Parliamentary Deadlock, National Paralysis

Parliamentary Deadlock, National Paralysis
United Daily New editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 12, 2007


Taiwan Independence "lawmakers" demonstrate their "respect for democracy" by assaulting Pan Blue legislators inside the Legislature


Taiwan Independence Zealots egg them on from outside the Legislature

Confrontations occurred both inside and outside the Legislative Yuan yesterday. On the surface it merely looks like a deadlock in the parliament. A closer look reveals that it is a nation in paralysis.

The Legislative Yuan has been deadlocked for months over the general budget and the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission (CEC). The root of the problem is neither the confrontation between a small ruling party and a large opposition party, nor the confrontation between the Green camp and the Blue camp. The real problem is that the ruling authorities lack any awareness of what it means to govern. The democratic structures that this nation built by means of parliamentary procedure have basically collapsed.

Which is more important? The central government's general budget, or the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission? Actually this is not a question of either/or, how but a question of checks and balances and mediation. A responsible government will always choose to pass a general budget. It will exhaust all legal means to find relief for other deadlocked legislation. But the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) attitude is to allow the general budget to become collateral damage in its effort to kill the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission. It would rather allow local development to come to a halt, than relinquish its monopoly on the appointment of Central Election Commission members. It blames opposition party boycotts for the five month long delay in passing the general budget. It would be more accurate to blame the ruling party for adopting "scorched earth" tactics, deliberately treating the general budget as cannon fodder.

If the Kuomintang version of the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission contains "constitutional violations," then the DPP government should propose a more persuasive version to win over the public and its opponents. But what the people are seeing is the ruling party laying its dirty hands on what is supposed to be an independent election mechanism, and unwilling to let go. Instead it turns around and accuses the the opposition parties, the long-suffering victims of flagrant Central Election Commission injustice, of "barbarism." In fact, any Central Election Commission bills pending within the legislature are merely "potentially" in violation of the constitution, whereas delaying the passage of the general budget by five months is already in violation of the constitution. The DPP is using the Republic of China Consitution, for which it has never shown one iota of respect, as a pretext to prevent the passage of a bill establishing a neutral and unbiased Central Election Commission. Now how funny is that?

According to ruling party reasoning, the Organic Law for the Central Election Commission and the general budget are of of equal importance. The general budget doesn't worry the DPP. What worries the DPP is its magic talisman, the Central Election Commission. Now that is something over which it will never relinquish control. From this perspective, the rumbles within the legislature and the protests outside the legislature are all too easy to understand. Because what the DPP cares about is not the promotion of sound governance, but merely the gaining of partisan electoral advantage.

A look at actual developments confirms this assessment. The Executive Yuan has declared that the budget delay will reduce economic growth by 0.64%, and prevent the the implementation of 70 billion NT in new development. Yet neither the Chen administration nor the DPP have shown the slightest concern, or attempted to negotiate with the political opposition. Chen Shui-bian upped the ante on Welfare Subsidies to Elderly Farmers, as usual. Prime Minister Su traveled to Yunling, Chiayi, and Tainan counties in southern Taiwan, issuing checks exceeding 20 billion NT. So what if the general budget hasn't passed? What does that have to do with them?

In power for seven years, the DPP is still unwilling to face the necessity of consultations and compromise. Its political accomplishments add up to a big zero, and yet it has not learned to respect the parliamentary majority in the legislature. This is the reality behind governmental gridlock and national stagnation. A look at the vicious dog eat dog behavior of the DPP's "Four Princes" and rival factions during the DPP primaries reveals the party's true colors. But what really brings a chill to the heart is that apart from being adept at campaigning, electioneering, and infighting, this political party has completely forgotten its responsibility to rule. This is why the DPP has the effrontery to deny the legislature its right to vote, destroying the very roots of democracy and constitutional government!

What the Chen administration is most adept at is packaging the ruling party's electioneering requirements in the guise of government policies. Any policy that doesn't correspond with what the ruling party needs, may be replaced or abolished. Therefore they can flip-flop on the Suhua Freeway project as election circumstances demand. The demolition of the Losheng Sanatorium can start or stop on a dime. Mainland tourists can suddenly be allowed in or kept out on a whim. The Orwellian "rectification of names" for China Petroleum, the Chunghua Postal Service, and even the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, are nothing more than means of diverting public attention in order to trumpet their "achievements." Can this really satifsy the individual aspirations of the public?

In a democratic nation, elections are merely a means. The end is for the ruling party solve society's problems. But on Taiwan, what the people see every day is endless political rallies and political struggles. Political figures have no sooner finished campaigning for this election, than they begin campaigning for the next. Who has a mind to govern? Chen Shui-bian has forsaken the responsibility of being a leader to the nation as a whole for seven years. The ruling party considers political struggle as its highest priority. What policy on Taiwan is not motivated at its root by selfish partisan interest?

Over the past several years, the DPP has earned its reputation as a party that "knows only how to campaign, not how to govern." It has degenerated into a party that "only worries about campaigning, and not about governing." Over two bills, the Legislative Yuan has enacted a series of world-class political farces. This is Taiwan's democracy in retreat. The reason is our "ruling party" is in reality "a party that doesn't rule."

Original Chinese below:

社論》
國會癱瘓，國家癱瘓：只問選舉，不要治國！
社論

立法院昨天院內院外的雙線對峙，表面上看是一個癱瘓的國會，深一層看，其實是一個癱瘓的國家。

立法院為了總預算和中選會組織條例連續衝撞數月，問題的根源，其實已不在朝小野大或藍綠對峙；真正的問題在主政當局完全缺乏執政意識。這個國家透過國會機制實踐民主的機制，基本上已經崩毀。

中央政府總預算與中選會組織條例，孰重？這其實不是「二選一」的問題，而是如何權衡和折衝的問題。如果是一個負責任的民主政府，一定會選擇以維護總預算為重，對其他法案的僵局則另外窮盡合法手段尋求救濟。但民進黨的態度，卻是寧可讓總預算陪葬，也要卡死中選會條例；寧可地方建設停頓，也不放棄自己壟斷中選會委員的任命特權。總預算延宕五個月未通過，與其說是在野黨杯葛，不如說是執政黨採取焦土戰略，蓄意把總預算當砲灰所致。

如果國民黨版的中選會條例有「違憲之虞」，那麼民進黨政府應設法提出一個更具說服力的版本，爭取民眾和對手的認同。但人們看到的，卻是執政黨把髒手深深伸進這個理應獨立的選舉機構，硬是不肯鬆手，卻還反咬屢因中選會不公而吃盡悶虧的在野黨野蠻。事實上，尚未通過立法的中選會只不過是有違憲「之虞」，而總預算案延宕五個月未能通過卻是「既遂」的違憲；民進黨拿它從來不尊重的中華民國憲法為藉口來阻擋中選會條例，豈不可笑之至？

在執政黨的天平上，中選會條例和總預算居然被放在等量齊觀的位置，也極耐人咀嚼：若非民進黨太不把總預算放在心上，便是中選會對它而言是太珍貴的政治法寶了，一點都不可鬆手。從這個角度看，立院的群毆、院外的群眾包圍，也就變得比較容易理解：因為民進黨在乎的不是施政的推展，它在乎的只是本黨能從中獲取多少選舉利益罷了！

觀察現實情況的發展，也確乎如此。行政院雖宣稱總預算延宕將影響百分之零點六四的經濟成長，使七百億元新興計畫無法進行；但我們看不出扁政府或民進黨對此有何焦慮，亦無意設法調解朝野矛盾。陳水扁照樣對老農津貼喊價加碼，蘇揆南下雲嘉南建設支票一開就是兩百多億；總預算過不過，於他們何有哉？

執政七年，還不肯面對協商妥協之必要；政績零蛋，還學不會尊重國會多數，這就是政府癱瘓、國家停滯的真相。試看民進黨四大天王及各派系在初選中的殘酷撕咬，是如何地顯露了一個政黨的兇狠本色。但真正令人心寒的是，這個政黨除了長於選舉、造勢和鬥爭，已完全不記得自己還有執政的責任。也正因如此，民進黨連國會的「表決機制」也敢悍然剝奪，不啻根本摧毀了民主憲政！

扁政府最厲害的本事，是將一切政策或措施均配合執政黨造勢的需要進行包裝，凡是不符政黨需要的政策，隨時可以抽換廢除。所以，蘇花高可以視選舉情勢反反覆覆，樂生的去留可以忽左忽右，大陸觀光客可以忽開忽停；包括對中油、中華郵政、乃至中正紀念堂的改名，目的也只是在轉移焦點以浮報自己的「業績」罷了，這能滿足民眾什麼獨立的渴望嗎？

在民主國家，選舉是手段，執政黨透過施政為社會大眾解決問題，才是政治的目的。但在台灣，人民每天看到的是無止盡的選舉造勢和政治鬥爭，政治人物忙完了這場選舉，立即開始忙下一場選舉，誰有心施政？試想，陳水扁放棄國家領導人的超然角色已經七年，執政黨既一切以政治鬥爭為首要，台灣還有什麼政策不是從一黨之私出發？

前幾年，民進黨被認為「只會選舉、不會治國」，如今，它更自我退化至「只問選舉，不要治國」。立法院為了兩個法案，幾度上演世界級的政治鬧劇，這是台灣的民主退化。原因在於，我們的執政黨其實是一個「不執政黨」。

Frank Hsieh's First Challenge: Transitional Justice within the DPP

Frank Hsieh's First Challenge: Transitional Justice within the DPP
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 10, 2007

Frank Hsieh has won a major victory in the primary election, and will represent the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in its bid for president in 2008. But now he faces his first major challenge, how to implement transitional justice within his own party.

At this time and place transitional justice within the DPP means negotiating the transition from the Chen Shui-bian Era to the Frank Hsieh Era by reestablishing justice within the DPP.

But even though the Five Princes vowed to uphold party unity the day after the primary, Frank Hsieh's situation within his own party remains precarious. Chen Shui-bian has publicly declared that he "will not be a lame duck, and still has many matters to attend to." This remark was clearly directed at Frank Hsieh, warning him against acting rashly. Su Tseng-chang still occupies the position of prime minister, and surely intends to shield Chen Shui-bian and to check Frank Hsieh. Su and Hsieh became foes during the primary election. If Su continues to control the cabinet, he will remain a thorn in Hsieh's side. Yu Hsi-kuen, who persists in advocating formal independence, remains DPP chairman. Hsieh, who advocates a Conciliation and Coexistence cross-Straits policy, has become a square peg in a round hole. Therefore, even though Frank Hsieh has won the party primary, he now finds himself in the crosshairs of a Chen/Su/Yu trio.

