WTO Breakthrough: Threat of Taiwan's Marginalization Persists
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 10, 2013
Summary: This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
Full text below:
The Ninth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia has just adjourned. The conference reached resolutions on trade facilitation, agricultural products safety, and trade development. These Doha Round issues have been bandied about for years without resolution. Now, finally, we have achieved results. As a result, the international media has used provocative titles to describe this major breakthrough. Some even say the Doha Round is over. These three resolutions did not come easily. Actually they had little to do with Doah Round core issues. The prospect of Taiwan's marginalization remains undiminished.
In 2001 the WTO initiated the Doha Round of negotiations. Nine issues were included. These include agriculture, liberalization of the industrial and service sectors, trade facilitation, trade regulation, trade and development, trade and the environment, dispute resolution, and intellectual property rights. Too many issues were involved. Member states increased to 159 nations. As a result, 12 years have elapsed, but the round has yet to reach a conclusion. Every time the Council of Ministers expected a breakthrough. But every time they were disappointed. The last Council of Ministers even hoped the countries would consider an alternative. They were ready to give up on Doha. Under the circumstances, the Council of Ministers consensus on some of the nine issues is truly exciting.
Take trade facilitation resolution. The disclosure of information, risk management , simplification of procedures, and provisions for relief will reduce unnecessary costs and trade barriers created by international customs clearance and customs inspection procedures. The remaining agriculture-related resolutions are more relevant to developing countries. One of them relates to countries such as India, with its food safety considerations. Government budgets are used to acquire rice, wheat, and other major food stores, These are distributed to the poor. If they exceed the limit for "domestic agricultural support," other countries may not object to these temporary measures. The other two relate to agricultural tariff quota management, and the management of agricultural export subsidies .
Another issue affects Taiwan more directly -- trade facilitation resolution. Global rules may further reduce the inconvenience and cost of exports. This is definitely a good thing, especially the more complex customs procedures. These cause much greater inconvenience, distress, and harm to SMEs than multinationals. SMEs export less. They lack professional talent. They have less inventory. They are extremely concerned about time. According to international estimates for large enterprises, customs procedure trade costs are almost irrelevant. But they account for 10 to 20 percent of the cost for SME exports, almost as much as customs duties.
For supporters of WTO and multilateral liberalization, a consensus is possible on these small packages. They give the Doha Round a chance to survive. More importantly, the aforementioned trade facilitation resolution has already met the basic terms for bilateral free trade agreements in general (FTA). For example, the Taiwan-New Zealand and Taiwan-Singapore economic agreements have similar provisions. This means that a variety of bilateral and regional integration mechanisms, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement TPP) are are likely to lead to global convergence.
The recent resolutions on these three issues are important. But strictly speaking, they are second bananas in global trade liberalization, and not the stars of the show. The WTO refers to these items in the Doha menu as "a la carte" items.
In particular, the current resolution does not include the stars of the show, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, or liberalization of the services market. Most of the Member States remain committed to the standards of the WTO when it was established 18 years ago. This has motivated them to promote FTAs. For example, for many Southeast Asian countries, WTO tariff rates exceed 10%. FTAs have enabled these countries to eliminate tariffs entirely on nearly all goods. Also, 18 years ago, we were still unsure about service sector liberalization. Attitudes toward liberalization were conservative. But over the past decade, in order to attract foreign investment, many countries have promoted the modernization of services. They have substantially relaxed foreign investment restrictions.
This reduction of tariffs from 10% to zero, and the liberalization of service concessions, are limited to FTA Contracting States. The Taiwan Region of the ROC has almost no FTAs. It has not joined the TPP. It must abide by outdated entry conditions from 18 years ago. Compared to South Korea, Japan, and other competitors, Taiwan stands at a disadvantage. Therefore although the WTO has made a breakthrough, Taiwan still faces the threat of marginalization. We have no room to relax.
WTO有突破，台灣邊緣化的威脅未減
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.10 04:20 am
世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）第九屆部長會議日前在印尼峇里島閉幕，會中針對貿易便捷化、農業安全及貿易發展等議題達成決議。這三個議題均屬於談了多年無法結束的「杜哈回合」議題，總算有了些結果，因此國際媒體皆以聳動的標題來描述這項重大突破，甚至有謂杜哈回合已經結束。這三個決議確實得來不易，但離杜哈談判的核心問題其實還很遠，台灣邊緣化的威脅亦絲毫未減。
二○○一年啟動的ＷＴＯ「杜哈回合」談判，設定了九個談判議題，分別是農、工及服務業的自由化、貿易便捷化、貿易規則、貿易與發展、貿易與環境、爭端解決以及智慧財產權等。由於議題太多，成員國又膨脹到一五九國，所以至今已經十二個年頭，仍無法結束。過去每次部長會議都期望有所突破，卻都失望而歸；上一屆部長會議，甚至要各國開始思考「替代方案」，幾乎要放棄杜哈。在這個背景下，這次部長會議能對於九大議題中的部分項目達成共識，確實令人振奮。
以貿易便捷化決議為例，主要是透過資訊公開、風險控管、程序簡化以及提供救濟管道等要求，來降低世界各國因通關、檢驗等海關程序所造成的貿易障礙及無謂成本。其餘幾個與農業相關的決議，則與發展中國家比較有關。其中一項是關於如印度等國家基於糧食安全的考量，以政府預算收購稻米、小麥等主要糧食儲存，甚至用作發放給貧民之用者，若超過各國被允許的「國內農業支持」總量上限時，其他國家不得提出告訴的暫時措施。另二項則是關於農業關稅配額的管理，以及農產品出口補貼之管理。
對台灣利益比較直接相關者，是貿易便捷化決議。透過這個全球規則，能進一步減少出口的不便與成本，絕對是好事一件。特別是海關程序越複雜、不便，對於中小企業的困擾及影響，往往遠高於跨國企業；因為中小企業出口量少，專業人才不足，庫存也少，對時間快慢很敏感。事實上，按照國際組織估計，海關程序佔大型企業的貿易成本幾乎無關痛癢，卻可能佔中小企業出口成本的一到兩成，幾乎跟被課關稅的效果差不多。
對ＷＴＯ與多邊自由化的支持者而言，這些小型套餐能達成共識，至少可使「杜哈回合」出現起死回生的一線生機。更重要的是，前述的貿易便捷化決議內容，其實已經是一般雙邊自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）的基本條款（例如台紐、台星經濟協定都有類似規定），意味著各種雙邊及區域整合（如跨太平洋夥伴協定ＴＰＰ）機制，未來皆可能匯流成為全球共同規則。
本次達成決議的三個項目雖然都很重要，但嚴格來說，只能稱得上是全球貿易自由化的「龍套」，而不是主角。用ＷＴＯ的術語形容，只是整套杜哈菜單中的一個「小套餐」。
尤其，本次決議並不包含農工產品的關稅削減、服務業市場開放等自由化主角，使得絕大部分會員國的承諾仍停留在十八年前ＷＴＯ成立時的水準，也導致各國推動ＦＴＡ的動力依舊絲毫未減。例如，許多東南亞國家的ＷＴＯ關稅稅率，都還超過十％；而在ＦＴＡ下，這些國家都承諾把接近所有的商品的關稅降到零。此外，十八年前大家對服務業自由化還很陌生，開放得很保守；而在過去十年，各國為吸引外資、促進服務業現代化，都大幅鬆綁外資限制。
這種「關稅從十到零」及服務業開放的優惠，僅ＦＴＡ締約國可享有。台灣在幾無ＦＴＡ、未加入ＴＰＰ的情況下，只能繼續適用十八年前早已過時的進入條件，相對於韓、日等競爭對手，我國居於下風的劣勢絲毫未變。因此，雖然ＷＴＯ有所突破，但台灣被邊緣化的威脅仍舊存在，絲毫沒有可以鬆懈的空間。
Monday, December 9, 2013
Sunday, December 8, 2013
Abe's Normal Nation, US-Japan Strange Bedfellows
Abe's Normal Nation, US-Japan Strange Bedfellows
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 8, 2013
Summary: The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
Full text below:
Observers are concerned about heightened tensions in East Asia in the wake of Beijing's announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Japanese government has cleverly exploited the situation. Both houses of parliament passed a "National Security Council Law" and "Special State Secrets Protection Act." The Abe regime is nominally promoting the "normalization of the nation." But is brazenly attempting hide in plain sight. By doing so, it is merely making Japan's East Asian ambitions increasingly clear.
First, it has established a "National Security Council." This has long been Abe's dream. The Abe regime longs to restore Japan's status as a great power. Rebuilding its security system is an important part of this ambition. Since Abe became prime minister in 2006, he has done everything possible to pass this law. But the Japanese public would not accept it. Now however, he has taken advantage of the East China Sea ADIZ to incite anti-Chinese hatred. He got the bill passed in one fell swoop. A National Security Council has been established. It has become Prime Minister Abe's political power center. Japan's security policy will be firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Chief, the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, and four other policy making groups.
Secondly, he promoted the Special State Secrets Protection Act as a complement to the National Security Council Establishment Law. The Special State Secrets Protection Act enables Abe to use the National Security Council to classify information based on security policy. Without the cover of the Special Secrets Protection Act, the power of the National Security Council would be seriously undermined. No wonder Abe ignored intense public opposition within Japan. No wonder he risked having his public support fall below 50%. He rammed through the bill. Henceforth the policies developed by Japan's National Security Council are likely to become Special State Secrets. Parliament will not be able to review them. Japanese citizens will no longer be able to know what national security policy is.
Take Japanese society. The National Security Council Establishment Law and the Special State Secrets Protection Act are ostensibly part of the nation's "normalization." But the Japanese public sees them as very different. Establishing a National Security Council enables Japan to respond rapidly in the face of cross-departmental emergencies and to take any necessary measures. Establishing a National Security Council unifies the intelligence ministries, making it a single window that reports to the Prime Minister. This is a big step in the integration of intelligence and strategy.
By contrast, the Special State Secrets Protection Act has provoked intense public suspicion. The law lacks concrete definitions for confidential information. Yet it includes an extensive list of defense, diplomacy, counter espionage, and anti-terrorism items. It includes 23 specific secrets, including quantity of weapons, ammunition, and aircraft. The Japanese government can classify any intelligence unfavorable to it as confidential information. These are the main reasons 60% of the Japanese public opposes the act. Moreover, the Special State Secrets Protection Act concentrates all the information in hands of the Prime Minister and few others. This is a giant step backwards for Japanese democracy.
Take international society. When the Japanese government made significant modifications to defense policy in the past, it usually first sold the idea abroad, then adopted it back home. It cited changes in the international situation or demands by allies as excuses to demand parliamentary and public support. This time however, the Abe government cited demands by the United States as its trump card. It said the U.S. government repeatedly asked Japan to increase its intelligence security measures in order to enhance the sharing of intelligence. In fact, after Japan's National Security Council was established, the focus shifted to Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, and defense issues. The highest priority was changes to collective defense and the establishment of new defense plans. The implementation of these has fallen well short of U.S. government expectations.
Take the United States. On the one hand it does not recognize Beijing's ADIZ. On the other hand it requires U.S. civilian aircraft to submit flight plans to the Chinese mainland. As we can see, the maintenance of stability in East Asia remains the first order of United States policy. Recently Xi Jinping met with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. They said that despite their differences, they hoped to strengthen the new great power relationship between the US and China. Abe asked the US to demand that the Chinese mainland revoke its ADIZ. The United States turned Abe down. This shows that containing Japan's aggressive behavior is an important US consideration.
The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
安倍的正常國家，美日的同床異夢
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.08 04:18 am
就在外界關注中共東海防空識別區導致東亞局勢緊張之際，日本政府卻巧妙地借力使力，接連在參眾兩院通過「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」，為安倍政府推動「國家正常化」奠基。如此明修棧道、暗度陳倉的手法，只是使得日本在東亞逞強爭勝的司馬昭之心愈發顯得無可遮掩。
首先，成立「國家安全保障會議」一直是安倍個人所追求的夢想，也是安倍政府恢復大國榮光、重建安全保障體系的重要一環。安倍早在二○○六年的首次首相任內，便千方百計想要通過該法，卻未被當時的日本民意所接受；這次，他趁著東海防空識別區在日本掀起的強大反中氛圍，一舉通過了這項法案。「國安會」正式成立，安倍的首相府即成為強大的政治權力中心，而日本的安全保障政策也將牢牢地掌握在首相、內閣官房長官、防衛大臣及外務大臣等「四人決策小組」手中。
其次，制定「特定秘密保護法案」，就是「國安會設置法」的配套措施；透過「特定秘密保護法案」，便可輕易地將安倍主導的「國安會」所制定的安全保障政策訂為機密情報。若沒有「特定秘密保護法案」的支持，設立「國安會」的美意與成效便會大打折扣；這也難怪安倍會不顧日本輿論的強烈反對，甘冒民意支持度跌破五成的政治風險，強行通過這項法案。今後，日本「國安會」所制定的政策，都有可能化身變成特定機密情報，國會將無法對其進行實質審議，日本國民對於國家的安保政策方針也將逐漸喪失知的權利。
就日本社會而言，「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」兩法案雖是國家正常化路線的一體兩面，但日本人民對這兩項法案的感受卻大不相同。設立「國安會」，可讓日本面對緊急事態時快速做出跨部會的判斷，並迅速採取必要的處置；成立「國家安全保障局」，則可以統合各部會的情報，成為向首相報告的唯一窗口，這是跨出情報／戰略一體化的一大步。
相形之下，「特定秘密保護法案」卻招致社會強烈質疑。該法對於何謂「機密情報」缺乏具體定義，卻對國防、外交、反間諜及反恐等四大項目作了廣泛羅列，並將武器、彈藥及飛機數量等二十三項特定機密皆納入；除此之外，日本政府還可以隨時將不利於己的情報列為「機密情報」。這些，都是高達六成日本國民反對該法的主要原因。而且，「特定秘密保護法案」以中央集權方式將機密情報集中在首相等少數人手中，這不啻讓日本民主倒退了一大步。
從國際層面看，過去日本政府在修改或通過重大的防衛政策時，通常都會利用出口轉內銷，以國際情勢變化或是同盟國家要求為由，作為尋求國會及人民支持的藉口。這次，安倍政府也照例抬出美國當成「尚方寶劍」，稱美國政府一再要求日本能夠加強保護情資，以便雙方增進情報的交流及分享。事實上，日本「國安會」成立後，運作焦點卻集中在解決中日關係、島嶼爭議及強化離島防衛議題上，並以修改集體自衛權及訂定新防衛計畫大綱為優先課題。這些作法，皆與美國政府的期待有重大落差。
從美國一方面不承認中共劃定的東海防空識別區，一方面又要求美國籍民航機向中方提交飛航計畫，可見，維穩仍將是美國今後東亞政策的主軸。日前美國副總統拜登會見習近平時，兩人在識別區議題上雖有歧見，卻仍希望在美中「新型大國關係」上加強合作；同時，美國也拒絕安倍要求中國大陸撤銷防空識別區的提議。由此可見，如何牽制日本過激的行為，似已成為美國的重要考量。
拜登此次東亞之行，主要是想扮演和事佬，而非扮演激化衝突的火柴棒。安倍上台後，一逕戴著大國夢的鋼盔往前衝；但當他驀然回首，將會發現自己其實是在孤軍作戰。美日在東海防空識別區上的不同調，就是最好的警訊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 8, 2013
Summary: The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
Full text below:
Observers are concerned about heightened tensions in East Asia in the wake of Beijing's announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Japanese government has cleverly exploited the situation. Both houses of parliament passed a "National Security Council Law" and "Special State Secrets Protection Act." The Abe regime is nominally promoting the "normalization of the nation." But is brazenly attempting hide in plain sight. By doing so, it is merely making Japan's East Asian ambitions increasingly clear.
