The Door is Locked from the Inside:
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2012
Summary: The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
Full Text below:
Beginning today, the DPP will hold a four week long forum on Mainland issues. It has invited "all parties" to discuss cross-Strait issues. Rumors are today's topic will be "A Focus on the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress."
The DPP has been clamoring for months about a "Great [Mainland] China Policy Debate." If all that hoopla has come down to this, then it was a colossal joke.
The DPP boasted that the policy debate would be thoroughgoing. Outsiders expected such a debate. Yet suddenly we were told this ostensibly thoroughgoing debate would focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress? The DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. The DPP says it wants to resolve its Mainland China policy. But how does having "all parties" banging on the DPP's door from outside do any good? The DPP has fastened a lock to the door and injected superglue into the keyhole. We hope the DPP can somehow manage to open the lock. Su Tseng-chang admits he cannot unlock the door from the inside. He does not even have the guts to call for a Mainland China policy debate inside the party. Instead he went through the motions of "seeking out different parties to focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress." This was simply staggering. One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.
Every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows that the DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. Su Tseng-chang knows this as well. Su Tseng-chang may be afraid to launch either an open or closed-door policy debate on Mainland China policy within the DPP. But he should at least coordinate with Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. The trio should be able to offer a cross-Strait policy that is confident, open, and well thought out. The trio could coordinate their rhetoric and their action. They could spearhead the transformation of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They could open the door that has been locked from the inside.
The current situation is clear. Su and Tsai intend to run for president in 2016. Frank Hsieh on the other hand, wants to be the chief engineer of cross-Strait policy transition. As a result Su, Tsai, and Hsieh all want to transform the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Each of the three is a key figure who can influence the situation. But Su and Tsai will be political rivals in 2016. The two hope to benefit from the transformation. But neither wishes to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Each may want the other to take the lead in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. That way when the other offends the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, he or she can benefit from the other's troubles. As a result, these two may be reluctant to lead the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. After all, opposition from Taiwan independence fundamentalists caused Frank Hsieh's "Cross-Strait Affairs Committee" to run aground.
This is the fundamental reason for the DPP's current predicament. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh are key figures in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. They are irreplaceable. But each has a hidden agenda. They cannot work together. The door is locked from the inside. Who is going to open it?
Consider current political developments. On the one hand, the prospects for the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016 are improving. On the other hand, the DPP must establish better relations with Beijing. Voter anxiety over this matter cannot be ignored. Suppose the current situation persists. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins the presidential election in 2016. Suppose it is unable to transform its cross-Strait policy before the election. Once the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will immediately become Beijing's hostage. Beijing will demand that the DPP explicitly renounce Taiwan independence, and reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP refuses, Beijing will make life impossible for the DPP. It need only lure away one of Taipei's diplomatic allies, cut Mainland tourists to Taiwan by 20%, reduce orders for Taiwan's agricultural products, or refuse to sign an FTA. The ruling DPP regime would soon be in total chaos.
The Ma administration's record since its re-election in 2012 has been less than stellar. Fortunately the Ma administration has been able to stabilize cross-Strait relations. Otherwise the chaos would be unimagineable. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen had been elected in 2012. The DPP would still be wrangling over a "Cross-Strait Dialogue Working Group." Imagine the chaos that would have ensued.
The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more it must change is cross-Strait policy. The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more concerned voters will be about its cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012. The main reason was swing voters' deep rooted suspicions about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. The DPP will continue to face these problems in 2016. Neither Su nor Tsai can avoid them.
Su and Tsai may not like each other. But the two must work together to transform of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must not attempt to use the transformation to take political advantage of each other. If the transformation is successful, it will be beneficial to both of them during the 2016 election. It will also be beneficial to one of them in the event one or the other is elected. The two can refuse to work together. The two can watch each other from the sidelines. Each can hope that the other becomes trapped in a quagmire. But if they refuse to work together, the hoped for DPP transformation will evaporate into thin air. The result will be unfavorable to the presidential ambitions of both candidates. It will be especially unfavorable to the DPP in the event it returns to power. It may even become one of Taiwan's greatest political and economic disasters.
Frank Hsieh is a DPP insider. He is the one closest to this locked door. He holds the keys that can open the door. He says Taiwan independence is impossible. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China. His rhetoric may require closer scrutiny. But he already has three of the four numbers to a four digit combination lock. Su and Tsai may find it difficult to unlock the door on their own. But they can arrive at a tacit agreement and allow Frank Hsieh to enter the final number to the combination.
The situation is clear. Beijing intends to force the DPP to abandon Taiwan independence. Until it does, it has no intention of letting up. DPP leaders such as Frank Hsieh know that Taiwan independence is impossible. This is the last number in the combination. This is the number that every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows by heart. The problem is the DPP's door is locked from the inside. Can Su, Tsai, and Hsieh work together to open the door? If the door cannot be opened, then the DPP cannot get out. Su and Tsai of course, cannot either.
The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
門是從裡面鎖死：籲蘇蔡謝共赴民黨轉型工程
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.11
民進黨今起連續四周在周二舉辦中國問題座談會，邀約「各方人士」討論兩岸議題，據謂今日首場的主題將「聚焦中共十八大」。
這若就是民進黨喧嚷了幾個月的「中國政策大辯論」，直可令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非。
首先，民進黨內原本宣示的，及外界原本期待的，應是一場穿骨入髓的「中國政策大辯論」，怎會突然抽樑換柱成了「聚焦中共十八大」？再者，民進黨兩岸政策的大門其實是從裡面鎖死的，若要解決其中國政策的困局，找來「各方人士」從門外敲敲打打有何用？只能寄望民進黨人從門裡設法打開被三秒膠堵死的大鎖。如今，蘇貞昌擺明了沒有能力從裡面開鎖，甚至連在黨內進行中國政策大辯論的膽識都沒有，居然以「找各方人士聚焦中共十八大」來敷衍形勢，豈不令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非？
每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知，民進黨兩岸政策的大門是從裡面鎖死的，當然蘇貞昌亦不會不知。蘇貞昌如果不敢在民進黨內發動公開的或閉門的中國政策大辯論，他至少亦應設法與蔡英文及謝長廷共三人，一同就兩岸政策進行推心置腹、開誠佈公的深刻研議，然後在三人協調的論述及三人協調的行動下，共同帶動民進黨兩岸政策的大轉型，從裡面打開那扇鎖死的大門。
當下的情勢很清楚，蘇蔡皆有意競逐二○一六總統，謝長廷則以兩岸政策轉型總工程師自許；因而，蘇蔡謝三人皆願見民進黨的兩岸政策轉型，且皆是影響情勢的關鍵人物。但是，由於蘇蔡的二○一六之爭，兩人雖皆期待轉型之利，卻又不希望得罪獨派，甚至皆希望對方因主導轉型而開罪獨派以收漁翁之利，以致兩人在轉型工程上均有所顧忌，又因獨派反對而使謝長廷出掌「兩岸事務委員會」亦告觸礁。
這正是民進黨今日困局的根本原由：因為蘇蔡謝三人皆是在轉型工程上不可取代的關鍵人物，如今三人卻各懷鬼胎，不能同心協力，這扇從裡頭鎖死的大門還能盼誰來打開？
就政局發展來看，一方面民進黨在二○一六總統選舉的情勢漸趨看好，另一方面民進黨對於不能改善與北京關係的焦慮更已無法掩飾。此一局勢發展下去，民進黨倘在二○一六贏得選舉，而在選前不能做好兩岸政策的轉型工程；一旦民進黨執政，即勢將立即落入北京的挾持之中。屆時，民進黨若不接受「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」的立場，北京只消拿掉台灣一個邦交國，或減少二十％陸客來台，或抽掉幾張台灣農特產訂單，或杯葛一下ＦＴＡ，就可讓民進黨政權鬧得內外難以收拾。
國民黨馬政府贏得二○一二年連任以來的表現欠佳，但平實而言，幸好馬政府尚能穩住兩岸這一塊，否則國家亂局必更難以想像。倘若二○一二是由民進黨的蔡英文當選，現在兩岸恐怕仍在因「兩岸對話工作小組」而鬧得不可開交，那種亂局豈能想像？
民進黨愈有趨近重新執政的可能性，愈應及早調整其兩岸政策；而愈接近民進黨有執政可能之時，選民對其兩岸政策必愈加關切。蔡英文在二○一二敗選的主因，正是緣於中間選民對民進黨的兩岸政策深具疑懼。這是民進黨在二○一六總統大選時仍將面對的問題，無論蘇蔡皆無以逃避。
所以，無論蘇蔡如何不喜歡對方，二人仍應同心協力帶動民進黨兩岸政策的轉型工程；而切切不應以轉型工程來相互牽制。因為，轉型若成功，對二人之競選二○一六總統必有利，亦對倘若當選後之執政也有利；倘若不此之圖，二人相互觀望，甚至希望對方能陷溺於轉型的泥淖中，如此必終導致轉型成為泡影，這對兩人的競選之路不利，尤對倘若當選後執政大不利，甚至必會演成為台灣的政經大災禍。
謝長廷是民進黨內最接近從裡面鎖死的大門者，他手中所持鑰匙也是最有開鎖可能者。他說，台獨不可行，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到中華民國；這些論述，雖然尚多可以細究之處，但如果是要開號碼鎖的話，四個數碼可謂大概已對中了三個。蘇蔡二人皆有不能自己打一把鑰匙去開鎖的難處，但只要能形成挺謝的默契，就讓謝長廷去轉動那開鎖的最後一字密碼吧。
情勢很清楚。北京不將民進黨逼到放棄台獨的地步，不會鬆手；而民進黨人如謝長廷者亦皆知，台獨不可行。這就是開鎖的最後一字密碼，這也是每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知的密碼；只是民進黨的大門是從裡面鎖死的，但看蘇蔡謝三人能否在這一次的機遇中合力共同打開。門打不開，民進黨就走不出去，蘇蔡當然亦走不出去。
北京的兩岸政策三元素是：「反對台獨／九二共識／一中框架」；台灣的對策則應是：「一中憲法／一中各表（一個中國是中華民國）／大屋頂中國（中華民國是民主中國）」。民進黨若想迎對二○一六的新局，必須先打開從裡面鎖死的大門。
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
Monday, September 10, 2012
Big Roof China: Democratic China and Socialist China
Big Roof China: Democratic China and Socialist China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 10, 2012
Summary: We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
Full Text below:
On August 15, The Chi Feng 2 departed from Hong Kong and reached the Diaoyutai Islands. The passengers carried with them red, white, and blue ROC flags and five star PRC flags. They waved these flags on the islands to dramatic effect. The next day Mainland media organizations outdid each other reporting the story. Sad to say, most of them useds PhotoShop to edit out the red, white, and blue ROC flag. This provoked a backlash from netizens on the Mainland. The two images, one with the ROC flag and one without, are worth contemplating. This is true for ROC officials and civilians alike.