If Su Tseng-chang had won this primary, Su would merely be obediently fulfilling Chen's wishes. Chen and Su would be be as one, and transitional justice would not be an issue. But Frank Hsieh is not Chen Shui-bian's political heir. The gap between his ideology and direction and Chen's is increasing. Naturally transitional justice is going to be problem. The role Chen Shui-bian has assigned Su Tseng-chang is to clean up after Chen, to polish the image of the Chen Shui-bian Era. The role Frank Hsieh has assigned himself is to establish an innovative Frank Hsieh Era. Therefore, the first challenge Frank Hsieh faces is transitional justice within the DPP.

Even after the results of the primary became known, Chen Shui-bian continued lying. He said he maintained neutrality during the primary election, and that since he had never intervened on behalf of Su, Hsieh's win didn't mean that the presidential trump card had lost any of its magic. Chen Shui-bian, for whom lying has long been second nature, has given the public yet another reason to loathe him. This primary was a watershed vote of confidence within the DPP. On the one hand it was a vote of non-confidence in the Chen/Su alliance. On the other hand it was a vote of confidence in the nation's path and cross-Straits policy.

As matters stand, Chen Shui-bian, who lost a vote of confidence, says "I am not a lame duck." Su Tseng-chang, who lost a vote of confidence, remains prime minister. Yu Hsi-kuen,who failed to win the primary, remains DPP party chairman. Frank Hsieh, who won a vote of confidence, finds himself surrounded and under attack by Chen/Su/Yu. What an absurd and dangerous situation.

In both political ideology and political style, Chen and Hsieh are very different people. That is why transitional justice is an issue. Frank Hsieh supports the Resolution on Taiwan's Future and advocates amending the constitution only in accordance with procedures laid out in the constitution. Hsieh's differences with Chen Shui-bian, who is anxious to rewrite the constitution, and Yu Hsi-kuen, who proposes to do away with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, are obvious. Furthermore, Frank Hsieh's ideas about Conciliation and Coexistence are at odds with Chen Shui-bian's cutthroat political tactics. The most important difference is that Chen Shui-bian's political aim is to use Taiwan independence ideology as cover for massive corruption, and to continue controlling the political scene even after leaving office, whereas Frank Hsieh's declared goals are to become "a president to all the people" and to promote "ethnic coexistence and cross-Straits peace." Chen Shui-bian must ensure that he remains a "power behind the throne" even after leaving office. Frank Hsieh must guard against the possibility of Chen Shui-bian becoming a "king of kings" above him. Chen Shui-bian hopes that the status quo within the DPP, which champions independence, champions Chen, champions graft, remains just as it is, and not be subjected to transitional justice. But Frank Hsieh must implement transitional justice, otherwise he cannot mark the transition from a Chen Shui-bian Era to a Frank Hsieh Era. To sum up, the confrontation between Chen and Hsieh hinges on whether the DPP will implement transitional justice within its own party.

One could say that Frank Hsieh is the person most consciously committed to transitional justice within the DPP in 20 years. He is also the first person to win the system's endorsement and vote of confidence. Others who have advocated transitional justice within the DPP, such as Hsu Hsing-liang , Shih Ming-teh, and Lin Yi-hsiung, were not as fortunate. On May 6, the DPP party primary made Frank Hsieh the party's presidential candidate. It also endorsed transitional justice within the party.

But if Chen Shui-bian, who champions independence as cover for his corruption, is not willing to be a lame duck, if Chen Shui-bian's agent Su Tseng-chang still occupies the Prime Minister's office, if Yu Hsi-kuen, who demands Taiwan independence remains DPP chairman, how is Frank Hsieh to promote transitional justice within the DPP? How will he win over swing voters during the presidential election? Even if he wins the election, he may be held hostage by those who haven't transitioned, in which case, how is he to rule the nation?

The day after the primary, when Chen Shui-bian stood in front of Frank Hsieh and told him to his face that "I am not a lame duck," is the day the struggle over transitional justice within the DPP began.

Original Chinese below:

謝長廷的第一課：完成民進黨內的「轉型正義」
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.10 03:17 am

謝長廷初選大勝，將代表民進黨競選總統；但他面臨的第一個課題與挑戰，卻是必須儘速完成「民進黨內」的「轉型正義」。

此時此際，所謂「民進黨內的轉型正義」，就是對「陳水扁時代」換軌至「謝長廷時代」之黨內正義的重建。

但是，縱使「五大天王」在初選翌日即聯袂宣示團結，謝長廷在黨內的處境卻仍相當凶險。陳水扁公開宣示「不會跛腳」、「還有很多事要做」，這當然是衝著謝長廷而發，命他不得輕舉妄動。蘇貞昌仍居閣揆之位，則亦可確定是獲陳水扁授意，意在牽制謝長廷；而蘇謝在初選中已成仇敵，蘇續掌內閣，謝不啻芒刺在背。至於堅持「法理台獨」的游錫?回任黨主席，與謝「和解共生」的兩岸政策亦成圓鑿方枘，遂成雞兔共籠之局。於是，謝長廷看似初選勝出，其實卻仍陷於扁蘇游三人的層層包夾之中，凶險莫測。

倘若此次初選是蘇貞昌勝出，蘇承扁意，扁蘇一體，自然不會有「轉型正義」的問題。但是，謝長廷卻不是陳水扁的政治後裔，且在政治境界與政策路線上與陳水扁的區隔愈來愈大，自然就有「轉型正義」的問題。簡單而言，蘇貞昌被授予的角色是為「陳水扁時代」擦屁股，謝長廷自許的角色則是為「謝長廷時代」創新機。因此，謝長廷面臨的第一個課題，就是「黨內轉型正義」。

陳水扁直至初選揭曉後仍在說謊。他說，他在初選中維持中立，「總統牌既然沒有出，所以也就沒有總統牌失靈的問題」。說謊成性的陳水扁之令人厭惡，又增一例。但是，此次初選卻無疑是一次重大且慘烈的黨內信任投票。一方面是對扁蘇聯盟的信任投票，另一方面亦是對國家路線兩岸政策的信任投票。

如今的情勢卻是：輸掉信任投票的陳水扁說「我未跛腳」，輸掉信任投票的蘇貞昌則仍掌內閣，未贏得初選的游錫?亦仍占據黨主席的職位。謝長廷贏得了這場信任投票，竟仍身陷扁蘇游的圍堵之中；荒謬莫甚於此，凶險亦莫甚於此。

無論從政治理念及政治操作上來看，扁謝皆不屬同一「型」；因此，遂有「轉型正義」的問題。謝長廷的「台灣前途決議文」立場，及「循憲定修憲程序修憲」，與急欲操弄正名制憲的陳水扁頗有差異，亦與主張廢除「台灣前途決議文」的游錫?顯有區隔；再者，謝長廷的「和解共生」理念與陳水扁擅長的割喉手段亦大異其趣。最重要的差別是，陳水扁的政治目標在「用台獨漂染貪腐」，俾在卸任後繼續操縱政局；謝長廷的政治目標，卻是成為「全民總統」，創造「族群共生，兩岸和平」的憧憬。陳水扁現在必須部署在離任後「垂簾聽政」的條件，謝長廷則自今日始就應防範陳水扁未來成為「太上總統」的風險。陳水扁希望民進黨內「挺獨挺扁挺貪」的「正義」繼續維持，不可「轉型」；但謝長廷則必須創造「轉型正義」，否則即不可能由「陳水扁時代」轉軌至「謝長廷時代」。總而言之，扁謝二人的一切矛盾，皆在是否實現「黨內轉型正義」

或許可以這麼說：謝長廷是二十年來民進黨內有意識地提倡「黨內轉型正義」、且竟能贏得體制背書及信任投票的第一人。其他曾主張「黨內轉型正義」者，如許信良、施明德及林義雄，皆無此福緣。因此，五月六日這場黨內總統初選，不只是為謝長廷成為民進黨總統候選人頒授令狀，更不啻是民進黨對處理「黨內轉型正義」作了背書。

但是，如果「挺獨遮貪」的陳水扁不肯「跛腳」，如果陳水扁的代理人蘇貞昌仍占據內閣，如果「台獨真堅定」的游錫?亦留任不去，謝長廷將如何體現內外對「黨內轉型正義」的期待？將如何爭取中間選民以贏得大選？即使贏得大選恐亦仍被「未轉型者」挾持，則又將如何治國？

初選翌日，陳水扁當面向謝長廷宣稱「我未跛腳」之時，民進黨「應否實現黨內轉型正義」的鬥爭已告爆發！

A Feeble Prosecution has turned the Justice System into a Crap Shoot

A Feeble Prosecution has turned the Justice System into a Crap Shoot
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 9, 2007


Left to Right: Prosecutors Chen Tsung-ming (陳聰明) Eric Chen (陳瑞仁) and Hou Kuan-jen (侯寬仁) of Taiwan's "Justice System

A Feeble Prosecution has turned the Justice System into a Crap Shoot
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 9, 2007

Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming yesterday convened a Chief Prosecutors' Conference to discuss the Discretionary Fund case. The conclusion of the conference was: Those already indicted will be handled by the courts. Those still being investigated will be dealt with on a case by case basis, based on subjective perceptions, objective circumstances, and other factors. This tells us that prosecutors at odds with each other will remain at odds with each other, and that the conference arrived at no conclusion whatsoever.

For prosecutors to be afraid of settling on a single standard, amounts to leaving defendants at the mercy of Lady Luck. If one runs into public prosecutor A, one is innocent. If one runs into public prosecutor B, one is guilty. If that is the case, what have district prosecutors' offices become, except crap shoots, and defendants high-stakes gamblers? What have public prosecutors throughout the island become, except religious inquisitors? One might as well allow defendants draw straws to determine whether they are guilty or innocent.

We believe this constitutes a serious dereliction of duty within the public prosecution system. Prior to the Chief Prosecutors' Conference, prosecutors conducted an opinion poll. Of the 16 local prosecutors willing to express in opinion, half thought the Discretionary Fund was public money. At the same time, half thought that officials who drew from the Discretionary Fund were innocent of wrongdoing. In other words, regardless of what the legal status of the Discretionary Fund might be, most public prosecutors thought that drawing from the Discretionary Fund did not constitute either criminal intent or deceit. They did not consider it a crime. Under such circumstances, public prosecutors should arrive at a clearcut legal opinion. Any yammering about "case by case determinations" is merely shirking one's responsibility.