First, it has established a "National Security Council." This has long been Abe's dream. The Abe regime longs to restore Japan's status as a great power. Rebuilding its security system is an important part of this ambition. Since Abe became prime minister in 2006, he has done everything possible to pass this law. But the Japanese public would not accept it. Now however, he has taken advantage of the East China Sea ADIZ to incite anti-Chinese hatred. He got the bill passed in one fell swoop. A National Security Council has been established. It has become Prime Minister Abe's political power center. Japan's security policy will be firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Chief, the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, and four other policy making groups.
Secondly, he promoted the Special State Secrets Protection Act as a complement to the National Security Council Establishment Law. The Special State Secrets Protection Act enables Abe to use the National Security Council to classify information based on security policy. Without the cover of the Special Secrets Protection Act, the power of the National Security Council would be seriously undermined. No wonder Abe ignored intense public opposition within Japan. No wonder he risked having his public support fall below 50%. He rammed through the bill. Henceforth the policies developed by Japan's National Security Council are likely to become Special State Secrets. Parliament will not be able to review them. Japanese citizens will no longer be able to know what national security policy is.
Take Japanese society. The National Security Council Establishment Law and the Special State Secrets Protection Act are ostensibly part of the nation's "normalization." But the Japanese public sees them as very different. Establishing a National Security Council enables Japan to respond rapidly in the face of cross-departmental emergencies and to take any necessary measures. Establishing a National Security Council unifies the intelligence ministries, making it a single window that reports to the Prime Minister. This is a big step in the integration of intelligence and strategy.
By contrast, the Special State Secrets Protection Act has provoked intense public suspicion. The law lacks concrete definitions for confidential information. Yet it includes an extensive list of defense, diplomacy, counter espionage, and anti-terrorism items. It includes 23 specific secrets, including quantity of weapons, ammunition, and aircraft. The Japanese government can classify any intelligence unfavorable to it as confidential information. These are the main reasons 60% of the Japanese public opposes the act. Moreover, the Special State Secrets Protection Act concentrates all the information in hands of the Prime Minister and few others. This is a giant step backwards for Japanese democracy.
Take international society. When the Japanese government made significant modifications to defense policy in the past, it usually first sold the idea abroad, then adopted it back home. It cited changes in the international situation or demands by allies as excuses to demand parliamentary and public support. This time however, the Abe government cited demands by the United States as its trump card. It said the U.S. government repeatedly asked Japan to increase its intelligence security measures in order to enhance the sharing of intelligence. In fact, after Japan's National Security Council was established, the focus shifted to Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, and defense issues. The highest priority was changes to collective defense and the establishment of new defense plans. The implementation of these has fallen well short of U.S. government expectations.
Take the United States. On the one hand it does not recognize Beijing's ADIZ. On the other hand it requires U.S. civilian aircraft to submit flight plans to the Chinese mainland. As we can see, the maintenance of stability in East Asia remains the first order of United States policy. Recently Xi Jinping met with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. They said that despite their differences, they hoped to strengthen the new great power relationship between the US and China. Abe asked the US to demand that the Chinese mainland revoke its ADIZ. The United States turned Abe down. This shows that containing Japan's aggressive behavior is an important US consideration.
The purpose of Biden's trip to East Asia was to allow the US play the role of peacemaker. It was not to play with matches and intensify the conflict. Upon assuming power, Abe charged forward with his Great Power dream for Japan. But when he looks back, he finds himself fighting alone. The US and Japan are singing different tunes about the East China Sea ADIZ. That ought to be a warning to Japan.
安倍的正常國家，美日的同床異夢
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.08 04:18 am
就在外界關注中共東海防空識別區導致東亞局勢緊張之際，日本政府卻巧妙地借力使力，接連在參眾兩院通過「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」，為安倍政府推動「國家正常化」奠基。如此明修棧道、暗度陳倉的手法，只是使得日本在東亞逞強爭勝的司馬昭之心愈發顯得無可遮掩。
首先，成立「國家安全保障會議」一直是安倍個人所追求的夢想，也是安倍政府恢復大國榮光、重建安全保障體系的重要一環。安倍早在二○○六年的首次首相任內，便千方百計想要通過該法，卻未被當時的日本民意所接受；這次，他趁著東海防空識別區在日本掀起的強大反中氛圍，一舉通過了這項法案。「國安會」正式成立，安倍的首相府即成為強大的政治權力中心，而日本的安全保障政策也將牢牢地掌握在首相、內閣官房長官、防衛大臣及外務大臣等「四人決策小組」手中。
其次，制定「特定秘密保護法案」，就是「國安會設置法」的配套措施；透過「特定秘密保護法案」，便可輕易地將安倍主導的「國安會」所制定的安全保障政策訂為機密情報。若沒有「特定秘密保護法案」的支持，設立「國安會」的美意與成效便會大打折扣；這也難怪安倍會不顧日本輿論的強烈反對，甘冒民意支持度跌破五成的政治風險，強行通過這項法案。今後，日本「國安會」所制定的政策，都有可能化身變成特定機密情報，國會將無法對其進行實質審議，日本國民對於國家的安保政策方針也將逐漸喪失知的權利。
就日本社會而言，「國家安全保障會議設置法」及「特定秘密保護法案」兩法案雖是國家正常化路線的一體兩面，但日本人民對這兩項法案的感受卻大不相同。設立「國安會」，可讓日本面對緊急事態時快速做出跨部會的判斷，並迅速採取必要的處置；成立「國家安全保障局」，則可以統合各部會的情報，成為向首相報告的唯一窗口，這是跨出情報／戰略一體化的一大步。
相形之下，「特定秘密保護法案」卻招致社會強烈質疑。該法對於何謂「機密情報」缺乏具體定義，卻對國防、外交、反間諜及反恐等四大項目作了廣泛羅列，並將武器、彈藥及飛機數量等二十三項特定機密皆納入；除此之外，日本政府還可以隨時將不利於己的情報列為「機密情報」。這些，都是高達六成日本國民反對該法的主要原因。而且，「特定秘密保護法案」以中央集權方式將機密情報集中在首相等少數人手中，這不啻讓日本民主倒退了一大步。
從國際層面看，過去日本政府在修改或通過重大的防衛政策時，通常都會利用出口轉內銷，以國際情勢變化或是同盟國家要求為由，作為尋求國會及人民支持的藉口。這次，安倍政府也照例抬出美國當成「尚方寶劍」，稱美國政府一再要求日本能夠加強保護情資，以便雙方增進情報的交流及分享。事實上，日本「國安會」成立後，運作焦點卻集中在解決中日關係、島嶼爭議及強化離島防衛議題上，並以修改集體自衛權及訂定新防衛計畫大綱為優先課題。這些作法，皆與美國政府的期待有重大落差。
從美國一方面不承認中共劃定的東海防空識別區，一方面又要求美國籍民航機向中方提交飛航計畫，可見，維穩仍將是美國今後東亞政策的主軸。日前美國副總統拜登會見習近平時，兩人在識別區議題上雖有歧見，卻仍希望在美中「新型大國關係」上加強合作；同時，美國也拒絕安倍要求中國大陸撤銷防空識別區的提議。由此可見，如何牽制日本過激的行為，似已成為美國的重要考量。
拜登此次東亞之行，主要是想扮演和事佬，而非扮演激化衝突的火柴棒。安倍上台後，一逕戴著大國夢的鋼盔往前衝；但當他驀然回首，將會發現自己其實是在孤軍作戰。美日在東海防空識別區上的不同調，就是最好的警訊。
Thursday, December 5, 2013
Xi Jinping Meeting with Joe Biden Reveals New Great Power Relationship
Xi Jinping Meeting with Joe Biden Reveals New Great Power Relationship
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 6, 2013
Summary: The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
Full text below:
This week U.S. Vice President Joe Biden began a tour of Japan, Mainland China, and South Korea. The tour was scheduled even before Beijing announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Now however, this development has changed the focus. The entire world is focused on Biden's stop in Beijing and his meeting with Xi Jinping.
Biden and Xi will meet behind closed doors. The time alloted will be increased from 45 minutes to 2 hours. After the meeting, they will hold a brief press conference. Biden and Xi will resume their meeting again after dinner. Observers are wondering whether Biden will raise the issue of the ADIZ, both during the meeting and press conference. Biden did not say. But that does not mean the issue of ADIZ will not be raised during the meeting.
According to the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry, Biden and Xi will address bilateral relations and other issues of shared concern in a frank and in-depth manner. In diplomatese "frank" means that any differences will be raised and discussed.
The next day Biden attended a luncheon held by the American Chamber of Commerce. He said when he meets Xi Jinping, he will straightforwardly express US positions and expectations regarding Mainland China's sudden announcement of an East China Sea ADIZ, which was followed by heightened regional tensions. At the same time, Biden said, Washington is unwilling to strain its relations with Beijing. Therefore it vigorously promotes a new Sino-US great power relationship.
Basically the US backs Japan. This is beyond doubt. Last year, during the Huangyan Island dispute, the United States did not support the Philippines' claim of sovereignty. Asian-Pacific countries are talking in private about the United States' "Return to Asia." They are wondering whether it is tough enough to confront Mainland China. Take ADIZ. If Washington remains silent, everyone will worry that the US is retreating. But this time one of the disputants is Japan, America's most loyal ally in the Asian-Pacific. Recently, with US acquiescence, Abe proposed amending Japan's constitution. Abe proposed establishing a National Security Council, and expanding its definition of collective self-defense. Many other governments think the U.S. defense budget is tight, therefore dependent upon Japan. Only Japan enables it to return to Asia and adhere by its commitment to defend its allies.
But the United States cannot back the Japanese side unconditionally. Japan has swung too far to the right. A backlash is inevitable. South Korea and Mainland China are deeply concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism. They feel the United States has unleashed a vicious Japanese attack dog on them.
Japan claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. It has arrogantly proclaimed that its sovereignty must not be challenged. Last year it went so far as to announce its "nationalization." It hopes the islands will be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. But the US stance is clear. It acknowledges Japan's administrative authority. But it holds no position regarding the sovereignty dispute. In other words the United States has not expressed support for Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands.
Observers have taken note. Biden arrived in Japan. The Abe government hoped Biden would back Japan. But three days of Japanese-US press conferences show they failed to close the gap. The United States expressed grave concern over Mainland China's announced ADIZ. But it did not demand that Mainland China take it back. This forced Abe to change his demands. Secondly, US and Japanese airline companies continue to sing different tunes regarding the submission of flight plans. Japan cannot force the United States to change its position.
International politics is realpolitik. Frankly, the US posture is based not on justice or international law. A large part of it is concern for Mainland China's reaction. Washington knows that Chinese nationalist sentiment is a powerful force. Chinese leaders must go with the flow. They dare not defy it. If the United States wishes to develop a new great power relationship with Mainland China, it cannot afford to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
This shows something else as well. Currently U.S. Asian-Pacific policy focuses on the relationship between US and China. Its chief focus is the new great power relationship. On November 20, National Security Advisor Susan Rice spoke on Asian-Pacific policy. She underscored the need to establish a new great power relationship between major powers. Joe Biden added that the new great power relationship between Mainland China and the US requires trust and optimism regarding each other's motives. Biden and Xi reached this important consensus. Mainland China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that both sides must promote this new Sino-US great power relationship.
From the perspective of Japan and other Asian-Pacific governments, including the ROC government on Taiwan, this "new great power relationship" looks a lot like the G2 power structure. In short, the Asian-Pacifc order will be determined by the United States and Mainland China. This is not what Japan wants to see. But the U.S. desire to return to Asia, but oppose Mainland China, is self-contradictory. The U.S. itself finds it difficult to justify. But political reality is intractable.