Diaoyutai Island Defense Movement activists from Hong Kong took both the red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag with them to the islands. At first, people were surprised. But it did not take long before they understood. Hong Kong is located in the Pearl River estuary. It has witnessed two centuries of vicissitudes. It long ago transcended allegiance to either side. During the 50s and 60s, prior to its 1997 return to the Mainland, the streets of Hong Kong were often festooned with ROC flags on Double Ten National Day. To this day, the values held in Hong Kong are closer to those held on Taiwan than on the Mainland. The red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands by private individuals from Hong Kong. They were not using the ROC national flag to "promote Chinese reunification." Their actions merely reflect the deep affection the people of Hong Kong feel for the ROC flag.
Mainland newspapers "airbrushed" the red, white, and blue ROC flag from the photograph of the Diaoyutai Islands landing. Mainland netizens denounced the newspapers' actions as "bogus" and "shameless." Later, one newspaper published a solemn apology. It acknowledged that it "hurt the feelings of readers." It acknowledged that "as a member of the Fourth Estate, it should never have allowed this to happen. When referring to the ROC, Mainland newspapers generally add scare quotes to "president," "Executive Yuan," and "legislators." This is another form of "airbrushing." After all, these government offices and government entities do exist on Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the Global Times, a sister publication of the People's Daily, published the photograph intact. It refrained from editing out the red, white, and blue ROC flag.
We must not exaggerate the significance of these two images. We must also acknowledge that the problem is one both sides share. Do citizens of the ROC realize the importance of the ROC to people on the Mainland and Hong Kong? Do citizens of the ROC realize they must make a place for the ROC in the hearts of people on the Mainland and Hong Kong?
The ROC government should stop saying that it "has no intention of joining forces with the Mainland against Japan" on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. It should use the issue as leverage. It should use the Diaoyutai Islands issue to steer cross-Strait relations in the right direction. President Ma proposed "three bilateral talks and one trilateral talk." By doing so he avoided tying his own hands. He avoided having to deny that he was joining forces with the Mainland against Japan. He implied the possibility of a "big roof" encompassing both Taiwan and the Mainland.
During the Cold War, the Republic of China referred to itself as "Free China." Actually, under martial law, Taiwan was not all that free. But it was free compared to the Mainland, with its protracted political struggles. Compared to the Mainland, society on Taiwan was imbued with a sense of justice, honor, even mission. It championed the idea of the "Three Peoples Principles unifying China." But the world changed, and the nation with it. The very concept of "China" has become anathema on Taiwan. This happened because when it comes to cross-Strait relations, people on Taiwan have lost confidence in themselves. They may even have lost their sense of self-esteem. Now when people from Hong Kong proudly carry the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands, some people on Taiwan denounce them for "promoting Chinese reunification." Some people on Taiwan are afraid to compete with Beijing in defending the Diaoyutai Islands. Worse, they they are afraid even to accept a goodwill gesture from private citizens from Hong Kong, who proudly carried the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands from Hong Kong. Under such circumstances, how can one not despair?
Two decades of Taiwan independence indoctrination have undermined the concept of "Free China." Meanwhile however, Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore citizens of the Republic of China must attempt to establish a Chinese identity that people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland can identify with.
As mentioned before, during the 50s and 60s, the Republic of China positioned itself as "Free China." It was not quite as free as the name implied. But today's Republic of China is unquestionably a "democratic China." It has the name. It also has the game. It can gain the respect of people from Hong Kong, overseas, and the Mainland.
People from Hong Kong proudly carried the red, white, and blue ROC flag with them to the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland netizens angrily denounced Mainland newspapers for airbrushing the ROC flag out of Mainland news photos. This tells us that if citizens of the Republic of China want a solution to the cross-Strait stalemate, the answer is not to beg Uncle Sam. The answer is not to provoke Beijing. The answer is to appeal to the conscience and goodwill of Chinese people wherever they may be.
We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
On August 15, based on the "big roof" concept, two flags were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands. One represented the ROC and democracy. The other represented the PRC and socialism. Together they represent the political thinking of most Chinese.
We must continue to shout out loud, "The Republic of China is a democratic China." If we do we will eventually win most Chinese the world over. But if we lack the courage to shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China," then no one will be able to prevent us from being airbrushed out of existence.
大屋頂中國：民主中國與社會主義中國
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.10
八月十五日，香港「啟豐二號」登上釣魚台，諸人分別擎持一幅青天白日滿地紅國旗及一幅五星國旗，場面極具震撼效果；隔日，中國大陸媒體競相報導，但大都以ＰＳ（修圖）軟體將青天白日滿地紅旗遮去，引發大陸網民質疑。這兩個場景，值得台灣朝野深思。
香港保釣人士擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，令人第一眼覺得意外，但也立即就能產生會心的理解。因為，位於珠江口的香港，看盡兩岸百餘年滄桑，早有一種超越兩岸的眼光；何況，在一九九七回歸大陸以前，香港在上世紀五○、六○年代，曾是街頭巷尾在雙十節掛滿青天白日滿地紅旗的城市；一直到現在，在價值信念上，香港人民與台灣的心理距離仍近過大陸。青天白日滿地紅旗登上釣島，應非港人「利用中華民國國旗為統戰工具」，而是一定程度地反映了這面國旗在港人心中的位置。
大陸報紙將登島照片「修去」青天白日滿地紅旗，被大陸網民指為「造假，無恥」；事後，一家報紙鄭重刊出道歉啟事，自承「傷害了讀者的感情」、「做為負責任的媒體，不應發生這樣的錯誤」。網民並指出，大陸報刊將台灣的「總統」、「行政院」、「立法委員」皆加引號，這是另一種「ＰＳ」，因為這些官銜及機構在台灣皆實際存在。值得注意的是，《人民日報》的姊妹報《環球時報》，當日刊出了完整的全圖，未修掉青天白日滿地紅旗。
不宜過度放大這兩個場景的意義，但應當感知二者反映的共同問題是：中華民國是否理解自己在大陸人民或香港人民心中的地位？或者，中華民國是否知道應當努力在大陸人民或香港人民的心中尋找一個地位及建立一個地位？
以釣魚台問題而言，台灣其實不必一再宣示「無意與大陸聯手對抗日本」，而可借力使力，藉釣島問題來導正兩岸關係。直至馬總統提出台陸日「三組雙邊對話到一組三邊協商」，始跳脫了「無意兩岸聯手」的自縛手腳，導引出「大屋頂中國」的想像空間。
在上世紀五○、六○冷戰年代，中華民國曾自稱「自由中國」；其實，當時台灣處在戒嚴時期，並非真正「自由」。但與長期陷於政治鬥爭運動的大陸相比，當時的台灣社會卻有一種正義感與光榮感，甚至有一種對整個「中國」的使命感，而有「三民主義統一中國」的倡議；然而，隨著世局國情的推移變化，「中國」漸漸成為台灣避忌的對象，這反映出台灣在處理兩岸關係上已經失去了自信，甚至喪失了自尊。如今，港人擎旗上島，竟然指為「統戰」；這非但是不敢與北京爭保釣行動的地位，更簡直是連民間擎青天白日滿地紅國旗登島的善意也嚇得不敢領受了。此情此景，豈能不使人觸目神傷。
近二十年的台獨狂飆，使得台灣喪盡當年「自由中國」的志氣；然而，如今台獨已完全不可能，中華民國終究必須在台灣人、香港人、大陸人及全球華人的「中國概念」中找到頂天立地的立足之地。
如前所述，上世紀五○、六○年代，中華民國以「自由中國」在兩岸間定位，其實未必名實相副；然而，今日的中華民國難道不能也不敢以「民主中國」的旗幟在兩岸間定位？倘能如此，這不但是名副其實，應也能逐漸獲得香港人、海外華人及大陸人民的接納與珍惜。
從香港人擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，及大陸網民指責報紙ＰＳ，或許可以看出，中華民國欲在兩岸的困局中找出路，不在求美國，也未必在與北京政權角力，而可能要在全體華人的良知及善意中激發共鳴並找到位置。
但是，首先中華民國要大聲說出，「中華民國是民主中國」；唯有說得愈大聲，才愈能激發全球華人的思考與接納；而當愈多的華人能思考與接納，則「中華民國是民主中國」的地位也將愈真實也愈穩固。這才是「一中各表」戰略的真正實踐。
八月十五日，兩幅國旗，同登釣島；在「大屋頂中國」的概念下，一幅是代表「民主中國」的中華民國國旗，一幅是代表「社會主義中國」的中華人民共和國國旗，這可視為多數華人心中的政治思維之反映。
只要我們不斷大聲地說，「中華民國是民主中國」，應當終有說服多數全球華人的一天；但如果我們自己也沒有信心說、沒有膽量說「中華民國是民主中國」，就無人能助我們擺脫任意被ＰＳ的屈辱命運！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 10, 2012
Summary: We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
Full Text below:
On August 15, The Chi Feng 2 departed from Hong Kong and reached the Diaoyutai Islands. The passengers carried with them red, white, and blue ROC flags and five star PRC flags. They waved these flags on the islands to dramatic effect. The next day Mainland media organizations outdid each other reporting the story. Sad to say, most of them useds PhotoShop to edit out the red, white, and blue ROC flag. This provoked a backlash from netizens on the Mainland. The two images, one with the ROC flag and one without, are worth contemplating. This is true for ROC officials and civilians alike.
