Ma Ying-jeou's Accomplishments and Failures, the KMT's Life or Death
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2012
Summary: The KMT reclaimed political power in 2008. It held on to political power in 2012. This was due primarily to voter support for Ma Ying-jeou as an individual, for his personal integrity. If Ma Ying-jeou is perceived as a political failure, it means the Kuomintang as a whole can no longer be trusted. Ma Ying-jeou's failure means the KMT can no longer win the presidential election in 2016 on the basis of personal charisma. Therefore the KMT can single out Ma Ying-jeou for blame. But if the party leaves the impression it is in chaos and rotten, it will not survive.
Full Text below:
Ma Ying-jeou has announced that he is seeking another term as KMT Chairman. He said the KMT must unite and reform. It has no alternative. It cannot afford internal divisions and internal bickering.
His announcement is seen as a response to rumors he has been forced to step down. The fact is the KMT is on verge of breaking apart. This is happening on Ma Ying-jeou's watch, as both president of the nation and chairman of the party. Clearly his chairmanship was no guarantee of either party unity or party reform. The situation has been deteriorating. Had Ma Ying-jeou not been party chairman, the situation might have been even worse. Nevertheless, his chairmanship was no guarantee of good governance. The current chaos is proof of that.
Just exactly how did Ma Ying-jeou wind up in his current predicament? The main reason was his failure to effectively lead the KMT ruling administration. The ruling KMT administration failed to build the Ma Ying-jeou brand name. It failed to become a political asset. Instead it became a political liability. It became Ma Ying-jeou's worst political enemy. Ma Ying-jeou must accept the lion's share of responsibility for his administration's failure of leadership. But the ruling KMT administration can hardly escape blame.
The KMT's current challenge is not merely to address Ma's crisis of governance. It is to ensure the KMT's survival. Public opinion may one-sidedly blast Ma Ying-jeou. But the KMT cannot pretend that Ma Ying-jeou is the only one with a problem. The KMT must realize this means life or death for the KMT in 2014 and 2016.
Following the presidential election, three controversies raged. These controversies concerned U.S. beef imports, the capital gains tax, and gasoline and electricity rate hikes. These left Ma Ying-jeou with an "incompetent" label stuck to his forehead. Soon afterward, the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal left Ma Ying-jeou with a "poor judge of character" and even "covering up corruption" label as well. Ma Ying-jeou must of course assume responsibility for this. But the KMT can hardly escape blame.
Consider these three post-election controversies from a variety of perspectives. Remain objective and rational. Clearly the administration was not wrong in principle. But these three cases were turned upside down by the controversy that raged without end. The administration dragged its feet. The public became angry. The main reason was internal KMT divisions and infighting. This provided the opposition Green parties an opportunity that they seized with relish. As a result society paid a high price. The public concluded that the Ma administration was incompetent, and treated it with contempt and hostility. Actually, the "incompetent" label on the Ma administration's forehead was put there by the "five member team" in the Executive Yuan and the KMT legislative caucus. Insinuations of "incompetence" appeared in the Ma Ying-jeou administration's internal proceedings. The sole objective of these administration proceedings was to use "internal rebellion" to depict Ma Ying-jeou as "incompetent." Ma Ying-jeou lost his "civil war." How can he possibly win any "foreign wars?"
Now take the Lin Yi-shi corruption scandal. The Lin corruption scandal has dealt a serious blow to Ma Ying-jeou. It has dealt what may be a fatal blow to the KMT. One must never judge a book by its cover. We have no shortage of Monday morning quarterbacks. But no one imagined Lin Yi-shi capable of corruption. He had such a down to earth, honest face. He had such a radiant golden boy political image. He was a model for a new generation of "native Taiwanese" political leaders. People could not imagine him in bed with corrupt embezzlers. But the roof fell in. The public learned of his arrogant folly, in both words and deeds. For the KMT, this may mean a rupture in generational succession. It may be a death knell for the KMT. Lin Yi-shi was the darling of the party. Why did he feel no sense of mission or sense of responsibility? Why was he indifferent to the KMT's good name and survival? This is a giant question mark for the Kuomintang. What the public wants to know is whether the next generation of Kuomintang leaders will be Lin Yi-shi clones.
Ma Ying-jeou's "incompetence" was confined mainly to incompetence in his leadership of the Kuomintang. The ruling Kuomintang administration spun Ma as "incompetent." The fact that they were successful proves that in this limited sense, they were right. The KMT's lifeblood has been opposition to corruption. Lin Yi-shi is a bad apple who has ruined the bunch. The KMT has succeeded in making Ma Ying-jeou look "incompetent." But that hardly makes it look "competent." Ma Ying-jeou has long relied on his image for integrity. But his image cannot withstand the negative impact of a single Lin Yi-shi. In other words, the problem originates with Ma Ying-jeou. But the problem rests with the ruling Kuomintang administration as a whole.
The KMT reclaimed political power in 2008. It held on to political power in 2012. This was due primarily to voter support for Ma Ying-jeou as an individual, for his personal integrity. If Ma Ying-jeou is perceived as a political failure, it means the Kuomintang as a whole can no longer be trusted. Ma Ying-jeou's failure means the KMT can no longer win the presidential election in 2016 on the basis of personal charisma. Therefore the KMT can single out Ma Ying-jeou for blame. But if the party leaves the impression it is in chaos and rotten, it will not survive.
If the KMT sees the issue as "Saving Private Ma," it is barking up the wrong tree. The KMT's problem is to restore order out of chaos. Ma Ying-jeou's historical legacy, his successes and failures, will determine whether the KMT survives in 2016.
馬英九的得失，國民黨的生死
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.13
馬英九宣布明年將競選連任國民黨主席。他說：國民黨除了團結、改革，沒有第二條路可走；更沒有分裂、內訌的本錢。
此一表態，被解讀為回應「逼宮」的傳言。然而，事實卻是，國民黨如今的分崩離析之局，正是發生在馬英九以總統兼任黨主席之時，可見兼任不是團結、改革的保證。情勢惡化至今，馬英九若不兼任黨主席，局面或許會更加不可收拾；但兼任絕對不是治理的保證，眼前的亂象即是證明。
細究馬英九走到今日局面的原因，主要是在未能有效領導國民黨團隊；而國民黨團隊非但未能成為馬英九的執政品牌與資源，反而成為政治負債，甚至成為馬英九最強悍的「政敵」。所以，馬英九固應承負領導失能的最大責任，但國民黨團隊亦罪無可逭。
國民黨當前的課題，不止是要挽救馬英九的治理危機，更是整個國民黨將要如何存活下去的問題。輿論可以一面倒地將馬英九轟擊得體無完膚，但國民黨內不能以為那只是馬英九一人的得失問題，而應警覺，這其實已是國民黨在二○一四及二○一六的生死問題。
總統大選後，「選後三案：美牛、證所稅、油電雙漲」鬧得沸沸揚揚，在馬英九的額頭貼上「無能」的標籤；接著，林益世案又給馬英九扣上「識人不明」、「包庇貪汙」的帽子。馬英九應當對此一體承當，但國民黨亦責無旁貸。
如今，從高低遠近的政策考量，來看「選後三案」，只要尚存一念客觀及理智者，應皆不會認為三案在原理原則上有何根本錯誤。但是，最後三案鬧得是非顛倒、拖泥帶水、民怨沸騰，主要是因國民黨內的「分裂、內訌」，供應了在野黨火上加油的操弄空間，以致付出了慘痛的社會成本，使民眾對馬團隊的「無能」產生輕視與敵視。然而，馬政府額頭上的這一張「無能」標籤，其實是「五人小組」、行政院及國民黨立院黨團自己貼上去的。最後呈現的景象是：馬英九在所有的團隊內部程序中皆出現「窩裡反」的「無能」，而所有的團隊內部程序之唯一目標，彷彿也只是要全力用「窩裡反」」來「塑造」馬英九的「無能」。馬的「內戰」失敗，豈有可能對外戰勝？
再看林益世案。林案對馬英九是一重傷，而對國民黨尤為致命的一擊。知人知面不知心，若不是事後諸葛亮，恐怕沒有人會想到林益世會貪汙；他那張「土直」的面孔，與「政治金童」的想像，一直都被視為國民黨本土新世代的樣板人物，使人不至於將他與「貪汙犯」聯想在一起。然而，東窗事發，民眾發現其言行愚妄至不可思議的地步；這其實是對國民黨接班一代的想像之破滅，也是對整個國民黨的未來寄望之破滅。像林益世這樣在黨內集三千寵愛於一身者，為何對國民黨的榮辱存亡完全沒有一點使命感與責任心？這是國人對國民黨人油然而生的一個大問號。人們現在心中的疑問是：國民黨的下一梯隊會不會由「林益世們」接班？
馬英九的「無能」主要表現在「無能」領導國民黨，亦表現在國民黨團隊以「塑造」馬之「無能」為能事；再者，國民黨的命脈之一是反貪反腐，但一個林益世簡直是一坨牛大便弄壞一鍋粥。國民黨既使馬英九「無能」，就不可能使整個執政團隊看起來「有能」；馬英九經營的反貪形象，更禁不起林益世一個人的糟蹋。也就是說，問題當然出在馬英九，但問題也出在整個國民黨團隊。
國民黨能在二○○八贏回政權，及在二○一二維持政權；無可諱言，主要是因馬英九個人的特質獲得選民的支持所致。馬英九現今的表現若被視為治理失敗，那也將被視為整個國民黨的更加不可信託；而且，馬英九的失敗，也預告了國民黨在二○一六不再可能有任何人能以個人的人格魅力贏得總統選舉，且縱目望去國民黨內也已全無具備個人人格魅力之人。因此，國民黨倘若只是馬英九一人承當失能的罵名猶可違，但若整個黨留下亂黨、爛黨的印象，那就不可活了。
對於國民黨來說，現在若只把問題看成「搶救英九大兵」，那是搞錯了方向；問題在於，這個亂黨必須撥亂反正。這是馬英九歷史定位的得失問題，更是國民黨在二○一六後還能否存活的問題。
Thursday, July 12, 2012
RIMPAC: Beijing and Taipei Conspicuous by Their Absence
RIMPAC: Beijing and Taipei Conspicuous by Their Absence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 12, 2012
Summary: The South China Sea dispute is heating up. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is deadlocked. The US-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises are currently under way. This is the largest scale exercise in the history of the world. Twenty-two nations are participating over a period of five weeks. All told they will mobilize 42 ships, six submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 troops.
Full Text below:
The South China Sea dispute is heating up. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is deadlocked. The US-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises are currently under way. This is the largest scale exercise in the history of the world. Twenty-two nations are participating over a period of five weeks. All told they will mobilize 42 ships, six submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 troops.
The original purpose of the exercise was to test the ability of the United States to work with its Asian-Pacific allies. But the current exercise tried to please everyone. The attempt to create a unified command structure was a major undertaking. Never mind actual tactical drills. From a military perspective, it means far less than exercises between the United States, Japan and South Korea. But from a political perspective it is very important indeed.
First of all, almost every country that borders the Pacific is involved in this US led exercise. Some may have only a single ship or single aircraft in the exercise. But these symbolize their military ties with Washington. Recently, while visiting Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the eastward shift of U.S. Navy forces, into the Pacific Region. The RIMPAC exercises show that Washington is determined to stay in Asia.
This exercise was initiated in 1971. It was originally aimed at the Soviet Pacific Fleet. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the exercises were cut to one every two years. Its mission became increasingly blurred. It included rounding up pirates, disaster relief, and search and rescue missions. This year however, the scale suddenly expanded. In the past, the enemy was Russia. This year, even Russia was invited to participate. Mainland China on the other hand, was not. This of course has led to speculation. Apparently Mainland China has become the enemy in the RIMPAC exercises.
Before the exercises began, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, the U.S. Pacific Combatant Commander, told interviewers in Beijing that the exercises represented Washington's policy of firmness and flexibility. The implication was that although they would conduct exercises, they would first inform Beijing that the exercises were not directed at it. Beijing accused Washington of harboring ulterior motives. But at the same time it staged a lavish reception, saying that Beijing and Washington might fight but they would not split.
When Locklear was visiting Mainland China, he said he was not concerned about war breaking out in the South China Sea. The U.S. military has an obligation to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and free passage through other waters around the world. As for territorial disputes, he said Washington does not side with any of the parties in these disputes. He hoped that the controversies will be settled peacefully. But he said he was concerned about the growth of the PLA, and whether Beijing could ensure transparency. When interviewed by the New York Times Locklear stressed that the United States hoped the rise of China would lead to a constructive partnership.
These words naturally grated on Beijing's ears. Beijing suspects that its exclusion from the RIMPAC exercises was deliberate. Washington was using the opportunity to rattle its sabers and bolster its military alliances. As a result, Beijing has accelerated trials of its aircraft carrier in Dalian naval harbor. It hopes to quickly get up to speed. It hopes to weaponize its space technology. These are all seen responses to Washington's intentions. Beijing's live fire exercises in waters near the Zhoushan Islands is seen as a rival gesture.
Most Asian-Pacific countries participating in the RIMPAC exercise have doubts about the rise of Mainland China. The Huangyan Island and Diaoyutai Islands territorial disputes have heated up. Washington and Beijing are both seeking hegemony. This leaves these Asian Pacific countries in an awkward position. They are worried about Beijing's hegemony. They hope Washington will not withdraw from Asia. But they also worry if they get too close to Washington, they may anger Beijing and undermine economic and trade relations.
In many ways the Republic of China is similar to these Asia-Pacific countries. Economically it is dependent upon the Mainland market. Militarily however, it is dependent upon Washington. This is the reason for its vacillating foreign policy. Take the South China Sea dispute. The ROC is one of six nations claiming sovereignty, But its voice remains unheard. Beijing advocates cross-Strait cooperation in defense of Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. But according to Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington has discussed its South China Sea policy with Taipei. Washington says that Taipei is "very, very careful" about the Diaoyutai Islands issue. both privately and publicly. Taipei's situation is particularly delicate and sensitive.
The fate of Taiwan remains the most sensitive and difficult problem in Washington/Beijing relations. Cross-Strait relations are different from bilateral relations between Mainland China and other countries. That is why Washington cannot invite Taipei to participate in the RIMPAC exercises. Washington/Taipei relations are actually about arms sales. Arms sales reflect a tacit understanding concerning security. Retiring AIT Director William Stanton criticized Taipei's reduced defense budget, saying it has led to a cross-Strait military imbalance. The ROC Ministry of Defense is stepping up fighter procurements. It is unwilling to see Washington/Taipei relations suffer.
