Establish Sensible and Reasonable Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 21, 2013
Summary: Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
Full Text below:
Former KMT Chairman Lien Chan undertook his "Journey of Peace" to the Chinese mainland in April 2005. He and former Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced "five shared visions." The two parties established channels for high-level dialogue. In 2008, the KMT returned to office. The two sides initiated in high-level dialogue. This played a major role in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Recently they concluded the Wu Xi Meeting. It lasted only a few hours. But it may pave the way for an entirely new cross-Strait relationship.
For starters, the Wu Xi Meeting was followed by the Obama Xi Meeting between Washington and Beijing. This means that KMT leaders have a clear understanding of the International political situation. They are well aware of the role the United States plays in cross-Strait relations, It cannot be ignored. Barack Obama and Xi Jinping addressed the "Taiwan issue." In terms of content, it was the same old tune. Both sides stuck to their guns. But Obama enthusiastically affirmed progress in cross-Strait relations, This means that cross-Strait reconciliation has a neighborhood effect. Not only can it lead to "win-win." It can even lead to "win-win-win." Looking to the future, cross-Strait relations must continue in the direction of peaceful development. There is simply no alternative.
Secondly, the Wu Xi Meeting addressed cross-Strait policy priorities. It provided ruling authorities on the two sides opportunities to refamiliarize themselves with each other. The Chinese Communist Party has completed its power transfer. Xi Jinping is the new leader of the CCP. Much speculation has emerged concerning various aspects of his policy. Take Taiwan policy. In the short-term most observers think Xi will dutifully implement Hu's policies. But new people often have new ways of doing things. Some are worried that Xi will pressure Taipei to take part in cross-Strait political negotiations. Meanwhile, President Ma is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is about to become a lame duck. This has led to numerous complaints that the Ma administration lacks a sufficiently proactive Mainland policy. President Xi Jinping admits that his talk with KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung changed some of his preconceptions about President Ma Ying-jeou. We believe the Wu Xi Meeting will at least prevent the two sides from misjudging each other, and that it will prevent misunderstandings.
Finally, the Wu Xi Meeting was rooted in strategic national interest. For example, Xi Jinping placed particular emphasis on the notion that "both sides of the Strait are members of the same family." Wu Poh-hsiung stressed "national identity." He said "one does not choose one's ancestors." We are all members of the same family. Therefore, as long as we are considering the long term interests of the nation, the two sides need not haggle over "Who made what concession to whom."
Most importantly, for cross-Strait relations to move forward, requires more than lip service. It requires seriously consideration of a wide range of practical matters. On this point, the CCP 18th National Congress proposed "sensible and reasonable" arrangements for cross-Strait relations. This was an inspired notion. It means the two sides can "seek common ground while setting aside differences." It means they can "preserve what they share in common, even as they dissolve their differences."
The term "sensible" connotes the senses. It has emotional connotations. The term "sensible" implies consistency with human nature. Take Taipei's Mainland policy. Has it taken into account the Mainland's peaceful rise? Has it taken into account the resulting nationalist sentiment and public calls for democratization? Now take the Mainland's Taiwan policy. Has it taken into account Taiwan's desire for breathing room and freedom from military threats? If the parties think only of themselves, or worse, treat each other with hostility it will only hurt the feelings of people on both sides.
The term "reasonable" connotes the rational faculties. It involves objective standards. The term "reasonable" encompasses universal values, including the underlying rules of civilization. The term "reasonable" implies certain legal norms, aka, jurisprudence. Whatever is "reasonable" must be fair. If it is unfair, then it cannot be reasonable. Reason is a universal value. Only reasonable policies can win public support. The establishment of cross-Strait representative offices will benefit the people on both sides. If the two sides become stuck over details such as "humanitarian access," that is unreasonable. President Ma has reiterated that the handling of cross-Strait relations and Mainland policy are consistent with the framework of the ROC Constitution. Therefore allegations that Wu Poh-hsiung's proposals during the Wu Xi Meeting were "unconstitutional" are unfounded.
In short, Wu Poh-hsiung was duly authorized by Ma Ying-jeou to speak on his behalf. Therefore the Wu Xi Meeting confirms that the ruling authorities on both sides have handled cross-Strait issues quite well. They have considered the future of the Chinese nation. They have realistically safeguarded the interests of people on both sides. This is the most urgent task facing the two sides. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. We look forward to concrete moves by adminstrative agencies on both sides. Cross-Strait relations should be systematized as soon as possible. This will enable the two sides and the international community to get along, and to make sensible and reasonable arrangements.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.21
社論－建構「合情合理」的兩岸關係
本報訊
自從國民黨前主席連戰於二○○五年四月，前往中國大陸從事「和平之旅」，並與中共前總書記胡錦濤發表「五項共同願景」後，國共兩黨之間即建立了高層對話的管道。國民黨於二○○八年重新取得執政地位，兩黨高層對話持續進行，對於兩岸關係的和平發展，發揮了重大的作用。日前落幕的「吳習會」，雖然只有短短幾個小時，卻有可能為今後兩岸關係的發展，開創一個全新的局面。
首先，「吳習會」緊接著美中「歐習會」登場，說明國共兩黨領導人都己清楚認識，國際環境因素，特別是美國扮演的角色，對兩岸關係起的作用，不容忽視。雖然，歐巴馬和習近平在論及「台灣問題」時，內容仍屬舊調重彈，並且是各持己見；但歐巴馬高度肯定兩岸關係的進展，顯示兩岸和解的「擴散效應」，不但可以創造「雙贏」，並且可以產生「三贏」。展望未來，兩岸關係除了繼續循和平發展的方向前進外，已無其他道路可以選擇。
其次，「吳習會」針對兩岸政策的優先秩序，提供兩岸執政當局，一次「再認識」的機會。不容諱言，在中共完成黨政權力轉移後，外界對於習近平為首的中共新領導班子，在政策上曾出現方方面面的揣測。在對台政策方面，雖然多數認為短期內「胡規習隨」的可能性居多；但「新人新作風」，也有人擔心習會加促兩岸政治談判的壓力；相形之下，在馬總統進入執政的最後任期，所謂「跛鴨」之說，也隨之甚囂塵上，認為馬政府在大陸政策上已缺乏積極有所作為的旺盛企圖心。習近平主席坦承他和國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄會談後，改變了原先對馬英九總統的一些想法。我們認為，「吳習會」至少消除了兩岸未來因錯估對方，而造成諸多誤判的可能。
最後，「吳習會」是站在民族大義的戰略高度上思考問題。例如，習近平特別強調要積極宣導「兩岸一家人」的理念；吳伯雄則強調「民族認同」，認為「祖先無從選擇」。既然都是一家人，則只要考量民族的根本利益和長遠利益，兩岸就不必斤斤計較，沒有所謂「誰讓利給誰」的問題。
最重要的是，兩岸關係要向前發展，大家不能光說不練，而必須認真思考一些屬於操作面的問題。針對這點，中共「十八大」提出兩岸「合情合理」安排雙方關係的概念，是一個具有啟發性的想法，意味著兩岸互動有可能從雙方的「求同存異」，一步登上「存同化異」的台階。
「情」字帶有感性的色彩，主觀意識很濃。「合情」指的是合乎人之常情。例如，台灣制定大陸政策時，是否曾考慮大陸和平崛起後，隨之而來的民族主義情緒和民眾對於民主化的需求；大陸在制定對台政策時，是否思考台灣要求擴大對外活動空間和免於受到武力威脅的恐懼。如果雙方一意孤行，甚至採取背道而馳的政策，結果勢必因此傷了兩岸民眾的感情。
「理」字帶有理性的色彩，有其客觀判斷的標準。「理」包含普世的價值，即文明之理。理也包含特定的法律規範，也就是所謂的法理。「合理」講求的是正不正當，即合不合乎道理。有理走遍天下，合理的政策就能得到人民的支持。兩岸互設辦事機構對兩岸民眾有利，如果雙方協商卡在「人道探視」這個節骨眼的問題上，就是沒有道理。馬總統一再重申是在中華民國憲法架構下處理兩岸關係，制定大陸政策。因此，質疑吳伯雄在「吳習會」的主張「違憲」，也是沒有道理。
總之，由於吳伯雄此行獲有馬英九的充分授權，因此這次「吳習會」己充分展現了兩岸執政當局處理兩岸問題的高度和深度。雙方的交集不僅是著眼於中華民族的未來，也實事求是地把維護兩岸人民的利益，視為眼前兩岸面臨的當務之急。「千里之行，始於足下」，我們期待雙方行政部門能採取具體行動，盡速針對兩岸關係的制度化問題和兩岸在國際社會的相處之道，進行合情合理的安排。
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated: DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
Taiwan Independence Dream Has Evaporated:
DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2013
Summary: What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
Full Text below:
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is convening its nine session "Huashan Conference." The theme of the first session is "Taiwan's China [sic] Policy: Core Values and Vision." The theme of the second session is "How to Deal with the 1992 Consensus."
It is not hard to imagine the form these two themes originally took. The first was probably, "Taiwan independence vs. one China, different interpretations: Which has a larger market?" The second was probably, "Should cross-Strait interaction be based on the 1992 consensus, or a constitutional consensus?" The original and final forms expose the issues at the core of DPP's cross-Strait policy. Clearly the DPP is still casting about for an alternative to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. This is abundantly clear from the DPP's response to the "one China framework" proposed during the Wu Xi Meeting
The KMT initially championed "one China, different interpretations." Wu Poh-hsiung's new formulation, at least as far as the KMT is concerned, replaces it with "one China framework, different interpretations." Both inside and outside the Wu Xi Meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the "one China framework" is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. What he said was 100% correct.
In response to the "one China framework," Su Tseng-chang insisted that Taiwan is not part of China. The DPP is absolutely unwilling to be locked into the "one China" framework. It equates "one China" with the "Peoples Republic of China." It opposes "a constitutionally-defined one China." Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said, "One country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." But oddly enough, he also said the Republic of China "should relinquish its fictitious claim to represent all of China and all its territory." Frank Hsieh's logic is flawed. After all, if "one country, two regions" is constitutional, then isn't it unconstitutional to "relinquish its claim to represent all of China and all its territory?"
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was the most bizzare of all. She said the Ma administration's advocacy of the "one China framework" is the same as accepting the "one China principle." By the same token, she said, recognizing the 1992 consensus is the same as accepting the "one China principle," without the qualifier "different interpretations." She even said. "What exactly is there left of the Republic of China? Is it still is a sovereign and independent country?" As everyone knows, opposition to the 1992 consensus is Tsai Ing-wen's calling card. Yet now she would have people believe she is coming to the rescue of the 1992 consensus. She even said "Without one China, different interpretations, what exactly is there left of the Republic of China?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "Do not turn around and promote Taiwan independence." But Su, Hsieh, and Tsai all share a common problem. Their references to the one China framework, to the Republic of China, and the Republic of China Constitution, are incomplete. They are all piecemeal constructs. Su Tseng-chang openly asserted that "One China means the People's Republic of China." This, she said, is opposed to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said "one country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." Yet he also advocated relinquishing claims of sovereignty over the Mainland Region of China. This mires him in a contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen argues that the 1992 consensus must include "one China, different interpretations." But when has she ever officially accepted the 1992 consensus?
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations can be equated with either one China, different interpretations, or the one China framework, different interpretations. Either manner of expression is rooted in the ROC Constitution. Either is consistent with the ROC's basic survival strategy. The DPP has responded in various ways to the one China framework. But the only correct way is the one Hsu Hsing-liang advocates, "a bold affirmation of one China." Hsu believes that Taiwan must find its footing inside the one China framework. It must not deny or avoid the one China framework.
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh's rhetoric expose the contradictions, the defects, and the dilemmas inherent in the DPP's cross-Strait policy proposals. These contradictions, defects, and dilemmas, all share the same root. They all attempt to use the Republic of China to engage in "backdoor listing," even as they repudiate the one China Constitution. Alas, the reality is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party still denies that "the ROC Constitution is a one China constitution," then why not simply "turn around and promote Taiwan independence?" Conversely, if the DPP accepts the Constitution of the Republic of China, then how can it oppose the one China framework?
When confronting the future of cross-Strait relations, the DPP has only one option. That option is to cease playing around with any form of backdoor listing, and reaffirm the ROC's one China Constitution, in toto. That option is to use the one China framework to fight the PRC over the right to define itself as "China." That option is to attempt to spin the meaning of the one China framework. Perhaps this is what Hsu Hsing-liang meant by the "bold advocacy of one China."
Tsai Ing-wen has blasted the Ma government for not having the courage to openly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state." She also argued that the 1992 consensus must include one China, different interpretations. We have no idea whether Tsai Ing-wen was drunk or sober when she issued these pronouncements. But we are pleased to see Tsai Ing-wen, who once alleged that the "The Republic of China is a foreign regime," loudly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country!"