The procedure officials must follow for drawing upon the Discretionary Fund is consistent. The uses to which the funds may be put and the procedures for verification must comply with the requirements of relevant accounting departments, and amount to long-established administrative convention. Therefore, unless a particular official has a special situation that demands special consideration, this is a non-issue, and what is the justification for "case by case determinations?" What would be the ruling government's reason for insisting on "case by case determinations," other than to selectively prosecute political enemies? What would be the public prosecutors' reason for "case by case determinations," other than fear of taking a stand against the ruling government? The same goes for the public prosecutors' canned remark that "Those already indicted will be handled by the courts."

It is precisely because the Discretionary Fund case has led to a "guilty in the north, innocent in the south" scenario, and because the DPP's "Four Princes" have been selectively spared prosecution, leading to gross injustice, that a unified opinion by public prosecutors is urgently needed. Therefore the public prosecutors should either decide that everyone is innocent, and allow the courts to understand the prosecutors' reasoning and defense attorneys to argue on behalf of their clients. Or, they should decide that everyone is guilty, and order district prosecutors and special investigative units to aggressively investigate and prosecute each and every case. As it is now, a solitary defendant is being used as a legal test case for all potential defendants, and all responsibility for the outcome is being pushed onto the shoulders of the courts, making judges susceptible to political attacks from different camps. This behavior is weak and irresponsible.

Speaking of Discretionary Fund cases, the rosters of the now defunct Prosecutor General Office's Anti-Corruption Center and its successor, the Special Investigative Unit, include Public Prosecutor Hou Kuan-jen. Initially, Hou resisted requests for coordination from the Tainan Public Prosecutor's Office. Hou hastily indicted Ma Ying-jeou, even as he intentionally avoided indicting the DPP's "Four Princes," behaving in an obviously unprofessional manner. Hou Kuan-jen declared that "The Four Princes will be indicted a month from now, due to manpower shortages." But as of today, many months have passed. The Anti-Corruption Center has been dissolved and the Special Investigative Unit has been formed. Would Public Prosecutor Hou Kuan-jen care to update us on the progress of his promised indictments of the DPP's Four Princes? Public Prosecutors assure us that they prosecute cases in accordance with the law, that they don't get involved in politics. But the way public prosecutors have handled the Discretionary Funds case, aggressively prosecuting certain individuals while shamelessly shielding others, means they are already involved in politics. If public prosecutors truly don't understand the distinction, then that is a reflection on their education and training. If, on the other hand, public prosectuors do understand the distinction, then their motive for behaving as they do is even more worth pondering.

Because of the Discretionary Fund case, at least one hundred defendants have been indicted. The public prosecutors' differences of opinon regarding the Discretionary Fund case will inevitably show up again and again under different circumstances. As a result, many individuals may be indicted on the heels of the Ma Ying-jeou case, even as many others evade prosecution. For anyone with an iota of respect for the rule of law, this is inconceivable.

Some people might say, even if prosecutors have differences of opinion, the defendant won't necessarily be found guilty. Some may look to the Judicial Yuan and even the High Court to reach a unified opinion. But even assuming this is the case, the indictment process itself is an ordeal. How will the injustice done to the defendant be compensated? To sum up, the prosecutors' refusal to take a stand is not only a dereliction of duty, it is a failure to uphold the spirit of justice.

In the past public prosecutors who defied their superiors' directives would be punished. When members of the public questioned the fairness of the system, prosecutors would always cite "uniformity of prosecution" as a shield. Today, when we truly need "uniformity of prosecution" in the pursuit of justice and equality, prosecutors have fallen silent, and the answer to the question, "Are prosecutors nothing more than political henchmen?" is abundantly clear.

Original Chinese below:

懦弱的檢方：司法成為各憑運氣的賭場！
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.09 03:15 am

檢察總長陳聰明昨天召開檢察長會議討論特別費案，會議結論是：已起訴的案件由法院審理，偵辦中的案件則視主觀認知、客觀情形等作個案認定。這意味著分歧的檢方還是分歧，會議根本沒有結論。

檢方不敢定出統一標準，形同聽任被告各憑運氣；碰上甲檢察官無罪，碰上乙就有罪。那麼，各地檢察署豈非成了司法賭場，被告但看手氣；而全國檢察官豈非成了神棍，讓被告抽籤決定有罪無罪即可！

我們認為，這是檢察體系的嚴重失職。在檢察長會議前，檢方曾進行各地檢署檢察官之意見調查，調查結果，在願意表示意見的十六個地檢署中，認為以領據支領的特別費是公款的佔半數，但同時認為支領首長不構成犯罪的也佔半數。換言之，不論以領據支領的特別費之法律性質為何，多數檢察官認為領用首長沒有犯罪故意，以及未使用詐術，而認定不構成犯罪。在此情況下，檢方理當作出一定的見解方屬合理，所謂「個案認定」根本是推卸責任。

就所有領用特別費的首長而言，其支領程序其實是一致的，即按照會計單位的要求辦理；就用途及核銷等而言，亦屬行之有年的行政慣例。因此，除非某一特定首長確有特殊情形而待另行檢討，否則這類以領據領用特別費的爭議案情幾為一致，又何來個案認定的餘地？所謂個案認定之說，當然只是不敢表態的託詞。

至於已起訴的案件聽由法院審理云云，更是遁詞。正因特別費案出現「北有罪，南無罪」的歧異，又有民進黨四大天王涉案遲未處理，造成了極不公平的狀態，亟須由檢方表示統一的意見。因此，檢方應有的作為是：或者決定採無罪說，讓法院瞭解檢方立場，讓辯護人得為被告主張；或者決定採有罪說，而命各地檢署及特偵組積極偵辦其他案件。但像現在這樣，由單一被告為所有潛在被告充當法律實驗品，然後將全部作決定的負擔及風險推給法院，讓法官的判決承受可能來自不同政治陣營的批判，這委實是非常不負責任且懦弱的表現。

說到其他特別費案，從高檢署查黑中心時代到現在的特偵組都列名其中的侯寬仁檢察官，先是拒絕南檢協調要求、急於起訴馬英九於前，卻又故意擱置了民進黨四大天王案於後，顯然最失專業立場。侯寬仁曾說，「四大天王案接案晚一個月、人手不足」所以未辦；但如今，不知幾個月過去了，查黑中心亦已轉成了特偵組，試問侯檢察官目前的進度又在哪裡？檢察官自稱依法辦案，不管政治；但對個案積極偵辦或消極處理，緩急之差異確已造成影響，其實就已經介入了政治。倘謂檢察官對於這一點不能瞭解，那真的有負其所受教育訓練；而若檢察官知道其中的利害關係竟仍然這樣做，居心何在，便殊堪玩味了。

如今因特別費而成被告者至少已百餘案。檢方聽任特別費案意見分歧，則各地檢署受理的案件勢必仍將出現相同案件、不同處理的情況；於是，繼馬英九之後，將有許多人可能因此而遭起訴，但也可能有許多人避開了官司。這對國家法律正義來說，實為不可想像的景況。

或有人說，縱然檢方意見分歧，但起訴到法院也未必定罪；甚至寄望司法院乃至最高法院會考慮統一見解。然而，即使如此，訴訟過程中造成當事人受到的不利境遇，又將如何彌補？總之，檢方這次懦弱不表態的處理，非但失職，亦喪失了主持正義的司法精神。

過去有檢察官辦案不聽上級指揮受到懲處，各界一有質疑，檢方總是搬出「檢察一體」作為擋箭牌。如今，真正需要「檢察一體」，以統一見解來追求公平正義的時候，卻成了噤聲寒蟬。檢方是不是政治打手，現在已是十分清楚了！

What ails France is What ails Taiwan

What ails France is What ails Taiwan
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 8, 2007


Charles de Gaulle, Founder of France's Fifth Republic

What ails France is What ails Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2007

Nicholas Sarkozy's election as president of France has been characterized as a "hard right turn." The people of France are no longer willing to endure the "French Disease" of long-term economic weakness, political division, isolationism, and moral degeneration. Although Sarkozy's right wing views are controversial, his bold pledge to change France's plight has gained the trust of a majority of French voters.

Looking at France from Taiwan, this election, besides being noteworthy for changing France's own direction, is also noteworthy for its impact on the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan. The constitutional changes we carelessly plagiarized from France years ago, specifically its "semi-presidential system," have resulted in constitutional deadlock. For the past decade, Taiwan's economy has withered, political opposition has escalated, and its international status has become increasingly isolated. What ails Taiwan and what ails France is somewhat similar. Observing how France is overcoming its debilitating illness, may provide Taiwan with a clue on how to treat ourselves.

Sarkozy only announced his candidacy in March, yet within a short time he won over the voters, mainly because he grasped the French voters' disaffection with the current situation, and proposed large scale reforms distinguishing himself from Chirac's government. Although Sarkozy is a Minister of Internal Affairs within the Chirac government, he does not shy away from expressing his own views, nor does he minimize the differences between himself and the Chirac government. Because of this, despite his background as a member of the ruling party, he was able to win over public opinion with demands for reform, and allow the international community to believe that he represented a force for change within France.

Compare this scenario with the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "Four Princes," blindly following in Chen Shui-bian's footsteps, competing to show him their "love," eagerly awaiting his endorsement, as Chen Shui-bian continues manipulating the post-Chen political scene. The difference is like night and day. Taiwan's long drawn out election process wears people out, both politically and psychologically. When a ruler regards "appointing a successor" as something perfectly natural, the "will of the people" has long been consigned to to the back burner.

Sarkozy is a second-generation Hungarian immigrant, with Greek and Jewish ancestry on his maternal side. His diverse background made his election unusually colorful. Two years ago Sarkozy suppressed ethnic minority riots with an iron hand, provoking unease among liberty-loving Frenchmen. This is the principle factor behind the unrest in minority districts following his election. But Sarkozy's ancestral background and political ability seem to have alleviated this unease. It could be said that his election is itself an expression of French racial tolerance. Those still saying that "wai-sheng ren (persons from other provinces) are unsuited to be Republic of China president" please take a look at France's diverse and colorful roster of candidates.

To sum up, Sarkozy's prescription for what ails France includes: First, in terms of the economy, France must reduce taxes, reduce wages, increase working hours, improve the investment environment, revive a flagging economy, and reduce high unemployment rates. Second, in terms of international strategy, Sarkozy hopes that the European constitution, which has been ratified but shelved, and the reestablishment of friendly relations with US, will enable France to free itself of its recent isolation, re-join Europe and re-engage America. Third, in terms of social reform, Sarkozy advocates attacking corruption, crime. and illegal immigration, helping poor youths find employment, and addressing France's crisis of moral bankruptcy.

