How Should Taipei Position Itself in East Asia?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 13, 2013
Summary: The Washington-Beijing major balance of power has become imbalanced. The
Tokyo-Seoul minor balance of power is also changing. As an East Asian
government, Taipei cannot sit idly by. It must reassess the situation
and respond. It matters not what message King Pu-tsung brought back from
Washington. Taipei faces increasing pressure from both Beijing and
Washington. Can Taipei establish a new East Asian security strategy? Can
it find a new posture amidst unbalanced power relations in East Asia?
These are the government's most urgent national security concerns.
Full text below:
King Pu-tsung, the Republic of China's Representative to the US, has quietly returned home. He is rumored to have conveyed Washington's concern about Taipei's stand on Beijing's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). He allegedly arranged for EPA Director Gina McCarthy to visit Taipei. Not surprisingly, the premature leaking of this highly symbolic visit displeased Washington and led to its cancellation.
East Asia is undergoing complex changes. Beijing's East China Sea ADIZ has affected the balance of power between Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei. Washington seeks Taipei's cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leakk was unforgivable. Taipei constantly harps on its now old "East China Sea Peace Initiative." But its highest priority should be to decide exactly where it stands on the issue.
Seoul recently announced a further expansion of its own ADIZ, which now includes the southern tip of Jeju Island, Marlowe Island, and Red Island. It overlaps islands within Beijing's ADIZ. This is seen as the first countermove by an East Asian nation. South Korea is attempting to fine tune the strategic picture. In the past, Seoul avoided taking sides among Washington, Tokyo, and Moscow. It attempted to split the difference and maintain the delicate balance between Beijing and Washington. It attempted to maximize its own national interests. The current initiative from Seoul can be seen as an attempt at balanced East Asian diplomacy. It may have a domino effect for neighboring countries, and force them to take sides. This warrants concern.
In 2009, Washington announced that it was "returning to Asia." In East Asia, there is one major balance of power and three minor balances of power. All are linked, and all affect each other. The major balance of power is the "constructive strategic partnership" between the United States and Mainland China. It is Washington's attempt to "contain" Beijing while simultaneously engaging in coopetition. The three minor balances of power take place within the framework of Washington-Beijing coopetition. These are moves made by Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei within the Washington-Beijing framework. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a "comprehensively strategic, mutually beneficial" toward Beijing. Park Geun-hye of Korea has adopted a strategic partnership with Beijing. The Ma administration in Taipei has adopted a balanced diplomacy policy that befriends Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo.
The major balance of power and three minor balances of power depends on three factors. One. The major balance of power depends on the maintenance of internal power. It depends on the ebb and flow of Beijing and Washington's military strength in East Asia. It depends on whether Beijing challenges Washington's core interests in East Asia, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. It depends on whether Beijing attempts to transform its brown water navy into a blue water navy. These will determine whether cooperation or competition will prevail between Washington and Beijing. Two. The minor balance of power depends on the tug of war between the weaker powers. Tokyo and Seoul are Washington's military allies. But the two have long clashed over the sovereignty of the Dokdo Islands, This has enabled Washington and Beijing to intervene. Three. The major balance of powers and the minor balances of power involve dynamic equilibrium and the internalization of conflicts. Beijing and Tokyo have clashed over the Diaoyutai Islands. But Washington still considers this a territorial dispute between China and Japan, one that will not change the status quo in East Asia.
But consider the major balance of power and the three minor balances of power. These were once in equilibrium. But Beijing's ADIZ changed the balance of power. Confrontation followed. One. Beijing's ADIZ enabled aircraft to take off and land from the Liaoning aircraft carrier in the East China Sea. It also enabled Beijing to break through the Western Pacific island chain, through the Miyako Strait. This changed the ebb and flow of Washington-Beijing military power in East Asia. Two. Beijing included islands claimed by Seoul within its ADIZ This pulled Seoul into the East China Sea dispute. This gave Tokyo and Seoul common cause to oppose Beijing. Washington may seize the opportunity to bridge the gap with Tokyo and Seoul. Three. The East China Sea ADIZ has expanded the Sino-Japanese dispute over sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. It has turned it into an East China Sea regional conflict. It has externalized the conflict, and will gradually change the status quo in East Asia.
Consider the three minor balances of power. In September last year, the Noda Cabinet's Diaoyutai "nationalization" destroyed any "comprehensively strategic, mutually beneficial" relationship between Beijing and Tokyo. Bilateral conflict is intensifying. Tokyo has reverted to its unconditionally pro-Washington policy. It has begun actively courting Washington and Tokyo's East Asian neighbors, to counter Beijing. Seoul has expanded its East China Sea ADIZ. Beijing's ADIZ and Seoul's ADIZ now overlap. It has shattered Park Geun-hye aggressive attempt to strike a balance between Beijing and Washington. Cracks have appeared in the Beijing-Seoul "strategic partnership."
The Washington-Beijing major balance of power has become imbalanced. The Tokyo-Seoul minor balance of power is also changing. As an East Asian government, Taipei cannot sit idly by. It must reassess the situation and respond. It matters not what message King Pu-tsung brought back from Washington. Taipei faces increasing pressure from both Beijing and Washington. Can Taipei establish a new East Asian security strategy? Can it find a new posture amidst unbalanced power relations in East Asia? These are the government's most urgent national security concerns.
台灣如何在東亞權力大平衡尋求新定位
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.13 04:29 am
我駐美代表金溥聰悄悄返國，據稱是傳達美方對我國在東海防空識別區立場之關切，並安排美國環保署長吉娜麥卡錫訪台。詎料，此一極具象徵意義的部長訪問，竟因消息提前曝光引起美方不滿，而告取消。
東亞情勢正處於微妙的變動中，中國大陸東海防空識別區的劃設，牽動了美、中、日、韓和我國在此區域的權力平衡。在此之際，美方亟欲爭取我方的合作，而我外交部門卻發生如此不可原諒的疏漏，令人扼腕。更重要的是，我方面對此一形勢，除了不斷重彈「東海和平倡議」的老調，究竟應如何找到自己新的定位，是當務之急。
日前韓國政府宣布進一步擴大其防空識別區，範圍涵括了濟州島南端的馬羅島及紅島，同時也劃入與中共防空識別區重疊的離於島。此舉，被視為東亞國家開出反制的第一槍，也是韓國對區域形勢「小平衡」採取了微調。過去，韓國政府在美中日俄環伺中不輕易選邊，而以左右逢源戰術，在美中之間維持微妙的平衡關係，以爭取國家利益的最大化。這次韓國政府的舉措，不僅可視為東亞平衡外交的傾頹，也可能引發周邊國家選邊站的骨牌效應，值得注意。
自二○○九年美國宣布重返亞洲之後，東亞基本存在著一個「大平衡」與三個「小平衡」，彼此相互連動，也相互制衡。所謂「大平衡」，是指美中之間的「建設性戰略合作夥伴關係」，美國對中國大陸採取既圍堵、又合作的競爭性夥伴關係。而三個「小平衡」，是指在美中競合的框架下，日本、韓國及台灣在美中之間各自所採取的平衡政策；例如，日本民主黨時期所採取的中日「全面性戰略互惠關係」政策，韓國朴槿惠的「建立中韓戰略夥伴關係」，以及台灣馬政府上台後所採取的「親美、和中、友日」的平衡外交政策。
在這「一大三小」的權力平衡架構下，靠著三項因素維繫彼此間的均衡關係。第一，「大平衡」內部權力的維持，繫乎美中在東亞地區軍事實力的消長，只要中國大陸不挑戰美國在東亞的核心利益──南海與東海，不從近海朝向遠洋軍事大國推進，美中之間的合作關係自然大於競爭。第二，「小平衡」內部均衡的維持，繫乎各國之間的相互角力。日韓都是美國的軍事同盟國，但是兩國長期以來卻因為歷史問題及獨島爭議而不睦，這有利於美中兩大國的政治力介入。第三，「大平衡」與「小平衡」之間動態均衡的維持，是繫乎衝突的內化；中日關係雖因釣魚台而齟齬，但對美國而言，這仍是中日兩國間的領土爭議，不致改變東亞權力現狀。
然而，這個「大平衡」與三個「小平衡」間原有的均衡關係，卻因中共劃定防識區而出現變化，從權力平衡逐漸朝相互對抗發展。首先，中共劃定東海防識區，主要是便於遼寧號航空母艦在東海的飛機起降，同時透過前進宮古海峽突破西太平洋第一島鏈；這改變了美中在東亞地區的勢力消長。其次，中共將中韓間爭議的離於島也劃入防識區範圍，不啻將韓國捲入東海爭議；這使日韓找到共同抗中的連接點，而美國則可趁機彌補美日韓三邊軍事關係的缺口。最後，東海防識區的劃定，將中日釣魚台主權爭議擴大為東海區域衝突，衝突的外部化將逐漸改變東亞的權力現狀。
事實上，在三個「小平衡」中，中日「全面性戰略互惠關係」，在去年九月野田內閣將釣魚台國有化後，即已告瓦解；在雙邊衝突激化下，日本又重新回到過去對美一面倒的政策，開始積極拉攏美國及東亞鄰國，以對抗中國大陸。而韓國這次擴大東海防識區的舉動，讓中韓兩國的防識區出現了重疊，這也打破朴槿惠上台後積極推動的對中和對美的平衡外交，中韓「戰略夥伴關係」似已出現裂痕。
當美中「大平衡」已逐漸失衡，而日韓「小平衡」也開始出現變化，身為東亞利害關係國的我國當然不可能置身事外，亦不可能不對情勢作出新的評估及因應。不論金溥聰返國帶回什麼樣的訊息，我國面臨來自中共和美國兩邊的壓力也會與日俱增；如何建構新的東亞安全戰略，在失衡的東亞權力關係中找到自己的新定位，當是政府國安高層的當務之急。
Thursday, December 12, 2013
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
The DPP: Mired in the Past
The DPP: Mired in the Past
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 12, 2013
Summary: Let us be blunt. The DPP started out as an "outside the KMT" political organization. It grew strong because it pursued social justice. Today the DPP spares no effort in its pursuit of power. Its pursuit of power has clearly replaced its former pursuit of social justice. The means by which it pursues power have clearly replaced its former principles and ideals. As a result, it can no longer persuade the masses to follow. Therefore the "Princes of the Five Cities" is not merely a faded myth, but a political fact.
Full text below:
The DPP is holding its Taipei City and Xinbei City party primaries. This has led political wags to joke about the "Princes of the Five Cities," and underscored the Green Camp generational gap. Yu Shyi-kun handily defeated Chuang Shuo Han at the polls and won the Xinbei City primaries. That is nothing to wonder at. Annette Lu recently blasted her opponents in Taipei, asking "What contribution have young people made to democracy?" As one can see, the Green Camp generational gap has deeper structural causes.
Consider the central leadership and the major DPP factions. They still consist mostly of Formosa Incident leaders and defense attorneys. This means that although Taiwan has undergone vast changes over the past two decades, the DPP itself has remained frozen in time. This has two implications. One. Consider the internal changing of the guard. The party elders who founded the party remain active and refuse to step down, preventing the rise of a newer generation of party leaders. Two. Consider the ideological implications. The party elders cling to rigid theories about checks and balances, and outdated ideas about cross-Strait and international relations. They are unable to deal with the problems that confront Taiwan today. The DPP remains oblivious. It does not know how to reform itself. The former failing affects the evolution of the DPP. The latter failing undermines the progress of Taiwan.
The DPP remains frozen in time. Internally, this has prevented a changing of the guard. Even the "Old School" KMT has undergone three generational changes, from Lee Teng-hui to Lien Chan to Ma Ying-jeou. By contrast the DPP remains senile. This is true even when compared to the Mainland. Even the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party has developed a decade old system for its changing of the guard. Over the past twenty years, the baton has passed smoothly from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. By contrast, the once youthful and energetic DPP is undergoing a young vs. old power struggle. This is deeply regrettable.
Consider the party's political path. The DPP remains frozen in time. This has led to a disconnect between it and society. The Democratic Progressive Party was originally an opposition party. It opposed the KMT's authoritarian rule and one-party monopoly. Under the circumstancs, its obstructionist strategy could be read as idealism and progressiveness. But the nation has undergone two ruling party changes. The Kuomintang was once cast as demonic. Now it has been revealed to be merely mediocre. Yet the DPP still persists in demonizing its opponent. The problems to be solved require professionals in environmentalism, public safety, and other matters. But the DPP is unable to offer any professional vision of its own. Its idealism often comes across as hollow. The DPP often flip flops. It says one thing when in power, and in flagrant self-contradiction, something else when it is not.
The list of examples is endless. For example, when in power, the Democratic Progressive Party repeatedly stopped and restarted construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. But when it found itself out of power, it engaged in obstructionism and demanded the total abolition of nuclear power generation. When in power, it quietly allowed U.S. beef imports. When it found itself out of power, it categorically opposed them. When in power, it flung the doors wide open on government allowances and benefits. When it found itself out of power, it blasted the same measures as fiscally destructive.
Consider an even more obvious example -- the DPP's obstinate foot-dragging on cross-Strait policy. Over the past two decades, the Mainland has undergone Glastnost. It has changed from an Iron Curtain country to the world's factory. It has become the world's second largest economy. But the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party has no idea how to deal with this dramatic transformation. On the one hand, it persists in attacking the KMT's cross-Strait policy to cover up its own unworkable isolationist approach to "loving Taiwan." On the other hand, it restricts Taiwan businesses and cross-Strait exchanges, in order to protect the Holy Grail of Taiwan independence. It opposes ECFA. It opposes TISA. The DPP's thinking remains mired in the same two decades old Sinophobia. Over the past two decades, the world has become flat. Only the DPP's Taiwan Strait has become deeper. Taiwan has become more isolated, more closed. For this the DPP bears enormous responsibility.
