Monday, March 11, 2013

The ROC Flag under the Tokyo Dome

The ROC Flag under the Tokyo Dome
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 12, 2013


Summary: The sea of ROC national flags displayed at the WBC match offers us a lesson. At one time, some civil servants would refuse to swear allegiance to the ROC national flag. Now we have people across the nation, standing beneath the red, white, and blue ROC national flag, cheering the Chinese Taipei team on. Does the Republic of China represent the mainstream? Just look at the sea of ROC national flags at the Intercontinental Stadium or Tokyo Dome for your answer. After all, no one can divide the fans. No one dares divide the fans. The ROC national flag can hold its own.

Full Text below:

The Chinese Taipei team has never performed better than it did at this year's World Baseball Classic (WBC). The Republic of China (ROC) national flag has never been more visible than it was, from the Taichung Intercontinental Baseball Stadium to the Tokyo Dome, at this year's game.

The ROC national flag is controversial. For decades, Green Camp supporters never displayed a single ROC national flag at their rallies. One time, when Mainland VIPs visited, the ROC government actually hid the ROC national flag. Every year, on New Years Day, the government holds a flag-raising ceremony in front of the Presidential Palace. The lines between Blue and Green, official and civilian are clear. During this year's WBC games however, the appearance of the ROC national flag was totally spontaneous. The sea of flags, brought to the games by fans on their own initiative, took on a life of their own. They generated heat. They transcended Blue vs. Green political divisions. They connected viscerally with the people. The "Mexican wave" that accompanied the ROC national flag remains vivid in our memory.

When the audience waved flags their motive was non-political. They merely wanted to proclaim who they were among the fans in the stands. Otherwise, how would anyone know? But the sea of flags inadvertently offered some major revelations about politics on Taiwan, and future cross-Strait relations. The impacts are subtle but profound. One of the most important is the unwitting establishment of a precedent for future Olympic games.

The ROC withdrew from the United Nations and thereby lost membership in the Olympics in 1971. In 1981, according to the "Olympic Model," the ROC was reinstated, and represented by the five ringed Olympic flag. The ROC national flag subsequently disappeared from Olympic venues. The International Olympics Committee (IOC) adopted the Olympic flag. Beijing also forbade sports fans in the grandstands from waving ROC national flags. The Atlanta and Sydney Olympic tickets even stated that fans were not permitted to bring flags other than delegation flags into the venues. As a result, disputes arose over sports fan's personal flags. Even high school students took part in the IOC disputes on gaming venues. These venues were of course not under IOC jurisdiction. During the 2001 Asian Women's Soccer Cup and 2005 Asian Figure Skating Cup, the host city was Taipei. Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou said he "did not recommend audience members bringing ROC national flags into the venues." He said "The organizers must abide by the IOC model." Ma Ying-jeou is still being criticized for the position he took back then.

In 2008, the Beijing Olympic torch was initially scheduled to come to Taiwan. But rumors emerged that the IOC, under pressure from Beijing, would forbid the display of the ROC national flag along the streets of Taipei. It was as if all of Taiwan was subject to the Olympic model. As a result, both the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the general public, lashed back. As a result, during the 2008 presidential election campaign, presidential candidate Ma Ying-flag set forth "Five Principles for the Display of the ROC National Flag and the Singing of the ROC National Anthem." He proposed that henceforth a distinction would be made between event organizers and sports fans. Later Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. During the 2009 World Games in Kaohsiung, and the Taipei Deaflympics, the IOC model was adopted for the event organizers, but sports fans would be allowed to wave whatever flag they wished. Since then, there have been few disputes during international competitions.

The World Baseball Classic follows this "event organizers vs. sports fans" model. The WBC match is sponsored by Major League baseball organizations in the US. It is also sponsored by baseball organizations in Japan and South Korea. Mainland China is a participant (Group A). Group B preliminary rounds are held in Taichung. As a result the match has become a "Taiwan, Mainland, US, and Japan" gala event. This match was an international event. It attracted considerable attention. The Intercontinental Stadium telecast attracted over 10 million viewers. The showdown between Taiwan and Japan at the Tokyo Dome sold out. The ROC national flag flew in the stands under the Tokyo Dome. This offers us an even better precedent for the "IOC model."

The Blue and Green camps on Taiwan remain deadlocked. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait seek continued peace.  This evolution is something that all four participants should contemplate. First, consider cross-Strait relations. In 2005, Ma Ying-jeou clung to the old IOC model. During the Beijing Olympics of 2008, Beijing insisted that no ROC national flags be displayed along the Olympic torch route. But as a result of the 2008 presidential election, the ROC national flag reappeared under the Tokyo Dome. On this issue, the two sides achieved cross-Strait consensus. The more the ROC national flag is held high, the more enduring peace between the two sides is possible. When Beijing attempted to prevent display of the red, white, and blue ROC national flag, it merely increased alienation on Taiwan. Today baseball fans on Taiwan have show their heartfelt support for the red, white, and blue ROC national flag. Today, it should be easier to understand this newspaper's "Glass Theory." Taiwan is the water. The Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains contained. Once the glass is shattered, the water spills out everywhere.

The sea of ROC national flags displayed at the WBC match offers us a lesson. At one time, some civil servants would refuse to swear allegiance to the ROC national flag. Now we have people across the nation, standing beneath the red, white, and blue ROC national flag, cheering the Chinese Taipei team on. Does the Republic of China represent the mainstream? Just look at the sea of ROC national flags at the Intercontinental Stadium or Tokyo Dome for your answer. After all, no one can divide the fans. No one dares divide the fans. The ROC national flag can hold its own.

The Chinese Taipei team's victory at the WBC match was not complete. But the enthusiasm shown by sports fans will save the ROC national flag.

東京巨蛋的青天白日滿地紅國旗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.12 02:51 am

這次世界棒球經典賽,是中華隊表現最佳的一次。與此同時,亦有人注意到,這次世界棒球經典賽,從台中洲際棒球場,到東京巨蛋球場,也是青天白日滿地紅國旗表現得最亮眼、最壯盛的一次。

國旗是一個爭議話題。幾十年來,綠營的集會看不見國旗,且曾有一度大陸賓客來訪還要藏起國旗;每年元旦總統府前的升旗典禮由政府主辦,也是藍、綠、官、民分明;而在此次經典賽中,國旗的出現完全由球迷自發而起,令人感覺到這一片旗海有了生命、有了熱力、突破藍綠,與民眾血肉相連,那看台上隨著國旗疾走而演出的波浪舞,現今彷彿仍是歷歷在目。

觀眾擎旗,其動念初衷應不是出自政治,只是要為看台上的球迷建立一個身分的認同,否則即不知「我們究竟是誰?」;但這一片旗海,對今後的台灣內部政治及兩岸關係,皆應有重大啟示,也理當會發生微妙且深刻的影響。其中最重要的意義,是使兩岸在不知不覺間,已然創造了一個「新奧會模式」。

一九七一年中華民國退出聯合國,繼之失去奧會會籍。一九八一年,藉「奧會模式」恢復會籍,以梅花五環旗為「會旗」,自此國旗即自奧會場地消失身影;且不但大會採用「會旗」,北京亦不容看台的觀眾擎持青天白日滿地紅國旗,甚至在亞特蘭大及雪梨奧運的門票上,載明不准觀眾持「代表團會旗」以外的旗幟。於是,觀眾持旗的糾紛時起,甚至連高中生的國際奧林匹亞競賽及電玩比賽場地中也生爭執,但這些場域卻皆非奧會所轄。二○○一年亞洲盃女子足球賽,及二○○五年亞洲花式滑冰賽,主辦城市台北市市長馬英九表示,「不建議觀眾持國旗進場」,而稱「主辦單位必須遵守奧會模式」;這段過節,使馬英九的立場迄今仍遭批評。

二○○八年,北京奧運聖火原本計劃來台,但傳出不容所經的台北街道出現青天白日滿地紅國旗的主張,儼然欲將整個台灣納入「奧會模式」,因而被台灣朝野及輿論峻拒。於是,當時是二○○八總統大選候選人的馬英九提出「旗歌五原則」,主張此後應將「賽事」與「觀眾」區隔。後來,馬英九當選總統,二○○九年的高雄世運及台北聽奧,即採「大會採奧會模式/看台任觀眾持旗」的默契;此後,即罕聞在國際賽事看台上的旗幟爭執。

