui-bian is no exception. He need merely meet the requirements for medical parole. This means he must not be a suicide risk in the event he is granted medical parole.
Should Chen Shui-bian be granted medical parole? There ought to be three pre-conditions. 1. One must first determine whether Chen Shui-bian is receiving medical treatment or being paroled. 2. His illness must be real. We must not permit a replay of the National Taiwan University Hospitial scandal, during which Wu Shu-chen called in sick 17 times, and the doctors backed her lies. 3. If the alleged illnesses are later found to be fabrications, or if Chen Shui-bian engages in outrageous behavior while on parole, someone must bear responsibility. The Chen family members cannot be trusted to bear responsibility. Nor can Chou Yuan-hua, from a legal standpoint.
Most members of the public feel that whoever requires medical parole should receive it. But they are afraid of being deceived, yet again, by Chen and his doctors.
就醫或保外:陳水扁要的是什麼?
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.03 04:21 am
榮總專案醫療小組周元華醫師在立法院報告指出,陳水扁不適合再回台北監獄,應該出院,可考慮居家療養,或轉介到離家較近設有精神科的綜合醫院或精神專科醫院安置;他在答覆立委詢問時且說,陳水扁若回到監獄,自殺風險肯定非常高。
這是專案醫療小組在立法院所作的正式報告,自然具有不同的分量,因而也使陳水扁的處遇問題再度成為視聽焦點。
周元華醫師說,陳水扁患有重度憂鬱症等五種病症。因此,陳水扁應當接受治療,對此應無社會異議。爭議的問題是在陳水扁應在何處接受治療,這卻連周元華的主張也自相矛盾。他說:一、扁不適合再回北監;二、應當出院;三、可考慮居家療養;四、他說,扁若回北監,自殺風險肯定非常高;五、但他也不排除若居家照護,亦有自殺死在家裡的可能性;六、於是,他又補充說,亦可轉介其他醫院安置。
周元華繞了一圈的論述,其實點出了一個關鍵性的概念,那就是:陳水扁要的究竟是「就醫」或「保外」?
如果重點在「就醫」,則北榮公認是精神科的權威,包括周元華醫師在內亦是此中菁英;則謂建議轉介到「離家較近設有精神科的綜合醫院或精神專科醫院」,就醫療水準言,是否倒有退而求其次之虞?何況,這只是「轉院」,而非周元華所主張的「出院」,或「居家療養」。因而,倘是以「就醫」為最高的目標,目前在北榮「戒護就醫」,可能即是國內醫療水準所能提供的最佳處遇;且若家屬勤於探病,實已無異於「居家療養」。
至於周元華建議的「居家療養」,則一方面是現行法律無此規制,另一方面扁既被認為有自殺風險而有死在家中的可能,因而亦多出一層顧慮。於是,又回到是否可以「保外就醫」?
周元華說,他不反對保外就醫,但責任須由家屬自負;且保外就醫的前提是,如果病好了,仍要回到監所服刑。這段話聽起來,真是醫生之見。
其實,依現行法制,「保外就醫」就是「醫療假釋」;也就是從獄中釋放去就醫,享有與假釋犯幾乎無異的自由。然而,陳水扁並非癱臥在床,即使在家關起門來召集政治會議恐亦找不到「家屬負責」,遑論保外就醫仍有自殺風險;更何況,要由誰來決定陳水扁何時「病好了」,又由誰來決定陳水扁「病好了,仍要回到監所服刑」?若「病好了」,卻不肯回監,將如何?
倘若「保外」不能保證陳水扁出來後不主持或參加政治性會議等活動,而又不能排除陳水扁在家中自殺;則就法律正義言,或醫療安排言,「保外就醫」似乎皆有顧慮。
更關鍵的問題是在社會信任的問題,可分兩個層次:一、陳家不可信任,陳水扁從選縣長詐稱被下毒、吳淑珍詐稱政治車禍,到陳水扁花樣百出的政治操作,皆使這一家人不可信任,何況吳淑珍還有十七次詐病不出庭的紀錄。二、醫療系統的公信力也已受傷,前述吳淑珍十七次詐病尚曾得到台大醫院的背書,實在令人無法相信這些醫師的人品與醫德。現在,如果連醫師都說陳水扁非常可能自殺,難道卻要家屬去負這個責任?