Diaoyutai Island Defense Movement activists from Hong Kong took both the red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag with them to the islands. At first, people were surprised. But it did not take long before they understood. Hong Kong is located in the Pearl River estuary. It has witnessed two centuries of vicissitudes. It long ago transcended allegiance to either side. During the 50s and 60s, prior to its 1997 return to the Mainland, the streets of Hong Kong were often festooned with ROC flags on Double Ten National Day. To this day, the values held in Hong Kong are closer to those held on Taiwan than on the Mainland. The red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands by private individuals from Hong Kong. They were not using the ROC national flag to "promote Chinese reunification." Their actions merely reflect the deep affection the people of Hong Kong feel for the ROC flag.
Mainland newspapers "airbrushed" the red, white, and blue ROC flag from the photograph of the Diaoyutai Islands landing. Mainland netizens denounced the newspapers' actions as "bogus" and "shameless." Later, one newspaper published a solemn apology. It acknowledged that it "hurt the feelings of readers." It acknowledged that "as a member of the Fourth Estate, it should never have allowed this to happen. When referring to the ROC, Mainland newspapers generally add scare quotes to "president," "Executive Yuan," and "legislators." This is another form of "airbrushing." After all, these government offices and government entities do exist on Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the Global Times, a sister publication of the People's Daily, published the photograph intact. It refrained from editing out the red, white, and blue ROC flag.
We must not exaggerate the significance of these two images. We must also acknowledge that the problem is one both sides share. Do citizens of the ROC realize the importance of the ROC to people on the Mainland and Hong Kong? Do citizens of the ROC realize they must make a place for the ROC in the hearts of people on the Mainland and Hong Kong?
The ROC government should stop saying that it "has no intention of joining forces with the Mainland against Japan" on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. It should use the issue as leverage. It should use the Diaoyutai Islands issue to steer cross-Strait relations in the right direction. President Ma proposed "three bilateral talks and one trilateral talk." By doing so he avoided tying his own hands. He avoided having to deny that he was joining forces with the Mainland against Japan. He implied the possibility of a "big roof" encompassing both Taiwan and the Mainland.
During the Cold War, the Republic of China referred to itself as "Free China." Actually, under martial law, Taiwan was not all that free. But it was free compared to the Mainland, with its protracted political struggles. Compared to the Mainland, society on Taiwan was imbued with a sense of justice, honor, even mission. It championed the idea of the "Three Peoples Principles unifying China." But the world changed, and the nation with it. The very concept of "China" has become anathema on Taiwan. This happened because when it comes to cross-Strait relations, people on Taiwan have lost confidence in themselves. They may even have lost their sense of self-esteem. Now when people from Hong Kong proudly carry the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands, some people on Taiwan denounce them for "promoting Chinese reunification." Some people on Taiwan are afraid to compete with Beijing in defending the Diaoyutai Islands. Worse, they they are afraid even to accept a goodwill gesture from private citizens from Hong Kong, who proudly carried the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands from Hong Kong. Under such circumstances, how can one not despair?
Two decades of Taiwan independence indoctrination have undermined the concept of "Free China." Meanwhile however, Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore citizens of the Republic of China must attempt to establish a Chinese identity that people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland can identify with.
As mentioned before, during the 50s and 60s, the Republic of China positioned itself as "Free China." It was not quite as free as the name implied. But today's Republic of China is unquestionably a "democratic China." It has the name. It also has the game. It can gain the respect of people from Hong Kong, overseas, and the Mainland.
People from Hong Kong proudly carried the red, white, and blue ROC flag with them to the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland netizens angrily denounced Mainland newspapers for airbrushing the ROC flag out of Mainland news photos. This tells us that if citizens of the Republic of China want a solution to the cross-Strait stalemate, the answer is not to beg Uncle Sam. The answer is not to provoke Beijing. The answer is to appeal to the conscience and goodwill of Chinese people wherever they may be.
We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
On August 15, based on the "big roof" concept, two flags were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands. One represented the ROC and democracy. The other represented the PRC and socialism. Together they represent the political thinking of most Chinese.
We must continue to shout out loud, "The Republic of China is a democratic China." If we do we will eventually win most Chinese the world over. But if we lack the courage to shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China," then no one will be able to prevent us from being airbrushed out of existence.
大屋頂中國：民主中國與社會主義中國
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.10
八月十五日，香港「啟豐二號」登上釣魚台，諸人分別擎持一幅青天白日滿地紅國旗及一幅五星國旗，場面極具震撼效果；隔日，中國大陸媒體競相報導，但大都以ＰＳ（修圖）軟體將青天白日滿地紅旗遮去，引發大陸網民質疑。這兩個場景，值得台灣朝野深思。
香港保釣人士擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，令人第一眼覺得意外，但也立即就能產生會心的理解。因為，位於珠江口的香港，看盡兩岸百餘年滄桑，早有一種超越兩岸的眼光；何況，在一九九七回歸大陸以前，香港在上世紀五○、六○年代，曾是街頭巷尾在雙十節掛滿青天白日滿地紅旗的城市；一直到現在，在價值信念上，香港人民與台灣的心理距離仍近過大陸。青天白日滿地紅旗登上釣島，應非港人「利用中華民國國旗為統戰工具」，而是一定程度地反映了這面國旗在港人心中的位置。
大陸報紙將登島照片「修去」青天白日滿地紅旗，被大陸網民指為「造假，無恥」；事後，一家報紙鄭重刊出道歉啟事，自承「傷害了讀者的感情」、「做為負責任的媒體，不應發生這樣的錯誤」。網民並指出，大陸報刊將台灣的「總統」、「行政院」、「立法委員」皆加引號，這是另一種「ＰＳ」，因為這些官銜及機構在台灣皆實際存在。值得注意的是，《人民日報》的姊妹報《環球時報》，當日刊出了完整的全圖，未修掉青天白日滿地紅旗。
不宜過度放大這兩個場景的意義，但應當感知二者反映的共同問題是：中華民國是否理解自己在大陸人民或香港人民心中的地位？或者，中華民國是否知道應當努力在大陸人民或香港人民的心中尋找一個地位及建立一個地位？
以釣魚台問題而言，台灣其實不必一再宣示「無意與大陸聯手對抗日本」，而可借力使力，藉釣島問題來導正兩岸關係。直至馬總統提出台陸日「三組雙邊對話到一組三邊協商」，始跳脫了「無意兩岸聯手」的自縛手腳，導引出「大屋頂中國」的想像空間。
在上世紀五○、六○冷戰年代，中華民國曾自稱「自由中國」；其實，當時台灣處在戒嚴時期，並非真正「自由」。但與長期陷於政治鬥爭運動的大陸相比，當時的台灣社會卻有一種正義感與光榮感，甚至有一種對整個「中國」的使命感，而有「三民主義統一中國」的倡議；然而，隨著世局國情的推移變化，「中國」漸漸成為台灣避忌的對象，這反映出台灣在處理兩岸關係上已經失去了自信，甚至喪失了自尊。如今，港人擎旗上島，竟然指為「統戰」；這非但是不敢與北京爭保釣行動的地位，更簡直是連民間擎青天白日滿地紅國旗登島的善意也嚇得不敢領受了。此情此景，豈能不使人觸目神傷。
近二十年的台獨狂飆，使得台灣喪盡當年「自由中國」的志氣；然而，如今台獨已完全不可能，中華民國終究必須在台灣人、香港人、大陸人及全球華人的「中國概念」中找到頂天立地的立足之地。
如前所述，上世紀五○、六○年代，中華民國以「自由中國」在兩岸間定位，其實未必名實相副；然而，今日的中華民國難道不能也不敢以「民主中國」的旗幟在兩岸間定位？倘能如此，這不但是名副其實，應也能逐漸獲得香港人、海外華人及大陸人民的接納與珍惜。
從香港人擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，及大陸網民指責報紙ＰＳ，或許可以看出，中華民國欲在兩岸的困局中找出路，不在求美國，也未必在與北京政權角力，而可能要在全體華人的良知及善意中激發共鳴並找到位置。
但是，首先中華民國要大聲說出，「中華民國是民主中國」；唯有說得愈大聲，才愈能激發全球華人的思考與接納；而當愈多的華人能思考與接納，則「中華民國是民主中國」的地位也將愈真實也愈穩固。這才是「一中各表」戰略的真正實踐。
八月十五日，兩幅國旗，同登釣島；在「大屋頂中國」的概念下，一幅是代表「民主中國」的中華民國國旗，一幅是代表「社會主義中國」的中華人民共和國國旗，這可視為多數華人心中的政治思維之反映。
只要我們不斷大聲地說，「中華民國是民主中國」，應當終有說服多數全球華人的一天；但如果我們自己也沒有信心說、沒有膽量說「中華民國是民主中國」，就無人能助我們擺脫任意被ＰＳ的屈辱命運！
Thursday, September 6, 2012
End Miscarriages of Justice: Prosecute Cases Scientifically
End Miscarriages of Justice: Prosecute Cases Scientifically
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2012
Summary: The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
Full Text below:
The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
The course of the Su case was full of twists and turns. The impact was far-reaching. Su Chien-ho, Chuang Lin-hsun, and Liu Ping-lang were suspects in the Wu Ming-han husband and wife homicides in Xizhi. Wang Wen-hsiao's fingerprints were found at the scene. A military tribunal found him guilty and executed him. Prosecutors continued to claim that the trio were accomplices. Three times the High Court upheld the death sentence. Three times Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou supported Prosecutor General Chen Han's appeals. Three times their appeals were rejected, Eventually however they obtained a retrial.