Assuming the news reports were accurate, the first and second sessions of the DPP's Huashan Conference have indeed yielded answers to two questions. Question One. What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? The answer is, Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. Question Two. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The answer is, the DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
台獨幻滅 民進黨應當大膽一中
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.20 04:15 am
民進黨「華山會議」將間續舉行九場。第一場的主題是「台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景」，第二場的主題是「如何處理九二共識」。
在擬想階段，這兩個題目的原型是：「第一場／台灣獨立和一中各表，誰有市場？」，及「第二場／兩岸互動依據應為九二共識或憲法共識？」。從原型與定稿的對照可知，民進黨兩岸政策的核心議題，似仍在尋找「九二共識／一中各表」的「替代物」。這從民進黨內對「吳習會」所提「一中架構」的回應，亦可概見。
國民黨原持「一個中國／各自表述」的主張；吳伯雄此次的新提法，就國民黨而言，只是換成「一中架構／各自表述」。吳伯雄在吳習會中及會外皆稱，「一中架構」是根據中華民國憲法，此說無誤。
對於「一中架構」的回應，蘇貞昌說：台灣不是「中國」的一部分，民進黨絕不願被鎖在「一個中國」的框架中；這是將「一個中國」指為「中華人民共和國」，並反對「憲法一中」。倡議「憲法各表」的謝長廷則說，「一國兩區，難謂違憲」；但他卻也主張「（中華民國）要放棄虛構的代表中國及領土」。謝長廷的理論缺口在於：如果「一國兩區」是合憲的，則「放棄代表中國及領土」是否違憲？
蔡英文的主張最奇妙。她說，馬政府主張「一中架構」，等於接受「一中原則」，也等於承認「九二共識」就只是「一中原則」，而沒有了「各自表述」。她進而質疑：「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？還算是主權獨立的國家嗎？」然而，眾所皆知，反對「九二共識」是蔡英文的政治旗幟，但如今她的口氣卻像是在搶救「九二共識」似的，甚至稱：「如果沒有一中各表，中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？」
蘇貞昌說：「不要回過頭去搞台獨。」但是，蘇謝蔡三人共同的問題，卻在於對「一中架構」及「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」的論述皆不完整，都是七折八扣。蘇貞昌直指「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這就是反對「九二共識／一中各表」；謝長廷主張「憲法各表」，而稱「一國兩區，難謂違憲」，卻又倡議放棄對「大陸地區」的主權主張，遂陷於自相矛盾；蔡英文則主張「九二共識」應當含有「一中各表」，但她迄今卻未曾正式表示過接受「九二共識」。
其實，「九二共識／一中各表」，不論是「一個中國／各自表述」或「一中架構／各自表述」，皆是本於中華民國憲法的應然表述方式，也是中華民國的基本生存戰略。因此，在民進黨對「一中架構」的各種回應中，唯一正確的思維應是許信良所主張的「大膽一中」，認為台灣必須在「一中架構」中尋找立足點，而不是否定或逃避「一中架構」。
從蘇蔡謝的論述可以看出，民進黨的兩岸議題走到今日，充分暴露其矛盾錯亂的窘境。而這種矛盾錯亂的窘境，皆是出自同一根源，那就是：又想利用「中華民國」借殼上市，卻又欲否定「一中憲法」。現在擺明的情勢是：民進黨倘若反對「中華民國憲法為一中憲法」，何不乾脆「回過頭去搞台獨」？反之，民進黨如果接受「中華民國憲法」，又豈能反對「一中架構」？
面對兩岸未來情勢，民進黨其實只有一種選擇。那就是：不再玩弄任何形式的「借殼上市」，完完整整地回到中華民國的「一中憲法」下，根據「一中架構」，與中華人民共和國爭取「中國」的定義權，並努力節制「一中架構」的內涵與發展。這或許就是許信良所說的「大膽一中」。
蔡英文猛批馬政府不敢公開表態說「中華民國是主權獨立的國家」，更指「九二共識」不能沒有「一中各表」。我們不知這是糊塗的蔡英文或清醒的蔡英文，但十分欣慰見到曾說「中華民國是外來政府」的蔡英文高呼：「中華民國是主權獨立的國家！」
倘係如此，第一場及第二場華山會議其實已有解答。一、台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景是什麼？答案是：基於中華民國憲法的民主自由價值與願景，即是台灣的核心價值與願景。二、如何處理九二共識？答案是：堅持「一中各表」或「大屋頂中國」，否則，即如蔡英文所說「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼」？
DPP Should Boldly Champion One China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2013
Summary: What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
Full Text below:
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is convening its nine session "Huashan Conference." The theme of the first session is "Taiwan's China [sic] Policy: Core Values and Vision." The theme of the second session is "How to Deal with the 1992 Consensus."
It is not hard to imagine the form these two themes originally took. The first was probably, "Taiwan independence vs. one China, different interpretations: Which has a larger market?" The second was probably, "Should cross-Strait interaction be based on the 1992 consensus, or a constitutional consensus?" The original and final forms expose the issues at the core of DPP's cross-Strait policy. Clearly the DPP is still casting about for an alternative to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. This is abundantly clear from the DPP's response to the "one China framework" proposed during the Wu Xi Meeting
The KMT initially championed "one China, different interpretations." Wu Poh-hsiung's new formulation, at least as far as the KMT is concerned, replaces it with "one China framework, different interpretations." Both inside and outside the Wu Xi Meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the "one China framework" is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. What he said was 100% correct.
In response to the "one China framework," Su Tseng-chang insisted that Taiwan is not part of China. The DPP is absolutely unwilling to be locked into the "one China" framework. It equates "one China" with the "Peoples Republic of China." It opposes "a constitutionally-defined one China." Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said, "One country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." But oddly enough, he also said the Republic of China "should relinquish its fictitious claim to represent all of China and all its territory." Frank Hsieh's logic is flawed. After all, if "one country, two regions" is constitutional, then isn't it unconstitutional to "relinquish its claim to represent all of China and all its territory?"
Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was the most bizzare of all. She said the Ma administration's advocacy of the "one China framework" is the same as accepting the "one China principle." By the same token, she said, recognizing the 1992 consensus is the same as accepting the "one China principle," without the qualifier "different interpretations." She even said. "What exactly is there left of the Republic of China? Is it still is a sovereign and independent country?" As everyone knows, opposition to the 1992 consensus is Tsai Ing-wen's calling card. Yet now she would have people believe she is coming to the rescue of the 1992 consensus. She even said "Without one China, different interpretations, what exactly is there left of the Republic of China?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "Do not turn around and promote Taiwan independence." But Su, Hsieh, and Tsai all share a common problem. Their references to the one China framework, to the Republic of China, and the Republic of China Constitution, are incomplete. They are all piecemeal constructs. Su Tseng-chang openly asserted that "One China means the People's Republic of China." This, she said, is opposed to the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Frank Hsieh champions "different constitutional interpretations [of one China]." Hsieh said "one country, two regions can hardly be considered unconstitutional." Yet he also advocated relinquishing claims of sovereignty over the Mainland Region of China. This mires him in a contradiction. Tsai Ing-wen argues that the 1992 consensus must include "one China, different interpretations." But when has she ever officially accepted the 1992 consensus?
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations can be equated with either one China, different interpretations, or the one China framework, different interpretations. Either manner of expression is rooted in the ROC Constitution. Either is consistent with the ROC's basic survival strategy. The DPP has responded in various ways to the one China framework. But the only correct way is the one Hsu Hsing-liang advocates, "a bold affirmation of one China." Hsu believes that Taiwan must find its footing inside the one China framework. It must not deny or avoid the one China framework.
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh's rhetoric expose the contradictions, the defects, and the dilemmas inherent in the DPP's cross-Strait policy proposals. These contradictions, defects, and dilemmas, all share the same root. They all attempt to use the Republic of China to engage in "backdoor listing," even as they repudiate the one China Constitution. Alas, the reality is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party still denies that "the ROC Constitution is a one China constitution," then why not simply "turn around and promote Taiwan independence?" Conversely, if the DPP accepts the Constitution of the Republic of China, then how can it oppose the one China framework?
When confronting the future of cross-Strait relations, the DPP has only one option. That option is to cease playing around with any form of backdoor listing, and reaffirm the ROC's one China Constitution, in toto. That option is to use the one China framework to fight the PRC over the right to define itself as "China." That option is to attempt to spin the meaning of the one China framework. Perhaps this is what Hsu Hsing-liang meant by the "bold advocacy of one China."
Tsai Ing-wen has blasted the Ma government for not having the courage to openly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state." She also argued that the 1992 consensus must include one China, different interpretations. We have no idea whether Tsai Ing-wen was drunk or sober when she issued these pronouncements. But we are pleased to see Tsai Ing-wen, who once alleged that the "The Republic of China is a foreign regime," loudly proclaim that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country!"
Assuming the news reports were accurate, the first and second sessions of the DPP's Huashan Conference have indeed yielded answers to two questions. Question One. What core values and vision should Taiwan's China [sic] policy promote? The answer is, Taiwan should promote the liberal and democratic values and vision embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of China. Question Two. How should the DPP deal with the 1992 consensus? The answer is, the DPP should adhere to one China, different interpretations, or the "big roof concept of China." Otherwise, as Tsai Ing-wen herself noted, ""What exactly will there be left of the Republic of China?"
台獨幻滅 民進黨應當大膽一中
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.20 04:15 am
民進黨「華山會議」將間續舉行九場。第一場的主題是「台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景」，第二場的主題是「如何處理九二共識」。
在擬想階段，這兩個題目的原型是：「第一場／台灣獨立和一中各表，誰有市場？」，及「第二場／兩岸互動依據應為九二共識或憲法共識？」。從原型與定稿的對照可知，民進黨兩岸政策的核心議題，似仍在尋找「九二共識／一中各表」的「替代物」。這從民進黨內對「吳習會」所提「一中架構」的回應，亦可概見。
國民黨原持「一個中國／各自表述」的主張；吳伯雄此次的新提法，就國民黨而言，只是換成「一中架構／各自表述」。吳伯雄在吳習會中及會外皆稱，「一中架構」是根據中華民國憲法，此說無誤。
對於「一中架構」的回應，蘇貞昌說：台灣不是「中國」的一部分，民進黨絕不願被鎖在「一個中國」的框架中；這是將「一個中國」指為「中華人民共和國」，並反對「憲法一中」。倡議「憲法各表」的謝長廷則說，「一國兩區，難謂違憲」；但他卻也主張「（中華民國）要放棄虛構的代表中國及領土」。謝長廷的理論缺口在於：如果「一國兩區」是合憲的，則「放棄代表中國及領土」是否違憲？
蔡英文的主張最奇妙。她說，馬政府主張「一中架構」，等於接受「一中原則」，也等於承認「九二共識」就只是「一中原則」，而沒有了「各自表述」。她進而質疑：「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？還算是主權獨立的國家嗎？」然而，眾所皆知，反對「九二共識」是蔡英文的政治旗幟，但如今她的口氣卻像是在搶救「九二共識」似的，甚至稱：「如果沒有一中各表，中華民國究竟還剩下什麼？」
蘇貞昌說：「不要回過頭去搞台獨。」但是，蘇謝蔡三人共同的問題，卻在於對「一中架構」及「中華民國」、「中華民國憲法」的論述皆不完整，都是七折八扣。蘇貞昌直指「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這就是反對「九二共識／一中各表」；謝長廷主張「憲法各表」，而稱「一國兩區，難謂違憲」，卻又倡議放棄對「大陸地區」的主權主張，遂陷於自相矛盾；蔡英文則主張「九二共識」應當含有「一中各表」，但她迄今卻未曾正式表示過接受「九二共識」。
其實，「九二共識／一中各表」，不論是「一個中國／各自表述」或「一中架構／各自表述」，皆是本於中華民國憲法的應然表述方式，也是中華民國的基本生存戰略。因此，在民進黨對「一中架構」的各種回應中，唯一正確的思維應是許信良所主張的「大膽一中」，認為台灣必須在「一中架構」中尋找立足點，而不是否定或逃避「一中架構」。
從蘇蔡謝的論述可以看出，民進黨的兩岸議題走到今日，充分暴露其矛盾錯亂的窘境。而這種矛盾錯亂的窘境，皆是出自同一根源，那就是：又想利用「中華民國」借殼上市，卻又欲否定「一中憲法」。現在擺明的情勢是：民進黨倘若反對「中華民國憲法為一中憲法」，何不乾脆「回過頭去搞台獨」？反之，民進黨如果接受「中華民國憲法」，又豈能反對「一中架構」？
面對兩岸未來情勢，民進黨其實只有一種選擇。那就是：不再玩弄任何形式的「借殼上市」，完完整整地回到中華民國的「一中憲法」下，根據「一中架構」，與中華人民共和國爭取「中國」的定義權，並努力節制「一中架構」的內涵與發展。這或許就是許信良所說的「大膽一中」。
蔡英文猛批馬政府不敢公開表態說「中華民國是主權獨立的國家」，更指「九二共識」不能沒有「一中各表」。我們不知這是糊塗的蔡英文或清醒的蔡英文，但十分欣慰見到曾說「中華民國是外來政府」的蔡英文高呼：「中華民國是主權獨立的國家！」
倘係如此，第一場及第二場華山會議其實已有解答。一、台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景是什麼？答案是：基於中華民國憲法的民主自由價值與願景，即是台灣的核心價值與願景。二、如何處理九二共識？答案是：堅持「一中各表」或「大屋頂中國」，否則，即如蔡英文所說「中華民國究竟還剩下什麼」？
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
Facilitating Communications Industry Development: The Real Purpose
Facilitating Communications Industry Development: The Real Purpose
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 19, 2013
Summary: We welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
Full Text below:
The "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" is a textbook case of "populist law-making." In April of this year, the National Communications Commission (NCC) sought approval of this law in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan Transportation Committee and DPP version, differed from the KMT version. Preliminary review of the proposed legislation was rushed through ahead of the recess. Last week, during an emergency session called at the DPP's insistence, it was classified as priority legislation.
The proposed legislation is narrowly focused and highly controversial. The executive and legislative branches remind one of street racers playing a game of "chicken." Scholars in the relevant fields were not consulted while the legislation was being drafted. The views of media professionals in particular, were ignored. The Legislative Yuan sought only to expedite its passage. It merged different versions of the proposed legislation into a grotesque hodgepodge. Yesterday, five major media industry associations, including the China Press Institute, Taiwan Media Watch, the Republic of China Media Self Regulation Association, the Republic of China Broadcasting Association, and the Taipei Newspaper Association issued an unprecedented joint statement. They denounced certain provisions within the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act." They said these provisions were outside the NCC's legal authority. They consider them a serious violation of freedom of the press. These provisions also violate the basic spirit of Article 11 of the Constitution, which protects freedom of speech.
Let us summarize their joint declaration, which makes two points. The first point pertains to the print media, to newspapers and magazines. These are not under the jurisdiction of the NCC. Yet the draft legislation included the print media, even though it is not subject to NCC regulation. It treated them as if they were the broadcast media. It demanded that they provide information about their operations to the NCC on an annual basis. It demanded that national dailies establish newsroom conventions. It demanded that print media with a certain level of capitalization appoint outside boards of directors. It demanded that the print media "not engage in unfair competition." Otherwise the NCC would intervene and impose fines. The above demands exceed the NCC's legal authority, and may have had a chilling effect on media freedom. The second point pertains to numerous media regulations. Their definitions are vague. The media cannot understand them. They cannot tell if they are in violation of them. This has a chilling effect on media freedom. The NCC may use these to suppress freedom of the press. Therefore the media is concerned.