The RIMPAC exercises reflect the confrontation between Washington and Beijing. They reflect changes in the regional situation. They influence the subtle four-way relationship between Taipei, Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Taipei may not be able to respond. Maybe it should not respond. But it must confront a changeable and complex situation, It must negotiate its its way through a political minefield.
廿二國環太平洋演習 未見大陸與台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.12
南海爭議方興未艾，釣魚台問題相持不下；由美國主導的「環太平洋」海上軍事演習正在進行。這場演習的規模為史上最大，共有二十二國參加，為期五周，計動員四十二艘艦艇、六艘潛艇，超過二百架飛機以及二萬五千名軍人。
軍演本來的目的，是要測試美國和亞太盟國間的作戰協同能力；但這次演習包山包海，單單要統一程序命令就大費周章，談不上實際戰術的操演，從軍事效用上來說，遠遠不及之前的美日韓三國演習，但在政治意義上卻很重要。
首先，幾乎所有濱太平洋的國家都參與這次由美國主導的演習，即使只出一艘船艦一架飛機，都象徵性地強調自己與美國的防衛關係；而美國國防部長潘尼達日前在新加坡宣示美海軍優勢兵力東移太平洋，顯係藉此次演習實際展現出美國要留在亞洲的決心。
這項演習其實始自一九七一年，原本是針對蘇聯的太平洋艦隊。蘇聯解體後，演習改為兩年舉行一次，項目越來越鬆散，只是圍捕海盜、天災救援等，但是今年規模陡然擴大，且連過去演習的假想敵俄羅斯都受邀參加，卻偏偏沒有邀請中國，這當然會引發北京猜測，中國此刻儼然成了太平洋演習的假想敵。
在演習展開前，主導的太平洋美軍司令洛克利爾到北京訪問，這是美國剛柔並濟的手法，意謂雖然將有演習，但先通報這不是針對你的；而北京雖然一方面猛烈批評美國別有用心，另一方面也盛大接待他，上演一場中美之間典型的「鬥而不破」的交手過招。
洛克利爾在中國時表示，他不擔心南海會有戰爭，美軍有保證南海的航行自由及保證於全球其他海域自由通行的義務。至於全球的領土爭議問題，美國不站在爭議的任何一方，希望爭議能和平解決；但他也表示，關切解放軍的成長，與能否確保透明度等。另在接受紐約時報訪問時又特別強調，美國只希望中國崛起能成為「我們有建設性的夥伴」。
這些話，中國聽起來當然刺耳。北京懷疑，太平洋軍演沒讓中國參加，美國就是要趁機顯示軍事實力，拉攏軍事盟友；於是，中國在大連軍港的航母連續試航，加快速度希望年底成軍，及運用太空科技於軍事方面等動作，都被解讀為因應美國意圖的行動。就在此刻，大陸正在舟山群島附近海域進行實彈演習，亦可視為分庭抗禮的姿態。
細數這些參加「環太平洋」演習的亞太國家，大多是對中國的崛起有疑慮的，尤其是最近黃岩島、釣魚台等領土主權爭議趨於激化；但他們在美中爭霸中的立場尷尬：因為擔心中國霸權的興起，所以希望美國不要撤出亞洲，但若太過向美國靠攏，又擔心會惹惱中國，危及經貿關係。
台灣在許多方面與亞太國家相似，經濟上沒辦法離開中國市場，在安全上卻也依賴美國，這使對外政策常陷於左右搖擺。譬如在南海爭議中，台灣雖是主權爭議的六國之一，但幾乎聽不到抗議的聲音；中國大陸不斷提出要兩岸合作，共同捍衛南海主權，但根據亞太國務助卿坎貝爾透露，美國曾經與台灣討論其南海政策，據美方的了解，台灣無論是公開或私下，都「非常、非常的小心」。至於釣魚台問題，台灣的處境尤其微妙敏感。
台灣問題是美國與中國大陸關係中最敏感棘手的問題，兩岸關係又不同於中國大陸與其他國家的雙邊關係，這也正是為什麼美國不可能邀請台灣參加環太平洋軍演的原因。美台之間其實是藉著軍售，來體現彼此之間的安全默契。在此一背景下，卸任在即的ＡＩＴ處長司徒文還批評台灣國防預算減少，導致兩岸軍力失衡；我國防部則正加緊推進戰機採購簽約程序，不願見美台關係出現波折。
這場「環太平洋」演習，顯現了美中交鋒與區域情勢的變遷，也多少影響了台美日中四邊關係的微妙氛圍。台灣也許不能亦不必有何回應，卻應面對此一變動中的複雜情勢，再次省思平衡各方的自處之道。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 12, 2012
Summary: The South China Sea dispute is heating up. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is deadlocked. The US-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises are currently under way. This is the largest scale exercise in the history of the world. Twenty-two nations are participating over a period of five weeks. All told they will mobilize 42 ships, six submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 troops.
Full Text below:
The South China Sea dispute is heating up. The Diaoyutai Islands dispute is deadlocked. The US-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercises are currently under way. This is the largest scale exercise in the history of the world. Twenty-two nations are participating over a period of five weeks. All told they will mobilize 42 ships, six submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 troops.
The original purpose of the exercise was to test the ability of the United States to work with its Asian-Pacific allies. But the current exercise tried to please everyone. The attempt to create a unified command structure was a major undertaking. Never mind actual tactical drills. From a military perspective, it means far less than exercises between the United States, Japan and South Korea. But from a political perspective it is very important indeed.
First of all, almost every country that borders the Pacific is involved in this US led exercise. Some may have only a single ship or single aircraft in the exercise. But these symbolize their military ties with Washington. Recently, while visiting Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the eastward shift of U.S. Navy forces, into the Pacific Region. The RIMPAC exercises show that Washington is determined to stay in Asia.
This exercise was initiated in 1971. It was originally aimed at the Soviet Pacific Fleet. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the exercises were cut to one every two years. Its mission became increasingly blurred. It included rounding up pirates, disaster relief, and search and rescue missions. This year however, the scale suddenly expanded. In the past, the enemy was Russia. This year, even Russia was invited to participate. Mainland China on the other hand, was not. This of course has led to speculation. Apparently Mainland China has become the enemy in the RIMPAC exercises.
Before the exercises began, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, the U.S. Pacific Combatant Commander, told interviewers in Beijing that the exercises represented Washington's policy of firmness and flexibility. The implication was that although they would conduct exercises, they would first inform Beijing that the exercises were not directed at it. Beijing accused Washington of harboring ulterior motives. But at the same time it staged a lavish reception, saying that Beijing and Washington might fight but they would not split.
When Locklear was visiting Mainland China, he said he was not concerned about war breaking out in the South China Sea. The U.S. military has an obligation to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and free passage through other waters around the world. As for territorial disputes, he said Washington does not side with any of the parties in these disputes. He hoped that the controversies will be settled peacefully. But he said he was concerned about the growth of the PLA, and whether Beijing could ensure transparency. When interviewed by the New York Times Locklear stressed that the United States hoped the rise of China would lead to a constructive partnership.
These words naturally grated on Beijing's ears. Beijing suspects that its exclusion from the RIMPAC exercises was deliberate. Washington was using the opportunity to rattle its sabers and bolster its military alliances. As a result, Beijing has accelerated trials of its aircraft carrier in Dalian naval harbor. It hopes to quickly get up to speed. It hopes to weaponize its space technology. These are all seen responses to Washington's intentions. Beijing's live fire exercises in waters near the Zhoushan Islands is seen as a rival gesture.
Most Asian-Pacific countries participating in the RIMPAC exercise have doubts about the rise of Mainland China. The Huangyan Island and Diaoyutai Islands territorial disputes have heated up. Washington and Beijing are both seeking hegemony. This leaves these Asian Pacific countries in an awkward position. They are worried about Beijing's hegemony. They hope Washington will not withdraw from Asia. But they also worry if they get too close to Washington, they may anger Beijing and undermine economic and trade relations.
In many ways the Republic of China is similar to these Asia-Pacific countries. Economically it is dependent upon the Mainland market. Militarily however, it is dependent upon Washington. This is the reason for its vacillating foreign policy. Take the South China Sea dispute. The ROC is one of six nations claiming sovereignty, But its voice remains unheard. Beijing advocates cross-Strait cooperation in defense of Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. But according to Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington has discussed its South China Sea policy with Taipei. Washington says that Taipei is "very, very careful" about the Diaoyutai Islands issue. both privately and publicly. Taipei's situation is particularly delicate and sensitive.
The fate of Taiwan remains the most sensitive and difficult problem in Washington/Beijing relations. Cross-Strait relations are different from bilateral relations between Mainland China and other countries. That is why Washington cannot invite Taipei to participate in the RIMPAC exercises. Washington/Taipei relations are actually about arms sales. Arms sales reflect a tacit understanding concerning security. Retiring AIT Director William Stanton criticized Taipei's reduced defense budget, saying it has led to a cross-Strait military imbalance. The ROC Ministry of Defense is stepping up fighter procurements. It is unwilling to see Washington/Taipei relations suffer.
The RIMPAC exercises reflect the confrontation between Washington and Beijing. They reflect changes in the regional situation. They influence the subtle four-way relationship between Taipei, Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Taipei may not be able to respond. Maybe it should not respond. But it must confront a changeable and complex situation, It must negotiate its its way through a political minefield.
廿二國環太平洋演習 未見大陸與台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.12
南海爭議方興未艾，釣魚台問題相持不下；由美國主導的「環太平洋」海上軍事演習正在進行。這場演習的規模為史上最大，共有二十二國參加，為期五周，計動員四十二艘艦艇、六艘潛艇，超過二百架飛機以及二萬五千名軍人。
軍演本來的目的，是要測試美國和亞太盟國間的作戰協同能力；但這次演習包山包海，單單要統一程序命令就大費周章，談不上實際戰術的操演，從軍事效用上來說，遠遠不及之前的美日韓三國演習，但在政治意義上卻很重要。
首先，幾乎所有濱太平洋的國家都參與這次由美國主導的演習，即使只出一艘船艦一架飛機，都象徵性地強調自己與美國的防衛關係；而美國國防部長潘尼達日前在新加坡宣示美海軍優勢兵力東移太平洋，顯係藉此次演習實際展現出美國要留在亞洲的決心。
這項演習其實始自一九七一年，原本是針對蘇聯的太平洋艦隊。蘇聯解體後，演習改為兩年舉行一次，項目越來越鬆散，只是圍捕海盜、天災救援等，但是今年規模陡然擴大，且連過去演習的假想敵俄羅斯都受邀參加，卻偏偏沒有邀請中國，這當然會引發北京猜測，中國此刻儼然成了太平洋演習的假想敵。
在演習展開前，主導的太平洋美軍司令洛克利爾到北京訪問，這是美國剛柔並濟的手法，意謂雖然將有演習，但先通報這不是針對你的；而北京雖然一方面猛烈批評美國別有用心，另一方面也盛大接待他，上演一場中美之間典型的「鬥而不破」的交手過招。
洛克利爾在中國時表示，他不擔心南海會有戰爭，美軍有保證南海的航行自由及保證於全球其他海域自由通行的義務。至於全球的領土爭議問題，美國不站在爭議的任何一方，希望爭議能和平解決；但他也表示，關切解放軍的成長，與能否確保透明度等。另在接受紐約時報訪問時又特別強調，美國只希望中國崛起能成為「我們有建設性的夥伴」。
這些話，中國聽起來當然刺耳。北京懷疑，太平洋軍演沒讓中國參加，美國就是要趁機顯示軍事實力，拉攏軍事盟友；於是，中國在大連軍港的航母連續試航，加快速度希望年底成軍，及運用太空科技於軍事方面等動作，都被解讀為因應美國意圖的行動。就在此刻，大陸正在舟山群島附近海域進行實彈演習，亦可視為分庭抗禮的姿態。
細數這些參加「環太平洋」演習的亞太國家，大多是對中國的崛起有疑慮的，尤其是最近黃岩島、釣魚台等領土主權爭議趨於激化；但他們在美中爭霸中的立場尷尬：因為擔心中國霸權的興起，所以希望美國不要撤出亞洲，但若太過向美國靠攏，又擔心會惹惱中國，危及經貿關係。
台灣在許多方面與亞太國家相似，經濟上沒辦法離開中國市場，在安全上卻也依賴美國，這使對外政策常陷於左右搖擺。譬如在南海爭議中，台灣雖是主權爭議的六國之一，但幾乎聽不到抗議的聲音；中國大陸不斷提出要兩岸合作，共同捍衛南海主權，但根據亞太國務助卿坎貝爾透露，美國曾經與台灣討論其南海政策，據美方的了解，台灣無論是公開或私下，都「非常、非常的小心」。至於釣魚台問題，台灣的處境尤其微妙敏感。
台灣問題是美國與中國大陸關係中最敏感棘手的問題，兩岸關係又不同於中國大陸與其他國家的雙邊關係，這也正是為什麼美國不可能邀請台灣參加環太平洋軍演的原因。美台之間其實是藉著軍售，來體現彼此之間的安全默契。在此一背景下，卸任在即的ＡＩＴ處長司徒文還批評台灣國防預算減少，導致兩岸軍力失衡；我國防部則正加緊推進戰機採購簽約程序，不願見美台關係出現波折。
這場「環太平洋」演習，顯現了美中交鋒與區域情勢的變遷，也多少影響了台美日中四邊關係的微妙氛圍。台灣也許不能亦不必有何回應，卻應面對此一變動中的複雜情勢，再次省思平衡各方的自處之道。
Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Diaoyutai: Uphold Territorial Sovereignty and National Dignity
Diaoyutai: Uphold Territorial Sovereignty and National Dignity
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 11, 2012
Summary: Disputes have erupted yet again over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. This has provoked protests from both Mainland China and Taiwan. Actually the Diaoyutai Defense Movement has been fraught with domestic political significance from the beginning. We must uphold our territorial sovereignty and maintain our national dignity. We must not turn Diaoyutai into a political circus. This will require political wisdom and finesse.
Full Text below:
Disputes have erupted yet again over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. This has provoked protests from both the Mainland and Taiwan. Actually the Diaoyutai Defense Movement has been fraught with domestic political significance from the beginning. We must uphold our territorial sovereignty and maintain our national dignity. We must not turn Diaoyutai into a political circus. This will require political wisdom and finesse.