The High Court found no evidence that the trio had ever been at the crime scene and dismissed the charges due to lack of evidence. Three times it ruled the trio not guilty. The law required a speedy trial. The third time the trio were found not guilty, the prosecution could no longer appeal. The final verdict was not guilty.
The case remained in litigation for 21 years. The three defendants are now middle-aged. The victims' families have also suffered. They have been unable to find peace of mind. This newspaper has published numerous critiques of the case. Today we are taking another look. Taiwan can learn some valuable lessons about the justice system from this case.
The victims Wu Ming-han and his wife were murdered under tragic circumstances. Suspect Wang Wen-hsiao was executed. The biggest questions remaining are whether Wang had accomplices, and whether the Su Chien-ho trio were the accomplices. The brutality of the crime, whether accomplices were involved, and who the accomplices were are separate questions. They are not necessarily related. From the start, police assumed that the murder was robbery related. The MO was brutal. The victims' bodies had nearly 80 knife wounds. From this the police concluded that there more than one murderer was involved. Confessions obtained through torture were mutually contradictory. Police concluded that the Su Chien-ho trio were Wang Wen-hsiao's accomplices.
Initially the court was not sufficiently alert. Prosecutors and police concluded that the Su trio were accomplices. But the defendants' confessions flatly contradicted each other. No traces of hair or fingerprints were found at the scene. The prosecution alleged rape. But the police did not even bother to collect any material evidence of rape. The court did not even investigate whether torture was used. Based on extremely weak evidence provided by accomplice confessions, the court sentenced three people to death. Can such a verdict be considered justice? If it can, then justice on Taiwan is crude and cheap beyond belief.
Even after a not guilty verdict was rendered, some in the media still wondered "Who can say that the three were not murderers?" The court should have asked certain questions when it concluded who the murderer was. Could the court conclude that the trio had to be guilty merely because no one could be certain they weren't? The world contains thousands of possible suspects. No one can be certain they aren't murderers. Can the court then conclude they must be guilty? Defendants do not need to prove they are innocent. Prosecutors must prove that defendants are guilty. They must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Why has this case revolved around guess work and hearsay about whether accomplices were involved and who they were?
The Su Chien-ho trio has been acquitted. Do doubts linger about whether the murderers have been brought to justice? If they do, blame the prosecutors and police who handled the case. They failed to collect and retain crime scene evidence. The material evidence was insufficient. That is why the case was reduced to guess work and confessions extracted through torture. The crime scene was contaminated. The evidence was lost. Allegations that Wang Wen-hsiao had accomplices were originally guess work. Twenty-one years ago, the police made inferences. They failed to collect evidence. Today they cannot prove that the trio was guilty. They cannot be certain whether accomplices were involved, let alone who they were.
The High Court recently determined that the police used torture. It also determined that Henry Lee's report was consistent with the science. This was enough to overthrow previous speculation. This is the key to the not-guilty verdict.
Forced confessions are hateful. They are a violation of human rights. They are also unscientific. People will confess to anything under toture. Investigators are able to close their cases this way. But they are unable to prove that the alleged murderer was really the killer. They injure the innocent. They cheat the families of the victims, as well as the families of those wrongly convicted.
The Su Chien-ho and Chiang Kuo-ching cases are the result of major blunders in criminal investigation and evidence gathering. Examples persist. Civil rights reformers have taken an active interest in the Cheng Hsing-che case. The law requires a speedy trial. Su has been acquitted three times. As a result prosecutors may no longer appeal. The evidence was insufficient from the outset, No trial procedure can make up for a lack of evidence.
The Chiang Kuo-ching case and Su Chien-ho case teach us a lesson. Confessions obtained through torture are not justice. Rough justice is not justice. They merely undermine the credibility of the justice system. We must avoid repeating our mistakes. The justice system must confront its errors. It must abandon obsolete and outdated methods of case handling. It must use rigorously scientific methods to collect evidence. It must solve cases through evidence rather than guess work. It must not force the prosecution to make repeated appeals and resort to endless procedural delays. The best way is for judges to render not-guilty verdicts. They must insist that prosecutors and police gather evidence in accordance with the law. Only then can they find the real murderers. Only then can they ensure justice and fairness for the victims' families.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.09.07
社論－杜絕冤獄 從頭貫徹科學辦案
本報訊
纏訟廿一年的蘇建和案，終於定讞了；而空軍士兵江國慶因冤獄致死案，家屬控告前空軍總司令陳肇敏等人瀆職，北檢兩度以不起訴處分，江母昨日前往北檢，提出再議聲請，後續發展值得關切。
蘇案在司法程序中歷程曲折，影響深遠。蘇建和、莊林勳、劉秉郎三人曾被疑為汐止吳銘漢夫妻命案的凶手。在現場留有指紋的凶手王文孝遭軍法判決確定執行死刑之後，檢方繼續指控三人為共犯，先是三度遭到最高法院判決死刑確定，三度由法務部長馬英九支持檢察總長陳涵提起非常上訴，雖三次均遭駁回，卻終於得到再審的機會。
嗣後則經高等法院以現場無三人之任何跡證、證據不足，三度宣判三人無罪。因為有了《速審法》，第三次判決無罪，檢方不得復為上訴，終告無罪定讞。
廿一年的纏訟，三名被告都已步入中年；被害人家屬也隨之翻騰，無法平靜。我們已不記得為了此案寫下多少次的觀察評析；今天該要回顧一下，台灣可從此案中得到什麼寶貴的司法經驗與教訓。
本案苦主吳銘漢夫婦被害情狀悲慘，除了王文孝確定涉案業已伏法之外，最大的疑問就是本案有無共犯，以及蘇建和等三人是否為其共犯。然而下手凶殘與是否有共犯，以及誰是共犯，未必有關係。警方一開始只從凶手劫財殺人、下手凶殘、被害者身上共有近八十處刀痕，推斷凶手不只一人，再以刑求的方式取得共同嫌疑人先後矛盾的自白，據之認定蘇建和等三人就是王文孝的共犯。
早期法院也未能警覺，檢警認定蘇等三人為凶案共犯，不但被告彼此的自白存有重大歧異，而且均無毛髮與指紋遺留現場。檢方指控強姦，警方卻連證據採樣也無，法院甚至不問有無刑求，即憑著證據力極其薄弱的共犯自白，判處三人死刑。若是以為這樣的判決就可以代表正義，那麼台灣的司法正義也未免過於粗糙而且廉價了！