此文絕非反對「保外就醫」。既然法律定有「保外就醫」的體制,任何符合「保外就醫」條件者,法務部皆有准其「保外就醫」的責任,而相關受刑人亦有「保外就醫」的權利;當然亦絕不可視陳水扁為例外,只要他真正符合保外就醫的條件,包括不要在保外後自殺。
考慮陳水扁是否「保外就醫」,應有三個前提:一、必須確定陳水扁要的是「就醫」或「保外」?二、病情必須是真的,不可再出現類似台大醫院為吳淑珍十七次不出庭背書的醜事;三、如果後來證實其中作假,或阿扁保外後又鬧出不可思議的怪事,必須要有人「負責」,因為陳家的「家屬」照例不會「負責」,屆時周元華也是依法不必「負責」。
我們認為,多數的民意皆會認為,「有保外就醫必要者,應予保外就醫」。但是,國人畢竟被陳家及醫師們騙怕了。
Monday, April 1, 2013
The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Daily Life, the Economy, and National Security
The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant:
Daily Life, the Economy, and National Security
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?
Full text below:
Building a "Number Five Nuclear Power Plant" on Taiwan will be impossible. Controversy is currently raging over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). Many people mistrust nuclear power per se, not just the 4NPP. If these people mistrusted only the 4NPP, rather than nuclear power per se, then in theory one could halt construction on 4NPP but still build a 5NPP. But as matters stand, a "nuclear-free homeland" has become established policy. Therefore whether construction on the 4NPP is halted or continued, there will be no "5NPP."
As a result, the referendum on whether to halt or continue construction on the 4NPP has become, in effect, a referendum on the immediate abolition of nuclear power vs. the gradual abolition of nuclear power. It has become a referendum on how to use the 4NPP as the first step towards a "nuclear-free homeland." As we have reiterated, if experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, then a referendum is superfluous and need not be held. But if experts certify that the 4NPP is safe, the commissioning of the 4NPP will merely be the first step in the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" or the "immediate abolition of nuclear power." Either way, the public on Taiwan will have taken the first step toward the abolition of nuclear power. Either way, there will be no "5NPP."
The "immediate abolition of nuclear power" and the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" differ in their procedure. If the 4NPP is commissioned, then the 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP can be decommissioned gradually. The 4NPP will act as a buffer in the gradual abolition of nuclear power generation. It will enable the power generation transition to proceed relatively smoothly. If however the 4NPP is immediately killed, and the 1NPP decommissioned in 2018, then the public on Taiwan will experience a more severe energy shortage.
Energy transformation is extremely difficult. It is a major political and economic undertaking. Consider only the hardware transformation. The construction of new, non-nuclear power plants, such as wind and solar, would take at least a decade, even assuming no procedural obstacles. Forget the widespread construction of small power plants, wind turbines, or solar panels. The time consumed due to public resistance will be inestimable. What about waiting until bioenergy or "new energy" becomes a viable form of "alternative energy?" That is like waiting for Lady Luck to smile upon us. That is hardly something one can take for granted. Even if everything imaginable is done, the energy transformation process will take at least two decades. We have not even mentioned other costs. Consider the aforementioned new power plants. Public resistance will exact a high price. Carbon emissions will increase. Electricity prices will rise. Corporations will be forced to restructure in response to environmental and economic costs. Therefore whether the energy transformation process is gradual or rapid will affect the social cost. The termination or continuation of the 4NPP has become a choice between the immediate abolition of nuclear power and the gradual abolition of nuclear power.