What ails France is of course not entirely Chirac's fault. It's more like a complication caused by France's "Fifth Republic." The unique characteristic of the Fifth Republic, is that it turned the presidency into the nation's center of political activity, while simultaneously weakening its parliament. Although Chirac did not expand the power of the presidency during his term of office, he underscored how unanswerable the president was to parliament or even public opinion. Taiwan perversely plagiarized this French constitution in which power and responsibility are out of balance, transforming Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian into "imperial presidents." Not only did the system not lead to "left right joint rule," it left a legacy of "Blue Green confrontation" and insoluble deadlock. From this perspective, isn't what ails Taiwan merely a new version of what ails France?

France's election reconsidered the problem of a president who had authority but no responsibility. It also called for a "Sixth Republic." The ROC on the other hand, chose not to include France's provision of run-off elections to ensure that the final winner commanded an absolute majority. As a result the ROC's elections degenerated into a vicious system of dog eat dog, inflicting immense harm upon democracy. Furthermore, Sarkozy will succeed Chirac after only ten days. The Democratic Progressive Party is promoting a two in one election, attempting to move the presidential election up to January, and to hold it concurrently with the legislative elections. if that is the case, the ROC will have a four month period in which there are "two presidents." The potential for back room deals and a power vacuum argues against such a rash measure.

Sarkozy is described as a "New Napoleon" brandishing a sword, sitting astride a rearing stallion. Perhaps that is an exaggeration. But without a doubt he is viewed as a force for political reform within the French nation. That being the case, are either Ma Ying-jeou or Frank Hsieh forces for political reform in 2008, when the fate of the ROC will be decided?

Original Chinese below:

從「法國病」看「台灣病」：改變的動力何在？
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.08 02:09 am

沙克吉當選總統，被稱為法國的「急右轉」。長期經濟虛弱、政治分裂、孤立主義、道德淪落的「法國病」，已到了讓人民無可忍受的地步；沙克吉的右翼立場雖受爭議，但他誓言改變法國現狀的企圖與魄力，終使他獲得多數選民的付託。

從 台灣看法國，這場選舉之所以備受關注，除了法國本身走向的變化，主要是我們當年憲改草率抄襲了法國「半總統制」，結果使憲政陷入僵局。尤其，十年來台灣經 濟萎縮、政治對立、在國際上更形孤立，這場「台灣病」和「法國病」也有幾分類似；觀察法國如何克服其衰弱症，或可提供台灣自我治療的參考。

沙 克吉三月多才宣布參選，短短時間即贏得青睞，主要在他抓住了法國選民對現狀的不滿，提出了有別於席哈克政府的大幅改革路線。沙克吉雖是席哈克政府的內政部 長，卻不避談自己的獨立見解，也毫不掩飾他與席哈克的歧見。正因為如此，他雖出身執政黨，卻仍能以改革訴求贏得民意，並讓國際社會相信他代表了法國迎向改 變的力量。

這種景象，比起民進黨四大天王亦步亦趨跟隨陳水扁路線、競逐他的關愛、 期待他的加持，而陳水扁更一心一意企圖操控「後扁時代」的政局，真有天壤之別。台灣漫長的大選過程，不僅是政治的消耗，更是人性的折磨；當主政者將「安排 接班人」視為理所當然，選民的意願早已被拋到腦後了。

沙克吉身為匈牙利移民第二 代，且從母系承襲了希臘和猶太血緣，這樣的多元背景，為他的當選增添了幾許傳奇色彩。兩年前沙克吉在鎮壓少數族裔暴動時的鐵腕，曾令愛好自由的法國人感到 不安，這也是選後巴黎少數地區騷動的主因。但沙克吉的族裔背景及政治上的幹練，似乎紓解了這種不安；可以說，他的當選本身就是法國種族寬容的表現。還在說 「外省人不適合當台灣總統」的人，請看看這次法國選舉多元多彩的名單吧！

歸納而 言，沙克吉所開出對付「法國病」的藥方包括幾方面：一、在經濟上，要採取減稅、降低工資、增加工時等措施，來改善投資環境，振興低迷的經濟，降低高失業 率；二、在國際戰略上，希望通過遭擱置的歐洲憲法，並與美國重新建立友好關係，使法國擺脫近幾年的孤立，重回歐美主流的懷抱。三、在社會改革上，主張加強 打擊貪汙、犯罪及非法移民，協助貧窮青年就業，重整法國的「道德破產」危機。

「法 國病」其實不完全是席哈克造成的，它更像是法國「第五共和」的併發症。第五共和的特徵，是使總統變成國家政治活動的中心，同時也導致國會的弱化。席哈克任 內雖未強化總統的權力，卻突出了總統不對國會負責、也不對民意負責的矛盾。偏偏台灣抄襲了法國這套權責不對稱的共和憲法，從而製造出李登輝和陳水扁兩個 「政治超人」；最後，不僅未能片刻實現「左右共治」，卻只留下「藍綠對峙」的無解僵局。由此看，「台灣病」不正是一個翻版的「法國病」？

法 國這次大選，對總統「有權無責」的問題作了重新思考，也提出了「第六共和」的呼聲。反觀台灣，當初修憲未將法國保證絕對多數當選的「兩輪選舉」的設計納 入，演變至今，已陷於一輪選舉的棄保及割喉苦戰，這對民主真是何其兇險！再看，沙克吉和席哈克的總統交接，十天之後就要進行；但民進黨推動的二合一選舉， 企圖將總統大選推前至一月與立委選舉合併舉行，果真如此，台灣將有長達四個多月出現「兩個總統」重疊的景象，勢將造成嚴重的政治黑箱及空窗期，實不宜貿然 實施。

沙克吉被描繪成揮刀躍馬的「新拿破崙」，也許言過其實，但他被寄望為推動法國改變的動力，則已毋庸置疑。那麼，在台灣大勢底定的二○○八大選，馬英九或謝長廷能為我們提供前進的動力嗎？

Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty

Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 07, 2007


Frank Hsieh wins Upset Victory over Su Tseng-chang

Hsieh's Win was a Surprise, Chen's Loss was a Certainty
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 07, 2007

Two major surprises. One, Frank Hsieh unexpectedly won a major victory, leading by nearly 16,000 votes. Two, Su Tseng-chang declared that he was forfeiting the party sponsored public opinion poll and withdrawing from the party primaries.

Prior to the election, even the Frank Hsieh camp estimated that Hsieh would lose by at least 15,000 votes. Instead, the result turned their universe upside down, and Frank Hsieh won by nearly 16,000 votes. Yesterday, halfway through the ballot counting, text messages from the Su Tseng-chang camp proclaimed that Su would seek to win the party sponsored public opinion poll, but shortly afterwards Su announced that he was withdrawing from the party primaries.

Frank Hsieh hopes to be the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate in 2008. Two upcoming developments are worth noting: One, on the eve of the election, Chen Shui-bian repudiated the suggestion that "the winner and runner-up should pair up." Su Tseng-chang also declared that he would not accept the vice-presidency. Now Su may have to resign his position as prime minister or else be forced out. Changes in this scenario will surely affect the political situation. Two, once Frank Hsieh, who advocates Conciliation and Co-existence, becomes the DPP presidential candidate, he will control developments within the the party and the ruling government. Chen Shui-bian will no longer be unable to manipulate the strategic picture and may become a lame duck.

Frank Hsieh had to move mountains to win his victory, at least four mountains. One, he affirmed the One China Constitution, Conciliation and Co-existence with mainland China, yet managed to retain the support of a majority within his party. Two, he is involved in the Kaohsiung Rapid Transit scandal and many other scandals. On the day of the vote, Su Tseng-chang even ran an ad proclaiming that Hsieh "may try to shift the focus away from himself, but he cannot change the reality of his involvement." Three, without the support of other factions within the DPP, exclusive reliance on "dummy voters" would not have assured Hsieh his landslide victory. Four, most importantly, Chen Shui-bian obviously supported Su Tseng-chang. Seven DPP mayors and county magistrates publicly supported Su. Every one of these four mountains was intimidating. Frank Hsieh unexpectedly moved them all, achieving a surprising and resounding victory.

On the eve of the vote, it was generally thought that Su Tseng-chang's momentum would increase, and that he would win by at least 15,000 votes. It was reasonable to assume that Su's offensive would draw blood. He attacked Hsieh's affirmation of a "One China Constitution," giving Hsieh more problems than he could handle. He attacked Hsieh's scandals, demanding that party members not vote for Hsieh, arguing that although Hsieh might be able to win the party primaries, he couldn't win the presidential election. These arguments had considerable substance. So why did Su Tseng-chang lose so badly?

The reasons are manifold, but Chen Shui-bian is without a doubt the key factor in Su Tseng-chang's downfall and defeat. In 2000, Lee Teng-hui dragged down Lien Chan. Today, Chen Shui-bian has dragged down Su Tseng-chang. Actually, everyone knows that this party primary was not merely a choice between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. The fact that Frank Hsieh could unexpectedly win a victory over an alliance between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and seven DPP mayors and county magistrates, reveals the discontent within the DPP, and changes within the hearts and minds of the DPP rank and file.

Given such developments, allow us to offer a guarded insight: Mainstream thinking within the Democratic Progressive Party since Chen Shui-bian's corruption scandals blew up in the party's face has been: "To rescue the party, we must rescue Chen." However, even after being rescued, Chen Shui-bian continued holding the DPP hostage. Therefore, during this primary election most party members supported Frank Hsieh, even though he is also implicated in numerous scandals, because they can no longer tolerate being held hostage by Chen Shui-bian. Only this can explain why most party members voted Chen out.

Some in the Green Camp believe that Su Tseng-chang's downfall and defeat is the fault of the New Tide Faction. They want to absolve Chen Shui-bian of responsibility. But even if the New Tide Faction was a factor, it was not the result of Chen, Su, and the New Tide Faction forming an alliance during the primary election. One need only look at Su Tseng-chang's rout in Chen Shui-bian's hometown -- Tainan City and Tainan County, to see the whole picture.

Frank Hsieh was not Chen Shui-bian's designated successor. From the beginning, Frank Hsieh maintained considerable distance between himself and Chen. This was Frank Hsieh's opportunity to "build his own brand." This was also the DPP's opportunity to begin its "Post-Chen" era. Chen Shui-bian has proclaimed that "In my remaining year in office, I still have many, many matters to attend to." We say it is time for Chen Shui-bian to stand down and give Frank Hsieh, the DPP, and Taiwan a way out.