The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
拜登會習近平透露的「新型大國關係」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.06 04:21 am
美國副總統拜登本周開始日本、中國大陸與南韓三國的訪問。這次亞洲行的安排，早於東海防空識別區爭議前即已預定，但現在重點完全受此議題牽引。北京這站與習近平見面，尤其全球矚目。
拜登與習的閉門會面，從預定時間四十五分鐘延長至兩小時，會議結束簡短記者會之後，再與習進行工作晚宴。外界最關心的是，拜登有沒有在會晤中，對習近平提出識別區議題。記者會上，拜登沒提，但這並不表示在會談中也沒提。
根據中共外交部表示，拜登與習近平見面時，雙方就中美關係和其他共同關心的重大問題坦誠、深入地交換了意見。這是外交語言，「坦誠」的意思是彼此有分歧，但是大家開誠布公講出來。
拜登在美僑商會次日舉行的餐會上則表示，在與習近平的會晤中，對中國大陸突然宣布東海航空識別區，引發地區緊張，「很直率地表達美國的立場與期待」；但是同時，美方也不願意與中國的關係鬧僵，所以依然強調要「努力推進中美新型大國關係建設」。
美國基本上會挺日本，這是無庸置疑的。去年黃岩島爭議，美國沒有支持菲律賓的主權主張，亞太國家私下都在議論，重返亞洲的美國，面對中國不夠強硬。這次在防空識別區的問題上，如果華盛頓還是悶不作聲，大家會擔心美國一退再退。但畢竟這次的爭端主角之一是日本，是美國在亞太最忠實的盟友。近日在美國默許下，安倍要修改憲法，成立國家安全會議，擴大集體自衛權解釋。國際上甚至認為，美國現在國防預算緊縮，要靠日本，才能遵守重返亞洲、捍衛盟友的承諾。
但是美國也不能完全站在日本這邊。日本的過度右傾，不是沒有引發反彈的，南韓與中國大陸就對日本的軍國主義復興，擔心不已，甚至認為美國是在「縱放」（unleash ）日本這條凶犬。
日本對釣魚台列嶼的主權主張，更是蠻橫地強調主權不容他人置喙，甚至去年宣布收歸國有，也是希望藉此包括在美日安保的適用範圍中。可是美國對此立場則很清楚，尊重日本的行政權，但是對主權爭議不持立場；換句話說，美國並未表示支持日本的釣魚台主權。
所以外界觀察到，拜登抵達日本後，安倍政府期待他會表態力挺，但是從三日的日美記者會看來，雙方態度有落差。首先，美國對中國大陸的識別區宣布，表示嚴重關切，但並不堅持中國要撤回，這讓安倍也只有改變主張；其次，美國航空公司與日本航空公司對提交飛航計畫依然不同調，日本也沒辦法強求美國改變。
國際政治是現實的。坦率地說，美國這番態度不是基於公義或國際法，很大一部分是顧忌大陸的反應。華盛頓深知，中國民族情緒的力量強大，任何中國領導人只能順勢而行，無法逆勢操作，美國要想與中國大陸發展新型大國關係，就不能傷害到中國人民的感情。
由此也可看出，目前美國亞太政策的重心是在美中關係，而美中關係的主調還是新型大國關係。十一月二十日國安顧問萊斯在首場亞太政策演說中強調，將努力使新型大國關係發揮作用；而拜登也說，中美兩個大國新型關係的發展，取決於雙方信任和對對方的動機保持樂觀。中國大陸外交部更總結拜登與習近平會談達成的最重要共識是，雙方要努力推進中美新型大國關係建設。
所謂「新型大國關係」，從日本與亞太各國、包括台灣看起來，就是G2的權力結構。亞太秩序由美中決定，這不是日本所願意見到的，而這也與既定的「美國重返亞洲，力抗中國」路線相左，其中矛盾，美國自己也難以解釋，卻是政治現實之必然。
東海現在風雲變幻莫測，提出「中國夢」的習近平，碰上的是想要扭轉日本成為正常化國家的安倍晉三，美國在期間看似左右逢源，兩方都要爭取，但是能夠迴旋的空間卻越來越小，這是局勢凶險之處。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 6, 2013
Summary: The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
Full text below:
This week U.S. Vice President Joe Biden began a tour of Japan, Mainland China, and South Korea. The tour was scheduled even before Beijing announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Now however, this development has changed the focus. The entire world is focused on Biden's stop in Beijing and his meeting with Xi Jinping.
Biden and Xi will meet behind closed doors. The time alloted will be increased from 45 minutes to 2 hours. After the meeting, they will hold a brief press conference. Biden and Xi will resume their meeting again after dinner. Observers are wondering whether Biden will raise the issue of the ADIZ, both during the meeting and press conference. Biden did not say. But that does not mean the issue of ADIZ will not be raised during the meeting.
According to the Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry, Biden and Xi will address bilateral relations and other issues of shared concern in a frank and in-depth manner. In diplomatese "frank" means that any differences will be raised and discussed.
The next day Biden attended a luncheon held by the American Chamber of Commerce. He said when he meets Xi Jinping, he will straightforwardly express US positions and expectations regarding Mainland China's sudden announcement of an East China Sea ADIZ, which was followed by heightened regional tensions. At the same time, Biden said, Washington is unwilling to strain its relations with Beijing. Therefore it vigorously promotes a new Sino-US great power relationship.
Basically the US backs Japan. This is beyond doubt. Last year, during the Huangyan Island dispute, the United States did not support the Philippines' claim of sovereignty. Asian-Pacific countries are talking in private about the United States' "Return to Asia." They are wondering whether it is tough enough to confront Mainland China. Take ADIZ. If Washington remains silent, everyone will worry that the US is retreating. But this time one of the disputants is Japan, America's most loyal ally in the Asian-Pacific. Recently, with US acquiescence, Abe proposed amending Japan's constitution. Abe proposed establishing a National Security Council, and expanding its definition of collective self-defense. Many other governments think the U.S. defense budget is tight, therefore dependent upon Japan. Only Japan enables it to return to Asia and adhere by its commitment to defend its allies.
But the United States cannot back the Japanese side unconditionally. Japan has swung too far to the right. A backlash is inevitable. South Korea and Mainland China are deeply concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism. They feel the United States has unleashed a vicious Japanese attack dog on them.
Japan claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. It has arrogantly proclaimed that its sovereignty must not be challenged. Last year it went so far as to announce its "nationalization." It hopes the islands will be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. But the US stance is clear. It acknowledges Japan's administrative authority. But it holds no position regarding the sovereignty dispute. In other words the United States has not expressed support for Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands.
Observers have taken note. Biden arrived in Japan. The Abe government hoped Biden would back Japan. But three days of Japanese-US press conferences show they failed to close the gap. The United States expressed grave concern over Mainland China's announced ADIZ. But it did not demand that Mainland China take it back. This forced Abe to change his demands. Secondly, US and Japanese airline companies continue to sing different tunes regarding the submission of flight plans. Japan cannot force the United States to change its position.
International politics is realpolitik. Frankly, the US posture is based not on justice or international law. A large part of it is concern for Mainland China's reaction. Washington knows that Chinese nationalist sentiment is a powerful force. Chinese leaders must go with the flow. They dare not defy it. If the United States wishes to develop a new great power relationship with Mainland China, it cannot afford to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
This shows something else as well. Currently U.S. Asian-Pacific policy focuses on the relationship between US and China. Its chief focus is the new great power relationship. On November 20, National Security Advisor Susan Rice spoke on Asian-Pacific policy. She underscored the need to establish a new great power relationship between major powers. Joe Biden added that the new great power relationship between Mainland China and the US requires trust and optimism regarding each other's motives. Biden and Xi reached this important consensus. Mainland China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that both sides must promote this new Sino-US great power relationship.
From the perspective of Japan and other Asian-Pacific governments, including the ROC government on Taiwan, this "new great power relationship" looks a lot like the G2 power structure. In short, the Asian-Pacifc order will be determined by the United States and Mainland China. This is not what Japan wants to see. But the U.S. desire to return to Asia, but oppose Mainland China, is self-contradictory. The U.S. itself finds it difficult to justify. But political reality is intractable.
The East China Sea situation is unpredictable. Xi Jinping champions the "Chinese Dream." It has collided with Shinzo Abe's Japanese normalization. The United States appears to be caught between the two aspirations, The two parties are engaged in a struggle. Maneuvering room is shrinking. The situation remains perilous.
拜登會習近平透露的「新型大國關係」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.06 04:21 am
美國副總統拜登本周開始日本、中國大陸與南韓三國的訪問。這次亞洲行的安排，早於東海防空識別區爭議前即已預定，但現在重點完全受此議題牽引。北京這站與習近平見面，尤其全球矚目。
拜登與習的閉門會面，從預定時間四十五分鐘延長至兩小時，會議結束簡短記者會之後，再與習進行工作晚宴。外界最關心的是，拜登有沒有在會晤中，對習近平提出識別區議題。記者會上，拜登沒提，但這並不表示在會談中也沒提。
根據中共外交部表示，拜登與習近平見面時，雙方就中美關係和其他共同關心的重大問題坦誠、深入地交換了意見。這是外交語言，「坦誠」的意思是彼此有分歧，但是大家開誠布公講出來。
拜登在美僑商會次日舉行的餐會上則表示，在與習近平的會晤中，對中國大陸突然宣布東海航空識別區，引發地區緊張，「很直率地表達美國的立場與期待」；但是同時，美方也不願意與中國的關係鬧僵，所以依然強調要「努力推進中美新型大國關係建設」。
美國基本上會挺日本，這是無庸置疑的。去年黃岩島爭議，美國沒有支持菲律賓的主權主張，亞太國家私下都在議論，重返亞洲的美國，面對中國不夠強硬。這次在防空識別區的問題上，如果華盛頓還是悶不作聲，大家會擔心美國一退再退。但畢竟這次的爭端主角之一是日本，是美國在亞太最忠實的盟友。近日在美國默許下，安倍要修改憲法，成立國家安全會議，擴大集體自衛權解釋。國際上甚至認為，美國現在國防預算緊縮，要靠日本，才能遵守重返亞洲、捍衛盟友的承諾。
但是美國也不能完全站在日本這邊。日本的過度右傾，不是沒有引發反彈的，南韓與中國大陸就對日本的軍國主義復興，擔心不已，甚至認為美國是在「縱放」（unleash ）日本這條凶犬。
日本對釣魚台列嶼的主權主張，更是蠻橫地強調主權不容他人置喙，甚至去年宣布收歸國有，也是希望藉此包括在美日安保的適用範圍中。可是美國對此立場則很清楚，尊重日本的行政權，但是對主權爭議不持立場；換句話說，美國並未表示支持日本的釣魚台主權。
所以外界觀察到，拜登抵達日本後，安倍政府期待他會表態力挺，但是從三日的日美記者會看來，雙方態度有落差。首先，美國對中國大陸的識別區宣布，表示嚴重關切，但並不堅持中國要撤回，這讓安倍也只有改變主張；其次，美國航空公司與日本航空公司對提交飛航計畫依然不同調，日本也沒辦法強求美國改變。
國際政治是現實的。坦率地說，美國這番態度不是基於公義或國際法，很大一部分是顧忌大陸的反應。華盛頓深知，中國民族情緒的力量強大，任何中國領導人只能順勢而行，無法逆勢操作，美國要想與中國大陸發展新型大國關係，就不能傷害到中國人民的感情。
由此也可看出，目前美國亞太政策的重心是在美中關係，而美中關係的主調還是新型大國關係。十一月二十日國安顧問萊斯在首場亞太政策演說中強調，將努力使新型大國關係發揮作用；而拜登也說，中美兩個大國新型關係的發展，取決於雙方信任和對對方的動機保持樂觀。中國大陸外交部更總結拜登與習近平會談達成的最重要共識是，雙方要努力推進中美新型大國關係建設。
所謂「新型大國關係」，從日本與亞太各國、包括台灣看起來，就是G2的權力結構。亞太秩序由美中決定，這不是日本所願意見到的，而這也與既定的「美國重返亞洲，力抗中國」路線相左，其中矛盾，美國自己也難以解釋，卻是政治現實之必然。
東海現在風雲變幻莫測，提出「中國夢」的習近平，碰上的是想要扭轉日本成為正常化國家的安倍晉三，美國在期間看似左右逢源，兩方都要爭取，但是能夠迴旋的空間卻越來越小，這是局勢凶險之處。
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Chen Deming Says "Taiwan, I Love You."
Chen Deming Says "Taiwan, I Love You."
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 5, 2013
Summary: The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
Full text below:
Beijing's ARATS Chairman Chen Deming has just concluded a long and eventful visit to Taiwan. During his visit he met face to face with people from all levels. He explained the Mainland's position on Taiwan. He promoted cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. He communicated a positive and friendly attitude. All in all, the visit was a success.
This is the first visit to Taiwan the ARATS chairman has made since taking office in April. During the visit the media dubbed his delegation the "Iron Man Delegation." Chen visited one city after another, nonstop, including Taoyuan, Pingtung, Kaohsiung, Chiayi, Taichung, Hsinchu, Xinbei City, Taipei, and eight other counties and cities. Chen visited the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park, the Kaohsiung Software Park, the Central Scientific Industrial Area, the Neihu Technology Park, Taipei Port, Taichung Port, Kaohsiung Port, and other important points to be opened as part of the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program. He directed his attention on issues related to the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.
Chen visited a number of landmark business firms, Including TSMC, HTC, Delta Electronics, Hon Hai, AU Optronics, MediaTek, and Yulon. He visited Mainland-funded businesses on Taiwan. He visited the Bank of China, China Electrical, and the Mainland's Chamber of Commerce offices on Taiwan. He looked into problems encountered by Mainland businesses on Taiwan. He met with political figures and discussed cross-Strait trends. He met and interacted with ordinary citizens. His saw the sights on Mount Alishan. He visited the Eslite Bookstore and got a taste of Taiwan's local culture.
Chen Deming repeatedly used emotionally charged terms to convey his feelings. For example, he said he wanted to experience "Taiwan's heartbeat." During a visit to Kaohsiung, he told enthusiastic crowds, "Taiwan, I love you!" When visiting the Kaohsiung Software Park, Chen Deming spoke in English. He said, "We have the same dream, flying over Taiwan and China."
