Tuesday, August 14, 2012

TaiMed Corruption Scandal: Case Closed but Questions Remain

TaiMed Corruption Scandal: Case Closed but Questions Remain
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 15, 2012

Summary: The TaiMed case may be closed. But such corruption must not be allowed to happen in the future. Never again may a Vice Premier Tsai be allowed to give a government grant to a Chairman Tsai. Perhaps the Special Investigation Unit "found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing." But the people cannot tolerate such ethical violations in the future. Tsai Ing-wen must be the first, last, and only vice premier ever to get away with such behavior. Never again.

Full Text below:

The Special Investigation Unit announced yesterday that it was closing the books on the TaiMed corruption scandal. It said it failed to find any criminal wrongdoing. This concludes the criminal proceedings. That is something we must accept. But the case remains clouded by suspicion. That is not something that simply closing the case can resolve.

The key question in the TaiMed corruption scandal is "Did Vice Premier Tsai give a government grant to Chairman Tsai?" The Special Investigation Unit report says no. But the facts are glaringly obvious. Vice Premier Tsai, who personally approved the government grant to TaiMed, is the same Tsai Ing-wen who became Chairman Tsai of TaiMed upon leaving office. The legal ruling clearly contradicts what the public sees with its own eyes and hears with its own ears.

This case may be legally closed. But people are asking questions. They are wondering whether a future Vice Premier will be able to personally approve a government grant to a company while in office, then assume the chairmanship of that company upon leaving office, without fear of prosecution for corruption. The prosecutors concluded that no crimes were committed. But the public feels utterly betrayed. They assumed that government officials would conduct themselves ethically, and that anti-corruption laws would ensure that they did. 

The Special Investigative Unit helped Tsai Ing-wen by providing her with lawyerly evasions. As "evidence," it argued that Tsai Ing-wen decided to invest in TaiMed in August, 2007. It argued that the Biotech and New Pharmaceutical Development Act was promulgated on July 4, 2007. It argued that "between the two there was a definite interval." In other words, the Special Investigation Unit argued that Tsai Ing-wen became part of TaiMed one month after the implementation of the new drug regulations. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen's role as Vice Premier Tsai has no relationship to Tsai Ing-wen's role as Chairman Tsai. This might be "legal," but it also defies common sense.

Let us rewind. Assume Vice Premier Tsai had no plans to join TaiMed when she was still in office. But Tsai Ing-wen decided to assume the chairmanship of TaiMed. Did she really not know that the Yu Chang Company, whose government grants she personally approved, was also known as TaiMed? Did she really not know that ethics required her to recuse herself? This is why the legal case may be closed, but the moral and ethical case is not. The people expected more from the prosecution, and were right to expect more. Tsai Ing-wen now has a black mark on her character. The public quite naturally considers her character suspect.

This case is rife with evidence of prosecutorial discretion. For example, the Special Investigation Unit argued that Tsai family capital was private capital. It argued that scheduled payments were deposited into designated investment accounts. It argued that there was no "pocketing of funds" or other illegal activity. But TaiMed was never about the misappropriation of public funds. The raison d'etre of TaiMed, from beginning to end, was to gain control of the biotech industry. Did the Special Investigation Unit deliberately bark up the wrong tree? Did it deliberately limit the scope of its investigation? The people have deep suspicions that will not easily be allayed.

Besides, just because the Tsai family did not line its pockets, does not mean that cabinet officials did not abuse their power or engage in patronage. For example, in February 2007, Ho Mei-yueh had yet to become Chairman of the National Development Fund. As a minister without portfolio, she sent a letter to the Executive Yuan, urging the National Development Fund to invest 20 million USD in TaiMed. TaiMed had not been formally established. Yet she was already recommending a subsidy. A political appointee behaved in such a manner. Even assuming she was not deliberately covering up or engaging in patronage, was this not an abuse of power? These questions have yet to be answered in the Control Yuan's investigation.

Fortunately for Tsai, a change in ruling parties soon followed. The National Development Fund was alerted to the subsidies and called a halt to them in a timely manner. It refrained from making any large investments. Tsai Ing-wen unexpectedly became DPP chairman. She was forced to resign as Chairman of TaiMed. She urged her family to sell their shares of TaiMed, at a profit. Otherwise the Special Investigation Unit might not have been able to prosecute her case in such a cavalier fashion and conclude that "no laws were broken."

Last December, during the general election, the Special Investigation Unit launched an investigation "to preserve the relevant evidence." Clearly it was not bound by political considerations. For this it should be acknowledged. But it delayed issuing summons to Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang until July this year. It also did nothing to prevent collusion between potential suspects. It soon became clear the case would go nowhere. It really had no intention of prosecuting the case. People acknowledge the Special Investigation Unit for closing the case. But they question the "prosecutorial discretion" exercised in the handling of the case.

The case may be closed. But such corruption must not be allowed to happen in the future. Never again may a Vice Premier Tsai be allowed to give a government grant to a Chairman Tsai. Perhaps the Special Investigation Unit "found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing." But the people cannot tolerate such ethical violations in the future.

Tsai Ing-wen must be the first, last, and only vice premier ever to get away with such behavior. Never again.

宇昌案:法律簽結 社會疑問未解
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.15 02:15 am

特偵組昨日公布宇昌案結案報告,未發現有人涉嫌犯罪;這是法律程序的結論,應予尊重,但此案留下的漫天疑雲卻非結案報告所能化解。

宇昌案的核心疑問在於:是不是「蔡副院長」批給了「蔡董事長」?特偵組的結案報告否定此說;但有目共睹的事實卻是,親手批定了TaiMed的「蔡副院長」,卸任後竟當了TaiMed所有相關公司的「蔡董事長」。於是,法律見解與社會視聽出現了矛盾。

本案雖然法律簽結,但國人要問的是:難道這是指出,在未來的政壇上,即可容許一位親批「宇昌案」的行政院副院長,毫無忌憚地在卸任後出任「宇昌公司」的董事長?在此,結案報告認為不涉犯罪的情事,卻與國人對政治道德及政風操守的期待出現了巨大的落差。

特偵組為蔡英文作出「切割」的手法,其主要的「證據」是:蔡英文係於九十六年八月間開始決定參與宇昌公司之投資,而《生技新藥產業發展條例》之公布施行則係於九十六年七月四日,「其間尚有一定之間隔甚明」。也就是說,特偵組指蔡英文是在《新藥條例》公布實施一個月後始決定進入宇昌公司,因此就切割了「蔡副院長」與「蔡董事長」的聯結。這也許是嚴格的「法律見解」,卻也是可笑的「經驗法則」。

退一萬步言,即使「蔡副院長」在任內沒有為自己加入宇昌公司預作準備,但難道當蔡英文在決定出任董事長時,她竟不知這家宇昌公司就是她親手批定的那一家TaiMed?更竟然不知在道德倫理上應當迴避?正因如此,法律雖可結案,但在政治道德及政風操守上,國人當然可以對本案的人物節操有更高的要求,而蔡英文也必須為此一人格汙點承當起必然的社會質疑。

再者,在結案報告中,處處可見「辦皮不辦骨」的痕跡。例如,特偵組說,蔡家資金都是自有資金,款項也都如期如數匯入指定投資帳戶,並無「中飽私囊」或涉及不法的情形。但是,宇昌公司自始至終的操作重點,都不在侵吞公帑,而在運用權力的槓桿取得生技產業的卡位特權。這點,無論是特偵組未對準偵辦方向或自我限縮偵辦範圍,都難消釋社會大眾之疑。

再說,蔡家帳目無中飽私囊情事,也不能反證內閣官員決策或行事沒有違規濫權或徇私苟且。例如,二○○七年二月,何美玥在尚未取得國發基金主委身分前,即以政務委員身分發函請行政院同意國發基金投資TaiMed兩千萬美元;又在宇昌公司尚未正式成立,即催促國發基金撥款。政務官這種作法,就算不是故意包庇或圖利,能說沒有越權及擅權嗎?這些疑問,恐怕尚待監察院的調查報告給出答案。

其實,若不是後來遇上政黨輪替,國發基金若干撥款及時警覺叫停,未再繼續砸下重金;加上蔡英文意外出任民進黨主席,不得不辭去宇昌董事長之職,並促其家族出售宇昌股份獲利了結;今天特偵組偵辦此案,恐怕不可能用如此輕鬆的姿態以「查無不法」結案吧?