The turnout for yesterday's election was only 55%, lower than anticipated. This shows that bloody infighting discouraged many party members from voting. Even more worth noting is how the candidates set up stalls in front of the polling booths, issuing party membership cards on the spot. These "voter brigages" marched in and out of the polling booths en masse. They didn't even bother concealing their actions. The problem of dummy voters inflating vote counts within the DPP was laid out under the sun for all to see. These dummy voters performed remarkably well during this party primary, engaging in "split voting."

During the national presidential primary race, the individual consciences of party members kicked in. This resulted in "Hsieh In, Su Out." It also had a significant influence on the DPP's ideological path and body politic. But in the local legislative primary race, the same voters unexpectedly reverted to the status of dummy voters. This led to machine politicians winning by landslides, and candidates who ran on idea-based platforms being overshadowed. The election result amounted to a test of dummy voter loyalty to political bosses. This did not help the DPP improve its image or clarify its political path.

Bloc voting by dummy voters is a congenital defect of the DPP. Instead of trying to reform this system of patronage, the party leadership has institutionalized this perverse system for primary elections, making the problem worse. In certain electoral districts, as long as some candidates are able to win because they control a several hundred dummy voters, they can demand a "Blues Excluded Opinion Poll." Isn't such a system a case of Gresham's Law, of bad currency driving out the good?

Dummy voters voted for legislators. Independent voters voted for the president. This reveals a bizarre self-contradiction within the DPP. Absent a spirit of reform, party members would not have rejected Chen and Su in favor of Frank Hsieh. But at the same time, Lin Cho-shui, Hsiao Bi-khim, Lee Wen-chung, Cheng Yun-peng, and Lin Shu-shan, who have been labeled the "Eleven Bandits" for having the temerity to demand internal reform, brought up the rear in the same election. This is not because party members displayed a commitment to reform only in the presidential primary race. This is because dummy voters were hijacked by legislators during the legislative elections.

This was not merely a DPP primary election. It was a civil war in which no quarter was given and no prisoners taken. Chen Shui-bian could have maintained neutrality. He could also have publicly supported Su Tseng-chang. Instead Chen Shui-bian made a pretense of neutrality, while in fact supporting Su Tseng-chang. As a result, Su Tseng-chang resorted to any and all means to attack Frank Hsieh. The grass roots within the party, not surprisingly, regarded Chen Shui-bian's indifference to Su's excesses as collusion. Chen Shui-bian and Su Tseng-chang used the same ruthless methods they used against the Blue Camp against their own comrade Frank Hsieh. This provoked a reaction against the Chen/Shu alliance, and won sympathy and support for Frank Hsieh.

Chen Shui-bian and seven mayors and county magistrates supported Su. They monopolized all power and resources. Yet they were trounced by Frank Hsieh, who had no resources whatsoever. This was a case of the rank and file lashing out at the high command. This was a case of of the will of the people delivering a knock-out blow to the will of their masters. Because of this, the DPP party hierarchy is now split. The rank and file within the DPP have revealed their desire for rebirth and reform. But the bizarre paradox of "dummy voters voting for legislators, independent voters voting for the president" has left the DPP mired in confusion.

When Frank Hsieh won, he said "Those with the least resources turned out to be those with the most resources." Chen Shui-bian lost. He needs to realize that "Those who abuse their power and resources, may well end up with no resources!"

Frank Hsieh's win was a surprise. Chen Shui-bian's loss was a certainty.

Original Chinese below:

謝長廷贏得意外，陳水扁輸得當然
【聯合報／社論】
2007.05.07 03:39 am

兩大意外。一，謝長廷居然以近一萬六千票的巨幅領先而大勝；二，蘇貞昌放棄進入民調，宣布退出初選。

選前，連謝長廷陣營也自估至少會輸一萬五千票，結果反而乾坤逆轉，大贏近一萬六千票；昨日開票過半之時，曾傳出蘇貞昌陣營仍以簡訊宣示將爭取民調勝出，不料稍後竟宣布退選。

謝長廷可望代表民進黨競選二○○八年總統。接下來值得注意的發展有二：一，由於陳水扁在投票前夕否定了「第一名要與第二名搭配」的說法，且蘇貞昌亦曾宣示「不當副手」，如今更極可能主動或被動地辭去行政院長；未來與此相關的情勢變化，必將牽動政局。二，主張和解共生的謝長廷成為民進黨的總統候選人後，勢須掌握黨政情勢的發展，陳水扁恐難再恣意左右大局，甚至可能跛腳。

謝長廷不啻是移走了四座大山，才能贏得如此漂亮。一，他主張憲法一中、和解共生，居然未動搖多數黨員對他的支持。二，他涉及高捷案等多件弊案，投票當日蘇貞昌甚至還登廣告指謝「轉移焦點不能改變涉案事實」。三，初選以人頭黨員為主體，非獲得超派系之支持，無可能獲此大勝。四，最重要的是，陳水扁明顯支持蘇貞昌，七縣市長亦公開挺蘇。這四座大山，無一不是巍峨險峻，謝長廷居然將之移去，贏得令人拍案驚奇。

投票前夕，一般認為蘇貞昌的聲勢看漲，至少會在黨員投票中贏謝一萬五千票。因為，就情理而論，蘇的攻勢確有打動人心之處。他痛擊謝的「憲法一中」，讓謝捉襟見肘；猛攻謝的弊案，要黨員勿投給即使初選過關、大選也過不了關的謝長廷。這些訴求皆是極其凌厲，但為何票開出來，蘇貞昌輸得如此難看？

原因很多，但陳水扁無疑是造成蘇貞昌落敗的核心因素。二○○○年李登輝拖垮了連戰，如今陳水扁則拖垮了蘇貞昌。其實，無人不知，此次初選不啻是要黨員在謝長廷與扁蘇之間作一選擇。而謝長廷居然能在「四座大山」壓頂之下，勝過扁蘇與七縣市長的聯盟，可見民進黨內的不平之氣，與民進黨內的人心思變。

情勢發展至此，或許可以審慎地提出一種想像：民進黨內自陳水扁貪腐弊案爆發以來的主流思想其實是：「為了救黨，才要救扁！」然而，陳水扁在獲救後竟仍想繼續挾持民進黨；因而，此次初選多數黨員寧可挺弊案纏身、爭議不斷的謝長廷，也要斷然擺脫陳水扁的操弄與挾持。倘非如此，不能解釋為何多數選票棄陳水扁而去。

綠營有人認為，蘇貞昌落敗是受新潮流之累，欲藉此開脫陳水扁的責任。但即使有新潮流的因素，亦因為扁蘇與新潮流於初選結盟所致。只要看蘇貞昌在陳水扁故鄉台南縣市大敗，已可一葉知秋。

謝長廷不是陳水扁所選擇與支持的接班人，而謝長廷自始即與扁維持相當的距離；這正是謝長廷自創品牌的契機，亦是民進黨真正開創「後扁時代」的空間。口口聲聲「在未來一年任期，還有很多很多事要做」的陳水扁，應當已到了放謝長廷、民進黨與台灣一條生路的時刻了！

昨天的選舉，五成五的投票率，較原先預期為低，顯示刀光血影的競爭廝殺，影響了黨員投票的意願。更值得注意的是，候選人在投票所前各自擺攤發證，「投票部隊」毫不避諱地團進團出，也將民進黨「人頭黨員」充斥的問題赤裸裸暴露在陽光下。然而，這些人頭黨員在此次初選中竟然演出了奇妙的「分離投票」。

在全國選區的總統初選部分，黨員的自主意識發揮了作用，這使得「謝上蘇下」，亦對民進黨的路線與體質皆有重大影響；但在地方選區的立委選舉中，同一批選民竟又回復到「人頭黨員」的角色，使金牛型人物遙遙領先，理念型人物黯然失色，選舉結果只是表達了「人頭黨員」的忠貞，對民進黨的體質改善與路線釐清並無幫助。

人頭黨員充斥，是民進黨的先天不良；黨中央不思設法導正，反而設計出這套畸形的初選制度，愈發使之惡化。試想，在若干選區中，有些候選人只要掌握數百張人頭黨員票即可勝出，然後順利獲得「排藍民調」的護送；這樣的制度，不是在進行劣幣驅逐良幣的反淘汰嗎？

「人頭黨員」選立委，「自主黨員」選總統；其間透露出自相矛盾的弔詭。倘若黨員不具改革精神，不可能棄扁蘇而選謝長廷；但是，包括林濁水、蕭美琴、李文忠、鄭運鵬、林樹山等被貼上「十一寇」罪名的黨內改革派，卻在這次黨員投票均吊車尾。這不能說「黨員」只在總統初選中才有改革精神，而是「人頭」被立委選舉挾持所致。

這不只是一場民進黨的「初選」，更是一場砍殺見骨的民進黨「內戰」。陳水扁原本可以維持中立，也可以公開支持蘇貞昌；但陳水扁卻謊稱中立，實際上則挺蘇。因此，蘇貞昌攻擊謝長廷之不擇手段，勢必被基層黨員視為陳水扁所包庇縱容。陳水扁以對付泛藍陣營的殘忍手法，與蘇貞昌用來鬥爭黨內同志謝長廷；這使扁蘇同盟遭到反彈，亦使謝長廷獲得了同情與支持。

陳水扁與七縣市長挺蘇，匯集了一切權力與資源，卻被自稱「最沒有資源」的謝長廷擊敗。這是基層擊倒高層，也是民意擊倒上意。民進黨的高層因此分裂，民進黨的基層卻透露出重生再造的期待。但是，「自主黨員選總統，人頭黨員選立委」的矛盾弔詭，亦將使民進黨陷於錯亂。

謝長廷贏了，他說：「最沒有資源，也就是最有資源。」陳水扁輸了，他應知：「最有權力資源，濫用權力資源，就可能變成最無資源！」

謝長廷贏得意外，陳水扁輸得當然。

Taiwan must Move Forward

Taiwan must Move Forward: Strengthen the Economy, Connect with the Asian-Pacific Region, and Adopt a Global Outlook
by Ma Ying-jeou
translated by Bevin Chu, Wu Min-yen, Li Cheng-hsiu
May 2, 2007


Ma Ying-jeou (standing)

Ladies and Gentlemen, Fellow Party Members, County and Municipal Chiefs, Members of the Press, Welcome!

ONE. UNITE OUR FORCES, ENSURE OUR VICTORY

The Kuomintang (KMT) Central Standing Committee has just approved Ma Ying-jeou as the party's presidential candidate in 2008, and will report its decision to the National People's Congress in June this year. I feel honored by their decision. I also feel the the weight of responsibility on my shoulders. Next year's presidential election will determine whether Taiwan can regroup and move forward. I promise to unite our forces to ensure our victory at the polls. I will personally invite Chairman Wang Jyn-ping to be my running mate, and together we will fight for Taiwan's future.