For years Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan have all asserted sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. Most confrontations have been between vessels at sea. In 2008 a Japanese patrol ship sank the Taiwan vessel "Union." The ROC Coast Guard escorted Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists to the islands and enabled them to make a landing. In 2010 Japan and Mainland China ships collided. Right-wing Japanese groups have repeatedly landed on the islands and proclaimed sovereignty. Now however, the Japanese government has decided to "buy" the three Diaoyutai Islands from its "owner." This new move was promoted by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara.
The ruling Democratic Party's popularity has steadily declined. When those in power show signs of weakness, challengers soon appear. A new generation of political stars such as Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto is leading a new wave of reformers. Conservative right wingers are also uniting to topple the Democratic Party.
Shintaro Ishihara used the Diaoyutai Islands issue to check Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Ishihara announced that Tokyo intends to raise money to buy the three islands. Currently the central government is "leasing" the three islands from its "owner." So far Ishihara has received NT $30 million in donations. Ishihara is using the issue to make the Noda government appear weak, and to unite right-wing masses under his leadership. He clearly has Prime Ministerial ambitions.
Noda's popularity has been plummeting. The defection of the Ozawa faction crippled the ruling coalition in the Diet. According to the latest NHK polls, the Noda cabinet's approval rating is now at 27%. Its disapproval rating is now at a 56%. This is a record high for Noda. When political parties or politicians weaken, their confidence is low. At times like these they may be hijacked by extremists. The extremists may be a minority. But if they are vocal and know how to demagogue the issues, they can influence policy.
To avoid Diaoyutai becoming the focus of political attacks during the next Lower House election, the Noda government has decided to up the ante. To bolster its credentials as a defender of national sovereignty, Noda is scrambling to negotiate with the "owner." Panic buying has erupted. This is essentially a domestic Japanese political struggle. Diaoyutai is merely a tool.
That said, the governments on the two sides of the Strait cannot sit and do nothing. Noda is preparing to "purchase" Diaoyutai Island. President Ma Ying-jeou says that relations between Taipei and Tokyo are the best they have ever been. Nevertheless on issues of national interest and national sovereignty, Ma says "We will not yield even an inch." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China also issued a statement. It solemnly reiterated its territorial claims. Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said China will not allow its sacred territory to be bought and sold.
Actually, shortly after Ishihara announced his intention to "buy" the Diaoyutai Islands, fishing boats from the Mainland entered Diaoyutai Island waters for the first time. Moves to assert sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands escalated. Earlier this month Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists traveled to the Diaoyutai Islands on the Taiwan ship "Quanjiafu" to proclaim sovereignty. ROC Coast Guard ships accompanied them. But the Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists failed to bring along a Republic of China flag. They used a Peoples Republic of China flag to assert sovereignty. The Diaoyutai Defense Movement was already riddled with political sensitivities. This development made it even more controversial. Japan worried that the two sides were ganging up on Japan. Some on Taiwan wondered whether ROC Coast Guard ships were proclaiming sovereignty over Diaoyutai on behalf of the Chinese Mainland. The two sides of the Strait already have sovereignty disputes. Have Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists from Taiwan put the Republic of China government in a bind?
In the face of territorial disputes, the international community invariably advocates peaceful negotiated settlements. But this is pro forma lip service. In reality territorial disputes are seldom settled through negotiations. Nobody wants to do something for which there are no benefits. Nations already exercising sovereignty have no need to talk. Nations that claim sovereignty must be able to recover their territory by force. Otherwise all they can do is shout their claims. All they can do is keep the status of the disputed territory controversial, and to ensure that they are heard. Such proclamations, protests, and assertions can continue for decades. But they change nothing.
If domestic affairs are not put in order, they lead to diplomatic troubles. This is common in international politics. This was true for Argentina, which provoked the Falklands War. This is true for Noda. The national interest is many-faceted. Some interests are urgent and require immediately attention. Others involve fighting a protracted war. If one is led around by the nose by the demands of domestic politics, the nation will be difficult to govern. The ROC faces a sovereignty dispute over Diaoyutai. It must also promote exchanges and cooperation beween Taipei and Tokyo. It must weigh the two and do what it can to uphold the national interest.
社論－堅持主權尊嚴 勿讓釣魚台成政治秀場
2012-07-11 01:02
中國時報
【本報訊】
最近釣魚台群島主權爭議又起，日本首相野田佳彥決定將釣魚台列嶼「收歸國有」，引發中國大陸與台灣的反彈抗議。其實，從當年的「保釣」運動至今，釣魚台一直是個充滿內部政治意義的議題，如何維護領土主權尊嚴，同時避免釣魚台成為政治秀場，需要政治智慧的平衡拿捏。
中、日、台環繞著釣魚台的宣示主權動作，這些年來陸續不斷，大多僅止於海上船隻的對峙衝突，包括二○○八年台灣聯合號被日本巡邏艦撞沉、海巡署護送保釣人士登島、二○一○年日中撞船事件等。日本右派團體也多次登島宣示主權，但日本政府決定向地主洽談購買釣魚台的三個小島，卻是個新的動作，而這是被東京都知事石原慎太郎逼出來的。
執政的民主黨聲勢節節下滑，掌權者一旦力乏勢弱，挑戰者立即紛竄出頭。新生代政治明星大阪市知事橋下徹登高一呼，帶動要求改革的新流派；保守右派勢力也開始集結，有意組黨扳倒民主黨。
石原於是拿釣魚台來將野田一軍，宣布東京都要募款買下現由中央政府向民間租借的三座小島，至今已經收到約新台幣三千萬元捐款。石原不但藉此讓野田政府顯得護土無力又對中軟弱，還能動員右派群眾凝聚自己的人氣，顯然意在未來問鼎首相寶座。
偏偏野田聲望直直落，小澤派出走更讓執政聯盟在國會嚴重跛腳。ＮＨＫ最新民調顯示，支持野田內閣為廿七％，不支持高達五六％，創野田上台以來新高紀錄。當政黨或政治人物力量變弱、自信降低時，往往容易被極端派牽著走，即使極端派只居少數，但只要聲音大、會炒作，就能擴大政策影響力。
為了避免下屆眾議院選舉時，釣魚台問題成為攻擊焦點，野田政府於是決定加碼喊進，以在捍衛領土上表態。野田政府與石原還爭著與地主交涉，出現「搶購」的現象。很明顯的，這根本是一場日本內部的政治角力，釣魚台只是個工具。
即使如此，兩岸政府卻不能緘默以對，對於野田要買釣魚台小島，馬英九總統強調，即使台日關係現在是最好時刻，但基於民族大義和堅持國家主權，「我們一寸都不會讓步」。中華民國外交部也發表聲明，嚴正重申領土主張。中共外交部發言人劉為民則表示，中國的神聖領土絕不允許任何人拿來買賣。
其實在石原宣布要買釣魚台小島後，中國大陸的漁政船已經首度進入釣魚台海域，雙方保釣動作逐漸加溫。而本月初台灣保釣人士搭乘全家福號，在海巡艦艇戒護下赴釣魚台周邊海域宣示主權時，台灣保釣人士竟然沒有帶中華民國國旗，結果用來宣示主權的是五星旗，這讓原已充滿政治敏感性的保釣活動更具爭議。不但日本擔心兩岸在釣魚台問題上聯手抗日，台灣內部也質疑台灣的海巡船是不是去替中國大陸宣示主權。兩岸原本就有主權地位之爭，台灣保釣人士此舉，又置台灣於何地？
國際社會面對領土爭議時，都主張和平協商解決，不過這只是漂亮的場面話，事實上，領土爭議很難能靠協商解決。因為，沒好處的事沒有人想做，已經擁有統治權的國家根本沒必要談，其他宣稱有主權的國家除非有本事動武拿回土地，否則也只能三不五時喊一喊，以保持該地的爭議狀態和自己的發言地位。這些宣示、抗議、表態動作，可以持續數十年，但其實什麼事也改變不了。
內政搞不通，就在外交上惹事，在國際政治上相當常見，當年挑起福克蘭戰爭的阿根廷如此，現在的野田亦復如是。不過，國家利益存在著許多面向，有些是迫切需要立即投注心力，有些則要打持久戰，如果被政治秀牽著鼻子走，將難以維持一個平衡穩定的國家施政。台灣面對釣魚台主權爭議，以及推動台日關係交流合作之間，必須適度拿捏輕重，才能對整體國家利益作最大維護。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 11, 2012
Summary: Disputes have erupted yet again over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. This has provoked protests from both Mainland China and Taiwan. Actually the Diaoyutai Defense Movement has been fraught with domestic political significance from the beginning. We must uphold our territorial sovereignty and maintain our national dignity. We must not turn Diaoyutai into a political circus. This will require political wisdom and finesse.
Full Text below:
Disputes have erupted yet again over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided to "nationalize" the Diaoyutai Islands. This has provoked protests from both the Mainland and Taiwan. Actually the Diaoyutai Defense Movement has been fraught with domestic political significance from the beginning. We must uphold our territorial sovereignty and maintain our national dignity. We must not turn Diaoyutai into a political circus. This will require political wisdom and finesse.
For years Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan have all asserted sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands. Most confrontations have been between vessels at sea. In 2008 a Japanese patrol ship sank the Taiwan vessel "Union." The ROC Coast Guard escorted Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists to the islands and enabled them to make a landing. In 2010 Japan and Mainland China ships collided. Right-wing Japanese groups have repeatedly landed on the islands and proclaimed sovereignty. Now however, the Japanese government has decided to "buy" the three Diaoyutai Islands from its "owner." This new move was promoted by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara.
The ruling Democratic Party's popularity has steadily declined. When those in power show signs of weakness, challengers soon appear. A new generation of political stars such as Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto is leading a new wave of reformers. Conservative right wingers are also uniting to topple the Democratic Party.
Shintaro Ishihara used the Diaoyutai Islands issue to check Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Ishihara announced that Tokyo intends to raise money to buy the three islands. Currently the central government is "leasing" the three islands from its "owner." So far Ishihara has received NT $30 million in donations. Ishihara is using the issue to make the Noda government appear weak, and to unite right-wing masses under his leadership. He clearly has Prime Ministerial ambitions.
Noda's popularity has been plummeting. The defection of the Ozawa faction crippled the ruling coalition in the Diet. According to the latest NHK polls, the Noda cabinet's approval rating is now at 27%. Its disapproval rating is now at a 56%. This is a record high for Noda. When political parties or politicians weaken, their confidence is low. At times like these they may be hijacked by extremists. The extremists may be a minority. But if they are vocal and know how to demagogue the issues, they can influence policy.
To avoid Diaoyutai becoming the focus of political attacks during the next Lower House election, the Noda government has decided to up the ante. To bolster its credentials as a defender of national sovereignty, Noda is scrambling to negotiate with the "owner." Panic buying has erupted. This is essentially a domestic Japanese political struggle. Diaoyutai is merely a tool.
That said, the governments on the two sides of the Strait cannot sit and do nothing. Noda is preparing to "purchase" Diaoyutai Island. President Ma Ying-jeou says that relations between Taipei and Tokyo are the best they have ever been. Nevertheless on issues of national interest and national sovereignty, Ma says "We will not yield even an inch." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China also issued a statement. It solemnly reiterated its territorial claims. Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin said China will not allow its sacred territory to be bought and sold.
Actually, shortly after Ishihara announced his intention to "buy" the Diaoyutai Islands, fishing boats from the Mainland entered Diaoyutai Island waters for the first time. Moves to assert sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands escalated. Earlier this month Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists traveled to the Diaoyutai Islands on the Taiwan ship "Quanjiafu" to proclaim sovereignty. ROC Coast Guard ships accompanied them. But the Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists failed to bring along a Republic of China flag. They used a Peoples Republic of China flag to assert sovereignty. The Diaoyutai Defense Movement was already riddled with political sensitivities. This development made it even more controversial. Japan worried that the two sides were ganging up on Japan. Some on Taiwan wondered whether ROC Coast Guard ships were proclaiming sovereignty over Diaoyutai on behalf of the Chinese Mainland. The two sides of the Strait already have sovereignty disputes. Have Diaoyutai Defense Movement activists from Taiwan put the Republic of China government in a bind?
In the face of territorial disputes, the international community invariably advocates peaceful negotiated settlements. But this is pro forma lip service. In reality territorial disputes are seldom settled through negotiations. Nobody wants to do something for which there are no benefits. Nations already exercising sovereignty have no need to talk. Nations that claim sovereignty must be able to recover their territory by force. Otherwise all they can do is shout their claims. All they can do is keep the status of the disputed territory controversial, and to ensure that they are heard. Such proclamations, protests, and assertions can continue for decades. But they change nothing.
If domestic affairs are not put in order, they lead to diplomatic troubles. This is common in international politics. This was true for Argentina, which provoked the Falklands War. This is true for Noda. The national interest is many-faceted. Some interests are urgent and require immediately attention. Others involve fighting a protracted war. If one is led around by the nose by the demands of domestic politics, the nation will be difficult to govern. The ROC faces a sovereignty dispute over Diaoyutai. It must also promote exchanges and cooperation beween Taipei and Tokyo. It must weigh the two and do what it can to uphold the national interest.