Annette Lu asked, "What contributions have young people made to democracy?" This revealed more than her own egotism. It also revealed a political party's nostalgia, and reluctance to change with the times. Annette Lu fought the good fight. But her time is past. The challenges that confront future generations must be dealt with by new generations. Otherwise, one will remain mired in two decades old ideology and friend versus foe dualism. How can Taiwan undergo transformation? How can it progress?
The DPP remains frozen in history. It cannot bring itself to pass the baton to a new generation. This problem is not limited to the Green Camp. It undermines political, economic, and social evolution on Taiwan. Admittedly, The DPP was once a major force in promoting progress on Taiwan. It introduced new faces to the scene. But in recent years, this force has diminished. The result has been its current state of degeneration. Green Government died, but was never given a thorough autopsy. The DPP never engaged in soul-searching over Chen Shui-bian's malfeasance and corruption.
Let us be blunt. The DPP started out as an "outside the KMT" political organization. It grew strong because it pursued social justice. Today the DPP spares no effort in its pursuit of power. Its pursuit of power has clearly replaced its former pursuit of social justice. The means by which it pursues power have clearly replaced its former principles and ideals. As a result, it can no longer persuade the masses to follow. Therefore the "Princes of the Five Cities" is not merely a faded myth, but a political fact.
民進黨歷史感的停滯與世代困境
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.12 03:54 am
民進黨北二都的黨內初選，引起了外界「五府千歲」之譏，也暴露了綠營內部世代交替的困境。游錫?在新北市民調輕易擊敗莊碩漢贏得初選，固不足奇；而呂秀蓮近日在台北市猛烈砲轟對手：「年輕人對民主有何貢獻？」則可看出綠營的世代困境有著更深的結構根源。
放眼民進黨中央和各大派系，主要仍是美麗島世代及律師世代在當家，這意味，以台灣廿幾年的時空變化之深鉅，在民進黨內，歷史感卻是凝固了。所謂凝固，有兩個意涵：一，從內部的人事更替看，創黨元老的活躍不退，阻滯了中生代及新生代的進路與崛起；二，從意識形態面看，大老僵固的制衡論、過時的兩岸觀、和陳舊的國際視野，皆已無法應付今天的台灣形勢，而民進黨卻不自覺，亦不知如何調整。前者，影響了民進黨的進化；後者，則拖累了台灣的進步。
民進黨這種時空凝滯的現象，表現在內部交班上，較之已歷經李登輝、連戰、馬英九三代更替的百年老店國民黨，猶顯老態龍鍾。若與對岸相比，連集權統治的中國共產黨都已發展出十年換屆的穩健交棒制度，近廿年江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平的順利傳承，對照之下，曾經年輕氣盛的民進黨如今卻演出老少爭鋒的景象，令人唏噓。
若從問政路線看，民進黨歷史感的凝滯，更造成了它和社會及時勢的脫節。民進黨最初的反對路線，是針對國民黨的威權統治及一黨獨大而發；在那樣的情境下，它的許多杯葛策略都比較容易被賦與理想性質和進步色彩。但隨著兩度政黨輪替的推演，揭掉「妖魔化」外衣的國民黨，露出了「平庸化」政黨的內裡；然而，民進黨卻仍緊抱其「妖魔化」對手的戰術；問題是，在必須倚賴專業解決的財經、環保、安全等議題上，它自己卻拿不出有瞻矚的專業見解，常顯得理念虛空。更常見的，則是民進黨立場的搖擺反覆，執政時說一套，在野時說另一套，自我矛盾。
這類的例子，不勝枚舉。例如，民進黨執政時對核四忽停忽建，在野時卻又為杯葛而主張全面廢核；執政時悄悄開放美牛，在野時又全面杯葛；執政時對津貼及福利政策大開善門，在野時卻痛批此舉會使財政更加惡化。
更突出的例子，則表現在它的兩岸政策的僵固與被動上。廿年間，中國大陸在開放政策下從一個鐵幕國家變成了世界工廠，更成為世界第二大經濟體；但是，靠著鼓吹台獨起家的民進黨，卻始終不知如何應對這樣的形勢變化。它只能一方面不斷攻擊國民黨的兩岸政策，以掩飾自己「鎖國愛台」主張的技窮；一方面力主限制台商、限制兩岸往來，以保護自己台獨「神主牌」於不墜。從反ＥＣＦＡ到反兩岸服貿協議，民進黨的思維仍然是廿多前那套一成不變的反中訴求；這廿年，全世界都變平了，只有民進黨的海峽變得更深。台灣這些年變得更孤立、更封閉，民進黨要負很大的責任。
呂秀蓮那句「年輕人對民主有什麼貢獻」，暴露的不只是她個人的驕傲，也反映了一個政黨留戀昔日榮景、不願與時俱進的心情。呂秀蓮打過的美好戰役，早已結束；未來世代要面對的挑戰，必須交給新世代來承擔。否則，一直停留在廿多年前的意識形態及敵友想像上，台灣如何轉型？如何進步？
民進黨歷史感的停滯及世代交替的困境，其實不只是綠營內部的問題，也牽動著整個台灣的政經和社會發展。不可否認，民進黨曾經是推動台灣進步的重要力量，也曾經出現過新人輩出的榮景；然而，這股力量近年卻不斷消退，以致惡化成今天的景象。其間最重要的關鍵，是綠色執政的失敗沒有獲得徹底檢討，陳水扁的貪瀆失德未曾在黨內有過深刻反省。
更一針見血地說，民進黨當年之所以從「黨外」崛起，進而壯大，是因為它不斷試圖追求「社會正義」；而如今，民進黨用盡手段追求的，不過是要滿足自己「執政的欲望」。很顯然，它追求執政的欲望已膨脹到失去對時代與社會的回應能力，而它的追求手段又投機到看不出原則與理想，難再召喚群眾追隨。就這個意義而言，「五府千歲」不只是褪色的神話，而是困住的政治現實。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 12, 2013
Summary: Let us be blunt. The DPP started out as an "outside the KMT" political organization. It grew strong because it pursued social justice. Today the DPP spares no effort in its pursuit of power. Its pursuit of power has clearly replaced its former pursuit of social justice. The means by which it pursues power have clearly replaced its former principles and ideals. As a result, it can no longer persuade the masses to follow. Therefore the "Princes of the Five Cities" is not merely a faded myth, but a political fact.
Full text below:
The DPP is holding its Taipei City and Xinbei City party primaries. This has led political wags to joke about the "Princes of the Five Cities," and underscored the Green Camp generational gap. Yu Shyi-kun handily defeated Chuang Shuo Han at the polls and won the Xinbei City primaries. That is nothing to wonder at. Annette Lu recently blasted her opponents in Taipei, asking "What contribution have young people made to democracy?" As one can see, the Green Camp generational gap has deeper structural causes.
Consider the central leadership and the major DPP factions. They still consist mostly of Formosa Incident leaders and defense attorneys. This means that although Taiwan has undergone vast changes over the past two decades, the DPP itself has remained frozen in time. This has two implications. One. Consider the internal changing of the guard. The party elders who founded the party remain active and refuse to step down, preventing the rise of a newer generation of party leaders. Two. Consider the ideological implications. The party elders cling to rigid theories about checks and balances, and outdated ideas about cross-Strait and international relations. They are unable to deal with the problems that confront Taiwan today. The DPP remains oblivious. It does not know how to reform itself. The former failing affects the evolution of the DPP. The latter failing undermines the progress of Taiwan.
The DPP remains frozen in time. Internally, this has prevented a changing of the guard. Even the "Old School" KMT has undergone three generational changes, from Lee Teng-hui to Lien Chan to Ma Ying-jeou. By contrast the DPP remains senile. This is true even when compared to the Mainland. Even the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party has developed a decade old system for its changing of the guard. Over the past twenty years, the baton has passed smoothly from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. By contrast, the once youthful and energetic DPP is undergoing a young vs. old power struggle. This is deeply regrettable.
Consider the party's political path. The DPP remains frozen in time. This has led to a disconnect between it and society. The Democratic Progressive Party was originally an opposition party. It opposed the KMT's authoritarian rule and one-party monopoly. Under the circumstancs, its obstructionist strategy could be read as idealism and progressiveness. But the nation has undergone two ruling party changes. The Kuomintang was once cast as demonic. Now it has been revealed to be merely mediocre. Yet the DPP still persists in demonizing its opponent. The problems to be solved require professionals in environmentalism, public safety, and other matters. But the DPP is unable to offer any professional vision of its own. Its idealism often comes across as hollow. The DPP often flip flops. It says one thing when in power, and in flagrant self-contradiction, something else when it is not.
The list of examples is endless. For example, when in power, the Democratic Progressive Party repeatedly stopped and restarted construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. But when it found itself out of power, it engaged in obstructionism and demanded the total abolition of nuclear power generation. When in power, it quietly allowed U.S. beef imports. When it found itself out of power, it categorically opposed them. When in power, it flung the doors wide open on government allowances and benefits. When it found itself out of power, it blasted the same measures as fiscally destructive.
Consider an even more obvious example -- the DPP's obstinate foot-dragging on cross-Strait policy. Over the past two decades, the Mainland has undergone Glastnost. It has changed from an Iron Curtain country to the world's factory. It has become the world's second largest economy. But the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party has no idea how to deal with this dramatic transformation. On the one hand, it persists in attacking the KMT's cross-Strait policy to cover up its own unworkable isolationist approach to "loving Taiwan." On the other hand, it restricts Taiwan businesses and cross-Strait exchanges, in order to protect the Holy Grail of Taiwan independence. It opposes ECFA. It opposes TISA. The DPP's thinking remains mired in the same two decades old Sinophobia. Over the past two decades, the world has become flat. Only the DPP's Taiwan Strait has become deeper. Taiwan has become more isolated, more closed. For this the DPP bears enormous responsibility.
Annette Lu asked, "What contributions have young people made to democracy?" This revealed more than her own egotism. It also revealed a political party's nostalgia, and reluctance to change with the times. Annette Lu fought the good fight. But her time is past. The challenges that confront future generations must be dealt with by new generations. Otherwise, one will remain mired in two decades old ideology and friend versus foe dualism. How can Taiwan undergo transformation? How can it progress?
The DPP remains frozen in history. It cannot bring itself to pass the baton to a new generation. This problem is not limited to the Green Camp. It undermines political, economic, and social evolution on Taiwan. Admittedly, The DPP was once a major force in promoting progress on Taiwan. It introduced new faces to the scene. But in recent years, this force has diminished. The result has been its current state of degeneration. Green Government died, but was never given a thorough autopsy. The DPP never engaged in soul-searching over Chen Shui-bian's malfeasance and corruption.
Let us be blunt. The DPP started out as an "outside the KMT" political organization. It grew strong because it pursued social justice. Today the DPP spares no effort in its pursuit of power. Its pursuit of power has clearly replaced its former pursuit of social justice. The means by which it pursues power have clearly replaced its former principles and ideals. As a result, it can no longer persuade the masses to follow. Therefore the "Princes of the Five Cities" is not merely a faded myth, but a political fact.
