Walking on Two Legs: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait
by Ma Ying-jeou
translated by Bevin Chu
March 12, 2007
Comments: Apparently Ma Ying-jeou didn't get the memo.
So here it is:
The Cold War is over. Mainland China is no longer your enemy. The US government is no longer your friend.
Walking on Two Legs: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait
by Ma Ying-jeou
translated by Bevin Chu
March 12, 2007
As many observers have pointed out, cross-Straits issues concern not only the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but also the Asian-Pacific region and foreign policy, because it may be the only issue that could provoke war between the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, and Communist-ruled mainland China, which has the world's largest population. If war were to break out, not only would regional trade and development be brought to a halt, nations in the region might be forced to choose between supporting and resisting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), precipitating long-term structural changes in the strategic environment of the Asian-Pacific region.
At a deeper level, I would especially like to point out three major negative developments affecting the security of both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the past several years. First, the rapid and large-scale development of Communist Chinese military forces.
In November 2006, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, established at the request of the US Congress, made public its annual congressional report.
One of its main conclusions was "Many experts have already arrived at an important consensus, that between 2008 and 2015, if a conflict arises, or tension increases between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the US decides that it must assist Taiwan, the United States military will experience a Window of Vulnerability."
In other words, many of the CCP's Taiwan-oriented military modernization plans, including submarines, destroyers, cruise missiles, as well as high mobility ballistic missiles, new style Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance Systems (C4ISR), as well as attack plans, may all be deployed around 2008, or shortly thereafter.
Meanwhile, the measures that the United States military may use to hinder the Chinese Communists, including guided missile defense systems, nearshore military capabilities, as well as comprehensive antisubmarine warfare networks, may not have adequate strength until 2015.
This will seriously reduce the ability of American military forces to intimidate the CCP, and simultaneously increase the cost of US intervention. Secondly, since 2000, the ruling DPP has never attempted to establish any form of relations with the newly-awaken Dragon of the East. Even more disadvantageous is the fact that the DPP stops at nothing to provoke the CCP, and frequently manufactures tensions between the US and the CCP.
One week ago, President Chen made yet another shocking statement: "Taiwan must become independent! Taiwan demands a new constitution! Taiwan must carry out the Rectification of Names! Taiwan demands economic development!" Since 2002, as we can see, Chen Shui-bian has set off a series of bombshells: "one country on each side," "referendum," "authoring a new constitution," "the balance of terror," as well as "abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification," and "Four Yeses and One No."
Many analysts think the DPP has already begun pursuing "de jure Taiwan independence." Because of election considerations, such a development may determine Taiwan's political climate for the coming year. Whether this development leads to tensions between the two sides of the Strait is not something that concerns either Chen Shui-bian or the DPP in the slightest.
Thirdly, despite the hardline standoff between their governments, the public on both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to establish close economic and cultural relations. This, in today's world, is a unique situation.
However the DPP government turns a blind eye to the economic and cultural needs of millions who travel, trade, invest, and receive educations on the mainland.
In other countries such activities are fundamental to market liberalization and globalization, but some DPP political figures actually denounce such activities as "selling out Taiwan."
Even sadder, when people from Taiwan struggle alone on the outside, all they hear is insults and criticisms about "selling out Taiwan." This has cut them to the quick and demeaned their feelings for Taiwan. Their alienation has in turn strengthened the DPP's contempt for both economic considerations and human feelings.
In addition, such a vicious cycle has created significant internal fissures within Taiwan's society. One positive development, amidst the above three major negative developments, is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have experienced a rapid increase in economic and cultural exchanges over the past several years.
According to figures published by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), cross-Straits trade between 1987 and 2006 has already amounted to 562.4 billion US dollars. As for the proportion of cross-Straits trade, Taiwan comprises approximately 5% of the mainland's trade, while the mainland accounts for 20% of Taiwan's trade.
Over the past ten years, Taiwan has enjoyed a favorable 244 billion US dollar trade balance with the mainland. Taking only 2006 (up to November) as an example, cross-Straits trade volume exceeded 80 billon US dollars, including the export of 57 billion US dollars and the import of 23 billion US dollars. In other words, Taiwan enjoyed a favorable balance of 34 billion US dollars.
At the same time, Taiwan's total world trade surplus was only 18.3 billion US dollars. In other words, without the mainland market, Taiwan would already have had an unfavorable balance of trade. In terms of investments, according to Ministry of Economic Affairs figures, as of 2006 Taipei had already authorized 35,542 investments on the mainland totalling 54.9 billion US dollars.
Mainland China is currently Taiwan's largest investor, accounting for 67.35% of Taiwan's total outside investments. Beijing's official figures show that since 1991, Taiwan had at least 72,285 investments on the mainland, amounting to 100 billion US dollars. In 2006, Taiwan remitted to and collected from mainland China receipts totalling approximately 180 billion US dollars, nearly ten times the amount in 2002.
That is why I refer to this trend as a positive development, instead of what the DPP calls a "hollowing out of the economy," not merely because it is a contribution to Taiwan's economy, but because it is helpful to the stability of cross-Straits relations.
For example, Taiwan's investments and human resources on the mainland have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the mainland's economic development.
Therefore CCP authorities, at either the central government or local level, all appreciate the role Taiwan's business people have made to mainland economic development, career opportunities, and the upgrading of technology.
Close exchanges across the Taiwan Strait also help each side to understand the other's anxieties, expectations, and constraints. As a result of direct contacts, Taiwan's elites and public can begin to appreciate mainland China's political system and ideological principles and constraints. At the same time, more and more mainland elites and members of the public can better understand Taiwan's system of democracy and its lively political environment.
The above, I believe, can be helpful to the long-term benefit of Taiwan as well as mainland China. In my opinion, mainland China is not exclusively a threat, it is also an opportunity. If, as many DPP public figures insist, we treat mainland China exclusively as a threat, then we will be misled and unable to discover the opportunities it has to offer.
Similarly, if we regard mainland China exclusively as an opportunity, that is also a mistake. The mainland is simultaneously a threat and an opportunity. This will be the case for a long time to come.
In order to resist the Chinese Communist threat, Taiwan should adopt a kind of "Two-handed Strategy." First, on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, or perhaps "One China, Two Interpretations," Taiwan should re-establish the dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party that was interrupted in 1999. By means of dialogue, both sides of the Taiwan Strait may be able, by direct contact, to negotiate a modus vivendi that allows Taiwan more space and the opportunity to participate in international activities.
Once both sides of the Taiwan Strait have established sufficient trust and good will, we may even be able to look forward to a negotiated peace agreement. Next, in order to resist Chinese Communist threats, the ROC must also maintain a solid national defense. But we do not agree with the DPP's view that Taiwan should develop an "offensive approach to national defense."
An offensive approach to national defense would not not be feasible unless Taiwan develops weapons of mass destruction (WMD), otherwise any other deterrent would have not real effect. The danger of an "offensive approach to national defense" is that it would undoubtedly invite international intervention, even a CCP "first strike." We believe that the ROC's national defense posture should be to arm ourselves only to the point where the CCP cannot be confident of a successful "first strike."