特偵組在去年十二月大選期間,「為期保全相關證據」,發動調查此案,顯示不受政治現實的拘束,值得肯定;但竟遲至今年七月始傳訊蔡英文及蘇貞昌等人,又對相關人等全無防止串供的強制處分,則顯然是眼看著必然「流案」,根本沒有劍及屨及的偵辦意志。如今,國人應當尊重特偵組作出簽結的職權,但當然也可對這一份「辦皮不辦骨」的結案報告表示質疑。

雖然已經簽結,但我們仍要主張:未來政壇上,絕不容許再發生「蔡副院長」批給「蔡董事長」的情事。即使特偵組認為「未發現有人涉嫌犯罪」,但在政治道德及政風操守上,國人應當不會鼓勵、贊成,及容許這樣的情事在以後繼續發生。

蔡英文應是唯一及最後一個出現這種行為的行政院副院長,下不為例!

Japan, Do Not Become the Object of Universal Scorn

Japan, Do Not Become the Object of Universal Scorn
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 14, 2012


Summary: The Ma administration proposed an East China Sea Peace Initiative. On the one hand, it sent 120 mortars and 40 anti-aircraft artillery to Taiping Island. On the other hand, it responded to a possible move by Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists from the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. It faces a complex and treacherous situation. It must avoid a crisis. It must seize the moment. It must refrain from inciting conflict. But it must not run from provocations. It must respond judiciously. It must find a way to make a bold breakthrough.

Full Text below:

Japanese lawmakers have threatened to set foot on Diaoyutai Island on the 19th. Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, including the Taiwan Region, the Mainland Region, the Hong Kong SAR, and the Macau SAR, claim sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. They have arranged to meet in the waters surrounding Pengjia Island. They will then proceed to the Diaoyutai Islands to proclaim sovereignty.

The current crisis was provoked by Japan. In April, Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara announced the "purchase" of the Diaoyutai Islands. In July, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda threatened to "nationalize" the "purchase" of the Diaoyutai Islands. Japan is in the grip of a new wave of populism. The Diaoyutai Island issue has become political a football. Rival Japanese politicians are determined to incite nationalist sentiment for own domestic political advantage. Chinese people from the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, will not tolerate abuse. They feel compelled to defend their national territory. They demand justice. But in the eyes of Japanese politicians, their feelings mean nothing. These Japanese politicians are populist demagogues who care only about domestic, not foreign political sentiment. This makes them dangerous. It also makes it unlikely that they will achieve their goals.

Japan faces an unprecendent situation. For the first time in history, three territorial disputes have come to a head, simultaneously. Japan has disputes over the four northern islands with Russia, over Dokdo with Korea, and the Diaoyutai Islands with Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. . The three disputes are clearly having an effect on each other. Japan's opponents may well join hands against Japan. Japan must not allow itself to hijacked by populist sentiment. It must not become the object of universal condemnation.

On August 10th, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak set foot on Dokdo. He attracted worldwide notice. Earlier, on July 3rd, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev set foot on Kunashir Island, one of the four northern islands. He declared that Russia would "never yield an inch of territory." Medvedev set foot on the four islands back in 2010 as well, during his term as president. Dmitry Medvedev and Lee Myung-bak have set foot on islands claimed by Japan. Japan's escalation in the Diaoyutai Islands has left it unable to respond to other disputes. They are taking advantage of this fact. They are using Japan's plight to gain leverage. As mentioned earlier, these disputes are having an effect on each other. Japan has three territorial disputes with three different nations. Naturally they could join hands against Japan. If Japan handles these disputes recklessly, it could encourage an alliance of sorts among Russia, South Korea, Mainland China, and Taiwan. The crisis could enter a new phase. Three conflicts are escalating simultaneously. Japan must not see this as merely an historical coincidence. It must take this very seriously.

These three territorial disputes are the result  of Japanese attempts to exploit wartime chaos. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is the result of Japan's attempt to exploit the chaos resulting from the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895. It is now exploiting the Divided China situation to its own advantage and to the advantage of the US. China is currently weak. Japan is taking advantage of China's current weakness to prey on it. China may be divided. But the consensus among Chinese on the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, is to make no concessions. Chinese in all four regions share a common history. No one in the four regions is willing to tolerate abuse. Japan is not the only country in the world with strong public sentiment.

Given the situation, Japan should consider two possibilities. One. After Medvedev set foot on Kunashir Island, and Lee Myung-bak set foot on Dokdo, Russia and South Korea gained an advantage. Japan currently occupies and patrols the Diaoyutai Islands. There it enjoys an advantage. To avoid escalating the disputes, it should practice moderation. If it insists on raising the ante, if Japanese legislators set foot on Diaoyutai island, if the Japanese government "purchases" the island, or worse, if Japan's Prime Minister sets foot on the islands, the consequences could be catastrophic. When Medvedev set foot on Kunashir Island, Japan merely recalled its Ambassador to Russia. When Lee Myung-bak set foot on Dokdo, Japan merely appealed to the International Court of Justice. Both cases were handled cautiously. Only with Diaoyutai Island has Japan recklessly ignored the status quo. On the contrary, it has raised the ante and upset the status quo.

Two. As previously mentioned, Japan must realize the error of its ways. Japan is not the only nation that has powerful nationalist sentiments. Other nations also have powerful nationalist sentiments. The main reason Medvedev and Lee set foot on their respective islands, was that the two nations have adopted democratic electoral systems. They must respond to public opinion. The Diaoyutai Island dispute will not escalate to the point where Hu Jintao sets foot on the island, mainly because Mainland China still has an authoritarian system that exercises restraint in diplomacy. It need not appease public sentiment on the Chinese Mainland. So far Japan's Prime Minister has not dared to set foot on Diaoyutai Island. It knows it must not play with fire. Taipei has attempted to mediate between Tokyo and Beijing. On August 5th, President Ma Ying-jeou proposed an East China Sea Peace Initiative. He reaffirmed our long held sovereignty, but said we were willing to shelve disputes, promote peace, and develop the resources jointly. He called on all parties to exercise self-restraint and not take increasingly aggressive action. These words may sound bland. But this is the only way to get to the root of the problem. In fact, the status quo is highly favorable to Japan. The status quo has been maintained through external constraints. Japan must exercise self-restraint. If it raises the ante and upsets the status quo, the long term results may not be nearly so favorable to Japan.

The disputes over the four northern islands, Dokdo, the Diaoyutai Islands, and the South China Sea islands, have already had an affect on each other. They have already led to a joining of hands against Japan. The US and Japan joining hands may counter this situation to some degree. But it will never solve the problem. Russia, South Korea, and China have disputes with Japan over the sovereignty of these islands. As one can imagine, this has the effect of containing Japan. It amounts to an alliance against Japan. The joining of hands between the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao is especially intriguing. Japan must not allow itself to be hijacked by domestic populist sentiment. It must return to a sensible diplomatic posture. Enough is enough. Leave bad enough alone.

The Ma administration proposed an East China Sea Peace Initiative. On the one hand, it sent 120 mortars and 40 anti-aircraft artillery to Taiping Island. On the other hand, it responded to a possible move by Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists from the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. It faces a complex and treacherous situation. It must avoid a crisis. It must seize the moment. It must refrain from inciting conflict. But it must not run from provocations. It must respond judiciously. It must find a way to make a bold breakthrough.