民進黨歷史感的停滯與世代困境
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.12 03:54 am
民進黨北二都的黨內初選，引起了外界「五府千歲」之譏，也暴露了綠營內部世代交替的困境。游錫?在新北市民調輕易擊敗莊碩漢贏得初選，固不足奇；而呂秀蓮近日在台北市猛烈砲轟對手：「年輕人對民主有何貢獻？」則可看出綠營的世代困境有著更深的結構根源。
放眼民進黨中央和各大派系，主要仍是美麗島世代及律師世代在當家，這意味，以台灣廿幾年的時空變化之深鉅，在民進黨內，歷史感卻是凝固了。所謂凝固，有兩個意涵：一，從內部的人事更替看，創黨元老的活躍不退，阻滯了中生代及新生代的進路與崛起；二，從意識形態面看，大老僵固的制衡論、過時的兩岸觀、和陳舊的國際視野，皆已無法應付今天的台灣形勢，而民進黨卻不自覺，亦不知如何調整。前者，影響了民進黨的進化；後者，則拖累了台灣的進步。
民進黨這種時空凝滯的現象，表現在內部交班上，較之已歷經李登輝、連戰、馬英九三代更替的百年老店國民黨，猶顯老態龍鍾。若與對岸相比，連集權統治的中國共產黨都已發展出十年換屆的穩健交棒制度，近廿年江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平的順利傳承，對照之下，曾經年輕氣盛的民進黨如今卻演出老少爭鋒的景象，令人唏噓。
若從問政路線看，民進黨歷史感的凝滯，更造成了它和社會及時勢的脫節。民進黨最初的反對路線，是針對國民黨的威權統治及一黨獨大而發；在那樣的情境下，它的許多杯葛策略都比較容易被賦與理想性質和進步色彩。但隨著兩度政黨輪替的推演，揭掉「妖魔化」外衣的國民黨，露出了「平庸化」政黨的內裡；然而，民進黨卻仍緊抱其「妖魔化」對手的戰術；問題是，在必須倚賴專業解決的財經、環保、安全等議題上，它自己卻拿不出有瞻矚的專業見解，常顯得理念虛空。更常見的，則是民進黨立場的搖擺反覆，執政時說一套，在野時說另一套，自我矛盾。
這類的例子，不勝枚舉。例如，民進黨執政時對核四忽停忽建，在野時卻又為杯葛而主張全面廢核；執政時悄悄開放美牛，在野時又全面杯葛；執政時對津貼及福利政策大開善門，在野時卻痛批此舉會使財政更加惡化。
更突出的例子，則表現在它的兩岸政策的僵固與被動上。廿年間，中國大陸在開放政策下從一個鐵幕國家變成了世界工廠，更成為世界第二大經濟體；但是，靠著鼓吹台獨起家的民進黨，卻始終不知如何應對這樣的形勢變化。它只能一方面不斷攻擊國民黨的兩岸政策，以掩飾自己「鎖國愛台」主張的技窮；一方面力主限制台商、限制兩岸往來，以保護自己台獨「神主牌」於不墜。從反ＥＣＦＡ到反兩岸服貿協議，民進黨的思維仍然是廿多前那套一成不變的反中訴求；這廿年，全世界都變平了，只有民進黨的海峽變得更深。台灣這些年變得更孤立、更封閉，民進黨要負很大的責任。
呂秀蓮那句「年輕人對民主有什麼貢獻」，暴露的不只是她個人的驕傲，也反映了一個政黨留戀昔日榮景、不願與時俱進的心情。呂秀蓮打過的美好戰役，早已結束；未來世代要面對的挑戰，必須交給新世代來承擔。否則，一直停留在廿多年前的意識形態及敵友想像上，台灣如何轉型？如何進步？
民進黨歷史感的停滯及世代交替的困境，其實不只是綠營內部的問題，也牽動著整個台灣的政經和社會發展。不可否認，民進黨曾經是推動台灣進步的重要力量，也曾經出現過新人輩出的榮景；然而，這股力量近年卻不斷消退，以致惡化成今天的景象。其間最重要的關鍵，是綠色執政的失敗沒有獲得徹底檢討，陳水扁的貪瀆失德未曾在黨內有過深刻反省。
更一針見血地說，民進黨當年之所以從「黨外」崛起，進而壯大，是因為它不斷試圖追求「社會正義」；而如今，民進黨用盡手段追求的，不過是要滿足自己「執政的欲望」。很顯然，它追求執政的欲望已膨脹到失去對時代與社會的回應能力，而它的追求手段又投機到看不出原則與理想，難再召喚群眾追隨。就這個意義而言，「五府千歲」不只是褪色的神話，而是困住的政治現實。
Tuesday, December 10, 2013
The President and Political Appointees Should Return Their Year End Bonuses
The President and Political Appointees Should Return Their Year End Bonuses
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 11, 2013
Summary: Legislators only know how to point the finger at others. Let us examine their performance and cost. Shouldn't they engage in a little soul searching of their own? Many bills remain frozen in the legislature. Others pander to populist sentiment. Can legislators answer to the taxpayers for the quality and quantity of their legislation?
Full text below:
The economy will not grow by 2% this year. It will not grow by 3% next year. Across the board price increases and food safety crises have left the public anxious. Public resentment is not hard to imagine. A number of legislators have called for the firing of cabinet ministers and the cancellation of year end bonuses, especially for those ministers responsible for fiscal and economic affairs. This may give some people a little temporary satisfaction. It may enable some legislators to make headlines. It may make for a good show. But such humiliations do do more than cut these ministers' incomes. They also undermine the morale and dignity of the ministers and their subordinates. They may even undermine fairness within the cabinet system. If ministers responsible for the economy fail to perform, are they the only ones who ought to be reprimanded?
The purpose of cutting official salaries is not to "decapitate" them. Cutting salaries has two serious implications. First, the economic environment is poor. People's incomes have stagnated. Officials feel their pain. They are willing to cut their salaries. After all, their salaries come out of the taxpayers' pockets. Salaries for the general public are not expected to increase, and may even decrease. Official salaries being cut, or year-end bonuses being withheld, is only natural.
Secondly, salary cuts let those in office know that their performance was unsatisfactory, due either to insufficient effort, or despite their best efforts. Salary cuts are a way to express repentance.
Whether the former or the latter, it is important to increase government responsiveness. Key government officials must seize the initiative. In May 2012, Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto made a suggestion during his election campaign. Salaries for civil servants come from taxes paid by the public. Civil service salary levels must never be higher than those in the private sector. If elected mayor, he promised to make the wages of city officials commensurate with those of corporate employees. After taking office, Toru Hashimoto cut salaries by one third. Osaka municipal government and municipal labor union negotiations led to a phased salary reduction plan.
Following the 3/11 earthquake, financial resources were required for reconstruction. In February 2012, the Japanese government proposed a national civil service wage bill. From April 2012 to March 2014, the average wage for all public servants was cut by 7.8%.
In 2008, the global economy slowed. The Singaporean government cut pay for the Prime Minister, Ministers, and high-level civil servants for the next year, by 11 to 19 percent, so they would share the public's pain. At the time, some elected representatives on Taiwan demanded that political appointees emulate Singapore, and take the lead by cutting their own pay. But some cabinet ministers felt that the payment methods for Taiwan and Singapore were different. The same rules were not applicable here. Singapore pays cabinet ministers the same amount as private sector CEOs. Salaries for officials on Taiwan are far lower. There is much less room for cuts.
This is reasonable. But lest we forget, different countries have different per capita incomes. Are salaries for government officials high or low? One cannot simply make comparisons between one country and another. One must also make comparison within any given country. In other words, one must compare net incomes, including various allowances, against the private sector and the general public. Secondly, suppose salaries for high-level government officials or civil servants are made commensurate with those in private enterprise. Their compensation must also be linked to their performance, to Key Performance Indicators (KPI). When the KPI is high, they receive pay increases. When the KPI slips, their pay must be cut accordingly. Similarly, lawmakers' salaries should be based on legislative performance. They should be commensurate with the private sector and the general public.
Recently some have proposed that ministers should be paid according to the "misery index," adjusted in accordance with the unemployment rate and inflation rate. This may be emotionalistic, but it is not without some basis. According to DGBAS statistics, Taiwan's latest misery index is higher than those of neighboring South Korea and Singapore. Don't even mention average salaries. Salaries on Taiwan have not increased in 16 years.
Economic growth has been less than expected. Legislators have decided to cut CEPD Kuan Chung-min's year-end bonus by half. The other half has been frozen on a probationary basis. It will be unfrozen based on Taiwan's future economic performance.
The CEPD is responsible for the overall planning of the economy. Its performance has been poor. Naturally, the chairman is responsible. But the selective pay cuts proposed by elected representatives is not a good policy. Moreover, when it comes to responsibility, the president and the premier are national leaders. As the CEOs of the nation, shouldn't they bear even more responsibility?
The year is about to end. But year-end bonuses in the private sector have been disappointing. According a Job Bank survey they have hit a four year low. Public sentiment is not hard to imagine. High ranking government officials must acknowledge these realities. What are they thinking, and what will they do?
Legislators only know how to point the finger at others. Let us examine their performance and cost. Shouldn't they engage in a little soul searching of their own? Many bills remain frozen in the legislature. Others pander to populist sentiment. Can legislators answer to the taxpayers for the quality and quantity of their legislation?
社論－總統與政務官應退回年終獎金
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月11日 04:09
今年經濟成長率確定保2不成，明年也無法保3，然百物齊漲加上食安造成人心不安，民意怨氣沖天可想而知，部分立委因而要求刪減閣員、尤其是財經相關部會首長的年終獎金。這或可一時大快人心，讓立委攻占不少媒體版面，頗有快意江湖之色；但這種羞辱的方式，刪減的不只是相關部會首長的收入，也同時打擊了部會首長乃至於其所領導團隊的士氣與尊嚴，甚至傷害了內閣部會的公平性。試問，經濟表現不如人意，需要負責的只是財經部會首長嗎？
削減官員薪資的目的絕非「梟首示眾」，應有兩個深刻的意涵，一是在整體大環境不佳的情況下，人民的收入沒有成長，官員們苦民所苦，願意減收俸祿，畢竟「爾俸爾祿乃民脂民膏」，當人民的薪資收入普遍因經濟成長未如預期而無法增加、甚至減少時，官員薪資的供給也會減少，減薪或至少減年終獎金，本是理所當然。
其次，藉減薪讓為政者知道是因為自己不夠努力或者即使「自認」已經很努力了，但成績就是不理想，因此以減薪表達自我惕勵與懺悔之意。
無論是前者還是後者，重要的是應該由行政體系自發性提出，關鍵在政府官員主動且甘心願意。2012年5月大阪市長橋下徹在競選時提出，公務員的薪資來自人民的納稅錢，公務員的薪資水平如果比企業高，是毫無道理的事，如果當選市長，會讓市府職員的工資比照一般企業員工。橋下徹上任後，本人先行減薪1/3，大阪市政府與市勞動組合工會交涉後也分階段進行削減計畫。
311大地震後，為尋找重建工程所需財源，日本政府在2012年2月提出國家公務員減薪法案，從2012年4月到2014年3月，對所有國家公務員平均減薪7.8％。
2008年景氣低迷衝擊全球，新加坡政府決定總理、部長及高階公務員在隔年將減薪11％至19％，以共體時艱；當時台灣也有民意代表要求政務官向新加坡學習，帶頭減薪，但有閣員認為台星兩地政務官的給薪制度不同，難以比照辦理。新加坡是依民間企業的CEO（執行長）給薪，而台灣官員的薪水低太多了，意思是削減的空間十分有限。
此言不能說無理，但是別忘了，各國平均國民所得不同，政府官員的薪資究竟是高還是低，不只是要有國與國之間的橫向比較，更應該要有該國內的縱向比較，也就是說，其總收入（含各項津貼）與一般任職於民間企業者相較如何。其次，若是政務官或者高階公務人員的薪資比照民間企業，那麼其薪資報酬是必須與經營績效（KPI，Key Performance Indicators，關鍵業績指標）連動的，也就是說，當KPI高的時候可以加薪，一旦KPI滑落收入自然就減少了。同理，立法委員也要看立法績效，縱向與一般任職於民間企業者比照敘薪也。
近日坊間有人倡議閣員薪水應該隨著「痛苦指數」（失業率加物價上漲率）浮動調整，此說雖帶有情緒，但也並非全無道理。根據主計處統計資料顯示，台灣最新的痛苦指數較之鄰國南韓與新加坡都來得高；至於平均薪資水準那就更不用講了，16年薪水沒漲的台灣是比都沒得比的。
因為經濟成長不如預期，立委決定刪減經建會主委管中閔的年終獎金一半，另一半則凍結「留校察看」，依未來台灣經濟表現再決定是否「解凍」。
經建會負責整體經濟規畫，經濟表現差，主委自是責無旁貸，但是民代這種個別式的選擇刪減，終非良策；況且說到負責，做為國家領導人的總統與國家CEO的閣揆豈不是更應該要負責嗎？
年終將屆，但企業員工一年一度最期待的年終獎金卻不如人意，據人力銀行的調查，將創下4年最低，人民心情之悶可想而知，此情此景，政府高官必然看在眼理，有何感想又有何作為呢？
回頭再來看只知檢討別人的立法諸公，攤開其立法績效與成本，是不是更該自我減俸。今天不少法案不是躺在立院就是民粹修法，立法的質與量對納稅人交代得過去嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 11, 2013
Summary: Legislators only know how to point the finger at others. Let us examine their performance and cost. Shouldn't they engage in a little soul searching of their own? Many bills remain frozen in the legislature. Others pander to populist sentiment. Can legislators answer to the taxpayers for the quality and quantity of their legislation?
Full text below:
The economy will not grow by 2% this year. It will not grow by 3% next year. Across the board price increases and food safety crises have left the public anxious. Public resentment is not hard to imagine. A number of legislators have called for the firing of cabinet ministers and the cancellation of year end bonuses, especially for those ministers responsible for fiscal and economic affairs. This may give some people a little temporary satisfaction. It may enable some legislators to make headlines. It may make for a good show. But such humiliations do do more than cut these ministers' incomes. They also undermine the morale and dignity of the ministers and their subordinates. They may even undermine fairness within the cabinet system. If ministers responsible for the economy fail to perform, are they the only ones who ought to be reprimanded?
The purpose of cutting official salaries is not to "decapitate" them. Cutting salaries has two serious implications. First, the economic environment is poor. People's incomes have stagnated. Officials feel their pain. They are willing to cut their salaries. After all, their salaries come out of the taxpayers' pockets. Salaries for the general public are not expected to increase, and may even decrease. Official salaries being cut, or year-end bonuses being withheld, is only natural.
Secondly, salary cuts let those in office know that their performance was unsatisfactory, due either to insufficient effort, or despite their best efforts. Salary cuts are a way to express repentance.
Whether the former or the latter, it is important to increase government responsiveness. Key government officials must seize the initiative. In May 2012, Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto made a suggestion during his election campaign. Salaries for civil servants come from taxes paid by the public. Civil service salary levels must never be higher than those in the private sector. If elected mayor, he promised to make the wages of city officials commensurate with those of corporate employees. After taking office, Toru Hashimoto cut salaries by one third. Osaka municipal government and municipal labor union negotiations led to a phased salary reduction plan.
Following the 3/11 earthquake, financial resources were required for reconstruction. In February 2012, the Japanese government proposed a national civil service wage bill. From April 2012 to March 2014, the average wage for all public servants was cut by 7.8%.
In 2008, the global economy slowed. The Singaporean government cut pay for the Prime Minister, Ministers, and high-level civil servants for the next year, by 11 to 19 percent, so they would share the public's pain. At the time, some elected representatives on Taiwan demanded that political appointees emulate Singapore, and take the lead by cutting their own pay. But some cabinet ministers felt that the payment methods for Taiwan and Singapore were different. The same rules were not applicable here. Singapore pays cabinet ministers the same amount as private sector CEOs. Salaries for officials on Taiwan are far lower. There is much less room for cuts.