As long as the CCP cannot be confident that it can achieve such goal, its strategic calculations will remain difficult, and the temptation to launch a surprise attack will be diminished. In order to become "a nut too tough to bite," the ROC should carry out national defense reforms while simultaneously purchasing advanced weapons from overseas.
Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the mainland also allows us to adopt a "Two-handed Strategy." On the one hand, both sides should sit down and reach an agreement on direct flights. Not only would this immediately and significantly increase cross-Straits economic activity, it would also promote the first large-scale direct contacts in cross-Straits history. The impact on economic and cultural exchanges would be immeasurable.
The political impact would also be beneficial; we could simultaneously forsee a reduction in the danger of war.
But, direct links would not merely bring positive results for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. They would also help safeguard investments, promote joint crime-fighting, intellectual property rights protection, and other long-unresolved questions, long neglected by the DPP's "Three Noes" policy (no contacts, no negotiations, no compromises).
I agree whole-heartedly in the necessity of cross-Straits "conflict management." The key word being "management." Overseas visitors may not realize that the DPP government defines cross-Straits relations as a "reunification vs. independence issue."
I emphatically disagree with this definition. Because no matter whether one is pro-reunification or pro-independence, neither conforms to the current wishes of the majority of people on Taiwan. According to numerous surveys, even officially-sponsored surveys, the results show that many of those who "identify with Taiwan" do not support Taiwan independence.
But just as the proverb which says "God helps those who help themselves," I believe that the "Walking on Two Legs" policy and the "Two-handed Strategy" offer a good start for Taiwan. Only by blazing a new trail and setting a new precedent, can we establish cross-Straits peace and prosperity.
Original Chinese below:
兩條腿走路：
台海的衝突管理
馬英九
三月十二日
正如同許多觀察家所指出的，台海問題並不僅攸關兩岸，而且是亞太地區的外交政策問題。因為它可能是唯一會引發世界唯一超強的美國，與最多人口的中共兩國之間戰爭的重大議題。一旦戰爭爆發，區域的貿易與發展不但會中斷，也可能會迫使區域各國必須在支持與對抗中共之間做出選擇，因而造成亞太地區戰略環境與結構長久性的改變。
再深入一點來說，我要特別指出在過去幾年，影響到台海安全與兩岸關係的三大負面發展。首先，中共軍力的快速與大規模現代化發展
2006年11月，由美國國會所要求成立的「美中經濟安全檢討委員會」(US- China Economic and Security Review Commission)公布了對國會的年度報告。
其中一個主要結論就是，「許多專家業已形成了一項重要共識，那就是在2008到2015年之間，如果兩岸之間出現衝突或緊張情況，而美國決定要協援台灣的話，美軍將會出現一個「脆弱之窗」(Window of Vulnerability)。
也就是說，中共許多針對台灣的軍事現代化計劃，包括潛艦、驅逐艦、巡弋飛彈以及具高度機動性的彈道飛彈、新式指管通情電監偵(C4ISR)系統，以及攻擊計劃等等，都很有可能會在2008年左右，或在之後的一段短暫時間內完成部署。
然而，美軍可以用來阻絕中共這些攻勢的措施與作為，包括飛彈防禦系統、近岸打擊兵力以及具整合性的反潛戰網絡等，卻可能在2015年前仍無法發揮戰力。
這將會嚴重降低美國軍力用來嚇阻中共的效果，同時也會增加美國進行干涉的成本。」第二，自2000年之後，民進黨政府從未嘗試要對這覺醒的東方巨龍進行任何形式上的交往。更為不利的是，民進黨還無所不用其極地刺激中共，並且還常常造成美國與中共這兩個強權之間關係的緊張。
就在一個禮拜前，我們的陳總統又再一次地發表了震撼性的談話：「台灣要獨立！台灣要新憲！台灣要正名！台灣要經濟發展！」誠如各位所看到的，自2002年後，陳水扁已經施放了一連串的震撼彈。「一邊一國」、「公民投票」、「制定新憲」、「恐怖平衡」以及「廢除國統綱領」到現在的「四要一沒有」，
許多分析家認為現在民進黨已經開始追求「法理台獨」。由於選舉的需要，這樣的發展趨勢很可能會主導著台灣未來一年的政治議題。對於是否會造成兩岸之間的緊張局勢，陳水扁和民進黨並不在乎。
第三，在雙方政府的強硬對立之下，台海兩邊的民眾持續在經濟上與文化上建立起密切交流關係。這是今天世界上最為獨特的情況之一。
然而對於數以百萬計的民眾在大陸旅遊、貿易、投資、教育，以及其他許多在經濟與文化方面的需要，民進黨政府完全視若無睹。
在其他國家內，這些活動是最基本的市場自由化與全球化的交流與活動，但一些民進黨政治人物卻污名化為「賣台」。
更令人痛心地是，當台灣人民獨自在外奮鬥的時候，耳朵裡聽到的卻是像「賣台」這類的污辱與批評。這在實質上已傷害了他們對於台灣這塊土地的情感。他們的疏離感轉過來又強化民進黨對於經濟與人性上的追?求嗤之以鼻。
此外，這樣的惡性循環也造成了台灣社會內部的重大裂痕。一項正面發展所幸，除了以上三大負面發展之外，在過去幾年還有一項正面的發展趨勢出現，那就是兩岸在經濟與文化交流上的快速成長。
根據陸委會的資料顯示，從1987到 2006年，兩岸的貿易總額已經累計達到了5,624億美元。至於兩岸貿易的比例，台灣約佔了中共對外貿易總額的5％；中共則佔了台灣對外貿易總額的 20％。
在過去十年間，台灣對大陸總共享有2,440億美元的順差。只以2006年（到11月）為例，兩岸的貿易額超過了 800億美元，其中包括了出口的570億美元，以及進口的230億美元，也就是說，台灣享有順差340億美元。
然而，在同一時期，台灣的全球貿易順差卻只有183億美元。換言之，如果沒有大陸市場，台灣早已是一個入超國了。在投資方面，根據我國經濟部的資料，到2006年為止，台北已經批准了35,542件的對大陸投資案，總額達到了549億美元。
中國大陸目前是台灣最大的投資對象，去年佔了台灣對外投資總額的67.35％。北京的官方資料則顯示出，自1991年，台灣對大陸累積投資案已至少有72,285件，總額達到了 1,000億美元。在2006年，台灣對中國大陸匯出及匯入款總額約有1,800億美元，這幾乎是2002年數字的十倍。
我之所以會像這個趨勢稱為「正面」發展，而不是民進黨所聲稱的「經濟空洞化」，不僅僅是因為這對於台灣的經濟福祉有所貢獻，更是因為這個發展有助於兩岸關係的穩定。
舉例而言，台灣對中國大陸在投資與人力資源上的挹注，無疑地會對大陸的經濟發展形成重大貢獻。
所以中共當局不論是中央或地方政府對於台商在其經濟發展、人員就業、以及技術提升上的付出都能感然於心。
海峽兩岸間的密切交流也幫助了彼此理解到對方的憂慮、期待以及限制。藉由直接的連繫，台灣社會的菁英與民眾開始能體會到中國大陸的政治系統與意識形態中的原則與其侷限。與此同時，也有越來越多的大陸菁英與一般民眾能夠了解台灣的民主制度以及活潑不羈的政治活動。
以上種種，我相信都會有助於台灣以及中國大陸兩者的長遠利益。在我看來，中國大陸不但是個「威脅」，也是個「機會」。如果像許多民進黨人士所言，只把中國大陸當做是個「威脅」，那麼我們就會被誤導而無法發掘到它所提供的「機會」。
同樣地，如果只把中國大陸當成是一塊充滿「機會」的寶地也是錯誤的。大陸同時是「威脅」，也是「機會」，這在未來很長的一段時間都會是如此。
為了抵抗中共的威脅，台灣應該採取一種「兩手策略」。首先，台灣應該在「九二共識」，或是「一中各表」的基礎上，重新與中共展開自1999年即中斷至今的對話。藉由雙邊對話，
海峽兩邊可以在彼此直接交往的情況下，談判出所謂的「活路模式」(modus vivendi)，讓台灣有更多空間可以參與國際活動。
當台海雙方有足夠的信任與善意後，「和平協議」的談判亦可預見。其次，為了抵禦來自中共的威脅，台灣還必須要維持堅實的國防實力。不過，我們卻不同意民進黨所提，台灣應該發展「攻勢國防」的看法。
攻勢國防」之所以不可行，是因為除非台灣發展出大規模毀滅性武器，否則任何其他的嚇阻都沒有實效；「攻勢國防」之所以危險，是因為它必將引起國際干涉，甚至是中共的先發攻擊。我們認為，台灣的國防態勢應該是要武裝到中共沒有把握可以成功地發動「第一擊」。
只要中共沒有自信能達到這樣的目標，其戰略盤算就會變得複雜，同時奇襲攻台的誘因也會減少。為了成為一顆「咬不動的堅果」，台灣應該持續進行國防改革，同時繼續向國外採購先進武器。
要利用中國大陸的「機會」也可以採取「兩手策略」。一方面，雙方應該坐下來好好就直航達成協議。這不僅立即大幅促進海峽兩岸的經濟活動，也會實現兩岸歷史上第一次大規模的直接往來，這在經濟與文化交流上的影響將十分巨大。
在政治上的影響也會是利多；同時可以預見地，戰爭的危險將會顯著地減少。
不過，直航並非只能為雙方帶來正面結果。包括投資保障、共同打擊犯罪、智慧財產權的保護等等長久以來懸而未決的問題，一直被民進黨政府的「三不」政策（不接觸、不談判、不妥協）忽略。
我衷心地認同「衝突管理」在兩岸關係的必要性。這其中的關鍵字是「管理」。來自國外的貴客或許不特別知道，民進黨政府把兩岸關係定位為「統獨關係」。
但我非常不同意這個定位。因為不管是「統」或「獨」，都不符合目前台灣大多數人民的期望。根據許多調查資料，甚至是官方所主辦的調查都顯示，許多「台灣認同」的人並不支持「台獨政策」。
但正如一句諺語所說：「天助自助者。」我相信我所提到的「兩條腿走路」以及兩套「兩手策略」可以為台灣提供了一個好的開始，藉此發展出新的道路與典則，也才有可能建立出一個和平而繁榮的台海局勢。