Chen Deming is seen as someone who knows Taiwan. He served as Mayor of Suzhou and as Minister of Commerce. He has considerable experience with exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. His emotionally charged language underscores the nature of the cross-Strait relationship. An overarching love for one's compatriots can serve as a common language linking the two sides. Goodwill between the two sides is a valuable asset that can resolve long standing differences. The search for consensus will provide important opportunities, by which the next generation can build a new future.
Cross-Strait relations have undergone many twists and turns. Former ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan planned to visit Taiwan. But President Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "two states theory." Cross-Strait relations went into deep freeze. The two cross-Strait organizations could no longer communicate. Only when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, could cross-strait reconciliation resume.
Friendly cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation have been highly beneficial to Taiwan. The Green Camp mobilized regardless. Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation became the target of Green Camp protestors, whose goal was to discredit them. When ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the Green Camp organized mass protests. Former ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing was even shoved to the ground by protestors at the Confucius Temple.
But cross-Strait exchanges have expanded. Mainland China's economic power on the international stage has swiftly increased. More and more people appreciate the market opportunities the Mainland has provided Taiwan. This includes even southern Taiwan DPP county chiefs and city mayors, who have visited the Mainland to sell local agricultural products. The public on Taiwan has become accustomed to increasingly frequent visits by Mainland tourists, Mainland political and economic officials, and Mainland business people. ARATS officials visiting Taiwan has become routine. Cross-Strait civilian exchanges have expanded. The old hostilities have begun to fade.
The atmosphere during Chen's recent visit Taiwan was very different from what it was in the past. Most of the people he encountered were friendly and welcoming. Very few were hostile. Protests were small and peaceful. Public sentiment toward people from the Mainland has changed. Cross-strait relations have visibly improved.
Take Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa. When Chen Deming met with him, Chang said the two sides speak the same language. They eat the same food. There are so many things they can exchange views on. They are like family members. Taiwan and the Mainland should unite to create a win-win situation. They should see each others as kin. They must not let people from other nations look down on them. Chen Deming repeatedly called on the two sides to enter the global market together, and create a win-win situation.
The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
社論－當陳德銘說「台灣，我愛你」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月05日 04:10
在密集的參訪之後，大陸海協會長陳德銘結束了在台灣的訪問行程，此行既面對面地接觸台灣各層面，也對中國大陸的對台立場作出說明，並且傳達推動兩岸交流合作的積極友善態度。綜而觀之，堪稱圓滿成功。
這是陳德銘4月就任海協會長後的首度訪台，在這趟被媒體戲稱為「鐵人團」的行程中，他馬不停蹄走訪桃園、屏東、高雄、嘉義、台中、新竹、新北、台北等8個縣市；參訪屏東農業生物科技園區、高雄軟體園區、中部科學工業區、內湖科技園區、台北港、台中港、高雄港等台灣自由經濟示範區重要開放點，聚焦在台灣自經區參訪與兩岸經貿合作相關議題。
此外，陳德銘還參訪多家台灣指標性的大型企業，包括台積電、宏達電、台達電、鴻海、友達光電、聯發科、裕隆等。他也訪問在台灣的陸資企業及中國銀行、中國機電商會在台的辦事處，深入瞭解大陸企業在台發展遭遇的問題。他會見政界大老討論兩岸走向，也和基層民眾面對面互動；他親登阿里山賞雲海，也去誠品書店體會台灣的人文況味。
陳德銘更多次以感性的語言表達心意，例如說想來體會「台灣的心跳」，在參觀高雄港時，對熱情民眾的招呼回應說：「台灣，我愛你！」在高雄軟體園區參觀時，陳德銘還以英文說出：「We have the same dream , flying over the Taiwan and China.（我們有共同的夢想，攜手飛越台灣和中國）」。
被譽為「知台派」的陳德銘，擔任過蘇州市長與商務部長，有不少與台灣交流合作的經驗。他對台灣的感性語言，凸顯了在兩岸的互動過程中，民族大愛可以是雙方最基本的共同語言，而兩岸彼此間的善意，更是一項彌足珍貴的資產，也是台灣與大陸化解歧異、尋找共識、為下一代開創嶄新未來的重要契機。
在此之前，兩岸互動曾經經歷過許多波折。前海協會會長汪道涵原本計畫來台，卻因為前總統李登輝突然提出「兩國論」，兩岸關係陷入急凍，兩會協商也為之停擺。直到馬英九當選總統後，開始推動兩岸和解，雙方互動才恢復熱絡。
但是，在綠營政治人物的政治動員下，兩岸友善的交流合作，即使內容明顯對台灣有利，仍然經常成為綠營的抗議抹黑焦點。例如前海協會會長陳雲林首度來台訪問時，就曾經出現激烈的群眾抗爭，前海協會副會長張銘清甚至在孔廟遭抗議民眾擠倒。
不過，隨著兩岸交流逐步推動，以及中國經濟力量在國際舞台迅速崛起，愈來愈多人體認到大陸市場提供的商機對台灣極為重要。即使是民進黨籍的南部縣市長，也紛紛前進大陸推銷當地農特產。台灣社會對日益頻繁來訪的大陸觀光客及政經官員、企業人士，早已司空見慣，海協會官員來訪常態化，兩岸民間交流不斷擴大深化，舊有的敵意隔閡也開始緩解。
這次陳德銘訪問台灣時，氣氛和過去已大不相同，接觸到的多是友善親切的民眾，只有偶爾遇到零星、小規模而平和的抗議活動，今昔相比，對照得出台灣社會在接納大陸人士時的態度變化，也可看出兩岸關係確實已有相當大的進展。
就像長榮集團總裁張榮發在接見陳德銘時所說的，兩岸不論語言或食物都一樣，很多事情大家應該可以交換意見，就像自己家裡的人一樣。台灣和大陸應團結創造雙贏，像一家人，不能讓外國人瞧不起。陳德銘此行也一再呼籲兩岸合作共同進軍全球市場，共創雙贏。
雖然兩岸之間仍然存在著歧異，但仔細檢視，會發現兩岸人民與社會的共通點遠遠大於差異處。如果能夠站在民族大愛、共創榮景的前提下，堅持善意友好的路徑，積極推動各項合作計畫，為兩岸人民福祉創造更大利多，一個和平繁榮的兩岸盛世，不會是夢。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 5, 2013
Summary: The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
Full text below:
Beijing's ARATS Chairman Chen Deming has just concluded a long and eventful visit to Taiwan. During his visit he met face to face with people from all levels. He explained the Mainland's position on Taiwan. He promoted cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. He communicated a positive and friendly attitude. All in all, the visit was a success.
This is the first visit to Taiwan the ARATS chairman has made since taking office in April. During the visit the media dubbed his delegation the "Iron Man Delegation." Chen visited one city after another, nonstop, including Taoyuan, Pingtung, Kaohsiung, Chiayi, Taichung, Hsinchu, Xinbei City, Taipei, and eight other counties and cities. Chen visited the Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park, the Kaohsiung Software Park, the Central Scientific Industrial Area, the Neihu Technology Park, Taipei Port, Taichung Port, Kaohsiung Port, and other important points to be opened as part of the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program. He directed his attention on issues related to the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program and cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation.
Chen visited a number of landmark business firms, Including TSMC, HTC, Delta Electronics, Hon Hai, AU Optronics, MediaTek, and Yulon. He visited Mainland-funded businesses on Taiwan. He visited the Bank of China, China Electrical, and the Mainland's Chamber of Commerce offices on Taiwan. He looked into problems encountered by Mainland businesses on Taiwan. He met with political figures and discussed cross-Strait trends. He met and interacted with ordinary citizens. His saw the sights on Mount Alishan. He visited the Eslite Bookstore and got a taste of Taiwan's local culture.
Chen Deming repeatedly used emotionally charged terms to convey his feelings. For example, he said he wanted to experience "Taiwan's heartbeat." During a visit to Kaohsiung, he told enthusiastic crowds, "Taiwan, I love you!" When visiting the Kaohsiung Software Park, Chen Deming spoke in English. He said, "We have the same dream, flying over Taiwan and China."
Chen Deming is seen as someone who knows Taiwan. He served as Mayor of Suzhou and as Minister of Commerce. He has considerable experience with exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. His emotionally charged language underscores the nature of the cross-Strait relationship. An overarching love for one's compatriots can serve as a common language linking the two sides. Goodwill between the two sides is a valuable asset that can resolve long standing differences. The search for consensus will provide important opportunities, by which the next generation can build a new future.
Cross-Strait relations have undergone many twists and turns. Former ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan planned to visit Taiwan. But President Lee Teng-hui trotted out his "two states theory." Cross-Strait relations went into deep freeze. The two cross-Strait organizations could no longer communicate. Only when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, could cross-strait reconciliation resume.
Friendly cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation have been highly beneficial to Taiwan. The Green Camp mobilized regardless. Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation became the target of Green Camp protestors, whose goal was to discredit them. When ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the Green Camp organized mass protests. Former ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing was even shoved to the ground by protestors at the Confucius Temple.
But cross-Strait exchanges have expanded. Mainland China's economic power on the international stage has swiftly increased. More and more people appreciate the market opportunities the Mainland has provided Taiwan. This includes even southern Taiwan DPP county chiefs and city mayors, who have visited the Mainland to sell local agricultural products. The public on Taiwan has become accustomed to increasingly frequent visits by Mainland tourists, Mainland political and economic officials, and Mainland business people. ARATS officials visiting Taiwan has become routine. Cross-Strait civilian exchanges have expanded. The old hostilities have begun to fade.
The atmosphere during Chen's recent visit Taiwan was very different from what it was in the past. Most of the people he encountered were friendly and welcoming. Very few were hostile. Protests were small and peaceful. Public sentiment toward people from the Mainland has changed. Cross-strait relations have visibly improved.
Take Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa. When Chen Deming met with him, Chang said the two sides speak the same language. They eat the same food. There are so many things they can exchange views on. They are like family members. Taiwan and the Mainland should unite to create a win-win situation. They should see each others as kin. They must not let people from other nations look down on them. Chen Deming repeatedly called on the two sides to enter the global market together, and create a win-win situation.
The two sides still have differences. But on closer examination, what they have in common far outweighs what separates them. Are we willing to open our hearts to our compatriots? Are we willing to help each other prosper? Are we willing to walk the path of goodwill? Are we willing to promote cooperation? If we are, we can advance the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait. We can create a Golden Age of peace and prosperity for both sides. That is not a pipe dream.
社論－當陳德銘說「台灣，我愛你」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月05日 04:10
在密集的參訪之後，大陸海協會長陳德銘結束了在台灣的訪問行程，此行既面對面地接觸台灣各層面，也對中國大陸的對台立場作出說明，並且傳達推動兩岸交流合作的積極友善態度。綜而觀之，堪稱圓滿成功。
這是陳德銘4月就任海協會長後的首度訪台，在這趟被媒體戲稱為「鐵人團」的行程中，他馬不停蹄走訪桃園、屏東、高雄、嘉義、台中、新竹、新北、台北等8個縣市；參訪屏東農業生物科技園區、高雄軟體園區、中部科學工業區、內湖科技園區、台北港、台中港、高雄港等台灣自由經濟示範區重要開放點，聚焦在台灣自經區參訪與兩岸經貿合作相關議題。
此外，陳德銘還參訪多家台灣指標性的大型企業，包括台積電、宏達電、台達電、鴻海、友達光電、聯發科、裕隆等。他也訪問在台灣的陸資企業及中國銀行、中國機電商會在台的辦事處，深入瞭解大陸企業在台發展遭遇的問題。他會見政界大老討論兩岸走向，也和基層民眾面對面互動；他親登阿里山賞雲海，也去誠品書店體會台灣的人文況味。
陳德銘更多次以感性的語言表達心意，例如說想來體會「台灣的心跳」，在參觀高雄港時，對熱情民眾的招呼回應說：「台灣，我愛你！」在高雄軟體園區參觀時，陳德銘還以英文說出：「We have the same dream , flying over the Taiwan and China.（我們有共同的夢想，攜手飛越台灣和中國）」。
被譽為「知台派」的陳德銘，擔任過蘇州市長與商務部長，有不少與台灣交流合作的經驗。他對台灣的感性語言，凸顯了在兩岸的互動過程中，民族大愛可以是雙方最基本的共同語言，而兩岸彼此間的善意，更是一項彌足珍貴的資產，也是台灣與大陸化解歧異、尋找共識、為下一代開創嶄新未來的重要契機。
在此之前，兩岸互動曾經經歷過許多波折。前海協會會長汪道涵原本計畫來台，卻因為前總統李登輝突然提出「兩國論」，兩岸關係陷入急凍，兩會協商也為之停擺。直到馬英九當選總統後，開始推動兩岸和解，雙方互動才恢復熱絡。
但是，在綠營政治人物的政治動員下，兩岸友善的交流合作，即使內容明顯對台灣有利，仍然經常成為綠營的抗議抹黑焦點。例如前海協會會長陳雲林首度來台訪問時，就曾經出現激烈的群眾抗爭，前海協會副會長張銘清甚至在孔廟遭抗議民眾擠倒。
不過，隨著兩岸交流逐步推動，以及中國經濟力量在國際舞台迅速崛起，愈來愈多人體認到大陸市場提供的商機對台灣極為重要。即使是民進黨籍的南部縣市長，也紛紛前進大陸推銷當地農特產。台灣社會對日益頻繁來訪的大陸觀光客及政經官員、企業人士，早已司空見慣，海協會官員來訪常態化，兩岸民間交流不斷擴大深化，舊有的敵意隔閡也開始緩解。
這次陳德銘訪問台灣時，氣氛和過去已大不相同，接觸到的多是友善親切的民眾，只有偶爾遇到零星、小規模而平和的抗議活動，今昔相比，對照得出台灣社會在接納大陸人士時的態度變化，也可看出兩岸關係確實已有相當大的進展。
就像長榮集團總裁張榮發在接見陳德銘時所說的，兩岸不論語言或食物都一樣，很多事情大家應該可以交換意見，就像自己家裡的人一樣。台灣和大陸應團結創造雙贏，像一家人，不能讓外國人瞧不起。陳德銘此行也一再呼籲兩岸合作共同進軍全球市場，共創雙贏。
雖然兩岸之間仍然存在著歧異，但仔細檢視，會發現兩岸人民與社會的共通點遠遠大於差異處。如果能夠站在民族大愛、共創榮景的前提下，堅持善意友好的路徑，積極推動各項合作計畫，為兩岸人民福祉創造更大利多，一個和平繁榮的兩岸盛世，不會是夢。
Tuesday, December 3, 2013
East China Sea ADIZ: Did Beijing Overplay Its Hand, or Exploit an Opportunity?