What worries the public on Taiwan the most is the economy. Therefore I would like to take this opportunity to share my vision for Taiwan, and to suggest the means by which this vision can be made a reality.

TWO. THE ISLAND'S ECONOMY IS DEPRESSED, THE PEOPLE'S LIVES ARE HARD

Recently I visited the Wang-kung fishing Port in Fang-yuan Village, Changhua County. I met a 70 year old woman named Yang, whose daily work was shucking oysters. Her work looked hard. I asked her how many hours she worked, and how much money she made. She said she worked ten hours a day, but the economy wasn't what it used to be, so she made only 200 NT a day. When I heard this, I felt a twinge of pain in my heart. This is Taiwan's plight. The common man works long hours, makes little money, and lives a hard life.

Ever since the Democratic Progressive Party assumed power, the economy has been in free fall, and the suicide rate has skyrocketed. Incomes no longer keep pace with living costs. University graduates' starting salaries are in decline. Among the Four Asian Tigers, Taiwan's economic performance is bringing up the rear. South Korea's national income has surpassed Taiwan's. The gap between rich and poor increases day by day. One hundred forty thousand schoolchildren cannot afford a nutritious lunch. Unemployment has nearly doubled during the past seven years. Fewer and fewer foreign businesses come to invest. More and more Taiwan businesses list on the Hong Kong exchange. The US and South Korea have reached a Free Trade Agreement. Asean and mainland China have established a Free Trade Area disadvantageous to Taiwan's development. Taiwan is increasingly marginalized.

Confronted with this reality, we cannot pretend to be blind, because people can feel the pressure, and are losing confidence in the future. If the Kuomintang takes office in 2008, we will bring order out of chaos, restore public confidence, and revive Taiwan's economy.

THREE. A STRATEGY TO REVIVE TAIWAN'S ECONOMY: STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY, CONNECT WITH THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION, AND ADOPT A GLOBAL OUTLOOK

In 2008, once the Kuomintang is in office, our goal will be an annual growth rate of 6%, and an average annual income of $US 20,000 by 2011.

The specifics of our strategy are:

First: Establish Local Reconstruction Funds to improve Local Finances; Promote Local Development to increase Taiwan's Prosperity

Given the embarrassing state of local finances, payrolls can't be met, making it difficult to promote local development. By the end of last year, long-term local government debt was 600 billion NT, revenues and expenditures were seriously out of balance, and local development was seriously hampered.

Central and local governments should be partners. But for seven years the central government has not only been grabbing all the power, it has been pocketing all the money. Local governments have been poor relations without a penny to their name. During my term as Taipei mayor, I experienced this hardship first hand. Many county and municipal chiefs are in the audience today. Once the Kuomintang is in office, we will reestablish the partnership between central and local governments. The central government should use its surplus revenues to establish a Local Government Financial Reconstruction Fund. It should help local governments pay off their debts, improve their finances, and promote local development. It is not necessary to wait till 2008. The central government should act now.

For the past several years central government tax revenues have exceeded expenditures. Why not use the surplus to help local governments? Haven't local governments contributed to to the central government's budget surplus? In 2005, central government revenue surpluses totaled 188 billion NT. Last year, they totaled 125 billion NT. The total for both years exceeded 300 billion NT. The central government will enjoy a surplus this year as well.

The election is drawing near, and the Democratic Progressive Party government is recklessly writing blank checks, buying political support from all quarters. We maintain that government money should help be used to help local communities. We suggest emulating private sector debt restructuring mechanisms, and before the end of this year, allocating at least 100 billion NT of the central government's surplus revenues to a Reconstruction Fund to help local governments pay off their debts. If we are in office in 2008, we will continue such a policy.

Second: Found Emerging Industries, Promote Traditional Industries, Create 100,000 Job Opportunities

Reviving Taiwan's economy requires founding emerging industries and promoting traditional industries, including service industries, manufacturing industries, and agriculture, directly creating job opportunities. If the Kuomintang is in office in 2008, we will reduce unemployment to less than 3%, and create 100,000 jobs per year.

In the emerging industries, for example biotechnology and the solar energy industry, if the Kuomintang is in office in 2008, we will implement concrete measures for achieving world leadership in emerging industries, and expand the scope of emerging industries, enhancing the potential for economic growth.

In the service industries, we will immediately eliminate unnecessary controls, creating income and job opportunities.

In the traditional manufacturing industries, we will promote competitiveness while upholding strict standards for environmental protection. Some industries face restructuring pressures. We must assist them, allowing these industries to become high value added industries producing products akin to French perfumes, Italian shoes, and Swiss watches. Which of these traditional industries is not a local, traditional industry? Because global consumers follow fashion, they are willing to pay high prices for these products, therefore these traditional industries have all become high valued added industries. If the government is diligent, Taiwan brands and products can be marketed the world over.

Taiwan's agriculture is not a sunset industry. It has the potential to reinvent itself. Once the Kuomintang is in office, we will support agriculture. On the one hand we will transform agriculture into a service industry. On the other hand, we will develop special crops, increasing overseas and mainland competitiveness. The Kuomintang will not cancel Welfare Subsidies to Elderly Farmers. If the National Annuity has not been established as scheduled, Welfare Subsidies to Elderly Farmers should be increased 1,000 NT to 6,000 NT, providing a safety net for senior citizens in rural regions.

Third: Connect with the Asian-Pacific Region by promoting Global Strategies: Transform Taiwan into a Bi-regional Airline Hub for both NE Asia and SE Asia. Transform Taiwan into an Dual Purpose Operations Center

The KMT's third strategy for reviving Taiwan's economy is to exploit Taiwan's geographical advantage, transforming Taiwan into a Bi-regional Airline Hub for both the Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian regions. We will do this by linking Taipei's CKS Airport to Tokyo's Haneda Airport, Seoul's Gimpo Airport and Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport in the north, and to Hong Kong's Chek Lap Kok Airport, Singapore's Changi Airport, and airports in the ASEAN nations in the south. We will establish Taipei's CKS Airport as a "double-gold" airline hub, then add existing trans-Pacific air routes. Taiwan-based enterprises can then set up global operations centers on Taiwan, and foreign companies can set up Asian-Pacific regional operations centers on Taiwan, transforming Taiwan into a Dual Purpose Operations Center.

The concept of a Bi-regional Airline Hub and a Dual Purpose Operations Center has implications not only for cross-Straits relations, but for the entire world. It connects Taiwan's economy to the economies of the Asian-Pacific region. We also seek to cooperate with the U.S. and other important economic partners in Asia, and to actively negotiate free trade agreements.

Fourth: Normalize Cross-Straits Economic and Trade Relations, predicated upon "Taiwan and the People First" and "Open as a Rule, Restricted as an Exception"

The ruling DPP knows the importance of the mainland market. However, because of its ideological bias and its Closed Door Policy, no opening is possible. Controls on cross-Straits economic policies should be eased. As long as provisions are made for crisis management, and as long as the Taiwan region and ROC citizens are given priority, Taiwan's policy should be "Open as a Rule, Restricted as an Exception." Specific provisions include:

( 1 ) Control Technology, not Capital when Businessmen from Taiwan invest on the Mainland

Regulations stipulate that companies based on Taiwan may not invest more than 40% of their net value on the mainland. Such restrictions harm only Taiwan, not the mainland. Take Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC) for example. If the government had allowed TSMC to invest on the mainland before the mainland developed its own wafer industry, TSMC would be the leader in IC manufacturing. Instead, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) has assumed that role. Even Intel has announced that it will set up a 12-inch wafer plant in Dalian. Taiwan has lost its edge.

If the KMT regains power, we will control only technology, not capital. If Taiwan -based enterprises keep their R&D on Taiwan, they can develop and own key technology. If that happens, we won’t need to limit the flow of capital. Allow businesses based on Taiwan to explore new frontiers and promote local prosperity.

( 2 ) Encourage Businessmen from Taiwan operating on the Mainland to list on Taiwan's Stock Market

Businessmen from Taiwan operating on the mainland are forbidden to list their companies on Taiwan's stock market. This prevents them from reinvigorating the capital market, from establishing new industries, and from keeping their roots in Taiwan. Permitting them to list their companies on the TAIEX would attract more foreign direct investment, benefiting Taiwan. Last year the number of companies listed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea jumped. Only Taiwan experienced a drop. Listings on the TAIEX fell from 691 to 688. Further losses are expected in the near future. More and more companies based on Taiwan are listing in Hong Kong. This trend is definitely hurting Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan should welcome investments by businessmen from Taiwan operating on the mainland.

( 3 ) Change Cross-Straits Tourism from Unilateral Consumption to Bilateral Exchange

Large numbers of tourists from Taiwan visit the mainland each year, but the ruling DPP stubbornly refuses to allow mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. This is irrational. If we wish to increase economic prosperity, we must change cross-Straits tourism from Unilateral Consumption to Bilateral Exchange, and open our arms to mainland tourists. We intend to set a quota of 3000 visitors per day, one million visitors per year, and increase that number to three million visitors per year within four years. By doing so, we intend to create business opportunities totaling 100 billion NT per year.

( 4 ) Set Limits on the Import of Mainland Agricultural Products

We will not unconditionally open Taiwan to mainland produce. We are concerned about the sustainability of some of Taiwan's agricultural products and consumer goods. Mainland produce that threaten Taiwan's agricultural development will not be imported. We will evaluate the impact of low-priced products from the mainland on Taiwan's production. What should be allowed will be allowed. What shouldn't be allowed won't be allowed.

4. CONCLUSION: LET DEPRESSION END, LET HOPE BEGIN

The public on Taiwan has endured a shrinking economy caused by ruling DPP incompetence for seven years. That is seven years too long. Only change can offer hope. Only a change in leadership can bring about a change in our future. Let us work together hand in hand for that future.

Only genuine commitment can unite the people and make Election Day 2008 a turning point. Let depression end. Let hope begin.

Taiwan must not sink. Taiwan must not remain stuck. Taiwan must move forward!

Thank you very much!