Energy transformation involves three levels. 1. Daily Life 2. The Economy 3. National Security
1. Daily Life. This is the most superficial level. If the energy transformation process is too abrupt, energy shortages and the rising cost of electricity will impact the daily life of the individual. If energy transformation affected only this level, it would be bad enough. We could use a little less air conditioning and pay a little more on our electricity bills. If the impact was confined to our daily lives, if Taiwan became a larger version of Palau, then why not?
Two. The Economy. Irene Chen will not mind paying more for her electricity bills. But the impact on small factories and snack bars will be very different. Last year the electricity rate hike was essentially a test run. Now the impact has expanded from daily life to the economy. It will impact all industries. We can of course trumpet industrial transformation. We can oppose energy consuming industries. But merely wishing does not make it so. Moreover, we face an immediate need. We must break through the barriers of TPP or RCEP within a few years. Energy insecurity and rising electricity prices could affect the competitiveness of our economy and liberalization process. The consequences must be addressed.
Three. National Security. If energy insecurity impacts the economy, it will also impact national security. For example, if Taiwan's economic status is weakened as a result of the energy transformation process, it will inevitably become more dependent upon favors from the Mainland. It will naturally increase the risk in cross-Strait relations. Such national security concerns cannot be ignored.
Taiwan is not Palau. Palau has no cross-Strait relations. Some on Taiwan may yearn to return to the same natural lifestyle as Palau. But Taiwan's economic development cannot be turned back. Taiwan's survival depends on it. Taiwan must be competitive enough to withstand the magnetic attraction of the Mainland. National security is the third level of the energy transition problem.
In today's populist atmosphere, anyone making the above arguments will be accused of being alarmist. That is not surprising. The leaders of the various political parties know the truth. But they use the 4NPP issue as a political tool to divide the public. We predict that if the DPP is able to halt construction on the 4NPP, and wins the 2016 presidential election, its first major energy policy will be to "postpone the decommissioning of the 1NPP." That will prove that its current anti-nuke rhetoric is a sham. Yet the DPP categorically refuses to adopt a gradual abolition of nuclear energy policy in the event experts certify that the 4NPP is safe.
The DPP has done two things that are fatal to Taiwan. The first is to advocate Taiwan independence. The other is to interrupt construction on the 4NPP during the Chen administration. Now, whether the 4NPP can be certified as safe or not, the DPP is obdurately opposed to its construction. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. But even if the 4NPP is certified as safe, it has been ruined by the DPP. In this sense, the DPP has indeed done everything it can.
Energy policy and energy transformation are major issues affecting a nation's survival. As we have reiterated the United States experienced the Three Mile Island incident. Russia experienced the Chernobyl disaster. Japan experience the Fukushima disaster. Yet they remain nuclear energy nations. This shows that a nuclear free homeland is not something one can have merely because one wants it. Which of these three has political and economic conditions inferior to Taiwan's? Never mind that the United States and Russia are major producers of energy.
Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?