East China Sea ADIZ: Did Beijing Overplay Its Hand, or Exploit an Opportunity?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 4, 2013
Summary: Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast, because failure meant embarrassment."
Full text below:
Beijing declared an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Did it overplay its hand? Or did it exploit an opportunity? We will have to wait and see.
On the morning of the 23rd of last month, Beijing's MInistry of Defense announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Aircraft entering and leaving are required to submit flight plans and to identify themselves. Beijing announced that "If aircraft fail to identify themselves or obey commands, [Mainland] China's armed forces will take emergency defensive measures." Rumors emerged that the Mainland Chinese Embassy in Japan was carrying out alien registration. Rumors also emerged that the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" had left port.
Washington immediately denounced the move as an unnecessary provocation. It declared that it would not recognize it, would not provide notification, and would not respond. It then dispatched two B-52 bombers into the ADIZ for two hours. In response, it adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing did not demand that the B-52s identify themselves. Nor did it issue any orders. It merely said that it engaged in "timely identification" and exercised "effective control." Over the past few days, US and Japanese military aircraft have come and gone in the ADIZ. They have all adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing has responded saying merely that it engaged in "timely identification."
Beijing's swift change in posture was either a case of tough on the outside, weak on the inside, or a return to reason. On the one hand, it reiterated that the Air Defense Identification Zone was not airspace. Still less was it a no-fly zone. It was merely a "warning zone." Aircraft entering and exiting the ADIZ are not about to be shot down. According to this reading, Mainland China's armed forces are not obligated to use force. On the other hand, it explained that the Liaoning set sail and passed through the Taiwan Strait along Taiwan's west coast. It did not sail past the east coast of Taiwan, the waters of the Diaoyutai Islands, and the "first island chain." Its purpose was to refute the slanderous "China threat theory."
Beijing's changes in posture had people wondering. If it is so flexible, why the original theatrics? Actually Beijing normalized sea and air patrols around the Diaoyutai Islands last September. Doing so ensured that the status of the Diaoyutai Islands would remain "disputed." One might say it was a successful strategy. But the sudden announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone was perhaps excessive. Overnight Beijing was forced back on the defensive. One cannot help wondering. Did Beijing overplay its hand?
Beijing announced its ADIZ just when the situation in the East China Sea was most tense. What was its intention? Was it to establish a warning system to minimize misunderstandings? That would have been a positive development. But Beijing used incendiary language, imposed alien registration, and that its aircraft carrier had left port. It turned the event into a show of force. This gave Washington an opportunity to lash back, leaving Beijing in an embarrassing situation.
Or one might say that what Washington opposed was Beijing's attitude, and not Beijing's Air Defense Identification Zone. Six days after the incident, the U.S. State Department announced that civilian US aircraft should identify themselves when entering and exiting the East China Sea region, and that they should provide Beijing with identification. The State Department also said this did not constitute acceptance of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. The State Department probably meant that U.S. military aircraft in the region may still adhere to the "three noes policy." In fact, this is standard practice for Air Defense Identification Zones the world over. Civilian aircraft must identify themselves. But military aircraft that do not enter the airspace of other nations need not provide identification. If Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea ADIZ, then it has essentially reached an agreement with Beijing on its East China Sea ADIZ.
The situation is unpredictable, and could deteriorate. Washington's decision to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is probably a wise move. The Japanese declared an Air Defense Identification Zone during the Cold War, in 1969. In 2002, it pushed the zone to within 130 nautical miles of Mainland China's coast. This established a warning system to minimize misjudgments. The situation in the East China Sea is dangerous. The international community should be pleased that Mainland China too has established a warning system to minimize misunderstandings in the East China Sea. The Japanese and Mainland Chinese ADIZs have considerable overlap. This underscores the need to strike a balance between the two sides' interests. Washington and other nations may object to Beijing's attitude when it established its ADIZ. But they have no call to forbid Beijing from establishing an ADIZ. Instead, they should encourage Beijing to adopt the correct terminology and attitudes when establishing an ADIZ.
Washington has apparently given Tokyo a slap in the face. Can Washington approve Tokyo's establishment of an ADIZ, but reject Beijing's establishment of an ADIZ? Washington knows that would not fly. Suppose Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft? If Japan persists in going its own way, it will be reduced to "the sound of one hand clapping." Suppose the situation shifts toward this direction. Suppose Beijing's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone incident fades from memory. If its patrol zone and ADIZ are abruptly advanced toward the "first island chain," one might characterize Mainland China's move as opportunistic.
Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast, because failure meant embarrassment."
東海劃界：畫蛇添足或得寸進尺
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.04 03:42 am
北京宣示「東海防空識別區」，究竟是畫蛇添足的敗筆？還是得寸進尺的高招？有待後續發展的檢驗。
上月二十三日晨，中國大陸國防部剛上班就公布東海防空識別區，要求往來航空器提交飛行計畫且回答識別詢問。並宣稱：「對不配合識別或拒不服從指令的航空器，中國武裝力量將採取防禦性緊急處置措施。」接著，傳出中國駐日使館進行僑民登記；又宣布航母「遼寧號」出航。
在第一時間，美國即指此為「不必要的煽動舉動」；並宣示「不承認／不通報／不回應」。接著，就派出兩架Ｂ五十二轟炸機進入識別區飛了二小時，對北京所訂「規則」採前述「三不政策」；而北京未對Ｂ五十二進行「識別詢問」，也並無任何「指令」，只稱已做到「及時識別」、「有效監控」。數日來，美日韓軍機進出識別區已如家常便飯，皆採「三不政策」，北京均以「及時識別」回應。
北京姿態的急轉直下，即非色厲內荏，至少是從魯莽回復了理智。例如：一方面再三解釋，「防空識別區不是領空，更不是禁航區」，而只是「預警地帶」，不可能對進入識別區的航空器擊落；以此解釋「中國武裝力量」何以沒有強制動作。另一方面又解釋，遼寧號出航，通過台灣西岸的台灣海峽，而未穿越台灣東岸的釣魚台海域及第一島鏈地帶，是要打破外界「中國威脅論」的誣衊。
北京姿態的前後變化，令人覺得，既然能屈能伸，當初何必大張旗鼓？其實，去年九月以來，北京在釣島海空域的「例行巡邏常態化」，已使釣島「爭議的現狀」得以維持，可謂是成功的戰略；然而，防空識別區一舉，卻似是過猶不及，一夕之間反而落為守勢，不禁令人質疑，這是不是畫蛇添足之舉？
其實，在東海情勢日緊之時，北京宣布識別區，若意在「設置預警／減低誤判」，未嘗沒有正面意義；但北京卻以充滿火藥味的文字及僑民登記、航空母艦出航等動作，將整個事件操作成一個耀武揚威的肌肉展示。這正好給美國抓住了反擊題材，導致了北京難堪的局面。
或許可說，美國反對的是北京的「態度」，而未必是北京設置「防空識別區」這個動作。事發六天後，美國務院宣布「美國民用飛機在進入東海識別區時，應向北京提供識別資訊」。不過，國務院也同時表示，「這並不代表接受中國東海防空識別區的各項要求」，這應是指美國軍機在識別區內仍可能採「三不政策」。其實，這也是舉世「防空識別區」的通例；民航機遵行識別動作，軍機若不繼續進入對方國之領空即不提供識別。倘若美國在東海識別區採此「軍民分流」的政策，則可視為北京的東海識別區對美國已經局部成立。
在情勢出現不測及更加惡化之前，美國改採「軍民分流」的防空識別區通則，應是明智之舉。因為，日本在一九六九年冷戰時期已宣示其防空識別區，二○○二年更將之推進至距中國海岸一三○公里處，這是為了「設置預警／減低誤判」；則在東海風雲險惡之際，國際社會其實也應當樂見中國亦相對宣布「設置預警／減低誤判」的東海識別區；而日本與中國防空識別區的大部分重疊，更顯示相對權益應當求取平衡的必要性。於是，美國及國際社會縱有正當理由來反對北京設置識別區的「態度」，卻沒有理由禁阻北京設置識別區之作為，反而應當協助北京以正確的語言及態度來面對識別區。
日本好像被美國甩了一巴掌。但若只准日本設識別區，卻不容中國設識別區，美國亦知這不可能成為公論。而只要美國改採「軍民分流」，日本如仍一意孤行，即是孤掌難鳴。倘若局勢朝此方向發展，則北京「東海防空識別區」的尷尬期即可望逐漸度過，並藉此將其巡弋及預警空域大幅推向第一島鏈，也許即可在未來東海情勢的戰略地位上有了得寸進尺的獲益。
然而，無論如何，北京在此次東海防空識別區上的操作手法，應是可「批評與自我批評」的。性格決定政策；鄧小平以來的「韜光養晦」，出自動心忍性的性格，這是性格飛揚者所不能及。若讀論語，即知治國與修身無異，子曰：「古者言之不出，恥躬之不逮也。」
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 4, 2013
Summary: Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast, because failure meant embarrassment."
Full text below:
Beijing declared an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Did it overplay its hand? Or did it exploit an opportunity? We will have to wait and see.
On the morning of the 23rd of last month, Beijing's MInistry of Defense announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Aircraft entering and leaving are required to submit flight plans and to identify themselves. Beijing announced that "If aircraft fail to identify themselves or obey commands, [Mainland] China's armed forces will take emergency defensive measures." Rumors emerged that the Mainland Chinese Embassy in Japan was carrying out alien registration. Rumors also emerged that the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" had left port.
Washington immediately denounced the move as an unnecessary provocation. It declared that it would not recognize it, would not provide notification, and would not respond. It then dispatched two B-52 bombers into the ADIZ for two hours. In response, it adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing did not demand that the B-52s identify themselves. Nor did it issue any orders. It merely said that it engaged in "timely identification" and exercised "effective control." Over the past few days, US and Japanese military aircraft have come and gone in the ADIZ. They have all adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing has responded saying merely that it engaged in "timely identification."
Beijing's swift change in posture was either a case of tough on the outside, weak on the inside, or a return to reason. On the one hand, it reiterated that the Air Defense Identification Zone was not airspace. Still less was it a no-fly zone. It was merely a "warning zone." Aircraft entering and exiting the ADIZ are not about to be shot down. According to this reading, Mainland China's armed forces are not obligated to use force. On the other hand, it explained that the Liaoning set sail and passed through the Taiwan Strait along Taiwan's west coast. It did not sail past the east coast of Taiwan, the waters of the Diaoyutai Islands, and the "first island chain." Its purpose was to refute the slanderous "China threat theory."
Beijing's changes in posture had people wondering. If it is so flexible, why the original theatrics? Actually Beijing normalized sea and air patrols around the Diaoyutai Islands last September. Doing so ensured that the status of the Diaoyutai Islands would remain "disputed." One might say it was a successful strategy. But the sudden announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone was perhaps excessive. Overnight Beijing was forced back on the defensive. One cannot help wondering. Did Beijing overplay its hand?
Beijing announced its ADIZ just when the situation in the East China Sea was most tense. What was its intention? Was it to establish a warning system to minimize misunderstandings? That would have been a positive development. But Beijing used incendiary language, imposed alien registration, and that its aircraft carrier had left port. It turned the event into a show of force. This gave Washington an opportunity to lash back, leaving Beijing in an embarrassing situation.
Or one might say that what Washington opposed was Beijing's attitude, and not Beijing's Air Defense Identification Zone. Six days after the incident, the U.S. State Department announced that civilian US aircraft should identify themselves when entering and exiting the East China Sea region, and that they should provide Beijing with identification. The State Department also said this did not constitute acceptance of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. The State Department probably meant that U.S. military aircraft in the region may still adhere to the "three noes policy." In fact, this is standard practice for Air Defense Identification Zones the world over. Civilian aircraft must identify themselves. But military aircraft that do not enter the airspace of other nations need not provide identification. If Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea ADIZ, then it has essentially reached an agreement with Beijing on its East China Sea ADIZ.
The situation is unpredictable, and could deteriorate. Washington's decision to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is probably a wise move. The Japanese declared an Air Defense Identification Zone during the Cold War, in 1969. In 2002, it pushed the zone to within 130 nautical miles of Mainland China's coast. This established a warning system to minimize misjudgments. The situation in the East China Sea is dangerous. The international community should be pleased that Mainland China too has established a warning system to minimize misunderstandings in the East China Sea. The Japanese and Mainland Chinese ADIZs have considerable overlap. This underscores the need to strike a balance between the two sides' interests. Washington and other nations may object to Beijing's attitude when it established its ADIZ. But they have no call to forbid Beijing from establishing an ADIZ. Instead, they should encourage Beijing to adopt the correct terminology and attitudes when establishing an ADIZ.
Washington has apparently given Tokyo a slap in the face. Can Washington approve Tokyo's establishment of an ADIZ, but reject Beijing's establishment of an ADIZ? Washington knows that would not fly. Suppose Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft? If Japan persists in going its own way, it will be reduced to "the sound of one hand clapping." Suppose the situation shifts toward this direction. Suppose Beijing's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone incident fades from memory. If its patrol zone and ADIZ are abruptly advanced toward the "first island chain," one might characterize Mainland China's move as opportunistic.
Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast, because failure meant embarrassment."
