The Government Wants Alibaba, But Refuses to Utter Open Sesame

The Government Wants Alibaba, But Refuses to Utter Open Sesame
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 14, 2016

Executive Summary: When Ko Wen-je's approval ratings plummeted, he used the Twin Cities Forum as a stage for cross-Strait political theater. He attempted to salvage his reputation by resuming construction on the Taipei Dome. By contrast, when Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings plummeted, placing her on the critical list, Chen Shui-bian's dark shadow loomed large. If Tsai Ing-wen is seeking a way out in cross-Straits relations, she need not emulate Chen Shui-bian or Ko Wen-je. But she must be wise enough to know the difference between the two.

Full Text Below:

President Tsai has been in office a mere 100 days, but her approval ratings are already in the cellar. Taiwan independence forces are holding high the "core constituency" banner, demanding that the empress abdicate. In response, the Tsai government has made a number of subtle changes in its personnel appointments. It originally boasted that presidential appointments for SOEs and government shareholder corporations would be made on the basis of professional qualifications. Now however, personnel appointments are being made on the basis of “green, not expert”. How much of this is belated nepotism and political appeasement? Will appointees responsible for cross-Strait relations change government policy? That is a matter of concern.

Since the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power, it has busied itself purging the blue camp. It is too preoccupied with its vendetta to take to the streets. As a result, its cross-Strait agenda has lain dormant. It has ignored the standoff over the 1992 Consensus. It is unwilling to rub the CCP tiger the wrong way. It is unwilling to confront the slings and arrows of the Taiwan independence movement. It assumes that if it can "maintain the status quo", it will not lose points. President Tsai met with reporters recently after 100 days in office. In theory, she has racked up a number of achievements. But in cross-Strait relations, "maintaining the status quo" is the only thing that matters. In her inaugural address she insisted she was doing everything in her power to narrow the distance between the two sides and maintain stable cross-Strait relations. She clearly does not consider cross-Strait policy a matter of urgency. She is either unable or unwilling to provide a “clever response” explaining the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland.

Meanwhile Mainland students, Mainland tourists, and milkfish sales have already exerted an economic impact. The political repercussions of the ICAO Assembly and the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting have already been felt. The cross-Strait agenda continues to buffet Taiwan head on. What is the nature of the relationship between the two sides? Tsai Ing-wen refuses to say. She insists she has "maintained the status quo". In fact, the status quo has already changed. Tsai Ing-wen must respond by uttering the magic password.

Consider the current situation. Tsai Ing-wen seems to think she does not need to say "Open Sesame". She seems to thinks that as long as she can locate Alibaba, she can open the door to the treasure trove. Either that, or Taiwan independence forces suspect that behind the door lies a bottomless pit, and that uttering "Open Sesame" will bind them hand and foot. Tsai Ing-wen hopes that Alibaba can remain silent, and that she can open the door using ventriloquism.

Taiwan independence forces are organizing a group that will demand Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. The word is that Tien Hung-mao, Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, and James Soong, will be special envoys to the APEC leaders' meeting in Peru. Taiwan independence forces have praised the move. Beijing's only response has been that cross-Strait issues are not about individuals, they are about political principles. Taiwan independence forces have objected to Tien and Soong. For the moment the Mainland has refrained from responding. Taiwan watchers on the Mainland suspect that the entire enterprise will be a case of “bailing water with a sieve”.

Indeed, Tien Hung-mao's office still features a photograph of him standing next to Jiang Zemin. The memory of James Soong and Hu Jintao issuing a joint communique affirming the 1992 Consensus remains fresh. Tsai Ing-wen's version of the Arabian Nights forbids the uttering of "Open Sesame". Will the appointment of two men really open the door to the treasure trove?

Tien Hung-mao was blunt. He told Tsai Ying-wen that if she refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait communication channels would be interrupted. Now however, he says the other side has yet to speak, therefore "there is still room for hope". Tien Hung-mao cannot possibly be that oblivious. Relations between the two sides may not hinge solely on the term "1992 Consensus". But they do hinge on its core meaning. Does Tien Hung-mao have any suggestions? Or is he merely dragging his feet, hoping that something will change? Only time will tell.

The biggest concern observers have is the Tsai government's domestic gaffes. One group after another has taken to the streets. The economy shows no improvement. Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked. If approval ratings continue to plummet, Beijing will be reluctant to offer further concessions. Taiwan independence forces are demanding that the empress abdicate. Will Tsai Ing-wen follow in Chen Shui-bian's footsteps?

In fact, the Tsai government has used "reform" and "justice" as pretexts to expand its powers. Its flip-flops on the vice president of the Judicial Yuan nomination reveals their connection to special interests. Delays in cross-Strait personnel appointments have ended with renewed attempts to gain entry to the United Nations. This reveals their connection to Taiwan independence. Political pressure or political collusion never ends. Tsai Ing-wen's pragmatic "communicate, listen, resolve" approach, differs from Chen Shui-bian's reckless "confront, compromise, progress" approach. The pain that Chen Shui-bian's confrontational approach inflicted lingers. Externally, Washington and Beijing are co-managing the Taiwan Strait. Internally, the public remains on tenterhooks. Will objective conditions change and favor Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan independence forces? That remains their biggest challenge.