即使在本案判決無罪確定之後，媒體上猶聞有人問道：「誰能說他們三人不是真凶？」然而，問題就出在法院判決誰是凶手時，應該問什麼問題。如果只是憑著無人敢說他們不是真凶就說他們是真凶，那麼世上還有成千上萬的張三李四，也是無人敢說他們不是真凶，誰又可以因此就被法院指為真凶呢？無辜不需要證明，有罪才需要證明，而且須要指控者提出無可置疑的證明！本案為何至今都只能憑著猜測臆說有無共犯，誰是共犯呢？
蘇建和三人被判無罪之後，如果還是懷疑真凶沒有伏法，那麼最該負責的就是當初偵辦此案的檢警人員，完全沒有盡到蒐集並保留現場證據的責任。正是因為蒐證不夠嚴謹確實、純憑推論與刑求辦案，才會破壞了現場，滅失了證據。畢竟「本案除了王文孝，還有共犯」這個說法，原本只是個推論。廿一年前的警方只做推論，不做蒐證，就是今天沒有能力認定三人有罪的原因，也是今天連有無共犯也無法確知、遑論知道共犯是誰的原因。
高等法院在近次的裁判書中，業已認定警方當年確有刑求，也認定李昌鈺的鑑定報告符合科學法則，足以推翻先前純屬臆測的推論，正是無罪判決確定的關鍵。
刑求可惡之處，不僅在於違反人權，而且在於不科學；「捶楚之下，何求不得」？其結果是辦案人員報功敘獎，但卻無法證明所控的凶手真是凶手，不但殃及無辜，而且無法對被害人的家屬以及被冤枉者的家屬交代。
蘇建和案與江國慶案都是種因於偵查犯罪蒐證的重大失誤，而這樣的例子或許仍然還有，如民間司法改革團體積極關注的鄭性澤案，也值得注意。此次蘇案是因為《速審法》要求三次判決無罪檢方不得上訴而告定讞。其實開頭蒐證不足，後面再多的審級也難以彌補證據的欠缺。
江國慶案與蘇建和案提供的教訓是，刑求不是正義，粗糙的正義不是正義，只會灼燒司法的公信力。要避免錯誤一再發生，司法必須面對錯誤，揚棄陳舊落伍的辦案觀念，用嚴謹的科學方法蒐證，用證據而不用臆測推論破案。與其任由檢方事後一再上訴為無盡的程序拖延，最好的方法就是由審判者用無罪判決要求檢警依法蒐證辦案，才能正確找到真凶，還給被害者家屬以及全體社會真正的正義與公道！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2012
Summary: The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
Full Text below:
The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
The course of the Su case was full of twists and turns. The impact was far-reaching. Su Chien-ho, Chuang Lin-hsun, and Liu Ping-lang were suspects in the Wu Ming-han husband and wife homicides in Xizhi. Wang Wen-hsiao's fingerprints were found at the scene. A military tribunal found him guilty and executed him. Prosecutors continued to claim that the trio were accomplices. Three times the High Court upheld the death sentence. Three times Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou supported Prosecutor General Chen Han's appeals. Three times their appeals were rejected, Eventually however they obtained a retrial.
The High Court found no evidence that the trio had ever been at the crime scene and dismissed the charges due to lack of evidence. Three times it ruled the trio not guilty. The law required a speedy trial. The third time the trio were found not guilty, the prosecution could no longer appeal. The final verdict was not guilty.
The case remained in litigation for 21 years. The three defendants are now middle-aged. The victims' families have also suffered. They have been unable to find peace of mind. This newspaper has published numerous critiques of the case. Today we are taking another look. Taiwan can learn some valuable lessons about the justice system from this case.
The victims Wu Ming-han and his wife were murdered under tragic circumstances. Suspect Wang Wen-hsiao was executed. The biggest questions remaining are whether Wang had accomplices, and whether the Su Chien-ho trio were the accomplices. The brutality of the crime, whether accomplices were involved, and who the accomplices were are separate questions. They are not necessarily related. From the start, police assumed that the murder was robbery related. The MO was brutal. The victims' bodies had nearly 80 knife wounds. From this the police concluded that there more than one murderer was involved. Confessions obtained through torture were mutually contradictory. Police concluded that the Su Chien-ho trio were Wang Wen-hsiao's accomplices.
Initially the court was not sufficiently alert. Prosecutors and police concluded that the Su trio were accomplices. But the defendants' confessions flatly contradicted each other. No traces of hair or fingerprints were found at the scene. The prosecution alleged rape. But the police did not even bother to collect any material evidence of rape. The court did not even investigate whether torture was used. Based on extremely weak evidence provided by accomplice confessions, the court sentenced three people to death. Can such a verdict be considered justice? If it can, then justice on Taiwan is crude and cheap beyond belief.
Even after a not guilty verdict was rendered, some in the media still wondered "Who can say that the three were not murderers?" The court should have asked certain questions when it concluded who the murderer was. Could the court conclude that the trio had to be guilty merely because no one could be certain they weren't? The world contains thousands of possible suspects. No one can be certain they aren't murderers. Can the court then conclude they must be guilty? Defendants do not need to prove they are innocent. Prosecutors must prove that defendants are guilty. They must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Why has this case revolved around guess work and hearsay about whether accomplices were involved and who they were?
The Su Chien-ho trio has been acquitted. Do doubts linger about whether the murderers have been brought to justice? If they do, blame the prosecutors and police who handled the case. They failed to collect and retain crime scene evidence. The material evidence was insufficient. That is why the case was reduced to guess work and confessions extracted through torture. The crime scene was contaminated. The evidence was lost. Allegations that Wang Wen-hsiao had accomplices were originally guess work. Twenty-one years ago, the police made inferences. They failed to collect evidence. Today they cannot prove that the trio was guilty. They cannot be certain whether accomplices were involved, let alone who they were.
The High Court recently determined that the police used torture. It also determined that Henry Lee's report was consistent with the science. This was enough to overthrow previous speculation. This is the key to the not-guilty verdict.
Forced confessions are hateful. They are a violation of human rights. They are also unscientific. People will confess to anything under toture. Investigators are able to close their cases this way. But they are unable to prove that the alleged murderer was really the killer. They injure the innocent. They cheat the families of the victims, as well as the families of those wrongly convicted.
The Su Chien-ho and Chiang Kuo-ching cases are the result of major blunders in criminal investigation and evidence gathering. Examples persist. Civil rights reformers have taken an active interest in the Cheng Hsing-che case. The law requires a speedy trial. Su has been acquitted three times. As a result prosecutors may no longer appeal. The evidence was insufficient from the outset, No trial procedure can make up for a lack of evidence.