Allow us to sum up the concerns of these five major media industry organizations. In fact, their concerns are merely a small part of a highly controversial media anti-trust law. Think back to the initial deliberations over the proposed legislation. Consider the latest developments in Internet media. One can use to Internet to access all variety of media. One can even publish information on one's own websites. Yet Executive Yuan Political Affairs Committee Member Chang Shan-cheng publicly attacked an alleged "media monopoly" in today's multimedia era. This is clearly a phony issue. Is the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Ensurance Act" really necessary? Shouldn't the authorities consult experts, instead of dancing to the tune of mob sentiment?
The NCC is the responsible national authority. Those in the know include PFP Legislator Lee Tung-hao and other media scholars. They feel that the primary purpose of the NCC was established at the outset, in the "Basic Communications Law." The NCC's raison d'etre was to "take into account technological convergence, in order to promote the sound development of the communications industry." But ever since the NCC's inception, it has done nothing of the sort. First it launched a "no nit too small to pick" campaign of harassment against the broadcast media. Then it hopped on the media anti-trust bandwagon, all in the name of "safeguarding media diversity and professional autonomy." In reality, its interventions were motivated by the desire to expand its powers, and to clamp down on the print media. On the other hand, confronted with today's Internet technology, accelerated information convergence, and the need for international competitiveness and a voice in the communications industry, the NCC has accomplished nothing. The Control Yuan has failed to correct NCC negligence and omissions. Shouldn't the NCC improve its media management and control, as well as promote industry development?
Take a closer look at how the NCC has approached its two statutory mandates. The NCC has done too much in one area, but nothing in the other. The crux of the problem is common to all executive branch agencies. They have some idea about how to oversee an industry. But they have no idea whatsoever how to encourage an industry or to promote industrial development. The information industry on Taiwan had plentiful high-tech industry support. It should have been able to flex its muscles in the Internet era. Instead, information convergence left it in the dust. It has lagged far behind South Korea. It has even lagged behind the Chinese mainland. Its competitiveness ranking has declined. This is what the Ma government should be worrying about. How can the NCC allow itself to be distracted by other matters, and not think about how to catch up?
In sum, we welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.19
社論－促進通訊傳播產業發展 才是硬道理
本報訊
堪稱是「民粹式立法」典範的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）於今年四月間送請立法院審議後，立法院交通委員會併同民進黨版及國民黨版等不同版本，趕在臨休會前匆匆完成委員會初審，並在上周的立院臨時會中，經由民進黨團的堅持，列為臨時會的優先審議法案。
有鑒於此一極具針對性與高度爭議性的重要法案，行政和立法部門竟以近乎飆車的速度，草案研議過程既未博採周諮相關學者，特別是媒體實務界的意見看法，立法院審議階段更是一味求快，把不同版本拼裝成一個四不像的大雜燴。包括中國新聞學會、中華民國新聞媒體自律協會、中華民國廣播事業協會、中華民國廣播同業公會，和台北市報業商業同業公會等五大事業媒體社團，破天荒於昨天發表共同聲明，指陳《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》的部分條文內容，逾越ＮＣＣ法定職掌範圍，恐有嚴重侵犯新聞自由之嫌，也違反了憲法第十一條保障言論及出版自由的基本精神。
歸納此一「共同聲明」的訴求，重點其實有二。其一是質疑包括報紙和雜誌在內的紙面媒體，原非ＮＣＣ的管轄範圍，但在立法草案中卻把即使沒有參與跨媒體整合的紙媒，也比照廣電媒體，要求每年必須將營運的基本資料送給ＮＣＣ備查，要求全國性日報應訂定新聞編輯室公約，要求紙媒資本額達一定金額應設外部董事，要求紙媒不得有不公平競爭行為，否則ＮＣＣ即可干預並處以罰鍰。凡此ＮＣＣ實已構成違法擴權，並有箝制新聞之嫌。其二是草案不少對媒體規範的條文，定義十分模糊，令媒體無所適從，甚至因怕動輒得咎而將產生寒蟬效應，同時還可能引發ＮＣＣ欲藉此箝制新聞自由之疑慮。
綜觀五大新聞專業團體所關注的議題，其實只是具高度爭議性的反媒體壟斷法的一個小環節。事實上回顧此一法案在研議立法之初，針對在今天網路新興媒體發展，透過網路每個人都可以方便地「臨近」各式各樣媒體，甚至還可以透過個人網站主動發布訊息，行政院政務委員張善政即曾公開指出，所謂的「媒體壟斷」處於今天的「全媒體」時代，根本是一個假議題。準此，則所謂反媒體壟斷是否有必要立法，主管機關自應博採周諮，而非隨著民粹起舞。
尤有進者，包括親民黨立委李桐豪，以及不少傳媒學者，認為ＮＣＣ做為國家通訊傳播的主管機關，在《通訊傳播基本法》第一條開宗明義設定成立ＮＣＣ的目的，就是要「因應科技匯流，促進通訊傳播健全發展」。然而ＮＣＣ從成立迄今，先是對廣電媒體展開「無微不至」的規範與懲處，繼而又要搭反媒體壟斷的便車，以維護媒體多元和專業自主之名，行擴權干預、箝制紙面媒體之實。而唯獨在面對網路科技日新月異的今天，各國莫不加速資訊匯流的腳步，力爭通訊傳播產業的國際競爭力與話語權的當下，我們的ＮＣＣ在這個方面卻幾乎是交了白卷。我們認為，即使監察委員不提案糾正ＮＣＣ的怠忽職守與不作為，ＮＣＣ在加強管控媒體和促進產業發展之間難道不應該兼籌並顧嗎？
進一步探析ＮＣＣ何以對其前述兩大法定任務，會出現如此過度作為和近乎不作為的異象，我們認為，其中的癥結應該在於行政機關的通病，對於如何管理業者相對較為嫻熟，但對於如何輔導業者促進產業發展則相對較為陌生甚至是無能為之。結果就使得台灣的資訊傳播產業，原本被期待在既有的厚實高科技產業支撐下，可以於網路新時代大展拳腳，最後卻落得資訊匯流的進度，不只已遠遠落後南韓，甚至也被中國大陸超越。這種國家競爭力的落居下風，毋寧才是馬政府所應引以為憂，ＮＣＣ又怎能分心旁騖，不思急起直追的對策。
總結來看，我們欣見五大新聞專業團體針對內容荒腔走板偏差的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，終於不再集體失聲。業者站在第一線，痛感台灣媒體經營環境在過度規範下碎裂化為不具競爭力的中小企業，正所謂心所謂危，不能不言，至於能否對迷失方向感的馬政府，以及遭民粹綁架的立法部門，產生振聾發聵的效應，大家就拭目以待吧！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 19, 2013
Summary: We welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
Full Text below:
The "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" is a textbook case of "populist law-making." In April of this year, the National Communications Commission (NCC) sought approval of this law in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan Transportation Committee and DPP version, differed from the KMT version. Preliminary review of the proposed legislation was rushed through ahead of the recess. Last week, during an emergency session called at the DPP's insistence, it was classified as priority legislation.
The proposed legislation is narrowly focused and highly controversial. The executive and legislative branches remind one of street racers playing a game of "chicken." Scholars in the relevant fields were not consulted while the legislation was being drafted. The views of media professionals in particular, were ignored. The Legislative Yuan sought only to expedite its passage. It merged different versions of the proposed legislation into a grotesque hodgepodge. Yesterday, five major media industry associations, including the China Press Institute, Taiwan Media Watch, the Republic of China Media Self Regulation Association, the Republic of China Broadcasting Association, and the Taipei Newspaper Association issued an unprecedented joint statement. They denounced certain provisions within the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act." They said these provisions were outside the NCC's legal authority. They consider them a serious violation of freedom of the press. These provisions also violate the basic spirit of Article 11 of the Constitution, which protects freedom of speech.
Let us summarize their joint declaration, which makes two points. The first point pertains to the print media, to newspapers and magazines. These are not under the jurisdiction of the NCC. Yet the draft legislation included the print media, even though it is not subject to NCC regulation. It treated them as if they were the broadcast media. It demanded that they provide information about their operations to the NCC on an annual basis. It demanded that national dailies establish newsroom conventions. It demanded that print media with a certain level of capitalization appoint outside boards of directors. It demanded that the print media "not engage in unfair competition." Otherwise the NCC would intervene and impose fines. The above demands exceed the NCC's legal authority, and may have had a chilling effect on media freedom. The second point pertains to numerous media regulations. Their definitions are vague. The media cannot understand them. They cannot tell if they are in violation of them. This has a chilling effect on media freedom. The NCC may use these to suppress freedom of the press. Therefore the media is concerned.
Allow us to sum up the concerns of these five major media industry organizations. In fact, their concerns are merely a small part of a highly controversial media anti-trust law. Think back to the initial deliberations over the proposed legislation. Consider the latest developments in Internet media. One can use to Internet to access all variety of media. One can even publish information on one's own websites. Yet Executive Yuan Political Affairs Committee Member Chang Shan-cheng publicly attacked an alleged "media monopoly" in today's multimedia era. This is clearly a phony issue. Is the "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Ensurance Act" really necessary? Shouldn't the authorities consult experts, instead of dancing to the tune of mob sentiment?
The NCC is the responsible national authority. Those in the know include PFP Legislator Lee Tung-hao and other media scholars. They feel that the primary purpose of the NCC was established at the outset, in the "Basic Communications Law." The NCC's raison d'etre was to "take into account technological convergence, in order to promote the sound development of the communications industry." But ever since the NCC's inception, it has done nothing of the sort. First it launched a "no nit too small to pick" campaign of harassment against the broadcast media. Then it hopped on the media anti-trust bandwagon, all in the name of "safeguarding media diversity and professional autonomy." In reality, its interventions were motivated by the desire to expand its powers, and to clamp down on the print media. On the other hand, confronted with today's Internet technology, accelerated information convergence, and the need for international competitiveness and a voice in the communications industry, the NCC has accomplished nothing. The Control Yuan has failed to correct NCC negligence and omissions. Shouldn't the NCC improve its media management and control, as well as promote industry development?
Take a closer look at how the NCC has approached its two statutory mandates. The NCC has done too much in one area, but nothing in the other. The crux of the problem is common to all executive branch agencies. They have some idea about how to oversee an industry. But they have no idea whatsoever how to encourage an industry or to promote industrial development. The information industry on Taiwan had plentiful high-tech industry support. It should have been able to flex its muscles in the Internet era. Instead, information convergence left it in the dust. It has lagged far behind South Korea. It has even lagged behind the Chinese mainland. Its competitiveness ranking has declined. This is what the Ma government should be worrying about. How can the NCC allow itself to be distracted by other matters, and not think about how to catch up?
In sum, we welcome the five media industry organizations' critique of the absurd "Media Monopoly Prevention and Diversity Guarantee Act" Finally, they have broken their collective silence. Finally, industry leaders are standing on the front lines. They know the media on Taiwan has been reduced to non-competitive small and medium enterprises by over-regulation and populist law-making. They feel the danger in their hearts. They can no longer remain silent. The Ma administration has lost its compass. The legislature has been hijacked by populism. Are these media industry organizations' voices loud enough to be heard? We will have to wait and see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.19
社論－促進通訊傳播產業發展 才是硬道理
本報訊
堪稱是「民粹式立法」典範的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）於今年四月間送請立法院審議後，立法院交通委員會併同民進黨版及國民黨版等不同版本，趕在臨休會前匆匆完成委員會初審，並在上周的立院臨時會中，經由民進黨團的堅持，列為臨時會的優先審議法案。
有鑒於此一極具針對性與高度爭議性的重要法案，行政和立法部門竟以近乎飆車的速度，草案研議過程既未博採周諮相關學者，特別是媒體實務界的意見看法，立法院審議階段更是一味求快，把不同版本拼裝成一個四不像的大雜燴。包括中國新聞學會、中華民國新聞媒體自律協會、中華民國廣播事業協會、中華民國廣播同業公會，和台北市報業商業同業公會等五大事業媒體社團，破天荒於昨天發表共同聲明，指陳《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》的部分條文內容，逾越ＮＣＣ法定職掌範圍，恐有嚴重侵犯新聞自由之嫌，也違反了憲法第十一條保障言論及出版自由的基本精神。
歸納此一「共同聲明」的訴求，重點其實有二。其一是質疑包括報紙和雜誌在內的紙面媒體，原非ＮＣＣ的管轄範圍，但在立法草案中卻把即使沒有參與跨媒體整合的紙媒，也比照廣電媒體，要求每年必須將營運的基本資料送給ＮＣＣ備查，要求全國性日報應訂定新聞編輯室公約，要求紙媒資本額達一定金額應設外部董事，要求紙媒不得有不公平競爭行為，否則ＮＣＣ即可干預並處以罰鍰。凡此ＮＣＣ實已構成違法擴權，並有箝制新聞之嫌。其二是草案不少對媒體規範的條文，定義十分模糊，令媒體無所適從，甚至因怕動輒得咎而將產生寒蟬效應，同時還可能引發ＮＣＣ欲藉此箝制新聞自由之疑慮。
綜觀五大新聞專業團體所關注的議題，其實只是具高度爭議性的反媒體壟斷法的一個小環節。事實上回顧此一法案在研議立法之初，針對在今天網路新興媒體發展，透過網路每個人都可以方便地「臨近」各式各樣媒體，甚至還可以透過個人網站主動發布訊息，行政院政務委員張善政即曾公開指出，所謂的「媒體壟斷」處於今天的「全媒體」時代，根本是一個假議題。準此，則所謂反媒體壟斷是否有必要立法，主管機關自應博採周諮，而非隨著民粹起舞。
尤有進者，包括親民黨立委李桐豪，以及不少傳媒學者，認為ＮＣＣ做為國家通訊傳播的主管機關，在《通訊傳播基本法》第一條開宗明義設定成立ＮＣＣ的目的，就是要「因應科技匯流，促進通訊傳播健全發展」。然而ＮＣＣ從成立迄今，先是對廣電媒體展開「無微不至」的規範與懲處，繼而又要搭反媒體壟斷的便車，以維護媒體多元和專業自主之名，行擴權干預、箝制紙面媒體之實。而唯獨在面對網路科技日新月異的今天，各國莫不加速資訊匯流的腳步，力爭通訊傳播產業的國際競爭力與話語權的當下，我們的ＮＣＣ在這個方面卻幾乎是交了白卷。我們認為，即使監察委員不提案糾正ＮＣＣ的怠忽職守與不作為，ＮＣＣ在加強管控媒體和促進產業發展之間難道不應該兼籌並顧嗎？
進一步探析ＮＣＣ何以對其前述兩大法定任務，會出現如此過度作為和近乎不作為的異象，我們認為，其中的癥結應該在於行政機關的通病，對於如何管理業者相對較為嫻熟，但對於如何輔導業者促進產業發展則相對較為陌生甚至是無能為之。結果就使得台灣的資訊傳播產業，原本被期待在既有的厚實高科技產業支撐下，可以於網路新時代大展拳腳，最後卻落得資訊匯流的進度，不只已遠遠落後南韓，甚至也被中國大陸超越。這種國家競爭力的落居下風，毋寧才是馬政府所應引以為憂，ＮＣＣ又怎能分心旁騖，不思急起直追的對策。
總結來看，我們欣見五大新聞專業團體針對內容荒腔走板偏差的《媒體壟斷防制與多元維護法》，終於不再集體失聲。業者站在第一線，痛感台灣媒體經營環境在過度規範下碎裂化為不具競爭力的中小企業，正所謂心所謂危，不能不言，至於能否對迷失方向感的馬政府，以及遭民粹綁架的立法部門，產生振聾發聵的效應，大家就拭目以待吧！
Monday, June 17, 2013
Snowden Tugs at Hong Kongers' Heartstrings
Snowden Tugs at Hong Kongers' Heartstrings
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2013
Summary: The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
Full Text below:
Twenty-seven Hong Kong citizens' groups took to the streets yesterday. They called on the Hong Kong Government to protect Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee and whistleblower who has taken refuge in Hong Kong. They forced Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung to publicly promise that he would deal with the matter "according to the law." Is Snowden a hero or a traitor? This answers the question. He may be a fugitive wanted by the U.S. government. But in cyberspace he is a hero. Hong Kong is his hiding place the non-virtual world. Hong Kongers feel obligated to come to his defense.