Original Chinese below:

台灣必須大步向前行！
壯大台灣，結合亞太，布局全球
馬英九
96.5.2

各位先進、各位同志、各位來自全國各縣市的首長、以及記者先生女士們，大家好！

一、團結一切力量，爭取勝選

中 國國民黨中央常務委員會剛才通過英九代表中國國民黨參選２００８總統一案，並將提報今年六月全國代表大會，個人至感榮幸，並也感受責任的重大。明年總統大 選關係著台灣能否重整旗鼓，向前出發。英九向大家保證，將團結一切可以團結的力量，爭取勝選，我也將親自邀請王院長，擔任競選夥伴，共同為台灣打拼。

如今台灣民眾最關心的還是經濟問題，所以英九想借用這個機會，闡明對台灣經濟的願景以及實踐願景的政策。

二、台灣經濟不振，基層民眾生活艱苦

最 近我到彰化芳苑鄉王功漁港，認識一位阿?，姓楊，已經七十歲了，她每天的工作是把蚵仔從殼裡一個一個挑出來。我看她挑得很辛苦，問她每天工作多久？可以賺 多少錢？她說每天要工作十小時，這幾年景氣比過去差很多，工作一天只能賺兩百多塊。我聽到，一陣心酸。這就是台灣的現狀，基層人民工作辛苦，但收入很少， 生活非常艱困。

民進黨執政以來，經濟不斷向下沈淪，自殺人數創新高；人民薪資趕不上物價上漲；大學生起薪與過去比，變為負成長；台灣經濟 表現落到四小龍尾；韓國國民所得超過了台灣；貧富差距日益擴大；如今十四萬學童繳不起營養午餐；台灣失業人口七年間最高增加將近一倍。此外，外商來投資的 越來越少，台商到香港上市的越來越多，再加上美韓自由貿易協定、東協加中國大陸的自由貿易區等等不利台灣的發展，台灣被邊緣化的壓力越來越大。

面對這些情況，我們不能視而不見，因為人民感到壓力，對未來慢慢失去信心。如果２００８國民黨執政，保證一定撥亂反正，恢復大家信心，重振台灣經濟。

三、重振台灣經濟的策略──壯大台灣、結合亞太、布局全球

2008年，國民黨一旦執政，將以每年經濟成長率6%為目標，2011年時，每人平均所得可達20,000美元。

我們具體政策如下：

第一、設地方重建基金，改善地方財政，推動地方建設，壯大台灣

現在地方財政困窘，連薪水都發不出，難以推動地方建設，影響經濟發展。根據瞭解，到去年底為止，各地方政府長期債務，約達6,000億元，收支嚴重失衡，地方建設大受影響。

中 央與地方應是夥伴關係，七年以來中央集權又集錢，地方政府巧婦難為無米之炊，我在台北市長任內感受至深。今天多位縣市長同志在座，我要提出一項政策，就 是國民黨如果執政，一定重建中央與地方的夥伴關係，中央政府應將超收的稅捐，成立「地方政府財政重建基金」，幫地方政府打消債務，改善地方財政困境，促進 地方建設。我們認為不必等到２００８，中央政府應該立即去做。

近這幾年中央政府稅捐超收，實際課稅收入超過了預算，為什麼不拿超收的錢，幫助地方呢？稅捐超收，地方政府難道沒貢獻嗎？九十四年，中央政府稅捐超收約1,880億元，去年又有1,250億元，兩年加起來已經超過3,000億，今年肯定也會超收。

大 選快到了，我們看到民進黨政府亂開支票，四處綁樁。我們呼籲：政府的錢應該多幫地方。我們建議參考民間債務協商機制，在今年底前，從超徵的稅收中，至少提 撥1,000億，作為第一年「重建基金」，協助地方政府打消債務、解決燃眉之急。2008年以後，如果我們執政，一定繼續提撥。

第二、開創新興產業，振興傳統產業，創造十萬個就業機會

重振台灣經濟必須同時開創新興產業與振興包括服務業、製造業與農業等傳統產業，直接創造就業機會。如果2008年國民黨執政，我們將使失業率逐步降至3%以下，每年多創造的就業機會，要逐步增加到十萬人。

在新興產業方面，例如生物科技、太陽能產業等，2008國民黨如果執政，將研擬具體計畫，以創造具世界領導地位的新興產業及擴充新興產業的範疇，厚實經濟成長的動力。

在振興服務業方面，將立刻訂定振興方案，消除不必要的管制，課以各部會創造所得和就業數量的明確責任。

在 傳統製造業方面，將協助其提升競爭力與配合日益嚴格的環保要求。有些產業則面臨轉型壓力，必須協助他們，努力讓這些產業變成高附加價值的「高級產業」，就 像法國的香水、義大利的皮鞋、瑞士的鐘錶一樣。這些產業哪一項不是當地的傳統產業？但全球的消費者卻趨之若騖，願付很高的價錢買這些產品，所以這些傳統產 業都變成高附加價值的產業。只要政府用心，台灣品牌與產品一定可以行銷全世界。

另外，我們要強調台灣農業並不是夕陽產業，它絕對有轉型再 造的能力。國民黨執政一定扶植農業，一方面將農業服務業化，另一方面發展台灣特殊品種的農作物，增加在海內外市場（包括大陸）的競爭力。我們在此保證，國 民黨執政絕對不會取消老農年金，如果國民年金沒有如期開辦，希望老農年金增加1,000元，成為6,000元，讓農村老年人的生活獲得基本保障。

第三、以雙航圈、雙中心，結合亞太，布局全球

我 們重振台灣經濟的第三項策略，是利用台灣地理優勢，推動東北亞及東南亞雙航圈，向北連結東京羽田機場、首爾金浦機場，上海虹橋機場、向南連結香港、新加坡 和東協各國首都。有了「雙黃金航圈」，配合既有的跨越太平洋航線，就可以促使台商在台灣設立全球營運中心，外商在台灣設立亞太營運中心，也就是「雙營運中 心」。

這個「雙航圈、雙中心」的概念，包含了兩岸政策，但超越了兩岸政策，而是「全方位」布局，也就是以台灣既有的經濟實力，和亞太經濟緊密結合，同時我們也將尋求與美國及亞太重要經濟夥伴，積極協商自由貿易協定，達成布局全球的目標。

第四、在「以台灣為主、對人民有利」及「原則開放、例外管制」原則下，推動兩岸經貿正常化

民進黨政府也瞭解大陸市場的重要，但因為意識形態與鎖國政策，遲遲無法突破。我們認為只要作好風險管理，秉持「以台灣為主，對人民有利」及「原則開放，例外管制」的原則，兩岸經濟管制應該鬆綁，具體政策包括：

1. 企業赴大陸投資應控管技術，不管資金

台灣企業到大陸投資，目前規定不能超過淨值40%，這種限制「對大陸無效，對台灣有害」。

像台積電晶圓廠，如果幾年前，大陸自己晶圓產業沒有成型之前，就讓台積電去布局，現在大陸晶圓製造的市場龍頭地位，就非台積電莫屬，但目前大陸的中芯等廠已經起來，甚至英特爾宣佈在大連設置十二吋晶圓廠，台灣已漸錯過時機。

如果國民黨執政，我們將合理控管技術，不會控管資金。我們堅持台灣企業須持續在台灣進行研發活動，發展關鍵技術、保有關鍵技術。只要這些能做到，就不要限制資金，讓企業自由到外地開疆闢土，提升台灣實力。

2. 鼓勵大陸台商回台上市，活絡台股，根留台灣

目 前大陸台商回台上市，受限投資規定，沒有可行性，但讓台商在台灣的股票市場上市，可以活絡台灣資本市場，帶動新興產業發展，讓台商根留台灣，並且可以吸 引更多外資，對台灣有利。去年不論香港、新加坡與韓國股市新上市公司都大幅度增加，只有台灣的上市公司減少了三家[691降到688]，未來還可能進一步 減少，而台灣去香港上市的公司越來越多，這對台灣極為不利。所以，台商回台上市，應當全面開放。

3. 兩岸觀光從「單向消費」改成「雙向互惠」

在 觀光方面，每年台灣有大批人去大陸旅遊、消費，但不准大陸觀光客來台花錢，實在說不通。要對人民有利，就要把「單向消費」，改成「雙向互惠」，開放大陸觀 光客來台。我們希望每天開放3,000人，每年100萬人，四年內增加到每年300萬人，這樣有機會創造每年1,000億以上的收益。

4. 大陸農產品進口，不輕易開放

兩 岸經貿並不是全部都開放。像台灣許多農產品和消費品，我們必須注意產業的承受能力。貿然開放大陸農產品大量輸入台灣，如果衝擊台灣農業發展，就先不要開 放。另外，大陸低價的消費品，有些也要慎重，評估對台灣不利的影響。所以，我們強調，開放不是放任，當開則開，不當開則不開。

四、結語：鬱卒到此結束，希望從此開始

七年了，民進黨政府無能，經濟一落千丈，大家受的苦已經夠了。大家想過好日子，只有改變才有希望，只有政黨再次輪替才有機會。讓我們大家一起努力，用選票達到我們希望的改變。

只要我們精誠團結，結合廣大群眾的力量，就可以讓2008投票的那ㄧ天，鬱卒到此結束，希望從此開始。

台灣不能繼續沈淪、不能原地踏步，台灣必須大步向前行！

台灣加油！

謝謝大家！

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 1, 2007


Now: US controlled Puppet Regime on Taiwan poses Deadly Threat to China

Then: Soviet controlled Puppet Regime on Cuba posed Deadly Threat to America

Comment: The following China Times editorial astutely notes that the puppet regime illegally squatting in the Republic of China Presidential Palace has dropped the ball, big time. The Chen Shui-bian regime, like the Lee Teng-hui regime before it, has proven thoroughly incompetent at anything other than populist rabble-rousing.

Forget any hope that it can increase the nation's long term economic prosperity. The Chen regime doesn't even have the ability to slow the nation's precipitous decline in prosperity.

But when the author of this otherwise excellent editorial wrings his hands over this undisputed fact, and demands that the Chen regime do a better job of countering Beijing's "soft offensive," he is confessing that he can no longer see the forest for the trees.

The China Times, as its name implies, is a Chinese newspaper. It is not a "Taiwanese" newspaper. By that I mean that it is a newspaper in the nation of China. It is not a newspaper in any "Nation of Taiwan." It is not a newspaper in any "Nation of Taiwan" because there is no "Nation of Taiwan."

Since it is a newspaper in the nation of China, presumably concerned with the well-being of the nation it is a part of, should the China Times be wringing its hands over the failure of a puppet regime to advance its traitorous agenda of Balkanizing the Chinese nation?

It is one thing to wring one's hands over the economic plight of the Chinese people in the Taiwan region of the Republic of China.

It is another thing altogether to wring one's hands over the fact that a puppet regime is bungling its efforts to divide and conquer the Chinese nation on behalf of hostile governments in neighboring nations.

The mainland authorities are indeed attempting to use soft, i.e., economic, power to reunite the Chinese nation. Remembering that economic power is the power of persuasion, one can't help asking the author of the China Times editorial, how exactly is that a bad thing?