The Chiang Kuo-ching case and Su Chien-ho case teach us a lesson. Confessions obtained through torture are not justice. Rough justice is not justice. They merely undermine the credibility of the justice system. We must avoid repeating our mistakes. The justice system must confront its errors. It must abandon obsolete and outdated methods of case handling. It must use rigorously scientific methods to collect evidence. It must solve cases through evidence rather than guess work. It must not force the prosecution to make repeated appeals and resort to endless procedural delays. The best way is for judges to render not-guilty verdicts. They must insist that prosecutors and police gather evidence in accordance with the law. Only then can they find the real murderers. Only then can they ensure justice and fairness for the victims' families.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.09.07
社論－杜絕冤獄 從頭貫徹科學辦案
本報訊
纏訟廿一年的蘇建和案，終於定讞了；而空軍士兵江國慶因冤獄致死案，家屬控告前空軍總司令陳肇敏等人瀆職，北檢兩度以不起訴處分，江母昨日前往北檢，提出再議聲請，後續發展值得關切。
蘇案在司法程序中歷程曲折，影響深遠。蘇建和、莊林勳、劉秉郎三人曾被疑為汐止吳銘漢夫妻命案的凶手。在現場留有指紋的凶手王文孝遭軍法判決確定執行死刑之後，檢方繼續指控三人為共犯，先是三度遭到最高法院判決死刑確定，三度由法務部長馬英九支持檢察總長陳涵提起非常上訴，雖三次均遭駁回，卻終於得到再審的機會。
嗣後則經高等法院以現場無三人之任何跡證、證據不足，三度宣判三人無罪。因為有了《速審法》，第三次判決無罪，檢方不得復為上訴，終告無罪定讞。
廿一年的纏訟，三名被告都已步入中年；被害人家屬也隨之翻騰，無法平靜。我們已不記得為了此案寫下多少次的觀察評析；今天該要回顧一下，台灣可從此案中得到什麼寶貴的司法經驗與教訓。
本案苦主吳銘漢夫婦被害情狀悲慘，除了王文孝確定涉案業已伏法之外，最大的疑問就是本案有無共犯，以及蘇建和等三人是否為其共犯。然而下手凶殘與是否有共犯，以及誰是共犯，未必有關係。警方一開始只從凶手劫財殺人、下手凶殘、被害者身上共有近八十處刀痕，推斷凶手不只一人，再以刑求的方式取得共同嫌疑人先後矛盾的自白，據之認定蘇建和等三人就是王文孝的共犯。
早期法院也未能警覺，檢警認定蘇等三人為凶案共犯，不但被告彼此的自白存有重大歧異，而且均無毛髮與指紋遺留現場。檢方指控強姦，警方卻連證據採樣也無，法院甚至不問有無刑求，即憑著證據力極其薄弱的共犯自白，判處三人死刑。若是以為這樣的判決就可以代表正義，那麼台灣的司法正義也未免過於粗糙而且廉價了！
即使在本案判決無罪確定之後，媒體上猶聞有人問道：「誰能說他們三人不是真凶？」然而，問題就出在法院判決誰是凶手時，應該問什麼問題。如果只是憑著無人敢說他們不是真凶就說他們是真凶，那麼世上還有成千上萬的張三李四，也是無人敢說他們不是真凶，誰又可以因此就被法院指為真凶呢？無辜不需要證明，有罪才需要證明，而且須要指控者提出無可置疑的證明！本案為何至今都只能憑著猜測臆說有無共犯，誰是共犯呢？
蘇建和三人被判無罪之後，如果還是懷疑真凶沒有伏法，那麼最該負責的就是當初偵辦此案的檢警人員，完全沒有盡到蒐集並保留現場證據的責任。正是因為蒐證不夠嚴謹確實、純憑推論與刑求辦案，才會破壞了現場，滅失了證據。畢竟「本案除了王文孝，還有共犯」這個說法，原本只是個推論。廿一年前的警方只做推論，不做蒐證，就是今天沒有能力認定三人有罪的原因，也是今天連有無共犯也無法確知、遑論知道共犯是誰的原因。
高等法院在近次的裁判書中，業已認定警方當年確有刑求，也認定李昌鈺的鑑定報告符合科學法則，足以推翻先前純屬臆測的推論，正是無罪判決確定的關鍵。
刑求可惡之處，不僅在於違反人權，而且在於不科學；「捶楚之下，何求不得」？其結果是辦案人員報功敘獎，但卻無法證明所控的凶手真是凶手，不但殃及無辜，而且無法對被害人的家屬以及被冤枉者的家屬交代。
蘇建和案與江國慶案都是種因於偵查犯罪蒐證的重大失誤，而這樣的例子或許仍然還有，如民間司法改革團體積極關注的鄭性澤案，也值得注意。此次蘇案是因為《速審法》要求三次判決無罪檢方不得上訴而告定讞。其實開頭蒐證不足，後面再多的審級也難以彌補證據的欠缺。
江國慶案與蘇建和案提供的教訓是，刑求不是正義，粗糙的正義不是正義，只會灼燒司法的公信力。要避免錯誤一再發生，司法必須面對錯誤，揚棄陳舊落伍的辦案觀念，用嚴謹的科學方法蒐證，用證據而不用臆測推論破案。與其任由檢方事後一再上訴為無盡的程序拖延，最好的方法就是由審判者用無罪判決要求檢警依法蒐證辦案，才能正確找到真凶，還給被害者家屬以及全體社會真正的正義與公道！
Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation
Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty?
Full Text below:
APEC member states gathered on a large Russian island south of Haishengwei ("Vladivostok"). They discussed the establishment of closer economic cooperation between Asian-Pacific nations. The disputes between East Asian countries over the sovereignty of several islands continue to rage. The toxic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea even cast a shadow over this year's APEC summit.
Summit host Russia is attempting to become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific region and to create a "New Asia." But international attention focused on Japan, which is attempting to assert leadership over East Asia. International attention focused on Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his interaction with Mainland Chinese and South Korean leaders. These will indicate whether relations between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are running hot or cold. They will also indicate whether the disputes over islands in the East China Sea can be resolved peacefully.
Following the war, Japan periodically clashed with its neighbors. In the past, the main factor affecting Japan's relations with its neighbors was Japan's interpretation of history. But in recent years, sovereignty over numerous islands has replaced Japan's interpretation of history as the raw nerve undermining international relations in Northeast Asia. Issues of territorial sovereignty affect these nations' substantive interests. Disputes over maritime rights and geopolitical security have become the most significant variables affecting relations between Bejing, Tokyo, and Seoul.
In fact, during the Koizumi cabinet, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. Official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not really the issue. As President Bush noted, Sino-Japanese relations are much more complex than the Yasukuni Shrine issue. American Japanologist Michael Green spoke bluntly. He said that even if the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it would make no difference. The United States knows that disputes over maritime interests stand in the way of trust and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. .
But the disputes over East Asian islands are not limited to Beijing and Tokyo. Tokyo is an ally of Washington. But so are Taipei, Seoul, and Manila. Even Hanoi has attempted to improve relations with Washington. The disputes over the sovereignty of these islands are complex. To Washington's embarrassment, its "return to Asia" has precipitated these problems. The US wants to ensure unity among the first Pacific island chain that is "containing" Mainland China. Instead it finds itself robbing Peter to pay Paul. All it can do is offer platitudes. All it can do is call on the parties to sit down and talk, and to resolve disputes through dialogue. Beijing appears to be playing a waiting game. It appears to be waiting for someone else to make a mistake. It calmly sits on the sidelines, watching Washington play Big Brother in East Asia. It uses the opportunity to appeal to Taipei. It hopes cross-Strait cooperation over the Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands") and Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty conflicts.
Once President Ma came to office, ECFA gradually normalized cross-Strait economic exchanges. But this normalization has not extended to the political realm. It has not reduced the historical grievances between the KMT and CCP. In the international arena, Beijing has not changed its "One China=PRC" attitude. It continues to restrict Taipei's diplomatic space. This makes cross-Strait cooperation on sovereignty impossible. This makes it impossible for Taipei to shed its Cold War mentality vis a vis national security. Beijing wants to Taipei to rally to the larger issue of national sovereignty in the islands disputes. It wants the two sides to join in the defense of Chinese territory. But if the illusion of cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be maintained, such efforts will be futile.
Taipei still views itself as the defender of "one China," as per the Republic of China Constitution. The Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands disputes have left it trapped between international diplomacy and cross-Strait relations. It finds itself fighting a thankless battle on both fronts, Recently Taipei began live-fire exercises on Taiping Island. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet overlooking the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically Taipei finds itself in a tight spot. It is attempting to practice "balanced diplomacy." It seeks to avoid undermining security relations with Washington. It is implicitly asserting the sovereignty of the Republic of China through international diplomatic initiatives. Needless to say this attracted far less attention than South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's impassioned landing on Dokdo.
On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps hold conflicting ideological views regarding Japan. These are clearly reflected in the ruling and opposition parties' positions on the Diaoyutai Islands. There should be unity on Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement. Instead the Diaoyutai Islands conflict has become part of the ongoing internecine Blue vs. Green conflict. This has encouraged the Japanese government to cast covetous eyes on the Diaoyutai Islands.
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty? DPP officials have equated the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement with Chinese reunification and Taiwan independence, and with "cozying up to [Mainland] China." Perhaps Chairman Su will cease abetting their disinformation activities? Perhaps he will cease his attempts to confuse the public and shake their confidence in ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?
It is not easy for Taipei to cooperate with Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea islands conflicts. But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should be able to launch a coordinated attack regarding the Diaoyutai Islands. They should be able to join hands to defend our territorial sovereignty. The ruling and opposition parties must form a united front. Only then can they make their position on the East China Sea clearly heard within the international community. Amidst the dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, they must reunify the Republic of China. Only then can they win the respect of the international community.