日本勿成眾矢之的
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.14 01:54 am

為回應日本議員揚言在十九日登陸釣魚台,兩岸四地民間保釣人士宣稱,定今日乘船在彭佳嶼海域會合,共同前往釣魚台宣示主權。

當下的尖銳情勢是日本一手挑起的。從四月東京市長石原宣稱「購買釣魚台」,至七月野田首相揚言將釣魚台購為「國有化」,釣魚台問題儼然成為日本政局新一波的民粹競賽。日本埋著頭只顧在自己的政客之間競賽操作民族主義,眼中根本不管中台港澳四地也有分別及共同的民族主義,不可凌辱、必須捍衛、必須伸張。日本這種只顧內不顧外的民粹政治,不但危險,亦難得逞。

日本現在所面對的,是歷史上首次北方四島(對俄)、獨島(對韓),及釣魚台(對中台港澳)等三處島嶼領土糾紛的同時同步升高。這三處紛爭顯然已出現了「相互牽動」的情勢,而日本的對造國家甚至也有潛在的「相互聯合」的可能性。日本不可陷在民粹氛圍中不知自拔,不要成為眾矢之的。

韓國總統李明博八月十日登獨島,引發舉世矚目;其實,更早在七月三日,俄國總理麥維德夫已先一步登上「北方四島」中的國後島,宣示「寸土不讓」(麥氏在二○一○總統任內亦曾登四島);麥維德夫與李明博先後登上與日本發生領土爭議的島嶼,顯然皆是利用日本升高釣魚台形勢而無力兼顧之際,借力使力,此即前述「相互牽動」的情勢,而日本在這三處領土糾紛的對造國家,當然亦存有潛在之「相互聯合」的情勢;日本倘操作不慎,一旦激發了俄韓中台的某種「合縱」情勢,事態即進入了另一階段。因而,三處衝突在此際同時同步升高,日本不能只視之為歷史巧合,必須嚴肅面對。

這三處領土爭議,皆是日本利用戰爭時期的錯亂所造成;其中,釣魚台問題是利用甲午戰爭以來的紛亂,至現代又利用「中國」之分裂而由美日二國私相授受而生。這分明是利用「中國」積弱之際而巧取豪奪,然「中國」即使分裂,但中台港澳仍有無可退讓的共同立場;因為,四處皆有共同的歷史,也有不可凌辱的民意,而不是唯日本才有民意。

日本面對此局,至少應有兩種思考:一、麥維德夫登國後島,李明博登獨島,俄韓已占優勢;而日本在事實上已占有釣魚台的巡邏優勢,為免爭端升高,實應適可而止,若欲加碼到議員登島或政府購島,甚至未來出現首相登島的局面,即可能引爆難以收拾的後果。對麥維德夫登島,日本止於召回駐俄大使;對李明博登島,日本止於擬訴諸國際法庭,兩案之處理皆見保守。但豈唯有在釣魚台不知珍惜向日本傾斜的現狀,反而要加碼破壞現狀的道理?

二、如前所述,日本必須深悟,不是唯日本才有民族主義,別人也有民族主義。麥維德夫及李明博的分別登島,主要原因是兩國皆採民主選舉制度,必須回應民意。至於釣魚台的情勢不會發展至胡錦濤登島的地步,主要是因中國大陸在外交手段上仍保有專制的節制,而不是中國無民意;而日本迄今未敢走向首相登釣魚台的地步,自亦是深知不可玩火。再者,台灣在日中兩者之間,馬英九總統於八月五日宣示《東海和平倡議》,重申「主權在我,擱置爭議、和平互惠、共同開發」的一貫立場,呼籲相關各方自我克制,不要升高對立行動;這些話聽來平淡無奇,卻是在此時際釜底抽薪的不二法門。其實,現狀已是對日本傾斜的最佳狀態,而此一現狀是因外界的克制所維持;日本若不知自我克制,從長遠看,加碼改變現狀後未必對日本有利。

從北方四島,至獨島、釣魚台,到南海諸島,已然出現「相互牽動」又「相互聯合」的情勢。美日的「聯合」或許可以鎮懾情勢,但不可能解決問題;俄、韓、中對日本的島嶼爭議,至少在姿態上的「牽制」與「合縱」,不是不能想像;而兩岸四地中台港澳的「聯合」,尤其微妙。最關鍵的問題在於:日本不能放任情勢被內部的民粹政治牽著走,應速速回到理智外交的立場,適可而止,見不好就收。

馬政府一方面宣示《東海和平倡議》,一方面向太平島送上一二○迫擊砲及四○防空砲,另一方面又要因應今日可能出現的兩岸四地保釣事件;面對複雜詭譎的情勢,宜應避免危機,把握轉機,不製造爭端,不逃避挑釁,小心因應,大膽突破!

Monday, August 13, 2012

Skilled Labor Shortage Requires Root Level Solutions

Skilled Labor Shortage Requires Root Level Solutions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2012


Summary: The shortage of skilled labor is a systemic problem. Upstream we must improve the educational system. Midstream we must increase hiring opportunities. Downstream we must offer incentives to retain skilled labor. Only then can the situation be improved. The first two require restructuring. They must begin immediately. But they will not yield results in the short-term. Therefore we must increase the incentives to attract talent. This includes improved conditions to attract talent from the Mainland, as a short term cure.

Full Text below:

Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council, and Kuan Chung-ming, a Member of the Executive Yuan Political Affairs Office, along with other government leaders, have recently warned about the shortage of skilled labor. Kuan fears that the Republic of China will become a "third rate nation." Chu was even more blunt. He said if the problem is not addressed, we will soon "die a miserable death."

Over the past several years, Taiwan has experienced a shortage of skilled labor, in many areas. This is a topic that has attracted much public attention. Everyone knows about the problem. But no one has a clear solution. The two officials' remarks stunned the public. Their remarks reflected their sense of powerlessness and sense of urgency.

There are many kinds of skilled labor. Some skills are innate. But many more skills are acquired through education and training. One solve the shortage of skilled labor problem by acquiring the necessary skills. One can thereby meet one's target requirements. Those who are born with skills are geniuses. They are statistically rare. Most people with skills acquired them. They are more common. They come from all walks of life. Both the public and private sectors must make every effort to find, hire, and keep skilled labor. The so-called shortage of skilled labor involves three problems. The lack of skilled labor, the lack of job opportunities for skilled labor, and the inability to retain skilled labor.

Take the lack of skilled labor. To say that Taiwan lacks skilled labor is perhaps an exaggeration. The "lack of skilled labor" may be a lack of labor with the skills to solve certain problems and to meet certain goals. Taiwan has millions of people with Masters and PhDs. On a per capita basis, it ranks number one in the world. Clearly this is not a problem of quantity, but of quality.

Over the past decade, institutions of higher learning have thrown open their doors. Masters degrees are now as commonplace as Bachelors degrees. PhDs are now as commonplace as Masters degrees. This has dramatically reduced the incentive for students to study abroad. It has also created many graduates with advanced degrees but who have few real world skills. They do not meet the educational and training requirements of either industry or society. Those who need skilled labor seldom need academics with broad, generalized knowledge. They need individuals able to think on their own, with the ability to solve problems creatively, with the ability to cope with different challenges at different stages of the game. As a result, education and employment have experienced a serious disconnect.

To cope with surging enrollments, universities have been forced to adopt passive teaching methods. As a result students lack the ability to think for themselves. They lack training in how to innovate. They bury their heads in their books. They never look around at the world. The birth rate is low. National Taiwan University, Tsinghua University, Jiaotong University and other institutions all have trouble recruiting students. The shortage in resources means teachers carelessly assign teaching materials. This, and poor students with no desire to learn, lead to a vicious cycle. No wonder one multinational company said the pool of talent on Taiwan is shallower than a sheet of paper.

Now take the lack of job opportunities for skilled labor. Economic growth on Taiwan has slowed recently. This has reduced employment opportunities. Naturally it has affected worker recruitment. Private enterprises have a variety of mechanisms to seek out and hire skilled labor. They are more flexible, therefore encounter fewer problems. By contrast, government agencies have long had to guard against fraud. This has made them rigid in their hiring practices. Government hiring requires strict adherence to test scores. These determine one's advancement. More senior civil servants require more diverse skills. But promotions are still limited by the civil service system. The government needs creative individuals with a more macro level perspective. Even those willing to accept salaries significantly lower than those offered by private enterprises, are denied the opportunity. Former National Security Council Secretary General Su Chi said the government's lack of talent was the result of twenty years of "too much conservatism, too little creativity."

Finally, take Taiwan's inability to retain skilled labor. The mobility of skilled labor is generally a good thing. As long as one introduces new blood, one introduces new thinking. But Taiwan currently faces a brain drain. The reasons are varied. Low salaries, unreasonable restrictions against the hiring of foreign workers, and the lack of a coherent legal framework are the main culprits that invite universal condemnation.