此次經典賽應可視為「大會/看台」分流的「新奧會模式」的確立。此賽由美國職棒大聯盟主辦(國際棒總、日本棒球機構及韓國棒球委員會也是經典賽發起人),且中國大陸亦是參賽國(A組),而B組初賽又在台中舉行,於是使比賽成為「台/陸/美/日」的匯演事件;以此賽的國際高度,加上觀眾的注目(洲際球場電視轉播台灣觀眾逾千萬人,東京巨蛋台日戰滿座),而中華民國國旗既能飄揚在東京巨蛋的看台,應可視作已為「新奧會模式」建立了更加穩固的範例。

此事的演化,對台灣內部政治的「藍綠僵局」與兩岸的「和平發展」皆是彌可深思的啟示。先就兩岸關係論:試想,二○○五年,馬英九仍持「舊奧會模式」,而北京在二○○八年仍主張奧運聖火來台不可見到國旗;但只因二○○八一場總統大選,如今青天白日滿地紅國旗,已然飄揚在東京巨蛋球場。兩岸在此獲得的共同啟示是:愈護持青天白日滿地紅國旗,兩岸愈有「和平發展」的可能性。尤其是北京,經歷過去打壓封殺青天白日滿地紅旗,而把台灣愈逼愈遠的日子;如今見到台灣球迷如此護持青天白日滿地紅旗,應當更可領悟本報倡議的「杯子理論」:台灣是水,中華民國是杯;杯在水在,杯破水覆。

經典賽的旗海對台灣政治的藍綠惡鬥亦深具啟示意義。試想,我們曾有公職人員拒絕在國旗前宣誓就職的往日;但我們也有全國民眾在青天白日滿地紅旗之下,一起為「中華隊」加油的今日。若問「中華民國」能不能代表台灣的「主體性」,洲際球場及東京巨蛋看台的國旗也許就是答案。畢竟,沒有人能撕裂球迷,沒有人敢撕裂球迷,國旗就能挺住!

中華隊在經典賽沒有全贏,但熱情的球迷終將中華民國國旗救回來、贏回來了!


Sunday, March 10, 2013

Stop the Brain Drain: Resuscitate the Economy

Stop the Brain Drain: Resuscitate the Economy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 11, 2013


Summary: To renew emphasis on youth unemployment, and more aggressively confront the problems, this newspaper's "Vision Workshop" will publish a series of reports in the coming year, entitled, "Finding a Way for Youth." What is our human resources strategy? What kind of talent will be needed In the world of the future?

Full Text below:

On June 18 of last year, this newspaper's "Vision Workshop" began running a series of special reports entitled, "Two Critical Years for Taiwan's Revival." We compared different countries' past and present circumstances. We expressed hope that President Ma Ying-jeou, who had just been re-elected to a second term, would use these two years to resusciate Taiwan's economy. We stressed, in particular, the need to address the Brain Drain. We noted that the younger generation, and whether youth unemployment could be solved, was the key to Taiwan's continued prosperity.

The Brain Drain gradually seized the attention of the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the public. Controversy raged. Over the past nine months, government officials have analyzed the relevant issues. As the new chief of the CEPD pointed out, Taiwan's Brain Drain involves four major issues. They include: a shortage of talent, an educational system afflicted with rigor mortis, the cultivation of talent the market does not demand, and Taiwan's inability to offer talent what other economies can.

Government agencies realize the seriousness of the problem. Two years ago, Chu Ching-yi said the Brain Drain did not happen yesterday. It is nothing new. But he also admitted that before he studied the subject, he had no idea how serious the shortage was.

Two years ago, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey and others published a "Declaration on Human Talent," and asked the government to develop countermeasures. The Office of the President said the brain drain was sufficiently serious to constitute a threat to national security. President Ma attaches great importance to the matter. As far back as late 2010, he instructed the relevant agencies to suggest solutions. The Executive Yuan approved a "Talent Cultivation Program." It said it intended to invest 600 billion NT to cultivate talent.

Today, two years later, we see no significant improvement in the supply of talent. If anything, the problem is even more serious. The problem has three main causes. One. People with talent cannot find jobs. Two. People with talent refuse to stay on. Three. People with talent are not allowed to enter. The problems are most serious among the younger generation.

Unemployment among the young is a universal problem. According to the 2013 World Development Report, published by the World Bank in October of last year, 200 million people the world over are unemployed. About 75 million people are young people 25 or below. About 620 million young people are neither working nor studying. By comparison, the youth unemployment rate on Taiwan was 12.6% in December of last year. It was the highest among the major Asian economies. It was three times the overall unemployment rate of 4.18%. This means that young people on Taiwan are more susceptible than society as a whole.

High youth unemployment on Taiwan is an effect. The cause has several aspects. One is the government's past industrial development planning and human resources strategy. Industry failed to upgrade. This led to changes in demographics and imbalances in employment demand. Serious imbalances developed between industry and academia. Another aspect was "Educational Reform." In earlier times, the cultivation of technical and professional talent provided Taiwan with many mid level technicians. But "Educational Reform" led vocational schools to restructure themselve as "Science and Technology Institutes," and to compete with ordinary universities. This led to a shortage of vocational school trained talent.

Yet another key was industry negativity. Industry passed the buck for the cultivation of talent onto the government and the schools. Big Business complained loudly about the "lack of talent." It insisted that "Young people are not good workers." It criticized the government and the schools. It assumed that the government and the schools were obligated to cultivate talent for its use. But it did nothing itself toward that end. It was as if Big Business did not have to assume any responsibility.

Admittedly, the problem has an even more important aspect. That is young peoples' willingness to cultivate their own talent. When the government offers bad policies, when Big Business has bad attitudes, when the educational system fails them, when economic growth slows, young people must not remain hothouse flowers. They must exercise intiative. They must flex their muscles. This is undoubtedly the best solution to their problems.

The new cabinet is currently taking office. The youngest premier in ROC history is assuming power. To renew emphasis on youth unemployment, and more aggressively confront the problems, this newspaper's "Vision Workshop" will publish a series of reports in the coming year, entitled, "Finding a Way for Youth." We hope to work with the government and the public to confront the problem of youth unemployment. We hope government and industry will not dwell exclusively on solving current problems, but look to the future, to the next ten or twenty years. What is our human resources strategy? What kind of talent will be needed In the world of the future? We hope they will consider the changes in population structure and industrial structure, and offer a roadmap for future talent. Only this will address the plight faced by today's talent.

搶救人才 台灣躍起
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.11 01:38 am

去年六月十八日本報系「願景工作室」特別企劃《關鍵兩年──台灣快轉》系列報導,經由跨國比較,勾勒過去、檢視現在,期許剛剛展開第二任期的馬英九總統,能運用這開始的關鍵兩年,讓台灣恢復成長動力,進而使經濟脫胎換骨。當時我們即明確指出,人才問題是迫切需要解決的課題,青年世代的困境能否紓解,尤是台灣能否永續發展的關鍵所在。

隨後人才議題逐漸受到朝野及社會各界重視,討論和建議聲音不斷。在這近九個月的時間中,我們也屢見政府官員分析相關問題,包括新任經建會主委管中閔曾指出,台灣在人才問題上有四大危機,包括人才供需落差、教育體制偏差僵化、人才培育不符需求,及國際人才競逐失利。

政府部門其實並不是不知道人才問題的嚴重性。兩年前政務委員朱敬一在接受訪問時就談到,人才外流不是現在才發生的問題,已經不是新聞了。但他也坦承在研究此議題之前,不知道台灣的人才地圖如此失衡。

也就在兩年前,中央研究院院長翁啟惠等人發表「人才宣言」,呼籲政府研擬對策。總統府也表示人才問題已到了國安層次,馬總統非常重視這個問題,早在二○一○年底就指示相關單位提出解決方案。行政院則強調,已核定「人才培育方案」,預計投入六百億元的經費,培養國家社會所需人才。

如今兩年過去了,台灣的人才問題卻不見有明顯改善,反而更形嚴重。況且,台灣的人才問題有許多面向,歸納起來大致可以分為用不上、留不住及進不來三大部分。其中又以青年世代問題的嚴重性最為凸顯。

環顧全球,青年世代的就業、失業,是個普遍性的問題。根據去年十月世界銀行公布《二○一三年世界發展報告》,全球約有兩億人處於失業狀態,其中七千五百萬人是二十五歲以下的青年。更有報告指出,全球約有六點二億青年人既不工作也沒有求學。比較來看,去年十二月台灣青年失業率為十二‧六%,竟是亞洲主要國家中最高者,而對照整體失業率四‧一八%,則達到了三倍。這也意味著,在台灣的青年,相對於整體社會更為弱勢。