According to a South China Morning Post poll, nearly half of the people in Hong Kong oppose turning Snowden over to the United States. Only 17% favor surrendering him to US authorities. A full 33% of those polled see Snowden as a hero. Only 13% consider him a traitor. About 23% consider him somehwere in between. Public passions in Hong Kong may fluctuate on certain issues, but they never dissipate entirely.
Outsider may be skeptical of Hong Kong's post-retrocession autonomy. But as far the Snowden incident is concerned, the "one country, two systems" arrangement has led to this intriguing development. On the one hand, it has forced Beijing to stand down. On the other hand, it has enabled Hong Kong to go on the attack. This amounts to a one two punch to the United States. The incident has answered another question for Beijing. Is Snowden a gift from heaven, or a hot potato? The answer is, he is clearly not the latter.
The Snowden incident has tugged at peoples' heartstrings for three reasons. One. Snowden chose to break the news when Obama and Xi Jinping were meeting to discuss cyberwarfare. This caused the U.S. government no end of embarrassment. Without even drawing his sword, Xi Jinping was promptly rendered unassailable. Two. Snowden chose Hong Kong, a free port, to make his appearance, This posed a problem for U.S. diplomacy. It also put Beijing's handling of Hong Kong to the test. Three. Netizens the world over were made aware of the United States 1984 style "Big Brother" intelligence gathering methods. They were shocked and disgusted. The US has long touted itself as the world's champion of freedom and human rights. The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality left them deeply disillusioned. Obama's image also took a hit.
It was in just such a political atmosphere that Hong Kongers came forward to support Snowden. Snowden said he chose to flee to Hong Kong because Hong Kong was so free. Some think Snowden lacked a clear understanding of Hong Kong. They said he went from the frying pan into the fire. But from another perspective, it was precisely his assertion that Hong Kong was so free that sent waves of emotion through Hong Kongers's hearts, and made them so willing to protect him, and fight the erosion of freedom in Hong Kong. The June 4th candlelight vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Incident took place a few days earlier. As a result, the organizers of the protest march praised Snowden for sacrificing his own freedom to defend others' freedom of speech and fredoom of expression.
Practically speaking, is Hong Kong really a place Snowden can pin his hopes on? Can he eventually defect to Iceland? For the moment it is hard to say. The Hong Kong Government has been placed in an awkward position. Behind the scenes, it must comply with the CCP's diplomatic strategy. On this matter, Hong Kong has no choice. On the surface, Beijing certainly has no reason to rollover for the United States. But could the situation change? Would that turn Snowden into a secret bargaining chip? It is hard to say. In fact, there are rumors that Snowden's leaks were orchestrated by the CCP. That is why the leaks were so perfectly choreographed.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been hiding in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London over the past year. Assange has suggested that Snowden seek political asylum in one of the Latin American countries. HIs implication was that Asian countries are likely to succumb to US pressure. His remark suggested a lack of trust. The British government has already forbidden airline companies to allow Snowden into the UK. Snowden's whereabouts have been a mystery for many days. Has he quietly fled to a third country? Or is he still under the protection of private individuals or the CCP? Everyone is wondering.
To be sure, the more Hong Kongers stand up for and express solidarity with Snowden, the less likely he is to be secretly extradited to the United States. More and more netizens are expressing solidarity with him. The likelihood that US security agencies will deal with Snowden illegally is diminishing. When the Prism Project came to light, the U.S. Government immediately tried to appease domestic public opinion. It insisted the plan was directed only at foreigners, rather than the American public. These words grated on the ears of foreign governments, especially those who see themselves as allies of the United States. These words were difficult for them to swallow. Snowden exposed the recklessness of U.S. security agencies, the high-handedness of the U.S. government, and the servility of major technology companies who kowtowed to their political authority.
The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
史諾登挑動了香港人的心弦
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.18 02:02 am
香港廿七個公民團體日昨上街遊行，要求港府保護目前隱身香港的前中情局洩密雇員史諾登，並迫使特首梁振英表態會「依法處理」。史諾登究竟是英雄還是叛徒，由此大致得到答案：他雖是美國政府通緝的要犯，卻是網路世界的英雄；香港作為其藏身之實體世界，港人自覺有義務要聲援他。
根據南華早報的民調，有近半數的香港人反對將史諾登交給美國，只有一成七的人贊成將他交出。三成三的受訪者把史諾登視為「英雄」，僅一成三市民認為他是「叛徒」，兩成三的人認為他介乎兩者之間。香港的民意對特定議題雖然時有起落，向來不褪流行。
儘管外界對香港回歸後的自主地位抱持懷疑，但在史諾登事件上，「一國兩制」的設計恰好在此構成一個巧妙的帷幕，一方面讓北京「退可守」，一方面是香港「進可攻」，可分進合擊因應美國。如此，也就答覆了此一事件的另一項提法：對北京而言，史諾登是天下掉下來的禮物還是燙手山芋？答案顯非後者。
史諾登事件之所以如此扣人心弦，一是他選擇在歐巴馬和習近平會晤談「網軍戰爭」時爆料，給了美國政府一個莫大的難堪，習近平刀不出鞘即立於不敗之地；二是他選擇在自由港的香港現身，既挑戰美國的外交能耐，又考驗北京對香港的操控尺度；三是對全球的網路使用者而言，得悉美國以幾近「老大哥」的手法包山包海地監聽情蒐，不僅深覺震驚與反感，也對美國標榜自由人權的表裡不一感到失望，歐巴馬的形象也因而受創。
這樣的氛圍，給了香港人挺身聲援史諾登的正當性。史諾登聲稱，他選擇避居香港，是因為香港很自由。這點，有人認為是史諾登對香港認識不清，使他「才出虎穴，又入狼窩」。但換個角度看，也正是「香港很自由」這句話，激起了香港人內心的漣漪，願意起而保護他，同時維護香港日漸消褪的自由。何況，六四的紀念燭光晚會才過了沒幾天。也因此，遊行發起人在演說中，讚許史諾登是犧牲了自己的自由，來捍衛其他人的言論和通訊自由。
務實地看，香港是否真為史諾登可以寄託希望的地方，他最後能否如願投奔冰島，目前尚難斷言。港府在曖昧表態之餘，背後還得配合中共的外交戰略行事，這是香港的不由自主。表面上，北京當然沒有理由對美國示軟；但會不會在某種情勢變化下，讓史諾登被當成暗中交易的籌碼，則很難說。事實上，已有傳言指稱史諾登洩密事件莫非是中共一手主導，才會如此天衣無縫。
目前藏身厄瓜多爾駐倫敦大使館已逾一年的維基解密創辦人亞桑傑，即建議史諾登應向拉美國家尋求政治庇護；言下，他對易於屈從美國的亞洲國家，充滿不信任。而英國政府則已下令，禁止航空公司搭載史諾登入境英國。多日來行蹤成謎的史諾登，是否已悄悄前往第三地？或者他仍在民間人士或中共的保護之下，都令人好奇。
可以確定的是，有越多香港人民站出來聲援史諾登，他被私下交易引渡回美受審的機率就越小；有越多國際網路使用者站出來聲援他，史諾登遭到美國安全機構非法對待的機會，也就越小。事實上，當「稜鏡計畫」曝光後，美國政府立刻安撫國內民眾說，這項計畫針對的只是「外國人」，而不是針對美國人民；此話，聽在外國政府──尤其是那些自視為是美國良好盟邦的外國政府耳裡，不僅格外刺耳，也備感不是滋味。史諾登暴露的，不僅是美國安全機構的妄為，也是美國政府的霸道，和那些大科技公司向權力稱臣的卑躬姿態。
對北京而言，要依西方國家所謂的人權標準來處理史諾登事件，最好的辦法就是鬆手讓香港處理，把民意當成指標。去年投奔北京美國大使館的陳光誠，最後依其意願赴美；史諾登投奔香港事件，總不能低於此一標準吧！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 18, 2013
Summary: The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
Full Text below:
Twenty-seven Hong Kong citizens' groups took to the streets yesterday. They called on the Hong Kong Government to protect Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee and whistleblower who has taken refuge in Hong Kong. They forced Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung to publicly promise that he would deal with the matter "according to the law." Is Snowden a hero or a traitor? This answers the question. He may be a fugitive wanted by the U.S. government. But in cyberspace he is a hero. Hong Kong is his hiding place the non-virtual world. Hong Kongers feel obligated to come to his defense.
According to a South China Morning Post poll, nearly half of the people in Hong Kong oppose turning Snowden over to the United States. Only 17% favor surrendering him to US authorities. A full 33% of those polled see Snowden as a hero. Only 13% consider him a traitor. About 23% consider him somehwere in between. Public passions in Hong Kong may fluctuate on certain issues, but they never dissipate entirely.
Outsider may be skeptical of Hong Kong's post-retrocession autonomy. But as far the Snowden incident is concerned, the "one country, two systems" arrangement has led to this intriguing development. On the one hand, it has forced Beijing to stand down. On the other hand, it has enabled Hong Kong to go on the attack. This amounts to a one two punch to the United States. The incident has answered another question for Beijing. Is Snowden a gift from heaven, or a hot potato? The answer is, he is clearly not the latter.
The Snowden incident has tugged at peoples' heartstrings for three reasons. One. Snowden chose to break the news when Obama and Xi Jinping were meeting to discuss cyberwarfare. This caused the U.S. government no end of embarrassment. Without even drawing his sword, Xi Jinping was promptly rendered unassailable. Two. Snowden chose Hong Kong, a free port, to make his appearance, This posed a problem for U.S. diplomacy. It also put Beijing's handling of Hong Kong to the test. Three. Netizens the world over were made aware of the United States 1984 style "Big Brother" intelligence gathering methods. They were shocked and disgusted. The US has long touted itself as the world's champion of freedom and human rights. The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality left them deeply disillusioned. Obama's image also took a hit.
It was in just such a political atmosphere that Hong Kongers came forward to support Snowden. Snowden said he chose to flee to Hong Kong because Hong Kong was so free. Some think Snowden lacked a clear understanding of Hong Kong. They said he went from the frying pan into the fire. But from another perspective, it was precisely his assertion that Hong Kong was so free that sent waves of emotion through Hong Kongers's hearts, and made them so willing to protect him, and fight the erosion of freedom in Hong Kong. The June 4th candlelight vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Incident took place a few days earlier. As a result, the organizers of the protest march praised Snowden for sacrificing his own freedom to defend others' freedom of speech and fredoom of expression.
Practically speaking, is Hong Kong really a place Snowden can pin his hopes on? Can he eventually defect to Iceland? For the moment it is hard to say. The Hong Kong Government has been placed in an awkward position. Behind the scenes, it must comply with the CCP's diplomatic strategy. On this matter, Hong Kong has no choice. On the surface, Beijing certainly has no reason to rollover for the United States. But could the situation change? Would that turn Snowden into a secret bargaining chip? It is hard to say. In fact, there are rumors that Snowden's leaks were orchestrated by the CCP. That is why the leaks were so perfectly choreographed.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been hiding in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London over the past year. Assange has suggested that Snowden seek political asylum in one of the Latin American countries. HIs implication was that Asian countries are likely to succumb to US pressure. His remark suggested a lack of trust. The British government has already forbidden airline companies to allow Snowden into the UK. Snowden's whereabouts have been a mystery for many days. Has he quietly fled to a third country? Or is he still under the protection of private individuals or the CCP? Everyone is wondering.
To be sure, the more Hong Kongers stand up for and express solidarity with Snowden, the less likely he is to be secretly extradited to the United States. More and more netizens are expressing solidarity with him. The likelihood that US security agencies will deal with Snowden illegally is diminishing. When the Prism Project came to light, the U.S. Government immediately tried to appease domestic public opinion. It insisted the plan was directed only at foreigners, rather than the American public. These words grated on the ears of foreign governments, especially those who see themselves as allies of the United States. These words were difficult for them to swallow. Snowden exposed the recklessness of U.S. security agencies, the high-handedness of the U.S. government, and the servility of major technology companies who kowtowed to their political authority.
The best way for Beijing to deal with Snowden, and adhere to Western nations' standards for human rights, is to allow the Hong Kong government to deal with Snowden on its own, in accordance with public opinion. Last year Chen Guangcheng defected to the United States Embassy in Beijing. Eventually he got his wish and made his way to the United States. This year Edward Snowden has defected to Hong Kong. Surely the bar cannot be set lower now.