社論－堅持主權尊嚴 勿讓釣魚台成政治秀場
2012-07-11 01:02
中國時報
【本報訊】
最近釣魚台群島主權爭議又起，日本首相野田佳彥決定將釣魚台列嶼「收歸國有」，引發中國大陸與台灣的反彈抗議。其實，從當年的「保釣」運動至今，釣魚台一直是個充滿內部政治意義的議題，如何維護領土主權尊嚴，同時避免釣魚台成為政治秀場，需要政治智慧的平衡拿捏。
中、日、台環繞著釣魚台的宣示主權動作，這些年來陸續不斷，大多僅止於海上船隻的對峙衝突，包括二○○八年台灣聯合號被日本巡邏艦撞沉、海巡署護送保釣人士登島、二○一○年日中撞船事件等。日本右派團體也多次登島宣示主權，但日本政府決定向地主洽談購買釣魚台的三個小島，卻是個新的動作，而這是被東京都知事石原慎太郎逼出來的。
執政的民主黨聲勢節節下滑，掌權者一旦力乏勢弱，挑戰者立即紛竄出頭。新生代政治明星大阪市知事橋下徹登高一呼，帶動要求改革的新流派；保守右派勢力也開始集結，有意組黨扳倒民主黨。
石原於是拿釣魚台來將野田一軍，宣布東京都要募款買下現由中央政府向民間租借的三座小島，至今已經收到約新台幣三千萬元捐款。石原不但藉此讓野田政府顯得護土無力又對中軟弱，還能動員右派群眾凝聚自己的人氣，顯然意在未來問鼎首相寶座。
偏偏野田聲望直直落，小澤派出走更讓執政聯盟在國會嚴重跛腳。ＮＨＫ最新民調顯示，支持野田內閣為廿七％，不支持高達五六％，創野田上台以來新高紀錄。當政黨或政治人物力量變弱、自信降低時，往往容易被極端派牽著走，即使極端派只居少數，但只要聲音大、會炒作，就能擴大政策影響力。
為了避免下屆眾議院選舉時，釣魚台問題成為攻擊焦點，野田政府於是決定加碼喊進，以在捍衛領土上表態。野田政府與石原還爭著與地主交涉，出現「搶購」的現象。很明顯的，這根本是一場日本內部的政治角力，釣魚台只是個工具。
即使如此，兩岸政府卻不能緘默以對，對於野田要買釣魚台小島，馬英九總統強調，即使台日關係現在是最好時刻，但基於民族大義和堅持國家主權，「我們一寸都不會讓步」。中華民國外交部也發表聲明，嚴正重申領土主張。中共外交部發言人劉為民則表示，中國的神聖領土絕不允許任何人拿來買賣。
其實在石原宣布要買釣魚台小島後，中國大陸的漁政船已經首度進入釣魚台海域，雙方保釣動作逐漸加溫。而本月初台灣保釣人士搭乘全家福號，在海巡艦艇戒護下赴釣魚台周邊海域宣示主權時，台灣保釣人士竟然沒有帶中華民國國旗，結果用來宣示主權的是五星旗，這讓原已充滿政治敏感性的保釣活動更具爭議。不但日本擔心兩岸在釣魚台問題上聯手抗日，台灣內部也質疑台灣的海巡船是不是去替中國大陸宣示主權。兩岸原本就有主權地位之爭，台灣保釣人士此舉，又置台灣於何地？
國際社會面對領土爭議時，都主張和平協商解決，不過這只是漂亮的場面話，事實上，領土爭議很難能靠協商解決。因為，沒好處的事沒有人想做，已經擁有統治權的國家根本沒必要談，其他宣稱有主權的國家除非有本事動武拿回土地，否則也只能三不五時喊一喊，以保持該地的爭議狀態和自己的發言地位。這些宣示、抗議、表態動作，可以持續數十年，但其實什麼事也改變不了。
內政搞不通，就在外交上惹事，在國際政治上相當常見，當年挑起福克蘭戰爭的阿根廷如此，現在的野田亦復如是。不過，國家利益存在著許多面向，有些是迫切需要立即投注心力，有些則要打持久戰，如果被政治秀牽著鼻子走，將難以維持一個平衡穩定的國家施政。台灣面對釣魚台主權爭議，以及推動台日關係交流合作之間，必須適度拿捏輕重，才能對整體國家利益作最大維護。
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
ECA Strategy Blueprint: Delayed Points of Light
ECA Strategy Blueprint: Delayed Points of Light
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2012
Summary: Taiwan will be integrated into the regional economy. The roadmap showing how is about to be published. The temporary name for the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) promotion and action plan is the "ECA Strategic Blueprint." It is the product of years of studies on how to participate in regional economic integration. It will become our declaration to the outside world. It will become our mission statement to our fellow citizens. It will become the framework that guides our implementation. The government's free trade agreement (FTA) policies can also be implemented this way. Such a step is crucial to Taiwan's economic and trade policies.
Full Text below:
Taiwan will be integrated into the regional economy. The roadmap showing how is about to be published. The temporary name for the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) promotion and action plan is the "ECA Strategic Blueprint." It is the product of years of studies on how to participate in regional economic integration. It will become our declaration to the outside world. It will become our mission statement to our fellow citizens. It will become the framework that guides our implementation. The government's free trade agreement (FTA) policies can also be implemented this way. Such a step is crucial to Taiwan's economic and trade policies.
The ECA strategic blueprint being prepared echoes the proposals of this newspaper's Vision Workshop. On the 17th of last month, this newspaper's Vision Workshop issued its special report entitled, "Two Critical Years: Taiwan Fast Forwards." It also convened a "Two Critical Years: Paving the Way for Taiwan's Economic Future" economic summit on the 25th of last month. It called upon the government to respond proactively to the global wave of FTA signings, to establish an overall strategy, and to promote free markets. It called on the government to report on its progress on a regular basis. Less than ten days later, Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-hsiang said he would announce the ECA Strategy Blueprint. This prompt response deserves special affirmation. But society has greater expectations.
The fact is this strategic blueprint is tardy. Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration began in 1989, when it joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC). More recently global trade liberalization shifted from multilateral consultations to bilateral consultations. This was due to slow progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of negotiations, launched at the end of 2001. Since then various forms of regional integration such as bilateral FTAs, ASEAN+N, ECAs, and others have appeared. In mid-August 2003, Korea announced its FTA Roadmap, (FTA blueprint), a full nine years before us. Consider our actual progress. In 2009 we began consultations on the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). This was our most important step down the road to FTAs. But there has been no follow-up. No significant progress has been made over the past three years.
Taking it slow is okay. Grinding to a halt is not. The strategic blueprint must acknowledge that we are a relative latecomer. We must make up for lost time and for lost opportunities. To achieve such ambitious goals, our strategic blueprint must declare its intention to the outside world. It must inspire fellow citizens at home. It must be clearly defined. Only then can it break through the limitations of its existing framework. Only then can it swiftly yield visible results. Only then can it make up ten years of lost time in two years.
Consider it a declaration to the outside world. According to the ECA Strategy Blueprint we will first sign agreements with countries with which we have the largest trade volume. We will adopt a strategy of simultaneously promoting FTAs, making multiple contacts, and signing FTAs one by one. Given these goals, our highest priority is follow-up consultations on ECFA. Next are the United States, Singapore, New Zealand, and other core trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) countries. After that are Japan, the EU, India, and Indonesia. Such a negotiation path accords with public perception. It is also our current restructuring. The central government has proclaimed it as a national goal. This enables our international allies to better understand our thinking and our needs.
Such a declaration can only yield limited results. After all, the decision is in other hands, not our own. The nations we have listed as our top priority, do not necessarily consider us their top priority. If the two sides fail to reach an agreement, then no further progress can be made. Therefore this strategic blueprint is not merely a path. It is also a "point of light" that must attract other countries and persuade them to sign with us. This is our best approach to regional economic integration. This approach could not be clearer. As the international gateway to the Mainland China market, follow up consultations on ECFA are essential.
The second "point of light" in the strategic blueprint is internal cohesion. The government is planning to promote an ECA signing work program. It will require various agencies to conduct an inventory of economic and trade liberalization policies. It will attempt to understand, narrow, and remedy the domestic and foreign policy gap. Its name makes no difference. This program is domestically oriented. This is especially true for the executive branch program. It will determine how the Government promotes ECA, and the speed and the force that it exerts. This is up to us. It is how we demonstrate our desire to promote ECA. It is how we increase international recognition. As a result, this "point of light" must be bright. The program must be specific. The sharper its focus the better.
The third "point of light" pertains to executive branch implementation. The executive branch has been trumpeting FTAs for years. But it has little to show. President Ma has declared that he will personally lead the FTA promotion group. But FTAs involve far too many administrative details. President Ma may be sincere, but will probably be unable to deliver on his promise. Therefore he must establish an administrative system equivalent to the cross-ministry mechanisms required to join WTO. The aforementioned work program is essential to realizing our strategic blueprint.
ECA策略藍圖：後發先至的亮點
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.10
台灣第一張加入「區域經濟整合」的路徑圖（roadmap）即將公布，這項暫以「ＥＣＡ策略藍圖」為名的「經濟合作協議」（ＥＣＡ）推動暨行動計畫，是政府爭取加入區域經濟整合多年以來首度研擬，將成為對外宣示、對內聚力、整合執行的最高指導綱領，政府的「自由貿易協定」（ＦＴＡ）政策也可望由此全面啟動，誠是台灣經貿政策極具關鍵意義的一步。
正在緊密籌劃的「ＥＣＡ策略藍圖」，呼應了本報系願景工程的主張。自上月十七日起，本報系願景工作室先推出「關鍵兩年‧台灣快轉」跨國專題報導，再於廿五日舉行「關鍵兩年──為台灣經濟開路」高峰會，呼籲政府積極因應全球ＦＴＡ風起雲湧之情勢，訂立整體策略，推動市場開放，並期望政府定期提出進度報告。不到十天，經濟部長施顏祥即表示，將會很快對外公布ＥＣＡ策略藍圖，此一迅速回應殊值肯定，但社會對其有更多的期待。
不可諱言，這份策略藍圖來得遲了一些。追溯台灣參與區域經濟整合活動，早自一九八九年加入亞太經濟合作會議（ＡＰＥＣ）就已開始；即使拉近一點，全球經貿自由化從多邊協商走向雙邊化，則是源於世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）於二○○一年底啟動杜哈（Doha）回合談判遲無進展的結果，自此之後各種形式的區域整合如雙邊ＦＴＡ、東協＋Ｎ、ＥＣＡ等大量出現，韓國更在二○○三年八月發表「ＦＴＡ Roadmap」（ＦＴＡ藍圖），足足比台灣早了九年；再依實際進展言，二○○九年啟動協商的兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）可說是開啟台灣ＦＴＡ之路的最重要起步，但後續行動仍未見整合，以致三年來未見太大進展。
不怕慢，只怕站。研訂中的策略藍圖必須有「後發先至」的企圖心，以追回此前蹉跎流失的時間與機會。而要達成這樣的積極性目標，策略藍圖必須在對外宣示、對內聚力、整合執行等三方面有清楚的定位，方有可能突破既有的框架與限制，快速取得可見的成果，以關鍵兩年彌補失落十年。
在對外宣示上，依ＥＣＡ策略藍圖的初步規劃，將選定與我貿易量大的國家，列為優先洽簽ＥＣＡ目標，以「同時推動、多元接觸、逐一協商」的策略推進。依此目標，兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續協商最優先，其次是美國、新加坡及紐西蘭等跨太平洋經濟夥伴協議（ＴＰＰ）核心國家，再次是日本、歐盟及印度、印尼等。這樣的洽談路徑符合一般社會認知，也是目前推動實況的重整，且因提升至國家宣示層次，可以讓國際盟友更精準地了解台灣的需求與想法。
只是，此一宣示能夠獲得多少的成果，畢竟是「受制於人」而非操之在我，因為我們列為優先洽簽的國家，不一定也把台灣列為優先，若兩相不合意，也就走不下去。因此，這項策略藍圖不只是條路徑，更須有吸引他國將台灣列入優先洽簽名單的「亮點」，其一即是台灣在區域經濟整合的最佳定位，而這個定位也再清楚不過，就是做為國際進軍中國大陸市場的門戶，ＥＣＦＡ後續協商的完整化即屬必要。
策略藍圖的「亮點」之二，則是在對內聚力上，目前政府規劃將之訂為「推動洽簽ＥＣＡ工作綱領」，將要求各部門進行經貿自由化的政策盤點、了解國內外的政策落差、縮小落差的開放對策，以及相應的配套作為。無論名稱為何，這項面向國內、尤其是行政部門的綱領，將決定政府推動ＥＣＡ的方向、速度與力道，不只是「可操之在己」，更可由此實質展現台灣推動ＥＣＡ的成果與誠意，向外提升國際認同。也因此，這個「亮點」要夠亮，綱領內容應是愈具體、愈聚焦愈好。
第三個「亮點」繫乎執行力。政策高喊ＦＴＡ多年，但乏善可陳，馬總統雖曾宣示將親自領軍ＦＴＡ小組推動，但畢竟ＦＴＡ涉及太多行政面的執行細節，馬總統縱有心亦無力，因而必須在行政體系組建相當於加入ＷＴＯ規格的跨部會推動機制，以落實前述工作綱領的要求，這是欲實現策略藍圖不可或缺的一項。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2012
Summary: Taiwan will be integrated into the regional economy. The roadmap showing how is about to be published. The temporary name for the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) promotion and action plan is the "ECA Strategic Blueprint." It is the product of years of studies on how to participate in regional economic integration. It will become our declaration to the outside world. It will become our mission statement to our fellow citizens. It will become the framework that guides our implementation. The government's free trade agreement (FTA) policies can also be implemented this way. Such a step is crucial to Taiwan's economic and trade policies.
Full Text below:
Taiwan will be integrated into the regional economy. The roadmap showing how is about to be published. The temporary name for the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) promotion and action plan is the "ECA Strategic Blueprint." It is the product of years of studies on how to participate in regional economic integration. It will become our declaration to the outside world. It will become our mission statement to our fellow citizens. It will become the framework that guides our implementation. The government's free trade agreement (FTA) policies can also be implemented this way. Such a step is crucial to Taiwan's economic and trade policies.
The ECA strategic blueprint being prepared echoes the proposals of this newspaper's Vision Workshop. On the 17th of last month, this newspaper's Vision Workshop issued its special report entitled, "Two Critical Years: Taiwan Fast Forwards." It also convened a "Two Critical Years: Paving the Way for Taiwan's Economic Future" economic summit on the 25th of last month. It called upon the government to respond proactively to the global wave of FTA signings, to establish an overall strategy, and to promote free markets. It called on the government to report on its progress on a regular basis. Less than ten days later, Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-hsiang said he would announce the ECA Strategy Blueprint. This prompt response deserves special affirmation. But society has greater expectations.
The fact is this strategic blueprint is tardy. Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration began in 1989, when it joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (APEC). More recently global trade liberalization shifted from multilateral consultations to bilateral consultations. This was due to slow progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of negotiations, launched at the end of 2001. Since then various forms of regional integration such as bilateral FTAs, ASEAN+N, ECAs, and others have appeared. In mid-August 2003, Korea announced its FTA Roadmap, (FTA blueprint), a full nine years before us. Consider our actual progress. In 2009 we began consultations on the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). This was our most important step down the road to FTAs. But there has been no follow-up. No significant progress has been made over the past three years.
Taking it slow is okay. Grinding to a halt is not. The strategic blueprint must acknowledge that we are a relative latecomer. We must make up for lost time and for lost opportunities. To achieve such ambitious goals, our strategic blueprint must declare its intention to the outside world. It must inspire fellow citizens at home. It must be clearly defined. Only then can it break through the limitations of its existing framework. Only then can it swiftly yield visible results. Only then can it make up ten years of lost time in two years.