These problems are particularly serious in research institutions. The Mainland lures away skilled labor with high salaries. Starting salaries for teachers at universities in Hong Kong and Macau have long been four to five times higher than on Taiwan. The "anti-fat cat" initiatives were supposed to prevent sweetheart deals in public works projects. Instead they were misapplied to international caliber talent at the Industrial Technology Research Institute and the National Institutes of Health. These people were engaged in R&D that would help us leapfrog others through rapid innovation. Our competitors offer skilled labor a wide range of benefits. We on the other hand, impose all manner of restrictions. How can we not cause a brain drain?

Many measures protecting domestic labor block more than blue-collar foreign labor. They also prevent the hiring of highly skilled foreign labor, including lawyers, accountants, and other professionals. This illustrates the limits of protectionism.

The shortage of skilled labor is a systemic problem. Upstream we must improve the educational system. Midstream we must increase hiring opportunities. Downstream we must offer incentives to retain skilled labor. Only then can the situation be improved. The first two require restructuring. They must begin immediately. But they will not yield results in the short-term. Therefore we must increase the incentives to attract talent. This includes improved conditions to attract talent from the Mainland, as a short term cure.

人才斷層要上中下游一起解決
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.13

國科會主委朱敬一、行政院政務委員管中閔等幾位學界出身的政府首長,近日均對人才斷層問題提出警語。管政委擔心台灣淪為「三流國家」,朱主委更直言問題再不解決,很快會「死狀甚慘」。

其實,過去幾年,不同領域中人才缺乏又迅速流失的問題,一直是各界關注的話題;但問題人人皆知,答案卻不清不楚。二位首長語出驚人,正反映出這種無力感與急迫感。

人才有很多種;有些人才具備與生俱來的異秉,但更多的是經過後天的教育及訓練,而習得能夠持續解決問題、達成目標的能力。前者是天才,原本稀少;而後者則是各行各業,不分公私部門都應該盡力發掘、晉用,並全力留住的對象。因此,所謂人才斷層,至少涉及了沒有人才、晉用無門,以及無法留人等三個層次的問題。

先看沒有人才的問題。若說台灣沒有人才,或許言過其實;但沒有人才,可能是人才數量不敷所需,也可能是人力素質不具備解決問題、達成目標的能力。台灣碩、博士人數即將突破百萬,按人口比堪稱世界第一,所以看來不是量的問題,而是質的問題。

過去十年,我國高等教育廣開大門,讓碩士大學化、博士碩士化,一方面大幅降低了學子出國留學的意願,他方面又未能針對產業、社會所需設計教育訓練內容,導致高學歷卻非高能力的結果。特別是人才養成所需要者,往往不是學富五車的廣博學識,而是主動思考,以創意解決問題的態度及方法,以應付不同階段的挑戰;因此,學用嚴重脫節。

為應付暴增的學生人數,各大學只能採取被動式的教學,使得學生欠缺思考,創新應變的訓練與方法,只會低頭看眼前,從不抬頭看世界。加上少子化趨勢,除台、清、交等名校外,各大專院校都普遍面對招生不易、資源短缺的問題,導致教師無心設計教材,又因學生素質低落而意興闌珊。如此惡性循環,無怪乎有跨國企業指台灣人才比一張紙還薄。

再談晉用無門的問題。台灣近年經濟發展趨緩,就業機會減少,自然影響人才獲得發展的空間。對於私人企業而言,因有各種發掘、晉用人才的機制,而且彈性很高,問題或尚相對較低;反而是政府部門,長期在防弊的思維下,使得晉用管道極端僵化。政府用人,非但一切按考試分數的高低,決定晉用與否,而有更高多元人才需求的高級文官,其選任制度也仍然是以公務員身分為限,致使有助於提供政府更為宏觀、創意的人才,即便願意屈就於明顯低於民營企業的薪資,也沒有參與的空間。前國安會秘書長蘇起感慨政府缺乏人才,比二十年前更加「保守多、創新少」,其來有自。

最後是留不住人的問題。人才流動通常是好事,只要能有新血加入,反而有助於引進更多元的思維。但台灣現在面臨的,卻是人才流出多過流入的人才赤字問題。造成這個局面的原因很多,但偏低的薪資、過於保護的外國人聘用條件,及欠缺完善的配套,皆是千夫所指的主因。

這類問題在研究機構尤其嚴重;除了中國大陸高薪挖角外,香港、澳門的大學教師起薪,早就是我們的四、五倍,而如「打肥貓」等原本應該用在防杜公營事業酬庸的機制,竟也一體適用在如工研院、國家衛生研究院這些需要國際頂尖人才,協助我國研發創新迅速躍進的機構上。在競爭對手多所禮遇,我們卻百般限制的情況下,如何能不造成人才赤字?

同時,許多保護本國勞工的制度,不但防堵外籍藍領勞工,也一樣阻礙外國高階人才的引進。甚至如律師、會計師等專業人士市場,也同樣的基於保護主義而設有諸多限制。

人才斷層是個系統問題;必須從上游改善教育制度、中游增加晉用機會,到下游加強留用人才誘因同步下手,才有辦法加以改善。但前二者涉及體制改革,須要即刻開始,但短期無法見效;所以,強化吸引人才的誘因,改善包含中國大陸在內的外來人才的導入環境,也是因應短期的特效藥。

Thursday, August 9, 2012

A Worthy and Substantive Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement

A Worthy and Substantive Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2012


Summary: Yesterday the SEF and ARATS held its latest Chiang-Chen Meeting. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement and Customs Agreement. These consultations took two years. The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement attracted the attention not just of Taiwan businessmen, but of the general public. It is a substantive legal document deserving of recognition. It is worth taking the time to analyze its significance.

Full Text below:

Yesterday the SEF and ARATS held its latest Chiang-Chen Meeting. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement and Customs Agreement. These consultations took two years. The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement attracted the attention not just of Taiwan businessmen, but of the general public. It is a substantive legal document deserving of recognition. It is worth taking the time to analyze its significance.

Compare the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement to international bilateral investment protection agreements. This agreement may be the most important fruit of ECFA, the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement. Many points are worth noting. First of all, the agreement covers investments, investors, investment income, and relevant government provisions. The agreement is comprehensive. The wording is precise, and consistent with international standards. It establishes basic principles for investment protection. It emphasizes due process and non-discrimination. Besides protecting the security of investments, it specifies that investors must enjoy the same rights as local citizens, and calls for MFN treatment. The two sides pledged to improve treatment for investors, and a halt to new restrictive provisions.

One issue that delayed agreement concerned personal liberty and personal safety. The requirement that family members of detained businessmen be notified within 24 hours was not reflected in the text of the agreement. The agreement merely stated that the two sides must provide notice within the specified period of time, in accordance with existing notification requirements. This results were less than hoped for. But they should not be regarded as a failure. Negotiators for our side stressed the provisions of Article VIII of the Constitution, which require notification within 24-hours to protect personal freedom. They attempted to establish standards for the protection of cross-Strait investors. Their efforts should be applauded.

This set the bar quite high for the the other side. It was difficult to incorporate into their criminal procedure system. But it was also a lesson in constitutionalism. Article VIII of the Constitution provides strict protections for personal freedom. But even on Taiwan the government does not always fully comply with the relevant requirements. Our side stressed the Constitution. Our side called on the Mainland to respect the personal rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen. We called for treatment beyond that afforded local citizens. Such demands were not excessive. They were not incorporated into the agreement. But the government must engage in self-introspection. It must adhere more strictly to Article VIII of the Constitution on Taiwan. It must do so for the sake of foreign investments as well as its own citizens. These principles should apply to everyone. This should become the basis for future reciprocity.