東海劃界：畫蛇添足或得寸進尺
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.04 03:42 am
北京宣示「東海防空識別區」，究竟是畫蛇添足的敗筆？還是得寸進尺的高招？有待後續發展的檢驗。
上月二十三日晨，中國大陸國防部剛上班就公布東海防空識別區，要求往來航空器提交飛行計畫且回答識別詢問。並宣稱：「對不配合識別或拒不服從指令的航空器，中國武裝力量將採取防禦性緊急處置措施。」接著，傳出中國駐日使館進行僑民登記；又宣布航母「遼寧號」出航。
在第一時間，美國即指此為「不必要的煽動舉動」；並宣示「不承認／不通報／不回應」。接著，就派出兩架Ｂ五十二轟炸機進入識別區飛了二小時，對北京所訂「規則」採前述「三不政策」；而北京未對Ｂ五十二進行「識別詢問」，也並無任何「指令」，只稱已做到「及時識別」、「有效監控」。數日來，美日韓軍機進出識別區已如家常便飯，皆採「三不政策」，北京均以「及時識別」回應。
北京姿態的急轉直下，即非色厲內荏，至少是從魯莽回復了理智。例如：一方面再三解釋，「防空識別區不是領空，更不是禁航區」，而只是「預警地帶」，不可能對進入識別區的航空器擊落；以此解釋「中國武裝力量」何以沒有強制動作。另一方面又解釋，遼寧號出航，通過台灣西岸的台灣海峽，而未穿越台灣東岸的釣魚台海域及第一島鏈地帶，是要打破外界「中國威脅論」的誣衊。
北京姿態的前後變化，令人覺得，既然能屈能伸，當初何必大張旗鼓？其實，去年九月以來，北京在釣島海空域的「例行巡邏常態化」，已使釣島「爭議的現狀」得以維持，可謂是成功的戰略；然而，防空識別區一舉，卻似是過猶不及，一夕之間反而落為守勢，不禁令人質疑，這是不是畫蛇添足之舉？
其實，在東海情勢日緊之時，北京宣布識別區，若意在「設置預警／減低誤判」，未嘗沒有正面意義；但北京卻以充滿火藥味的文字及僑民登記、航空母艦出航等動作，將整個事件操作成一個耀武揚威的肌肉展示。這正好給美國抓住了反擊題材，導致了北京難堪的局面。
或許可說，美國反對的是北京的「態度」，而未必是北京設置「防空識別區」這個動作。事發六天後，美國務院宣布「美國民用飛機在進入東海識別區時，應向北京提供識別資訊」。不過，國務院也同時表示，「這並不代表接受中國東海防空識別區的各項要求」，這應是指美國軍機在識別區內仍可能採「三不政策」。其實，這也是舉世「防空識別區」的通例；民航機遵行識別動作，軍機若不繼續進入對方國之領空即不提供識別。倘若美國在東海識別區採此「軍民分流」的政策，則可視為北京的東海識別區對美國已經局部成立。
在情勢出現不測及更加惡化之前，美國改採「軍民分流」的防空識別區通則，應是明智之舉。因為，日本在一九六九年冷戰時期已宣示其防空識別區，二○○二年更將之推進至距中國海岸一三○公里處，這是為了「設置預警／減低誤判」；則在東海風雲險惡之際，國際社會其實也應當樂見中國亦相對宣布「設置預警／減低誤判」的東海識別區；而日本與中國防空識別區的大部分重疊，更顯示相對權益應當求取平衡的必要性。於是，美國及國際社會縱有正當理由來反對北京設置識別區的「態度」，卻沒有理由禁阻北京設置識別區之作為，反而應當協助北京以正確的語言及態度來面對識別區。
日本好像被美國甩了一巴掌。但若只准日本設識別區，卻不容中國設識別區，美國亦知這不可能成為公論。而只要美國改採「軍民分流」，日本如仍一意孤行，即是孤掌難鳴。倘若局勢朝此方向發展，則北京「東海防空識別區」的尷尬期即可望逐漸度過，並藉此將其巡弋及預警空域大幅推向第一島鏈，也許即可在未來東海情勢的戰略地位上有了得寸進尺的獲益。
然而，無論如何，北京在此次東海防空識別區上的操作手法，應是可「批評與自我批評」的。性格決定政策；鄧小平以來的「韜光養晦」，出自動心忍性的性格，這是性格飛揚者所不能及。若讀論語，即知治國與修身無異，子曰：「古者言之不出，恥躬之不逮也。」
Monday, December 2, 2013
East China Sea Situation: Taipei's Role is to Make Peace
East China Sea Situation: Taipei's Role is to Make Peace
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 3, 2013
Summary: In the East China Sea, a weaker power caught between two strong powers can do little. The Ma Ying-jeou government is relatively neutral. Its behavior and speech are rational. It has indicated that the issue of sovereignty is not involved. That was left to the discretion of the relevant ministries. They would ensure goodwill and the larger interests of the nation. Yet the DPP and Pan Green media blasted him. They accused him of "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." They accused him of self-abasement. Such accusations are unreasonable. The media should not add fuel to the fire.
Full text below:
On November 23, Beijing's Ministry of Defense announced its "Scope of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone." It included the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing declared that in the future, all aircraft flying within the zone would be required to provide identification. Otherwise, the Mainland's armed forces could take "emergency defensive measures." The announcement touched raw nerves in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Taipei. East China Sea tensions escalated. Even neighboring countries such as South Korea and Australia expressed concern. The Republic of China government is among the parties involved. Therefore it has a right to speak on the matter. It must adopt a firm stance on the matter.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, "We absolutely do not accept (Chinese) attempts to change the status quo by force." He ordered Japan's airlines not to cooperate. The U.S. State Department also issued a statement. It said "This unilateral action constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident." It reiterated the U.S. commitment to allies and partners, saying that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyutai Islands. Japan refers to the islands as "Senkaku." American B-52 bombers overflew over the Diaoyutai Islands. The Mainland's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, held exercises in the waters of the South China Sea. The situation will apparently get worse before it gets better.
View the matter objectively. Tensions in the region are increasing. Witihout advance warning, Beijing suddenly announced an air defense identification zone. The timing and manner were not conducive to regional stability. Whether the situation will worsen in the future is debatable. Will Beijing go further and designate air defense identification zones in the Yellow Sea and South China Seas? That remains to be seen. Beijing's move was aimed mainly at Japan. This is indisputable. Beijing probably expected the reaction from the Washington. But other countries have reacted swiftly. Opposition has been widespread. Tensions with many neighbors have increased. This is not in Beijing's best interests.
The concerned parties have alll put on shows. They have all spoken their peace. We believe conflict can be avoided. We do not believe war is imminent. The parties are merely testing each other's bottom lines. For the moment, they are merely exchanging insults and putting on a show, attempting to counter each others' arrogance. This is the time to prevent tensions from esclating. If something truly unexpected were to happen, even a small-scale accident, someone might attempt to gain an advantage. Even unexpected conflicts must be avoided. The parties can adhere to their positions. They can defend their dignity. They can demand that their interests be protected. But if a shooting war erupts, all parties will be losers.
Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo need not go to war over this tiny island. For Beijing, keeping a low profile while taking care of business is still its best foreign policy option. It needs a stable international and domestic environment to pursue economic growth and address its domestic problems. Even a tiny leak can sink a great ship. Therefore, Beijing need not provoke trouble, and destroy a rare opportunity for strategic development. Beijing's move was not necessarily an attempt to change the status quo. Many actions Washington and Tokyo took were indeed provocative. But Beijing must realize that if China and Japan clash, no matter how small or large the conflict, the biggest winner will be the US. A wise man will not be taken in.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will visit China, Japan, and South Korea this week. He says this is to enhance communication. He says he wants to understand Beijing's strategic intentions. In fact the problem has nothing to do with a lack of communications or lack of knowledge. The problem is that everyone has his own position. Everyone has internal pressures and cannot compromise. Take Taipei's perspective. The Japanese government nationalized the Diaoyutai Islands. It made the first move. It upset the status quo. It must be severely condemned. Washington's flagrantly biased pro-Japanese stance must also be condemned as unacceptable. Beijing included the Diaoyutai Islands in its territorial sea baselines. It included them its air defense identification zone. It included them because it was compelled to do so. This is why we are willing to withhold judgment.
Lastly, the ROC Legislature passed a resolution yesterday, requiring the government to issue a strong statement. This is political grandstanding. Legislators from any nations are inclined to make unrealistic boasts. They cannot be taken seriously. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly set forth his East China Sea Peace Initiative. He advocates shelving disputes. He hopes that peaceful dialogue will resolve problems through negotiations. He advocates joint development of resources. This is actually a reasonable proposition, in line with the best interests of all parties. Unfortunately Taipei is often ignored. Nobody pays any attention. In the East China Sea, a weaker power caught between two strong powers can do little. The Ma Ying-jeou government is relatively neutral. Its behavior and speech are rational. It has indicated that the issue of sovereignty is not involved. That was left to the discretion of the relevant ministries. They would ensure goodwill and the larger interests of the nation. Yet the DPP and Pan Green media blasted him. They accused him of "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." They accused him of self-abasement. Such accusations are unreasonable. The media should not add fuel to the fire.
社論－東海風雲緊 和平是台灣唯一角色
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月03日 04:10
11月23日，大陸國防部公告「東海防空識別區」範圍，將釣魚台列嶼劃入。北京宣稱，今後所有在此範圍內飛行的航空器須提供識別，否則大陸的武裝力量可採取「防禦性緊急處置措施」。事情一經宣布，不但牽動美、中、日、台敏感神經，引發東海區域緊張，甚至連其他周邊的國家，如南韓及澳洲也對此同表關切。台灣身為當事人之一，不但要有發言權，更要拿出堅定的立場和態度。
日本首相安倍晉三曾經指出，「對於（中國）試圖以武力改變現狀的行為，我們絕對不接受」，指令日本航空公司不得配合，而美國國務院也發表聲明，警告「這項片面行動已經構成企圖改變東海的現狀，升高行動只會增高區域的緊張情勢並製造發生意外的風險」，重申美國對盟邦和夥伴的承諾堅定不移，美日安保條約的第5條適用於尖閣群島（釣魚台列嶼），美國的B-52轟炸機飛越釣魚台上空，大陸航空母艦遼寧號則首度前往南海水域進行演訓。看來局勢在改善之前不無繼續惡化的可能。
客觀而言，就目前的區域緊張情勢發展來看，在毫無事前徵兆的情況下，大陸突然公布防空識別區，其時機與方式或許無益於區域穩定，未來情況是否會進一步惡化當然仍有討論空間，北京是否會進一步在黃海、南海地區也劃定防空識別區同樣有待後續觀察，但北京此舉主要針對日本而來應該是不爭的事實，若說大陸完全沒有料到此舉會引發美、日的反彈恐怕與事實並不吻合，但此事引起其他相關國家如此快速、廣泛的反對聲浪，要同時和這麼多鄰國升高緊張，或許也並不符合北京的最大利益。
就目前看來，相關各方現在都擺足了姿態，堅持自己的立場，但坦白的說，我們既不認為衝突無法避免，更不認為戰爭已經迫在眉睫，畢竟有關各方現在都只是在測試對方的底線，目前充其量而言只是在彼此叫陣，做足姿態，企圖壓制對方氣燄，也就是所謂的控制型升高緊張的階段，未來除非真的出現意外（即使這種小規模的意外應該也是盤算後的舉措），或任何一方想要藉著製造衝突來攫取利益，否則即使是偶發性的衝突應該也能避免。立場要顧，尊嚴要保，利益要爭，但真的打了起來，絕對是於人、於己都是個損失。
畢竟中、美、日三方都沒有為此蕞爾小島大動干戈的必要。對北京來說，韜光養晦、有所作為依然應是外交圭臬，而為所當為尤其重要，既然它需要一個安定的國際及國內環境來追求發展，改善內部叢生的問題，因此北京就更沒有必要小不忍則亂大謀的主動惹出事端，破壞自己難得的戰略發展機遇期。我們以為，中共的行動未必是要改變現狀，美、日的部分行動則確有挑釁意涵，但北京心中仍然應該知道，只要中、日發生衝突，不管規模大小，最大的得利者當然非美國莫屬，智者絕不上當。
美國副總統拜登周內將訪問中、日、韓三國，說是要加強溝通，希望了解北京的戰略意圖。其實今天的問題不在三方的溝通不足、了解不夠，而是大家都有自己的立場和堅持，都有內政壓力和不能妥協之處。從台灣的立場來看，事情發展到目前的階段，日本政府當初將釣魚台國有化的舉動是破壞現狀的始作俑者，必須加以嚴厲譴責，美國明顯親日的偏頗立場同樣值得批評，不能接受。中國大陸後來將釣魚台劃入其領海基線，現在又將其劃入防空識別區的舉動，北京認為這只是被動表態的必要作為，對此我們願意抱持理解的態度。
最後，立法院日昨通過決議案，要求政府強力表態，這本身就是一場政治大秀，各國國會議員不切實際、放言高論的惡習隨處可見，不必當真。馬英九總統最近一再提出東海和平倡議，主張暫時擱置爭議，希望用和平、對話、談判的方式來解決問題，共同從事資源的開發，這其實是一個符合各方最大利益的合理主張，可惜的是台灣人微言輕，沒人當成一回事情。在這次東海風雲中，兩大之間難為小，馬英九政府相對中性、理性的舉動及發言，表明此事不涉主權問題，著由相關部會自行處理，其中應該隱涵了一些善意與國族利益的整體考量，結果被民進黨和綠色媒體罵到臭頭，不是親中賣台，就是自我矮化，這樣的指控並不合理，媒體其實不必人云亦云雪上加霜。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 3, 2013
Summary: In the East China Sea, a weaker power caught between two strong powers can do little. The Ma Ying-jeou government is relatively neutral. Its behavior and speech are rational. It has indicated that the issue of sovereignty is not involved. That was left to the discretion of the relevant ministries. They would ensure goodwill and the larger interests of the nation. Yet the DPP and Pan Green media blasted him. They accused him of "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." They accused him of self-abasement. Such accusations are unreasonable. The media should not add fuel to the fire.