This is reasonable. But lest we forget, different countries have different per capita incomes. Are salaries for government officials high or low? One cannot simply make comparisons between one country and another. One must also make comparison within any given country. In other words, one must compare net incomes, including various allowances, against the private sector and the general public. Secondly, suppose salaries for high-level government officials or civil servants are made commensurate with those in private enterprise. Their compensation must also be linked to their performance, to Key Performance Indicators (KPI). When the KPI is high, they receive pay increases. When the KPI slips, their pay must be cut accordingly. Similarly, lawmakers' salaries should be based on legislative performance. They should be commensurate with the private sector and the general public.
Recently some have proposed that ministers should be paid according to the "misery index," adjusted in accordance with the unemployment rate and inflation rate. This may be emotionalistic, but it is not without some basis. According to DGBAS statistics, Taiwan's latest misery index is higher than those of neighboring South Korea and Singapore. Don't even mention average salaries. Salaries on Taiwan have not increased in 16 years.
Economic growth has been less than expected. Legislators have decided to cut CEPD Kuan Chung-min's year-end bonus by half. The other half has been frozen on a probationary basis. It will be unfrozen based on Taiwan's future economic performance.
The CEPD is responsible for the overall planning of the economy. Its performance has been poor. Naturally, the chairman is responsible. But the selective pay cuts proposed by elected representatives is not a good policy. Moreover, when it comes to responsibility, the president and the premier are national leaders. As the CEOs of the nation, shouldn't they bear even more responsibility?
The year is about to end. But year-end bonuses in the private sector have been disappointing. According a Job Bank survey they have hit a four year low. Public sentiment is not hard to imagine. High ranking government officials must acknowledge these realities. What are they thinking, and what will they do?
Legislators only know how to point the finger at others. Let us examine their performance and cost. Shouldn't they engage in a little soul searching of their own? Many bills remain frozen in the legislature. Others pander to populist sentiment. Can legislators answer to the taxpayers for the quality and quantity of their legislation?
社論－總統與政務官應退回年終獎金
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月11日 04:09
今年經濟成長率確定保2不成，明年也無法保3，然百物齊漲加上食安造成人心不安，民意怨氣沖天可想而知，部分立委因而要求刪減閣員、尤其是財經相關部會首長的年終獎金。這或可一時大快人心，讓立委攻占不少媒體版面，頗有快意江湖之色；但這種羞辱的方式，刪減的不只是相關部會首長的收入，也同時打擊了部會首長乃至於其所領導團隊的士氣與尊嚴，甚至傷害了內閣部會的公平性。試問，經濟表現不如人意，需要負責的只是財經部會首長嗎？
削減官員薪資的目的絕非「梟首示眾」，應有兩個深刻的意涵，一是在整體大環境不佳的情況下，人民的收入沒有成長，官員們苦民所苦，願意減收俸祿，畢竟「爾俸爾祿乃民脂民膏」，當人民的薪資收入普遍因經濟成長未如預期而無法增加、甚至減少時，官員薪資的供給也會減少，減薪或至少減年終獎金，本是理所當然。
其次，藉減薪讓為政者知道是因為自己不夠努力或者即使「自認」已經很努力了，但成績就是不理想，因此以減薪表達自我惕勵與懺悔之意。
無論是前者還是後者，重要的是應該由行政體系自發性提出，關鍵在政府官員主動且甘心願意。2012年5月大阪市長橋下徹在競選時提出，公務員的薪資來自人民的納稅錢，公務員的薪資水平如果比企業高，是毫無道理的事，如果當選市長，會讓市府職員的工資比照一般企業員工。橋下徹上任後，本人先行減薪1/3，大阪市政府與市勞動組合工會交涉後也分階段進行削減計畫。
311大地震後，為尋找重建工程所需財源，日本政府在2012年2月提出國家公務員減薪法案，從2012年4月到2014年3月，對所有國家公務員平均減薪7.8％。
2008年景氣低迷衝擊全球，新加坡政府決定總理、部長及高階公務員在隔年將減薪11％至19％，以共體時艱；當時台灣也有民意代表要求政務官向新加坡學習，帶頭減薪，但有閣員認為台星兩地政務官的給薪制度不同，難以比照辦理。新加坡是依民間企業的CEO（執行長）給薪，而台灣官員的薪水低太多了，意思是削減的空間十分有限。
此言不能說無理，但是別忘了，各國平均國民所得不同，政府官員的薪資究竟是高還是低，不只是要有國與國之間的橫向比較，更應該要有該國內的縱向比較，也就是說，其總收入（含各項津貼）與一般任職於民間企業者相較如何。其次，若是政務官或者高階公務人員的薪資比照民間企業，那麼其薪資報酬是必須與經營績效（KPI，Key Performance Indicators，關鍵業績指標）連動的，也就是說，當KPI高的時候可以加薪，一旦KPI滑落收入自然就減少了。同理，立法委員也要看立法績效，縱向與一般任職於民間企業者比照敘薪也。
近日坊間有人倡議閣員薪水應該隨著「痛苦指數」（失業率加物價上漲率）浮動調整，此說雖帶有情緒，但也並非全無道理。根據主計處統計資料顯示，台灣最新的痛苦指數較之鄰國南韓與新加坡都來得高；至於平均薪資水準那就更不用講了，16年薪水沒漲的台灣是比都沒得比的。
因為經濟成長不如預期，立委決定刪減經建會主委管中閔的年終獎金一半，另一半則凍結「留校察看」，依未來台灣經濟表現再決定是否「解凍」。
經建會負責整體經濟規畫，經濟表現差，主委自是責無旁貸，但是民代這種個別式的選擇刪減，終非良策；況且說到負責，做為國家領導人的總統與國家CEO的閣揆豈不是更應該要負責嗎？
年終將屆，但企業員工一年一度最期待的年終獎金卻不如人意，據人力銀行的調查，將創下4年最低，人民心情之悶可想而知，此情此景，政府高官必然看在眼理，有何感想又有何作為呢？
回頭再來看只知檢討別人的立法諸公，攤開其立法績效與成本，是不是更該自我減俸。今天不少法案不是躺在立院就是民粹修法，立法的質與量對納稅人交代得過去嗎？
Monday, December 9, 2013
WTO Breakthrough: Threat of Taiwan's Marginalization Persists
WTO Breakthrough: Threat of Taiwan's Marginalization Persists
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 10, 2013
Summary: This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
Full text below:
The Ninth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia has just adjourned. The conference reached resolutions on trade facilitation, agricultural products safety, and trade development. These Doha Round issues have been bandied about for years without resolution. Now, finally, we have achieved results. As a result, the international media has used provocative titles to describe this major breakthrough. Some even say the Doha Round is over. These three resolutions did not come easily. Actually they had little to do with Doah Round core issues. The prospect of Taiwan's marginalization remains undiminished.
In 2001 the WTO initiated the Doha Round of negotiations. Nine issues were included. These include agriculture, liberalization of the industrial and service sectors, trade facilitation, trade regulation, trade and development, trade and the environment, dispute resolution, and intellectual property rights. Too many issues were involved. Member states increased to 159 nations. As a result, 12 years have elapsed, but the round has yet to reach a conclusion. Every time the Council of Ministers expected a breakthrough. But every time they were disappointed. The last Council of Ministers even hoped the countries would consider an alternative. They were ready to give up on Doha. Under the circumstances, the Council of Ministers consensus on some of the nine issues is truly exciting.
Take trade facilitation resolution. The disclosure of information, risk management , simplification of procedures, and provisions for relief will reduce unnecessary costs and trade barriers created by international customs clearance and customs inspection procedures. The remaining agriculture-related resolutions are more relevant to developing countries. One of them relates to countries such as India, with its food safety considerations. Government budgets are used to acquire rice, wheat, and other major food stores, These are distributed to the poor. If they exceed the limit for "domestic agricultural support," other countries may not object to these temporary measures. The other two relate to agricultural tariff quota management, and the management of agricultural export subsidies .
Another issue affects Taiwan more directly -- trade facilitation resolution. Global rules may further reduce the inconvenience and cost of exports. This is definitely a good thing, especially the more complex customs procedures. These cause much greater inconvenience, distress, and harm to SMEs than multinationals. SMEs export less. They lack professional talent. They have less inventory. They are extremely concerned about time. According to international estimates for large enterprises, customs procedure trade costs are almost irrelevant. But they account for 10 to 20 percent of the cost for SME exports, almost as much as customs duties.
For supporters of WTO and multilateral liberalization, a consensus is possible on these small packages. They give the Doha Round a chance to survive. More importantly, the aforementioned trade facilitation resolution has already met the basic terms for bilateral free trade agreements in general (FTA). For example, the Taiwan-New Zealand and Taiwan-Singapore economic agreements have similar provisions. This means that a variety of bilateral and regional integration mechanisms, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement TPP) are are likely to lead to global convergence.
The recent resolutions on these three issues are important. But strictly speaking, they are second bananas in global trade liberalization, and not the stars of the show. The WTO refers to these items in the Doha menu as "a la carte" items.
In particular, the current resolution does not include the stars of the show, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, or liberalization of the services market. Most of the Member States remain committed to the standards of the WTO when it was established 18 years ago. This has motivated them to promote FTAs. For example, for many Southeast Asian countries, WTO tariff rates exceed 10%. FTAs have enabled these countries to eliminate tariffs entirely on nearly all goods. Also, 18 years ago, we were still unsure about service sector liberalization. Attitudes toward liberalization were conservative. But over the past decade, in order to attract foreign investment, many countries have promoted the modernization of services. They have substantially relaxed foreign investment restrictions.
This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
WTO有突破，台灣邊緣化的威脅未減
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.10 04:20 am
世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）第九屆部長會議日前在印尼峇里島閉幕，會中針對貿易便捷化、農業安全及貿易發展等議題達成決議。這三個議題均屬於談了多年無法結束的「杜哈回合」議題，總算有了些結果，因此國際媒體皆以聳動的標題來描述這項重大突破，甚至有謂杜哈回合已經結束。這三個決議確實得來不易，但離杜哈談判的核心問題其實還很遠，台灣邊緣化的威脅亦絲毫未減。
二○○一年啟動的ＷＴＯ「杜哈回合」談判，設定了九個談判議題，分別是農、工及服務業的自由化、貿易便捷化、貿易規則、貿易與發展、貿易與環境、爭端解決以及智慧財產權等。由於議題太多，成員國又膨脹到一五九國，所以至今已經十二個年頭，仍無法結束。過去每次部長會議都期望有所突破，卻都失望而歸；上一屆部長會議，甚至要各國開始思考「替代方案」，幾乎要放棄杜哈。在這個背景下，這次部長會議能對於九大議題中的部分項目達成共識，確實令人振奮。
以貿易便捷化決議為例，主要是透過資訊公開、風險控管、程序簡化以及提供救濟管道等要求，來降低世界各國因通關、檢驗等海關程序所造成的貿易障礙及無謂成本。其餘幾個與農業相關的決議，則與發展中國家比較有關。其中一項是關於如印度等國家基於糧食安全的考量，以政府預算收購稻米、小麥等主要糧食儲存，甚至用作發放給貧民之用者，若超過各國被允許的「國內農業支持」總量上限時，其他國家不得提出告訴的暫時措施。另二項則是關於農業關稅配額的管理，以及農產品出口補貼之管理。
對台灣利益比較直接相關者，是貿易便捷化決議。透過這個全球規則，能進一步減少出口的不便與成本，絕對是好事一件。特別是海關程序越複雜、不便，對於中小企業的困擾及影響，往往遠高於跨國企業；因為中小企業出口量少，專業人才不足，庫存也少，對時間快慢很敏感。事實上，按照國際組織估計，海關程序佔大型企業的貿易成本幾乎無關痛癢，卻可能佔中小企業出口成本的一到兩成，幾乎跟被課關稅的效果差不多。
對ＷＴＯ與多邊自由化的支持者而言，這些小型套餐能達成共識，至少可使「杜哈回合」出現起死回生的一線生機。更重要的是，前述的貿易便捷化決議內容，其實已經是一般雙邊自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的基本條款（例如台紐、台星經濟協定都有類似規定），意味著各種雙邊及區域整合（如跨太平洋夥伴協定ＴＰＰ）機制，未來皆可能匯流成為全球共同規則。
本次達成決議的三個項目雖然都很重要，但嚴格來說，只能稱得上是全球貿易自由化的「龍套」，而不是主角。用ＷＴＯ的術語形容，只是整套杜哈菜單中的一個「小套餐」。
尤其，本次決議並不包含農工產品的關稅削減、服務業市場開放等自由化主角，使得絕大部分會員國的承諾仍停留在十八年前ＷＴＯ成立時的水準，也導致各國推動ＦＴＡ的動力依舊絲毫未減。例如，許多東南亞國家的ＷＴＯ關稅稅率，都還超過十％；而在ＦＴＡ下，這些國家都承諾把接近所有的商品的關稅降到零。此外，十八年前大家對服務業自由化還很陌生，開放得很保守；而在過去十年，各國為吸引外資、促進服務業現代化，都大幅鬆綁外資限制。
這種「關稅從十到零」及服務業開放的優惠，僅ＦＴＡ締約國可享有。台灣在幾無ＦＴＡ、未加入ＴＰＰ的情況下，只能繼續適用十八年前早已過時的進入條件，相對於韓、日等競爭對手，我國居於下風的劣勢絲毫未變。因此，雖然ＷＴＯ有所突破，但台灣被邊緣化的威脅仍舊存在，絲毫沒有可以鬆懈的空間。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 10, 2013
Summary: This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
Full text below:
The Ninth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia has just adjourned. The conference reached resolutions on trade facilitation, agricultural products safety, and trade development. These Doha Round issues have been bandied about for years without resolution. Now, finally, we have achieved results. As a result, the international media has used provocative titles to describe this major breakthrough. Some even say the Doha Round is over. These three resolutions did not come easily. Actually they had little to do with Doah Round core issues. The prospect of Taiwan's marginalization remains undiminished.