The most praise-worthy aspect of the agreement concerns norms for investment levies. The agreement clearly defines levies to include direct expropriation and indirect expropriation. For Taiwan businessmen, this is highly significant. Taiwan businessmen encounter few cases of direct expropriation. But they encounter many cases of indirect expropriation. Indirect expropriation may not expropriation in name, but it is expropriation just the same. Examples include plant closings, deportations, forfeitures of equity, the repossession of land legally obtained, and so on. These all constitute indirect expropriation. These are expressly included in the agreement. The other side, especially local governments, often makes ever-increasing demands on Taiwan investors. The agreement will impose restraints. Detailed provisions allow investment transfers. This too was a plus.

The agreement calls for the timely payment of compensation. It calls for compliance with international standards. This too deserves praise. It clearly specifies that compensation must be calculated on the basis of fair market value. This constitutes a landmark provision for expropriation compensation, even for Taiwan.

The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement is a rare reminder for investors on both sides of the Strait, especially on Taiwan. International investment protection agreements seldom include provisions for commercial disputes between private investors. This agreement does. Investors may include arbitration clauses in business contracts as an alternative to litigation. Arbitration institutions from either side are eligible, and either side may serve as the arbitration locale. This allows arbitration institutions on either side to handle arbitration on the other side. Taiwan businessmen will have many more options during investment negotiations.

Taiwan businessmen must of course understand the rule of law. They must understand beforehand the arbitration clause in the contract, if they wish to avoid litigation. Consider disputes between investors and local governments. The agreement includes multiple means of conflict resolution. The current agreement includes mediating institutions. It was a compromise arrangement. Critics wanted the inclusion of international arbitration mechanisms. But as one can imagine, this was not something the other side could accept. This is not an option for dispute arbitration between investors and the government even on Taiwan. Such a demand amounts to super-national treatment. One can only hope that attitudes may change in the future. The current agreement is a giant step forward from what we had before. That is no exaggeration.

In sum, two years of concerted effort were not wasted. We expect the two governments to earnestly implement this hard-won agreement, and ensure the two sides' precious cross-Strait investments.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2012.08.10
社論-兩岸投保協議 內容豐富值得肯定
本報訊

     兩岸兩會日昨舉行江陳會,會中簽署了《兩岸投資保障協議》與《海關協議》。其中費時兩年協商,深受台商乃至全社會注意的投資保障協議,是一份內容豐富值得肯定的法律文件,也因此值得分析其具有的含義。

     兩岸投資保障協議,比照國際上雙邊投資保障協定的規格而書立,堪稱是兩岸經濟合作架構協議之後的一項重要協商成果,有許多值得注意之處。首先,其所涵蓋的投資、投資人、投資收益及受到規範的政府措施,相當周延,遣詞用字謹嚴,均符合國際投資保障協議的水準。其中樹立了投資待遇的基本保障原則,除了強調正當程序,不得歧視,並且保障投資安全之後,也納入了國民待遇及最惠國待遇的實質要求,雙方亦承諾改善待遇及不增加不利限制的規定。

     此中曾經一度拖延協議進度的議題,是關於人身自由與安全保障的通知義務。關於廿四小時內進行通報的規定,並未見諸協議文字,而只寫到了雙方應依各自規定的時限履行相關通知的義務,完善既有通報機制。此一成果雖不如預期,畢竟不應視為失敗。我方談判人員能夠記得憲法第八條關於廿四小時通知以保障人身自由的規定,企圖引為兩岸保障投資人的標準,立意極佳,值得稱許。

     對於對岸而言,此一要求雖然標準極高且尚難納為刑事訴訟制度的當然內容,但是也不妨視為一種憲法教育的過程,話說回來,憲法第八條關於人身自由的嚴格保障,即使在台灣,政府是否已然完全遵照做到,也非無可資檢討之處。我們不忘記憲法的規定,要求海峽彼岸尊重台商的人身權益,給予超國民待遇,倒也不算陳義過高。雖然並未如願載入協議;但政府同時應該自我督促,更切實地在台灣境內嚴格依照憲法第八條的規定辦事,對於外資以及本國人民,皆應一體適用,做為日後基於互惠原則要求對方的張本。

     最可稱道的約定,應數徵收投資的規範,本項協議明白定義徵收包括直接徵收與間接徵收,對於台商而言,甚有意義。因為台商遇到直接徵收的情形少,遇到間接徵收的情形多。所謂間接徵收,就是政府對於投資採取了不以徵收為名,而其實質效果等同於直接徵收的措施。例如封廠、驅逐出境、沒收股權、逕行收回合法審批的土地等等,都可能構成間接徵收。此項明文納入協議範圍,對於對岸特別是地方政府,處理台商投資事宜,許多予取予求的作風,應該具有收斂節制的作用,詳細規定容許投資轉移的細節,也具有正面的價值。

     協議中規定徵收補償應該符合即時、有效及充分等項符合國際要求的原則,也可按讚。尤其是明白寫下應以公平市場價值做為計算徵收補償的基準,即使是在台灣既有的徵收補償法制上,也是一項新穎而具有指標意義的規定。

     兩岸投資保障協議對於兩岸的投資者,特別是台商,還有一項罕見的提醒。一般的國際投資保障協定,少見明文載入私人間投資商務糾紛的規定,此次則也有著墨,而且仔細交代投資者可於商務契約中納入仲裁條款,作為替代訴訟的選擇。又強調兩岸的仲裁機構可以選擇兩岸各地做為仲裁地點,開放了兩岸仲裁機構至對岸辦理仲裁的可能性,對於台商是項可於投資談判中要求採納的利多選擇。

     當然此中的關鍵,仍然是台商要有足夠的法治認識,懂得事前在契約中納入仲裁條款,避免訴訟,就投資人與投資地政府的爭端,協議中也有多重的解決途徑。此次納入了機構調解的選擇,應該是折衷的安排。論者或許期待能有所謂的國際仲裁機制,此點不是對岸可以接受的選擇,可以想見。即使就台灣現行法制而言,提供投資者與政府間發生公法性質的爭執循仲裁方式解決,也不是既有的選項。如此要求,不啻是超國民待遇,只能期諸來日觀念的改變。現在協議的安排,比起簽署之前,是一大進步,則非過言。

     整體而言,兩年的協商努力,可謂功不唐捐,接下來,我們應該期待的是兩岸政府均能誠心落實執行這項來之不易的協議,保障兩岸彌足珍貴的投資活動。

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

Shortage of Talent on Taiwan Serious

Shortage of Talent on Taiwan Serious
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 9, 2012


Summary: The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.

Full Text below:

The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.

The shortage of talent on Taiwan did not begin today. Two or three years ago Chu Ching-yi was chairman of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. As an ordinary scholar he repeatedly issued warnings, including a number of concrete facts. For example, A Ph.D returning from the U.S. to work as an assistant researcher at the Academia Sinica, would be paid a monthly salary of 190,000 NT. The same individual working at Tsinghua University in Beijing, would receive an annual salary, moving expenses, and three years of housing subsidies. His or her average monthly salary would be 436,000 NT, two to three times the Academia Sinica salary. As one can imagine, given such differences in treatment, Beijing is clearly preferable to Taipei.

Three years later, the situation has not improved. Salaries for high-level talen on Taiwan lag far behind Hong Kong and Singapore, by as much as five times. Back then Chu Ching-yi estimated that if nothing was done, the talent shortage would reach crisis proportions within ten years. Even Chu did not realize the crisis would materialize so soon. Less than three years later, the situation has already deteriorated. High-level salaries are constrained by rigid laws. Mid and low-level salaries are constrained by economic hardship. When the pie cannot be made any larger, each piece of the pie will remain small. We lack the economic wherewithal to attract talent. In turn, the lack of talent in a knowledge-based economy will make economic growth impossible. In short, Taiwan may fall victim to more than a lack of talent. The lack of talent could lead to a vicious cycle of economic decline.

This is true for native talent. But how is it for foreign scientific and technological talent? Chu Ching-yi cites his own experience with foreign professors. Before the professor can receive a letter of appointment, he must undergo the same "foreign labor screening" as ordinary foreign workers. Screening for foreign professionals includes bewildering and humiliating screening for syphilis. They may be granted permanent residence, but their families and loved ones will not. Family members can be reunited only by obtaining a 30 day tourist visa. When it expires, family members must leave the country. Even driver's licenses are valid only for the duration of their residence. If their work permit has expired, income earned on Taiwan cannot be withdrawn overseas. Even dividends from unlisted shares require mountains of red tape. Personal information concerning the companies and the individuals must be submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs Investment Commission. Myriad restrictions make foreign professionals feel demeaned and subjected to unreasonable and unfair treatment. Why would they want to come to Taiwan?