如果說台灣青年失業率居高不下是果,其原因來自幾個關鍵。一是過去國家對於產業發展和人才戰略沒有規劃和願景,產業遲遲無法提升,導致人口結構的變化和就業需求類別,無法搭配,產學之間嚴重失衡。其次是教改的苦果,早期技職體系的發展,為台灣培養諸多中間階層的技術人員;然而,之後的教改,卻讓技職體系紛紛改制為科技大學,轉而跟普通大學競爭,也讓技職體系的人才出現斷層。

另一個關鍵,就是產業界的態度消極,多半將培養人才的責任推給政府和學校。特別是一些具有指標意義的大企業,通常會喊著「沒人才」、「年輕人不好用」,並對政府或學校提出非常多的批評和意見,以為人才就應該是政府和學校都幫他們培養好,他們只要拿來用就好,但反而沒有具體指出企業該做什麼,好像企業不用負起相當的責任。

誠然,還有一個更重要的關鍵,就是年輕人自我能力的培養。當政府政策面的改善、企業主的心態、教育制度的更新及經濟力提升都緩不濟急時,年輕人如何不被視為草莓族,而主動厚植自己的實力,無疑是解決自身問題的最佳利器。

值此新內閣就任、也是史上最年輕的行政院長上台之際,為了喚起各方再次重視青年問題,並能以更積極的態度和作為面對,本報系「願景工作室」正在連載策劃一年的「為青年尋路」系列報導,希望和台灣朝野各界一起攜手努力,正視並紓解青年世代問題。更期盼,我們的政府和產業界,不要只著眼於解決現在的問題,也要同時往前看,未來十年、二十年,我們的人才戰略是什麼,在未來世界中台灣需要什麼樣的人才,並同時考量人口結構和產業結構的變化,提出未來的人才地圖,讓現今台灣人才問題的種種困境有以救治。

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Referendum on 4NPP: Opportunity to Implement Absentee Balloting

Referendum on 4NPP:
Opportunity to Implement Absentee Balloting
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 8, 2013


Summary: The 4NPP referendum is an important democratic decision. No good reasons can be cited for opposition to absentee balloting via alternative balloting locations. Since the referendum on the 4NPP should be conducted through absentee balloting via alternative balloting locations, what reason can there be to oppose it during the presidential election? If absentee balloting can be implemented during the 4NPP referendum, perhaps we can established an alternative balloting locations system. This truly is a golden opportunity to advance the democratic process.

Full Text below:

The ruling and opposition parties are currently focused on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) Referendum. Because the referendum law has a high threshold, by design, the anti-nuclear camp objects. Xinbei City Mayor Eric Chu has used the occasion to promote absentee balloting. Premier Jiang Yi -hua has gone even further. He argues that the presidential and vice-presidential elections are also excellent opportunities for the implementation of absentee balloting. We agree. Absentee balloting will probably increase voter turnout for the 4NPP referendum. We should use this as an opportunity to implement absentee balloting for the presidential election and other national level elections.

The referendum on the 4NPP is an golden opportunity for people to consider absentee balloting. The process of weighing the pros and cons of the referendum will increase voter turnout. Along with absentee balloting, the higher turnout will more accurately reflect public sentiment. Whatever the result of the referendum on the 4NPP is, it will have greater credibility and legitimacy. Since absentee balloting will have this effect on the 4NPP referendum, it will have the same effect on the presidential election.

In response to Eric Chu's proposal, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang said "The promotion of absentee balloting can be considered." But he opposed the application of absentee balloting to the election law or to presidential elections. He said the ruling party should not shift the focus from the referendum on the 4NPP.

Su Tseng-chang says he is "willing to consider" absentee balloting for the 4NPP referendum. He says "This facilitates the people exercising their rights as citizens." But if voting in the 4NPP referendum "facilitates the people exercising their rights as citizens," why refuse to apply it to other elections? Especially in the most straightforward kind of election of all -- presidential elections?

The DGBAS has investigated the issue. At least 15% of the people live away from their voting districts. The Ministry of the Interior has also made preliminary estimates. The 15% includes election officials, on duty police officers, military personnel, those who work away from home, and students. Altogether, they amount to 1.2 million people. Obviously facilitating 1.2 million people or 15% of the voters in the exercise of their voting rights during a referendum or presidential election, will have a decisive impact on the results. To uphold citizens' right to participate in the political process, and to accurately reflect public sentiment, clearly absentee balloting should be implemented.

The 4NPP referendum can become a valid referendum. The key is whether the one half threshold can be met, whether enough voters can be included via absentee balloting. There is near unanimous support between the ruling and opposition parties. The Ministry of the Interior should pick up the pace of deliberations. It must not miss this opportunity to implement absentee balloting for the very first time. As for extending absentee balloting to other elections, notwithstanding DPP concerns about transparency and ballot distribution procedures, these can all be overcome technically.

Absentee balloting is divided into mail in balloting, proxy balloting, advance balloting, designated balloting locations, and alternative balloting locations. The Democratic Progressive Party vehemently objects to mail in balloting originating abroad or with Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. But the Ministry of the Interior made clear long ago that absentee balloting would not adopt mail in balloting. Instead, it would promote alternative balloting locations.

So-called alternative balloting locations accomodate voters who find polling day inconvenient or who live away from their voting districts. It enables voters to transfer to an alternative location prior to an election, enabling them to fully exercise their voting rights. Such a system allows students, office workers, or laborers, to transfer their balloting locations to nearby locales. They need not rush back to their voting districts. Su Tseng-chang paid lip service to "facilitating the peoples' exercise of their rights as citizens." This is not mail in balloting. It does not apply to overseas Chinese or Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. This is not mail in balloting or proxy voting. It ensures that all absentee balloting is performed on Taiwan and in person.

Transferring to an alternative balloting location is feasible given the maturity of our electoral system, Risks can be minimized. This can uphold the constitutional provisions which stipulate "The people have the freedom to live and move about wherever they wish" and "The people have basic human rights, including election, recall, initiative, and referendum."

Absentee balloting is important to the full implementation of our constitutional rights. In principle they ought to apply in all elections, rather than be limited to "special cases" such as the 4NPP referendum. Of course, the "seven in one elections" at end of next year involves many issues and many voters. They are local level elections. Implementing absentee balloting for them may be too difficult. But a national referendum, or a presidential election involve the same constituencies. The balloting process is simple. They are entirely suited to the implementation of absentee balloting.

This newspaper's editorials have repeatedly called for preliminary steps toward the implementation of alternative balloting locations. These could be limited to central government elections for the president and legislators. The current electoral system lacks absentee balloting. It fails to uphold civil liberties and peoples' right to participate in the political process. Failure to ensure civil liberties and the peoples' right to participate in the political process is already a a constitutional violation. If absentee balloting can be implemented for the 4NPP referendum, it will upgrade Taiwan's democracy. After all, absentee balloting is standard practice in over 90% of the world's democracies.

The 4NPP referendum is an important democratic decision. No good reasons can be cited for opposition to absentee balloting via alternative balloting locations. Since the referendum on the 4NPP should be conducted through absentee balloting via alternative balloting locations, what reason can there be to oppose it during the presidential election? If absentee balloting can be implemented during the 4NPP referendum, perhaps we can established an alternative balloting locations system. This truly is a golden opportunity to advance the democratic process.

讓核四公投成為不在籍投票的起點
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.08 03:53 am

朝野聚焦核四公投,而因公投法的高門檻設計,引發反核陣營抨擊,新北市長朱立倫順勢拋出「不在籍投票」,行政院長江宜樺則進一步表示正副總統選舉與公投是實施不在籍投票很好的起點。我們也認為,應以不在籍投票提高核四公投的投票率,並藉此成為總統大選等全國性選舉不在籍投票的試辦起點。

核四公投是國人省思不在籍投票機制的良機。因為正反雙方皆主張「催票」,而經由不在籍投票,愈高的投票率愈能反映公民的參與,可使核四公投的結果更具公信力及正當性。不在籍投票用於核四公投,既有此效應;則用於總統選舉,自亦有此效應。

對於朱立倫的主張,民進黨主席蘇貞昌在第一時間表示「推動境內的不在籍投票是可以考慮的方向」,但反對將不在籍投票應用於選罷法或總統大選,理由之一是執政黨不該轉移核四公投的焦點。

蘇貞昌認為,核四公投採不在籍投票「可以考慮」,其理由是「方便國人行使公民權」。然而,若不在籍投票在核四公投可「方便國人行使公民權」,則為何不可用於其他選舉,也「方便國人行使公民權」,尤其是選票最單純的總統大選?