Monday, March 12, 2007
Sunday, March 4, 2007
Chen Tsung-ming should resign as Prosecutor General
Unable to explain his presence at a banquet,
Chen Tsung-ming should resign as Prosecutor General
United Daily News Editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 4, 2007
Chen Tsung-ming, Prosecutor General
Comment: Chen Tsung-ming is the first ever Prosecutor General of the ROC. His counterpart in the US would be the attorney general. The position of prosecutor general carries with it enormous responsibility, and requires a person of Solomonic impartiality. Chen Tsung-ming does not even remotely qualify as such a person. In fact; he is its diametric opposite. He is exactly the kind of oily "player," who goes along to get along, that one would expect from a cronyist dictatorship. The following United Daily News Editorial is absolutely correct in demanding his resignation.
Unable to explain his presence at a banquet,
Chen Tsung-ming should resign as Prosecutor General
United Daily News Editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 4, 2007
Chen Tsung-ming, who was appointed prosecutor general amidst intense controversy, has not only forgotten the solemn pledge he made to the legislature, he doesn't even appreciate the discretion that his new role requires. Before and after Chinese New Year, he attended banquets held by the First Family's doctor Huang Fang-yen, a defendant in the gift certificate scandal. Following exposure by the media, Chen Tsung-ming unrepentantly referred to his actions as "No big deal!" Is such a prosecutor general worthy of the people's and the judiciary's confidence?
The purpose of establishing the prosecutor general system is to reduce the influence of politics over the prosecutorial system, thereby promoting judicial independence. Chen Tsung-ming, as the first ever prosecutor general, has not only neglected his duty in this regard, he has demonstrated sheer indifference to the reputation of the judiciary. That is why he dared to cross the line of demarcation between proper and improper conduct.
We haven't even mentioned the disreputable go-between role Huang Fang Yan played in the Sogo gift certificate case, in which he performed the role of spin-controller for the First Family, also something the man in the street is well aware of. If Chen Tsung-ming, in response to such a sensitive banquet invitation, could attend as if doing so was no big deal, ignoring the distinction between public and private interests, does that mean that officials of the judiciary and those involved in judicial cases may fraternize and even exchange toasts with each other, without any constraints?
Even more serious is the fact that afterwards he did not come clean, but publicly lied. Regarding the get together, Chen Tsung-ming stated that a mutual friend invited them, that he and Huang Fang-yen "don't know each other all that well." Huang Fang-yen however stated that both of them have experienced family tragedies and frequently "discuss matters of the heart." Regarding the meeting time, Chen Tsung-ming declared that it went on for only an hour, but a neighbor and the gatekeeper revealed that he stopped by on the same day for over four hours, and that this was not the only occasion. He had done so several times before and after Chinese New Year. Based on the discrepancies in his explanations, Chen Tsung-ming has been neither frank nor forthcoming, and appears to be covering up certain facts.
Because Chen Tsung-ming has been less than candid, this has increased the outside world's suspicions towards him and Huang Fan-yen. If in fact they enjoy a personal friendship, why the huge gap between their statements? Why the need to lie about the duration of their meeting? If the statements of the gatekeeper and the neighbor are not in error, then before and after Chinese New Year he visited the Huang family several times, in which case the situation arouses suspicion, because such frequent visits far exceed those that occur between normal friends. In which case, why was Chen Tsung-ming visiting the Huang family so frequently? What exactly did the two talk about? Did their talks involve the violation of any oaths of office? Chen Tsung-ming must respond to these questions in detail before the legislature. Only by doing so will he be able to allow people from all walks of life to determine whether he is still fit to assume the duties of prosecutor general.
During the Legislative Yuan's review of the prosector general's qualifications, the most controversial point was Chen Tsung-ming's complex web of contacts. Chen Tsung-ming is distinguished by his ability to exploit personal relations, i.e., "guang xi." The main reason the People First Party repaid him by voting for his approval was his friendly relations with James Soong. Conversely speaking, this kind of gregarious, "ominivorous" personality trait, is the principle reason the judiciary is unable to avoid hindrance by favoritism. In other words, Chen Tsung-ming achieved prominence because of his personal relationships, but at the same time his personal relationships are an obstacle in the way of his capacity for judicial independence. We can see from the Huang family banquet incident that it is basically unrealistic to expect an official prone to micromanagement to maintain judicial impartiality.