生活、經濟、國安:核四問題的三個層次
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.02 03:21 am
台灣不可能再建「核五」。因為,倘若現在爭議的只是不能信任核四,而不是對整個核電的否定,則在理論上,即使停建核四,仍可另建足堪信任的「核五」;但是,現在的情勢,卻是「非核家園」已成既定政策,因此,核四無論停或續,皆已不會再有「核五」。
所以,核四停續公投就成了「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」的策略抉擇問題,也就是要公投決定如何用「核四」邁出「非核家園」的第一步。
我們屢申,倘若核四在專業體檢後不能確認其安全,即失去公投的基礎,也就不必舉行公投。但若核四的專業安全獲得確認,國人所迎對的即是贊成核四上路以「漸進廢核」,或反對核四上路以「立即廢核」的策略抉擇。畢竟,不論核四上路或不上路,台灣就此已邁出非核廢核的第一步,無論如何皆不會再有「核五」
所謂「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」,其差異是對「能源轉型」程序的不同抉擇。核四若能運轉,再一步一步使核一二三除役,那麼核四就能在廢核過程中發生交疊、緩衝及漸進的作用,即可使能源轉型的過渡程序走得比較平緩;但若核四立即退場,再加上二○一八年核一除役,台灣在能源的過渡程序上即會承負較大的壓力。
能源轉型是一個極端困難且牽涉廣大的政經工程。僅以硬體轉型言,如新建「非核」電廠、設置風力、太陽能機組,即使在一切手續皆全無阻障下,至少也須有十年以上的時間(何況,若要廣建小型發電廠、風力機組或太陽能板,其社會抗拒所消耗的時間及最終能否建得成皆難估計);至於若要等到生質能源等「新能源」能夠成為可用的「替代能源」,則尚須等待文明的幸運之神到來,不能視為當然。以上這些,即使一切想像得到的都能做得到,此一能源轉型過程也至少要有二十年上下的過渡程序;且尚未計入其代價,包括例如前述新建電廠等的社會抗爭代價,以及包括排碳增加、電費上漲、企業轉型等生態及經濟上的代價。所以,能源轉型過渡程序的平緩或急遽,對社會形成的負荷自有差異;也因此,核四的停續遂成為「立即廢核」及「漸進廢核」的抉擇問題。
進一步言,能源轉型更牽涉到三個層次的問題:一、生活方式;二、經濟形態;三、國安架構。
一、生活方式:這是最淺的一個層次。如果能源轉型的過程太激進,形成缺電或電費上漲,皆將影響個人的生活形態。然而,如果能源轉型的影響只及於此一層次,那也就罷了;少吹些冷氣,多繳點電費,只是生活層次受到影響,則將台灣想像成大一號的帛琉島又何妨?
二、經濟形態:陳藹玲不會在乎多繳些電費,但對小工廠及小吃店的影響就不一樣,其實去年電費上漲已經「演習」過了。此時,影響層面就從生活方式推進到了經濟形態,且是將擴展至一切的產業。當然,我們可以倡議產業轉型,反對「耗能產業」;但這也不是想得到就做得到的。何況,台灣眼前面對的是必須在幾年內闖過TPP或RCEP的關卡,倘因電力不穩定及電價上漲影響了開放後的經濟競爭力,其後果仍應正視。
三、國安架構:如果衝擊到經濟形態,自然也一定會影響到國安層次;譬如說,台灣的經濟狀態若因能源轉型失利而受創,難免就會更增加對大陸「讓利」的依賴,自亦更難避免兩岸關係的風險,這類顧慮皆是不可忽略的國安思維。
畢竟,台灣不是帛琉,因為帛琉沒有「兩岸關係」。台灣或許有人嚮往像帛琉那種回歸自然的生活方式,但台灣發展至今日,在經濟形態上已回不去了,而且台灣的生存更須建立在能夠開放競爭又足以抵擋中國大陸磁吸作用的國安架構之上。這即是能源轉型問題的三個層次。
以上論點,在今日民粹氛圍中,若被指為危言聳聽,亦不足為怪。問題在於,各政黨的領導人物皆不可能不知道這個道理,卻只是將核四議題當作撕裂社會的政治工具。即以民進黨言,核四若停建,我們可以預言,倘該黨當選二○一六年的總統,第一個重大的能源政策,必將是「核一延役」,屆時即可證明今天的一切皆是騙局;但民進黨今日卻絲毫不容「核四若在專業上確認安全,應採漸進廢核政策」的空間。
民進黨作了兩件會讓台灣致命的事:一是主張台獨,另一是扁政府把核四工序中斷毀壞,現在又不論核四安不安全都反核四。如今,台獨已無可能;但即使核四證實安全也會被民進黨毀了,這個,民進黨已有可能做到。
能源政策及能源轉型皆是攸關國家命脈的無比大事。我們曾論,即使如美國(三哩島)、俄羅斯(車諾比)、日本(福島)這樣的「核災大國」,如今仍維持核電政策,足徵這絕非一個想得到就做得到的事。這三國的政經條件難道不如台灣?更何況美俄還是能源生產大國。
因此,以台灣的特殊政經處境言,「非核家園」是否會顧此失彼,其實仍有議論空間,但是如今皆已無討論的餘地;然而,除非核四的專業安全未獲確認,否則,難道我們不能仔細想想究竟應「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」?
