China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 10, 2016
Executive Summary: On September 4 the KMT Party Convention approved a new policy platform. Two planks in this platform drew the most attention. The first was the “Peace Agreement”, one which would "actively seek a peace agreement ending the state of hostilities". The second was the "one China, different interpretations” phrase. The new policy platform refers to the 1992 Consensus only in general, when it mentions “one China, different interpretations”. When detailing cross-Strait policy, it read "consolidate the 1992 Consensus on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of China", and omitted “one China, different interpretations”. Observers have described this as “the disappearance of different interpretations".
Full Text Below:
On September 4 the KMT Party Convention approved a new policy platform. Two planks in this platform drew the most attention. The first was the “Peace Agreement”, one which would "actively seek a peace agreement ending the state of hostilities". The second was the "one China, different interpretations” phrase. The new policy platform refers to the 1992 Consensus only in general, when it mentions “one China, different interpretations”. When detailing cross-Strait policy, it read "consolidate the 1992 Consensus on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of China", and omitted “one China, different interpretations”. Observers have described this as “the disappearance of different interpretations".
Some objected to incorporating the Peace Agreement into the party platform. But in general it provoked little controversy. In fact then Chairman Ma Ying-jeou indirectly incorporated the Peace Agreement into the party platform in 2005, when he advocated implementation of the Five Goals of the Lien Hu summit. One of the Five Goals was a “peace agreement to terminate hostilities". Omitting "one China, different interpretations" from the party platform touched off a major controversy. Former Vice President Wu Den-yih defended the 1992 Consensus" and "one China, different interpretations", saying the two must remain linked, Other key players within the party also voiced reservations. The media characterized it as a battle over the KMT's political path. Many more interpreted it as a prelude to the 2017 chairmanship elections, and the beginning of a power struggle.
In 2014, the Kuomintang found itself mired in a new struggles over the “China Path” vs. the “Taiwan Path”. Beginning last September 4, the KMT made a major about face. It paid a huge price for this. It became the opposition party, only to wind up back where it began. On the same day last year, KMT presidential candidate Hung Shiu-chu spoke of "one China, same interpretation". This precipitated clashes within the party. Rumors flew about replacing Hung. Under pressure, she announced a three day moratorium. September 4 was the second day of the moratorium. At the eye of the storm was "one China, same interpretation". Many party members insisted on sticking with "one China, different interpretations". One year later, the KMT remains mired in the same controversy, unable to extricate itself. Pundits have since ridiculed the KMT, saying how the "September 3 Grand Protest March", was followed by the "September 4 Petty Intraparty Squabble".
The KMT is the second largest political party on Taiwan. A comeback is not out of the question. But for the moment the DPP's paint is chipping. Its ratings are in the cellar. Protests are spreading like wildfire. Public anger is boiling over. The Kuomintang has scored victory after victory in local elections. A protest march by military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers has brought core supporters back into the fold.
Despite a series of positive signs suggesting that the KMT may be able to make a comeback, skeptics remain. DPP support has fallen. But trust in and approval of the KMT has not increased significantly.
One year ago, the Kuomintang's core convictions were unclear. Its core values were uncertain. Its organizational structure was outdated. Its creativity and will to reform were nowhere to be seen. Its rhetoric was incoherent. It appeal for young people was non-existent. None of these "old problems" have been addressed since the election debacle earlier this year. Nothing new or inspiring has emerged. No revolutionary changes have been made. To outside observers, the party remains a plate of loose sand. Party leaders guard their personal fiefdoms jealously. Each goes his own way. Strife continues without end.
Are KMT leaders truly "amateurs at fighting outsiders, but experts at fighting each other”? Is the KMT truly destined for the scrap heap of history? Not necessarily. Last September 4, on the second day of Hung Shiu-chu's moratorium, this newspaper urged the KMT to convene a major debate on policy path in order to prevent the party's disintegration. Unfortunately it did not listen. Now it has another opportunity. KMT leaders must throw open the windows and speak the truth. Only by laying their cards out on the table, can KMT leaders make clear the choices they have made. Only then is true unity possible.
Hung Shiu-chu and Wu Den-yih disagree about whether to omit “different interpretations” from the party platform. The two are also seeking the party chairmanship. So why not hold a great debate over the party path? A meaningful and intense debate could lead to consensus and greater Kuomintang solidarity.
Since Hung Shiu-chu took over as party chairman, she has repeatedly expressed her willingness to hold a no preconditions internal party debate. But thunder has not been followed by rain. In the coming year Hung and Wu should hold a "civilized debate". This would honor their commitments. It would put their respective policy paths to the test. It would enable the KMT to reconsider its values, firm up its foundation, clarify factional differences, and promote party unity.
People have heard Wu Den-yih's objections to deleting “different interpretations” from the party platform. But they have yet to hear his views on incorporating the Peace Agreement into the platform. views, They do not understand why he insists on retaining "different interpretations". Wu Den-yih must explain. This is an opportunity to let people understand his overarching political perspective. If Hung and Wu can agree on the Peace Agreement during the debate, they can help the KMT promote cross-Strait peace. Voters will no longer remain in suspense. Any attempts by political opponents to divide the party by spreading rumors will be preempted.