In 2001 the WTO initiated the Doha Round of negotiations. Nine issues were included. These include agriculture, liberalization of the industrial and service sectors, trade facilitation, trade regulation, trade and development, trade and the environment, dispute resolution, and intellectual property rights. Too many issues were involved. Member states increased to 159 nations. As a result, 12 years have elapsed, but the round has yet to reach a conclusion. Every time the Council of Ministers expected a breakthrough. But every time they were disappointed. The last Council of Ministers even hoped the countries would consider an alternative. They were ready to give up on Doha. Under the circumstances, the Council of Ministers consensus on some of the nine issues is truly exciting.
Take trade facilitation resolution. The disclosure of information, risk management , simplification of procedures, and provisions for relief will reduce unnecessary costs and trade barriers created by international customs clearance and customs inspection procedures. The remaining agriculture-related resolutions are more relevant to developing countries. One of them relates to countries such as India, with its food safety considerations. Government budgets are used to acquire rice, wheat, and other major food stores, These are distributed to the poor. If they exceed the limit for "domestic agricultural support," other countries may not object to these temporary measures. The other two relate to agricultural tariff quota management, and the management of agricultural export subsidies .
Another issue affects Taiwan more directly -- trade facilitation resolution. Global rules may further reduce the inconvenience and cost of exports. This is definitely a good thing, especially the more complex customs procedures. These cause much greater inconvenience, distress, and harm to SMEs than multinationals. SMEs export less. They lack professional talent. They have less inventory. They are extremely concerned about time. According to international estimates for large enterprises, customs procedure trade costs are almost irrelevant. But they account for 10 to 20 percent of the cost for SME exports, almost as much as customs duties.
For supporters of WTO and multilateral liberalization, a consensus is possible on these small packages. They give the Doha Round a chance to survive. More importantly, the aforementioned trade facilitation resolution has already met the basic terms for bilateral free trade agreements in general (FTA). For example, the Taiwan-New Zealand and Taiwan-Singapore economic agreements have similar provisions. This means that a variety of bilateral and regional integration mechanisms, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement TPP) are are likely to lead to global convergence.
The recent resolutions on these three issues are important. But strictly speaking, they are second bananas in global trade liberalization, and not the stars of the show. The WTO refers to these items in the Doha menu as "a la carte" items.
In particular, the current resolution does not include the stars of the show, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, or liberalization of the services market. Most of the Member States remain committed to the standards of the WTO when it was established 18 years ago. This has motivated them to promote FTAs. For example, for many Southeast Asian countries, WTO tariff rates exceed 10%. FTAs have enabled these countries to eliminate tariffs entirely on nearly all goods. Also, 18 years ago, we were still unsure about service sector liberalization. Attitudes toward liberalization were conservative. But over the past decade, in order to attract foreign investment, many countries have promoted the modernization of services. They have substantially relaxed foreign investment restrictions.
This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
WTO有突破，台灣邊緣化的威脅未減
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.10 04:20 am
世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）第九屆部長會議日前在印尼峇里島閉幕，會中針對貿易便捷化、農業安全及貿易發展等議題達成決議。這三個議題均屬於談了多年無法結束的「杜哈回合」議題，總算有了些結果，因此國際媒體皆以聳動的標題來描述這項重大突破，甚至有謂杜哈回合已經結束。這三個決議確實得來不易，但離杜哈談判的核心問題其實還很遠，台灣邊緣化的威脅亦絲毫未減。
二○○一年啟動的ＷＴＯ「杜哈回合」談判，設定了九個談判議題，分別是農、工及服務業的自由化、貿易便捷化、貿易規則、貿易與發展、貿易與環境、爭端解決以及智慧財產權等。由於議題太多，成員國又膨脹到一五九國，所以至今已經十二個年頭，仍無法結束。過去每次部長會議都期望有所突破，卻都失望而歸；上一屆部長會議，甚至要各國開始思考「替代方案」，幾乎要放棄杜哈。在這個背景下，這次部長會議能對於九大議題中的部分項目達成共識，確實令人振奮。
以貿易便捷化決議為例，主要是透過資訊公開、風險控管、程序簡化以及提供救濟管道等要求，來降低世界各國因通關、檢驗等海關程序所造成的貿易障礙及無謂成本。其餘幾個與農業相關的決議，則與發展中國家比較有關。其中一項是關於如印度等國家基於糧食安全的考量，以政府預算收購稻米、小麥等主要糧食儲存，甚至用作發放給貧民之用者，若超過各國被允許的「國內農業支持」總量上限時，其他國家不得提出告訴的暫時措施。另二項則是關於農業關稅配額的管理，以及農產品出口補貼之管理。
對台灣利益比較直接相關者，是貿易便捷化決議。透過這個全球規則，能進一步減少出口的不便與成本，絕對是好事一件。特別是海關程序越複雜、不便，對於中小企業的困擾及影響，往往遠高於跨國企業；因為中小企業出口量少，專業人才不足，庫存也少，對時間快慢很敏感。事實上，按照國際組織估計，海關程序佔大型企業的貿易成本幾乎無關痛癢，卻可能佔中小企業出口成本的一到兩成，幾乎跟被課關稅的效果差不多。
對ＷＴＯ與多邊自由化的支持者而言，這些小型套餐能達成共識，至少可使「杜哈回合」出現起死回生的一線生機。更重要的是，前述的貿易便捷化決議內容，其實已經是一般雙邊自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的基本條款（例如台紐、台星經濟協定都有類似規定），意味著各種雙邊及區域整合（如跨太平洋夥伴協定ＴＰＰ）機制，未來皆可能匯流成為全球共同規則。
本次達成決議的三個項目雖然都很重要，但嚴格來說，只能稱得上是全球貿易自由化的「龍套」，而不是主角。用ＷＴＯ的術語形容，只是整套杜哈菜單中的一個「小套餐」。
尤其，本次決議並不包含農工產品的關稅削減、服務業市場開放等自由化主角，使得絕大部分會員國的承諾仍停留在十八年前ＷＴＯ成立時的水準，也導致各國推動ＦＴＡ的動力依舊絲毫未減。例如，許多東南亞國家的ＷＴＯ關稅稅率，都還超過十％；而在ＦＴＡ下，這些國家都承諾把接近所有的商品的關稅降到零。此外，十八年前大家對服務業自由化還很陌生，開放得很保守；而在過去十年，各國為吸引外資、促進服務業現代化，都大幅鬆綁外資限制。
這種「關稅從十到零」及服務業開放的優惠，僅ＦＴＡ締約國可享有。台灣在幾無ＦＴＡ、未加入ＴＰＰ的情況下，只能繼續適用十八年前早已過時的進入條件，相對於韓、日等競爭對手，我國居於下風的劣勢絲毫未變。因此，雖然ＷＴＯ有所突破，但台灣被邊緣化的威脅仍舊存在，絲毫沒有可以鬆懈的空間。
Sunday, December 8, 2013
Abe's Normal Nation, US-Japan Strange Bedfellows
Abe's Normal Nation, US-Japan Strange Bedfellows
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 8, 2013
Summary: The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
Full text below:
Observers are concerned about heightened tensions in East Asia in the wake of Beijing's announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Japanese government has cleverly exploited the situation. Both houses of parliament passed a "National Security Council Law" and "Special State Secrets Protection Act." The Abe regime is nominally promoting the "normalization of the nation." But is brazenly attempting hide in plain sight. By doing so, it is merely making Japan's East Asian ambitions increasingly clear.
First, it has established a "National Security Council." This has long been Abe's dream. The Abe regime longs to restore Japan's status as a great power. Rebuilding its security system is an important part of this ambition. Since Abe became prime minister in 2006, he has done everything possible to pass this law. But the Japanese public would not accept it. Now however, he has taken advantage of the East China Sea ADIZ to incite anti-Chinese hatred. He got the bill passed in one fell swoop. A National Security Council has been established. It has become Prime Minister Abe's political power center. Japan's security policy will be firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Chief, the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, and four other policy making groups.
Secondly, he promoted the Special State Secrets Protection Act as a complement to the National Security Council Establishment Law. The Special State Secrets Protection Act enables Abe to use the National Security Council to classify information based on security policy. Without the cover of the Special Secrets Protection Act, the power of the National Security Council would be seriously undermined. No wonder Abe ignored intense public opposition within Japan. No wonder he risked having his public support fall below 50%. He rammed through the bill. Henceforth the policies developed by Japan's National Security Council are likely to become Special State Secrets. Parliament will not be able to review them. Japanese citizens will no longer be able to know what national security policy is.
Take Japanese society. The National Security Council Establishment Law and the Special State Secrets Protection Act are ostensibly part of the nation's "normalization." But the Japanese public sees them as very different. Establishing a National Security Council enables Japan to respond rapidly in the face of cross-departmental emergencies and to take any necessary measures. Establishing a National Security Council unifies the intelligence ministries, making it a single window that reports to the Prime Minister. This is a big step in the integration of intelligence and strategy.
By contrast, the Special State Secrets Protection Act has provoked intense public suspicion. The law lacks concrete definitions for confidential information. Yet it includes an extensive list of defense, diplomacy, counter espionage, and anti-terrorism items. It includes 23 specific secrets, including quantity of weapons, ammunition, and aircraft. The Japanese government can classify any intelligence unfavorable to it as confidential information. These are the main reasons 60% of the Japanese public opposes the act. Moreover, the Special State Secrets Protection Act concentrates all the information in hands of the Prime Minister and few others. This is a giant step backwards for Japanese democracy.
Take international society. When the Japanese government made significant modifications to defense policy in the past, it usually first sold the idea abroad, then adopted it back home. It cited changes in the international situation or demands by allies as excuses to demand parliamentary and public support. This time however, the Abe government cited demands by the United States as its trump card. It said the U.S. government repeatedly asked Japan to increase its intelligence security measures in order to enhance the sharing of intelligence. In fact, after Japan's National Security Council was established, the focus shifted to Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, and defense issues. The highest priority was changes to collective defense and the establishment of new defense plans. The implementation of these has fallen well short of U.S. government expectations.
Take the United States. On the one hand it does not recognize Beijing's ADIZ. On the other hand it requires U.S. civilian aircraft to submit flight plans to the Chinese mainland. As we can see, the maintenance of stability in East Asia remains the first order of United States policy. Recently Xi Jinping met with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. They said that despite their differences, they hoped to strengthen the new great power relationship between the US and China. Abe asked the US to demand that the Chinese mainland revoke its ADIZ. The United States turned Abe down. This shows that containing Japan's aggressive behavior is an important US consideration.
The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
安倍的正常國家，美日的同床異夢
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.08 04:18 am
就在外界關注中共東海防空識別區導致東亞局勢緊張之際，日本政府卻巧妙地借力使力，接連在參眾兩院通過「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」，為安倍政府推動「國家正常化」奠基。如此明修棧道、暗度陳倉的手法，只是使得日本在東亞逞強爭勝的司馬昭之心愈發顯得無可遮掩。
首先，成立「國家安全保障會議」一直是安倍個人所追求的夢想，也是安倍政府恢復大國榮光、重建安全保障體系的重要一環。安倍早在二○○六年的首次首相任內，便千方百計想要通過該法，卻未被當時的日本民意所接受；這次，他趁著東海防空識別區在日本掀起的強大反中氛圍，一舉通過了這項法案。「國安會」正式成立，安倍的首相府即成為強大的政治權力中心，而日本的安全保障政策也將牢牢地掌握在首相、內閣官房長官、防衛大臣及外務大臣等「四人決策小組」手中。
其次，制定「特定秘密保護法案」，就是「國安會設置法」的配套措施；透過「特定秘密保護法案」，便可輕易地將安倍主導的「國安會」所制定的安全保障政策訂為機密情報。若沒有「特定秘密保護法案」的支持，設立「國安會」的美意與成效便會大打折扣；這也難怪安倍會不顧日本輿論的強烈反對，甘冒民意支持度跌破五成的政治風險，強行通過這項法案。今後，日本「國安會」所制定的政策，都有可能化身變成特定機密情報，國會將無法對其進行實質審議，日本國民對於國家的安保政策方針也將逐漸喪失知的權利。
就日本社會而言，「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」兩法案雖是國家正常化路線的一體兩面，但日本人民對這兩項法案的感受卻大不相同。設立「國安會」，可讓日本面對緊急事態時快速做出跨部會的判斷，並迅速採取必要的處置；成立「國家安全保障局」，則可以統合各部會的情報，成為向首相報告的唯一窗口，這是跨出情報／戰略一體化的一大步。
相形之下，「特定秘密保護法案」卻招致社會強烈質疑。該法對於何謂「機密情報」缺乏具體定義，卻對國防、外交、反間諜及反恐等四大項目作了廣泛羅列，並將武器、彈藥及飛機數量等二十三項特定機密皆納入；除此之外，日本政府還可以隨時將不利於己的情報列為「機密情報」。這些，都是高達六成日本國民反對該法的主要原因。而且，「特定秘密保護法案」以中央集權方式將機密情報集中在首相等少數人手中，這不啻讓日本民主倒退了一大步。
從國際層面看，過去日本政府在修改或通過重大的防衛政策時，通常都會利用出口轉內銷，以國際情勢變化或是同盟國家要求為由，作為尋求國會及人民支持的藉口。這次，安倍政府也照例抬出美國當成「尚方寶劍」，稱美國政府一再要求日本能夠加強保護情資，以便雙方增進情報的交流及分享。事實上，日本「國安會」成立後，運作焦點卻集中在解決中日關係、島嶼爭議及強化離島防衛議題上，並以修改集體自衛權及訂定新防衛計畫大綱為優先課題。這些作法，皆與美國政府的期待有重大落差。
從美國一方面不承認中共劃定的東海防空識別區，一方面又要求美國籍民航機向中方提交飛航計畫，可見，維穩仍將是美國今後東亞政策的主軸。日前美國副總統拜登會見習近平時，兩人在識別區議題上雖有歧見，卻仍希望在美中「新型大國關係」上加強合作；同時，美國也拒絕安倍要求中國大陸撤銷防空識別區的提議。由此可見，如何牽制日本過激的行為，似已成為美國的重要考量。
拜登此次東亞之行，主要是想扮演和事佬，而非扮演激化衝突的火柴棒。安倍上台後，一逕戴著大國夢的鋼盔往前衝；但當他驀然回首，將會發現自己其實是在孤軍作戰。美日在東海防空識別區上的不同調，就是最好的警訊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 8, 2013
Summary: The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
Full text below:
Observers are concerned about heightened tensions in East Asia in the wake of Beijing's announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Japanese government has cleverly exploited the situation. Both houses of parliament passed a "National Security Council Law" and "Special State Secrets Protection Act." The Abe regime is nominally promoting the "normalization of the nation." But is brazenly attempting hide in plain sight. By doing so, it is merely making Japan's East Asian ambitions increasingly clear.