Consider it a declaration to the outside world. According to the ECA Strategy Blueprint we will first sign agreements with countries with which we have the largest trade volume. We will adopt a strategy of simultaneously promoting FTAs, making multiple contacts, and signing FTAs one by one. Given these goals, our highest priority is follow-up consultations on ECFA. Next are the United States, Singapore, New Zealand, and other core trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) countries. After that are Japan, the EU, India, and Indonesia. Such a negotiation path accords with public perception. It is also our current restructuring. The central government has proclaimed it as a national goal. This enables our international allies to better understand our thinking and our needs.
Such a declaration can only yield limited results. After all, the decision is in other hands, not our own. The nations we have listed as our top priority, do not necessarily consider us their top priority. If the two sides fail to reach an agreement, then no further progress can be made. Therefore this strategic blueprint is not merely a path. It is also a "point of light" that must attract other countries and persuade them to sign with us. This is our best approach to regional economic integration. This approach could not be clearer. As the international gateway to the Mainland China market, follow up consultations on ECFA are essential.
The second "point of light" in the strategic blueprint is internal cohesion. The government is planning to promote an ECA signing work program. It will require various agencies to conduct an inventory of economic and trade liberalization policies. It will attempt to understand, narrow, and remedy the domestic and foreign policy gap. Its name makes no difference. This program is domestically oriented. This is especially true for the executive branch program. It will determine how the Government promotes ECA, and the speed and the force that it exerts. This is up to us. It is how we demonstrate our desire to promote ECA. It is how we increase international recognition. As a result, this "point of light" must be bright. The program must be specific. The sharper its focus the better.
The third "point of light" pertains to executive branch implementation. The executive branch has been trumpeting FTAs for years. But it has little to show. President Ma has declared that he will personally lead the FTA promotion group. But FTAs involve far too many administrative details. President Ma may be sincere, but will probably be unable to deliver on his promise. Therefore he must establish an administrative system equivalent to the cross-ministry mechanisms required to join WTO. The aforementioned work program is essential to realizing our strategic blueprint.
ECA策略藍圖：後發先至的亮點
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.10
台灣第一張加入「區域經濟整合」的路徑圖（roadmap）即將公布，這項暫以「ＥＣＡ策略藍圖」為名的「經濟合作協議」（ＥＣＡ）推動暨行動計畫，是政府爭取加入區域經濟整合多年以來首度研擬，將成為對外宣示、對內聚力、整合執行的最高指導綱領，政府的「自由貿易協定」（ＦＴＡ）政策也可望由此全面啟動，誠是台灣經貿政策極具關鍵意義的一步。
正在緊密籌劃的「ＥＣＡ策略藍圖」，呼應了本報系願景工程的主張。自上月十七日起，本報系願景工作室先推出「關鍵兩年‧台灣快轉」跨國專題報導，再於廿五日舉行「關鍵兩年──為台灣經濟開路」高峰會，呼籲政府積極因應全球ＦＴＡ風起雲湧之情勢，訂立整體策略，推動市場開放，並期望政府定期提出進度報告。不到十天，經濟部長施顏祥即表示，將會很快對外公布ＥＣＡ策略藍圖，此一迅速回應殊值肯定，但社會對其有更多的期待。
不可諱言，這份策略藍圖來得遲了一些。追溯台灣參與區域經濟整合活動，早自一九八九年加入亞太經濟合作會議（ＡＰＥＣ）就已開始；即使拉近一點，全球經貿自由化從多邊協商走向雙邊化，則是源於世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）於二○○一年底啟動杜哈（Doha）回合談判遲無進展的結果，自此之後各種形式的區域整合如雙邊ＦＴＡ、東協＋Ｎ、ＥＣＡ等大量出現，韓國更在二○○三年八月發表「ＦＴＡ Roadmap」（ＦＴＡ藍圖），足足比台灣早了九年；再依實際進展言，二○○九年啟動協商的兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）可說是開啟台灣ＦＴＡ之路的最重要起步，但後續行動仍未見整合，以致三年來未見太大進展。
不怕慢，只怕站。研訂中的策略藍圖必須有「後發先至」的企圖心，以追回此前蹉跎流失的時間與機會。而要達成這樣的積極性目標，策略藍圖必須在對外宣示、對內聚力、整合執行等三方面有清楚的定位，方有可能突破既有的框架與限制，快速取得可見的成果，以關鍵兩年彌補失落十年。
在對外宣示上，依ＥＣＡ策略藍圖的初步規劃，將選定與我貿易量大的國家，列為優先洽簽ＥＣＡ目標，以「同時推動、多元接觸、逐一協商」的策略推進。依此目標，兩岸ＥＣＦＡ後續協商最優先，其次是美國、新加坡及紐西蘭等跨太平洋經濟夥伴協議（ＴＰＰ）核心國家，再次是日本、歐盟及印度、印尼等。這樣的洽談路徑符合一般社會認知，也是目前推動實況的重整，且因提升至國家宣示層次，可以讓國際盟友更精準地了解台灣的需求與想法。
只是，此一宣示能夠獲得多少的成果，畢竟是「受制於人」而非操之在我，因為我們列為優先洽簽的國家，不一定也把台灣列為優先，若兩相不合意，也就走不下去。因此，這項策略藍圖不只是條路徑，更須有吸引他國將台灣列入優先洽簽名單的「亮點」，其一即是台灣在區域經濟整合的最佳定位，而這個定位也再清楚不過，就是做為國際進軍中國大陸市場的門戶，ＥＣＦＡ後續協商的完整化即屬必要。
策略藍圖的「亮點」之二，則是在對內聚力上，目前政府規劃將之訂為「推動洽簽ＥＣＡ工作綱領」，將要求各部門進行經貿自由化的政策盤點、了解國內外的政策落差、縮小落差的開放對策，以及相應的配套作為。無論名稱為何，這項面向國內、尤其是行政部門的綱領，將決定政府推動ＥＣＡ的方向、速度與力道，不只是「可操之在己」，更可由此實質展現台灣推動ＥＣＡ的成果與誠意，向外提升國際認同。也因此，這個「亮點」要夠亮，綱領內容應是愈具體、愈聚焦愈好。
第三個「亮點」繫乎執行力。政策高喊ＦＴＡ多年，但乏善可陳，馬總統雖曾宣示將親自領軍ＦＴＡ小組推動，但畢竟ＦＴＡ涉及太多行政面的執行細節，馬總統縱有心亦無力，因而必須在行政體系組建相當於加入ＷＴＯ規格的跨部會推動機制，以落實前述工作綱領的要求，這是欲實現策略藍圖不可或缺的一項。
Monday, July 9, 2012
KMT and DPP Must Get Back to TIFA
KMT and DPP Must Get Back to TIFA
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2012
Summary: The DPP has agreed to allow the importation of U.S. beef in accordance with international standards. The sole remaining obstacle to Taipei and Washington signing TIFA has been eliminated. This is the beginning of KMT and DPP consensus on TIFA. The Republic of China is under threat, both from within and without. The KMT and DPP must work together to defend the Republic of China and to save the nation. They can begin with TIFA.
Full Text below:
The DPP has agreed to allow the importation of U.S. beef in accordance with international standards. The sole remaining obstacle to Taipei and Washington signing TIFA has been eliminated. This is the beginning of KMT and DPP consensus on TIFA. Its significance is twofold.
One. TIFA (Taiwan-US Trade Investment Framework Agreement) may be the only major national policy proposal that the DPP is not determined to block to the bitter end. When ECFA was signed the DPP denounced it as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." It blocked it to the bitter end. But meetings over TIFA began during the Chen Shui-bian era. The DPP is not about to object to improved Taipei-Washington relations. It has no reason to object.
Two. If TIFA is signed, economic and trade relations between Taipei and Washington will improve. More importantly, so will political relations. If TIFA goes smoothly, Taipei will find it easier to sign other FTAs. Looking further ahead, TIFA may pave the way for Taipei to participate in the TPP (Pan-Pacific Partnership). It may enable Taiwan to become a Free Trade Island. Therefore, TIFA is not merely a step that will improve relations between Taipei and Washington. It is an important first step for Taipei's global strategy.
In other words, if Taipei's goal is to make Taiwan a "Free Trade Island" then it must proceed from ECFA to TIFA to other FTAs to the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone to TPP to a Free Trade Island. This is the step by step path it must take. This path has three meanings for Taiwan.
One. Taiwan has lost its way. TIFA will restore long-lost hope. The public will finally have a long range goal. A Free Trade Island will offer the public a vision everyone can work toward. It will show the way to achieve this goal. TIFA is the key.
Two. This goal and this path can change Taiwan. Taiwan has long been the victim of internal political bickering. TIFA can give Taiwan an economic perspective and an economic goal. It can offer a clear path. TIFA is the key.
Three. Joining the TPP wiil enable Taiwan to become a Free Trade Island. It will resolve Taiwan's economic and trade problems. It will show the way we must take. More importantly, it is the only way Taiwan can avoid marginalization on the international stage. The inevitable consequence of trade and economic marginalization is political marginalization. Taipei must use TPP and Taiwan's status as a Free Trade Island to become part of the international trade system. This will integrate it into the international security system. TIFA is the key.
In sum, we hope that the KMT and DPP will promptly end months of internal bickering. The signing of TIFA can be the basis for cooperation. Let us go from ECFA to TIFA to other FTAs to the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone to TPP to a Free Trade Island. Let this path be the basis by which political parties compete. Let the parties forgo the vicious infighting that results in wheel-spinning. Competition between political parties will of course continue to compete. But one must know for what and for whom one is fighting for. We are fighting for Taiwan. We want it to become a Free Trade Island.
The Democratic Progressive Party is in coopetition with the KMT. It can play an important role. One. The DPP must not oppose TIFA. But it can safeguard Taiwan's interests during negotiations. Two. TIFA's political and economic basis is the same as the political and economic basis for ECFA, other FTAs, the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone, TPP, and a Free Trade Island. Since the DPP supports TIFA, it must not oppose this underlying political and economic basis. Three. Cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust is an important basis for this system. Therefore the DPP must confront this system. It must rethink its cross-strait policy.
Finally, we solemly suggest that such a path may be the only political and economic way out. It is a difficult path, one fraught with risk. Becoming a Free Trade Island requires, in Vincent Siew's words, liberalizing the economic environment while upgrading the industrial structure. This is no easy task. But if the economic environment is not liberalized, we cannot become competitive. Our industrial structure will not be of high enough quality. It will not be able to withstand the competition. Therefore, the KMT and the DPP must confront this situation. They must reach a consensus. One. This path requires bipartisanship. Two. The two parties must reach a bipartisan consensus on cross-Strait policy. .
The Republic of China is under threat, both from within and without. The KMT and DPP must work together to defend the Republic of China and to save the nation. They can begin with TIFA.
國民兩黨速速回到TIFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.07
民進黨宣布將依「國際標準」開放美牛，台美議簽TIFA的唯一障礙已然解除，此際正是國、民兩黨共同面對TIFA的開端，其主要意義有二：
一、TIFA（台美貿易投資架構協定）可能是民進黨唯一不至於全盤否定與全盤杯葛的國家重大政策。不像ECFA議簽之時，民進黨斥為「傾中賣台」，全力反對；而TIFA則始議自扁政府時代，民進黨不至於反對改善台美關係，無反對的理由。
二、如果簽成TIFA，非但可使台美經貿關係升級，亦將使台美的政治關係更趨改善。且TIFA若進行順利，對於台灣議簽其他「類FTA」（類自由貿易協定）亦有指標作用；再向前推，則是為台灣參加TPP（泛太平洋夥伴關係）預作鋪墊，並指向將台灣建設為「自由經貿島」。因此，TIFA不只是改善台美關係的一個動作，更可視為台灣全球佈局的一個重要起步。
也就是說，台灣若以「自由經貿島」為目標，則ECFA↓TIFA↓類FTA↓高雄自由經濟示範區↓TPP↓自由經貿島，即是必須一步一腳印地走下去的路徑圖。而此一路徑圖，對台灣又有三大意義：
一、這將使得久已失去憧憬、迷失了方向的台灣，終於找到了一個終極的「目標」或「志向」，即「自由經貿島」；亦即找到了一個全民可以共同努力的前景，並畫出了通向此前景的路徑，而TIFA正是關鍵性的一步。
二、此一目標及路徑，將可改變台灣一向糾纏於政治內耗之中，並以政治來綑綁自己的困局；轉而改以經濟的觀點來標定台灣的目標，並指出明確的路徑，而TIFA則是關鍵性的一步。
三、參加TPP、將台灣建設為自由經貿島，不但是解決台灣經貿難題的必趨及應趨之路，更是若欲使台灣在國際政治上不致流於邊緣化的唯一方案。因為，經貿邊緣化，帶來的後果必定就是政治邊緣化；而台灣如果能以TPP、自由經貿島融入國際經貿體系，也就是形同相當程度的融入了國際安全體系，而TIFA更是關鍵性的一步。
綜上所論，我們寄望國、民兩黨速速收拾起幾個月來內耗空轉的亂局，何妨就以TIFA的議簽做為攜手努力的第一個合作題材，共同將台灣引上ECFA↓TIFA↓類FTA↓高雄自由經濟示範區↓TPP↓自由經貿島的路徑之上；今後即以此一路徑，作為政黨競合關係的準據，勿再陷於歪纏惡鬥的內耗空轉之中。如此，政黨之間當然仍有競爭，唯也會知道為何而戰，為誰而戰，即是為台灣走向「自由經貿島」的路徑而戰。
民進黨在此一競合關係中，尤可擔負重要角色。因為：一、民進黨不可能反對TIFA，且反而可以在議簽過程中扮演守護台灣利益的監督者。二、TIFA所代表的政經思維，其實就是ECFA、類FTA、高雄自由經濟示範區、TPP，及自由經貿島等一致且一貫的政經思維；民進黨若支持TIFA，即不可能反對這整個的政經思維體系。三、兩岸的善意及互信，是此一體系的重要基礎，因此，民進黨面對此一體系，就不能不調整其兩岸政策。
最後，我們必須十分嚴肅地說，這一個路徑圖可能是台灣唯一的政經出路，但這條路徑卻十分艱難且充滿風險。在邁向自由經貿島的過程中，如何兼顧「經濟環境自由化／產業結構優質化」（蕭萬長語），絕非易事。經濟環境不自由化，就無法建立競爭力；產業結構不優質化，就禁不起競爭。因此，國民兩黨面對此一情勢，最基本的共同態度應是：一、在此一路徑圖上，必須有「兩黨一致」（bipartisanship）的共識；二、首先，必須建立兩岸政策的「兩黨一致」。
內憂外患，台灣危矣。希望國民兩黨同心協力保台救國，就從一起速速回到TIFA做起！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2012
Summary: The DPP has agreed to allow the importation of U.S. beef in accordance with international standards. The sole remaining obstacle to Taipei and Washington signing TIFA has been eliminated. This is the beginning of KMT and DPP consensus on TIFA. The Republic of China is under threat, both from within and without. The KMT and DPP must work together to defend the Republic of China and to save the nation. They can begin with TIFA.
