China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2016
Executive Summary: President Tsai has repeatedly stressed her determination to maintain the status quo. She hoped to win over swing voters. She hoped to broaden her support base. She hoped that swing voters and pale blue voters would flock to her. The defection of swing voters is a warning to the Tsai government. She must address the 1992 Consensus.
Full Text Below:
Shortly after taking office, past presidents have invariably sought to transcend blue vs. green political affiliation and become presidents to all the people. President Tsai is no exception. Since taking office on May 20, her cabinet appointments have included members of the blue camp and civil service politicians. Her policy proposals have sought to ensure stability. Even on cross-Strait issues, she has been prudent. As a result, deep green elements are very unhappy. They are constantly pressuring President Tsai to start over. They have even demanded that the entire Lin Chuan cabinet be replaced. But President Tsai has held her ground. She has not changed either existing policy or existing personnel, with the sole exception of her Executive Yuan spokesman.
But as with past presidents, President Tsai's attempt to win the support of a majority of voters has failed. On the one hand, blue vs. green opposition has intensified. Different camps have taken diametrically opposed attitudes toward the Tsai government. According to previous TVBS polls, 75% of all DPP supporters are satisfied with President Tsai's performance. Up to 63% are satisfied with Lin Chuan's performance. Conversely, 71% of KMT supporters are dissatisfied with President Tsai's performance. Up to 67% are dissatisfied with Lin Chuan's performance.
According to another poll commissioned by the KMT think tank, 29.7% of those who switched from Ma to Tsai in 2012 and 2016, have changed their minds a second time. They are unhappy with Tsai's policies during her first 100 days. Among those who voted but did not specify whom they supported, 30% were unhappy with Tsai's performance. This means that blue camp supporters are returning home. Even more alarmingly, swing voters who are unhappy with Tsai's performance outnumber those who are happy. According to a TVBS poll, 31% of swing voters were dissatisfied. Only 27% were satisfied. As many as 38% of swing voters were dissatisfied with the Lin Chuan cabinet's performance. Only 23% were satisfied.
This swing voter turnabout was expected. The Tsai government's philosophy of governance seeks stability. But what Taiwan needs is a breakthrough in her current plight. In other words, the Tsai government's policy path is the problem. On today's Taiwan, the differences between the blue and green camps are many. They include cross-Strait policy, social welfare policy, and industrial policy. But the sharpest distinction between the KMT and the DPP is over cross-Strait policy.
Over 30% of all swing voters want to maintain the status quo. This is because swing voters and economically motivated voters have long overlapped. These voters are not so particularly concerned about blue vs. green reunification vs. independence ideology. They are more concerned about sound governance and economic development. On matters of reunification vs. independence, they seek to maintain the status quo, or hope to delay any decision for later, in order to avoid the risks either might pose for the status quo.
During the 2012 election, economically motivated voters chose to support Ma Ying-jeou. This does not mean they agreed with reunification. This meant they thought the 1992 Consensus would ensure stable cross-Strait relations. That in turn would ensure Taiwan's economic development. But four years later the Ma government failed to ensure the equitable distribution of the dividends of cross-Strait exchanges within society as a whole. Therefore swing voters shifted in favor of Tsai Ing-wen, precisely because they wanted to change Ma government economic policies.
This does not mean that swing voters support the cessation of cross-Strait exchanges. They merely seek cross-Strait equilibrium. They do not want to be too close to the Mainland. Nor to they want to move too far. Once President Tsai came to power, she dragged her feet on the 1992 Consensus. This led to a freeze in official cross-Strait interactions. This has also affected cross-Strait people to people interactions. Swing voters have begun to have doubts, and have begun to repudiate the Tsai government.
According to a TVBS poll, 43% of the people are unhappy with the Tsai government's cross-Strait policy. Only 36% are satisfied. This is obviously higher than the percentage of blue camp supporters within the population. According to the Kuomintang poll, 30% think that cross-Strait relations have become strained. With steady pressure from the Mainland, cross-Strait tension has continued to rise. More and more people are realizing that cross-Strait relations are deteriorating. According to the latest polls, those who advocate swift reunification or swift independence have risen to 7% and 16 % respectively, the highest in recent years. Those who advocate maintaining the status quo indefinitely, or declaring independence immediately, have fallen to 47% and 15% respectively, the lowest in recent years.
This reflects people's pragmatism. More and more people have come to realize that since the Tsai government took office, cross-Strait tensions have skyrocketed. They have begun to take a serious look at cross-Strait reunification vs. independence issues.
Interestingly enough, according to a Taiwan Indicators Survey Research poll of southern Taiwan, voter support in die hard green camp districts show even greater change. During the general election DPP support exceeded 60%. Now however, over 33% are unhappy with President Tsai. In southwestern Taiwan that number is up to 39%. Not only swing voters are disaffected with Tsai. Even green camp supporters are expressing disappointment. These people are dissatisfied because their economic interests have suffered. When cross-Strait relations were good, the Mainland procured large quantities of agricultural products from Taiwan. Now the relevant incentives have been significantly reduced. Local farmers and fishermen are definitely feeling the pain.