Full text below:
On November 23, Beijing's Ministry of Defense announced its "Scope of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone." It included the Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing declared that in the future, all aircraft flying within the zone would be required to provide identification. Otherwise, the Mainland's armed forces could take "emergency defensive measures." The announcement touched raw nerves in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Taipei. East China Sea tensions escalated. Even neighboring countries such as South Korea and Australia expressed concern. The Republic of China government is among the parties involved. Therefore it has a right to speak on the matter. It must adopt a firm stance on the matter.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, "We absolutely do not accept (Chinese) attempts to change the status quo by force." He ordered Japan's airlines not to cooperate. The U.S. State Department also issued a statement. It said "This unilateral action constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident." It reiterated the U.S. commitment to allies and partners, saying that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyutai Islands. Japan refers to the islands as "Senkaku." American B-52 bombers overflew over the Diaoyutai Islands. The Mainland's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, held exercises in the waters of the South China Sea. The situation will apparently get worse before it gets better.
View the matter objectively. Tensions in the region are increasing. Witihout advance warning, Beijing suddenly announced an air defense identification zone. The timing and manner were not conducive to regional stability. Whether the situation will worsen in the future is debatable. Will Beijing go further and designate air defense identification zones in the Yellow Sea and South China Seas? That remains to be seen. Beijing's move was aimed mainly at Japan. This is indisputable. Beijing probably expected the reaction from the Washington. But other countries have reacted swiftly. Opposition has been widespread. Tensions with many neighbors have increased. This is not in Beijing's best interests.
The concerned parties have alll put on shows. They have all spoken their peace. We believe conflict can be avoided. We do not believe war is imminent. The parties are merely testing each other's bottom lines. For the moment, they are merely exchanging insults and putting on a show, attempting to counter each others' arrogance. This is the time to prevent tensions from esclating. If something truly unexpected were to happen, even a small-scale accident, someone might attempt to gain an advantage. Even unexpected conflicts must be avoided. The parties can adhere to their positions. They can defend their dignity. They can demand that their interests be protected. But if a shooting war erupts, all parties will be losers.
Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo need not go to war over this tiny island. For Beijing, keeping a low profile while taking care of business is still its best foreign policy option. It needs a stable international and domestic environment to pursue economic growth and address its domestic problems. Even a tiny leak can sink a great ship. Therefore, Beijing need not provoke trouble, and destroy a rare opportunity for strategic development. Beijing's move was not necessarily an attempt to change the status quo. Many actions Washington and Tokyo took were indeed provocative. But Beijing must realize that if China and Japan clash, no matter how small or large the conflict, the biggest winner will be the US. A wise man will not be taken in.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will visit China, Japan, and South Korea this week. He says this is to enhance communication. He says he wants to understand Beijing's strategic intentions. In fact the problem has nothing to do with a lack of communications or lack of knowledge. The problem is that everyone has his own position. Everyone has internal pressures and cannot compromise. Take Taipei's perspective. The Japanese government nationalized the Diaoyutai Islands. It made the first move. It upset the status quo. It must be severely condemned. Washington's flagrantly biased pro-Japanese stance must also be condemned as unacceptable. Beijing included the Diaoyutai Islands in its territorial sea baselines. It included them its air defense identification zone. It included them because it was compelled to do so. This is why we are willing to withhold judgment.
Lastly, the ROC Legislature passed a resolution yesterday, requiring the government to issue a strong statement. This is political grandstanding. Legislators from any nations are inclined to make unrealistic boasts. They cannot be taken seriously. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly set forth his East China Sea Peace Initiative. He advocates shelving disputes. He hopes that peaceful dialogue will resolve problems through negotiations. He advocates joint development of resources. This is actually a reasonable proposition, in line with the best interests of all parties. Unfortunately Taipei is often ignored. Nobody pays any attention. In the East China Sea, a weaker power caught between two strong powers can do little. The Ma Ying-jeou government is relatively neutral. Its behavior and speech are rational. It has indicated that the issue of sovereignty is not involved. That was left to the discretion of the relevant ministries. They would ensure goodwill and the larger interests of the nation. Yet the DPP and Pan Green media blasted him. They accused him of "pandering to [Mainland] China" and "selling out Taiwan." They accused him of self-abasement. Such accusations are unreasonable. The media should not add fuel to the fire.
社論－東海風雲緊 和平是台灣唯一角色
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2013年12月03日 04:10
11月23日，大陸國防部公告「東海防空識別區」範圍，將釣魚台列嶼劃入。北京宣稱，今後所有在此範圍內飛行的航空器須提供識別，否則大陸的武裝力量可採取「防禦性緊急處置措施」。事情一經宣布，不但牽動美、中、日、台敏感神經，引發東海區域緊張，甚至連其他周邊的國家，如南韓及澳洲也對此同表關切。台灣身為當事人之一，不但要有發言權，更要拿出堅定的立場和態度。
日本首相安倍晉三曾經指出，「對於（中國）試圖以武力改變現狀的行為，我們絕對不接受」，指令日本航空公司不得配合，而美國國務院也發表聲明，警告「這項片面行動已經構成企圖改變東海的現狀，升高行動只會增高區域的緊張情勢並製造發生意外的風險」，重申美國對盟邦和夥伴的承諾堅定不移，美日安保條約的第5條適用於尖閣群島（釣魚台列嶼），美國的B-52轟炸機飛越釣魚台上空，大陸航空母艦遼寧號則首度前往南海水域進行演訓。看來局勢在改善之前不無繼續惡化的可能。
客觀而言，就目前的區域緊張情勢發展來看，在毫無事前徵兆的情況下，大陸突然公布防空識別區，其時機與方式或許無益於區域穩定，未來情況是否會進一步惡化當然仍有討論空間，北京是否會進一步在黃海、南海地區也劃定防空識別區同樣有待後續觀察，但北京此舉主要針對日本而來應該是不爭的事實，若說大陸完全沒有料到此舉會引發美、日的反彈恐怕與事實並不吻合，但此事引起其他相關國家如此快速、廣泛的反對聲浪，要同時和這麼多鄰國升高緊張，或許也並不符合北京的最大利益。
就目前看來，相關各方現在都擺足了姿態，堅持自己的立場，但坦白的說，我們既不認為衝突無法避免，更不認為戰爭已經迫在眉睫，畢竟有關各方現在都只是在測試對方的底線，目前充其量而言只是在彼此叫陣，做足姿態，企圖壓制對方氣燄，也就是所謂的控制型升高緊張的階段，未來除非真的出現意外（即使這種小規模的意外應該也是盤算後的舉措），或任何一方想要藉著製造衝突來攫取利益，否則即使是偶發性的衝突應該也能避免。立場要顧，尊嚴要保，利益要爭，但真的打了起來，絕對是於人、於己都是個損失。
畢竟中、美、日三方都沒有為此蕞爾小島大動干戈的必要。對北京來說，韜光養晦、有所作為依然應是外交圭臬，而為所當為尤其重要，既然它需要一個安定的國際及國內環境來追求發展，改善內部叢生的問題，因此北京就更沒有必要小不忍則亂大謀的主動惹出事端，破壞自己難得的戰略發展機遇期。我們以為，中共的行動未必是要改變現狀，美、日的部分行動則確有挑釁意涵，但北京心中仍然應該知道，只要中、日發生衝突，不管規模大小，最大的得利者當然非美國莫屬，智者絕不上當。
美國副總統拜登周內將訪問中、日、韓三國，說是要加強溝通，希望了解北京的戰略意圖。其實今天的問題不在三方的溝通不足、了解不夠，而是大家都有自己的立場和堅持，都有內政壓力和不能妥協之處。從台灣的立場來看，事情發展到目前的階段，日本政府當初將釣魚台國有化的舉動是破壞現狀的始作俑者，必須加以嚴厲譴責，美國明顯親日的偏頗立場同樣值得批評，不能接受。中國大陸後來將釣魚台劃入其領海基線，現在又將其劃入防空識別區的舉動，北京認為這只是被動表態的必要作為，對此我們願意抱持理解的態度。
最後，立法院日昨通過決議案，要求政府強力表態，這本身就是一場政治大秀，各國國會議員不切實際、放言高論的惡習隨處可見，不必當真。馬英九總統最近一再提出東海和平倡議，主張暫時擱置爭議，希望用和平、對話、談判的方式來解決問題，共同從事資源的開發，這其實是一個符合各方最大利益的合理主張，可惜的是台灣人微言輕，沒人當成一回事情。在這次東海風雲中，兩大之間難為小，馬英九政府相對中性、理性的舉動及發言，表明此事不涉主權問題，著由相關部會自行處理，其中應該隱涵了一些善意與國族利益的整體考量，結果被民進黨和綠色媒體罵到臭頭，不是親中賣台，就是自我矮化，這樣的指控並不合理，媒體其實不必人云亦云雪上加霜。
Sunday, December 1, 2013
Su Tseng-chang Will Enable Beijing to Eat the DPP's Lunch
Su Tseng-chang Will Enable Beijing to Eat the DPP's Lunch
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
November 29, 2013
Summary: The DPP will conclude its Huashan Conference in December. Its "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" will be published in January of next year. Only a month remains in which to change course. Su Tseng-chang must think hard. He must cease being intractable. He must not wait for the 2016 presidential campaign or the election of a DPP president, only to be eaten by Beijing.
Full text below:
The DPP "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" calls for "constitutional consensus" as the basis for exchanges with Mainland China. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Fan Liqing responded. He said the DPP must repudiate its Taiwan independence and "one country on each side" claims. Fan said "using fuzzy concepts (such as so-called constitutional consensus) as the political basis for exchanges with the Mainland is unacceptable."
Su Tseng-chang shot back. He said, "This shows that the other side is intractable and is determined to gobble up Taiwan." Actually the widely held consensus is that Su Tseng-chang has hijacked DPP cross-strait policy, and that if he remains intractable, Beijing will gobble up the DPP.
The DPP must alter its cross-strait policy. It can no longer remain intractable. The DPP longs for a return to power in 2016. If the DPP fails to return to power, it can clamor for Taiwan independence all it wants, but it will merely become irrelevant. Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on the 2016 presidential election. But he cannot bring himself to abandon his Taiwan independence stance and his advocacy of "one country on each side." Does he really intend to wait until he is elected president, then butt heads with Beijing over a "constitutional consensus?" Besides, suppose Su Tseng-chang is defeated in the DPP presidential primary? Is another DPP candidate such as Tsai Ing-wen, supposed to clash with Beijing over "constitutional consensus?"
A DPP presidential candidate may not may not win in 2016. But can he or she force Beijing to accept the DPP's "constitutional consensus?" Can the DPP refuse Beijing's call to "repudiate Taiwan independence and the advocacy of one country on each side?" When the time comes, the truth will emerge. There will be no surprises. Beijing will eat the DPP's lunch.
The DPP has only two cross-strait policy options. One. It can reject inclusion in any one China framework. These are Su Tseng-chang's own words. It can take the Taiwan independence path, the "one nation on each side" path. Two. It can acknowledge that "We can no longer take the Taiwan independence path. We can no longer turn back." These, ironically, are also Su Tseng-chang's words. It can fully include Taiwan in the "one China framework," i.e., the "one China constitution." It can engage in coopetition with the Mainland. It can acknowledge that Taiwan independence is a dead end. If the DPP attempts to promote Taiwan independence, Beijing will eat the DPP's lunch. The DPP must recognize that the only way to avoid this consequence is to recognize the "one China Constitution" and the "one China framework."
The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. That is its most grievous mistake. If the DPP were to accept the 1992 consensus, and support "one China, different interpretations," it could use this still somewhat fuzzy concept to establish strategic depth. But if DPP rejects the strategic ambiguity of the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations," Beijing must pressure the DPP to repudiate its Taiwan independence stance and its advocacy of "one country on each side." Beijing must demand that the DPP repudiate its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." Once upon a time there was a room divider known as the 1992 consensus. It divided a single room into two spaces. But the DPP has destroyed the room divider. Now whenever one enters the room, one sees one undivided space. One immediately sees the DPP's altar, and its sacred icon, the "Taiwan Independence Party Platform," and its irresponsible claims. In 2016, the DPP presidential candidate may or may not be elected president. But he or she will be the focus of cross-Strait attention. The DPP will not be able to obfuscate or evade the issue. When the time comes, will the DPP eat Beijing's lunch? Or will Beijing eat the DPP's lunch?
Su Tseng-chang surely realizes that the DPP is mired in a cross-strait policy crisis. Otherwise, he would not have convened a months long cross-strait policy conference. Su Tseng-chang's problem is that he wants to have it both ways. He acts tough, but he is weak. On the one hand he realizes "we can no longer go back to Taiwan independence." On the other hand, he "rejects inclusion within the one China framework." One the one hand, he falls back on Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." On the other hand, he equivocates and uses "constitutional consensus" as a weasel word and an escape clause. Su Tseng-chang said the DPP "can no longer go back to Taiwan independence." Therefore it is perfectly natural that Beijing would want the DPP to repudiate Taiwan independence and "one country on each side." If Su Tseng-chang cannot bring himself to do so, how can show Beijing has actually believes the DPP "can no longer go back to Taiwan independence?"
When Chen Shui-bian was running for president, former chairman Lin Yi-hsiung helped blaze a trail. The Democratic Progressive Party needs someone like Lin Yi-hsiung. Su Tseng-chang has hijacked the DPP party chairmanship in order to run for president. But inside and outside the DPP, support for Su remains weak. The will to transform DPP cross-strait policy also remains weak. As matters stand, Su Tseng-chang can no longer move down this road. Yet he clings to the party chairmanship. This makes it impossible for others to clear the way ahead. If this stalemate persists until 2016, the DPP presidential candidate will run for president. He or she may or may not win. But he or she will have to face Beijing's call to "repudiate the Taiwan independence party platform and return to the one China framework. At that point Beijing will surely eat the DPP's lunch. What's more, it will surely eat Taipei's lunch as well.
The DPP will conclude its Huashan Conference in December. Its "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" will be published in January of next year. Only a month remains in which to change course. Su Tseng-chang must think hard. He must cease being intractable. He must not wait for the 2016 presidential campaign or the election of a DPP president, only to be eaten by Beijing.