First, it has established a "National Security Council." This has long been Abe's dream. The Abe regime longs to restore Japan's status as a great power. Rebuilding its security system is an important part of this ambition. Since Abe became prime minister in 2006, he has done everything possible to pass this law. But the Japanese public would not accept it. Now however, he has taken advantage of the East China Sea ADIZ to incite anti-Chinese hatred. He got the bill passed in one fell swoop. A National Security Council has been established. It has become Prime Minister Abe's political power center. Japan's security policy will be firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Chief, the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, and four other policy making groups.
Secondly, he promoted the Special State Secrets Protection Act as a complement to the National Security Council Establishment Law. The Special State Secrets Protection Act enables Abe to use the National Security Council to classify information based on security policy. Without the cover of the Special Secrets Protection Act, the power of the National Security Council would be seriously undermined. No wonder Abe ignored intense public opposition within Japan. No wonder he risked having his public support fall below 50%. He rammed through the bill. Henceforth the policies developed by Japan's National Security Council are likely to become Special State Secrets. Parliament will not be able to review them. Japanese citizens will no longer be able to know what national security policy is.
Take Japanese society. The National Security Council Establishment Law and the Special State Secrets Protection Act are ostensibly part of the nation's "normalization." But the Japanese public sees them as very different. Establishing a National Security Council enables Japan to respond rapidly in the face of cross-departmental emergencies and to take any necessary measures. Establishing a National Security Council unifies the intelligence ministries, making it a single window that reports to the Prime Minister. This is a big step in the integration of intelligence and strategy.
By contrast, the Special State Secrets Protection Act has provoked intense public suspicion. The law lacks concrete definitions for confidential information. Yet it includes an extensive list of defense, diplomacy, counter espionage, and anti-terrorism items. It includes 23 specific secrets, including quantity of weapons, ammunition, and aircraft. The Japanese government can classify any intelligence unfavorable to it as confidential information. These are the main reasons 60% of the Japanese public opposes the act. Moreover, the Special State Secrets Protection Act concentrates all the information in hands of the Prime Minister and few others. This is a giant step backwards for Japanese democracy.
Take international society. When the Japanese government made significant modifications to defense policy in the past, it usually first sold the idea abroad, then adopted it back home. It cited changes in the international situation or demands by allies as excuses to demand parliamentary and public support. This time however, the Abe government cited demands by the United States as its trump card. It said the U.S. government repeatedly asked Japan to increase its intelligence security measures in order to enhance the sharing of intelligence. In fact, after Japan's National Security Council was established, the focus shifted to Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, and defense issues. The highest priority was changes to collective defense and the establishment of new defense plans. The implementation of these has fallen well short of U.S. government expectations.
Take the United States. On the one hand it does not recognize Beijing's ADIZ. On the other hand it requires U.S. civilian aircraft to submit flight plans to the Chinese mainland. As we can see, the maintenance of stability in East Asia remains the first order of United States policy. Recently Xi Jinping met with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. They said that despite their differences, they hoped to strengthen the new great power relationship between the US and China. Abe asked the US to demand that the Chinese mainland revoke its ADIZ. The United States turned Abe down. This shows that containing Japan's aggressive behavior is an important US consideration.
The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
安倍的正常國家，美日的同床異夢
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.08 04:18 am
就在外界關注中共東海防空識別區導致東亞局勢緊張之際，日本政府卻巧妙地借力使力，接連在參眾兩院通過「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」，為安倍政府推動「國家正常化」奠基。如此明修棧道、暗度陳倉的手法，只是使得日本在東亞逞強爭勝的司馬昭之心愈發顯得無可遮掩。
首先，成立「國家安全保障會議」一直是安倍個人所追求的夢想，也是安倍政府恢復大國榮光、重建安全保障體系的重要一環。安倍早在二○○六年的首次首相任內，便千方百計想要通過該法，卻未被當時的日本民意所接受；這次，他趁著東海防空識別區在日本掀起的強大反中氛圍，一舉通過了這項法案。「國安會」正式成立，安倍的首相府即成為強大的政治權力中心，而日本的安全保障政策也將牢牢地掌握在首相、內閣官房長官、防衛大臣及外務大臣等「四人決策小組」手中。
其次，制定「特定秘密保護法案」，就是「國安會設置法」的配套措施；透過「特定秘密保護法案」，便可輕易地將安倍主導的「國安會」所制定的安全保障政策訂為機密情報。若沒有「特定秘密保護法案」的支持，設立「國安會」的美意與成效便會大打折扣；這也難怪安倍會不顧日本輿論的強烈反對，甘冒民意支持度跌破五成的政治風險，強行通過這項法案。今後，日本「國安會」所制定的政策，都有可能化身變成特定機密情報，國會將無法對其進行實質審議，日本國民對於國家的安保政策方針也將逐漸喪失知的權利。
就日本社會而言，「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」兩法案雖是國家正常化路線的一體兩面，但日本人民對這兩項法案的感受卻大不相同。設立「國安會」，可讓日本面對緊急事態時快速做出跨部會的判斷，並迅速採取必要的處置；成立「國家安全保障局」，則可以統合各部會的情報，成為向首相報告的唯一窗口，這是跨出情報／戰略一體化的一大步。
相形之下，「特定秘密保護法案」卻招致社會強烈質疑。該法對於何謂「機密情報」缺乏具體定義，卻對國防、外交、反間諜及反恐等四大項目作了廣泛羅列，並將武器、彈藥及飛機數量等二十三項特定機密皆納入；除此之外，日本政府還可以隨時將不利於己的情報列為「機密情報」。這些，都是高達六成日本國民反對該法的主要原因。而且，「特定秘密保護法案」以中央集權方式將機密情報集中在首相等少數人手中，這不啻讓日本民主倒退了一大步。
從國際層面看，過去日本政府在修改或通過重大的防衛政策時，通常都會利用出口轉內銷，以國際情勢變化或是同盟國家要求為由，作為尋求國會及人民支持的藉口。這次，安倍政府也照例抬出美國當成「尚方寶劍」，稱美國政府一再要求日本能夠加強保護情資，以便雙方增進情報的交流及分享。事實上，日本「國安會」成立後，運作焦點卻集中在解決中日關係、島嶼爭議及強化離島防衛議題上，並以修改集體自衛權及訂定新防衛計畫大綱為優先課題。這些作法，皆與美國政府的期待有重大落差。
從美國一方面不承認中共劃定的東海防空識別區，一方面又要求美國籍民航機向中方提交飛航計畫，可見，維穩仍將是美國今後東亞政策的主軸。日前美國副總統拜登會見習近平時，兩人在識別區議題上雖有歧見，卻仍希望在美中「新型大國關係」上加強合作；同時，美國也拒絕安倍要求中國大陸撤銷防空識別區的提議。由此可見，如何牽制日本過激的行為，似已成為美國的重要考量。
拜登此次東亞之行，主要是想扮演和事佬，而非扮演激化衝突的火柴棒。安倍上台後，一逕戴著大國夢的鋼盔往前衝；但當他驀然回首，將會發現自己其實是在孤軍作戰。美日在東海防空識別區上的不同調，就是最好的警訊。
Thursday, December 5, 2013
Xi Jinping Meeting with Joe Biden Reveals New Great Power Relationship
Xi Jinping Meeting with Joe Biden Reveals New Great Power Relationship
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 6, 2013
Summary: The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
Full text below:
This week U.S. Vice President Joe Biden began a tour of Japan, Mainland China, and South Korea. The tour was scheduled even before Beijing announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Now however, this development has changed the focus. The entire world is focused on Biden's stop in Beijing and his meeting with Xi Jinping.
Biden and Xi will meet behind closed doors. The time alloted will be increased from 45 minutes to 2 hours. After the meeting, they will hold a brief press conference. Biden and Xi will resume their meeting again after dinner. Observers are wondering whether Biden will raise the issue of the ADIZ, both during the meeting and press conference. Biden did not say. But that does not mean the issue of ADIZ will not be raised during the meeting.
According to the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry, Biden and Xi will address bilateral relations and other issues of shared concern in a frank and in-depth manner. In diplomatese "frank" means that any differences will be raised and discussed.
The next day Biden attended a luncheon held by the American Chamber of Commerce. He said when he meets Xi Jinping, he will straightforwardly express US positions and expectations regarding Mainland China's sudden announcement of an East China Sea ADIZ, which was followed by heightened regional tensions. At the same time, Biden said, Washington is unwilling to strain its relations with Beijing. Therefore it vigorously promotes a new Sino-US great power relationship.
Basically the US backs Japan. This is beyond doubt. Last year, during the Huangyan Island dispute, the United States did not support the Philippines' claim of sovereignty. Asian-Pacific countries are talking in private about the United States' "Return to Asia." They are wondering whether it is tough enough to confront Mainland China. Take ADIZ. If Washington remains silent, everyone will worry that the US is retreating. But this time one of the disputants is Japan, America's most loyal ally in the Asian-Pacific. Recently, with US acquiescence, Abe proposed amending Japan's constitution. Abe proposed establishing a National Security Council, and expanding its definition of collective self-defense. Many other governments think the U.S. defense budget is tight, therefore dependent upon Japan. Only Japan enables it to return to Asia and adhere by its commitment to defend its allies.
But the United States cannot back the Japanese side unconditionally. Japan has swung too far to the right. A backlash is inevitable. South Korea and Mainland China are deeply concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism. They feel the United States has unleashed a vicious Japanese attack dog on them.
Japan claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. It has arrogantly proclaimed that its sovereignty must not be challenged. Last year it went so far as to announce its "nationalization." It hopes the islands will be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. But the US stance is clear. It acknowledges Japan's administrative authority. But it holds no position regarding the sovereignty dispute. In other words the United States has not expressed support for Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands.
Observers have taken note. Biden arrived in Japan. The Abe government hoped Biden would back Japan. But three days of Japanese-US press conferences show they failed to close the gap. The United States expressed grave concern over Mainland China's announced ADIZ. But it did not demand that Mainland China take it back. This forced Abe to change his demands. Secondly, US and Japanese airline companies continue to sing different tunes regarding the submission of flight plans. Japan cannot force the United States to change its position.
International politics is realpolitik. Frankly, the US posture is based not on justice or international law. A large part of it is concern for Mainland China's reaction. Washington knows that Chinese nationalist sentiment is a powerful force. Chinese leaders must go with the flow. They dare not defy it. If the United States wishes to develop a new great power relationship with Mainland China, it cannot afford to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
This shows something else as well. Currently U.S. Asian-Pacific policy focuses on the relationship between US and China. Its chief focus is the new great power relationship. On November 20, National Security Advisor Susan Rice spoke on Asian-Pacific policy. She underscored the need to establish a new great power relationship between major powers. Joe Biden added that the new great power relationship between Mainland China and the US requires trust and optimism regarding each other's motives. Biden and Xi reached this important consensus. Mainland China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that both sides must promote this new Sino-US great power relationship.
From the perspective of Japan and other Asian-Pacific governments, including the ROC government on Taiwan, this "new great power relationship" looks a lot like the G2 power structure. In short, the Asian-Pacifc order will be determined by the United States and Mainland China. This is not what Japan wants to see. But the U.S. desire to return to Asia, but oppose Mainland China, is self-contradictory. The U.S. itself finds it difficult to justify. But political reality is intractable.