Full Text below:
The DPP has agreed to allow the importation of U.S. beef in accordance with international standards. The sole remaining obstacle to Taipei and Washington signing TIFA has been eliminated. This is the beginning of KMT and DPP consensus on TIFA. Its significance is twofold.
One. TIFA (Taiwan-US Trade Investment Framework Agreement) may be the only major national policy proposal that the DPP is not determined to block to the bitter end. When ECFA was signed the DPP denounced it as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." It blocked it to the bitter end. But meetings over TIFA began during the Chen Shui-bian era. The DPP is not about to object to improved Taipei-Washington relations. It has no reason to object.
Two. If TIFA is signed, economic and trade relations between Taipei and Washington will improve. More importantly, so will political relations. If TIFA goes smoothly, Taipei will find it easier to sign other FTAs. Looking further ahead, TIFA may pave the way for Taipei to participate in the TPP (Pan-Pacific Partnership). It may enable Taiwan to become a Free Trade Island. Therefore, TIFA is not merely a step that will improve relations between Taipei and Washington. It is an important first step for Taipei's global strategy.
In other words, if Taipei's goal is to make Taiwan a "Free Trade Island" then it must proceed from ECFA to TIFA to other FTAs to the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone to TPP to a Free Trade Island. This is the step by step path it must take. This path has three meanings for Taiwan.
One. Taiwan has lost its way. TIFA will restore long-lost hope. The public will finally have a long range goal. A Free Trade Island will offer the public a vision everyone can work toward. It will show the way to achieve this goal. TIFA is the key.
Two. This goal and this path can change Taiwan. Taiwan has long been the victim of internal political bickering. TIFA can give Taiwan an economic perspective and an economic goal. It can offer a clear path. TIFA is the key.
Three. Joining the TPP wiil enable Taiwan to become a Free Trade Island. It will resolve Taiwan's economic and trade problems. It will show the way we must take. More importantly, it is the only way Taiwan can avoid marginalization on the international stage. The inevitable consequence of trade and economic marginalization is political marginalization. Taipei must use TPP and Taiwan's status as a Free Trade Island to become part of the international trade system. This will integrate it into the international security system. TIFA is the key.
In sum, we hope that the KMT and DPP will promptly end months of internal bickering. The signing of TIFA can be the basis for cooperation. Let us go from ECFA to TIFA to other FTAs to the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone to TPP to a Free Trade Island. Let this path be the basis by which political parties compete. Let the parties forgo the vicious infighting that results in wheel-spinning. Competition between political parties will of course continue to compete. But one must know for what and for whom one is fighting for. We are fighting for Taiwan. We want it to become a Free Trade Island.
The Democratic Progressive Party is in coopetition with the KMT. It can play an important role. One. The DPP must not oppose TIFA. But it can safeguard Taiwan's interests during negotiations. Two. TIFA's political and economic basis is the same as the political and economic basis for ECFA, other FTAs, the Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone, TPP, and a Free Trade Island. Since the DPP supports TIFA, it must not oppose this underlying political and economic basis. Three. Cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust is an important basis for this system. Therefore the DPP must confront this system. It must rethink its cross-strait policy.
Finally, we solemly suggest that such a path may be the only political and economic way out. It is a difficult path, one fraught with risk. Becoming a Free Trade Island requires, in Vincent Siew's words, liberalizing the economic environment while upgrading the industrial structure. This is no easy task. But if the economic environment is not liberalized, we cannot become competitive. Our industrial structure will not be of high enough quality. It will not be able to withstand the competition. Therefore, the KMT and the DPP must confront this situation. They must reach a consensus. One. This path requires bipartisanship. Two. The two parties must reach a bipartisan consensus on cross-Strait policy. .
The Republic of China is under threat, both from within and without. The KMT and DPP must work together to defend the Republic of China and to save the nation. They can begin with TIFA.
國民兩黨速速回到TIFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.07
民進黨宣布將依「國際標準」開放美牛，台美議簽TIFA的唯一障礙已然解除，此際正是國、民兩黨共同面對TIFA的開端，其主要意義有二：
一、TIFA（台美貿易投資架構協定）可能是民進黨唯一不至於全盤否定與全盤杯葛的國家重大政策。不像ECFA議簽之時，民進黨斥為「傾中賣台」，全力反對；而TIFA則始議自扁政府時代，民進黨不至於反對改善台美關係，無反對的理由。
二、如果簽成TIFA，非但可使台美經貿關係升級，亦將使台美的政治關係更趨改善。且TIFA若進行順利，對於台灣議簽其他「類FTA」（類自由貿易協定）亦有指標作用；再向前推，則是為台灣參加TPP（泛太平洋夥伴關係）預作鋪墊，並指向將台灣建設為「自由經貿島」。因此，TIFA不只是改善台美關係的一個動作，更可視為台灣全球佈局的一個重要起步。
也就是說，台灣若以「自由經貿島」為目標，則ECFA↓TIFA↓類FTA↓高雄自由經濟示範區↓TPP↓自由經貿島，即是必須一步一腳印地走下去的路徑圖。而此一路徑圖，對台灣又有三大意義：
一、這將使得久已失去憧憬、迷失了方向的台灣，終於找到了一個終極的「目標」或「志向」，即「自由經貿島」；亦即找到了一個全民可以共同努力的前景，並畫出了通向此前景的路徑，而TIFA正是關鍵性的一步。
二、此一目標及路徑，將可改變台灣一向糾纏於政治內耗之中，並以政治來綑綁自己的困局；轉而改以經濟的觀點來標定台灣的目標，並指出明確的路徑，而TIFA則是關鍵性的一步。
三、參加TPP、將台灣建設為自由經貿島，不但是解決台灣經貿難題的必趨及應趨之路，更是若欲使台灣在國際政治上不致流於邊緣化的唯一方案。因為，經貿邊緣化，帶來的後果必定就是政治邊緣化；而台灣如果能以TPP、自由經貿島融入國際經貿體系，也就是形同相當程度的融入了國際安全體系，而TIFA更是關鍵性的一步。
綜上所論，我們寄望國、民兩黨速速收拾起幾個月來內耗空轉的亂局，何妨就以TIFA的議簽做為攜手努力的第一個合作題材，共同將台灣引上ECFA↓TIFA↓類FTA↓高雄自由經濟示範區↓TPP↓自由經貿島的路徑之上；今後即以此一路徑，作為政黨競合關係的準據，勿再陷於歪纏惡鬥的內耗空轉之中。如此，政黨之間當然仍有競爭，唯也會知道為何而戰，為誰而戰，即是為台灣走向「自由經貿島」的路徑而戰。
民進黨在此一競合關係中，尤可擔負重要角色。因為：一、民進黨不可能反對TIFA，且反而可以在議簽過程中扮演守護台灣利益的監督者。二、TIFA所代表的政經思維，其實就是ECFA、類FTA、高雄自由經濟示範區、TPP，及自由經貿島等一致且一貫的政經思維；民進黨若支持TIFA，即不可能反對這整個的政經思維體系。三、兩岸的善意及互信，是此一體系的重要基礎，因此，民進黨面對此一體系，就不能不調整其兩岸政策。
最後，我們必須十分嚴肅地說，這一個路徑圖可能是台灣唯一的政經出路，但這條路徑卻十分艱難且充滿風險。在邁向自由經貿島的過程中，如何兼顧「經濟環境自由化／產業結構優質化」（蕭萬長語），絕非易事。經濟環境不自由化，就無法建立競爭力；產業結構不優質化，就禁不起競爭。因此，國民兩黨面對此一情勢，最基本的共同態度應是：一、在此一路徑圖上，必須有「兩黨一致」（bipartisanship）的共識；二、首先，必須建立兩岸政策的「兩黨一致」。
內憂外患，台灣危矣。希望國民兩黨同心協力保台救國，就從一起速速回到TIFA做起！
Thursday, July 5, 2012
President Ma's Declarations are Not Enough
President Ma's Declarations are Not Enough
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2012
Summary: The Lin Yi-shi corruption case has dealt a major blow to President Ma's reputation. Public approval has plummeted to a new low of 15%. The Special Investigation Unit took immediate action and worked on the case for several days straight. But if the Ma administration wants to reverse the decline, it must take more convincing action. Only then can it re-unite the people, and restore national morale.
Full Text below:
The Lin Yi-shi corruption case has dealt a major blow to President Ma's reputation. Public approval has plummeted to a new low of 15%. The Special Investigation Unit took immediate action and worked on the case for several days straight. But if the Ma administration wants to reverse the decline, it must take more convincing action. Only then can it re-unite the people, and restore national morale.
Lin Yi-shi abused his power as Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan to engage in corruption. He was immediately taken into custody. Clearly, the justice system has greater independence than before. But Ma Ying-jeou promoted Lin Yi-shi repeatedly. He contributed to LIn's unbridled arrogance. He is going to have a hard time avoiding ridicule for being a poor judge of character who was easily deceived. Turning everything over to the justice system will not make this go away. Superficially the matter pertains to Lin Yi-shi alone. But the Ma administration has stumbled repeatedly. The Lin corruption scandal has further undermined the Ma administration's prestige and popularity. This is what the ruling administration should concentrate on during this crisis.
President Ma has attempted to cope with the crisis, internally and externally, for several days. But the public senses little determination to turn the tide. One. When Ma first learned that a news magazine had blown the scandal wide open, he asked Lin Yi-shi to hold a press conference and explain himself. Nothing more. This made Ma look gullible and passive. Two. Ma subsequently issued a series of public apologies. But none came across as sincere, including his admonition that administration personnel should "learn a lesson from this." Ma's spin was disingenuous. It implied that he had nothing to do with it. Three. Ma's responses to any criticisms of his administration have never been convincing, Reciting "clean government" slogans merely reveals the impotence behind his good intentions.
Now in particular, dangers await. The affairs of state are overwhelming. Yet President Ma persists in his pro forma itinerary, giving speechs everywhere. He even presented certificates to comrades in the Central Standing Committee. He failed to allocate time to matters of state, or strengthen his resolve on national policy. Instead he shuttled back and forth, squandering valuable time on trivialities. Can this restore lost confidence in President Ma?
This does not mean a president must never participate in civic activities. It merely means he must reorder his priorities and make intelligent choices. If the nation's political and economic goals still need sorting out, yet leaders devote their time and energy to pro forma political speeches, how can they possibly rally the people to action?
Why was a corrupt martinet like Lin Yi-shi seen as a political golden boy? Beginning with Ma's first term. critics have repeatedly urged Ma to widen the circles from which he draws his staff and policy makers. They have urged him to listen more to suggestions from his presidential advisors, national policy advisors, and community leaders. President Ma loves giving talks before small groups. This has never changed. President Ma, when was the last time you heard this admonition? Do you remember who it was who gave you this advice?
President Ma is an honest man. He has integrity. Of this we need have no doubt. But honesty and integrity are personal virtues. To be a national leader in the public sector requires more. That is the gap that President Ma must fill. This involves three keys. One. The desire to lead must be transformed into concrete action. One cannot simply make ringing declarations and leave it at that. Ma Ying-jeou's political training has led to an over-reliance on political declarations, accompanied by a lack of actual follow-through. He must not muddle through a second four-year term. Otherwise he will accomplish nothing. Two. Ma must have a sense of urgency. Taiwan has been immoblized by internal bickering for years. Stronger leadership is required to lead the country out of its morass. President Ma must pick up the pace. He must break the deadlock. Otherwise, society will remain paralyzed by feelings of impotence, and the national nightmare will never end. Three. Ma must be willing to share power and delegate authority. A nation's development must not depend upon a single head of state. He must transcend partisanship and make the best use of human talent. If Ma continues to rely on his tiny circle of decision-makers things are unlikely to take a turn for the better.
President Ma is too much of a conformist. This cannot be denied. It has hampered his efforts at reform. It has made it hard to implement groundbreaking policies. Even more regrettable are Lin Yi-shi's corruption scandals. These have undermined the Ma administration's image. They have shown President Ma to be a poor judge of character. This is a crisis of governance, both for Ma's party and for the Ma administration. If the Ma administration merely parrots its anti-corruption declaration, or passively waits for the Special Investigation Unit to announce its findings, it cannot mollify public anger and disappointment. The Lin corruption scandal was a slap in Ma's face. President Ma must act to restore his reputation. Otherwise he can forget about any historical legacy.