When Ko Wen-je's approval ratings plummeted, he used the Twin Cities Forum as a stage for cross-Strait political theater. He attempted to salvage his reputation by resuming construction on the Taipei Dome. By contrast, when Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings plummeted, placing her on the critical list, Chen Shui-bian's dark shadow loomed large. If Tsai Ing-wen is seeking a way out in cross-Straits relations, she need not emulate Chen Shui-bian or Ko Wen-je. But she must be wise enough to know the difference between the two.

只要阿里巴巴，不要「芝麻開門」？
2016-09-14 聯合報

蔡總統執政百日民調瀕危，獨派高舉「核心選民」旗幟逼宮日甚，蔡政府人事遂出現微妙調整趨勢。如果說，先前標榜專業考量的國營事業與公股金融人事加快「綠化」腳步，多少還有些遲來的分封、安撫之意；那麼，兩岸關係領域的人事動態所反映的路線的意義與政策效應，更值得關注。

民進黨執政後，因忙於政治清算與追殺藍營，疲於應付排隊準備上街的抗爭，因而暫擱兩岸議程，冷對兩岸答卷，既不願捋中共虎鬚，也不想攖獨派鋒鏑，以為只要拖著「維持現狀」不失分即可。因此，蔡總統在執政百日前與記者茶敘時，雖然縷述各領域抽象政績，涉及兩岸議題其實只有一句話──重申「維持現狀」之重要。其重點，在強調就職演說已竭盡所能拉近雙方立場，並力圖維持兩岸關係穩定。顯然，兩岸政策非其當急之務，兩岸定位答卷則想不出「聰明回答」或根本不想答。

然而，從陸生、陸客到虱目魚契作的經濟效應已現，從國際民航組織大會到亞太經合會經濟領袖會議的政治效應則山雨欲來，兩岸議程終究撲面而至，兩岸答卷闕文仍待填補。蔡英文稱「維持現狀」，事實上，變動的「現狀」實已非原狀，催促著蔡英文提出適當的通關密語。

觀察目前情況，蔡英文似乎相信不必喊「芝麻開門」，只要找到「阿里巴巴」，就能打開藏寶山洞的石門。或者，由於獨派強烈質疑石門後面是個直墜深淵的無底洞，而「芝麻開門」更是一道自縛手腳的緊箍咒，蔡英文只好寄望阿里巴巴能不發出聲，只要運用腹語即可啟門。

就在獨派的台灣「入聯宣達團」啟程前夕，陸續傳出田弘茂接海基會董事長、及宋楚瑜將擔任特使出席祕魯APEC領袖會議的消息。對於前者，獨派盛讚是一手好棋；北京卻只回應，兩岸問題關鍵不在人，而在政治基礎。對於後者，則是獨派頗有雜音，而陸方暫不接腔，涉台學者則質疑恐將「竹籃打水」一場空。

確實，田弘茂辦公室裡還掛著與江澤民合照的相片，宋楚瑜與胡錦濤開宗明義確認「九二共識」的會談公報也記憶猶在；但蔡英文版的「一千零一夜」，有可能不喊「芝麻開門」，僅靠這兩人之任命即直入寶山嗎？

田弘茂曾直言蔡英文不接受「九二共識」，兩岸溝通機制就會中斷；現在卻說對岸還沒講話，「希望還有空間」。田弘茂或不致完全昧於現實，兩岸迂迴空間也可能不全在「九二共識」四字，而在如何表述其核心意涵；那麼，田弘茂錦囊中是否有何妙計，或只是以拖待變，各方拭目以待。

如今外界最大的憂慮是，蔡政府內政頻頻凸槌，凱道上輪流抗爭，經濟無法改善，兩岸難有出路。如果民調持續墜底，北京也不願釋出更大善意，在獨派頻頻逼宮下，蔡英文會不會走上陳水扁的老路？

事實上，從蔡政府以「改革」和「正義」為名踰法擴權的諸多舉措，到司法院正副院長提名反覆，皆可看到其身後特定團體的影武者身姿；而延宕的兩岸人事終告底定及台灣入聯的運動再起，也顯示獨派的試探、施壓或雙簧演出未曾停止。然而，蔡英文「溝通、傾聽、解決」的務實性格，和陳水扁「衝突、妥協、進步」的莽撞作風，畢竟有別。陳水扁衝撞之痛記憶猶存，外有美中共管台海，內有民眾心生警惕，客觀環境是否隨蔡及獨派主觀意志而移轉，恐怕才是最大的挑戰。

遭逢民調雪崩威脅的柯文哲，藉著雙城論壇攀上兩岸關係舞台，隨即又主動拆除大巨蛋解約引信，企圖挽救頹危的聲望。反觀民調從高峰跌至死亡交叉邊緣的蔡英文，在躊躇瞻顧之間，陳水扁的陰影威脅也越來越大。其實，要打開兩岸出路，蔡英文不必取法柯文哲或陳水扁，但她絕對必須有比兩人更清明的心智。