史諾登挑動了香港人的心弦
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.18 02:02 am
香港廿七個公民團體日昨上街遊行，要求港府保護目前隱身香港的前中情局洩密雇員史諾登，並迫使特首梁振英表態會「依法處理」。史諾登究竟是英雄還是叛徒，由此大致得到答案：他雖是美國政府通緝的要犯，卻是網路世界的英雄；香港作為其藏身之實體世界，港人自覺有義務要聲援他。
根據南華早報的民調，有近半數的香港人反對將史諾登交給美國，只有一成七的人贊成將他交出。三成三的受訪者把史諾登視為「英雄」，僅一成三市民認為他是「叛徒」，兩成三的人認為他介乎兩者之間。香港的民意對特定議題雖然時有起落，向來不褪流行。
儘管外界對香港回歸後的自主地位抱持懷疑，但在史諾登事件上，「一國兩制」的設計恰好在此構成一個巧妙的帷幕，一方面讓北京「退可守」，一方面是香港「進可攻」，可分進合擊因應美國。如此，也就答覆了此一事件的另一項提法：對北京而言，史諾登是天下掉下來的禮物還是燙手山芋？答案顯非後者。
史諾登事件之所以如此扣人心弦，一是他選擇在歐巴馬和習近平會晤談「網軍戰爭」時爆料，給了美國政府一個莫大的難堪，習近平刀不出鞘即立於不敗之地；二是他選擇在自由港的香港現身，既挑戰美國的外交能耐，又考驗北京對香港的操控尺度；三是對全球的網路使用者而言，得悉美國以幾近「老大哥」的手法包山包海地監聽情蒐，不僅深覺震驚與反感，也對美國標榜自由人權的表裡不一感到失望，歐巴馬的形象也因而受創。
這樣的氛圍，給了香港人挺身聲援史諾登的正當性。史諾登聲稱，他選擇避居香港，是因為香港很自由。這點，有人認為是史諾登對香港認識不清，使他「才出虎穴，又入狼窩」。但換個角度看，也正是「香港很自由」這句話，激起了香港人內心的漣漪，願意起而保護他，同時維護香港日漸消褪的自由。何況，六四的紀念燭光晚會才過了沒幾天。也因此，遊行發起人在演說中，讚許史諾登是犧牲了自己的自由，來捍衛其他人的言論和通訊自由。
務實地看，香港是否真為史諾登可以寄託希望的地方，他最後能否如願投奔冰島，目前尚難斷言。港府在曖昧表態之餘，背後還得配合中共的外交戰略行事，這是香港的不由自主。表面上，北京當然沒有理由對美國示軟；但會不會在某種情勢變化下，讓史諾登被當成暗中交易的籌碼，則很難說。事實上，已有傳言指稱史諾登洩密事件莫非是中共一手主導，才會如此天衣無縫。
目前藏身厄瓜多爾駐倫敦大使館已逾一年的維基解密創辦人亞桑傑，即建議史諾登應向拉美國家尋求政治庇護；言下，他對易於屈從美國的亞洲國家，充滿不信任。而英國政府則已下令，禁止航空公司搭載史諾登入境英國。多日來行蹤成謎的史諾登，是否已悄悄前往第三地？或者他仍在民間人士或中共的保護之下，都令人好奇。
可以確定的是，有越多香港人民站出來聲援史諾登，他被私下交易引渡回美受審的機率就越小；有越多國際網路使用者站出來聲援他，史諾登遭到美國安全機構非法對待的機會，也就越小。事實上，當「稜鏡計畫」曝光後，美國政府立刻安撫國內民眾說，這項計畫針對的只是「外國人」，而不是針對美國人民；此話，聽在外國政府──尤其是那些自視為是美國良好盟邦的外國政府耳裡，不僅格外刺耳，也備感不是滋味。史諾登暴露的，不僅是美國安全機構的妄為，也是美國政府的霸道，和那些大科技公司向權力稱臣的卑躬姿態。
對北京而言，要依西方國家所謂的人權標準來處理史諾登事件，最好的辦法就是鬆手讓香港處理，把民意當成指標。去年投奔北京美國大使館的陳光誠，最後依其意願赴美；史諾登投奔香港事件，總不能低於此一標準吧！
Sunday, June 16, 2013
Cross-Strait Relations Worth Looking Forward To
Cross-Strait Relations Worth Looking Forward To
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2013
Summary: According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
Full Text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping recently met with U.S. President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They discussed the establishment of a new superpower relationship. General Secretary Xi Jinping later met in Beijing with Honorary Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Wu said the talks between the two sides will eliminate many misunderstandings. Xi said they helped him better understand Ma Ying-jeou's position. The talks were cordial. Both sides held their ground, but also demonstrated their goodwill. They agreed on gradual, peaceful development. They agreed to expand relations. Does this mean that both sides are attempting to establish a new cross-Strait relationship? If it does, we approve.
Questions continue to haunt the recent Wu Xi talks. Which side initiated the talks? Which side agreed to them? How were the time, location, and attendees determined? Was the meeting duly authorized? What issues were discussed? Why did President Ma make so many public statements before the meeting? What about the content of his speech, and its emphasis? Whom exactly was he addressing? The public on Taiwan? The Mainland authorities? Or the international community? Why did President Ma give Wu Poh-hsiung's trip his special blessing? Why, by contrast, did he disassociate himself from the earlier trip by Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan? Were there political calculations outsiders are not privy to? .
Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the Wu Xi meeting sent the world a powerful political message. Both sides place a high value on the relationship. Peaceful development will continue, based on the one China framework. Cross-Strait relations may expand. Indirect cross-Strait political dialogue has already begun. Neither side wants outsiders to misunderstand. Wu Poh-hsiung and Xi Jinping repeated President Ma Ying-jeou and the CCP Central Committee's words verbatim.
During the talks, Xi Jinping set forth four views on cross-Strait relations. He began with the nation as a whole, and a strategy for national development. He reaffirmed the nature of cross-Strait relations. He reaffirmed national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He reaffirmed the goal of national reinvigoration. He reiterated opposition to Taiwan independence, and to separatist ideas and activities. He called for greater mutual trust, greater efforts to seek common ground, for greater pragmatism and a more positive attitude. This reflects how we, the Chinese people, value essentials over details, and principles over particulars. This underscores the importance we place on consistency in our thinking. During bilateral negotiations, the two sides must first clarify the fundamentals. Only then can they address the specifics.
Consider the specifics. The Taiwan side raised the matter of participation in international activities. Xi Jinping said the two sides agreed in principle to reduce internal friction on foreign issues. He said both sides should meet as equals. The Taiwan side can be specific about its actual needs. Xi Jinping was precise in his wording. He did not use the word "diplomacy," which implies that the two parties are sovereign countries. He spoke only of international events, not organizations. He implied that Taipei should not attempt to introduce outside forces into the equation, or make unilateral demands, even as it refused to consult with the Mainland. The CCP believes the following. One. The two sides must not give the outside world the impression that there are "two Chinas" or that there is an independent Taiwan. Two. The two sides must not tolerate foreign intervention or foreign pressure. Three. The two sides must comply with the statutes of international organizations. The CCP still insists on dealing with cases on an individual basis for the forseeable future.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung issued seven views. These were things that President Ma Ying-jeou should do, must do, and can do. Under the current system, we in the Republic of China, champion a one China framework. Wu affirmed that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Wu addressed the expansion of relations at all levels under ECFA, Taiwan's participation in regional economic organizations, and the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. These reflect both public opinion on Taiwan and the government's current direction. We applaud their resolute posture.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu said Taiwan wants meaningful participation in international activities, and the promotion of a cross-Strait educational protocol. In the past, Taiwan demanded participation in international organizations rather than international activities. The Government often sent different signals on cross-Strait educational and cultural agreements. This left people confused. Wu Poh-hsiung's statements however, were authorized by President Ma. We know they are offiical government policy. Taiwan may have learned from past experience. Perhaps it knows that participation in international activities is more important than participation in international organizations. Perhaps it has learned that cultural and educational activities may be the best way to foster a shared perspective and to resolve cross-Strait alienation. Over the next three years, we will be regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the government's policies.
Finally, this newspaper would like to reiterate its past conclusions. Beijing probably has many expectations. But it has already concluded that no solution is possible in the short term. It hopes to create the conditions required for the eventual resolution of the divided China problem. According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.17
社論－建構新型兩岸關係值得期待
本報訊
繼日前大陸國家主席習近平與美國總統歐巴馬於加州舉行莊園峰會，暢談建立新型大國關係之後，習近平總書記隨即又在北京會見到訪的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄。吳伯雄說此次會談消除了雙方很多的誤解，習近平也說增加了對馬英九的理解。會談氣氛融洽、雙方都堅守立場，但也展現了善意，同意本著和平發展的主軸，用漸進的方式，進一步深化、廣化彼此之間的關係。如果這意味著雙方正在努力構建新型的兩岸關係，我們對此持積極、鼓勵的態度。
這次吳、習會談是由何方主動、誰是被動、會面時機、地點的選擇、隨行團員的安排、是否經過充分授權、討論的議題，馬總統為何在行前特別予以接見，並且公開發表談話，談話的內容與用字遣詞的強弱、發言的對象到底是台灣民眾、大陸當局或國際社會，馬總統又為何會對吳伯雄此行特別給予加持，卻對稍早連戰榮譽主席的大陸之行強力切割，其中確實有太多值得探究的問題，或許還有一些不足為外人道的精密算計與政治考量，其實都可以成為各界觀察研究的課題。
不論如何，這次吳、習會的本身就給外界一個強烈的政治訊息：兩岸雙方都極度重視彼此之間的關係，在一中框架（台灣用語為一中架構）的基礎上，和平發展的政策將會持續下去，兩岸關係的發展有進一步深化的各種可能，兩岸的間接政治對話已然啟動，但雙方也都不希望給外界任何錯誤解讀的空間，這可由吳伯雄與習近平兩人，分別拿出經由馬英九主席及中共中央的定稿逐字照念，字斟句酌的謹慎動作得到證實。
在這次會談中，習近平提出兩岸關係四點意見，基本上都是先從民族整體利益及國家發展的戰略格局出發，比如說先確定兩岸的關係與定位，堅持維護國家領土主權的完整，追求民族的偉大復興，反對、遏制台獨分裂的主張和活動，然後再進一步要求雙方增進互信、求同存異、務實進取、良性互動。這反映出我們中國人認為綱舉而目張，原則重於枝節、講概念重於講方法的一貫思維。兩岸在談判的過程中，雙方都有先確立基本原則，再談具體事務的情形。
在具體事務上，在回應台灣方面所提有關參與國際活動問題時，習近平原則同意雙方在涉外事物上要減少內耗，提到兩岸應該平等協商，台灣可以具體表明自己的實際需求。習近平用字精準，並未使用隱涵主權國家意味的外交二字，只談國際活動未談組織，暗示台北不宜引進外力、片面提出要求，但又拒絕與大陸協商解決。中共的立場是，一不要給外界造成兩個中國或台灣獨立的印象，二不接受外國的干預和壓力，三要合乎各該國際組織的章程。中共今後仍是個案、逐年處理，仍有所堅持。
再談到吳伯雄榮譽主席提出的七點意見，這同樣也就是馬英九總統今後應做、要做、能做的事情，其中先提到了在中華民國現行體制下，我們對一中架構的自我堅持，確定兩岸絕非國與國的關係之後，然後再觸及後ECFA時期如何深化、廣化兩岸各個層面的交流，台灣參與區域經濟組織，雙方互設辦事處等等問題。這些基本上都反映了台灣的民意及政府當前努力的方向，我們對此有為有守的立場抱持肯定、支持的態度。
於此，我們要特別一提的是，吳榮譽主席提到，台灣希望有意義的參與國際活動，推動兩岸教育協議。過去，台灣慣常主張的是參與國際組織，而非國際活動，而政府對於兩岸簽署教育及文化協議也常釋出不同的訊息，讓人莫衷一是。如今吳伯雄的談話既然經過馬主席的授權，我們就認定這是政府的既定政策，台灣或許由過去的經驗學到了教訓，或許知道參與國際活動重於參加組織，而透過文化及教育來建構兩岸同胞命運共同體的認知，更是解決兩岸疏離的最佳之道。未來三年，我們將不時以此來做為檢驗政府施政的成效與誠信。
最後，我們要重申本報過去的判斷，北京雖然在主觀上有很多的期望，但已能理性面對兩岸暫時無解的困境，希望在可控制範圍內，先行創造條件，為將來解決問題尋找破解之道。據與會人士轉述習總書記的講話，「兩岸形式的統一更要心靈的契合」，大陸會耐心的等待，大陸有信心隨著兩岸的交流，人民會更了解和平發展是兩岸最大的利益。大陸如此，台灣亦當如是。多做實事，少說大話，尤其不要釋出前後矛盾的訊息，兩岸問題終有和平解決的一天。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2013
Summary: According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
Full Text below:
Mainland President Xi Jinping recently met with U.S. President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They discussed the establishment of a new superpower relationship. General Secretary Xi Jinping later met in Beijing with Honorary Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung. Wu said the talks between the two sides will eliminate many misunderstandings. Xi said they helped him better understand Ma Ying-jeou's position. The talks were cordial. Both sides held their ground, but also demonstrated their goodwill. They agreed on gradual, peaceful development. They agreed to expand relations. Does this mean that both sides are attempting to establish a new cross-Strait relationship? If it does, we approve.
Questions continue to haunt the recent Wu Xi talks. Which side initiated the talks? Which side agreed to them? How were the time, location, and attendees determined? Was the meeting duly authorized? What issues were discussed? Why did President Ma make so many public statements before the meeting? What about the content of his speech, and its emphasis? Whom exactly was he addressing? The public on Taiwan? The Mainland authorities? Or the international community? Why did President Ma give Wu Poh-hsiung's trip his special blessing? Why, by contrast, did he disassociate himself from the earlier trip by Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan? Were there political calculations outsiders are not privy to? .
Whatever the answers to these questions might be, the Wu Xi meeting sent the world a powerful political message. Both sides place a high value on the relationship. Peaceful development will continue, based on the one China framework. Cross-Strait relations may expand. Indirect cross-Strait political dialogue has already begun. Neither side wants outsiders to misunderstand. Wu Poh-hsiung and Xi Jinping repeated President Ma Ying-jeou and the CCP Central Committee's words verbatim.