馬總統的宣示不足回應社會期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.06
受林益世貪瀆案影響，馬總統原已捉襟見肘的聲望再受重挫，民意支持度已降至一成五之新低。儘管特偵組偵辦行動連日皆有斬獲，但馬政府若要扭轉頹勢，勢必拿出更具說服力的實際行動，才能重新凝聚民心、振作國家士氣。
林益世以行政院祕書長之高位涉貪，旋即遭到羈押，顯示司法之獨立性已日漸建立。但從政治面看，馬英九過去對林益世的不次拔擢，助長其驕恣氣焰，實難脫「識人不明」及「易受欺矇」之譏，這恐非一句「一切交給司法」即可交代。亦即，此案表面上是林益世個人操守問題，但在馬政府施政連連失利之際，這對執政團隊的領導威望及人民望治心切之情都是雪上加霜，這才應是主政者面對此一危機的著眼點。
然而，從馬總統連日對內對外的因應，人們卻看不到他展現雄心、力挽狂瀾的方法。第一，他最初得悉雜誌將爆料弊案，僅要求林益世開記者會說明，顯得輕信而被動。第二，他其後連續公開道歉都顯得誠意不足，包括要求執政團隊「記取教訓」，語意失準，彷彿自己還可以置身事外。第三，他回應外界質疑始終缺乏力量，反覆宣示幾句「清廉執政」口號，至少暴露其心餘力絀。
尤其，在此危機四伏、國事如麻之際，馬總統照舊每天進行一些非關緊要的儀式性參訪行程，到處致詞演說，包括頒發中常委證書給從政同志。不把寶貴的時間用來思考國是，為治國大政沉澱心志，卻穿梭在細瑣的行程中虛耗時光，馬總統如何挽回他失去的民心？
這並不是說總統不該參加民間活動，而是必須權衡輕重緩急而有所選擇。如果國家政經大計正待全力衝刺整合，而領導人卻把時間和心思花在一些行禮如儀的事務上，每天發表一些無足輕重的演說，如何號召全民行動？
為什麼一個貪瀆跋扈的林益世，竟被當成政治金童重用？從上屆任期開始，輿論要求他擴大選才圈及決策圈的建言即不曾間斷，包括應多聽取資政、國策顧問乃至社會賢能之士的建言，但馬總統樂在小場合演說的習慣始終未改。請問馬總統：你上一次聽到諫言是什麼時候的事？你又記得誰的什麼忠告？
馬總統是個廉潔、正直的人，這點毋需懷疑。但無論如何，廉潔正直只是個人修養的範疇，這和在公領域成為一個好的國家領導人還有很大的距離，那正是馬總統必須設法填補的差距。其中有三個重要關鍵：一，是要將領導的心志具體化為「行動」，不能停格在「宣示」的層次。馬英九的從政訓練導致他過度倚賴宣示，行動力和執行力相對不足；這點，在第二個四年任期不能再含糊以對，否則將一事無成。二，要有時間的迫切感。台灣陷於內耗多年，必須要強而有魄力的領導，才能帶國家走出泥淖；馬總統必須加快腳步打破僵滯之局，否則社會一直被無力感糾纏，人民將噩夢不斷。三，要有分享及下放權力的氣度。國家發展不可能只靠元首一人，他必須超越黨派格局善用人才，若局限在小決策圈中反覆用同一套思維處事，將難有轉機。
不可諱言，馬總統過度循規蹈矩的作風，多少拘礙了他力圖改革的腳步，也因此不易推動開創性的決策。更遺憾的是，林益世的貪瀆弊案，不僅重創了馬團隊形象，也暴露了馬總統的昧於知人，這是他的黨、政雙危機。因此，馬政府若只是重申反貪宣示，或在那裡消極坐待特偵組的調查，皆不足以回應社會大眾的憤怒和失望。面對這樣的迎頭痛擊，馬總統若還不知道要拿出行動挽回聲望，那還能奢談歷史定位嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2012
Summary: The Lin Yi-shi corruption case has dealt a major blow to President Ma's reputation. Public approval has plummeted to a new low of 15%. The Special Investigation Unit took immediate action and worked on the case for several days straight. But if the Ma administration wants to reverse the decline, it must take more convincing action. Only then can it re-unite the people, and restore national morale.
Full Text below:
The Lin Yi-shi corruption case has dealt a major blow to President Ma's reputation. Public approval has plummeted to a new low of 15%. The Special Investigation Unit took immediate action and worked on the case for several days straight. But if the Ma administration wants to reverse the decline, it must take more convincing action. Only then can it re-unite the people, and restore national morale.
Lin Yi-shi abused his power as Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan to engage in corruption. He was immediately taken into custody. Clearly, the justice system has greater independence than before. But Ma Ying-jeou promoted Lin Yi-shi repeatedly. He contributed to LIn's unbridled arrogance. He is going to have a hard time avoiding ridicule for being a poor judge of character who was easily deceived. Turning everything over to the justice system will not make this go away. Superficially the matter pertains to Lin Yi-shi alone. But the Ma administration has stumbled repeatedly. The Lin corruption scandal has further undermined the Ma administration's prestige and popularity. This is what the ruling administration should concentrate on during this crisis.
President Ma has attempted to cope with the crisis, internally and externally, for several days. But the public senses little determination to turn the tide. One. When Ma first learned that a news magazine had blown the scandal wide open, he asked Lin Yi-shi to hold a press conference and explain himself. Nothing more. This made Ma look gullible and passive. Two. Ma subsequently issued a series of public apologies. But none came across as sincere, including his admonition that administration personnel should "learn a lesson from this." Ma's spin was disingenuous. It implied that he had nothing to do with it. Three. Ma's responses to any criticisms of his administration have never been convincing, Reciting "clean government" slogans merely reveals the impotence behind his good intentions.
Now in particular, dangers await. The affairs of state are overwhelming. Yet President Ma persists in his pro forma itinerary, giving speechs everywhere. He even presented certificates to comrades in the Central Standing Committee. He failed to allocate time to matters of state, or strengthen his resolve on national policy. Instead he shuttled back and forth, squandering valuable time on trivialities. Can this restore lost confidence in President Ma?
This does not mean a president must never participate in civic activities. It merely means he must reorder his priorities and make intelligent choices. If the nation's political and economic goals still need sorting out, yet leaders devote their time and energy to pro forma political speeches, how can they possibly rally the people to action?
Why was a corrupt martinet like Lin Yi-shi seen as a political golden boy? Beginning with Ma's first term. critics have repeatedly urged Ma to widen the circles from which he draws his staff and policy makers. They have urged him to listen more to suggestions from his presidential advisors, national policy advisors, and community leaders. President Ma loves giving talks before small groups. This has never changed. President Ma, when was the last time you heard this admonition? Do you remember who it was who gave you this advice?
President Ma is an honest man. He has integrity. Of this we need have no doubt. But honesty and integrity are personal virtues. To be a national leader in the public sector requires more. That is the gap that President Ma must fill. This involves three keys. One. The desire to lead must be transformed into concrete action. One cannot simply make ringing declarations and leave it at that. Ma Ying-jeou's political training has led to an over-reliance on political declarations, accompanied by a lack of actual follow-through. He must not muddle through a second four-year term. Otherwise he will accomplish nothing. Two. Ma must have a sense of urgency. Taiwan has been immoblized by internal bickering for years. Stronger leadership is required to lead the country out of its morass. President Ma must pick up the pace. He must break the deadlock. Otherwise, society will remain paralyzed by feelings of impotence, and the national nightmare will never end. Three. Ma must be willing to share power and delegate authority. A nation's development must not depend upon a single head of state. He must transcend partisanship and make the best use of human talent. If Ma continues to rely on his tiny circle of decision-makers things are unlikely to take a turn for the better.
President Ma is too much of a conformist. This cannot be denied. It has hampered his efforts at reform. It has made it hard to implement groundbreaking policies. Even more regrettable are Lin Yi-shi's corruption scandals. These have undermined the Ma administration's image. They have shown President Ma to be a poor judge of character. This is a crisis of governance, both for Ma's party and for the Ma administration. If the Ma administration merely parrots its anti-corruption declaration, or passively waits for the Special Investigation Unit to announce its findings, it cannot mollify public anger and disappointment. The Lin corruption scandal was a slap in Ma's face. President Ma must act to restore his reputation. Otherwise he can forget about any historical legacy.
馬總統的宣示不足回應社會期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.06
受林益世貪瀆案影響，馬總統原已捉襟見肘的聲望再受重挫，民意支持度已降至一成五之新低。儘管特偵組偵辦行動連日皆有斬獲，但馬政府若要扭轉頹勢，勢必拿出更具說服力的實際行動，才能重新凝聚民心、振作國家士氣。
林益世以行政院祕書長之高位涉貪，旋即遭到羈押，顯示司法之獨立性已日漸建立。但從政治面看，馬英九過去對林益世的不次拔擢，助長其驕恣氣焰，實難脫「識人不明」及「易受欺矇」之譏，這恐非一句「一切交給司法」即可交代。亦即，此案表面上是林益世個人操守問題，但在馬政府施政連連失利之際，這對執政團隊的領導威望及人民望治心切之情都是雪上加霜，這才應是主政者面對此一危機的著眼點。
然而，從馬總統連日對內對外的因應，人們卻看不到他展現雄心、力挽狂瀾的方法。第一，他最初得悉雜誌將爆料弊案，僅要求林益世開記者會說明，顯得輕信而被動。第二，他其後連續公開道歉都顯得誠意不足，包括要求執政團隊「記取教訓」，語意失準，彷彿自己還可以置身事外。第三，他回應外界質疑始終缺乏力量，反覆宣示幾句「清廉執政」口號，至少暴露其心餘力絀。
尤其，在此危機四伏、國事如麻之際，馬總統照舊每天進行一些非關緊要的儀式性參訪行程，到處致詞演說，包括頒發中常委證書給從政同志。不把寶貴的時間用來思考國是，為治國大政沉澱心志，卻穿梭在細瑣的行程中虛耗時光，馬總統如何挽回他失去的民心？
這並不是說總統不該參加民間活動，而是必須權衡輕重緩急而有所選擇。如果國家政經大計正待全力衝刺整合，而領導人卻把時間和心思花在一些行禮如儀的事務上，每天發表一些無足輕重的演說，如何號召全民行動？
為什麼一個貪瀆跋扈的林益世，竟被當成政治金童重用？從上屆任期開始，輿論要求他擴大選才圈及決策圈的建言即不曾間斷，包括應多聽取資政、國策顧問乃至社會賢能之士的建言，但馬總統樂在小場合演說的習慣始終未改。請問馬總統：你上一次聽到諫言是什麼時候的事？你又記得誰的什麼忠告？
馬總統是個廉潔、正直的人，這點毋需懷疑。但無論如何，廉潔正直只是個人修養的範疇，這和在公領域成為一個好的國家領導人還有很大的距離，那正是馬總統必須設法填補的差距。其中有三個重要關鍵：一，是要將領導的心志具體化為「行動」，不能停格在「宣示」的層次。馬英九的從政訓練導致他過度倚賴宣示，行動力和執行力相對不足；這點，在第二個四年任期不能再含糊以對，否則將一事無成。二，要有時間的迫切感。台灣陷於內耗多年，必須要強而有魄力的領導，才能帶國家走出泥淖；馬總統必須加快腳步打破僵滯之局，否則社會一直被無力感糾纏，人民將噩夢不斷。三，要有分享及下放權力的氣度。國家發展不可能只靠元首一人，他必須超越黨派格局善用人才，若局限在小決策圈中反覆用同一套思維處事，將難有轉機。
不可諱言，馬總統過度循規蹈矩的作風，多少拘礙了他力圖改革的腳步，也因此不易推動開創性的決策。更遺憾的是，林益世的貪瀆弊案，不僅重創了馬團隊形象，也暴露了馬總統的昧於知人，這是他的黨、政雙危機。因此，馬政府若只是重申反貪宣示，或在那裡消極坐待特偵組的調查，皆不足以回應社會大眾的憤怒和失望。面對這樣的迎頭痛擊，馬總統若還不知道要拿出行動挽回聲望，那還能奢談歷史定位嗎？
End Blue vs. Green Enmity: Taiwan Needs Unity
End Blue vs. Green Enmity: Taiwan Needs Unity
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2012
Summary: At a recent forum, National Federation of Industries Chairman Rock Hsu said Taiwan's economy is drowning. What he meant was that people on Taiwan are like drowning men clutching at each other. The result is they drag each other down, and society as a whole sinks to the bottom even faster. Recently, two Blue Camp mayors shook hands, saying they hold no grudges, they merely want unity. What Taiwan needs is unity even if one still holds a grudge. On the world stage there must be no Blue or Green, there must only be Taiwan.
Full Text below:
At a recent forum, National Federation of Industries Chairman Rock Hsu said Taiwan's economy is drowning. What he meant was that people on Taiwan are like drowning men clutching at each other. The result is they drag each other down, and society as a whole sinks to the bottom even faster.
Rock Hsu said when he was younger, he almost drowned. A classmate jumped in the water to save him. But in his panic, Hsu desperately grabbed onto his classmate for dear life. As a result, they both sank and almost drowned. Hsu cited his own experience as a metaphor for Taiwan. His remark may strike a chord in many people. But to be honest, the situation on Taiwan is worse than what Rock Hsu described. A drowning man will frantically grab whoever is next to him out of blind desperation. But on Taiwan the motive is often different. On Taiwan, it is often a desire to take others down, to exploit them. It is less a desire to seek escape than a desire to drag others down, trip others up, and hold others back. This pattern of behavior merely ensures that everyone drowns and no one survives.
A drowning man does not deliberately drag someone else down with him. His is a reflex action. But Blue vs. Green infighting, ruling vs. opposition party infighting, and partisan infighting are "cost be damned" efforts to destroy each other. Unfortunately, the cost is often borne by the public. It often sacrifices the nation's prosperity and the peoples' well-being. Taiwan's situation could be likened to the Russo-Japanese War. Between 1904 and 1905, the Japanese Empire and the Russian Empire fought each other in Manchu-ruled China. The Qing government specially designated a war zone. The Japanese won. But statistics show that the Russo-Japanese War caused 20,000 Chinese civilian casualties, and property damage equivalent to 69 million catties of silver. The local Manchus could not help but lament, "The victorious Japanese rejoiced. The defeated Russians celebrated."
There is a popular expression in the Minan dialect, "Others eat rice noodles. I shout burn!" It means that there is no point in getting excited over things that have nothing to do with you. The Russo-Japanese War was a case of "Others eat rice noodles. I shout burn!" The "I" in Blue vs. Green confrontation on Taiwan today, is you, me, and him. Taiwan was once first among the Four Asian Tigers. Now it is the last. Taiwan once walked with its head up. Now it walks with its head down. Taiwan was once the "Taiwan Economic Miracle." Now it is the "Taiwan Joke." Taiwan was once the "Avenger Union." Now it is the "Voyage to Paradise." Who has been injured, traumatized, victimized, if not everyone on Taiwan?
Together we have experienced dramatic changes over the past two decades. These two decades are lost to us forever. During these two decades, the world turned upside down. On Taiwan, fundamental internal and external changes took place, simultaneously. Starting salaries for university graduates remained unchanged for two decades. In other words, during all that time, there was zero growth. But how did this happen? Andy Grove, former Intel CEO, said businesses inevitably undergo a period during which suddenly the situation is different, and things have changed. This is usually when a company is facing a strategic turning point. Grove said, "There is at least one point in the history of any company when you have to change dramatically to rise to the next level of performance. Miss that moment - and you start to decline." Grove pointed out that businesses encounter four strategic inflection points. One. Senior management experiences cognitive dissonance because the company has stopped growing but has no idea why. Two. Entrepreneurs smugly assume they are doing certain things. In fact they are unwittingly doing something else entirely. Three. Chaos pervades the company. Employees cling to their jobs. Disputes rage without end. Four. Faced with such circumstances, middle and upper management are utterly impotent and utterly clueless.