For the KMT, a timely debate would clean up its image. A Hung vs. Wu debate would attract wide public attention. It would refocus attention on the KMT's policy proposals. For Taiwan, a KMT debate over policy path could focus attention on Taiwan's path once Tsai Ing-wen steps down. The chance to consider a totally different path is something Taiwan desperately needs at this time.
吳敦義洪秀柱應就「去各表」辯論
2016/9/10 中國時報
國民黨9月4日全代會通過新政策綱領，兩個焦點受到關注，一是「和平協議入綱」：主張「積極探討以和平協議結束兩岸敵對狀態的可能性」；二是「一中各表出綱」，只在總論中提及「九二共識、一中各表」，但政策綱領細項兩岸部分，僅主張「在中華民國憲法的基礎上，深化九二共識」，卻刪除「一中各表」。外界形容，這是「消失的各表」。
「和平協議入政綱」在國民黨內有雜音，但沒有太大的爭論。事實上，和平協議早在馬英九主席時代，即以「間接」方式納入政綱，主張落實2005年「連胡五項願景」，五項願景之一即是「促進終止敵對狀態，達成和平協議」。「一中各表出綱」則掀起重大風波，前副總統吳敦義堅持「九二共識」與「一中各表」必須連結，不能拆開，其他多位黨內要角也表示疑慮。媒體定位為國民黨路線之爭，更有人解讀是2017黨主席選舉前哨戰，權力鬥爭烽火已點燃。
國民黨於2014年陷入新一輪中國與台灣路線之爭，回顧去年的9月4日，國民黨1年來拐了大彎、繞了大路、付了淪入在野的代價，卻還是走回原點。去年同日，代表國民黨參選總統的洪秀柱，接受媒體訪問時提到「一中同表」，引發了黨內路線衝突，漫天飛舞的換柱傳聞壓力下，她宣布閉關3天，9月4日是閉關第2天。風暴的核心就是「一中同表」，但黨內許多人堅持「一中各表」。1年過去了，國民黨依然陷在同一泥淖中不能自拔，論者嘲諷國民黨「9月3日大遊行」，「9月4日小內鬥」。
國民黨是第二大政黨，並非沒有再起的機會，但現況是：民進黨表現落漆、民調破盤、抗爭四起、民怨燎原；國民黨地方補選連戰皆捷，軍公教遊行推動基本盤回流。
一連串正面訊息加持下，民眾對國民黨能否重返執政，懷疑者仍眾。民進黨的支持度雖跌，對國民黨的信任度與好感度卻沒有明顯增加。
看看國民黨，1年前的問題，如中心思想不明、核心價值不具、老邁陳腐的組織看不見改革的創意與魄力、論述脫節、對年輕人缺乏吸引力，這些「老問題」，都沒有因為年初選舉的大敗，而出現令人耳目一新、脫胎換骨的大革新與大改變，呈現於外的，還是一盤散沙，各劃地盤、各行其是，傾軋不休。
「外拓無力，內鬥內行」真的是國民黨牢不可破，注定被拖進歷史墳墓的宿命嗎？未必。其中最重要的解方，就是去年9月4日洪秀柱入關第2天本報社論提出的建議「避免崩解，國民黨需要路線大辯論」。可惜當時國民黨並未採納，此時，正是另一個辯論的時機。只有打開天窗說亮話，把國民黨路線爭議放到檯面上，說清楚講明白，才有重整旗鼓，真正團結的可能。
既然洪秀柱與吳敦義在「去各表」問題產生了歧見，二人也都若隱若顯表達了角逐下任黨主席的意願，兩人何妨進行路線大辯論，若能由兩人帶動全黨大辯論，就更有意義，辯論愈激烈，形成共識後的國民黨愈團結。
對洪秀柱而言，她接任黨主席後，曾多次表示願意舉行開放、無底線的「黨內大辯論」，但一直「只聞樓梯響，不見辯論來」。未來1年，和吳敦義進行一輪「君子之辯」，不但是兌現其承諾，也是洗練驗證路線主張的契機，更可以為國民黨重凝價值、重塑論述打底奠基，並一次釐清黨內各派的分歧，找出促進團結的公約數。
對吳敦義而言，新政綱風波中，國人雖看見他對「去各表」的疑慮，卻沒有看見他對「和平協議入政綱」的看法，更不理解堅持「各表」的理由何在。吳敦義有責任說明清楚，這也是讓國人了解他國政高度的機會。如果在和平協議的問題上，吳、洪兩人能在辯論場上達成了共識，也將大大地加強國民黨推進兩岸和平的力度，選民不再有懸念，也可免去被政敵或流言分化的可能。
對國民黨而言，更是洗去犬儒形象、建立辯論文化的最好機會。吳、洪登高一辯，也有助於吸引大眾目光，重新關注國民黨的主張與發展。對台灣來說，國民黨路線大辯論也將是蔡英文執政後，另一種路線總檢視，這也是此時台灣迫切需要的視角。
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