Appointment of Tien Hung-mao and James Huang Reflect Tsai Ing-wen's Strategic Confusion

Appointment of Tien Hung-mao and James Huang 
Reflect Tsai Ing-wen's Strategic Confusion
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 6, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional relations and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. Chiang Shun-nan will not longer be appointed Representative to Singapore, due to his arrest for drunk driving. His position will be filled by New Southern Strategy Office Chief James Huang. Both individuals are experienced, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Full Text Below:

The Tsai government has been in office nearly 100 days. Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional relations and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. Chiang Shun-nan will not longer be appointed Representative to Singapore, due to his arrest for drunk driving. His position will be filled by New Southern Strategy Office Chief James Huang. Both individuals are experienced, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Personnel appointments must be guided by strategic vision. They are the means by which strategic visions are realized. These appointments reflect Tsai Ing-wen's lack of strategic vision.

First take cross-Strait relations. President Tsai refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, yet insists the two sides must maintain the status quo. Her appointees to the MAC and SEF may not be able to break the cross-Strait deadlock. But they must at least avoid worsening cross-Strait relations. The appointment of Katharine Chang as MAC Chairwoman was announced before May 20. Her appointment would not have provoked the Mainland. She was a relatively safe choice. For the same reason, James Soong or Wang Jin-pyng was slated to become SEF Chairman. But Tsai Ing-wen dragged her feet and refused to give the Mainland a straight answer. Eventually both Soong and Wang turned down this figurehead position.

The SEF Chairmanship appointment has been delayed 100 days. Instead of progressing, cross-Strait relations have regressed. A long string of incidents have touched sensitive nerves. They include the launching of a Hsiung Feng III missile in the direction of the Mainland, the South China Sea arbitration “ruling”, the deaths of Mainland tourists in a tour bus fire, and the Kenyan telecommunications fraud controversy. Add to this the new government's plummeting approval ratings and political pressure from Taiwan independence elements. The result was President Tsai promptly caved in and appointed green oriented Tien Hung-mao as SEF Chairman to appease Taiwan independence elements. Years ago, Tien Hung-mao reportedly drove Koo Kuan-min all over the US, helping him promote Taiwan independence. Today, a photo of him with former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin hangs in his office. Katherine Chang called his appointment “a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland”. But whether the other side will see it that way is another matter.

Put bluntly, frozen cross-Strait relations, broken cross-Strait connections, and stalled cross-Strait negotiations, have little to do with SEF and MAC appointments. The real problem is that Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, and hopes the Mainland will allow her to squeak by regardless. Last year Tien Hung-mao said that if Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait communication channels would probably be interrupted. Can Tien Hung-mao mollify Taiwan independence elements? Can he obtain authorization from Tsai Ing-wen to give the Mainland a straight answer? Unless he can, the SEF will remain hanging, and Tien Hung-mao will remain unable to cross the Strait.

Strategic errors are difficult to correct at the level of tactics. Tsai Ing-wen may be attempting to stabilize the current situation. But the reduction in Mainland students, the reduction in Mainland tourists, the cancellation of cross-Strait agreements, and the negative impact on cross-Strait relations, are ongoing. Cross-Strait tensions may soon affect diplomacy and trade, including the New Southern Strategy. James Huang's appointment at this time reflects another strategic dilemma.

Tsai Ing-wen is anxious to promote her New Southern Strategy. That is why she positioned it within the Presidential Office. But for the past several months little has been implemented apart from sloganeering. In mid August, when the government announced the New Southern Strategy, it appeared ready to spring into action. Who knew that half a month later, the political star appointed to the Southern Strategy Office would suddenly be replaced by Chiang Chun-nan, who was forced to resign several months ago for drunk driving. This change sent two messages. The first was that Tsai Ing-wen's bag of tricks is empty. She has no other candidates she can trust, so she mobilized James Huang. The second was that the new government realized its New Southern Strategy was easier said than done. Therefore it decided to take advantage of the opportunity provided by personnel changes to change its policy framework.

James Huang has been appointed Representative to Singapore. The Tsai government can of course indulge in euphemisms. It can refer to Singapore as its “command post” to the New South. But can it really? What government is going to allow foreign diplomats to use their country as a command post? If James Huang wants to use Singapore as command post for the New Southern Strategy, will ROC officials in ASEAN and South Asian countries have to obey his commands? Will the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to obey his commands? When two agencies differ on direction and priorities, whom must overseas officials obey? This is akin to moving the Hengshan Command Post to Kinmen, and moving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Tatan Island to take point. It is simply not feasible.