主計處曾調查,台灣地區至少有百分之十五民眾戶籍地與現居地不一致。內政部也初估,包括選務人員、值勤警察、軍人、在外工作、就學者共約一百廿萬人。顯而易見,在公投或總統大選中,這一百廿萬人或十五趴的選民,能否便利行使投票權,自對投票結果會有決定性的影響。為了維護公民參政權與準確反映民意,皆應推行不在籍投票。

核四公投能否成為「有效公投」,關鍵在於投票率是否跨過二分之一的投票門檻,如能納入不在籍投票,通過機會大增,朝野也幾乎一致支持,內政部應該加快腳步研議,以免誤了首度實施不在籍投票的良機。至於不在籍投票擴大適用於選舉,雖有民進黨人士擔憂的透明度、領票程序等問題,卻可從技術上克服。

不在籍投票分為「通訊投票」、「代理投票」、「提前投票」、「指定投票所投票」、「移轉投票」等。其中,最被民進黨質疑的是海外僑民或在大陸台商的通訊投票;但內政部早已表明,不在籍投票實施初期並不考慮納入通訊投票,而是優先推動「移轉投票」。

所謂移轉投票,即考慮選民在投票日不便或不能到戶籍地親自投票者,容許選舉人事先向選務機關申請移轉投票處所,以便就地行使投票權利。這種制度,可讓具有投票資格的學生、上班族或勞動者,就近在申請移轉的投票所輕鬆投票,不必趕返戶籍地,正是蘇貞昌口中的「方便國人行使公民權」。且因這非「通訊投票」,不適用於海外華僑或對岸台商,亦即不採「通訊投票」或「代理投票」,也可確保是「境內」及「親身」的不在籍投票。

移轉投票須事先申請,以我國選務運作的成熟度,應可將流弊降至最低,卻能積極保障憲法規定的「人民有居住及遷徙之自由」、「人民有選舉、罷免、創制及複決之權」等基本人權。

不在籍投票既是實踐憲法公民權的重要設計,理論上,即應成為各項選舉的「通例」,而非限於公投的「特例」。當然,像明年底的「七合一」選舉,因為選舉項目多、選票數也多,且為地方性選舉,實施不在籍投票相對複雜;但在全國性公投之外,總統選舉也是全國同屬一個選區,選票最單純,也是最適合實施不在籍投票的選舉。

本報社論多次呼籲,移轉投票實施初期,可限於總統及立委兩項中央級選舉;而現行選制少了不在籍投票,未能積極保障公民的自由權及參政權,其實已有違憲之虞。如今,若能在核四公投設置移轉投票,將使台灣的民主規制更上層樓,畢竟這已是世界上九成以上民主國家的通制。

核四公投是極為重大的民主抉擇,可說已舉不出反對不在籍移轉投票的道理;而既然核四公投應當採行移轉投票,則總統大選又有何理由排斥不在籍投票?倘能因核四公投,確立不在籍移轉投票的制度,這真是民主深化的珍貴機遇!

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Pyongyang: Diversion or Detriment?

Pyongyang: Diversion or Detriment?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 7, 2013


Summary: Today the UN Security Council will vote on whether to impose sanctions on North Korea for conducting nuclear tests. Washington and Beijing have already reached an agreement. The motion to impose sanctions on North Korea will pass. On March 5, North Korea announced in response that it would nullify the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, and cut telephone links between the two sides' military forces at Panmunjom. Suddenly, tensions on the Korean peninsula escalated dramatically.

Full Text below:

Today the UN Security Council will vote on whether to impose sanctions on North Korea for conducting nuclear tests. Washington and Beijing have already reached an agreement. The motion to impose sanctions on North Korea will pass. On March 5, North Korea announced in response that it would nullify the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, and cut telephone links between the two sides' military forces at Panmunjom. Suddenly, tensions on the Korean peninsula escalated dramatically.

In 1953, during the Korean War, the warring parties met in Panmunjom and signed the Korean Armistice Agreement. But numerous problems remained unresolved. The two sides have yet to sign a peace agreement. They have however, abided by a number of unwritten norms. Occasional conflicts have erupted, both large and small. But for the most part, peace has prevailed for the past 60 years.

Over the past month however, the atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula has changed. NBA star Dennis Rodman reportedly said, "He [Kim Jong-un] wants Obama to do one thing, call him." But U.S. sanctions are already in motion. There is no turning back. The White House said it "cannot encourage North Korea's bad behavior."

In fact, North Korea cannot use the sanctions as an excuse to declare war on South Korea or the United States. Between 2009 and 2010, North Korea twice proclaimed that it would cease to be bound by the Korean Armistice Agreement. This is the third time it said it would nullify the agreement. Its real intent is intimidation and blackmail. North Korea has declared that "It may strike at any time, against any target." It is protesting the United States-South Korean joint exercises scheduled to begin on the 11th. It simultaneously announced that Pyongyang would counter by holding joint land, sea, and air military exercises in the East China Sea.

For the moment, the two sides are merely bluffing. Neither side really wishes to commence hostilities. The United States is still fighting two wars that have not ended. North Korea is utterly impoverished. But its empty bravado nevertheless increases tensions. It inevitably reduces the room for error.

The most dangerous place for the two sides' military exercises is at sea. North Korea has long disputed the maritime boundary between North and South Korea. It feels the boundary was unilaterally set by the United States and South Korea. Recently North Korea's "Tatung Two" semi-submersibles have been active near the demarcation line. South Korea's military is worried. This type of submarine is extremely small. It is equipped with only two torpedoes. It is not easily detectable. One of them was responsible for sinking the Cheonan.

Reconnaissance General Bureau Deputy Chief Kim Yeong cheol declared that North Korea would nullify the armistice agreement. Reconnaissance General Bureau agents are responsible for infiltration, assassination, and sabotage against South Korea. The 2010 Cheonan Incident and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island were planned and executed by the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Now that the bureau has been assigned to provoke an incident, there is no guarantee that the Cheonan incident will not repeat itself.

North Korea is banging the wardrums. The situation for Beijing is embarrassing. Just before North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, the Mainland authorities repeatedly summoned North Korea's ambassador to Beijing, and called for restraint. They urged North Korea not to conduct the tests. But North Korea ignored them. On New Years Day Plus Three, it want ahead with the tests. Mainland Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi immediately lodged a powerful and  unprecedented protest with the North Korean ambassador. The public on the Mainland said that North Korea's action must not be tolerated, and that it must be punished.

Beijing's most pressing diplomatic problem is the Diaoyutai Islands. Wang Yi's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs is an indicator. Logically speaking, provocations by Pyongyang on the Korean peninsula should encourage the United States and Japan to ease pressure on Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands. It should divert their attention. But Beijing apparently sees Pyongyang's move as a sore spot. It feels Pyongyang is dragging Beijing down with it. Therefore it has gotten tough on Pyongyang, in order to smooth over the joint United States - Japan containment of the Diayoutai Islands. One might say Beijing is using Pyongyang's move for its own ends.

The current sanctions have yet to be imposed. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice spent three weeks discussing the issue with Mainland China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong. She wanted to make sure that the US had the support and cooperation of the Mainland. The US knows the Mainland has the ability to discipline North Korea.

For example, after a string of international sanctions, North Korea's financial network collapsed, even in Switzerland and Macao. Only one network remained operational, on Mainland China. If one truly wishes to have the Security Council prohibit "illicit funds," from North Korea, one must obtain the cooperation of the Mainland. If Beijing shuts off the Yalu River oil pipeline, or prevents food trucks from entering North Korea, Pyongyang will be seriously threatened. This is why Mainland Chinese agreement on sanctions can have a significant impact on North Korea.

Following the Korean War, North Korea and Mainland China signed the "PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance." The Treaty states that if one of the signatories "finds itself in a state of war, the other signatory shall immediately do its best to provide military and other assistance." In other words, in the event war erupts, the Chinese mainland is "automatically obligated to intervene." But if North Korea nullifies the armistice, then forces Beijing to take a stand, it may be indulging in wishful thinking. Beijing cannot possibly simultaneously collide with the US and Japan on both the Korean peninsula and the Diaoyutai Islands. It has no choice. It must agree to the U.S.-Japan sanctions against Pyongyang.

North Korea's move has impacted the situation in Northeast Asia. It has also impacted the long-term relationship between the United States and Mainland China, and the return of the United States to the Asian-Pacific region. The Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute has also been affected. Taiwan is within the storm circle. It must pay close attention. It must offer a careful response.