島嶼爭端捍衛主權 期待朝野分進合擊
2012-09-06
中國時報
APEC會員國齊聚俄國海參威南方的大俄羅斯島，討論亞太國家建立更緊密的經濟合作關係時，東亞國家間的島嶼爭端仍未見平歇，而中日韓間的詭譎氣氛更令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影。
國際注目的焦點似乎不在此次峰會的東道主俄國如何展現其融入亞太地區，實現「新亞洲」（New Asia）的決心，而是喧賓奪主的日本。國際將關注首腦會談中，野田首相如何與中、韓領袖互動，此不僅為中、日、韓關係的冷熱指標，亦可窺見東海「島嶼爭端」能否軟著陸的端倪。
戰後，日本與鄰國齟齬時有所聞，過去多屬「歷史認識問題」牽動日本與鄰國關係的良窳，但近年來，「島嶼爭端」取代「歷史認識問題」，挑動東北亞國際政治的敏感神經。因此，「歷史認識問題」對東北亞國際關係的影響將弱化，取而代之，攸關各國現實利益的領土主權問題、海洋權益之爭與地緣政治上的安保利益，將成為左右中、日、韓關係走向的主要變數。
其實，小泉內閣時期，中日關係陷入一九七二年雙方外交正常化以來的最低潮，「靖國神社參拜」問題並非主因，誠如布希總統所言，中日關係比單純的靖國神社參拜問題複雜許多。美國日本研究學者葛林（Michael Green）亦直言，「即使首相不參拜靖國神社，也無濟於事」。美國應已意識到來自於海洋利益中的糾葛所形成的不信任感始為中、日雙方溝通的障礙。
然而，東亞的「島嶼爭端」，非僅存在於中、日之間，在與日本同屬美國盟邦的台灣、韓國、菲律賓，甚至美國近年極力改善關係中的越南間，亦存有錯綜複雜的島嶼主權爭議，此為美國帶來「重返亞洲」時的尷尬。在美國欲重整太平洋第一島鏈的團結之際，美國在東亞的「島嶼爭端」中，左支右絀、顧此失彼，只能無力的喊話，呼籲各方坐下來談，透過對話解決爭議；過程中，北京似乎以逸待勞，除冷眼旁觀美國如何扮演東亞的老大哥，更伺機向台灣招手，期待兩岸在南沙群島與釣魚台列嶼主權上合作。
雖說馬總統主政後，ECFA逐步將兩岸的經濟交流制度化，但卻無法迅速向政治領域滲透，鬆動國共間的「歷史正朔」之爭。北京不改在國際間打壓台北外交空間的「一中」思維，使兩岸在主權議題上合作成為不切實際的主張，亦使台灣在安全上仍無法擺脫冷戰格局。因此，北京想在「島嶼爭端」中，對台灣曉以民族大義，爭取兩岸共同捍衛中華領土，或若有似無地製造兩岸在南海及東海問題中合作的假象，恐怕徒勞無功。
惟在憲法中，將自身定位為「一中」之正朔的台北仍須守土有責，在南沙群島及釣魚台列嶼爭議中，命定陷入外交與兩岸關係的狹縫間，兩面作戰，吃力難討好。近日，台灣實施太平島實彈演習及馬總統決定赴彭佳嶼遠眺釣魚台，皆為台北在艱困的外交空間下，嘗試以「平衡外交」的思維，在避免損及與美國間的安保關係考量中，含蓄地向國際宣示中華民國主權的外交舉措，此與韓國總統李明博「登獨島」的激情演出相較，自然在票房上冷熱有別。
此外，台灣內部帶有深淺不同之藍綠意識形態對立的「日本觀」更直接投射在朝野不同的「保釣」主張中，使本應一致對外的「保釣運動」意外成為藍綠內政戰線的延長，助長日本朝野染指釣魚台列嶼之野心。
因此，民進黨蘇貞昌主席不應一味對馬總統的「保釣」政策冷嘲熱諷。蘇主席若認為登彭佳嶼與「保釣」無關，只是「自我阿Ｑ」，那麼，蘇主席能否在釣魚台列嶼問題上更清楚的政策表態，或從黨中央的立場，支持擁有釣魚台列嶼行政管轄權的宜蘭縣長林聰賢登島宣示主權，而非放任其該黨公職人員或支持者隱諱地將「保釣」與「統獨」、「親中」掛鉤，模糊國人對釣魚台列嶼主權的認識，動搖社會的「保釣」信心。
台灣在「保釣」與「南海問題」上不容易與大陸合作，但朝野應可在台灣所處的「島嶼爭端」中分進合擊，共謀捍衛領土主權之策。相信只有朝野一致對外，始能讓國際社會清楚聽見台灣對東海、南海島嶼的主權論述，並在此「島嶼爭端」中，重新找回團結的中華民國，贏得國際的尊重。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty?
Full Text below:
APEC member states gathered on a large Russian island south of Haishengwei ("Vladivostok"). They discussed the establishment of closer economic cooperation between Asian-Pacific nations. The disputes between East Asian countries over the sovereignty of several islands continue to rage. The toxic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea even cast a shadow over this year's APEC summit.
Summit host Russia is attempting to become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific region and to create a "New Asia." But international attention focused on Japan, which is attempting to assert leadership over East Asia. International attention focused on Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his interaction with Mainland Chinese and South Korean leaders. These will indicate whether relations between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are running hot or cold. They will also indicate whether the disputes over islands in the East China Sea can be resolved peacefully.
Following the war, Japan periodically clashed with its neighbors. In the past, the main factor affecting Japan's relations with its neighbors was Japan's interpretation of history. But in recent years, sovereignty over numerous islands has replaced Japan's interpretation of history as the raw nerve undermining international relations in Northeast Asia. Issues of territorial sovereignty affect these nations' substantive interests. Disputes over maritime rights and geopolitical security have become the most significant variables affecting relations between Bejing, Tokyo, and Seoul.
In fact, during the Koizumi cabinet, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. Official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not really the issue. As President Bush noted, Sino-Japanese relations are much more complex than the Yasukuni Shrine issue. American Japanologist Michael Green spoke bluntly. He said that even if the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it would make no difference. The United States knows that disputes over maritime interests stand in the way of trust and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. .
But the disputes over East Asian islands are not limited to Beijing and Tokyo. Tokyo is an ally of Washington. But so are Taipei, Seoul, and Manila. Even Hanoi has attempted to improve relations with Washington. The disputes over the sovereignty of these islands are complex. To Washington's embarrassment, its "return to Asia" has precipitated these problems. The US wants to ensure unity among the first Pacific island chain that is "containing" Mainland China. Instead it finds itself robbing Peter to pay Paul. All it can do is offer platitudes. All it can do is call on the parties to sit down and talk, and to resolve disputes through dialogue. Beijing appears to be playing a waiting game. It appears to be waiting for someone else to make a mistake. It calmly sits on the sidelines, watching Washington play Big Brother in East Asia. It uses the opportunity to appeal to Taipei. It hopes cross-Strait cooperation over the Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands") and Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty conflicts.
Once President Ma came to office, ECFA gradually normalized cross-Strait economic exchanges. But this normalization has not extended to the political realm. It has not reduced the historical grievances between the KMT and CCP. In the international arena, Beijing has not changed its "One China=PRC" attitude. It continues to restrict Taipei's diplomatic space. This makes cross-Strait cooperation on sovereignty impossible. This makes it impossible for Taipei to shed its Cold War mentality vis a vis national security. Beijing wants to Taipei to rally to the larger issue of national sovereignty in the islands disputes. It wants the two sides to join in the defense of Chinese territory. But if the illusion of cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be maintained, such efforts will be futile.
Taipei still views itself as the defender of "one China," as per the Republic of China Constitution. The Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands disputes have left it trapped between international diplomacy and cross-Strait relations. It finds itself fighting a thankless battle on both fronts, Recently Taipei began live-fire exercises on Taiping Island. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet overlooking the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically Taipei finds itself in a tight spot. It is attempting to practice "balanced diplomacy." It seeks to avoid undermining security relations with Washington. It is implicitly asserting the sovereignty of the Republic of China through international diplomatic initiatives. Needless to say this attracted far less attention than South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's impassioned landing on Dokdo.
On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps hold conflicting ideological views regarding Japan. These are clearly reflected in the ruling and opposition parties' positions on the Diaoyutai Islands. There should be unity on Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement. Instead the Diaoyutai Islands conflict has become part of the ongoing internecine Blue vs. Green conflict. This has encouraged the Japanese government to cast covetous eyes on the Diaoyutai Islands.
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty? DPP officials have equated the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement with Chinese reunification and Taiwan independence, and with "cozying up to [Mainland] China." Perhaps Chairman Su will cease abetting their disinformation activities? Perhaps he will cease his attempts to confuse the public and shake their confidence in ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?
It is not easy for Taipei to cooperate with Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea islands conflicts. But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should be able to launch a coordinated attack regarding the Diaoyutai Islands. They should be able to join hands to defend our territorial sovereignty. The ruling and opposition parties must form a united front. Only then can they make their position on the East China Sea clearly heard within the international community. Amidst the dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, they must reunify the Republic of China. Only then can they win the respect of the international community.