Native talent has become harder to keep. Foreign talent has become even harder to attract. In recent years many people on Taiwan have evinced an intensely isolationist mentality. Mainland and foreign students have encountered the same obstacles, both in education and in employment. To ensure educational and employment opportunities for Taiwan students, students from the Mainland are not even allowed to marry someone from Taiwan. Allowing in foreign workers involves a variety of political considerations. On the surface such restrictions protect Taiwan. In fact they restrict the entry of high-level talent into Taiwan. They undermine national competitiveness. As a result, more talent leaves. In the global talent market, Taiwan has already lost its attraction. If talent cannot gather, how can industry upgrade? By contrast Singapore is encouraging professionals to move there in droves. The US is the world's most powerful nation. It has never changed its open invitation to professional talent. It spares no expense to train students. Is Taiwan really in any position to talk about global competitiveness?

People on Taiwan underwent years of hardship. They survived the "Come, come, come to National Taiwan University; Go, go, go to the United States" era. Eventually those who went to the United States returned home to create Taiwan's economic miracle. But once Taiwan took off, students had less incentive to study abroad. They stayed home and stood guard over a pool of stagnant water. As iD SoftCapital Group Chairman Stan Shih observed, "The new generation is talented. But we can no longer offer them a stage on which to perform." When asked how this came about, he said "under the influence of politic demagoguery, our society shrank the stage. We only looked inward. Industries lost their competitiveness. Young people no longer have a stage on which to perform."

Industry and academia see the problem. They have proposed solutions. The key is to free up the policies and the laws. The way must be cleared, all the way from the legislature to the executive. For example, the Legislative Yuan oversees public shares and public foundations. It fights fat cats. This enabled the Executive Yuan to invoke the "anti-fat cat articles" to attack research institutes willy nilly. Eventually they realized their error and proposed a "flexible salary program." They managed to retain research institute talent, barely. But the damage was already done.

Politics and economics on Taiwan is brims over with lip service to "the common man." Populist sentiment can easily lead to coercive egalitarianism. This is hardly conducive to the cultivation of cutting-edge talent. The political realm has reduced the stage for the economic realm and the social realm. As a result, far-sighted policies are no longer an option. Even assuming they could be implemented immediately, the government should give them careful consideration.

台灣人才斷層危機 不容低估
    2012-08-09 01:02
    中國時報 

 國科會舉行「科學技術發展諮議會」,邀集產官學界人士討論產學合作、國家型計畫及人才問題,國科會主委朱敬一會前受訪直指,台灣進入「人才斷層期」,如果再無作為,早年累積的優勢也會流失,與他國競爭的結果會是「死狀甚慘」,一語驚雷,讓產官學各界紛紛提出警語,然而,危機大家都看到了,解決辦法卻似乎還沒個譜。

 台灣人才危機非始於今日,早在二、三年前,朱敬一猶是中華經濟研究院董事長,以一介學者的身分,已多次撰文警示,當年他提出的幾項具體事實,隨便舉例,一位留美博士要返台出任中研院助研究員,依現行俸給規定月薪約台幣十九萬;相同的人才若赴北京清華大學,年薪加上安家費、三年助房補貼等等平均月薪四十三萬六千,是中研院薪給的二點三倍,可想而知,如果以待遇做選擇,北京會是台北之前的優選。

 三年過去,情況並未改善,而台灣高階人才的薪資待遇,甚至已經遠遠落後於香港、新加坡達五倍之多。當時,朱敬一預估,如果不加防範則人才斷層危機會在十年內呈現,他大概沒想到,危機來得既猛又快,三年不到已然惡化。高階人才薪給受困於僵化法令制度,中低階人員待遇則受限於實際的經濟發展,當餅做不大的時候,可分食的資源必然有限,經濟實力不夠缺乏足以吸引人才的誘因,人才不足則在知識經濟的時代更不可能翻轉提升經濟實力,質言之,台灣可能不只陷入人才斷層危機,而是已經陷入人才斷層與經濟頹軟的惡化循環。

 本國人才如此,外籍科研人才又如何?朱敬一以自己身邊外籍教授的經驗為例,即使是教授拿到聘書前,還是要和一般外勞相同先行「外勞篩檢」,檢驗項目包括讓外籍專業人士不解也感到羞辱的「梅毒」;他們即使因為工作而取得永久居留證,但其家屬親人卻始終無法取得居留證,家人想團聚只能以觀光簽證卅天居留,期滿就得出境,連駕照換照都只給到其居留期限;他們在台灣工作所得,因為在銀行的居留證資料過期而不能在國外提款;連購買未上市股票配發股票股利,還得搜集包括公司與個人的一大疊資料赴經濟部投審會「申請」;林林總總的限制,只讓外籍專業人士自覺低人一等,且受到不合理、不公平的待遇。誰還想到台灣?

 本國人才難留、外籍人才不來,更嚴重的,台灣近幾年有強烈的鎖國心態,不論是陸生或者外籍學生,從教育到就業都要碰到相同的爭議話題:保障台生就讀與就業權益,陸生甚至不能在台結婚,即使開放外勞都有各種牽牽絆絆的政治考量,表面上彷彿保障了台灣人,實情卻是限制了高階優秀人才移入台灣,國家整體競爭力因此衰退,更多人才因此出走,在全球化的人才市場上,台灣已經失去了磁吸作用,人才無法群聚,產業如何升級?相對於新加坡大量鼓勵專業人士移入,世界最大強國美國從未改變向全球張開雙臂歡迎專業人士,不惜重金培養留學生,台灣還有什麼條件談全球競爭力?

 台灣走過困頓的歲月,有過「來來來,來台大;去去去,去美國」的日子,然而,那些赴美人才陸續回鄉,開創台灣的經濟奇蹟,騰昇之後的台灣,學生出國留學意願漸低,留著守住一攤難以攪動的死水。智融集團董事長施振榮說得好,「新生代都是人才,但是我們沒有提供下一代可以發揮的舞台。」何以致此?「因為整個社會在政治運作下,把舞台做小了,都是往內看,產業沒有競爭力,年輕人也失去發揮的舞台。」

 產學界看到問題,提出可能的解決方案,重點還是卡在政策法令制度的鬆綁,得一路通關從行政部門打到立法機關。隨便舉例,因為立法院監督公股事業與財團法人,重打肥貓,讓行政院祭出「打肥貓條款」,打到工研院幾乎崩盤,才亟思挽救推出「彈薪方案」,勉強有利於研究機關延攬人才,但已打成重傷。

 而在舉國從政治、經濟甚至語言俱談「庶民」之際,民粹情緒很容易塑造齊頭式的平等,卻絕對無益於形塑尖端人才,政治壓縮了經濟與社會的舞台空間,致使有遠見的政策方案無法有效推出、即時落實執行,都值得執政者深思。

Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Asian-Pacific Territorial Disputes Escalate

Asian-Pacific Territorial Disputes Escalate
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 8, 2012


Summary: Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.

Full Text below:

Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.

Basically these sovereignty disputes are intensifying. A major cause is the rapid growth of Mainland China's military might. It is projecting its power into to the Pacific. It is attempting to breakthrough the Japanese-US island chain currently containing Mainland China. It is colliding with the powers currently occupying the region. The flashpoint will be disputes concerning territory or territorial waters. The United States is responding. It has begun its return to the Asian-Pacific region. This has emboldened other nations. This has encouraged them to thumb their noses at Mainland China. The US, they now assume, now has their back. A few days ago the U.S. State Department harshly criticized Mainland China for establishing Sansha City, a municipality to preside over three South China Sea islands. This provoked a vehement response from Mainland China. Mainland China and the US were clearly exchanging blows.

Meanwhile the global recession has discredited the governments of many nations. The influence of right-wing populist elements has been enhanced. Sovereignty disputes are often tools for domestic political struggles. They often force governments to draw lines in the sand. They often enable ultranationalist organizations to hijack their governments. They sometimes lead to foreign military quagmires.