President Tsai has repeatedly stressed her determination to maintain the status quo. She hoped to win over swing voters. She hoped to broaden her support base. She hoped that swing voters and pale blue voters would flock to her. The defection of swing voters is a warning to the Tsai government. She must address the 1992 Consensus.
蔡政府小心 中間選民轉向了
2016/9/22 中國時報
歷任總統上任之初，都希望超越藍綠成為全民總統，蔡總統也不例外。520上任以來，內閣成員選用了部分出身藍營或公務體系政治人物，政策基調力求穩定，即便在兩岸問題上，也盡量審慎處理。深綠對此大為不滿，不斷施壓蔡總統要求改弦更張，甚至要求林全內閣全面改組。但蔡總統仍然頂住壓力，沒有改變既有政策和人事，只先換了行政院發言人。
與以往歷任總統相似，蔡總統爭取更大多數選民的支持，努力還是失敗了。一方面，藍綠意見對立激化，不同陣營民眾對蔡政府的態度呈現截然對立的態勢。根據先前TVBS民調中心的調查結果，高達75﹪的民進黨認同者對蔡總統滿意，對林全的滿意度也有63﹪；但國民黨的認同者中，有71﹪的人對蔡總統感到不滿意，對林全的不滿意度也高達67﹪。
另根據國民黨智庫的委託調查，2012年投馬而2016年投蔡的「轉投族」，有29.7﹪的人對蔡政府施政百日不滿，投票未表態者同樣有3成對蔡政府不滿，代表藍營支持者的回流現象。更大的警訊是中間選民開始轉向，對蔡政府不滿的比例開始超過滿意者。在TVBS民調中，中間選民31﹪表示不滿意，滿意只有27﹪，對林全內閣，中間選民更是有38﹪不滿意，只有23﹪滿意。
中間選民轉向其實是意料之中的事情，蔡政府的施政理念以求穩為主，但當前台灣的問題是尋求突破困境之道，換句話說，蔡政府的施政方向本身就存在問題。在台灣，藍綠陣營的主要分歧廣泛存在於兩岸政策、社會福利、產業政策等各個領域，但相對來說，真正能對國民黨和民進黨做出明確區隔的只有兩岸政策。
對超過3成的中間選民來說，更希望維持現狀。這是因為長久以來，中間選民與所謂經濟選民高度重疊，這些選民並不那麼關心藍綠、統獨等意識形態問題，而更關注政府治理績效和經濟發展。他們在統獨立場上傾向於維持現狀，或者之後再做決定，避免現在走向統一和獨立給自己帶來的風險。
2012年大選，經濟選民在最後關頭選擇支持馬英九，這並不意味他們認同統一，而是認為九二共識可以帶來兩岸關係的穩定，進而為台灣經濟發展繼續提供動力。但這4年的發展經驗表明，馬政府並未將兩岸關係發展的紅利公平分配給全社會，因此中間選民開始轉向支持蔡英文，正是因為他們希望蔡英文能夠對馬政府的問題做出調整。
這並不表示中間選民支持兩岸交流停擺，而是希望兩岸關係能夠實現動態平衡，不至於過度向大陸靠攏，但也不能過分疏遠大陸。但蔡總統上台執政以後，遲遲處理不好九二共識問題，導致兩岸官方互動停頓，兩岸民間互動也受到影響，中間選民感到疑慮，進而開始轉向否定蔡政府。
事實上，根據TVBS的民調，已經有高達43﹪的民眾對蔡政府的兩岸政策不滿，只有36﹪的人表示滿意，這顯然高於藍營支持者人口比例。而在國民黨的調查中，也有3成民眾認為兩岸關係變得緊張。隨著大陸的不斷施壓，兩岸緊張對立的氛圍不斷加強，越來越多民眾意識到兩岸關係向壞發展的趨勢，根據最新的民調，主張急統和緩獨的比例分別達到7﹪和16﹪，均是近年來的最高值。主張永遠維持現狀和急獨的比例則降為47﹪和15﹪，都是近年來的最低值。
這一趨勢反映了民眾的務實心理，越來越人意識到蔡政府執政後的兩岸緊張情勢，開始認真看待兩岸統一問題。
有意思的是，在台灣指標民調所做的調查中，南部泛綠鐵票區對蔡政府的滿意度，呈現出更大幅度的變動。大選時民進黨支持度超過6成，現在高屏地區不滿蔡總統的比例高達33﹪，雲嘉南地區高達39﹪。從這個角度看，不僅是中間選民對蔡政府不滿，連綠營支持者也有人表示失望。這些人之所以不滿，顯然與自己既有的經濟利益受到損失有關，過去兩岸關係良好，大陸對台有大量的農產品採購和契作，現在相關優惠措施大幅減少，當地農漁民可謂十分有感。
蔡總統多次強調維持現狀的決心，本希望拉攏中間選民，希望擴大支持者的基礎，讓廣大中間乃至淺藍選民能夠成為自己的支持者。中間選民的背離現象是蔡政府的警訊，她必須認真為九二共識解套。
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