Daily Life, the Economy, and National Security
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2013
Summary: Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?
Full text below:
Building a "Number Five Nuclear Power Plant" on Taiwan will be impossible. Controversy is currently raging over the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP). Many people mistrust nuclear power per se, not just the 4NPP. If these people mistrusted only the 4NPP, rather than nuclear power per se, then in theory one could halt construction on 4NPP but still build a 5NPP. But as matters stand, a "nuclear-free homeland" has become established policy. Therefore whether construction on the 4NPP is halted or continued, there will be no "5NPP."
As a result, the referendum on whether to halt or continue construction on the 4NPP has become, in effect, a referendum on the immediate abolition of nuclear power vs. the gradual abolition of nuclear power. It has become a referendum on how to use the 4NPP as the first step towards a "nuclear-free homeland." As we have reiterated, if experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, then a referendum is superfluous and need not be held. But if experts certify that the 4NPP is safe, the commissioning of the 4NPP will merely be the first step in the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" or the "immediate abolition of nuclear power." Either way, the public on Taiwan will have taken the first step toward the abolition of nuclear power. Either way, there will be no "5NPP."
The "immediate abolition of nuclear power" and the "gradual abolition of nuclear power" differ in their procedure. If the 4NPP is commissioned, then the 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP can be decommissioned gradually. The 4NPP will act as a buffer in the gradual abolition of nuclear power generation. It will enable the power generation transition to proceed relatively smoothly. If however the 4NPP is immediately killed, and the 1NPP decommissioned in 2018, then the public on Taiwan will experience a more severe energy shortage.
Energy transformation is extremely difficult. It is a major political and economic undertaking. Consider only the hardware transformation. The construction of new, non-nuclear power plants, such as wind and solar, would take at least a decade, even assuming no procedural obstacles. Forget the widespread construction of small power plants, wind turbines, or solar panels. The time consumed due to public resistance will be inestimable. What about waiting until bioenergy or "new energy" becomes a viable form of "alternative energy?" That is like waiting for Lady Luck to smile upon us. That is hardly something one can take for granted. Even if everything imaginable is done, the energy transformation process will take at least two decades. We have not even mentioned other costs. Consider the aforementioned new power plants. Public resistance will exact a high price. Carbon emissions will increase. Electricity prices will rise. Corporations will be forced to restructure in response to environmental and economic costs. Therefore whether the energy transformation process is gradual or rapid will affect the social cost. The termination or continuation of the 4NPP has become a choice between the immediate abolition of nuclear power and the gradual abolition of nuclear power.
Energy transformation involves three levels. 1. Daily Life 2. The Economy 3. National Security
1. Daily Life. This is the most superficial level. If the energy transformation process is too abrupt, energy shortages and the rising cost of electricity will impact the daily life of the individual. If energy transformation affected only this level, it would be bad enough. We could use a little less air conditioning and pay a little more on our electricity bills. If the impact was confined to our daily lives, if Taiwan became a larger version of Palau, then why not?
Two. The Economy. Irene Chen will not mind paying more for her electricity bills. But the impact on small factories and snack bars will be very different. Last year the electricity rate hike was essentially a test run. Now the impact has expanded from daily life to the economy. It will impact all industries. We can of course trumpet industrial transformation. We can oppose energy consuming industries. But merely wishing does not make it so. Moreover, we face an immediate need. We must break through the barriers of TPP or RCEP within a few years. Energy insecurity and rising electricity prices could affect the competitiveness of our economy and liberalization process. The consequences must be addressed.