The delayed appointments of James Huang and Tien Hung-mao reflect Tsai Ing-wen's internal contradictions in foreign strategic thinking. That is why this clash between personnel appointments and harsh reality is so deeply worrisome.

田弘茂與黃志芳人事案反映的戰略困局
2016-09-06 聯合報

蔡政府上任逾百日，攸關區域發展與兩岸關係的兩項人事布局終告底定。懸缺多時的海基會董事長，倉促敲定由外交部前部長田弘茂接任；因江春男酒駕而空出來的駐新加坡代表，則由新南向辦公室主任黃志芳出任。兩人個別條件皆不差，但不等於適才適所；而整體人事布局則反映了蔡總統用人的窘迫及其戰略構想之凌亂，到了顧此失彼、顧小失大的地步。

戰略構想指導人事布局，人事安排則是實踐戰略構想的起手式。這兩項人事任命，正好反映蔡英文對外戰略布局的左支右絀。

先談兩岸關係。蔡總統拒絕接受「九二共識」，力稱要維持兩岸現狀，因此海、陸兩會的負責人選即使不能打開兩岸僵局，至少要能避免關係進一步惡化。陸委會主委張小月的人事，在五二○前即已出爐，就是一項對大陸不挑釁、對台灣相對安全的人事安排。基於同樣的考量，海基會董事長人選數月來一直鎖定王金平和宋楚瑜二人；但蔡英文對兩岸定位遲遲不願答卷，兩岸僵局難解，王、宋兩人最終拒絕接受此一有名無實之虛職。

在海基會董事長百日懸宕中，兩岸關係有退無進：從雄三誤射、南海仲裁、陸客團火燒車到肯亞電信詐騙案等，不斷挑動兩岸敏感神經。再加上新政府民調急墜，獨派又大動作逼宮，蔡總統因此加速妥協，急急任命了可以安撫獨派情緒的偏綠人士田弘茂。當年，田弘茂據稱曾在美國開車載著辜寬敏到處遊說推動台獨；如今，辦公室裡則掛著與中共前總書記江澤民的合照。他的任命，張小月可以誇稱「對中國大陸釋出善意」，但對岸是否接受是另一回事。

說穿了，目前兩岸關係急凍，聯繫中斷、協商停擺，問題並不在海陸兩會人事，而在蔡英文那份尚未完成的答卷。田弘茂去年曾說，如果蔡英文拒絕接受「九二共識」，極可能導致兩岸溝通機制中斷。而今，除非田弘茂能安撫獨派、取得蔡英文授權，補填答卷，否則海基會恐怕還是只能晾在那裡，田弘茂恐怕再也跨不過海峽。

戰略方向不對，戰術自難能回天。或許蔡英文暫時只想先穩住現況，但陸生縮、陸客減、契作斷，卻是正在不斷發生衝擊效應的兩岸關係進行式。而兩岸關係的未來式，還可能擴及外交與經貿層面，包括新南向政策。而此時黃志芳的人事安排，則反映了另一種戰略困局。

「新南向」是蔡英文亟欲推動的政策，因而在總統府設置了高位階的辦公室；但幾個月來，在執行上始終難有作為，在政策上也未擺脫「喊話」的虛招。更令人困惑的是，政府八月中才公布了新南向政策綱領，一副就要奮起行動之姿；誰料才短短半個月，卻驟然將南向辦公室主帥改派駐星，接替月前因酒駕請辭的江春男。此舉，透露了兩個訊息：其一，蔡英文的錦囊已空，掏不出合適又可以信賴的人選，所以挑來揀去只有調動黃志芳；其二，新政府深切認知新南向之「知易行難」，因此，決定藉此人事異動順勢更動政策架構。

黃志芳出使新加坡，蔡政府當然可以美其名曰，將可利用新加坡作為新南向之指揮站。問題是，這樣的說法，在現實上能成立嗎？別的不談，先問：哪國政府會容許外國使節把自己國家當成一個合縱連橫的指揮基地？再問：如果黃志芳要在新加坡指揮南向政策，我駐東協及南亞各國人員是要聽他指揮，抑或聽外交部指揮？當雙方指令有方向及優先序上的差異時，駐外人員又要聽誰之命？這種作法，就如同把衡山指揮所搬到金門，又把參謀總長送到大膽島擔任前敵指揮一般，是行不通的。

田弘茂和黃志芳的人事安排遲遲底定，反映蔡英文對外戰略思考的架構有內在矛盾，人事和政策現實之難以對應，不禁令人擔憂。