The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
拜登會習近平透露的「新型大國關係」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.06 04:21 am
美國副總統拜登本周開始日本、中國大陸與南韓三國的訪問。這次亞洲行的安排，早於東海防空識別區爭議前即已預定，但現在重點完全受此議題牽引。北京這站與習近平見面，尤其全球矚目。
拜登與習的閉門會面，從預定時間四十五分鐘延長至兩小時，會議結束簡短記者會之後，再與習進行工作晚宴。外界最關心的是，拜登有沒有在會晤中，對習近平提出識別區議題。記者會上，拜登沒提，但這並不表示在會談中也沒提。
根據中共外交部表示，拜登與習近平見面時，雙方就中美關係和其他共同關心的重大問題坦誠、深入地交換了意見。這是外交語言，「坦誠」的意思是彼此有分歧，但是大家開誠布公講出來。
拜登在美僑商會次日舉行的餐會上則表示，在與習近平的會晤中，對中國大陸突然宣布東海航空識別區，引發地區緊張，「很直率地表達美國的立場與期待」；但是同時，美方也不願意與中國的關係鬧僵，所以依然強調要「努力推進中美新型大國關係建設」。
美國基本上會挺日本，這是無庸置疑的。去年黃岩島爭議，美國沒有支持菲律賓的主權主張，亞太國家私下都在議論，重返亞洲的美國，面對中國不夠強硬。這次在防空識別區的問題上，如果華盛頓還是悶不作聲，大家會擔心美國一退再退。但畢竟這次的爭端主角之一是日本，是美國在亞太最忠實的盟友。近日在美國默許下，安倍要修改憲法，成立國家安全會議，擴大集體自衛權解釋。國際上甚至認為，美國現在國防預算緊縮，要靠日本，才能遵守重返亞洲、捍衛盟友的承諾。
但是美國也不能完全站在日本這邊。日本的過度右傾，不是沒有引發反彈的，南韓與中國大陸就對日本的軍國主義復興，擔心不已，甚至認為美國是在「縱放」（unleash ）日本這條凶犬。
日本對釣魚台列嶼的主權主張，更是蠻橫地強調主權不容他人置喙，甚至去年宣布收歸國有，也是希望藉此包括在美日安保的適用範圍中。可是美國對此立場則很清楚，尊重日本的行政權，但是對主權爭議不持立場；換句話說，美國並未表示支持日本的釣魚台主權。
所以外界觀察到，拜登抵達日本後，安倍政府期待他會表態力挺，但是從三日的日美記者會看來，雙方態度有落差。首先，美國對中國大陸的識別區宣布，表示嚴重關切，但並不堅持中國要撤回，這讓安倍也只有改變主張；其次，美國航空公司與日本航空公司對提交飛航計畫依然不同調，日本也沒辦法強求美國改變。
國際政治是現實的。坦率地說，美國這番態度不是基於公義或國際法，很大一部分是顧忌大陸的反應。華盛頓深知，中國民族情緒的力量強大，任何中國領導人只能順勢而行，無法逆勢操作，美國要想與中國大陸發展新型大國關係，就不能傷害到中國人民的感情。
由此也可看出，目前美國亞太政策的重心是在美中關係，而美中關係的主調還是新型大國關係。十一月二十日國安顧問萊斯在首場亞太政策演說中強調，將努力使新型大國關係發揮作用；而拜登也說，中美兩個大國新型關係的發展，取決於雙方信任和對對方的動機保持樂觀。中國大陸外交部更總結拜登與習近平會談達成的最重要共識是，雙方要努力推進中美新型大國關係建設。
所謂「新型大國關係」，從日本與亞太各國、包括台灣看起來，就是G2的權力結構。亞太秩序由美中決定，這不是日本所願意見到的，而這也與既定的「美國重返亞洲，力抗中國」路線相左，其中矛盾，美國自己也難以解釋，卻是政治現實之必然。
東海現在風雲變幻莫測，提出「中國夢」的習近平，碰上的是想要扭轉日本成為正常化國家的安倍晉三，美國在期間看似左右逢源，兩方都要爭取，但是能夠迴旋的空間卻越來越小，這是局勢凶險之處。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 6, 2013
Summary: The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
Full text below:
This week U.S. Vice President Joe Biden began a tour of Japan, Mainland China, and South Korea. The tour was scheduled even before Beijing announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Now however, this development has changed the focus. The entire world is focused on Biden's stop in Beijing and his meeting with Xi Jinping.
Biden and Xi will meet behind closed doors. The time alloted will be increased from 45 minutes to 2 hours. After the meeting, they will hold a brief press conference. Biden and Xi will resume their meeting again after dinner. Observers are wondering whether Biden will raise the issue of the ADIZ, both during the meeting and press conference. Biden did not say. But that does not mean the issue of ADIZ will not be raised during the meeting.
According to the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry, Biden and Xi will address bilateral relations and other issues of shared concern in a frank and in-depth manner. In diplomatese "frank" means that any differences will be raised and discussed.
The next day Biden attended a luncheon held by the American Chamber of Commerce. He said when he meets Xi Jinping, he will straightforwardly express US positions and expectations regarding Mainland China's sudden announcement of an East China Sea ADIZ, which was followed by heightened regional tensions. At the same time, Biden said, Washington is unwilling to strain its relations with Beijing. Therefore it vigorously promotes a new Sino-US great power relationship.
Basically the US backs Japan. This is beyond doubt. Last year, during the Huangyan Island dispute, the United States did not support the Philippines' claim of sovereignty. Asian-Pacific countries are talking in private about the United States' "Return to Asia." They are wondering whether it is tough enough to confront Mainland China. Take ADIZ. If Washington remains silent, everyone will worry that the US is retreating. But this time one of the disputants is Japan, America's most loyal ally in the Asian-Pacific. Recently, with US acquiescence, Abe proposed amending Japan's constitution. Abe proposed establishing a National Security Council, and expanding its definition of collective self-defense. Many other governments think the U.S. defense budget is tight, therefore dependent upon Japan. Only Japan enables it to return to Asia and adhere by its commitment to defend its allies.
But the United States cannot back the Japanese side unconditionally. Japan has swung too far to the right. A backlash is inevitable. South Korea and Mainland China are deeply concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism. They feel the United States has unleashed a vicious Japanese attack dog on them.
Japan claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. It has arrogantly proclaimed that its sovereignty must not be challenged. Last year it went so far as to announce its "nationalization." It hopes the islands will be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. But the US stance is clear. It acknowledges Japan's administrative authority. But it holds no position regarding the sovereignty dispute. In other words the United States has not expressed support for Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands.
Observers have taken note. Biden arrived in Japan. The Abe government hoped Biden would back Japan. But three days of Japanese-US press conferences show they failed to close the gap. The United States expressed grave concern over Mainland China's announced ADIZ. But it did not demand that Mainland China take it back. This forced Abe to change his demands. Secondly, US and Japanese airline companies continue to sing different tunes regarding the submission of flight plans. Japan cannot force the United States to change its position.
International politics is realpolitik. Frankly, the US posture is based not on justice or international law. A large part of it is concern for Mainland China's reaction. Washington knows that Chinese nationalist sentiment is a powerful force. Chinese leaders must go with the flow. They dare not defy it. If the United States wishes to develop a new great power relationship with Mainland China, it cannot afford to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
This shows something else as well. Currently U.S. Asian-Pacific policy focuses on the relationship between US and China. Its chief focus is the new great power relationship. On November 20, National Security Advisor Susan Rice spoke on Asian-Pacific policy. She underscored the need to establish a new great power relationship between major powers. Joe Biden added that the new great power relationship between Mainland China and the US requires trust and optimism regarding each other's motives. Biden and Xi reached this important consensus. Mainland China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that both sides must promote this new Sino-US great power relationship.
From the perspective of Japan and other Asian-Pacific governments, including the ROC government on Taiwan, this "new great power relationship" looks a lot like the G2 power structure. In short, the Asian-Pacifc order will be determined by the United States and Mainland China. This is not what Japan wants to see. But the U.S. desire to return to Asia, but oppose Mainland China, is self-contradictory. The U.S. itself finds it difficult to justify. But political reality is intractable.
The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
拜登會習近平透露的「新型大國關係」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.06 04:21 am
美國副總統拜登本周開始日本、中國大陸與南韓三國的訪問。這次亞洲行的安排，早於東海防空識別區爭議前即已預定，但現在重點完全受此議題牽引。北京這站與習近平見面，尤其全球矚目。
拜登與習的閉門會面，從預定時間四十五分鐘延長至兩小時，會議結束簡短記者會之後，再與習進行工作晚宴。外界最關心的是，拜登有沒有在會晤中，對習近平提出識別區議題。記者會上，拜登沒提，但這並不表示在會談中也沒提。
根據中共外交部表示，拜登與習近平見面時，雙方就中美關係和其他共同關心的重大問題坦誠、深入地交換了意見。這是外交語言，「坦誠」的意思是彼此有分歧，但是大家開誠布公講出來。
拜登在美僑商會次日舉行的餐會上則表示，在與習近平的會晤中，對中國大陸突然宣布東海航空識別區，引發地區緊張，「很直率地表達美國的立場與期待」；但是同時，美方也不願意與中國的關係鬧僵，所以依然強調要「努力推進中美新型大國關係建設」。
美國基本上會挺日本，這是無庸置疑的。去年黃岩島爭議，美國沒有支持菲律賓的主權主張，亞太國家私下都在議論，重返亞洲的美國，面對中國不夠強硬。這次在防空識別區的問題上，如果華盛頓還是悶不作聲，大家會擔心美國一退再退。但畢竟這次的爭端主角之一是日本，是美國在亞太最忠實的盟友。近日在美國默許下，安倍要修改憲法，成立國家安全會議，擴大集體自衛權解釋。國際上甚至認為，美國現在國防預算緊縮，要靠日本，才能遵守重返亞洲、捍衛盟友的承諾。
但是美國也不能完全站在日本這邊。日本的過度右傾，不是沒有引發反彈的，南韓與中國大陸就對日本的軍國主義復興，擔心不已，甚至認為美國是在「縱放」（unleash ）日本這條凶犬。
日本對釣魚台列嶼的主權主張，更是蠻橫地強調主權不容他人置喙，甚至去年宣布收歸國有，也是希望藉此包括在美日安保的適用範圍中。可是美國對此立場則很清楚，尊重日本的行政權，但是對主權爭議不持立場；換句話說，美國並未表示支持日本的釣魚台主權。
所以外界觀察到，拜登抵達日本後，安倍政府期待他會表態力挺，但是從三日的日美記者會看來，雙方態度有落差。首先，美國對中國大陸的識別區宣布，表示嚴重關切，但並不堅持中國要撤回，這讓安倍也只有改變主張；其次，美國航空公司與日本航空公司對提交飛航計畫依然不同調，日本也沒辦法強求美國改變。
國際政治是現實的。坦率地說，美國這番態度不是基於公義或國際法，很大一部分是顧忌大陸的反應。華盛頓深知，中國民族情緒的力量強大，任何中國領導人只能順勢而行，無法逆勢操作，美國要想與中國大陸發展新型大國關係，就不能傷害到中國人民的感情。
由此也可看出，目前美國亞太政策的重心是在美中關係，而美中關係的主調還是新型大國關係。十一月二十日國安顧問萊斯在首場亞太政策演說中強調，將努力使新型大國關係發揮作用；而拜登也說，中美兩個大國新型關係的發展，取決於雙方信任和對對方的動機保持樂觀。中國大陸外交部更總結拜登與習近平會談達成的最重要共識是，雙方要努力推進中美新型大國關係建設。
所謂「新型大國關係」，從日本與亞太各國、包括台灣看起來，就是G2的權力結構。亞太秩序由美中決定，這不是日本所願意見到的，而這也與既定的「美國重返亞洲，力抗中國」路線相左，其中矛盾，美國自己也難以解釋，卻是政治現實之必然。
東海現在風雲變幻莫測，提出「中國夢」的習近平，碰上的是想要扭轉日本成為正常化國家的安倍晉三，美國在期間看似左右逢源，兩方都要爭取，但是能夠迴旋的空間卻越來越小，這是局勢凶險之處。
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Chen Deming Says "Taiwan, I Love You."
Chen Deming Says "Taiwan, I Love You."
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 5, 2013
Summary: The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
Full text below:
Beijing's ARATS Chairman Chen Deming has just concluded a long and eventful visit to Taiwan. During his visit he met face to face with people from all levels. He explained the Mainland's position on Taiwan. He promoted cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. He communicated a positive and friendly attitude. All in all, the visit was a success.
This is the first visit to Taiwan the ARATS chairman has made since taking office in April. During the visit the media dubbed his delegation the "Iron Man Delegation." Chen visited one city after another, nonstop, including Taoyuan, Pingtung, Kaohsiung, Chiayi, Taichung, Hsinchu, Xinbei City, Taipei, and eight other counties and cities. Chen visited the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park, the Kaohsiung Software Park, the Central Scientific Industrial Area, the Neihu Technology Park, Taipei Port, Taichung Port, Kaohsiung Port, and other important points to be opened as part of the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program. He directed his attention on issues related to the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.
Chen visited a number of landmark business firms, Including TSMC, HTC, Delta Electronics, Hon Hai, AU Optronics, MediaTek, and Yulon. He visited Mainland-funded businesses on Taiwan. He visited the Bank of China, China Electrical, and the Mainland's Chamber of Commerce offices on Taiwan. He looked into problems encountered by Mainland businesses on Taiwan. He met with political figures and discussed cross-Strait trends. He met and interacted with ordinary citizens. His saw the sights on Mount Alishan. He visited the Eslite Bookstore and got a taste of Taiwan's local culture.
Chen Deming repeatedly used emotionally charged terms to convey his feelings. For example, he said he wanted to experience "Taiwan's heartbeat." During a visit to Kaohsiung, he told enthusiastic crowds, "Taiwan, I love you!" When visiting the Kaohsiung Software Park, Chen Deming spoke in English. He said, "We have the same dream, flying over Taiwan and China."
Chen Deming is seen as someone who knows Taiwan. He served as Mayor of Suzhou and as Minister of Commerce. He has considerable experience with exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. His emotionally charged language underscores the nature of the cross-Strait relationship. An overarching love for one's compatriots can serve as a common language linking the two sides. Goodwill between the two sides is a valuable asset that can resolve long standing differences. The search for consensus will provide important opportunities, by which the next generation can build a new future.
Cross-Strait relations have undergone many twists and turns. Former ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan planned to visit Taiwan. But President Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "two states theory." Cross-Strait relations went into deep freeze. The two cross-Strait organizations could no longer communicate. Only when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, could cross-strait reconciliation resume.