平壤圍魏救趙或拖人下水
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.07 02:57 am

聯合國安理會今日將對北韓核試爆制裁案表決,由於會前華府和北京已達成協議,制裁案勢可通過。對此,北韓率先於五日宣布,要將一九五三年簽訂的「韓戰停戰協定」作廢,並切斷板門店兩軍間的電話聯繫,一時間,朝鮮半島緊張局勢驟然升高。

韓戰交戰雙方於一九五三年板門店簽署了《朝鮮停戰協定》,但因許多問題相持不下,至今尚未簽署和平協定;不過,雙方素有不成文規範,雖然間有大小衝突,仍然維持了長達六十年的大體和平。

過去一個月,朝鮮半島的氣氛曾一度轉緩,NBA球星羅德曼傳話表示:「金正恩說,只希望能夠和歐巴馬通個電話。」但是美國的制裁已經箭在弦上,白宮強調,「不能鼓勵朝鮮的壞行為」。

其實,北韓不可能藉此向南韓或美國宣戰,之前二○○九年與二○一○年時,北韓也曾兩度表示不再受停戰協定約束,這第三次甚至宣布廢止協定,應仍以恫嚇訛詐的成分居多;北韓宣稱「可在任意時刻對任意對象實施打擊」,目的在對十一日將開始的美國與南韓聯合演習嗆聲,並宣布在同一時間,平壤將在東海實施相抗衡的陸海空聯合軍演。

此際,雙方應當只是虛張聲勢,誰也不想真的開打;美國還有兩場戰爭尚未收場,北韓更是民窮財盡。但儘管是虛張聲勢,也使緊張升高,不免導致緩衝空間減少。

雙方演習最危險的地點是海上,北韓一直對南北韓的海上分界線有異議,認為是美國與南韓單方面畫定的,近日發現北韓的「大同二級」半潛艇,已經在分界線附近活動,南韓軍方非常擔心,此型潛艇體積小,僅搭載二枚魚雷,不易被發現,卻曾是擊沉天安艦的兇手。

此次代表北韓軍方宣布廢止停戰協定的是偵察總局局長金永哲,偵察總局是對南韓進行間諜滲透與暗殺破壞的總指揮,二○一○年的天安艦事件與延坪島炮擊,偵察總局皆是主要的策畫執行者,現在似又負起挑釁的任務,難保天安艦事件不會重演。

北韓擂起戰鼓,北京的處境最為尷尬。北韓進行第三次核試前,大陸就多次召見北韓駐北京大使,要求克制,不要進行試爆。結果北韓不理,大年初三進行試爆後,大陸外交部長楊潔篪立即史無前例的對北韓大使提出強烈抗議,大陸輿論更強烈表示不應縱容,必須懲戒北韓。

北京目前最燙手的外交難題是釣魚台,王毅出任外交部長即是指標。照理說,平壤在朝鮮半島尋釁,或許會使美日在釣島問題上對北京相對鬆手,因而有「圍魏救趙」之功。但北京似視平壤此舉為哪壺不開提哪壺,拖人下水,反而以對平壤強硬,來平緩美日在釣島的圍堵,也可說是打蛇隨棍上,利用了平壤的動作。

這次制裁案提出前,美國駐聯合國大使萊斯,花了三星期與大陸駐聯合國大使李保東磋商,就是希望確保大陸的支持與配合,因為大陸手中,還是有可以懲戒北韓的工具。

例如:在歷經過去多次的國際制裁後,北韓的金融網路已經在世界各地,包括瑞士、澳門等地瓦解,唯一還在運作的,只剩下在中國大陸的金融體系,如果真要達到安理會禁止「非法資金」的效果,必須取得大陸方面的配合。何況,倘若北京關掉鴨綠江上的輸油管,或者不准糧食卡車進入北韓,平壤就深受威脅。這就是為什麼大陸同意制裁,可能對北韓產生重大影響的緣故。

依據韓戰後北韓與中國簽訂的《中朝友好互助條約》,其中規定:一旦締約一方「處於戰爭狀態時,締約另一方應立即盡其全力給予軍事及其他援助」。也就是說,依據這項條約,如果戰爭爆發後,中國大陸有義務「自動介入」。然而,北韓此次若是以廢止停戰協議的宣布,欲逼迫北京表態;這可能是一廂情願,北京不可能在朝鮮半島及釣島兩處皆與美日交惡,只有以同意制裁平壤向美日表態。

北韓的舉動不僅衝擊東北亞局勢,更會牽動美國與中國大陸的長遠關係,且美國重返亞太、釣魚台主權爭議,都會受到影響。台灣亦處暴風圈中,必須密切注意,小心因應。

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Electrical Power Generation on Taiwan for the Next Fifty Years

Electrical Power Generation on Taiwan for the Next Fifty Years
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2013


Summary: Taiwan is hardly alone. Is anyone in the world really "pro-nuclear?" That has long been a huge question mark. In any public referendum on the issue, opponents of nuclear power generation will attempt to seize the environmental and safety high ground. Conversely, those who support the continued use of nuclear power generation, have a different take on nuclear safety. They should not be demonized as "pro-nuclear." The two sides must respect each others' posititions.

Full Text below:

Taiwan is hardly alone. Is anyone in the world really "pro-nuclear?" That has long been a huge question mark. In any public referendum on the issue, opponents of nuclear power generation will attempt to seize the environmental and safety high ground. Conversely, those who support the continued use of nuclear power generation, have a different take on nuclear safety. They should not be demonized as "pro-nuclear." The two sides must respect each others' posititions.

The current referendum asks voters whether they support "a construction halt on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP)," not whether they support "the abolition of nuclear power generation." The 4NPP issue involves several paradoxes worth pondering. One. The 4NPP is a new power plant featuring new equipment. In the event it is shut down, three older nuclear power plants will be forced to operate overtime. Shutting down the new plant, while continuing to use the old plants, is contrary to the stated goals of the anti-nuke crowd. If a public referendum suddenly shuts down the 4NPP, will operating the older plants overtime increase the nuclear risk? In recent days, residents adjoining the 1NPP and 2NPP have expressed intense dissatisfaction. They are demanding that these two power plants be included in the referendum. This has undermined the legitimacy of the referendum.

Two. Many people think that Taipower built the 4NPP in haste. They lack confidence in the Atomic Energy Council's oversight. But who has been in charge of 1NPP, 2NPP, and 3NPP for the past 30 years? Who indeed, but Taipower and the Atomic Energy Council? Also, many of these same people have argued that Taiwan must be more industrially self-reliant. The 4NPP, it was decided, would not be a turnkey operation, contracted out to a foreign company. So why are these same people automatically poormouthing the 4NPP as "slapped together?" Shouldn't they be applauding it as reliance on our own local technology? Do people consider the management of the three older nuclear power plants more or less reliable? Doesn't Taipower have 30 years of accumulated experience? Would Taipower really willfully disregard the safety of the 4NPP, which is located a mere 30km from the nation's capital?

Three. Regardless of the outcome, the current referendum will push Taiwan onto a "non-nuclear" path. It is no longer possible to build any new nuclear power plants on Taiwan. Yet for the past decade or so, the ruling and opposition parties have continued to cross swords over the 4NPP. Neither side has ever proposed a serious alternative. This includes planning for alternative energy sources, comparisions with renewable energy sources, transformation of energy-consuming industries, or timetables for the phasing out of nuclear power plants. None of these have been investigated. Once construction on the 4NPP is halted, electricity rates will skyrocket. Even bigger problems will loom. They include restrictions on power usage, power failures, or power rationing by region. The political parties may unseat each other one after the other. But neither the Blue nor Green camps are prepared for what is to come. The anti-nuclear crowd, alas, has no answers whatsoever.

Assume for a moment that the public is willing to tolerate sky high electricity prices, endure the summer heat without air conditioners, and light candles at night. Once power shortages begin, they will encounter far greater inconveniences than these. For example, nearly completed articles on one's PC screen may be lost when the power goes out. Lights in the night markets or public parks may go out. This is not alarmism. If the 1NPP and 2NPP are decommissioned as scheduled, in five years, Taiwan will face a power shortage. Greater Taipei in particular has long relied on "southern electricity delivered to the north." The inevitable consequence will be power rationing by region. This is something the public had better realize in advance.