This is the situation on Taiwan today. Grove was not saying that when these phenomena appear the company is doomed. He was merely reminding entrepreneurs that when a company detects these signals it means that the old tricks, the old strategies, and the old choices are no longer viable. Therefore they must be rethought. Therefore a new strategy is needed. Every business, every country faces different challenges at different stages. The important point is that amidst panic entrepreneurs must detect the strategic turning points, and negotiate the turns.
Taiwan's problems require more than the wisdom of its businessmen. Its political leadership needs wisdom as well. The habit of internal bickering leads to results even worse than those experienced by a drowning man. Polarization has permeated political views, social class, party affiliation, even individual lifestyles. An obvious example is widespread anti-business sentiment and hatred for the rich. Many people have unconsciously adopted an attitude of "Schadenfreude" toward others.
Recently, two Blue Camp mayors shook hands, saying they hold no grudges, they merely want unity. What Taiwan needs is unity even if one still holds a grudge. On the world stage there must be no Blue or Green, there must only be Taiwan.
破除藍綠心結 台灣需要大團結
2012-07-01
中國時報
全國工業總會理事長許勝雄日前在一個論壇上表示，他認為台灣經濟已進入「溺水式的困境」。意思是說，台灣現在就如同溺水的人一般地互相拉扯，造成了整個社會更快速、更嚴重的陷溺。
許勝雄說，他少年時曾經溺水，當時有位同學跳下水去救他，而他把同學視為唯一的希望，就不顧一切地死命抱住同學，結果造成兩人一同向下沉淪。許勝雄以自己的經驗比喻台灣，這番描述可能會讓很多人心有戚戚；不過，老實講，台灣的現狀可能比許勝雄所形容的還要更不好。畢竟溺水的人之所以會瘋狂地抓住旁邊的人，往往是出於一種求生本能，但是看看台灣的情況，互相抵消、消耗的人，與其說是想要給自己求一條生路，不如說是更想要困住、絆住、扯住對方；這種行為模式，最終會連自己都游不出去。
溺水者並沒有想要讓對方滅頂的意思，但台灣的藍綠對立、朝野對立、政黨對立，卻是要「不計一切代價」地毀滅對方。不幸的是，所謂的不計一切代價，往往就是指犧牲國家發展與人民福祉。台灣的處境就像當年的日俄戰爭。一九○四、一九○五年間，日本帝國和俄羅斯帝國在中國（清朝滿州）的土地上打仗，清朝政府為這場戰爭專門劃出了一塊交戰區，最後日本取得勝利；然而，據統計，日俄戰爭造成中國平民傷亡兩萬人，財產損失折合白銀六千九百萬兩。當地的滿州人不禁發出悲嘆：「日勝何喜，俄敗何欣。」
台語有句俗諺說：「別人吃米粉，我喊燒！」形容事不關己的熱心沒有意義，當年的日俄戰爭卻是「別人吃米粉，我被燒」。今天台灣的藍綠大對抗裡的「我」，就是你、就是我、就是他！台灣從亞洲四小龍之首變成之尾、之外；從「走路有風」變成「走路漏風」；從「台灣奇蹟」變成「台灣滑稽」；從「海角一樂園」變成「復仇者聯盟」，受傷、受創、受害的，豈不正是台灣的每一個人嗎？
我們一同經歷劇烈變動的二十年、「回不去了」的二十年！這二十年時間裡，世界出現天翻地覆的變化，台灣也出現了根本性的變化，內、外變化加在一起，最具體的結果就是台灣的大學畢業生的起薪近二十年沒有變化，意思是沒有成長。然而，這一切，究竟是怎麼發生的呢？前英特爾總裁葛洛夫說，企業總有一段時間會感覺到「欸，情況不一樣了，事情變了。」通常這就是企業面臨「策略轉折點」的時刻；他的名言是：「如果無法順利通過轉折點，企業便會在越過高峰之後，往下滑落。」葛洛夫指出，企業出現策略轉折點的情境有四：一，經營階層感到煩亂，因為公司業績無法成長，但卻又說不出確切的原因；二，經營者以為自己是在做某些事情，然而，實際上卻是另一回事；三，公司內部混亂，團隊成員各持已見、紛爭不斷；四，面對現狀，中高階層經理人一籌莫展，無計可施。
感覺起來，這些情況跟現在的台灣很類似，不過，葛洛夫並不是認為當出現這些現象時，這家公司就完蛋了，而是提醒經營者，一旦公司有這些訊號，那就表示「過去的招數、策略、選擇，已經不管用了」，因此要思考、提出新的策略。每個企業、每個國家都可能在不同的階段面臨不同的挑戰，重點是在經歷一段慌亂的時光之後，經營者能不能明確抓住策略轉折點，並在轉折中再次躍進。
台灣的問題當然不只是國家經營者智慧、領導力有待提升，內部互相消耗的慣性，帶來結果可能比溺水者更糟糕。從政治立場到社會階層、從政黨到生活，台灣的對立甚至已滲透到深層意識，「反商」、「仇富」只是其中比較明顯例子，可能很多人已在不知不覺中養成了「見不得別人好」的價值觀。
日前，兩位藍營的五都首長握手言歡，表示彼此間「沒有心結、只有團結」。其實，台灣更需要的是「就算有心結也要團結」的氣度與格局。要知道，在世界的舞台上，沒有藍綠，只有台灣。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2012
Summary: At a recent forum, National Federation of Industries Chairman Rock Hsu said Taiwan's economy is drowning. What he meant was that people on Taiwan are like drowning men clutching at each other. The result is they drag each other down, and society as a whole sinks to the bottom even faster. Recently, two Blue Camp mayors shook hands, saying they hold no grudges, they merely want unity. What Taiwan needs is unity even if one still holds a grudge. On the world stage there must be no Blue or Green, there must only be Taiwan.
Full Text below:
At a recent forum, National Federation of Industries Chairman Rock Hsu said Taiwan's economy is drowning. What he meant was that people on Taiwan are like drowning men clutching at each other. The result is they drag each other down, and society as a whole sinks to the bottom even faster.
Rock Hsu said when he was younger, he almost drowned. A classmate jumped in the water to save him. But in his panic, Hsu desperately grabbed onto his classmate for dear life. As a result, they both sank and almost drowned. Hsu cited his own experience as a metaphor for Taiwan. His remark may strike a chord in many people. But to be honest, the situation on Taiwan is worse than what Rock Hsu described. A drowning man will frantically grab whoever is next to him out of blind desperation. But on Taiwan the motive is often different. On Taiwan, it is often a desire to take others down, to exploit them. It is less a desire to seek escape than a desire to drag others down, trip others up, and hold others back. This pattern of behavior merely ensures that everyone drowns and no one survives.
A drowning man does not deliberately drag someone else down with him. His is a reflex action. But Blue vs. Green infighting, ruling vs. opposition party infighting, and partisan infighting are "cost be damned" efforts to destroy each other. Unfortunately, the cost is often borne by the public. It often sacrifices the nation's prosperity and the peoples' well-being. Taiwan's situation could be likened to the Russo-Japanese War. Between 1904 and 1905, the Japanese Empire and the Russian Empire fought each other in Manchu-ruled China. The Qing government specially designated a war zone. The Japanese won. But statistics show that the Russo-Japanese War caused 20,000 Chinese civilian casualties, and property damage equivalent to 69 million catties of silver. The local Manchus could not help but lament, "The victorious Japanese rejoiced. The defeated Russians celebrated."
There is a popular expression in the Minan dialect, "Others eat rice noodles. I shout burn!" It means that there is no point in getting excited over things that have nothing to do with you. The Russo-Japanese War was a case of "Others eat rice noodles. I shout burn!" The "I" in Blue vs. Green confrontation on Taiwan today, is you, me, and him. Taiwan was once first among the Four Asian Tigers. Now it is the last. Taiwan once walked with its head up. Now it walks with its head down. Taiwan was once the "Taiwan Economic Miracle." Now it is the "Taiwan Joke." Taiwan was once the "Avenger Union." Now it is the "Voyage to Paradise." Who has been injured, traumatized, victimized, if not everyone on Taiwan?
Together we have experienced dramatic changes over the past two decades. These two decades are lost to us forever. During these two decades, the world turned upside down. On Taiwan, fundamental internal and external changes took place, simultaneously. Starting salaries for university graduates remained unchanged for two decades. In other words, during all that time, there was zero growth. But how did this happen? Andy Grove, former Intel CEO, said businesses inevitably undergo a period during which suddenly the situation is different, and things have changed. This is usually when a company is facing a strategic turning point. Grove said, "There is at least one point in the history of any company when you have to change dramatically to rise to the next level of performance. Miss that moment - and you start to decline." Grove pointed out that businesses encounter four strategic inflection points. One. Senior management experiences cognitive dissonance because the company has stopped growing but has no idea why. Two. Entrepreneurs smugly assume they are doing certain things. In fact they are unwittingly doing something else entirely. Three. Chaos pervades the company. Employees cling to their jobs. Disputes rage without end. Four. Faced with such circumstances, middle and upper management are utterly impotent and utterly clueless.
This is the situation on Taiwan today. Grove was not saying that when these phenomena appear the company is doomed. He was merely reminding entrepreneurs that when a company detects these signals it means that the old tricks, the old strategies, and the old choices are no longer viable. Therefore they must be rethought. Therefore a new strategy is needed. Every business, every country faces different challenges at different stages. The important point is that amidst panic entrepreneurs must detect the strategic turning points, and negotiate the turns.
Taiwan's problems require more than the wisdom of its businessmen. Its political leadership needs wisdom as well. The habit of internal bickering leads to results even worse than those experienced by a drowning man. Polarization has permeated political views, social class, party affiliation, even individual lifestyles. An obvious example is widespread anti-business sentiment and hatred for the rich. Many people have unconsciously adopted an attitude of "Schadenfreude" toward others.
Recently, two Blue Camp mayors shook hands, saying they hold no grudges, they merely want unity. What Taiwan needs is unity even if one still holds a grudge. On the world stage there must be no Blue or Green, there must only be Taiwan.
破除藍綠心結 台灣需要大團結
2012-07-01
中國時報
全國工業總會理事長許勝雄日前在一個論壇上表示，他認為台灣經濟已進入「溺水式的困境」。意思是說，台灣現在就如同溺水的人一般地互相拉扯，造成了整個社會更快速、更嚴重的陷溺。
許勝雄說，他少年時曾經溺水，當時有位同學跳下水去救他，而他把同學視為唯一的希望，就不顧一切地死命抱住同學，結果造成兩人一同向下沉淪。許勝雄以自己的經驗比喻台灣，這番描述可能會讓很多人心有戚戚；不過，老實講，台灣的現狀可能比許勝雄所形容的還要更不好。畢竟溺水的人之所以會瘋狂地抓住旁邊的人，往往是出於一種求生本能，但是看看台灣的情況，互相抵消、消耗的人，與其說是想要給自己求一條生路，不如說是更想要困住、絆住、扯住對方；這種行為模式，最終會連自己都游不出去。
溺水者並沒有想要讓對方滅頂的意思，但台灣的藍綠對立、朝野對立、政黨對立，卻是要「不計一切代價」地毀滅對方。不幸的是，所謂的不計一切代價，往往就是指犧牲國家發展與人民福祉。台灣的處境就像當年的日俄戰爭。一九○四、一九○五年間，日本帝國和俄羅斯帝國在中國（清朝滿州）的土地上打仗，清朝政府為這場戰爭專門劃出了一塊交戰區，最後日本取得勝利；然而，據統計，日俄戰爭造成中國平民傷亡兩萬人，財產損失折合白銀六千九百萬兩。當地的滿州人不禁發出悲嘆：「日勝何喜，俄敗何欣。」
台語有句俗諺說：「別人吃米粉，我喊燒！」形容事不關己的熱心沒有意義，當年的日俄戰爭卻是「別人吃米粉，我被燒」。今天台灣的藍綠大對抗裡的「我」，就是你、就是我、就是他！台灣從亞洲四小龍之首變成之尾、之外；從「走路有風」變成「走路漏風」；從「台灣奇蹟」變成「台灣滑稽」；從「海角一樂園」變成「復仇者聯盟」，受傷、受創、受害的，豈不正是台灣的每一個人嗎？
我們一同經歷劇烈變動的二十年、「回不去了」的二十年！這二十年時間裡，世界出現天翻地覆的變化，台灣也出現了根本性的變化，內、外變化加在一起，最具體的結果就是台灣的大學畢業生的起薪近二十年沒有變化，意思是沒有成長。然而，這一切，究竟是怎麼發生的呢？前英特爾總裁葛洛夫說，企業總有一段時間會感覺到「欸，情況不一樣了，事情變了。」通常這就是企業面臨「策略轉折點」的時刻；他的名言是：「如果無法順利通過轉折點，企業便會在越過高峰之後，往下滑落。」葛洛夫指出，企業出現策略轉折點的情境有四：一，經營階層感到煩亂，因為公司業績無法成長，但卻又說不出確切的原因；二，經營者以為自己是在做某些事情，然而，實際上卻是另一回事；三，公司內部混亂，團隊成員各持已見、紛爭不斷；四，面對現狀，中高階層經理人一籌莫展，無計可施。
感覺起來，這些情況跟現在的台灣很類似，不過，葛洛夫並不是認為當出現這些現象時，這家公司就完蛋了，而是提醒經營者，一旦公司有這些訊號，那就表示「過去的招數、策略、選擇，已經不管用了」，因此要思考、提出新的策略。每個企業、每個國家都可能在不同的階段面臨不同的挑戰，重點是在經歷一段慌亂的時光之後，經營者能不能明確抓住策略轉折點，並在轉折中再次躍進。
台灣的問題當然不只是國家經營者智慧、領導力有待提升，內部互相消耗的慣性，帶來結果可能比溺水者更糟糕。從政治立場到社會階層、從政黨到生活，台灣的對立甚至已滲透到深層意識，「反商」、「仇富」只是其中比較明顯例子，可能很多人已在不知不覺中養成了「見不得別人好」的價值觀。
日前，兩位藍營的五都首長握手言歡，表示彼此間「沒有心結、只有團結」。其實，台灣更需要的是「就算有心結也要團結」的氣度與格局。要知道，在世界的舞台上，沒有藍綠，只有台灣。
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