In any normal nation under the rule of law, any official of the judiciary who privately fraternizes with parties directly or indirectly involved in a legal case, is in violation of professional ethics, and subject to severe punishment. If we wish to establish a historical precedent on Taiwan, making the first-ever prosecutor general a role model worthy of emulation, then Chen Tsung-ming's transgressions must be subjected to the strictest investigation, and may not be glossed over. Not only must the Legislative Yuan demand that Chen Tsung-ming submit an exhaustive report of his conduct, it should form a special committee to investigate the facts of the case. If it discovers that Chen practiced favoritism, acted improperly, or perjured himself, it must demand that Chen Tsung-ming resign the office of prosecutor general. First, this will ensure that the integrity of the judiciary has not been compromised during the banquets he attended; Second, this will motivate Chen Tsung-ming to become more conscious of his solemn duty; Third, this will resolve suspicions on the part of other prosecutors and society as a whole.
We can see from the record of President Chen's behavior how it is easy it is for a nation's political system to be destroyed at the hands of a single individual. The prosecutor general system has just been initiated. It must not be destroyed by a single banquet that cannot be accounted for. This is an account that Chen Tsung-ming must settle, no ifs, ands, or buts.
Original Chinese below:
聯合報社論
交代不清夜宴始末，
陳聰明即應辭檢察總長
2007.03.04
方在爭議中出任檢察總長，陳聰明不僅旋即忘卻他對國會的莊嚴承諾，更不知自己的新角色有何分寸需要謹守，他在春節前後接連赴涉及禮券醜聞的第一醫師黃芳彥家夜宴。被媒體揭發後，陳聰明似乎仍不以為忤，自稱「這沒什麼啊！」這樣的檢察總長，還值得人民和司法信賴嗎？
檢察總長制度的設置，目的是在減少政治對檢察系統的控制，從而提升司法的獨立。陳聰明枉為首屆檢察總長，對這項職務的操持非但毫無警覺，更不把司法榮譽的維持放在心上，也因此，他才會連最起碼的形式迴避的界線都敢踐踏。
且不說黃芳彥在ＳＯＧＯ禮券案中不名譽的穿梭角色，他為第一家庭「打點」對外關係，亦是路人皆知的事。對如此敏感的邀宴，陳聰明如果可以若無其事地赴約，還覺得於公於私皆無損；那麼，今後所有司法官與案件關係人酬酢交往，是不是也都可以無所禁忌？
更嚴重的，是他事後的不坦白，甚至公開說謊。對於因何聚會，陳聰明說是友人居間邀約，他與黃芳彥並「不相熟」；黃芳彥則稱，兩人都有過家庭變故，經常聊天「談心事」。對於聚會時間，陳聰明聲稱只去了一小時，但鄰居和門房均稱他被爆料當日即逗留了四小時，且不僅這次，春節前後來過數回。從這些說詞的出入看，陳聰明並沒有對社會開誠布公，且似乎在刻意掩蓋某些事實。
正由於陳聰明的缺乏坦誠，更加深了外界對他和黃芳彥夜會所為何來的質疑。如果真是私人交誼，為何雙方說詞落差那麼大？又為何需要捏造聚會時間？而如果門房和鄰居的說法無誤，他在春節前後曾數度造訪黃家，那麼情況即益發啟人疑竇，因為那樣的頻率，已遠超乎朋友間交往拜會之常情。那麼，陳聰明究竟為何頻繁造訪黃家？雙方究竟談了什麼？有沒有涉及任何職務之承諾？這些，陳聰明都有必要詳盡將經過向國會提出說明，才能讓各界了解他是否仍堪擔當檢察總長的職務。
立法院在審查檢察總長資格時，陳聰明最滋爭議的一點，即是他的交往太過複雜。陳聰明的特質，是他善於人際關係，長於人和；親民黨當時為「回報」他對宋楚瑜的友好而投票支持他，這是主要原因。但反過來看，這種喜好交際、葷素不忌的性格，恰恰也是司法擺脫不了人情羈絆的主因。也就是說，陳聰明因人和而得以出線，但對人情交際的不拘，卻又成為他維持司法獨立的障礙。從黃家夜宴事件即可看出，要寄望一個喜歡面面俱到的總長來維持檢察系統的超然，根本不可能有兩全的機會。
在正常的法治國家，任何司法官員私會涉案人或其關係人，都是違背職業倫理的行為，將遭嚴厲處分。在台灣，若要建立史上首位檢察總長的角色典範，對陳聰明的踰矩行為，絕對應該嚴加追究，不可輕忽。立法院除要求陳聰明就此提出詳盡報告，更應該組織專案小組調查其真偽；如果發現徇私、失當或說謊情事，則應要求陳聰明辭去總長職務。 一來，是要確保沒有任何司法正義在夜宴中被出賣；二來，這可促使陳聰明對其職務之神聖性提高警覺；三來，也是對社會及檢察界的疑慮作一澄清。
國家制度設計的美意，多麼容易毀於一人之手，從陳水扁總統的作為即可見殷鑑歷歷。檢察總長制才要上路，不能被一場說詞迷離的夜宴給破壞；這筆帳，陳聰明非交代清楚不可。
Chen Tsung-ming should resign as Prosecutor General
United Daily News Editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 4, 2007
Chen Tsung-ming, Prosecutor General
Comment: Chen Tsung-ming is the first ever Prosecutor General of the ROC. His counterpart in the US would be the attorney general. The position of prosecutor general carries with it enormous responsibility, and requires a person of Solomonic impartiality. Chen Tsung-ming does not even remotely qualify as such a person. In fact; he is its diametric opposite. He is exactly the kind of oily "player," who goes along to get along, that one would expect from a cronyist dictatorship. The following United Daily News Editorial is absolutely correct in demanding his resignation.
Unable to explain his presence at a banquet,
Chen Tsung-ming should resign as Prosecutor General
United Daily News Editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 4, 2007
Chen Tsung-ming, who was appointed prosecutor general amidst intense controversy, has not only forgotten the solemn pledge he made to the legislature, he doesn't even appreciate the discretion that his new role requires. Before and after Chinese New Year, he attended banquets held by the First Family's doctor Huang Fang-yen, a defendant in the gift certificate scandal. Following exposure by the media, Chen Tsung-ming unrepentantly referred to his actions as "No big deal!" Is such a prosecutor general worthy of the people's and the judiciary's confidence?
The purpose of establishing the prosecutor general system is to reduce the influence of politics over the prosecutorial system, thereby promoting judicial independence. Chen Tsung-ming, as the first ever prosecutor general, has not only neglected his duty in this regard, he has demonstrated sheer indifference to the reputation of the judiciary. That is why he dared to cross the line of demarcation between proper and improper conduct.
We haven't even mentioned the disreputable go-between role Huang Fang Yan played in the Sogo gift certificate case, in which he performed the role of spin-controller for the First Family, also something the man in the street is well aware of. If Chen Tsung-ming, in response to such a sensitive banquet invitation, could attend as if doing so was no big deal, ignoring the distinction between public and private interests, does that mean that officials of the judiciary and those involved in judicial cases may fraternize and even exchange toasts with each other, without any constraints?