During the talks, Xi Jinping set forth four views on cross-Strait relations. He began with the nation as a whole, and a strategy for national development. He reaffirmed the nature of cross-Strait relations. He reaffirmed national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He reaffirmed the goal of national reinvigoration. He reiterated opposition to Taiwan independence, and to separatist ideas and activities. He called for greater mutual trust, greater efforts to seek common ground, for greater pragmatism and a more positive attitude. This reflects how we, the Chinese people, value essentials over details, and principles over particulars. This underscores the importance we place on consistency in our thinking. During bilateral negotiations, the two sides must first clarify the fundamentals. Only then can they address the specifics.
Consider the specifics. The Taiwan side raised the matter of participation in international activities. Xi Jinping said the two sides agreed in principle to reduce internal friction on foreign issues. He said both sides should meet as equals. The Taiwan side can be specific about its actual needs. Xi Jinping was precise in his wording. He did not use the word "diplomacy," which implies that the two parties are sovereign countries. He spoke only of international events, not organizations. He implied that Taipei should not attempt to introduce outside forces into the equation, or make unilateral demands, even as it refused to consult with the Mainland. The CCP believes the following. One. The two sides must not give the outside world the impression that there are "two Chinas" or that there is an independent Taiwan. Two. The two sides must not tolerate foreign intervention or foreign pressure. Three. The two sides must comply with the statutes of international organizations. The CCP still insists on dealing with cases on an individual basis for the forseeable future.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung issued seven views. These were things that President Ma Ying-jeou should do, must do, and can do. Under the current system, we in the Republic of China, champion a one China framework. Wu affirmed that cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations. Wu addressed the expansion of relations at all levels under ECFA, Taiwan's participation in regional economic organizations, and the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. These reflect both public opinion on Taiwan and the government's current direction. We applaud their resolute posture.
Honorary KMT Chairman Wu said Taiwan wants meaningful participation in international activities, and the promotion of a cross-Strait educational protocol. In the past, Taiwan demanded participation in international organizations rather than international activities. The Government often sent different signals on cross-Strait educational and cultural agreements. This left people confused. Wu Poh-hsiung's statements however, were authorized by President Ma. We know they are offiical government policy. Taiwan may have learned from past experience. Perhaps it knows that participation in international activities is more important than participation in international organizations. Perhaps it has learned that cultural and educational activities may be the best way to foster a shared perspective and to resolve cross-Strait alienation. Over the next three years, we will be regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the government's policies.
Finally, this newspaper would like to reiterate its past conclusions. Beijing probably has many expectations. But it has already concluded that no solution is possible in the short term. It hopes to create the conditions required for the eventual resolution of the divided China problem. According to participants who heard the General Secretary speak, "Cross-Strait reunification requires above all, a meeting of hearts and minds." The Mainland is willing to be patient. The Mainland is confident that cross-Strait exchanges will make people realize that peaceful development is the best for both sides. The Mainland realizes this. The Taiwan side should realize this as well. It must be more pragmatic and less prideful. In particular, it must not send contradictory messages. Eventually a peaceful resolution for cross-Strait issues will be found.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.17
社論－建構新型兩岸關係值得期待
本報訊
繼日前大陸國家主席習近平與美國總統歐巴馬於加州舉行莊園峰會，暢談建立新型大國關係之後，習近平總書記隨即又在北京會見到訪的國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄。吳伯雄說此次會談消除了雙方很多的誤解，習近平也說增加了對馬英九的理解。會談氣氛融洽、雙方都堅守立場，但也展現了善意，同意本著和平發展的主軸，用漸進的方式，進一步深化、廣化彼此之間的關係。如果這意味著雙方正在努力構建新型的兩岸關係，我們對此持積極、鼓勵的態度。
這次吳、習會談是由何方主動、誰是被動、會面時機、地點的選擇、隨行團員的安排、是否經過充分授權、討論的議題，馬總統為何在行前特別予以接見，並且公開發表談話，談話的內容與用字遣詞的強弱、發言的對象到底是台灣民眾、大陸當局或國際社會，馬總統又為何會對吳伯雄此行特別給予加持，卻對稍早連戰榮譽主席的大陸之行強力切割，其中確實有太多值得探究的問題，或許還有一些不足為外人道的精密算計與政治考量，其實都可以成為各界觀察研究的課題。
不論如何，這次吳、習會的本身就給外界一個強烈的政治訊息：兩岸雙方都極度重視彼此之間的關係，在一中框架（台灣用語為一中架構）的基礎上，和平發展的政策將會持續下去，兩岸關係的發展有進一步深化的各種可能，兩岸的間接政治對話已然啟動，但雙方也都不希望給外界任何錯誤解讀的空間，這可由吳伯雄與習近平兩人，分別拿出經由馬英九主席及中共中央的定稿逐字照念，字斟句酌的謹慎動作得到證實。
在這次會談中，習近平提出兩岸關係四點意見，基本上都是先從民族整體利益及國家發展的戰略格局出發，比如說先確定兩岸的關係與定位，堅持維護國家領土主權的完整，追求民族的偉大復興，反對、遏制台獨分裂的主張和活動，然後再進一步要求雙方增進互信、求同存異、務實進取、良性互動。這反映出我們中國人認為綱舉而目張，原則重於枝節、講概念重於講方法的一貫思維。兩岸在談判的過程中，雙方都有先確立基本原則，再談具體事務的情形。
在具體事務上，在回應台灣方面所提有關參與國際活動問題時，習近平原則同意雙方在涉外事物上要減少內耗，提到兩岸應該平等協商，台灣可以具體表明自己的實際需求。習近平用字精準，並未使用隱涵主權國家意味的外交二字，只談國際活動未談組織，暗示台北不宜引進外力、片面提出要求，但又拒絕與大陸協商解決。中共的立場是，一不要給外界造成兩個中國或台灣獨立的印象，二不接受外國的干預和壓力，三要合乎各該國際組織的章程。中共今後仍是個案、逐年處理，仍有所堅持。
再談到吳伯雄榮譽主席提出的七點意見，這同樣也就是馬英九總統今後應做、要做、能做的事情，其中先提到了在中華民國現行體制下，我們對一中架構的自我堅持，確定兩岸絕非國與國的關係之後，然後再觸及後ECFA時期如何深化、廣化兩岸各個層面的交流，台灣參與區域經濟組織，雙方互設辦事處等等問題。這些基本上都反映了台灣的民意及政府當前努力的方向，我們對此有為有守的立場抱持肯定、支持的態度。
於此，我們要特別一提的是，吳榮譽主席提到，台灣希望有意義的參與國際活動，推動兩岸教育協議。過去，台灣慣常主張的是參與國際組織，而非國際活動，而政府對於兩岸簽署教育及文化協議也常釋出不同的訊息，讓人莫衷一是。如今吳伯雄的談話既然經過馬主席的授權，我們就認定這是政府的既定政策，台灣或許由過去的經驗學到了教訓，或許知道參與國際活動重於參加組織，而透過文化及教育來建構兩岸同胞命運共同體的認知，更是解決兩岸疏離的最佳之道。未來三年，我們將不時以此來做為檢驗政府施政的成效與誠信。
最後，我們要重申本報過去的判斷，北京雖然在主觀上有很多的期望，但已能理性面對兩岸暫時無解的困境，希望在可控制範圍內，先行創造條件，為將來解決問題尋找破解之道。據與會人士轉述習總書記的講話，「兩岸形式的統一更要心靈的契合」，大陸會耐心的等待，大陸有信心隨著兩岸的交流，人民會更了解和平發展是兩岸最大的利益。大陸如此，台灣亦當如是。多做實事，少說大話，尤其不要釋出前後矛盾的訊息，兩岸問題終有和平解決的一天。
Thursday, June 13, 2013
Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?
Wu Xi Meeting: What is the Relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2013
Summary: Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
Full Text below:
Just before the Wu Xi Meeting, most speculation was directed at Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy. Would it harsher than President Hu Jintao's? Some even predicted that Xi would resort to threatening rhetoric.
But the general impression following the meeting was that although Xi Jinping upholds the "one China framework," his cross-Strait policy is no harsher than his predecessor's. In fact, it may even be more liberal, and offer greater maneuveuring room.
Compare this meeting with other meetings over the past five years. The recent Wu Xi Meeting included a political proclamation that upheld the "one China framework" and stressed that cross-Strait relations were "not relations between different countries." This may be regarded as old rhetoric. But the recent meeting achieved greater concrete results than ever before. For example, the KMT expressed a desire to participate in the RCEP (regional comprehensive economic partnership). The CCP expressed the desire to sign cultural agreements. The hallmark of the Wu Xi Meeting was its plain language, realism, and pragmatism.
The meeting zeroed in on several issues. Wu Poh-hsiung was the KMT's authorized representative to the CCP leadership. Wu proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Before Wu Poh-hsiung's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou expressed this same position many times. But this was the very first time the KMT issued such a proclamation right in front of the CCP.
What Wu Poh-hsiung said was that according to the two sides' laws, both sides should uphold the one-China principle. Both use the one-China framework when defining cross-Strait relations. Both define the relationship as non-state to state relations.
Wu Poh-hsiung's reasoning can be expanded as follows: Under the ROC's "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," cross-Strait relations are of course not "state to state relations," since they are both part of "one China."
The two sides talk about "cross-Strait relations" every day. But what precisely is the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland? In fact, we have a ready-made answer. It is "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." As Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the CPPCC observed, it is a relationship "in progress."
In order to establish cross-Strait representative offices, President Ma repeatedly proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Beijing has stressed that they are emphatically "not diplomatic in nature," and are "not embassies or consulates." In other words, neither side defines cross-Strait relations as "the relationship between the ROC and the PRC." Such a definition smacks of "state to state relations." But the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China obviously exist. It is merely that neither recognizes the other. But a flower is a flower all the same. Merely because one refuses to recognize it, does not mean it is not a flower.
The relationship between the PRC and the ROC is not the same as the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Both the PRC and Vietname see the other as foreign countries. But neither is the relationship between the PRC and the ROC like the relationship betwen the PRC and Fujian Province. After all, Beijing would never establish a "Fujianese Compatriates Office" in Fuzhou. The cross-Strait relationship is rooted in the two sides' constitutional frameworks and legal systems. It is not a relationship between foreign states. But in practice both sides see the relationship as a "non-foreign state to state relationship." This is what is meant by "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
The phrase "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," means that although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides are attempting to establish "one China" linkage points. The phrase "yet to be reunified" means that the People's Republic of China and the the Republic of China have yet to be reunified. Neither side recognizes the other as a "state." But this deprives "one China" of a linkage point. Therefore, although neither side recognizes the other as a "foreign state," that does not mean they cannot recognize each other as a "non-foreign state." They can use the "big roof concept of China" as a "one-China" linkage point. This may enable them to establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
As Wu Poh-hsiung noted, each sides upholds its own constitution, thereby upholding the cross-Strait "one China framework." The ROC and the PRC coexist, side by side, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is hardly "relations between one foreign country and another." This is the pillar of the "one China framework."
Therefore, the two sides should not endlessly bicker over whether cross-Strait relations are state to state relations. Cross-Strait relations are "political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China under special circumstances." The circumstances are special because neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China can eliminate each other. This has led to "special circumstances," and "a yet to be reunified" state of affairs. The two sides may refuse to recognize each other. But they cannot eliminate each other either. Doing so would not aid reunification. It would merely eliminate a linkage point for the "one China framework." It would merely weaken Taiwanese emotional identification with the "one China framework."
Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
吳習會：台灣與大陸是什麼關係？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.14 04:19 am
吳習會之前，最大的猜疑與懸念是：習近平的兩岸政策，會不會比胡錦濤嚴苛與緊縮？甚至有人預期，從習的口中，可能會聽到咄咄逼人的言語。
但會後的一般印象是：習近平在「一中框架」的堅持下，其兩岸政策觀點未見較前任嚴苛緊縮，且有更形寬闊與開明的可能性。
若與五年來多次叫得出「某某會」的場景相較，此次吳習會雖亦見政治宣示，如「一個中國的架構」及「不是國與國的關係」，卻皆可視為舊論的延伸。相對而言，此會在實際工作上則較過去著墨更多，例如國民黨方面表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ（區域性全面經濟夥伴關係）的意願，而中共則期望議簽文化協議等，此種文采簡樸、實事求是的務實風格，可視為此次吳習會的特色。
會談的焦點是，國民黨的授權代表吳伯雄在中共領導人面前，首次使用了「兩岸非國與國關係」一詞；雖然，在吳伯雄啟程前，馬英九總統已表達了多次。吳伯雄的論述是：兩岸各自的法律、體制都主張一個中國原則，都用一個中國架構來定位兩岸關係，而非國與國的關係。
吳伯雄的這個說法可以引申為：依據中華民國「一中憲法」的「一中各表」，兩岸自然不是「國與國的關係」，因為有「一中」的連結點。
然而，兩岸每天都在談「兩岸關係」，難道迄仍不知「台灣與大陸究竟是什麼關係」？其實，已有現成的答案，即是：「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。大陸政協主席俞正聲說，此一關係是「進行式」。
為了互設辦事處，馬總統屢申「兩岸不是國與國的關係」，北京則強調絕非「外交領事機構」。也就是說，兩岸目前皆不主張「兩岸關係」是「中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係」，好像這樣就會變成「國與國的關係」。然而，「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」卻皆是明明存在之事實，只是「互不承認」而已。不過，一朵花終究是一朵花，不因外人不承認即不是花。
其實，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，雖不類於「中華人民共和國與越南社會主義共和國的關係」（互為外國的關係）；但是，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，終究亦不類於「中華人民共和國與福建省的關係」，北京畢竟不會在福州市設置一個簽發「閩胞證」的辦事處。這樣的「關係」，就兩岸憲政法理言，固然不是「互視為外國」的關係，卻實際上蘊有「互視為非外國的國家」的關係，這也就是「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。
所謂「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，就是：雖然「尚未統一」，但希望能建構起「一個中國」的連結點。而「尚未統一的關係」，即是「未統一於中華人民共和國／亦未統一於中華民國」的「關係」；然而，如今相互否認對方為「國家」，卻也使得「一個中國」失去了「連結點」。於是，兩岸雖然「互不視為外國」，卻未必不可「互視為非外國的國家」，而以「大屋頂中國」為「一個中國」的「連結點」；如此始可能建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
如吳伯雄所言，倘以各自的憲法來維繫鞏固兩岸的「一中架構」；則中華民國與中華人民共和國在「尚未統一特殊情況下」的並立共存，非但不是「外國與外國的關係」，而且其實正是「一中架構」的主要支撐。
因此，不應再在「是不是國與國關係」的死胡同裡糾纏，兩岸的「關係」，其實就是「尚未統一（於中華人民共和國或中華民國的）特殊情況下的政治關係」，這種「特殊情況」，正是因為兩岸皆不能使「中華民國與中華人民共和國」消滅，始成為「特殊情況」，而「尚未統一」；畢竟，相互「否認」，其實不能使彼此「消滅」，也無助「統一」，只會使「一個中國」失去了「連結點」，更弱化了台灣人民在感情上對「一中架構」的想像。
習近平在昨日會中表達了有感的善意，且又提兩岸議簽《軍事互信機制》與《和平協議》；不過，如果不能對「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，做出合情合理的安排」，這些心願將如何實現？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2013
Summary: Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
Full Text below:
Just before the Wu Xi Meeting, most speculation was directed at Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy. Would it harsher than President Hu Jintao's? Some even predicted that Xi would resort to threatening rhetoric.