The abolition of nuclear power generation cannot be implemented overnight. Germany wants to go nonnuclear. It has established a 20 year timetable, to be implemented step by step. Some think that Taiwan can step up the construction of natural gas or coal-fired power plants, or increase reliance on wind power, solar power, and other renewable energy resources. They think that five years from now they will be able to avoid any disaster resulting from power shortages. But plant planning requires time. Taiwan is wracked by internal dissent. The construction of any sort of power plants will invite protests from local residents or environmental groups. Merely acquiring the land and meeting EIA will be hard enough. The construction process will also be dogged by unknowns. So-called stepping up the construction of alternative power plants is not really feasible. It is not something one can realistically anticipate.

The great debate over the 4NPP has yet to begin. The public need not rush to judgment. It should take five to ten years to reach a conclusion. It should examine the measures and countermeasures set forthy by the ruling and opposition parties, and by environmental groups. It should consider how their lives will be affected. Only then should it reach a decision. If this five to ten year transition period cannot be successfully negotiated, then neither can the road beyond.

It is the responsibility of the ruling party to clarify the pros and cons. It must not intimidate the public. It must not use the referendum to excuse its own mess. The DPP conversely, has a responsibility to offer a comprehensive alternative in the event the 4NPP is shut down. It must explain how it will solve the problems that would arise. Only this can prove that its advocacy of a nuclear-free homeland is not empty posturing for political advantage. Environmental groups must not blindly oppose Taipower and nuclear power generation. They must offer concrete energy-saving proposals. They must prove that the abolition of nuclear power generation will not result in a shortage of electricity.

After prolonged agitation, the ruling and opposition parties have agreed to maximize voter turnout for the referendum on the 4NPP, to ensure that the referendum truly represents public opinion. Only then can the result resolve the controversy. To achieve this goal, the ruling and opposition parties mus earnestly advance their own programs. They must allow the public to evaluate them. They may even wish to implement absentee voting. The referendum should not be linked to any election. This is one way to increase voter turnout. This is also an opportunity to test the effectiveness of absentee voting.

A public referendum on 4NPP has touched off a great debate. It has not provided a convenient escape. If the public fails to fully evaluate its choices, it could easily arrive at the wrong decision, and run headlong into a situation it never imagined.

以五至十年的跨度想像台灣電力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.06 03:25 am

不僅台灣,世界上究竟還存不存在所謂的「擁核」者,早就是個大問號。因此,未來的核四公投,主廢者站穩了高調的環保及安全的道德立場;相對的,反對停建者則是對核安風險有不同的評估,不該被指為「擁核」而妖魔化。這是正反雙方必須維持的基本尊重。

這次公投,以「停建核四」而非「廢核」為訴求,其題目本身其實存在著幾個「悖論」,值得深思。第一,核四是設備較新的電廠,一旦廢建,將迫使三個舊的核電廠必須延役運轉。且不談「廢新續舊」的矛盾,但若藉由公投一舉停廢了核四,會不會因舊廠「超限運轉」反而提高核安風險?連日來,已有核一二廠附近居民大表不滿,要求將兩電廠也納入公投,暴露了公投正當性的困窘。

第二,許多人認為,台電建核四的草率及原能會的監督讓人難以信任;但卅多年來負責核一二三廠運轉安全的,不也正是台電和原能會嗎?此外,人們常主張產業發展必須提高自主技術,為何核四建廠未採整廠方式交付外商統包,就被指為「拼裝」,而不是已建立若干自有技術?假設民眾認為前三座核電廠的管理基本可靠,台電憑其卅多年積累之經驗,難道會「故意」罔顧距離首都僅卅公里的核四安全?

第三,不論結局如何,此一公投都將把台灣推向「非核」之路,不可能再新建核電廠。但朝野十多年來為核四不斷交鋒,雙方卻從未認真提出完整的替代方案,包括替代能源的規劃、再生能源的比重、耗能產業的轉型,乃至核電廠除退役的時程,均付諸闕如。一旦核四停建,除了電價上漲的衝擊,更大的問題將是限電、斷電或分區供電。不論政黨如何輪替,藍綠陣營對此其實都沒有準備,反核團體對此恐怕也不會有答案。

亦即,就算民眾準備好要迎接高電價,準備好忍受夏季的高溫而不開冷氣,準備好點著蠟燭過夜,但一旦進入缺電階段,真實的遭遇可能比這些更不好受。例如:快寫好的文案,啪一聲消失在電腦;乃至夜市或公園的燈,再也無法明亮。這並不是危言聳聽,如果核一核二如期除役,五年內台灣就要面臨電力不足,尤其一向倚賴「南電北調」的大台北,勢必實施分區限電,這是民眾必須具備的認知。

廢核或反核,都不是一蹴可幾的事。德國要達成非核的目標,訂下廿年的期程,須一步步走完。有人認為,台灣可以加緊興建天然氣或燃煤電廠,或者增加風力、太陽能等再生能源比重,如此,五年後或可避免缺電之災。但任何電廠的規劃都需要相當時間,何況以台灣內部爭議之多端,建什麼電廠不會引起當地居民或環保團體的抗爭?光是土地取得及環評即困難重重,遑論建廠過程中還有層層變數。所謂加緊興建替代電廠,恐怕是緩不濟急,難以期待。

核四公投的大辯論還沒開始,民眾此刻不必急於選擇答案,而應以五到十年的跨度為設想,看看朝野或環保團體各能提出什麼對策,想想自己未來的生活將受到什麼影響,再作選擇。如果不能平順走過這五至十年的「過渡期」,再往前的路也會走不下去。

執政黨的責任,是把利弊得失及輕重緩急說明清楚,不可恫嚇百姓,也不能把公投當成自己收拾殘局的下台階。至於民進黨,則必須就廢核四之後的電力供需提出一套完整的對策,說明自己的解決方案為何,才能證明它主張的非核家園不是喊假的。而環保團體除了一味否定台電及核能,也該提出更具體的節能主張,說明廢核為何不會導致缺電。

經過多日激盪,朝野各方都同意應設法提高核四公投投票率,使其成為一個「有效公投」,才能收解疑定紛之效。要達到這個目標,除了朝野應切實提出各自的方案,供民眾比較參考,不妨趁此實施「不在籍投票」。在不綁選舉的情況下,這是提高投票率的有效手段,也是不在籍投票試劍的良機。

核四公投,啟動的是一個龐大的辯論,而不是提供一個便捷的出口。未經思辨的民眾,極可能走錯出口,而撞上自己不想面對的景象。

Monday, March 4, 2013

Nuclear Safety Can Be Controlled, Electricity Prices Cannot

Nuclear Safety Can Be Controlled, Electricity Prices Cannot
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 5, 2013

Summary: Nuclear safety concerns have many worried. But no one disputes the low price of nuclear power generation. Nuclear safety is relative. One may have nuclear safety concerns. But many countries continue to champion the use of nuclear energy, on condition that nuclear power safety measures are imposed. Electricity prices are inflexible. When the risks and rewards are weighed, more major nations support nuclear power than oppose it. In other words, nuclear safety can be controlled. Electricity prices cannot.

Full Text below:

Yesterday's editorial on nuclear safety posed a number of questions. Today' editorial weighs the benefits and deficits of nuclear energy. It compares the pros and cons.

Nuclear safety concerns have many worried. But no one disputes the low price of nuclear power generation. Nuclear safety is relative. One may have nuclear safety concerns. But many countries continue to champion the use of nuclear energy, on condition that nuclear power safety measures are imposed. Electricity prices are inflexible. When the risks and rewards are weighed, more major nations support nuclear power than oppose it. In other words, nuclear safety can be controlled. Electricity prices cannot.

The Jiang Cabinet has asked Taipower to carefully calculate electricity prices in the event the 4NPP is shut down. The numbers provided are objective, and have a scientific basis. But quantifying the psychological, social, and economic impact of rising electricity prices is not so easy.

If possible, one might want to implement a one year "non-nuclear" trial period. Then perhaps one could be certain whether society would really be willing to live with the consequences.

Japan, which has undergone two years of turmoil, is a clear example. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 54 nuclear power plants were completely shut down. The Japanese government is attempting to reduce the demand for electricity. But industrial use of electricity is up over 20%, and household use of electricity is up 15%. Japan's government has spent one trillion NT purchasing natural gas from all over the world. The result has been the first trade deficit in 30 years. Last year, Japan's nuclear power plants suspended all operations. Summer peak electricity rates rose fourfold. Industry was forced to scale down operations. That was the key reason Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the rebooting of nuclear power generation.

Simply put, there is no readily available alternative source of cheap energy. The impact of shutting down nuclear power plants is not limited to electricity rates. It is comprehensive, and impacts people's livelihood and economic development. Some have estimated that electricity rates on Taiwan in the event it goes non-nuclear, will double. There is also the risk of blackouts. Unfortunately this not alarmism. Maintaining a stable power supply is among the highest priorities for national security.

Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany announced total denuclearization by 2020. Germany can do this because back it decided to adopt a non-nuclear policy way back in 1998, and and gradually began phasing out its nuclear power plants. It adopted a three-pronged approach. It passed laws limiting new nuclear power plants, imposed energy conservation, and developed new renewable energy sources. Germany will have to pay a high price in international competitiveness. Only then will it be able to establish a non-nuclear environment. Another key is that the German power grid is linked to the French power grid. When it lacks electricity, it can purchase electricity generated by nuclear power plants in France. Nevertheless German electricity rates have risen repeatedly. The government has been forced to subsidize electricity costs for the poor.

ROC electricity rates are clearly low relative to other nations. Yet the public backlash in April of last year over rate increases, far exceeded expectations. In this case, the power supply was unaffected. Now imagine a shortfall in the power supply, rate hikes, brownouts, and power outages. The likely impact will be economic, political, and social unrest.

A large percentage of industrial production remains energy-intensive. One must face this fact. Even assuming one wishes to phase out these industries, one must do so gradually. Moreover, workers in these energy-intensive industries are among the most economically disadvantaged. Changing the structure of industry requires discrimination. So-called "changing the structure of industry" is not as easy as most people imagine. . Taiwan's main economic competitors, such as South Korea, Japan and Mainland China, all rely on nuclear power generation.

Taiwan's independent power grid cannot interact with its neighbors' to meet each other's energy needs. Taiwan has virtually no indigenous energy sources. Conditions for electrical power generation are poor. The government has promoted liberalization of the electrical power generation industry since 1995. But so far electrical energy sources remain limited. Global warming considerations require a reduced carbon footprint. The majority of aging, coal-fired power plants are being replaced by gas-fired ones. Taiwan has no indigenous energy sources. It is subject to the limitations of global energy struggles.

The biggest problem with Taiwan's electrical energy generation is base load power shortages. The use of gas-fired plants is increasing. Last year, natural gas purchases increased 25% over the year before. This equals 42.3 billion NT. This is close to the limit amidst the global grab for natural gas. Suppose we suddenly promote non-nuclear power generation? Where will we get the natural gas to make up for the 20% gap previously met by nuclear energy? We suffer from low energy autonomy. We have few cards to play in our attempt to promote a nuclear-free homeland.

Progress in wind power, solar power, biomass, and other renewable energy sources remains limited. The main reason is that the development potential sources is limited. Electricity is used mainly in the cities. Cities lack the conditions necessary for the development of renewable energy. The Taipower grid sends electricty generated in the south to the north, and electricity generated in the west to the east. Power losses are considerable. This increases the difficulty of Taipower electricity restructuring.

The government has established a goal of a non-nuclear Taiwan. But it has not established a timetable. The reason is Taiwan's environmental limitations. Preparation for a non-nuclear Taiwan. requires gradually reducing reliance on nuclear energy, increasing the efficiency of the electrical generation system, maximizing the benefits from each kilowatt of power, and reducing demand for electricity,

Should the 4NPP be shut down? The decision must not be made solely on the basis of whether one is anti or pro-nuclear. Going non-nuclear could be a path from which there is no return. Taiwan's political and economic future could end up on that same path of no return.

Recall what happened on Japan following March 11. Then examine Shinzo Abe's nuclear power policy.
  
核安可以控制 電價不能控制
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.05 07:48 am

昨日社論對核安提出質疑,今日試略論核能的效益,以對照比較正反雙方的觀點。

核電的安全顧慮使人憂心,但核電的低電價卻無可異議。核安是相對的,因此即使有核安顧慮,仍有國家主張在維持核安下使用核電;電價卻是絕對的,這也是之所以在比較風險及利益下,在重要國家中,支持核電的國家超過廢核非核者。也就是說,核安可以控制,但電價不能控制。

江內閣要求台電仔細計算若停建核四可能的電價波動,數值試算當然有一定的科學依據,但恐怕不易衡量電價上漲後對社會心理及經濟活動的影響。

其實,如果可能的話,可以試行一年的「無核電電價」,也許始能知道社會的接受度與承受力究竟如何。

日本這兩年的動盪是眼前的例子。福島核災後五十四座核電廠全關的短暫期間,雖然政府極力壓低電力需求,但工業用電電價仍上漲百分之二十多,家庭用電漲百分之十五,在全球蒐購天然氣斥資達一兆台幣之鉅,因而造成了三十餘年來首見的貿易赤字。去年,日本核電廠全數暫停運轉,夏季尖峰電價大漲四倍,產業界被迫縮減生產規模;這正是安倍晉三首相宣布重啟核電的關鍵考量。

簡單說,在沒有新的低廉能源替補情況下,關掉核電廠對國家影響絕不只是電價一項,將是全面性的,從民生日用到經濟發展。曾有人估算台灣非核後電價可能會調漲一倍,且有停電的風險,這恐怕不是危言聳聽,穩定供電必須以國安層次的高度來考量。

福島核災後,德國宣布二○二○年全面非核,德國能這麼做,是因早在一九九八年確定非核政策後即逐步做廢核準備;立法限制核電廠新設、節能、發展再生能源三管齊下,再加上德國具有承受高電價的國際競爭力,始能逐步建構廢核環境。另一個關鍵,德國電網與法國併聯,缺電可以向法國買核電;但德國電價仍因而連番上漲,政府甚至須補貼基層民眾的電費。

台灣的電價無疑是國際上的低水平,但去年四月的調高電價,民眾的反彈即遠超出預期,這還是供電品質未受影響的狀況;設若在供電準備不足情況下,調漲電價、限電、停電接連發生,可能的影響將是經濟、政治及社會動盪。

再者,產業結構還有相當比例的耗能工業,這是必須正視的事實;即便要淘汰這些產業,也必須循序漸進;何況,耗能產業從業人口多是經濟弱勢,改變產業結構的作為需更細緻。所謂「調整產業結構」,絕非如一般人想像之容易。何況,台灣的主要經濟競爭者,如韓、日及大陸,皆核電國。

台灣的獨立電網(未與鄰國互通有無),以及幾乎全無自產能源,電力環境相對艱困。雖然從民國八十四年起推動電業自由化,但迄今電力的開源仍相當有限;尤其地球暖化帶動減碳風潮的考慮下,多數燃煤機組老化後改以燃氣電廠取代,這又觸及台灣無自產能源、全球能源戰爭的限制。

台灣電力結構目前最大的問題,是基載電力不足,燃氣機組不斷增加,讓去年的天然氣採購較前年多出四分之一,達四百二十三億元,這幾乎已是全球搶氣的極限;如果驟然推動非核,要到哪裡買氣去填補近百分之二十的核電?在能源自主性低的情況下,推動非核家園的籌碼相對不足。

另個問題,是風電、太陽能、生質能等再生能源迄今進度有限,主要原因是發展場域潛力有限;加以用電主體在城市,多不具備再生能源發展條件,靠台電的電網南電北輸、西電東送,電力的流失相當可觀,這也增加台電電力結構調整的困難度。

政府目前以非核為目標,但不訂時間表,是因為台灣電力環境的先天限制。在逐步推動減核的過程,增加電力系統的有效度,讓每度電帶來的效益極大化,相對也就降低電力需求,這正是非核準備的一環。

停建核四與否,不應只是反核或擁核而已;若等廢核非核走上了不歸路,台灣的政治與經濟或許也走上一條不歸路。

想一想三一一的發生國日本,看一看安倍晉三的核電政策。

Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Fact vs. Fiction

Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Fact vs. Fiction
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2013


Summary: The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) can neither advance nor retreat. This dilemma was caused by lingering concerns about the project erupting, suddenly and simultaneously. The government is belatedly attempting to address these concerns via a popular referendum. Should the project be continued or halted? The government is seeking to "share responsibility" for the eventual choice and consequences. But before the public can participate in a referendum, the dissemination of information must first be sufficiently transparent. The problems must first be identified and understood. Only then can the trade-offs be weighed. Only then can one seek solutions through a referendum.

Full Text below:

The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) can neither advance nor retreat. This dilemma was caused by lingering concerns about the project erupting, suddenly and simultaneously. The government is belatedly attempting to address these concerns via a popular referendum. Should the project be continued or halted? The government is seeking to "share responsibility" for the eventual choice and consequences. But before the public can participate in a referendum, the dissemination of information must first be sufficiently transparent. The problems must first be identified and understood. Only then can the trade-offs be weighed. Only then can one seek solutions through a referendum.