Even more serious is the fact that afterwards he did not come clean, but publicly lied. Regarding the get together, Chen Tsung-ming stated that a mutual friend invited them, that he and Huang Fang-yen "don't know each other all that well." Huang Fang-yen however stated that both of them have experienced family tragedies and frequently "discuss matters of the heart." Regarding the meeting time, Chen Tsung-ming declared that it went on for only an hour, but a neighbor and the gatekeeper revealed that he stopped by on the same day for over four hours, and that this was not the only occasion. He had done so several times before and after Chinese New Year. Based on the discrepancies in his explanations, Chen Tsung-ming has been neither frank nor forthcoming, and appears to be covering up certain facts.
Because Chen Tsung-ming has been less than candid, this has increased the outside world's suspicions towards him and Huang Fan-yen. If in fact they enjoy a personal friendship, why the huge gap between their statements? Why the need to lie about the duration of their meeting? If the statements of the gatekeeper and the neighbor are not in error, then before and after Chinese New Year he visited the Huang family several times, in which case the situation arouses suspicion, because such frequent visits far exceed those that occur between normal friends. In which case, why was Chen Tsung-ming visiting the Huang family so frequently? What exactly did the two talk about? Did their talks involve the violation of any oaths of office? Chen Tsung-ming must respond to these questions in detail before the legislature. Only by doing so will he be able to allow people from all walks of life to determine whether he is still fit to assume the duties of prosecutor general.
During the Legislative Yuan's review of the prosector general's qualifications, the most controversial point was Chen Tsung-ming's complex web of contacts. Chen Tsung-ming is distinguished by his ability to exploit personal relations, i.e., "guang xi." The main reason the People First Party repaid him by voting for his approval was his friendly relations with James Soong. Conversely speaking, this kind of gregarious, "ominivorous" personality trait, is the principle reason the judiciary is unable to avoid hindrance by favoritism. In other words, Chen Tsung-ming achieved prominence because of his personal relationships, but at the same time his personal relationships are an obstacle in the way of his capacity for judicial independence. We can see from the Huang family banquet incident that it is basically unrealistic to expect an official prone to micromanagement to maintain judicial impartiality.
In any normal nation under the rule of law, any official of the judiciary who privately fraternizes with parties directly or indirectly involved in a legal case, is in violation of professional ethics, and subject to severe punishment. If we wish to establish a historical precedent on Taiwan, making the first-ever prosecutor general a role model worthy of emulation, then Chen Tsung-ming's transgressions must be subjected to the strictest investigation, and may not be glossed over. Not only must the Legislative Yuan demand that Chen Tsung-ming submit an exhaustive report of his conduct, it should form a special committee to investigate the facts of the case. If it discovers that Chen practiced favoritism, acted improperly, or perjured himself, it must demand that Chen Tsung-ming resign the office of prosecutor general. First, this will ensure that the integrity of the judiciary has not been compromised during the banquets he attended; Second, this will motivate Chen Tsung-ming to become more conscious of his solemn duty; Third, this will resolve suspicions on the part of other prosecutors and society as a whole.
We can see from the record of President Chen's behavior how it is easy it is for a nation's political system to be destroyed at the hands of a single individual. The prosecutor general system has just been initiated. It must not be destroyed by a single banquet that cannot be accounted for. This is an account that Chen Tsung-ming must settle, no ifs, ands, or buts.
Original Chinese below:
聯合報社論
交代不清夜宴始末，
陳聰明即應辭檢察總長
2007.03.04
方在爭議中出任檢察總長，陳聰明不僅旋即忘卻他對國會的莊嚴承諾，更不知自己的新角色有何分寸需要謹守，他在春節前後接連赴涉及禮券醜聞的第一醫師黃芳彥家夜宴。被媒體揭發後，陳聰明似乎仍不以為忤，自稱「這沒什麼啊！」這樣的檢察總長，還值得人民和司法信賴嗎？
檢察總長制度的設置，目的是在減少政治對檢察系統的控制，從而提升司法的獨立。陳聰明枉為首屆檢察總長，對這項職務的操持非但毫無警覺，更不把司法榮譽的維持放在心上，也因此，他才會連最起碼的形式迴避的界線都敢踐踏。
且不說黃芳彥在ＳＯＧＯ禮券案中不名譽的穿梭角色，他為第一家庭「打點」對外關係，亦是路人皆知的事。對如此敏感的邀宴，陳聰明如果可以若無其事地赴約，還覺得於公於私皆無損；那麼，今後所有司法官與案件關係人酬酢交往，是不是也都可以無所禁忌？
更嚴重的，是他事後的不坦白，甚至公開說謊。對於因何聚會，陳聰明說是友人居間邀約，他與黃芳彥並「不相熟」；黃芳彥則稱，兩人都有過家庭變故，經常聊天「談心事」。對於聚會時間，陳聰明聲稱只去了一小時，但鄰居和門房均稱他被爆料當日即逗留了四小時，且不僅這次，春節前後來過數回。從這些說詞的出入看，陳聰明並沒有對社會開誠布公，且似乎在刻意掩蓋某些事實。
正由於陳聰明的缺乏坦誠，更加深了外界對他和黃芳彥夜會所為何來的質疑。如果真是私人交誼，為何雙方說詞落差那麼大？又為何需要捏造聚會時間？而如果門房和鄰居的說法無誤，他在春節前後曾數度造訪黃家，那麼情況即益發啟人疑竇，因為那樣的頻率，已遠超乎朋友間交往拜會之常情。那麼，陳聰明究竟為何頻繁造訪黃家？雙方究竟談了什麼？有沒有涉及任何職務之承諾？這些，陳聰明都有必要詳盡將經過向國會提出說明，才能讓各界了解他是否仍堪擔當檢察總長的職務。
立法院在審查檢察總長資格時，陳聰明最滋爭議的一點，即是他的交往太過複雜。陳聰明的特質，是他善於人際關係，長於人和；親民黨當時為「回報」他對宋楚瑜的友好而投票支持他，這是主要原因。但反過來看，這種喜好交際、葷素不忌的性格，恰恰也是司法擺脫不了人情羈絆的主因。也就是說，陳聰明因人和而得以出線，但對人情交際的不拘，卻又成為他維持司法獨立的障礙。從黃家夜宴事件即可看出，要寄望一個喜歡面面俱到的總長來維持檢察系統的超然，根本不可能有兩全的機會。
在正常的法治國家，任何司法官員私會涉案人或其關係人，都是違背職業倫理的行為，將遭嚴厲處分。在台灣，若要建立史上首位檢察總長的角色典範，對陳聰明的踰矩行為，絕對應該嚴加追究，不可輕忽。立法院除要求陳聰明就此提出詳盡報告，更應該組織專案小組調查其真偽；如果發現徇私、失當或說謊情事，則應要求陳聰明辭去總長職務。 一來，是要確保沒有任何司法正義在夜宴中被出賣；二來，這可促使陳聰明對其職務之神聖性提高警覺；三來，也是對社會及檢察界的疑慮作一澄清。
國家制度設計的美意，多麼容易毀於一人之手，從陳水扁總統的作為即可見殷鑑歷歷。檢察總長制才要上路，不能被一場說詞迷離的夜宴給破壞；這筆帳，陳聰明非交代清楚不可。
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
Is the Executive Yuan Serious about its Pledge to Implement 12 Years of National Education?