But the general impression following the meeting was that although Xi Jinping upholds the "one China framework," his cross-Strait policy is no harsher than his predecessor's. In fact, it may even be more liberal, and offer greater maneuveuring room.
Compare this meeting with other meetings over the past five years. The recent Wu Xi Meeting included a political proclamation that upheld the "one China framework" and stressed that cross-Strait relations were "not relations between different countries." This may be regarded as old rhetoric. But the recent meeting achieved greater concrete results than ever before. For example, the KMT expressed a desire to participate in the RCEP (regional comprehensive economic partnership). The CCP expressed the desire to sign cultural agreements. The hallmark of the Wu Xi Meeting was its plain language, realism, and pragmatism.
The meeting zeroed in on several issues. Wu Poh-hsiung was the KMT's authorized representative to the CCP leadership. Wu proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Before Wu Poh-hsiung's departure, President Ma Ying-jeou expressed this same position many times. But this was the very first time the KMT issued such a proclamation right in front of the CCP.
What Wu Poh-hsiung said was that according to the two sides' laws, both sides should uphold the one-China principle. Both use the one-China framework when defining cross-Strait relations. Both define the relationship as non-state to state relations.
Wu Poh-hsiung's reasoning can be expanded as follows: Under the ROC's "one China constitution" and "one China, different interpretations," cross-Strait relations are of course not "state to state relations," since they are both part of "one China."
The two sides talk about "cross-Strait relations" every day. But what precisely is the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland? In fact, we have a ready-made answer. It is "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." As Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the CPPCC observed, it is a relationship "in progress."
In order to establish cross-Strait representative offices, President Ma repeatedly proclaimed that "cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations." Beijing has stressed that they are emphatically "not diplomatic in nature," and are "not embassies or consulates." In other words, neither side defines cross-Strait relations as "the relationship between the ROC and the PRC." Such a definition smacks of "state to state relations." But the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China obviously exist. It is merely that neither recognizes the other. But a flower is a flower all the same. Merely because one refuses to recognize it, does not mean it is not a flower.
The relationship between the PRC and the ROC is not the same as the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Both the PRC and Vietname see the other as foreign countries. But neither is the relationship between the PRC and the ROC like the relationship betwen the PRC and Fujian Province. After all, Beijing would never establish a "Fujianese Compatriates Office" in Fuzhou. The cross-Strait relationship is rooted in the two sides' constitutional frameworks and legal systems. It is not a relationship between foreign states. But in practice both sides see the relationship as a "non-foreign state to state relationship." This is what is meant by "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
The phrase "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," means that although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides are attempting to establish "one China" linkage points. The phrase "yet to be reunified" means that the People's Republic of China and the the Republic of China have yet to be reunified. Neither side recognizes the other as a "state." But this deprives "one China" of a linkage point. Therefore, although neither side recognizes the other as a "foreign state," that does not mean they cannot recognize each other as a "non-foreign state." They can use the "big roof concept of China" as a "one-China" linkage point. This may enable them to establish "cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
As Wu Poh-hsiung noted, each sides upholds its own constitution, thereby upholding the cross-Strait "one China framework." The ROC and the PRC coexist, side by side, under special circumstances in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." This is hardly "relations between one foreign country and another." This is the pillar of the "one China framework."
Therefore, the two sides should not endlessly bicker over whether cross-Strait relations are state to state relations. Cross-Strait relations are "political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China under special circumstances." The circumstances are special because neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China can eliminate each other. This has led to "special circumstances," and "a yet to be reunified" state of affairs. The two sides may refuse to recognize each other. But they cannot eliminate each other either. Doing so would not aid reunification. It would merely eliminate a linkage point for the "one China framework." It would merely weaken Taiwanese emotional identification with the "one China framework."
Yesterday Xi Jinping expressed palpable goodwill. He also proposed a cross-Strait "military mutual trust mechanism" and "peace agreement." But he must make "reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." Otherwise, how can his hopes be fulfilled?
吳習會：台灣與大陸是什麼關係？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.14 04:19 am
吳習會之前，最大的猜疑與懸念是：習近平的兩岸政策，會不會比胡錦濤嚴苛與緊縮？甚至有人預期，從習的口中，可能會聽到咄咄逼人的言語。
但會後的一般印象是：習近平在「一中框架」的堅持下，其兩岸政策觀點未見較前任嚴苛緊縮，且有更形寬闊與開明的可能性。
若與五年來多次叫得出「某某會」的場景相較，此次吳習會雖亦見政治宣示，如「一個中國的架構」及「不是國與國的關係」，卻皆可視為舊論的延伸。相對而言，此會在實際工作上則較過去著墨更多，例如國民黨方面表達了參與ＲＣＥＰ（區域性全面經濟夥伴關係）的意願，而中共則期望議簽文化協議等，此種文采簡樸、實事求是的務實風格，可視為此次吳習會的特色。
會談的焦點是，國民黨的授權代表吳伯雄在中共領導人面前，首次使用了「兩岸非國與國關係」一詞；雖然，在吳伯雄啟程前，馬英九總統已表達了多次。吳伯雄的論述是：兩岸各自的法律、體制都主張一個中國原則，都用一個中國架構來定位兩岸關係，而非國與國的關係。
吳伯雄的這個說法可以引申為：依據中華民國「一中憲法」的「一中各表」，兩岸自然不是「國與國的關係」，因為有「一中」的連結點。
然而，兩岸每天都在談「兩岸關係」，難道迄仍不知「台灣與大陸究竟是什麼關係」？其實，已有現成的答案，即是：「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。大陸政協主席俞正聲說，此一關係是「進行式」。
為了互設辦事處，馬總統屢申「兩岸不是國與國的關係」，北京則強調絕非「外交領事機構」。也就是說，兩岸目前皆不主張「兩岸關係」是「中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係」，好像這樣就會變成「國與國的關係」。然而，「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」卻皆是明明存在之事實，只是「互不承認」而已。不過，一朵花終究是一朵花，不因外人不承認即不是花。
其實，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，雖不類於「中華人民共和國與越南社會主義共和國的關係」（互為外國的關係）；但是，「中華人民共和國與中華民國的關係」，終究亦不類於「中華人民共和國與福建省的關係」，北京畢竟不會在福州市設置一個簽發「閩胞證」的辦事處。這樣的「關係」，就兩岸憲政法理言，固然不是「互視為外國」的關係，卻實際上蘊有「互視為非外國的國家」的關係，這也就是「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。
所謂「國家統一前特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，就是：雖然「尚未統一」，但希望能建構起「一個中國」的連結點。而「尚未統一的關係」，即是「未統一於中華人民共和國／亦未統一於中華民國」的「關係」；然而，如今相互否認對方為「國家」，卻也使得「一個中國」失去了「連結點」。於是，兩岸雖然「互不視為外國」，卻未必不可「互視為非外國的國家」，而以「大屋頂中國」為「一個中國」的「連結點」；如此始可能建立「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」。
如吳伯雄所言，倘以各自的憲法來維繫鞏固兩岸的「一中架構」；則中華民國與中華人民共和國在「尚未統一特殊情況下」的並立共存，非但不是「外國與外國的關係」，而且其實正是「一中架構」的主要支撐。
因此，不應再在「是不是國與國關係」的死胡同裡糾纏，兩岸的「關係」，其實就是「尚未統一（於中華人民共和國或中華民國的）特殊情況下的政治關係」，這種「特殊情況」，正是因為兩岸皆不能使「中華民國與中華人民共和國」消滅，始成為「特殊情況」，而「尚未統一」；畢竟，相互「否認」，其實不能使彼此「消滅」，也無助「統一」，只會使「一個中國」失去了「連結點」，更弱化了台灣人民在感情上對「一中架構」的想像。
習近平在昨日會中表達了有感的善意，且又提兩岸議簽《軍事互信機制》與《和平協議》；不過，如果不能對「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，做出合情合理的安排」，這些心願將如何實現？
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
Wu Poh-hsiung's Critical Mission: Initiate KMT-CCP Political Dialogue
Wu Poh-hsiung's Critical Mission: Initiate KMT-CCP Political Dialogue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
Full Text below:
On April 21, reporters asked President Ma Ying-jeou about the possibility of cross-Strait political dialogue. Ma said Beijing "sought progress amidst stability," and would not pressure Taipei. Ma said for Taipei to engage in political dialogue with Beijing was premature. "There is still no consensus. Therefore why the rush?" He said "While negotiating the past 18 agreements, we invariably encountered political problems. But we resolved every one of them. If we made a special effort to engage in political dialogue, what would we talk about?"
With these remarks still ringing in our ears, Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. The meeting was deliberately held at the Presidential Palace. News of the meeting was deliberately supplied to the media. Ma said he hoped the mission would be successful and achieve its purpose. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Therefore Wu Poh-hsiung's visit should be considered the first ever political contact between Taipei and Beijing. Wu Poh-hsiung's dialogue with Beijing's top officials, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, should be considered the first ever official and public political dialogue. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
According to media reports, the scope of the dialogue will include cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait exchanges, follow-up negotiations on ECFA, and the ARATS-SEF establishment of representative offices. The two sides are expected to discuss whether the KMT and CCP should address politically-related issues in the latter half of the year. Closer scrutiny reveaks that some of these reports are true, while some are false. Leave aside the false reports for the moment. The reports of "future cross-Strait relations," and the reports that the KMT and CCP will discuss "politically-related issues during the latter half of the year" are true. We know this because the Mainland Affairs Council only deals with practical matters. Issues such as "future cross-Strait relations," and "KMT-CCP cross-Strait political dialogue" are issues under the Presidential Office's purvue. The real issue Ma Ying-jeou is addressing, is how the two sides can bridge the gap across the Strait, and how the two parties can establish political contacts and begin political dialogue. That is why when President Ma Ying-jeou met with Wu Poh-hsiung, he thrice stressed that, "Cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations."
Take the "cross-Strait establishment of representative offices" as an example. Ma feels this has "very real political implications," that are important to cross-Strait relations. As Ma reiterated, "The relationship between the two sides is not a state to state relationship," because under the framework of the ROC Constitution, "The Mainland cannot be characterized as a state." Therefore, the representative offices the two sides establish will not be "embassies." This is an extremely sensitive issue on Taiwan. The wording is critical in any cross-Strait political statement. The political opposition must also base any such statements on the ROC Constitution. This reaffirms our own constitution. This also reassures the other side. Upholding our own constitution responds to a statement by the CCP late last July. The CCP spoke of a "one China framework." It said "The core issue is that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same country. Cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. The two sides should begin by reaffirming their existing legal provisions. They should reaffirm these as objective facts. They should establish a shared perception. On this basis, they should uphold and reaffirm the framework of one China." Therefore when Wu Poh-hsiung dialogues with Beijing regarding "future cross-Strait relations," the terms of the dialogue will be even clearer.
Ma Ying-jeou also recalled the events of 2008. Five years ago Wu Poh-hsiung led a delegation to the Mainland. a mere 10 days after his inauguration. He met with top CCP leaders and established a future direction for cross-Strait relations. This was a major contribution to cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou wished Wu Poh-hsiung a successful mission. He hoped Wu would bring back good news.
All this underscores the importance of Wu Poh-hsiung's mission. It is kick-starting cross-Strait ruling party political dialogue. A member of the delegation, former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi, said it was only natural that political dialogue would begin with the private sector. This was the case with negotiations over direct cross-Strait flights. "First let people to people talks yield results. Then when the time is ripe, let the government take over."
Let us evaluate the larger international picture. Let us predict the impact on the rest of Asia. Ma Ying-jeou's decision is correct. He summoned up the courage and finally took this step, one clearly crucial to the healthy and rational development of cross-Strait relations. We would like to offer the following reminders.
One. Is Ma Ying-jeou serious about cross-Strait political dialogue? If he is, political negotiations demand mental clarity. Is a policy conducive to Taiwan's development? If it is, then he must demonstrate the same courage he had when promoting ECFA. He must mobilize the government and community leaders to influence public opinion. He must focus his energy and resources to promote its implementation, to reassure the public, and to reduce opposition. He must not give up halfway. That would both destroy public support, and undermine cross-Strait relations.
Two. Ma must not use "political dialogue between the two parties" as bait, as a bargaining chip to benefit special interests. Genuine political dialogue to promote cross-Strait relations is essential. Otherwise, one may invoke public opinion on Taiwan. But if one returns to the same old populist demagoguery, then one will forfeit the moral high ground, and doom Taiwan to isolation.