In fact, most international disputes over sovereignty cannot be resolved through negotiations. If one cannot use force, then all one can do is protest. As a result, the sovereignty remains in dispute. This has long been the case for the Diaoyutai Islands dispute and South China Sea dispute. In recent years confrontations have intensified. Military intervention has become more frequent. For example, PRC fleets and Mainland Chinese fishing boats have repeatedly entered Diaoyutai Island waters. ROC Coast Guard ships have escorted Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement activists to the Diaoyutai Islands to proclaim sovereignty. Warships belonging to Mainland China and the Philippines have clashed in the Huangyan Islands.

All nations claim they want dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The international community agrees. In fact this is hypocritical lip service. Few people ever want dialogue during territorial sovereignty disputes. The reason is simple. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Nations in actual possession of the disputed territories do not want to talk to others. Doing so merely undermines their ownership claims. Other nations gain nothing from talks. For them, there is nothing to talk about. The recent ASEAN meeting originally wanted the South China Sea Code of Conduct included in the joint declaration, But they were unable to reach an agreement, so they gave up on the idea. As one can see, sovereignty disputes are not easy resolved by diplomatic means. Therefore they will only drag on.

President Ma Ying-jeou recently attended the 60th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. He reiterated the Republic of China's sovereignty over the islands. He also offered a five-point peace initiative for the East China Sea. One. Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonisms. Two. Shelve disputes. Do not give up on dialogue and communications. Three. Comply with international law. Settle disputes through peaceful means. Four. Seek consensus. Establish an East China Sea Code of Conduct. Five. Establish a mechanism for the development of East China Sea resources.

Ma Ying-jeou is an expert on international and maritime law. In particular, he has conducted in-depth research on the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute. According to reports, the proposed peace initiative for the East China Sea was drawn up by the ROC National Security Council. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Japan and other nations through unofficial channels. But so far none of the the parties have responded. This is not surprising. Other nations have no intention of engaging in more active diplomatic consultations. Moreover, Beijing does not want the ROC to take part in this territorial dispute in the name of a sovereign state. Japan is worried that Taipei and Beijing will join hands to defend the nation's territory against annexation by Japan. As for the cooperative development of resources, that is hardly a pressing issue. At this time any concrete move to develop regional resources would be regarded as serious provocation.

The ROC government has issued a five-point proposal for the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically, this keeps our hand in the game. This reaffirms our sovereignty. This is a necessary political gesture. Otherwise, if we stand by without saying anything, our role in the controversy will gradually shrink.

The most concrete and specific of these five points is "Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonism." This clearly refers to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, with their declared intention of "purchasing" the three Diaoyutai Islands. The two men are engaged in domestic political struggle. They are ignoring the diplomatic consequences of raising tensions with Mainland China. Diaoyutai for them may be a tool for domesic political struggle. But it is one that could lead to Sino-Japanese conflict. It is sure to impact the strategic picture and economic development in the Asian-Pacific region. It is not something anyone would be happy to see. It is not even something that the US, which longs to "contain" Mainland China, would be happy to see.

Territorial disputes may be intractable. But national policy must not allow disputes to undermine the national interest. This includes the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute in the Asian-Pacific region. Problems should be resolved peacefully and pragmatically. President Ma's clarion call merits the nation's attention.

對立尖銳化 亞太版圖之爭日趨緊繃
    2012-08-08 01:17
    中國時報

 亞太地區沿著太平洋岸,從北方四島、獨島/竹島、釣魚台到南沙群島,都長期存在著主權爭議,相關各國也經常針鋒相對。但近幾年來,這些爭執漸趨尖銳,甚至出現對峙行動,已經為亞太和平投下變數。主張擁有釣魚台和南沙群島主權且實際統轄太平島的台灣,當然不能置身事外,必須慎重關切局勢發展。

 就基本格局而言,這些主權之爭之所以日益升高,一大原因是中國勢力迅速增長,軍事力量開始往太平洋投射,力圖突破昔日美國圍堵中國的島鏈時,開始與原有勢力發生撞擊,直接的引爆點便在領土或領海問題上。而美國面對此一局勢,也開始「重返亞太」,使得相關國家在對中國嗆聲時,背後有更多依恃。日前美國國務院對中國設三沙市發出嚴厲批判,引發中共強力批駁,明顯地,中美過招意味濃厚。

 此外,在另一方面,國際經濟衰退導致許多國家政府人氣低落,右派民粹勢力影響力增強,主權之爭常成為內部政治鬥爭工具,甚至逼得政府必須跟進表態,甚至被民族主權激進團體拖著跑,有時也導致對外衝突難以下台。

 事實上,國際間的主權爭議所在多有,能夠經由談判解決的並不多,一般來說,如果不能動武,那麼就只能三不五時動動口,讓主權歸屬保持在爭議狀態。釣魚台與南海爭議多年來均是如此,但最近幾年的對立愈來愈尖銳,軍事介入也更為頻繁。例如中國大陸的艦隊及漁政船多次進入釣魚台海域、台灣海巡艦護送保釣船去釣魚台宣示主權、中國和菲律賓的艦艇與船隻在黃岩島對峙等等。

 雖然相關各國都聲稱希望對話和平解決糾紛,而國際社會也如此呼籲,但事實上,這些都只是虛偽的場面話,領土主權之爭很少有人真心想對話。原因很簡單:占者最大。實際占有的國家根本不想和別人談,否則就是把自己的擁有權打了折扣,其他國家既撈不著好處,那又何必多此一談?不久前的東協會議原本想把南海行為準則納入共同宣言,最後喬不攏而作罷,可見主權之爭不容易靠外交手段解決,只能繼續拖下去。

 馬英九總統在出席《中日和約》生效六十周年紀念活動時,除了重申中華民國擁有釣魚台主權外,也主動提出五點「東海和平倡議」:第一、自我克制,不升高對立行動;第二、擱置爭議,不放棄對話溝通;第三、遵守國際法,以和平方式處理爭端;第四、尋求共識,研訂「東海行為準則」;第五、建立機制,合作開發東海資源。

 馬英九本人其實是國際海洋法專家,對釣魚台的主權爭議尤其有深入研究。據報導,這次提出的「東海和平倡議」是由國安會主導規畫,外交部事前曾透過管道告知日本等國,但各方迄今未作回應。這並不讓人意外,因為其他國家目前無意於更積極的外交磋商。何況,中國大陸不希望台灣以主權國家地位參與這樁領土之爭,而日本則十分介意兩岸是否聯手護土抗日。至於合作開發資源,更不是迫切議題,此時任何具體的開發動作,反而會被視為更嚴重的挑釁。

 我國針對釣魚台問題提出五點倡議,在外交層次上,是一種保持話語權、重申主權地位的政治動作,而這是維護主權所必須做的。否則老是站在旁邊一語不發,參與爭議的地位會漸形薄弱。

 這五點裡最具體、也最有針對性的,是第一點「自我克制,不升高對立行動」。很明顯的,這是指近來相關國家的動作。尤其日本首相野田佳彥與東京都知事石原慎太郎爭相搶購釣魚台三小島,在內部政治角力下,不顧外交後果激化與中國的緊張。釣魚台如果成為內鬥工具,甚至引發日中衝突,勢必衝擊亞太整體局勢與經濟發展,並非任何國家之福,即使是想壓抑中國勢力的美國,也不樂見。

 領土之爭固然難解,但政策至少不能讓局勢朝損及國家利益的方向走;而包括釣魚台在內的亞太主權之爭,也應該在維護整體和平發展的前提下務實處理。馬總統提出的呼籲,值得相關國家思考。

Political Barriers Not Crossed by Eight Chiang-Chen Meetings

Political Barriers Not Crossed by Eight Chiang-Chen Meetings
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 7, 2012


Summary: Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.

Full Text below:

The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will convene tomorrowin Taipei. The two sides will sign a Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement and a Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement. The seventh Chiang-Chen Meeting took place during President Ma's first term. The two sides signed 16 agreements. Altogether the two sides have signed 18 agreements. They have established a solid record of cross-Strait interaction. They have heralded a new stage of mutually beneficial cross-strait relations.