When did our "pro reunification media" become Taiwan independence fellow travelers?

Now, more than ever, our pro reunification media needs to be clear that the Republic of China is not "Taiwan." The Republic of China is China.

The author of the China Times editorial asks "Where is Taiwan's response to the mainland's soft offensive?"

Permit me to point out that "Taiwan" shouldn't have a response to the mainland's soft offensive. If anybody should have a response to the mainland's soft offensive, it is not "Taiwan," but the Republic of China.

As long as mainland authorities are striving to reunite China in a manner consistent with the values embodied in the Republic of China Constitution, such as free markets and property rights, the pro reunification media on Taiwan should welcome, not dread such soft offensives.

Otherwise Taiwan independence Quislings should stop giving the China Times and the United Daily News undeserved credit by referring to them as "pro reunification media," and begin referring to them as "pro independence media."

Where is Taiwan's Response to the Mainland's Soft Offensive?
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
May 1, 2007

First problems arose with the introduction of the Olympic Flame to Taiwan. Next, the recent Kuomintang/Chinese Communist Party Forum announced its newest proposal for opening up the mainland to Taiwan. Finally, we saw the ruling regime's response, and we are more worried than ever. On the one hand we are witnessing wave upon wave of increasingly methodical soft offensives on the part of Beijing. On the other hand Taiwan's ruling regime seems to have no response other than sitting on its hands or mechanically repeating the word "No!"

To put it bluntly, the mainland's attitude is one of supreme confidence, throwing its doors wide open to anything and everything from Taiwan. Taiwan's response, by contrast, is to slam its doors shut on anything and everything from the mainland in an unseemly panic. As a result, pandas can't enter, mainland tourists can't enter, even the Olympic Flame can't enter. And judging by the ruling regime's initial reaction, mainland students probably won't be allowed to enter to study at universities on Taiwan either. This situation, in which one side opens up while the other side closes down, is one in which the Taiwan side is always the one dragging its feet, always the one whose position is problematic, and always the one responsible for any failure to reach an accommodation.

Take the current wave of mainland concessions for example. As the party granting concessions, the mainland can decide to give this, that, or the other to Taiwan. Whether Taiwan actually needs any particular concession is beside the point. Whether Taiwan accepts or rejects the concessions is no skin off the mainland's nose. If the Olympic Flame is not allowed to pass through Taiwan, does that mean the Olympics will no longer be held? Of course not! On the other hand, some people on Taiwan are worrying whether athletes from Taiwan will be allowed to participate in their events when the games begin. By the same token, if mainland students are not allowed to study at universities on Taiwan, universities from other nations will fall over each other competing for them. Those truly concerned will be universities on Taiwan already plagued by less than full enrollment.

One might say that these are two entirely different modes of strategic thinking. The mainland's focus is global public relations. By opening the mainland to Taiwan, they are demonstrating their sincere desire to improve cross-Straits relations. Based on global media coverage, they have surely succeeded. But how about Taiwan? Unfortunately, the ruling regime remains focused on internal elections. As a result, the ruling regime's kneejerk response to the mainland's soft offensive, besides saying "No!" is to angrily denounce both Beijing and the Blue Camp. The sole purpose of this kind of maneuver is to mobilize for elections. Even when an election is not pending, the ruling regime will choose to do nothing for fear of offending pro independence sensibilities. When one side is aggressively managing global perceptions, and the other side insists on haggling over short term internal advantage, which side do you imagine is going to gain the upper hand?

If truth be told, the concessions the mainland is granting Taiwan, such as allowing mainland students to attend universities on Taiwan, allowing mainland tourists to visit Taiwan, increasing the number of cities allowed to schedule direct cross-Straits charter flights, increasing the number of ports of entry for compatriots on Taiwan, all require complex negotiations by agencies from both sides of the Straits before they can become a reality. Without consultations, no matter how many concessions Beijing is willing to grant, they will remain nothing but lip service. Everyone knows the key is consultations. As long as the status of these issues is neither official nor unofficial, neither international or domestic, they will remain unresolved. Any discussions will be meaningless. A single technical detail can lead to deadlock. For the past several years, the Beijing authorities have not yielded on a single key issue. Taiwan's participation in the WHO is a clear example. Taiwan's maneuvering room on cross-Straits issues is becoming small and smaller. Under these circumstances, we can not only predict that direct flights will never happen, we can also predict that Taiwan will never be opened to mainland tourists. And you can forget about mainland students coming to Taiwan to attend university.

By contrast, the mainland, through its rapidly growing economy, has been beckoning to Taiwan's professional class. Last year the KMT/CCP Forum recognized diplomas issued by institutions of higher learning on Taiwan, and permitted doctors from Taiwan to practice on the mainland. This time the KMT/CPP Forum has opened the mainland to 15 different kinds of professionals from Taiwan, including economists, accountants, translators, auctioneers, real estate brokers, certified tax agents, and pharmacists. They are welcoming students from Taiwan to register for mainland commercial aviation schools. Aircraft maintenance technicians from Taiwan can also apply for mainland licenses. We should realize that these openings do not require any nod from agencies on Taiwan. The mainland merely needs to make a unilateral announcement to that effect. It takes little thought to realize that in the foreseeable future, these opening measures to Taiwan's specialized human resources will exert an intense magnetic attraction. Within a few years, after manufacturing industries have completed their massive westward migration, talented professionals will follow. In view of this trend, what strategy should Taiwan adopt? Don't ask the ruling regime.

With the exception of certain key industries, the euphemistically named "Exercise Patience, Avoid Haste" and "Aggressive Management, Effective Opening" policies imposed by Taiwan's ruling regime have not prevented the western migration of manufacturing industries. Those industries that have been blocked lost their chance to take the lead long ago. The very next step will be a wave of talented professionals from Taiwan following in their footsteps. Needless to say, we know exactly what the ruling regime is going to say and do. What we want to know is, in these challenges, where is Taiwan's strategic response?

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.05.01
面對大陸軟性攻勢，台灣的總體戰略在哪？
中時社論

先是奧運聖火登台生變，接著國共論壇大陸對台灣拋出的最新開放項目，最後再看到執政當局的相關反應，不諱言說，我們的憂慮真的愈來愈深。因為一方面我們見識北京當局對台灣的軟性攻勢一波接一波，勢道也愈來愈綿密；另一方面台灣的執政當局這邊除了負面的制式反應外，就只剩下不斷的被動接招了。

講得再白一點，目前的態勢是，大陸對台灣擺出的姿態是自信滿滿，這也開放，那也開放，台灣這邊作出的回應也幾乎都是能擋則擋，這也不准，那也不行。於是從先前的熊貓來不成、陸客赴台觀光來不成，奧運聖火來不成，此番開放陸生來台念大學，從此間初步反應看來，看樣子多半也是來不成。這種一邊放、另一邊堵的景況，陷於被動的都是台灣這一邊，可能被檢討的也是台灣這一邊，這一來一往之間，等於巧妙地將兩岸和解破局的責任，都移轉到台灣的這一邊了。

就用送禮做比喻吧！做為送禮的一方，大陸可以選擇要送這個還是送那個給台灣，台灣是不是真的有需要倒不是重點。而台灣接受也好，就算全部都不要，對大陸也不會有任何損失。試問聖火如果確定不繞過台灣，會不會影響奧運的順利舉行？不會嘛！倒是台灣這邊已經開始有人焦慮會不會屆時連運動員都去不成。同樣的，陸生來不成台灣念大學，立即會有很多國家的大學積極爭搶著他們去念，真正會急的將是台灣那些已經面臨招生不足的大學。

可以說，這幾乎是兩條截然不同的戰略思維。大陸著眼的是全球的公關效應，藉由一系列的對台政策開放，向全球的輿論展示他們改善兩岸關係的誠意與努力，這一點從全球媒體報導的取向看來，他們確實做到了。而台灣這邊呢？很遺憾，所在乎的主要還是內部選舉造勢的效應，於是面對大陸的開放攻勢，我們看到最多的制式反應，除了「說不」之外，就是痛批北京外加痛擊藍軍，這種操作模式唯一著眼就是選舉動員。就算碰到非選舉期間，也會基於獨派可能不滿考量下選擇不作為。當一邊積極經營全球視聽的聲勢，一邊則只計較內部短線的消費，試問那一邊會站在較有利的位置呢？

講實在話，大陸提供給台灣的所謂利多，如開放陸生來台念大學、開放大陸人士赴台旅遊、增加兩岸直航包機城市、增設台胞簽注口岸等，幾乎大部分都需要兩岸相關主管部門的繁複協商後才算成局，未經「協商」就算北京釋出再多的利多，也只是停留在「口惠」的階段。而誰也都知道，問題的關鍵就在這個「協商」上，只要類似「官方／非官方」、「國際／國內」的定位爭執永遠理不出頭緒，談什麼都是假的，一個技術性的小細節都有可能讓正在進行中的協商全面陷入僵局。偏偏這幾年，北京當局在核心問題的立場上一步也沒讓過（台灣參與ＷＨＯ即是顯例），台灣則在兩岸定位的立場上，彈性空間越來越少，這種情勢發展的態勢，預示未來不僅直航遙遙無期，連已經啟動協商的開放大陸客觀光也面臨破局，八字尚沒一撇開放陸生來台念大學，就更不必提了。

相對的，大陸也藉由其快速成長經濟環境，向台灣的專業人士全方位的招手。去年的國共論壇已經承認台灣高等院校學歷，並允許台灣醫生在大陸執業，這回更針對台灣相關領域的專業人士開放包括十五種專業技術人員的資格考試，包括經濟、會計、翻譯、拍賣師、房地產經紀人、註冊稅務師、藥師等。還歡迎台灣學生報考大陸民航學校，台灣的機務維修人員可考大陸執照等。要知道，這些開放是不需要台灣相關部門點頭的，大陸那邊只需片面宣布開放即可。而不用想都知道，在可預見的未來，這些開放措施將對台灣的專業人力資源，形成強烈的磁吸作用，不出幾年，繼產業大量西進之後，人才也要大量西進了。針對這個趨勢，台灣因應的策略是什麼？不知道。

台灣實施多年的戒急用忍、積極管理、有效開放等政策，除了關鍵產業外，其實並沒能封阻產業的西進，而被封阻住的產業則早已失去搶進布局的先機。很快的下一步將面臨台灣人才的西進浪潮，不諱言地說，執政當局會操作什麼批判論述我們已經很熟悉，我們在乎的是，因應這一波波的挑戰，台灣的總體戰略究竟在哪裡？