Three. National Security. If energy insecurity impacts the economy, it will also impact national security. For example, if Taiwan's economic status is weakened as a result of the energy transformation process, it will inevitably become more dependent upon favors from the Mainland. It will naturally increase the risk in cross-Strait relations. Such national security concerns cannot be ignored.
Taiwan is not Palau. Palau has no cross-Strait relations. Some on Taiwan may yearn to return to the same natural lifestyle as Palau. But Taiwan's economic development cannot be turned back. Taiwan's survival depends on it. Taiwan must be competitive enough to withstand the magnetic attraction of the Mainland. National security is the third level of the energy transition problem.
In today's populist atmosphere, anyone making the above arguments will be accused of being alarmist. That is not surprising. The leaders of the various political parties know the truth. But they use the 4NPP issue as a political tool to divide the public. We predict that if the DPP is able to halt construction on the 4NPP, and wins the 2016 presidential election, its first major energy policy will be to "postpone the decommissioning of the 1NPP." That will prove that its current anti-nuke rhetoric is a sham. Yet the DPP categorically refuses to adopt a gradual abolition of nuclear energy policy in the event experts certify that the 4NPP is safe.
The DPP has done two things that are fatal to Taiwan. The first is to advocate Taiwan independence. The other is to interrupt construction on the 4NPP during the Chen administration. Now, whether the 4NPP can be certified as safe or not, the DPP is obdurately opposed to its construction. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. But even if the 4NPP is certified as safe, it has been ruined by the DPP. In this sense, the DPP has indeed done everything it can.
Energy policy and energy transformation are major issues affecting a nation's survival. As we have reiterated the United States experienced the Three Mile Island incident. Russia experienced the Chernobyl disaster. Japan experience the Fukushima disaster. Yet they remain nuclear energy nations. This shows that a nuclear free homeland is not something one can have merely because one wants it. Which of these three has political and economic conditions inferior to Taiwan's? Never mind that the United States and Russia are major producers of energy.