The current Chiang-Chen Meeting will be different from previous meetings. President Ma recently began his second term. The leadership has changed. The CCP will hold its 18th Party Congress in October. Its leadership is also about to change. The current Chiang-Chen Meeting represents a farewell to the past. The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting is a period. The ARATS-SEF consultations were a semicolon. They clearly connected the two.

The highlight of the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will be the signing of the Investment Protection Agreement. Consultations lasted nearly two years. The process was complex. The agreement was supposed to be signed during the sixth and seventh Chiang-Chen Meetings. But both times the meetings concluded without results. As we can see, the agreement was hard won.

During the final stages of consultation, BYD filed an infringement suit against the Hon Hai Group's Foxconn Company. The suit was not actually relevant to the Investment Protection Agreement. The landlord for the Pacific SOGO Dalian Store increased rents an unreasonable amount and cut power to the store. These have become test cases for the effectiveness of the Investment Protection Agreement. Taiwan businessman Chung Ting-pang, who attended Falun Gong events, was detained by Mainland authorities. This is why some oppose the Investment Protection Agreement. The Investment Protection Agreement was originally confined to protecting investments. As we can see, some people expect too much from it.

Nevertheless, the significance of the agreement cannot be denied. One. Taiwan investments on the Mainland were once protected unilaterally by the Taiwan Compatriots Investment Protection Act. Now they are protected bilaterally by the Investment Protection Agreement. ROC authorities can now intervene in any investment disputes. This has dramatically increased the degree of protection afforded Taiwan business people on the Mainland. Two. Mainland companies and individuals have investments on Taiwan. Ruling party changes on Taiwan could jeopardize their interests. The Investment Protection Agreement may help dispel their fears and facilitate the normalization of Mainland investments on Taiwan. Three. The Investment Protection Agreement is one of four follow-up agreements to ECFA. It constitutes a cross-strait economic and trade success. It will facilitate follow-up ECFA negotiations and accelerate cross-Strait free trade.

The Investment Protection Agreement has led to major breakthroughs. But more hurdles must be overcome. Our side was concerned about the personal safety of Taiwan business people. These concerns were addressed in the Investment Protection Agreement. We fought for Taiwan business peoples' personal freedom, and won. If Mainland authorities detain Taiwan business people, they must notify their families within 24 hours, in accordance with "citizen status." Our side sought exemption from the Mainland's newly amended Code of Criminal Law. Our calls for "extra-citizen status" and "unconditional notification" were rejected.

Consider the settlement of disputes between investors (P2P). Our side wanted immunity from Mainland regulations. We were able to secure only arbitration on Taiwan and third party arbitration under Mainland arbitration institutions and arbitration rules. Our side wanted international arbitration for disputes between investors and local governments (P2G). The Mainland side refused. Multilateral mediation with fewer teeth was substituted.

In the final analysis, the cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement was dogged by political factors. The Mainland side objected to the internationalization of cross-Strait issues blurring the "one China principle." Turning cross-strait P2G disputes over to international arbitration bodies for arbitration violated the political bottom line. The Mainland agreed to notify the family members of those detained by Mainland authorities within 24 hours, based on "citizen status." But to avoid the misintrepretation of cross-strait relations, it substituted the concept of consensus for the concept of sovereignty in the standardized protocol.

Think back to protocols signed during the past seven Chiang-Chen Meetings. Whenever our demands touched upon sovereignty and jurisdiction, Beijing refused to budge. Consider the cross-Strait Maritime Transport Agreement. We have been fighting to get Mainland exports to other countries shipped to Taiwan ports for transit. But the Mainland sees re-exports as relations between sovereign states. It has balked. Our side wants cross-Strait air transport agreements merged into "beyond rights" Fifth Freedom of air travel. Our side wants Mainland visitors to transit Taiwan, then proceed to other countries. But this too is impossible due to political considerations. As a result our side's vision of a cross-Strait direct sea and air operations center has been set back.

Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.

八次江陳會尚未跨越的政治藩籬
【聯合報╱社論】
 
2012.08.07

第八次江陳會明起在台北舉行,將簽署「兩岸海關合作協議」及「兩岸投資保障和促進協議」,連同馬總統第一任內七次江陳會所簽署十六項協議,總計十八項協議,寫下兩岸互動的豐盛紀錄,也標幟兩岸關係互利雙贏的新階段。

這次江陳會意義不同於以往,一方面,舉行時間在馬總統第二任開始不久,有「展布新局」的意義;另方面,攸關中共人事換屆的「十八大」即將於十月召開,此時江陳會又是「總結過去」的象徵。喻以標點符號,「江陳會」名稱在第八次會議後可能劃下「句點」,但在兩岸兩會協商則是「分號」,承上啟下的意義至為明顯。

簽署投資保障協議是第八次江陳會的重頭戲,但協商歷時近兩年,過程一波三折,第六次及第七次江陳會兩次事前預告即將簽署,但最後皆告落空;可見該協議難度甚高。

在協商進入最後階段,和投保協議關聯不大的鴻海集團旗下富士康公司遭比亞迪侵權纏訟案,以及太平洋SOGO大陸大連店遭房東無理調漲租金及斷電案,先後浮上檯面,成為測試投保協議有效性的指標案件。修習法輪功的台商鍾鼎邦遭大陸羈押事件,更成為部分人士反對簽署投保協議的重要理由。可見原本侷限於保障投資相關權益的一紙協議,承載了多少過度期待。

儘管如此,投保協議簽署仍有不容抹殺的重要意義:第一,對台商大陸投資的保障,從大陸以單方面制定「台灣同胞投資保護法」作規範依據,轉變為依雙方協議加以規範,我方公權力可直接介入投資爭端協處,對大陸台商保護程度大幅提升;第二,對大陸企業或個人來台投資,投保協議可祛除投資人擔心台灣政黨輪替可能影響投資權益的心理障礙,有助促進陸資來台正常化;第三,對兩岸經貿布局而言,投保協議是ECFA後續四大協議之一,其成功達陣,有利推進ECFA後續談判,加速邁向兩岸自由貿易的既定目標。

從投保協議實質內容來看,我方爭取到若干重大突破,但也有難以克服的障礙。如我方將台商關心的人身安全保障納入投保協議,並爭取到台商人身自由受限制時,須在二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」,但在訴求排除大陸新修正「刑事訴訟法」國安條款適用、「超國民待遇」的「無例外通知」,則鎩羽而歸。

在投資爭端方面,關於投資人間(P2P)爭端,我方為排除大陸法規只能在大陸仲裁機構仲裁的規定,爭取到可在台灣及第三地仲裁的待遇,但關於投資人與在地政府間(P2G)爭端,我方訴求援引國際仲裁機制遭大陸拒絕,而代以強制力較低的「調解」、「協處」等多元方式處理。

追根究柢,兩岸投保協議很多限制都是政治因素作祟,大陸強力排斥兩岸問題國際化及兩岸關係定位模糊「一中原則」。因此,訴求兩岸P2G爭端交由國際仲裁機構仲裁,自是違反北京政治底線。大陸同意限制人身自由須二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」,但似為避免兩岸關係被錯誤解讀,據知將不在協議本文規範,而改以無主權意義的共識文件代之。

事實上,回溯過去七次江陳會簽署的各項協議,我方訴求只要碰觸到主權及管轄權問題,都很難突破北京的底線。如兩岸海運協議,我方一直爭取大陸輸往其他國家貨品能運到台灣港口中轉,但大陸視轉口為主權國間運輸關係,一直不願放行。我方訴求在兩岸空運協議納入延遠權,並爭取大陸來台旅客能從台灣轉往其他國家,也因北京同樣的政治考量而卡住。台灣藉由兩岸直航發展海空運轉中心的願景因之重挫。

總結過去經驗,北京設下的底線,就是八次江陳會難以跨越的政治藩籬。兩岸協商是建立在「九二共識」、「一中各表」的基礎上,經濟事務協商大可不必再箍上政治的條條框框。北京如能跨越意識形態的障礙,讓經濟的歸經濟,兩岸關係發展始可能再上層樓。第八次江陳會若能有所調整,成就必可超越過去。