Is the Executive Yuan Serious about its Pledge to Implement 12 Years of National Education?
Translation of a United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
February 28, 2007
"The lengthening of compulsory education to 12 years will be implemented within three years." Is this the key to Premier Su Chen-Chang's newest report on administration policy? Hardly. This is the policy Premier Li Huan announced many years ago. The year was 1989.
The government has been declaring that it would implement Twelve Years of Compulsory Education for nearly two decades. In early 2000, then Kuomintang presidential candidate Lien Chan made a similar policy announcement, declaring that "The time is ripe." And so it is with Su Chen-chang, who also claims that his proposal was not motivated by election concerns.
When we review the decision-making process, we do so not to poor mouth a major policy proposal put forth by Premier Su. Investing in education is never a wrong choice, and is a policy all citizens should welcome.
Twelve Years of National Education is easy to talk about, but hard to implement. It is easy to pander to voters by making empty promises, but after nearly 20 years of talk nobody has actually been able to do it. Clearly there are difficulties in implementation and differences in opinion that are not easily resolved.
When Premier Hao Pei-tsun succeeded Lee Huan, he resorted to more moderate methods, experimenting with a policy of exempting students from the need to pass senior high entrance exams. But where is his "Junior High Graduate Optional Schooling Plan" today? Touted as the basic post-junior high scholastic aptitude test, following the abolition of the Standardized Entrance Exam, hasn't it also forced ninth graders to study long hours cramming to make it into senior high school?
Obviously, when it comes to qualifying for senior high school, the slogan "Twelve years of National Education" is easy to shout, but the competitive pressures are not so easy to eliminate.
If the Su cabinet's policy of Twelve Years of National Education is for real, it must have the answer to a key question. According to news reports, former Minister of Education Huang Jung-tsun believes that funding is the major problem. Lin Wan-yi, the political affairs committee member responsible for project planning says the Executive Yuan has already earmarked the funds as subsidies for socially-disadvantaged students attending private schools. Frankly, given a policy of "The Poor must not be Poorly Educated," the biggest problem is not funding. The opposition parties in the legislature will not give the ruling government a hard time on this budget item. The problem is the Executive Yuan, which has listed the "Economically-disadvantaged, Privately-established Senior high School Student School Expense Subsidy" as its highest priority for the year. Obviously it doesn't think much of the Twelve Years of National Education policy. Is the difference in tuition really the issue that most worries senior high students attending private schools? Or is it disparities in school quality leading to disparities in the ability to compete for university admissions? If we fail to confront this central issue, then the issue of Twelve Years of National Education will remain rife with controversy and strewn with land mines.
On the face of it, the Twelve Years of National Education policy will allow everyone at the senior high level the opportunity to attend school. In reality the question is far more complex. Beginning in 1980s, the rate at which junior high graduates attended senior high school exceeded 100%. By the 1990s the recruiting quotas for senior high school and vocational school far exceeded their enrolled population. Private school vacancies reached as high as 10,000 per year. Obviously the problem was not too few schools, but that junior high graduates continued fighting each other tooth and nail qualifying for a tiny number of elite schools. Objective reality and parental perception remained unchanged. As long as the academic quality of senior high schools remained wildly uneven, students could not simply attend senior high schools in their local community and assume they would remain eligible for the university of their choice. The brutal reality was that students would find themselves handicapped during college admissions because economic disadvantages, regional disadvantages, and educational resource disadvantages forced them to attended less than ideal community schools. How can this be considered fair?
Educational Reform has been around for many years now. The trend has been toward "community high schools." This direction is correct. But the quality of community high schools has remained uneven, and the quantity of community high schools has remained inadequate. For this reason most parents push their children to get into elite schools, creating enormous pressure upon junior high students. Premier Su's proposal for Twelve Years of National Education includes a "Senior High Quality Improvement Plan." But if he wishes to implement such an ambitious plan in every school district across the land, can he really complete the process before 2009? Since the government has boldly promised to transform all senior high schools into providers of a "Basic Education for all Citizens," it must guarantee that such a "Basic Education" will provide all citizens with the same educational resources and the same quality schools. If it cannot fulfill its promise, if it allows students enrolled in "good school districts" to enjoy an unfair advantage and forces students enrolled in less than ideal community schools to flee to schools outside their district, then isn't Premier Su's "Basic Education for all Citizens" nothing but empty talk?
Whether the basic scholastic aptitude test will be held in 2009 remains in question. The Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Education have issued contradictory statements. Nor have the "Nationwide Regional Administrative Public Hearings to solicit Public Opinion" been held.
Is the Twelve Years of National Education plan scheduled for the year after next ready for implementation? Are the conditions ripe? The answer ought to be clear. Junior high students and their parents are going out of their minds with worry, and not without reason. They had better be prepared to "look after number one."
Original Chinese below:
行政院能否嚴肅看待後年實施十二年國教的承諾？
聯合報社論
2007-02-28
「延長十二年國民教育將在三年內實施」。這是行政院長蘇貞昌最新的施政報告重點嗎？非也，這是多年前的行政院長李煥所作的政策宣布，時間是民國七十八年。
政府宣示實施十二年國教，已近二十年之久。公元兩千年年初，當時具國民黨總統參選人身分的連戰，也作過同樣的政策宣布，並稱「實施時機成熟」；和今天的蘇貞昌一樣，也強調並非為了選舉考量才提出。
我們檢視這段決策過程，並不是為了唱衰蘇揆此一重大政策。事實上，投資教育自不會是錯誤的選擇，也是所有國民理應歡迎的政策。但十二年國教確係「知易行難」，容易討好選民，談了近二十年卻還做不到，可見其中必有執行上的困難，社會分歧意見尤其不易解決。當年繼李煥之後的行政院長郝柏村任內，以較為緩和改良的方式，實驗免試升學的「國中畢業生自願就學方案」，如今安在？號稱「取消聯考」之後的國中基本學力測驗，不是同樣造成國三學生「帶兩個便當上學」的苦讀局面？可見，在高中就學的問題上，「十二年國教」的口號容易喊，真正的競爭壓力卻不易消除。
蘇內閣這次對十二年國教政策如果要玩真的，首先須對問題關鍵有一番務實的認識。據報載，前教育部長黃榮村認為經費是最大的問題。負責規畫此案的政務委員林萬億則強調政院已編列經費，作為補助弱勢學生就讀私校的學費差額。老實說，在「窮不能窮教育」的前提下，經費問題反而並非真正的難題，在野黨在立院想必也不致太過刁難這筆預算。不過，政院把「經濟弱勢私立高中職學生學費補助」列為今年先行的目標，顯然有點小看了問題。就讀私立高中職學生最擔心的，難道是學費差額問題嗎？還是學校素質不一所造成的考大學競爭力差距問題呢？此一核心議題不去面對處理的話，十二年國教計畫仍將充滿爭議，且步步荊棘。
十二年國教政策，從形式上看，就是讓高中階段可使「人人有書讀」。但現實問題卻複雜許多倍。從民國七十年代中期開始，國中畢業生的「就學機會率」已超過百分之百；到九十學年左右，高中職及五專的核定招生名額都遠遠超過錄取人數，私校的學生缺額一年高達十萬之多。可見問題的關鍵絕非學校不足，而是每年眾多的國三學生仍在頭破血流地競爭少數明星學校。只要客觀現實和家長主觀認定上還存在著「高中好壞素質差距很大」的現象，學生就不容易安心地在社區高中就讀。更殘酷一點地說，處於經濟弱勢、地域弱勢、教育資源弱勢的學生，如果框限於不夠理想的社區高中就讀，因此削弱了升大學的競爭力，如何能稱公平？
教改實施多年以來，漸往「高中社區化」的目標推進，其實是正確的方向；但社區高中在質和量方面至今水準參差不齊，也因此仍見多數家長促使子女往明星學校「力爭上游」，致造成國中生的嚴酷升學壓力。這次蘇院長的十二年國教方案中也提出「高中優質化」的計畫，但這樣龐大的計畫，若要在全國各學區全面而普遍地落實，難道真是政院保證的二○○九年之前即可能完成？政府既然發下豪語要把全國的高中都變成「國民基本教育」，就要保證這樣的「基本教育」具有讓全國學子享受同樣教育資源、同等學校素質的權利；若不能做到此一要求，致使落戶在所謂「好學區」的學生享有優勢，而社區高中不夠理想的孩子不得不奮力申請跨區入學，則「國民基本高中教育」豈非空談？
至於國中基測在二○○九年到底考不考？政院和教育部至今說法不一，還有「全國分區辦理公聽會，廣納民意」等動作亦尚未開始。那麼，後年全面實施十二年國教的計畫到底是否已準備妥當、時機成熟，答案十分明顯；目前急得抓狂的國一學生和家長，應該要有些「自立自強」的心理準備了！
Translation of a United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
February 28, 2007
"The lengthening of compulsory education to 12 years will be implemented within three years." Is this the key to Premier Su Chen-Chang's newest report on administration policy? Hardly. This is the policy Premier Li Huan announced many years ago. The year was 1989.