Taiwan's political and economic situation is special. Would a "nuclear-free homeland" neglect some concerns for others? That is debatable. But as matters stand, there is no longer any room for debate. If experts cannot certify that the 4NPP is safe, that is one thing. Otherwise, should we not weigh the immediate abolition of nuclear power against the gradual abolition of nuclear power?
生活、經濟、國安:核四問題的三個層次
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.04.02 03:21 am
台灣不可能再建「核五」。因為,倘若現在爭議的只是不能信任核四,而不是對整個核電的否定,則在理論上,即使停建核四,仍可另建足堪信任的「核五」;但是,現在的情勢,卻是「非核家園」已成既定政策,因此,核四無論停或續,皆已不會再有「核五」。
所以,核四停續公投就成了「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」的策略抉擇問題,也就是要公投決定如何用「核四」邁出「非核家園」的第一步。
我們屢申,倘若核四在專業體檢後不能確認其安全,即失去公投的基礎,也就不必舉行公投。但若核四的專業安全獲得確認,國人所迎對的即是贊成核四上路以「漸進廢核」,或反對核四上路以「立即廢核」的策略抉擇。畢竟,不論核四上路或不上路,台灣就此已邁出非核廢核的第一步,無論如何皆不會再有「核五」
所謂「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」,其差異是對「能源轉型」程序的不同抉擇。核四若能運轉,再一步一步使核一二三除役,那麼核四就能在廢核過程中發生交疊、緩衝及漸進的作用,即可使能源轉型的過渡程序走得比較平緩;但若核四立即退場,再加上二○一八年核一除役,台灣在能源的過渡程序上即會承負較大的壓力。
能源轉型是一個極端困難且牽涉廣大的政經工程。僅以硬體轉型言,如新建「非核」電廠、設置風力、太陽能機組,即使在一切手續皆全無阻障下,至少也須有十年以上的時間(何況,若要廣建小型發電廠、風力機組或太陽能板,其社會抗拒所消耗的時間及最終能否建得成皆難估計);至於若要等到生質能源等「新能源」能夠成為可用的「替代能源」,則尚須等待文明的幸運之神到來,不能視為當然。以上這些,即使一切想像得到的都能做得到,此一能源轉型過程也至少要有二十年上下的過渡程序;且尚未計入其代價,包括例如前述新建電廠等的社會抗爭代價,以及包括排碳增加、電費上漲、企業轉型等生態及經濟上的代價。所以,能源轉型過渡程序的平緩或急遽,對社會形成的負荷自有差異;也因此,核四的停續遂成為「立即廢核」及「漸進廢核」的抉擇問題。
進一步言,能源轉型更牽涉到三個層次的問題:一、生活方式;二、經濟形態;三、國安架構。
一、生活方式:這是最淺的一個層次。如果能源轉型的過程太激進,形成缺電或電費上漲,皆將影響個人的生活形態。然而,如果能源轉型的影響只及於此一層次,那也就罷了;少吹些冷氣,多繳點電費,只是生活層次受到影響,則將台灣想像成大一號的帛琉島又何妨?
二、經濟形態:陳藹玲不會在乎多繳些電費,但對小工廠及小吃店的影響就不一樣,其實去年電費上漲已經「演習」過了。此時,影響層面就從生活方式推進到了經濟形態,且是將擴展至一切的產業。當然,我們可以倡議產業轉型,反對「耗能產業」;但這也不是想得到就做得到的。何況,台灣眼前面對的是必須在幾年內闖過TPP或RCEP的關卡,倘因電力不穩定及電價上漲影響了開放後的經濟競爭力,其後果仍應正視。
三、國安架構:如果衝擊到經濟形態,自然也一定會影響到國安層次;譬如說,台灣的經濟狀態若因能源轉型失利而受創,難免就會更增加對大陸「讓利」的依賴,自亦更難避免兩岸關係的風險,這類顧慮皆是不可忽略的國安思維。
畢竟,台灣不是帛琉,因為帛琉沒有「兩岸關係」。台灣或許有人嚮往像帛琉那種回歸自然的生活方式,但台灣發展至今日,在經濟形態上已回不去了,而且台灣的生存更須建立在能夠開放競爭又足以抵擋中國大陸磁吸作用的國安架構之上。這即是能源轉型問題的三個層次。
以上論點,在今日民粹氛圍中,若被指為危言聳聽,亦不足為怪。問題在於,各政黨的領導人物皆不可能不知道這個道理,卻只是將核四議題當作撕裂社會的政治工具。即以民進黨言,核四若停建,我們可以預言,倘該黨當選二○一六年的總統,第一個重大的能源政策,必將是「核一延役」,屆時即可證明今天的一切皆是騙局;但民進黨今日卻絲毫不容「核四若在專業上確認安全,應採漸進廢核政策」的空間。
民進黨作了兩件會讓台灣致命的事:一是主張台獨,另一是扁政府把核四工序中斷毀壞,現在又不論核四安不安全都反核四。如今,台獨已無可能;但即使核四證實安全也會被民進黨毀了,這個,民進黨已有可能做到。
能源政策及能源轉型皆是攸關國家命脈的無比大事。我們曾論,即使如美國(三哩島)、俄羅斯(車諾比)、日本(福島)這樣的「核災大國」,如今仍維持核電政策,足徵這絕非一個想得到就做得到的事。這三國的政經條件難道不如台灣?更何況美俄還是能源生產大國。
因此,以台灣的特殊政經處境言,「非核家園」是否會顧此失彼,其實仍有議論空間,但是如今皆已無討論的餘地;然而,除非核四的專業安全未獲確認,否則,難道我們不能仔細想想究竟應「立即廢核」或「漸進廢核」?
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