Plans for the 4NPP were first drawn up in 1980. The conditions for successful completion were quite favorable. The Number One, Two, and Three Nuclear Power Plants were all successes. The general contractor was reputable. Entering the era of the 4NPP ought to have been a simple matter. But the project was repeatedly stopped then restarted. Official construction finally began in 1999, after two decades of time was wasted. Taipower company personnel were already deceased. Reactor design the world over had come to a standstill due to the plant accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

Construction on the 4NPP began 15 years ago, Three aspects of the project, including civil engineering, machinery, and instrumentation and control hardware, are nearing completion. The civil engineering aspect is not a major problem. During the Chen regime, construction was stopped then restarted. Steel reinforcing bars were exposed to the elements for half a year, creating concerns about bonding strength when concrete work was resumed. Eventually remedies were found and the problem overcome. But other aspects of the project, such as the termination of the lease with the general contractor, and the departure of engineering consultants, had a real impact. The large tolerances and rough appearance are cast doubt on the quality control, but were entirely predictable.

The most controversial problems have been with the instrumentation and control systems. Japanese compenies Toshiba and Hitachi were responsible for the reactor and steam turbine. Their experience with nuclear power plant equipment was limited. Nevertheless they met internationally recognized standards. Any problems with them should be minor. But in 2000 the Chen regime stopped construction on the project without any justification. The contractors for the reactor and other components were caught off balance. In an attempt to make sure they got paid, they resorted to all sorts of tactics that may have undermined the quality of the plant's construction.

Today, doubts about the quality of the instrumentation persist. The 4NPP has over 100 component groups. The instrumentation required for eventual power plant operation requires at least 40,000 connection points. The need for complex coordination between subcontractors vastly increases the risk of mistakes. Untangling responsibility for the 4NPP construction mess is now impossible. But the awarding of contracts to subcontractors before the design of the 4NPP was complete, was indeed a major cause of these aftereffects.

Consider the travails of the 4NPP that led to the loss of public trust. The main concerns are listed below. They must be clarified before the referendum is held.

One. Construction began in 2000. Taipower turned the 3NPP over to commercial operators 15 years earlier, in 1985. It completed construction on the 3NPP over 20 years ago. Those who worked on the project scattered long gone. The same is true for the nuclear power generation field the world over. The US company General Electric has not built a nuclear power plant in 20 years. The subcontracts were awarded to "newbie" Japanese companies Toshiba and Hitachi.

Two. To establish an independent nuclear technology, a turnkey operation was instead subcontracted out. As a result, the safety of the plant design became our own responsibility. One mistake was especially egregious. The 4NPP design was similar to Japan's Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. But instead of using its design as a starting point and taking advantage of past experience, the decision was made to "be creative," and re-design every last interface, and subcontract every last component group. This resulted in today's interface issues and security concerns.

Three. The Chen regime resumed construction of the 4NPP in 1996. But it was clueless about manpower or financial resource allocation. The Chen regime responded to the construction of the 4NPP based on its anti-nuclear attitudes. It withheld both manpower and funds from the project. Under such circumstances, even though the certification papers appear to be in order, the project itself might not be.

Four. The subcontractors were made responsible for their own quality control. They were in effect grading their own test papers. This guaranteed that the quality control would be questionable. In particular, the Atomic Energy Council and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the agencies in charge, had limited manpower. They did what they could, but their ability was limited.

Five. The students graded their own test papers. Changing the rules of the game led to all manner of transgressions. The documentation may have been perfect. But the reality was anything but. This was true in particular for the instrumentation. The passage of time meant that once new designs were now old. Construction stops and restarts, along with hurried specifications, added to the problem.

Six. Basic data was lacking. The 4NPP is susceptible to submarine volcanoes and the Manila Subduction Zone. But it has yet to incorporate such updated information. In particular, new evidence reveals that the 4NPP is located near geological faults and submarine volcanoes. The only data referred to in the plans are more than 20 years old. Another problem concerns the seismic design. Is it adequate? Before the plant begins operation, field data must first undergo analysis. Only the latest data can be considered valid. Only then can one be sure that the seismic design data from years ago is correct. This is of great importance, and something that Taipower has neglected in the past.

The credibility of the ill-fated 4NPP is now extremely low. But nuclear safety is a problem for technical experts. It must not be treated as a political football. No matter what, doubts about the project must be sorted out. Only then can it be the subject of a public referendum.

全面釐清核四疑慮的虛實真偽
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.04 03:22 am

核四走到今天進退維谷的情境,是因所有的疑慮同時爆發所致:如今欲以公投方式解決,無論停續,皆是在求「共同承擔」其抉擇後果。然而,民眾參與公投,須有充分且透明的資訊,找出問題、瞭解問題,始能判斷取捨,也才有可能透過公投找到答案。

民國六十九年起始的核四計畫,原本有相當有利的成功條件,包括核一、二、三的成功上路,素質不錯的自主建廠人才,原本應可大步跨入核四年代;但數度計畫終止、回復,停停續續,到民國八十八年正式開工,二十年的時光蹉跎,不但台電的建廠人才漸已凋零,全球核電界的反應爐設計也因三哩島、車諾比事故而呈停頓狀態。

核四建廠起步迄今十五年,三大部門土木、機器、儀控的硬體都接近完工;土木的問題不大,扁政權初期的停工、復工,致使鋼筋紮筋裸露半年而與後續混凝土工程的握裹疑慮本待確認,後經補救,問題已克服。但其他部件諸如大包商解約,工程顧問公司走人,確實影響雖如今已粗具規格及水準的外觀,遭質疑乃是必然。

設備的部分,較被討論的是儀控系統。反應器及汽輪機的日商東芝、日立,雖然跨入核電設備製造資歷有限,但仍有國際認證的一定水準,問題應不大;但在二○○○年扁政府未有任何應對下的宣布停建,讓後續包括反應器等承製組件的包商亂了手腳,為了趕緊拿到工程款,花樣之多難以概述,亦恐影響工程品質。

儀控是至今讓人難以放心之處。核四大約有一百餘個組件,最終整合電廠運作的儀控部門,則至少有四萬個節點需要接到線、對到頭,皆因複雜的轉包分包而致頭緒萬端。如今追究整個核四發包過程的錯亂已無意義,但核四當年未完成全廠設計前分別發包,確實是個至今遺留後遺症的重大原因。

回顧核四廠至今的一路顛簸,失去國人信任,大致尚有以下幾點顧慮,皆須在公投前加以釐清:一、八十九年開工時,台電距七十四年核三第二機組完工商轉已十五年、距核三建廠施工則已二十餘年,相關人才多已散離。全球核電界也然,承包的美國奇異已二十年無核電廠承做實績,轉包給日本的東芝、日立廠,也是新手上路。

二、為了建立自主的核電技術,捨起初的統包改採分包,因而電廠的安全設計也必須改以自主創意;尤其錯誤的是,未以與核四同型且有實際施工經驗的日本柏崎刈羽的設計圖為基礎,卻逕自以自主創意重行設計每一個偶合機制,且各個組件分別發包,造成如今的介面問題及安全上的顧慮。

三、扁政府在民國八十五年回復核四工程,但對核四的人力、財源一直沒有章法。扁政府實質上是以反核的態度因應核四建廠,讓核四工程在「要人沒人、要錢沒錢」的狀況下進行;雖然檢測文件如常,但事實恐不盡然。

四、分包後續的品管是包商自主管理,這是「球員兼裁判」之不當,呈現的考評不確實也是必然存在,尤其原能會、經濟部的督導單位人力有限,雖仍窮盡努力,然也功能受限。

五、因為球員兼裁判,更改競賽規則的犯大忌行為也屢屢出現,以致文書呈現雖完美,但現實卻不足以保證。尤其後續儀控部門,因為時光流逝,新設計變成老設備,加以停工、復工及倉儲未按規格走,問題更多。

六、基本資料不足。核四所在的海底火山、馬尼拉隱沒帶的影響,迄今未具被更新過的基本資料,尤其對核四地質斷層、海底火山的新事證,至今仍只有二十餘年前的建廠資料。另核電廠的耐震設計正確與否,必須以運轉前的震波實地測量數據來檢視,只有最新的測量數據驗證,才知道多年前的建廠耐震應對的設計數據是否正確,這卻是台電以往最不重視的一塊。

核四的命運多舛,致使其公信力極薄弱。然而,核安畢竟是一個專業問題,不能用繪聲繪影的政治手法來面對。但是,無論如何皆必須釐清這些疑慮的真偽虛實,始能作為公民投票的基礎。