Three. When promoting change, pressure and criticism are inevitable. Reducing such pressure requires honest communication, openness, and transparency. It requires making a distinction between President Ma and Chairman Ma. It requires reanimating the spirit of the Kuomintang. It requires offering Taiwan and the Chinese nation a strategic plan. Doing so will provide Beijing with a clear response, and demonstrate the government's tactical aptitude. It will reaffirm Taiwan's value and ensure the people's well-being. It will ensure that the public and the party back the government's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.13
社論－吳伯雄任重道遠 開啟兩黨政治對話
本報訊
今年四月廿一日馬英九總統接受本報專訪時，被詢「兩岸是否可能開展政治對話」時還表示大陸對此已表示應「穩中求進步」，不會給任何壓力…台灣與對岸的政治對話時機仍不成熟，「大家都沒有一致的意見，那又何必急？」他又說「過去談判了十八項協議，多少會碰到政治問題，但都解決了；若特別要進行政治對話，那要談什麼？」
上述說法言猶在耳，日前馬英九刻意在「總統府」會見吳伯雄等國民黨代表團一行，而且主動向媒體公布，期許此行能順利達成交付任務，凸顯了吳伯雄榮譽主席此行所具的正式代表性。此一動作，自然有正式告訴北京，此團訪是經過中華民國政府授權的中國國民黨訪問團，因此，這次吳伯雄的訪問應該可以被定位為兩岸首次的政治接觸，而吳伯雄與北京高層，以及與習近平總書記的對話，就是一次不折不扣的兩岸首次正式公開的政治對話，不論其內容為何，都具有里程碑的意義。
按媒體披露此次對話範圍，包括：未來兩岸關係開展、兩岸交流、兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判、兩岸兩會互設辦事處等；另外，雙方可望交換意見，討論「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題。」詳細分析起來，這裡有實有虛，虛且不論，「未來兩岸關係開展」以及「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題」，是「實」的部分，因為「陸委會」只處理現實問題，而「未來兩岸關係開展」及「國共論壇列入兩岸政治對話」這一部分是總統府規畫，由此觀之，此次馬英九總統委託的真正議題，就是兩岸如何經由兩黨搭橋開啟兩岸初期的政治接觸與政治對話。所以馬英九總統才必須在會見吳伯雄等人時三度強調「兩岸不是國與國關係」。
借「現在推動兩岸互設辦事處」為例，他認為這是「具有高度政治涵義」的兩岸關係的重大措施，「但兩岸之間不是國與國的關係」，因為在「憲法」架構下，「不可能把大陸看做是一個國家」。因此，不會把雙方設立的辦事機構當做「外交使領館」。這是在台灣極敏感、在兩岸極關鍵的政治表態，是以憲法將在野黨一軍，也是以憲法表自己的態，安對岸的心，因為提出自己的憲法，正是回應了中共去年七月底，提出的「一中框架」中所說：「核心是大陸和台灣同屬一個國家，兩岸關係不是國與國的關係。兩岸從各自現行規定出發，確認這一客觀事實，形成共同認知，就確立、維護和鞏固了一個中國框架」，以便吳伯雄在與北京對話「未來兩岸關係開展」時，可以擁有更清楚的空間。
馬英九同時回顧了二○○八年的往事：五年前吳伯雄率團去大陸，就在他就職十幾天後，有機會與當時的中共最高領導人見面，確立未來兩岸關係發展方向，這點對兩岸關係有非常大的貢獻。馬英九預祝吳伯雄任務成功，帶回雙方關係往前邁進的好消息。
這裡就暗示了吳伯雄此團的重大意義，開啟兩岸執政黨的政治對話，同一團的前國安會祕書長蘇起表示，政治對話由民間開始最自然，就像當初兩岸協商直航，「讓民間先談出成果，等水到渠成再由政府來接手」。
盱衡整體國際形勢，前瞻亞洲的變化，馬英九的決定是正確的，鼓足勇氣，終於踏出了這一步，對未來兩岸關係的發展顯然是健康而理性的關鍵作為。我們在此要提醒的有：
第一、如果馬英九真正對兩岸的政治對話、政治談判的必要性想清楚，認定此一政策是對台灣發展有利，那就必須以推動ＥＣＦＡ的勇氣，動員政府，發動精英去引導民意，影響民意，專注精力和資源，促其實現，以安民心，以化對立。萬萬不可半途而廢，既失民心，又傷兩岸。
第二、切忌以「兩黨政治對話」為餌，換取某些政治利益，而沒有真誠推動兩岸關係政治對話的後續行動，甚至再以台灣民意、社會民調為藉口，走回民粹老路，則陷伯公於不義，陷台灣於孤立。
第三、推動變化，各種壓力在所難免，責難在所難免，化解壓力之道，除了誠心誠意的溝通，適時地公開透明之外，區別馬總統與馬主席，真正調動中國國民黨的精神資產，為台灣，為中華民族提出戰略規畫，以之因應北京；以中華民國政府的戰術作為，確保台灣的價值，台灣人民的幸福，則全民、全黨都會成為調整兩岸關係的後盾。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 13, 2013
Summary: Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
Full Text below:
On April 21, reporters asked President Ma Ying-jeou about the possibility of cross-Strait political dialogue. Ma said Beijing "sought progress amidst stability," and would not pressure Taipei. Ma said for Taipei to engage in political dialogue with Beijing was premature. "There is still no consensus. Therefore why the rush?" He said "While negotiating the past 18 agreements, we invariably encountered political problems. But we resolved every one of them. If we made a special effort to engage in political dialogue, what would we talk about?"
With these remarks still ringing in our ears, Ma Ying-jeou recently met with Wu Poh-hsiung and a KMT delegation preparing for a mission to the Mainland. The meeting was deliberately held at the Presidential Palace. News of the meeting was deliberately supplied to the media. Ma said he hoped the mission would be successful and achieve its purpose. Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's mission was clearly being given an official imprimateur. These moves informed Beijing that the Republic of China government was officially authorizing the KMT delegation to speak on its behalf. Therefore Wu Poh-hsiung's visit should be considered the first ever political contact between Taipei and Beijing. Wu Poh-hsiung's dialogue with Beijing's top officials, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, should be considered the first ever official and public political dialogue. Whatever their content, these talks will be of landmark significance.
According to media reports, the scope of the dialogue will include cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait exchanges, follow-up negotiations on ECFA, and the ARATS-SEF establishment of representative offices. The two sides are expected to discuss whether the KMT and CCP should address politically-related issues in the latter half of the year. Closer scrutiny reveaks that some of these reports are true, while some are false. Leave aside the false reports for the moment. The reports of "future cross-Strait relations," and the reports that the KMT and CCP will discuss "politically-related issues during the latter half of the year" are true. We know this because the Mainland Affairs Council only deals with practical matters. Issues such as "future cross-Strait relations," and "KMT-CCP cross-Strait political dialogue" are issues under the Presidential Office's purvue. The real issue Ma Ying-jeou is addressing, is how the two sides can bridge the gap across the Strait, and how the two parties can establish political contacts and begin political dialogue. That is why when President Ma Ying-jeou met with Wu Poh-hsiung, he thrice stressed that, "Cross-Strait relations are not state to state relations."
Take the "cross-Strait establishment of representative offices" as an example. Ma feels this has "very real political implications," that are important to cross-Strait relations. As Ma reiterated, "The relationship between the two sides is not a state to state relationship," because under the framework of the ROC Constitution, "The Mainland cannot be characterized as a state." Therefore, the representative offices the two sides establish will not be "embassies." This is an extremely sensitive issue on Taiwan. The wording is critical in any cross-Strait political statement. The political opposition must also base any such statements on the ROC Constitution. This reaffirms our own constitution. This also reassures the other side. Upholding our own constitution responds to a statement by the CCP late last July. The CCP spoke of a "one China framework." It said "The core issue is that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same country. Cross-Strait relations are not relations between different countries. The two sides should begin by reaffirming their existing legal provisions. They should reaffirm these as objective facts. They should establish a shared perception. On this basis, they should uphold and reaffirm the framework of one China." Therefore when Wu Poh-hsiung dialogues with Beijing regarding "future cross-Strait relations," the terms of the dialogue will be even clearer.
Ma Ying-jeou also recalled the events of 2008. Five years ago Wu Poh-hsiung led a delegation to the Mainland. a mere 10 days after his inauguration. He met with top CCP leaders and established a future direction for cross-Strait relations. This was a major contribution to cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou wished Wu Poh-hsiung a successful mission. He hoped Wu would bring back good news.
All this underscores the importance of Wu Poh-hsiung's mission. It is kick-starting cross-Strait ruling party political dialogue. A member of the delegation, former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi, said it was only natural that political dialogue would begin with the private sector. This was the case with negotiations over direct cross-Strait flights. "First let people to people talks yield results. Then when the time is ripe, let the government take over."
Let us evaluate the larger international picture. Let us predict the impact on the rest of Asia. Ma Ying-jeou's decision is correct. He summoned up the courage and finally took this step, one clearly crucial to the healthy and rational development of cross-Strait relations. We would like to offer the following reminders.
One. Is Ma Ying-jeou serious about cross-Strait political dialogue? If he is, political negotiations demand mental clarity. Is a policy conducive to Taiwan's development? If it is, then he must demonstrate the same courage he had when promoting ECFA. He must mobilize the government and community leaders to influence public opinion. He must focus his energy and resources to promote its implementation, to reassure the public, and to reduce opposition. He must not give up halfway. That would both destroy public support, and undermine cross-Strait relations.
Two. Ma must not use "political dialogue between the two parties" as bait, as a bargaining chip to benefit special interests. Genuine political dialogue to promote cross-Strait relations is essential. Otherwise, one may invoke public opinion on Taiwan. But if one returns to the same old populist demagoguery, then one will forfeit the moral high ground, and doom Taiwan to isolation.
Three. When promoting change, pressure and criticism are inevitable. Reducing such pressure requires honest communication, openness, and transparency. It requires making a distinction between President Ma and Chairman Ma. It requires reanimating the spirit of the Kuomintang. It requires offering Taiwan and the Chinese nation a strategic plan. Doing so will provide Beijing with a clear response, and demonstrate the government's tactical aptitude. It will reaffirm Taiwan's value and ensure the people's well-being. It will ensure that the public and the party back the government's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.13
社論－吳伯雄任重道遠 開啟兩黨政治對話
本報訊
今年四月廿一日馬英九總統接受本報專訪時，被詢「兩岸是否可能開展政治對話」時還表示大陸對此已表示應「穩中求進步」，不會給任何壓力…台灣與對岸的政治對話時機仍不成熟，「大家都沒有一致的意見，那又何必急？」他又說「過去談判了十八項協議，多少會碰到政治問題，但都解決了；若特別要進行政治對話，那要談什麼？」
上述說法言猶在耳，日前馬英九刻意在「總統府」會見吳伯雄等國民黨代表團一行，而且主動向媒體公布，期許此行能順利達成交付任務，凸顯了吳伯雄榮譽主席此行所具的正式代表性。此一動作，自然有正式告訴北京，此團訪是經過中華民國政府授權的中國國民黨訪問團，因此，這次吳伯雄的訪問應該可以被定位為兩岸首次的政治接觸，而吳伯雄與北京高層，以及與習近平總書記的對話，就是一次不折不扣的兩岸首次正式公開的政治對話，不論其內容為何，都具有里程碑的意義。
按媒體披露此次對話範圍，包括：未來兩岸關係開展、兩岸交流、兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續談判、兩岸兩會互設辦事處等；另外，雙方可望交換意見，討論「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題。」詳細分析起來，這裡有實有虛，虛且不論，「未來兩岸關係開展」以及「下半年國共論壇是否列入兩岸政治對話相關議題」，是「實」的部分，因為「陸委會」只處理現實問題，而「未來兩岸關係開展」及「國共論壇列入兩岸政治對話」這一部分是總統府規畫，由此觀之，此次馬英九總統委託的真正議題，就是兩岸如何經由兩黨搭橋開啟兩岸初期的政治接觸與政治對話。所以馬英九總統才必須在會見吳伯雄等人時三度強調「兩岸不是國與國關係」。
借「現在推動兩岸互設辦事處」為例，他認為這是「具有高度政治涵義」的兩岸關係的重大措施，「但兩岸之間不是國與國的關係」，因為在「憲法」架構下，「不可能把大陸看做是一個國家」。因此，不會把雙方設立的辦事機構當做「外交使領館」。這是在台灣極敏感、在兩岸極關鍵的政治表態，是以憲法將在野黨一軍，也是以憲法表自己的態，安對岸的心，因為提出自己的憲法，正是回應了中共去年七月底，提出的「一中框架」中所說：「核心是大陸和台灣同屬一個國家，兩岸關係不是國與國的關係。兩岸從各自現行規定出發，確認這一客觀事實，形成共同認知，就確立、維護和鞏固了一個中國框架」，以便吳伯雄在與北京對話「未來兩岸關係開展」時，可以擁有更清楚的空間。
馬英九同時回顧了二○○八年的往事：五年前吳伯雄率團去大陸，就在他就職十幾天後，有機會與當時的中共最高領導人見面，確立未來兩岸關係發展方向，這點對兩岸關係有非常大的貢獻。馬英九預祝吳伯雄任務成功，帶回雙方關係往前邁進的好消息。
這裡就暗示了吳伯雄此團的重大意義，開啟兩岸執政黨的政治對話，同一團的前國安會祕書長蘇起表示，政治對話由民間開始最自然，就像當初兩岸協商直航，「讓民間先談出成果，等水到渠成再由政府來接手」。
盱衡整體國際形勢，前瞻亞洲的變化，馬英九的決定是正確的，鼓足勇氣，終於踏出了這一步，對未來兩岸關係的發展顯然是健康而理性的關鍵作為。我們在此要提醒的有：
第一、如果馬英九真正對兩岸的政治對話、政治談判的必要性想清楚，認定此一政策是對台灣發展有利，那就必須以推動ＥＣＦＡ的勇氣，動員政府，發動精英去引導民意，影響民意，專注精力和資源，促其實現，以安民心，以化對立。萬萬不可半途而廢，既失民心，又傷兩岸。
第二、切忌以「兩黨政治對話」為餌，換取某些政治利益，而沒有真誠推動兩岸關係政治對話的後續行動，甚至再以台灣民意、社會民調為藉口，走回民粹老路，則陷伯公於不義，陷台灣於孤立。
第三、推動變化，各種壓力在所難免，責難在所難免，化解壓力之道，除了誠心誠意的溝通，適時地公開透明之外，區別馬總統與馬主席，真正調動中國國民黨的精神資產，為台灣，為中華民族提出戰略規畫，以之因應北京；以中華民國政府的戰術作為，確保台灣的價值，台灣人民的幸福，則全民、全黨都會成為調整兩岸關係的後盾。
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