這樣的蘇貞昌 將使民進黨被北京吃定
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.01 03:46 am
民進黨《對中政策總結報告》初稿指出，將以「憲政共識」作為與中國交流的基礎；北京國台辦發言人范麗青回稱，民進黨必須放棄台獨的立場與一邊一國的主張，「用一些模糊的概念（指「憲政共識」）作為與大陸交往的政治基礎，大陸不可能接受。」
對此，蘇貞昌作出強硬回應稱：「由此可見對岸是鐵板一塊，而且吃定台灣。」然而，眾所共見的事實卻是：被蘇貞昌所挾持的民進黨的兩岸政策如果仍是「鐵板一塊」，民進黨才將被北京「吃定」。
民進黨必須調整其兩岸政策，不能再是「鐵板一塊」，這是因為民進黨想要在二○一六重返執政；倘若民進黨不重返執政，則兀自搞他沒完沒了的台獨或一邊一國，其實皆已無關宏旨。然而，蘇貞昌既志在競選二○一六總統，卻不能在「放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」上有所表態，難道要等到他當選總統後，再與北京在「憲政共識」上開罵吵架？何況，如果蘇貞昌在民進黨內的總統初選落敗，難道要另一位民進黨候選人（蔡英文？）去頂著蘇貞昌的「憲政共識」與北京開罵吵架？
到了二○一六年，民進黨不論參選總統或當選總統，難道能強迫北京接受其「憲政共識」？民進黨又豈能不回答北京「必須放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」的問題？到了那個時候，不免要見真章，而絕無意外，民進黨必將被北京「吃定」。
對台灣而言，兩岸政策只有兩個選擇：一、「拒絕納入一中架構」（蘇貞昌語），走台獨及一邊一國的道路；二、「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」（也是蘇貞昌語），全力在「一中架構」（即「一中憲法」）下與大陸發展並建構競合關係。然而，對台灣來說，台獨已無生路，必被北京「吃定」；「一中憲法／一中架構」則是唯一可能不被「吃定」的活路。
民進黨否定「九二共識」，是最大的敗筆。因為，民進黨若接受「九二共識」，支持「一中各表」，尚可藉此「模糊的概念」建立戰略縱深。但是，民進黨放棄了「九二共識／一中各表」的戰略性模糊，使得如今北京幾乎言必稱「必須放棄台獨立場及一邊一國主張」，並直言民進黨必須廢除《台獨黨綱》。這好比原來有個「九二共識」的門簾，尚有內外之別；現在民進黨撤掉了門簾，來人就直接登堂入室，對著你家的神主牌《台獨黨綱》說三道四。二○一六年，民進黨參選總統或當選總統，這必皆是兩岸的焦點議題，民進黨將無「模糊」或「閃躲」的餘地；那麼，屆時將是民進黨「吃定」北京？或北京「吃定」民進黨？
其實，蘇貞昌並非不知民進黨已陷兩岸政策的危機，否則就不會一連幾個月召開那麼多場兩岸政策會議。蘇貞昌的問題，是在首鼠兩端、色厲內荏：一方面說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，另一方面又稱「拒絕納入一中架構」。一方面想要靠向謝長廷的「憲法共識」，另一方面卻又琵琶半遮地說成「憲政共識」；一字之差，差以千里。平情而論，蘇貞昌若說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，則北京希望見到民進黨「放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」，亦為理所當然；如果蘇貞昌這句話說不出口，如何自我印證「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」？
今天的民進黨，需要一個像為陳水扁競選總統開路的黨主席林義雄，但蘇貞昌卻是挾持著民進黨要競選總統的黨主席；由於蘇在黨內外競選總統的聲勢較弱，以致在兩岸政策上轉型的能量亦較差。如今的情景是，蘇貞昌自己打不通這條路，卻卡在黨主席的位子上，就使得黨內其他人也打不通這條路。倘若此一情勢僵持到二○一六年，在民進黨競選總統或當選總統時，再去面對北京「撤廢台獨黨綱／回到一中架構」的壓力，那麼民進黨必將被北京「吃定」，台灣亦被「吃定」。
民進黨將在十二月完成最後一場「華山會議」，而《對中政策總結報告》，則預定在明年一月公布。只剩下一個多月的調整時機，蘇貞昌宜慎思明辨，不可再「鐵板一塊」，勿待二○一六年民進黨競選總統或當選總統時被北京「吃定」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
November 29, 2013
Summary: The DPP will conclude its Huashan Conference in December. Its "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" will be published in January of next year. Only a month remains in which to change course. Su Tseng-chang must think hard. He must cease being intractable. He must not wait for the 2016 presidential campaign or the election of a DPP president, only to be eaten by Beijing.
Full text below:
The DPP "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" calls for "constitutional consensus" as the basis for exchanges with Mainland China. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Fan Liqing responded. He said the DPP must repudiate its Taiwan independence and "one country on each side" claims. Fan said "using fuzzy concepts (such as so-called constitutional consensus) as the political basis for exchanges with the Mainland is unacceptable."
Su Tseng-chang shot back. He said, "This shows that the other side is intractable and is determined to gobble up Taiwan." Actually the widely held consensus is that Su Tseng-chang has hijacked DPP cross-strait policy, and that if he remains intractable, Beijing will gobble up the DPP.
The DPP must alter its cross-strait policy. It can no longer remain intractable. The DPP longs for a return to power in 2016. If the DPP fails to return to power, it can clamor for Taiwan independence all it wants, but it will merely become irrelevant. Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on the 2016 presidential election. But he cannot bring himself to abandon his Taiwan independence stance and his advocacy of "one country on each side." Does he really intend to wait until he is elected president, then butt heads with Beijing over a "constitutional consensus?" Besides, suppose Su Tseng-chang is defeated in the DPP presidential primary? Is another DPP candidate such as Tsai Ing-wen, supposed to clash with Beijing over "constitutional consensus?"
A DPP presidential candidate may not may not win in 2016. But can he or she force Beijing to accept the DPP's "constitutional consensus?" Can the DPP refuse Beijing's call to "repudiate Taiwan independence and the advocacy of one country on each side?" When the time comes, the truth will emerge. There will be no surprises. Beijing will eat the DPP's lunch.
The DPP has only two cross-strait policy options. One. It can reject inclusion in any one China framework. These are Su Tseng-chang's own words. It can take the Taiwan independence path, the "one nation on each side" path. Two. It can acknowledge that "We can no longer take the Taiwan independence path. We can no longer turn back." These, ironically, are also Su Tseng-chang's words. It can fully include Taiwan in the "one China framework," i.e., the "one China constitution." It can engage in coopetition with the Mainland. It can acknowledge that Taiwan independence is a dead end. If the DPP attempts to promote Taiwan independence, Beijing will eat the DPP's lunch. The DPP must recognize that the only way to avoid this consequence is to recognize the "one China Constitution" and the "one China framework."
The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. That is its most grievous mistake. If the DPP were to accept the 1992 consensus, and support "one China, different interpretations," it could use this still somewhat fuzzy concept to establish strategic depth. But if DPP rejects the strategic ambiguity of the 1992 consensus and "one China, different interpretations," Beijing must pressure the DPP to repudiate its Taiwan independence stance and its advocacy of "one country on each side." Beijing must demand that the DPP repudiate its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." Once upon a time there was a room divider known as the 1992 consensus. It divided a single room into two spaces. But the DPP has destroyed the room divider. Now whenever one enters the room, one sees one undivided space. One immediately sees the DPP's altar, and its sacred icon, the "Taiwan Independence Party Platform," and its irresponsible claims. In 2016, the DPP presidential candidate may or may not be elected president. But he or she will be the focus of cross-Strait attention. The DPP will not be able to obfuscate or evade the issue. When the time comes, will the DPP eat Beijing's lunch? Or will Beijing eat the DPP's lunch?
Su Tseng-chang surely realizes that the DPP is mired in a cross-strait policy crisis. Otherwise, he would not have convened a months long cross-strait policy conference. Su Tseng-chang's problem is that he wants to have it both ways. He acts tough, but he is weak. On the one hand he realizes "we can no longer go back to Taiwan independence." On the other hand, he "rejects inclusion within the one China framework." One the one hand, he falls back on Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus." On the other hand, he equivocates and uses "constitutional consensus" as a weasel word and an escape clause. Su Tseng-chang said the DPP "can no longer go back to Taiwan independence." Therefore it is perfectly natural that Beijing would want the DPP to repudiate Taiwan independence and "one country on each side." If Su Tseng-chang cannot bring himself to do so, how can show Beijing has actually believes the DPP "can no longer go back to Taiwan independence?"
When Chen Shui-bian was running for president, former chairman Lin Yi-hsiung helped blaze a trail. The Democratic Progressive Party needs someone like Lin Yi-hsiung. Su Tseng-chang has hijacked the DPP party chairmanship in order to run for president. But inside and outside the DPP, support for Su remains weak. The will to transform DPP cross-strait policy also remains weak. As matters stand, Su Tseng-chang can no longer move down this road. Yet he clings to the party chairmanship. This makes it impossible for others to clear the way ahead. If this stalemate persists until 2016, the DPP presidential candidate will run for president. He or she may or may not win. But he or she will have to face Beijing's call to "repudiate the Taiwan independence party platform and return to the one China framework. At that point Beijing will surely eat the DPP's lunch. What's more, it will surely eat Taipei's lunch as well.
The DPP will conclude its Huashan Conference in December. Its "Summary Report on [Mainland] China Policy" will be published in January of next year. Only a month remains in which to change course. Su Tseng-chang must think hard. He must cease being intractable. He must not wait for the 2016 presidential campaign or the election of a DPP president, only to be eaten by Beijing.
這樣的蘇貞昌 將使民進黨被北京吃定
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.01 03:46 am
民進黨《對中政策總結報告》初稿指出，將以「憲政共識」作為與中國交流的基礎；北京國台辦發言人范麗青回稱，民進黨必須放棄台獨的立場與一邊一國的主張，「用一些模糊的概念（指「憲政共識」）作為與大陸交往的政治基礎，大陸不可能接受。」
對此，蘇貞昌作出強硬回應稱：「由此可見對岸是鐵板一塊，而且吃定台灣。」然而，眾所共見的事實卻是：被蘇貞昌所挾持的民進黨的兩岸政策如果仍是「鐵板一塊」，民進黨才將被北京「吃定」。
民進黨必須調整其兩岸政策，不能再是「鐵板一塊」，這是因為民進黨想要在二○一六重返執政；倘若民進黨不重返執政，則兀自搞他沒完沒了的台獨或一邊一國，其實皆已無關宏旨。然而，蘇貞昌既志在競選二○一六總統，卻不能在「放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」上有所表態，難道要等到他當選總統後，再與北京在「憲政共識」上開罵吵架？何況，如果蘇貞昌在民進黨內的總統初選落敗，難道要另一位民進黨候選人（蔡英文？）去頂著蘇貞昌的「憲政共識」與北京開罵吵架？
到了二○一六年，民進黨不論參選總統或當選總統，難道能強迫北京接受其「憲政共識」？民進黨又豈能不回答北京「必須放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」的問題？到了那個時候，不免要見真章，而絕無意外，民進黨必將被北京「吃定」。
對台灣而言，兩岸政策只有兩個選擇：一、「拒絕納入一中架構」（蘇貞昌語），走台獨及一邊一國的道路；二、「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」（也是蘇貞昌語），全力在「一中架構」（即「一中憲法」）下與大陸發展並建構競合關係。然而，對台灣來說，台獨已無生路，必被北京「吃定」；「一中憲法／一中架構」則是唯一可能不被「吃定」的活路。
民進黨否定「九二共識」，是最大的敗筆。因為，民進黨若接受「九二共識」，支持「一中各表」，尚可藉此「模糊的概念」建立戰略縱深。但是，民進黨放棄了「九二共識／一中各表」的戰略性模糊，使得如今北京幾乎言必稱「必須放棄台獨立場及一邊一國主張」，並直言民進黨必須廢除《台獨黨綱》。這好比原來有個「九二共識」的門簾，尚有內外之別；現在民進黨撤掉了門簾，來人就直接登堂入室，對著你家的神主牌《台獨黨綱》說三道四。二○一六年，民進黨參選總統或當選總統，這必皆是兩岸的焦點議題，民進黨將無「模糊」或「閃躲」的餘地；那麼，屆時將是民進黨「吃定」北京？或北京「吃定」民進黨？
其實，蘇貞昌並非不知民進黨已陷兩岸政策的危機，否則就不會一連幾個月召開那麼多場兩岸政策會議。蘇貞昌的問題，是在首鼠兩端、色厲內荏：一方面說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，另一方面又稱「拒絕納入一中架構」。一方面想要靠向謝長廷的「憲法共識」，另一方面卻又琵琶半遮地說成「憲政共識」；一字之差，差以千里。平情而論，蘇貞昌若說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，則北京希望見到民進黨「放棄台獨立場與一邊一國主張」，亦為理所當然；如果蘇貞昌這句話說不出口，如何自我印證「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」？
今天的民進黨，需要一個像為陳水扁競選總統開路的黨主席林義雄，但蘇貞昌卻是挾持著民進黨要競選總統的黨主席；由於蘇在黨內外競選總統的聲勢較弱，以致在兩岸政策上轉型的能量亦較差。如今的情景是，蘇貞昌自己打不通這條路，卻卡在黨主席的位子上，就使得黨內其他人也打不通這條路。倘若此一情勢僵持到二○一六年，在民進黨競選總統或當選總統時，再去面對北京「撤廢台獨黨綱／回到一中架構」的壓力，那麼民進黨必將被北京「吃定」，台灣亦被「吃定」。
民進黨將在十二月完成最後一場「華山會議」，而《對中政策總結報告》，則預定在明年一月公布。只剩下一個多月的調整時機，蘇貞昌宜慎思明辨，不可再「鐵板一塊」，勿待二○一六年民進黨競選總統或當選總統時被北京「吃定」。
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