Friendly cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation have been highly beneficial to Taiwan. The Green Camp mobilized regardless. Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation became the target of Green Camp protestors, whose goal was to discredit them. When ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the Green Camp organized mass protests. Former ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing was even shoved to the ground by protestors at the Confucius Temple.
But cross-Strait exchanges have expanded. Mainland China's economic power on the international stage has swiftly increased. More and more people appreciate the market opportunities the Mainland has provided Taiwan. This includes even southern Taiwan DPP county chiefs and city mayors, who have visited the Mainland to sell local agricultural products. The public on Taiwan has become accustomed to increasingly frequent visits by Mainland tourists, Mainland political and economic officials, and Mainland business people. ARATS officials visiting Taiwan has become routine. Cross-Strait civilian exchanges have expanded. The old hostilities have begun to fade.
The atmosphere during Chen's recent visit Taiwan was very different from what it was in the past. Most of the people he encountered were friendly and welcoming. Very few were hostile. Protests were small and peaceful. Public sentiment toward people from the Mainland has changed. Cross-strait relations have visibly improved.
Take Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa. When Chen Deming met with him, Chang said the two sides speak the same language. They eat the same food. There are so many things they can exchange views on. They are like family members. Taiwan and the Mainland should unite to create a win-win situation. They should see each others as kin. They must not let people from other nations look down on them. Chen Deming repeatedly called on the two sides to enter the global market together, and create a win-win situation.
The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
社論－當陳德銘說「台灣，我愛你」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月05日 04:10
在密集的參訪之後，大陸海協會長陳德銘結束了在台灣的訪問行程，此行既面對面地接觸台灣各層面，也對中國大陸的對台立場作出說明，並且傳達推動兩岸交流合作的積極友善態度。綜而觀之，堪稱圓滿成功。
這是陳德銘4月就任海協會長後的首度訪台，在這趟被媒體戲稱為「鐵人團」的行程中，他馬不停蹄走訪桃園、屏東、高雄、嘉義、台中、新竹、新北、台北等8個縣市；參訪屏東農業生物科技園區、高雄軟體園區、中部科學工業區、內湖科技園區、台北港、台中港、高雄港等台灣自由經濟示範區重要開放點，聚焦在台灣自經區參訪與兩岸經貿合作相關議題。
此外，陳德銘還參訪多家台灣指標性的大型企業，包括台積電、宏達電、台達電、鴻海、友達光電、聯發科、裕隆等。他也訪問在台灣的陸資企業及中國銀行、中國機電商會在台的辦事處，深入瞭解大陸企業在台發展遭遇的問題。他會見政界大老討論兩岸走向，也和基層民眾面對面互動；他親登阿里山賞雲海，也去誠品書店體會台灣的人文況味。
陳德銘更多次以感性的語言表達心意，例如說想來體會「台灣的心跳」，在參觀高雄港時，對熱情民眾的招呼回應說：「台灣，我愛你！」在高雄軟體園區參觀時，陳德銘還以英文說出：「We have the same dream , flying over the Taiwan and China.（我們有共同的夢想，攜手飛越台灣和中國）」。
被譽為「知台派」的陳德銘，擔任過蘇州市長與商務部長，有不少與台灣交流合作的經驗。他對台灣的感性語言，凸顯了在兩岸的互動過程中，民族大愛可以是雙方最基本的共同語言，而兩岸彼此間的善意，更是一項彌足珍貴的資產，也是台灣與大陸化解歧異、尋找共識、為下一代開創嶄新未來的重要契機。
在此之前，兩岸互動曾經經歷過許多波折。前海協會會長汪道涵原本計畫來台，卻因為前總統李登輝突然提出「兩國論」，兩岸關係陷入急凍，兩會協商也為之停擺。直到馬英九當選總統後，開始推動兩岸和解，雙方互動才恢復熱絡。
但是，在綠營政治人物的政治動員下，兩岸友善的交流合作，即使內容明顯對台灣有利，仍然經常成為綠營的抗議抹黑焦點。例如前海協會會長陳雲林首度來台訪問時，就曾經出現激烈的群眾抗爭，前海協會副會長張銘清甚至在孔廟遭抗議民眾擠倒。
不過，隨著兩岸交流逐步推動，以及中國經濟力量在國際舞台迅速崛起，愈來愈多人體認到大陸市場提供的商機對台灣極為重要。即使是民進黨籍的南部縣市長，也紛紛前進大陸推銷當地農特產。台灣社會對日益頻繁來訪的大陸觀光客及政經官員、企業人士，早已司空見慣，海協會官員來訪常態化，兩岸民間交流不斷擴大深化，舊有的敵意隔閡也開始緩解。
這次陳德銘訪問台灣時，氣氛和過去已大不相同，接觸到的多是友善親切的民眾，只有偶爾遇到零星、小規模而平和的抗議活動，今昔相比，對照得出台灣社會在接納大陸人士時的態度變化，也可看出兩岸關係確實已有相當大的進展。
就像長榮集團總裁張榮發在接見陳德銘時所說的，兩岸不論語言或食物都一樣，很多事情大家應該可以交換意見，就像自己家裡的人一樣。台灣和大陸應團結創造雙贏，像一家人，不能讓外國人瞧不起。陳德銘此行也一再呼籲兩岸合作共同進軍全球市場，共創雙贏。
雖然兩岸之間仍然存在著歧異，但仔細檢視，會發現兩岸人民與社會的共通點遠遠大於差異處。如果能夠站在民族大愛、共創榮景的前提下，堅持善意友好的路徑，積極推動各項合作計畫，為兩岸人民福祉創造更大利多，一個和平繁榮的兩岸盛世，不會是夢。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 5, 2013
Summary: The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
Full text below:
Beijing's ARATS Chairman Chen Deming has just concluded a long and eventful visit to Taiwan. During his visit he met face to face with people from all levels. He explained the Mainland's position on Taiwan. He promoted cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. He communicated a positive and friendly attitude. All in all, the visit was a success.
This is the first visit to Taiwan the ARATS chairman has made since taking office in April. During the visit the media dubbed his delegation the "Iron Man Delegation." Chen visited one city after another, nonstop, including Taoyuan, Pingtung, Kaohsiung, Chiayi, Taichung, Hsinchu, Xinbei City, Taipei, and eight other counties and cities. Chen visited the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park, the Kaohsiung Software Park, the Central Scientific Industrial Area, the Neihu Technology Park, Taipei Port, Taichung Port, Kaohsiung Port, and other important points to be opened as part of the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program. He directed his attention on issues related to the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.
Chen visited a number of landmark business firms, Including TSMC, HTC, Delta Electronics, Hon Hai, AU Optronics, MediaTek, and Yulon. He visited Mainland-funded businesses on Taiwan. He visited the Bank of China, China Electrical, and the Mainland's Chamber of Commerce offices on Taiwan. He looked into problems encountered by Mainland businesses on Taiwan. He met with political figures and discussed cross-Strait trends. He met and interacted with ordinary citizens. His saw the sights on Mount Alishan. He visited the Eslite Bookstore and got a taste of Taiwan's local culture.
Chen Deming repeatedly used emotionally charged terms to convey his feelings. For example, he said he wanted to experience "Taiwan's heartbeat." During a visit to Kaohsiung, he told enthusiastic crowds, "Taiwan, I love you!" When visiting the Kaohsiung Software Park, Chen Deming spoke in English. He said, "We have the same dream, flying over Taiwan and China."
Chen Deming is seen as someone who knows Taiwan. He served as Mayor of Suzhou and as Minister of Commerce. He has considerable experience with exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. His emotionally charged language underscores the nature of the cross-Strait relationship. An overarching love for one's compatriots can serve as a common language linking the two sides. Goodwill between the two sides is a valuable asset that can resolve long standing differences. The search for consensus will provide important opportunities, by which the next generation can build a new future.
Cross-Strait relations have undergone many twists and turns. Former ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan planned to visit Taiwan. But President Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "two states theory." Cross-Strait relations went into deep freeze. The two cross-Strait organizations could no longer communicate. Only when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, could cross-strait reconciliation resume.
Friendly cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation have been highly beneficial to Taiwan. The Green Camp mobilized regardless. Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation became the target of Green Camp protestors, whose goal was to discredit them. When ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the Green Camp organized mass protests. Former ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing was even shoved to the ground by protestors at the Confucius Temple.
But cross-Strait exchanges have expanded. Mainland China's economic power on the international stage has swiftly increased. More and more people appreciate the market opportunities the Mainland has provided Taiwan. This includes even southern Taiwan DPP county chiefs and city mayors, who have visited the Mainland to sell local agricultural products. The public on Taiwan has become accustomed to increasingly frequent visits by Mainland tourists, Mainland political and economic officials, and Mainland business people. ARATS officials visiting Taiwan has become routine. Cross-Strait civilian exchanges have expanded. The old hostilities have begun to fade.
The atmosphere during Chen's recent visit Taiwan was very different from what it was in the past. Most of the people he encountered were friendly and welcoming. Very few were hostile. Protests were small and peaceful. Public sentiment toward people from the Mainland has changed. Cross-strait relations have visibly improved.
Take Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa. When Chen Deming met with him, Chang said the two sides speak the same language. They eat the same food. There are so many things they can exchange views on. They are like family members. Taiwan and the Mainland should unite to create a win-win situation. They should see each others as kin. They must not let people from other nations look down on them. Chen Deming repeatedly called on the two sides to enter the global market together, and create a win-win situation.
The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
社論－當陳德銘說「台灣，我愛你」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月05日 04:10
在密集的參訪之後，大陸海協會長陳德銘結束了在台灣的訪問行程，此行既面對面地接觸台灣各層面，也對中國大陸的對台立場作出說明，並且傳達推動兩岸交流合作的積極友善態度。綜而觀之，堪稱圓滿成功。
這是陳德銘4月就任海協會長後的首度訪台，在這趟被媒體戲稱為「鐵人團」的行程中，他馬不停蹄走訪桃園、屏東、高雄、嘉義、台中、新竹、新北、台北等8個縣市；參訪屏東農業生物科技園區、高雄軟體園區、中部科學工業區、內湖科技園區、台北港、台中港、高雄港等台灣自由經濟示範區重要開放點，聚焦在台灣自經區參訪與兩岸經貿合作相關議題。
此外，陳德銘還參訪多家台灣指標性的大型企業，包括台積電、宏達電、台達電、鴻海、友達光電、聯發科、裕隆等。他也訪問在台灣的陸資企業及中國銀行、中國機電商會在台的辦事處，深入瞭解大陸企業在台發展遭遇的問題。他會見政界大老討論兩岸走向，也和基層民眾面對面互動；他親登阿里山賞雲海，也去誠品書店體會台灣的人文況味。
陳德銘更多次以感性的語言表達心意，例如說想來體會「台灣的心跳」，在參觀高雄港時，對熱情民眾的招呼回應說：「台灣，我愛你！」在高雄軟體園區參觀時，陳德銘還以英文說出：「We have the same dream , flying over the Taiwan and China.（我們有共同的夢想，攜手飛越台灣和中國）」。
被譽為「知台派」的陳德銘，擔任過蘇州市長與商務部長，有不少與台灣交流合作的經驗。他對台灣的感性語言，凸顯了在兩岸的互動過程中，民族大愛可以是雙方最基本的共同語言，而兩岸彼此間的善意，更是一項彌足珍貴的資產，也是台灣與大陸化解歧異、尋找共識、為下一代開創嶄新未來的重要契機。
在此之前，兩岸互動曾經經歷過許多波折。前海協會會長汪道涵原本計畫來台，卻因為前總統李登輝突然提出「兩國論」，兩岸關係陷入急凍，兩會協商也為之停擺。直到馬英九當選總統後，開始推動兩岸和解，雙方互動才恢復熱絡。
但是，在綠營政治人物的政治動員下，兩岸友善的交流合作，即使內容明顯對台灣有利，仍然經常成為綠營的抗議抹黑焦點。例如前海協會會長陳雲林首度來台訪問時，就曾經出現激烈的群眾抗爭，前海協會副會長張銘清甚至在孔廟遭抗議民眾擠倒。
不過，隨著兩岸交流逐步推動，以及中國經濟力量在國際舞台迅速崛起，愈來愈多人體認到大陸市場提供的商機對台灣極為重要。即使是民進黨籍的南部縣市長，也紛紛前進大陸推銷當地農特產。台灣社會對日益頻繁來訪的大陸觀光客及政經官員、企業人士，早已司空見慣，海協會官員來訪常態化，兩岸民間交流不斷擴大深化，舊有的敵意隔閡也開始緩解。
這次陳德銘訪問台灣時，氣氛和過去已大不相同，接觸到的多是友善親切的民眾，只有偶爾遇到零星、小規模而平和的抗議活動，今昔相比，對照得出台灣社會在接納大陸人士時的態度變化，也可看出兩岸關係確實已有相當大的進展。
就像長榮集團總裁張榮發在接見陳德銘時所說的，兩岸不論語言或食物都一樣，很多事情大家應該可以交換意見，就像自己家裡的人一樣。台灣和大陸應團結創造雙贏，像一家人，不能讓外國人瞧不起。陳德銘此行也一再呼籲兩岸合作共同進軍全球市場，共創雙贏。
雖然兩岸之間仍然存在著歧異，但仔細檢視，會發現兩岸人民與社會的共通點遠遠大於差異處。如果能夠站在民族大愛、共創榮景的前提下，堅持善意友好的路徑，積極推動各項合作計畫，為兩岸人民福祉創造更大利多，一個和平繁榮的兩岸盛世，不會是夢。
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