The government has been declaring that it would implement Twelve Years of Compulsory Education for nearly two decades. In early 2000, then Kuomintang presidential candidate Lien Chan made a similar policy announcement, declaring that "The time is ripe." And so it is with Su Chen-chang, who also claims that his proposal was not motivated by election concerns.
When we review the decision-making process, we do so not to poor mouth a major policy proposal put forth by Premier Su. Investing in education is never a wrong choice, and is a policy all citizens should welcome.
Twelve Years of National Education is easy to talk about, but hard to implement. It is easy to pander to voters by making empty promises, but after nearly 20 years of talk nobody has actually been able to do it. Clearly there are difficulties in implementation and differences in opinion that are not easily resolved.
When Premier Hao Pei-tsun succeeded Lee Huan, he resorted to more moderate methods, experimenting with a policy of exempting students from the need to pass senior high entrance exams. But where is his "Junior High Graduate Optional Schooling Plan" today? Touted as the basic post-junior high scholastic aptitude test, following the abolition of the Standardized Entrance Exam, hasn't it also forced ninth graders to study long hours cramming to make it into senior high school?
Obviously, when it comes to qualifying for senior high school, the slogan "Twelve years of National Education" is easy to shout, but the competitive pressures are not so easy to eliminate.
If the Su cabinet's policy of Twelve Years of National Education is for real, it must have the answer to a key question. According to news reports, former Minister of Education Huang Jung-tsun believes that funding is the major problem. Lin Wan-yi, the political affairs committee member responsible for project planning says the Executive Yuan has already earmarked the funds as subsidies for socially-disadvantaged students attending private schools. Frankly, given a policy of "The Poor must not be Poorly Educated," the biggest problem is not funding. The opposition parties in the legislature will not give the ruling government a hard time on this budget item. The problem is the Executive Yuan, which has listed the "Economically-disadvantaged, Privately-established Senior high School Student School Expense Subsidy" as its highest priority for the year. Obviously it doesn't think much of the Twelve Years of National Education policy. Is the difference in tuition really the issue that most worries senior high students attending private schools? Or is it disparities in school quality leading to disparities in the ability to compete for university admissions? If we fail to confront this central issue, then the issue of Twelve Years of National Education will remain rife with controversy and strewn with land mines.
On the face of it, the Twelve Years of National Education policy will allow everyone at the senior high level the opportunity to attend school. In reality the question is far more complex. Beginning in 1980s, the rate at which junior high graduates attended senior high school exceeded 100%. By the 1990s the recruiting quotas for senior high school and vocational school far exceeded their enrolled population. Private school vacancies reached as high as 10,000 per year. Obviously the problem was not too few schools, but that junior high graduates continued fighting each other tooth and nail qualifying for a tiny number of elite schools. Objective reality and parental perception remained unchanged. As long as the academic quality of senior high schools remained wildly uneven, students could not simply attend senior high schools in their local community and assume they would remain eligible for the university of their choice. The brutal reality was that students would find themselves handicapped during college admissions because economic disadvantages, regional disadvantages, and educational resource disadvantages forced them to attended less than ideal community schools. How can this be considered fair?
Educational Reform has been around for many years now. The trend has been toward "community high schools." This direction is correct. But the quality of community high schools has remained uneven, and the quantity of community high schools has remained inadequate. For this reason most parents push their children to get into elite schools, creating enormous pressure upon junior high students. Premier Su's proposal for Twelve Years of National Education includes a "Senior High Quality Improvement Plan." But if he wishes to implement such an ambitious plan in every school district across the land, can he really complete the process before 2009? Since the government has boldly promised to transform all senior high schools into providers of a "Basic Education for all Citizens," it must guarantee that such a "Basic Education" will provide all citizens with the same educational resources and the same quality schools. If it cannot fulfill its promise, if it allows students enrolled in "good school districts" to enjoy an unfair advantage and forces students enrolled in less than ideal community schools to flee to schools outside their district, then isn't Premier Su's "Basic Education for all Citizens" nothing but empty talk?
Whether the basic scholastic aptitude test will be held in 2009 remains in question. The Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Education have issued contradictory statements. Nor have the "Nationwide Regional Administrative Public Hearings to solicit Public Opinion" been held.
Is the Twelve Years of National Education plan scheduled for the year after next ready for implementation? Are the conditions ripe? The answer ought to be clear. Junior high students and their parents are going out of their minds with worry, and not without reason. They had better be prepared to "look after number one."
Original Chinese below:
行政院能否嚴肅看待後年實施十二年國教的承諾？
聯合報社論
2007-02-28
「延長十二年國民教育將在三年內實施」。這是行政院長蘇貞昌最新的施政報告重點嗎？非也，這是多年前的行政院長李煥所作的政策宣布，時間是民國七十八年。
政府宣示實施十二年國教，已近二十年之久。公元兩千年年初，當時具國民黨總統參選人身分的連戰，也作過同樣的政策宣布，並稱「實施時機成熟」；和今天的蘇貞昌一樣，也強調並非為了選舉考量才提出。
我們檢視這段決策過程，並不是為了唱衰蘇揆此一重大政策。事實上，投資教育自不會是錯誤的選擇，也是所有國民理應歡迎的政策。但十二年國教確係「知易行難」，容易討好選民，談了近二十年卻還做不到，可見其中必有執行上的困難，社會分歧意見尤其不易解決。當年繼李煥之後的行政院長郝柏村任內，以較為緩和改良的方式，實驗免試升學的「國中畢業生自願就學方案」，如今安在？號稱「取消聯考」之後的國中基本學力測驗，不是同樣造成國三學生「帶兩個便當上學」的苦讀局面？可見，在高中就學的問題上，「十二年國教」的口號容易喊，真正的競爭壓力卻不易消除。
蘇內閣這次對十二年國教政策如果要玩真的，首先須對問題關鍵有一番務實的認識。據報載，前教育部長黃榮村認為經費是最大的問題。負責規畫此案的政務委員林萬億則強調政院已編列經費，作為補助弱勢學生就讀私校的學費差額。老實說，在「窮不能窮教育」的前提下，經費問題反而並非真正的難題，在野黨在立院想必也不致太過刁難這筆預算。不過，政院把「經濟弱勢私立高中職學生學費補助」列為今年先行的目標，顯然有點小看了問題。就讀私立高中職學生最擔心的，難道是學費差額問題嗎？還是學校素質不一所造成的考大學競爭力差距問題呢？此一核心議題不去面對處理的話，十二年國教計畫仍將充滿爭議，且步步荊棘。
十二年國教政策，從形式上看，就是讓高中階段可使「人人有書讀」。但現實問題卻複雜許多倍。從民國七十年代中期開始，國中畢業生的「就學機會率」已超過百分之百；到九十學年左右，高中職及五專的核定招生名額都遠遠超過錄取人數，私校的學生缺額一年高達十萬之多。可見問題的關鍵絕非學校不足，而是每年眾多的國三學生仍在頭破血流地競爭少數明星學校。只要客觀現實和家長主觀認定上還存在著「高中好壞素質差距很大」的現象，學生就不容易安心地在社區高中就讀。更殘酷一點地說，處於經濟弱勢、地域弱勢、教育資源弱勢的學生，如果框限於不夠理想的社區高中就讀，因此削弱了升大學的競爭力，如何能稱公平？
教改實施多年以來，漸往「高中社區化」的目標推進，其實是正確的方向；但社區高中在質和量方面至今水準參差不齊，也因此仍見多數家長促使子女往明星學校「力爭上游」，致造成國中生的嚴酷升學壓力。這次蘇院長的十二年國教方案中也提出「高中優質化」的計畫，但這樣龐大的計畫，若要在全國各學區全面而普遍地落實，難道真是政院保證的二○○九年之前即可能完成？政府既然發下豪語要把全國的高中都變成「國民基本教育」，就要保證這樣的「基本教育」具有讓全國學子享受同樣教育資源、同等學校素質的權利；若不能做到此一要求，致使落戶在所謂「好學區」的學生享有優勢，而社區高中不夠理想的孩子不得不奮力申請跨區入學，則「國民基本高中教育」豈非空談？
至於國中基測在二○○九年到底考不考？政院和教育部至今說法不一，還有「全國分區辦理公聽會，廣納民意」等動作亦尚未開始。那麼，後年全面實施十二年國教的計畫到底是否已準備妥當、時機成熟，答案十分明顯；目前急得抓狂的國一學生和家長，應該要有些「自立自強」的心理準備了！
Thursday, February 1, 2007
Introduction
Welcome to Dateline Taipei [http://datelinetaipei.blogspot.com/]
Dateline Taipei features editorial and opinion pieces from the Taipei based United Daily News and China Times, translated into English by Bevin Chu, author of The China Desk.
Dateline Taipei will critique some of these Pan Blue media editorial and opinion pieces. Dateline Taipei's criticisms may not always be kind to the authors, because even the Pan Blue media has begun to buckle under relentless pressure from the ruling DPP's "soft dictatorship."
Externally, this pressure manifests itself in the form of intimidation by the ruling DPP's "Anaconda in the Chandelier."
Internally, this pressure manifests itself in the form of gradual indoctrination by Taiwan independence Political Correctness.
The Pan Blue media's surrender, fortunately, is not complete, at least not yet.
Some Pan Blue media editorial and opinion pieces may reflect continued allegiance to the cosmopolitan Pan Blue values of political liberty and free trade. Those pieces will receive The China Desk's enthusiastic affirmation.
Other pieces may reflect pusillanimous surrender to the self-hating racism of the Pan Green camp's "Taiwanese, not Chinese" identity politics and nation building. Those pieces will receive Dateline Taipei's unflinching opprobrium.
A note on translation policy.
Sometimes the nominally "Pro Reunification Media" will carelessly, or worse, intentionally use terms such as "Taiwan" and "Taiwanese" as if they were interchangeable with "Republic of China" and "the Chinese people on Taiwan," or "citizens of the Republic of China."
Such mistakes, intentional or otherwise, will be translated in a manner consistent with the Original Intent of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Where the original text reads "Taiwanese," I will substitute "the Chinese people on Taiwan" or "citizens of the Republic of China." Where the original text reads "Taiwan" I will substitute "Republic of China."
This is not an attempt to deceive. This is an attempt to nip creeping "wen hua tai du" or "cultural Taiwan independence" in the bud. This is an attempt to demand strict adherence to Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law.
The original Chinese article will be displayed below the English translation. This will allow bilingual readers to compare and contrast the original text and my translation.
Dateline Taipei features editorial and opinion pieces from the Taipei based United Daily News and China Times, translated into English by Bevin Chu, author of The China Desk.
Dateline Taipei will critique some of these Pan Blue media editorial and opinion pieces. Dateline Taipei's criticisms may not always be kind to the authors, because even the Pan Blue media has begun to buckle under relentless pressure from the ruling DPP's "soft dictatorship."
Externally, this pressure manifests itself in the form of intimidation by the ruling DPP's "Anaconda in the Chandelier."
Internally, this pressure manifests itself in the form of gradual indoctrination by Taiwan independence Political Correctness.
The Pan Blue media's surrender, fortunately, is not complete, at least not yet.
Some Pan Blue media editorial and opinion pieces may reflect continued allegiance to the cosmopolitan Pan Blue values of political liberty and free trade. Those pieces will receive The China Desk's enthusiastic affirmation.
Other pieces may reflect pusillanimous surrender to the self-hating racism of the Pan Green camp's "Taiwanese, not Chinese" identity politics and nation building. Those pieces will receive Dateline Taipei's unflinching opprobrium.
A note on translation policy.
Sometimes the nominally "Pro Reunification Media" will carelessly, or worse, intentionally use terms such as "Taiwan" and "Taiwanese" as if they were interchangeable with "Republic of China" and "the Chinese people on Taiwan," or "citizens of the Republic of China."
Such mistakes, intentional or otherwise, will be translated in a manner consistent with the Original Intent of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Where the original text reads "Taiwanese," I will substitute "the Chinese people on Taiwan" or "citizens of the Republic of China." Where the original text reads "Taiwan" I will substitute "Republic of China."
This is not an attempt to deceive. This is an attempt to nip creeping "wen hua tai du" or "cultural Taiwan independence" in the bud. This is an attempt to demand strict adherence to Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law.
The original Chinese article will be displayed below the English translation. This will allow bilingual readers to compare and contrast the original text and my translation.
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