島嶼爭端捍衛主權 期待朝野分進合擊
2012-09-06
中國時報
APEC會員國齊聚俄國海參威南方的大俄羅斯島，討論亞太國家建立更緊密的經濟合作關係時，東亞國家間的島嶼爭端仍未見平歇，而中日韓間的詭譎氣氛更令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影。
國際注目的焦點似乎不在此次峰會的東道主俄國如何展現其融入亞太地區，實現「新亞洲」（New Asia）的決心，而是喧賓奪主的日本。國際將關注首腦會談中，野田首相如何與中、韓領袖互動，此不僅為中、日、韓關係的冷熱指標，亦可窺見東海「島嶼爭端」能否軟著陸的端倪。
戰後，日本與鄰國齟齬時有所聞，過去多屬「歷史認識問題」牽動日本與鄰國關係的良窳，但近年來，「島嶼爭端」取代「歷史認識問題」，挑動東北亞國際政治的敏感神經。因此，「歷史認識問題」對東北亞國際關係的影響將弱化，取而代之，攸關各國現實利益的領土主權問題、海洋權益之爭與地緣政治上的安保利益，將成為左右中、日、韓關係走向的主要變數。
其實，小泉內閣時期，中日關係陷入一九七二年雙方外交正常化以來的最低潮，「靖國神社參拜」問題並非主因，誠如布希總統所言，中日關係比單純的靖國神社參拜問題複雜許多。美國日本研究學者葛林（Michael Green）亦直言，「即使首相不參拜靖國神社，也無濟於事」。美國應已意識到來自於海洋利益中的糾葛所形成的不信任感始為中、日雙方溝通的障礙。
然而，東亞的「島嶼爭端」，非僅存在於中、日之間，在與日本同屬美國盟邦的台灣、韓國、菲律賓，甚至美國近年極力改善關係中的越南間，亦存有錯綜複雜的島嶼主權爭議，此為美國帶來「重返亞洲」時的尷尬。在美國欲重整太平洋第一島鏈的團結之際，美國在東亞的「島嶼爭端」中，左支右絀、顧此失彼，只能無力的喊話，呼籲各方坐下來談，透過對話解決爭議；過程中，北京似乎以逸待勞，除冷眼旁觀美國如何扮演東亞的老大哥，更伺機向台灣招手，期待兩岸在南沙群島與釣魚台列嶼主權上合作。
雖說馬總統主政後，ECFA逐步將兩岸的經濟交流制度化，但卻無法迅速向政治領域滲透，鬆動國共間的「歷史正朔」之爭。北京不改在國際間打壓台北外交空間的「一中」思維，使兩岸在主權議題上合作成為不切實際的主張，亦使台灣在安全上仍無法擺脫冷戰格局。因此，北京想在「島嶼爭端」中，對台灣曉以民族大義，爭取兩岸共同捍衛中華領土，或若有似無地製造兩岸在南海及東海問題中合作的假象，恐怕徒勞無功。
惟在憲法中，將自身定位為「一中」之正朔的台北仍須守土有責，在南沙群島及釣魚台列嶼爭議中，命定陷入外交與兩岸關係的狹縫間，兩面作戰，吃力難討好。近日，台灣實施太平島實彈演習及馬總統決定赴彭佳嶼遠眺釣魚台，皆為台北在艱困的外交空間下，嘗試以「平衡外交」的思維，在避免損及與美國間的安保關係考量中，含蓄地向國際宣示中華民國主權的外交舉措，此與韓國總統李明博「登獨島」的激情演出相較，自然在票房上冷熱有別。
此外，台灣內部帶有深淺不同之藍綠意識形態對立的「日本觀」更直接投射在朝野不同的「保釣」主張中，使本應一致對外的「保釣運動」意外成為藍綠內政戰線的延長，助長日本朝野染指釣魚台列嶼之野心。
因此，民進黨蘇貞昌主席不應一味對馬總統的「保釣」政策冷嘲熱諷。蘇主席若認為登彭佳嶼與「保釣」無關，只是「自我阿Ｑ」，那麼，蘇主席能否在釣魚台列嶼問題上更清楚的政策表態，或從黨中央的立場，支持擁有釣魚台列嶼行政管轄權的宜蘭縣長林聰賢登島宣示主權，而非放任其該黨公職人員或支持者隱諱地將「保釣」與「統獨」、「親中」掛鉤，模糊國人對釣魚台列嶼主權的認識，動搖社會的「保釣」信心。
台灣在「保釣」與「南海問題」上不容易與大陸合作，但朝野應可在台灣所處的「島嶼爭端」中分進合擊，共謀捍衛領土主權之策。相信只有朝野一致對外，始能讓國際社會清楚聽見台灣對東海、南海島嶼的主權論述，並在此「島嶼爭端」中，重新找回團結的中華民國，贏得國際的尊重。
Wednesday, September 5, 2012
Central Standing Committee Protocol Trivial, Loss of Party Cohesion Serious
Central Standing Committee Protocol Trivial, Loss of Party Cohesion Serious
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2012
Summary: The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
Full Text below:
The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. But in recent years its importance has declined. President Ma Ying-jeou consults the Central Standing Committee less and less. Its role continues to shrink. It has become an arena for second-tier power struggles. Central Standing Committee by-elections have become pro forma rituals. Some of those unhappy with the party leadership use the Central Standing Committee by-elections to vent anti-Ma sentiment. They use it to give Ma Ying-jeou a hard time. This is not surprising.
Who is in and who is out within the Central Standing Committee? Which factions are operating behind the scenes and resorting to dirty tricks? That is not important. The KMT party machinery has become weaker under President Ma and Chairman Ma. This is the real problem. This is the most import factor in ruling vs. opposition party rivalry.
Politics on Taiwan is "winner-take-all." This is true whether the Blue camp or Green camp is in power. The levers of power end up in the hands of the ruling administration. The ruling party winds up playing the role of second fiddle, go-fer, and political machine. Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office and Ma Ying-jeou's four make this abundantly clear. Political power is real power. It calls the shots. When the party is in office, the party hierarchy is relegated to second fiddle. But it must not have the life squeezed out of it. The power of the party must be balanced against the power of the ruling administration. They must not become alienated from each other. Why not? Because rule is temporary. Ruling parties parties are eventually toppled. The party organization must endure. It must remain in operation. A political party must have a structural framework and a belief system. Otherwise its constitution will be weak. It will have a difficult time maintaining discipline. It will lacking fighting ability. That is inevitable.
Consider the weakening of the KMT Central Standing Committee. The candidates who participated in the by-election were indifferent. The roster lacked talent. This is clearly unhealthy. The reasons for this phenomenon are deep-rooted. The Blue camp has lost internal cohesion. The KMT Central Standing Committee leaders lack charisma. These are all important factors.
The DPP Central Standing Committee is a different story altogether. In July the DPP Central Standing Committee underwent reorganization. Factions engaged in bitter struggles. The major factions faced off with each other, determined to prevail. Contrast this with the KMT Central Standing Committee by-election. The difference was vast. The DPP brought together the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. Attendees included party princes and faction leaders Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun. The meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee was a far quieter affair. Discussions were for the most part mere formalities. Chairman Ma approved the proposals and got them out of the way. DPP Central Standing Committee meetings on the other hand are often live fire exercises. Chairman Su Tseng-chang often found himself overwhelmed.
Now look further ahead. Consider the differences between the Blue and Green Central Standing Committees. The problem involves more than mere atmosphere or visual impact. It is closely related to the party's thinking and action. The DPP Central Standing Committee has many grizzled veterans. They may make it difficult for Su Tseng-chang to act. But the Central Standing Committee also serves as a platform of intraparty political wrangling. By contrast the KMT Central Standing Committee is an empty shell. This may lead to blind spots in decision-making. Most people are unhappy with the KMT's performance. This shows the need for brainstorming to enhance decision-making and execution. But if the KMT Central Standing Committee is unable to function as a conduit for suggestions, how can the Blue camp regain the trust and support of the public?
During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the KMT Central Standing Committee recruited the most forward thinking party and government officials. It was a decision-making platform both in name and in fact. Today the Central Standing Committee is a hollow shell. Every year it holds by-elections. But party members with real power don't even care enough to compete. This may be political evolution. The party and the government may be going their separate ways. But for a political party lacking in cohesion it should be a matter of concern. The party elite is depressed about the Central Standing Committee's performance. One can only imagine how discouraged party members are at the grassroots.
Every KMT Central Standing Committee decline should be a call to action. But consider the new Central Standing Committee members. Are they up to the task of reinvigorating the party? Many people are questioning the staying power of the Blue camp. Ma Ying-jeou appears to have no response. He appears to have interpreted all calls for soul-searching as "anti-Ma" sentiment. But if no action is taken in response to these voices, danger awaits.
中常會式微事小，黨凝聚力流失事大
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.05 02:27 am
國民黨中常委改選，只堪以「意興闌珊」四字形容。當選者難謂雀躍，落選者莫名所以，挺馬人士遭中南部代表集體抵制的傳聞則印證不假。真正的問題是，在這種情況下產生的新一屆中常委名單，卻也解讀不出什麼新意義。
中常會是國民黨的最高權力機構，但近年功能日漸式微，不僅馬英九主席越來越少徵詢或採納中常委的意見，中常會的角色也不斷矮化，成為二軍競逐的舞台。因而，中常會改選變得行禮如儀，乃至有些不滿黨中央的人士藉改選發洩一下「反馬」情緒，要給馬英九一個好看，也就不足為奇了。
在這種情況下，與其觀察個別中常委誰上誰下，或追究什麼派系在幕後運作搞鬼，倒不如關注國民黨機器在馬總統與馬主席黨政雙兼下的「弱化」問題如何解決，恐怕才是影響未來朝野競爭的更重要因素。
以目前台灣「贏者全拿」的政治架構，無論藍綠誰政執，執政黨的權力槓桿都會大大向「政」傾斜，「黨」變成輔佐、抬轎及選舉機器。這從陳水扁的八年和馬英九的四年，都看得極為清楚，是政治的權力現實使然。然而，在執政時，「黨」雖然退居輔位，但它的生理命脈不可過度壓抑，而必須和「政」維持一定的衡稱關係，才不致發生斷層與疏離。原因是，執政是暫時的，總會遇上輪替的時刻；而政黨組織則要追尋恆久的運作；一個缺乏政見體系及政治意志的政黨，其生理命脈脆弱，難以在戰鬥中保持隊形，更難施展戰鬥力，這是必然。
從這個角度看，國民黨中常會的弱化，由參與競逐狀況的冷清，到缺乏亮眼的名單，顯然都不是健康的發展。此一現象，所反映的深層原因，無論是藍營內部凝聚力的流失，或者黨中央領導人號召力的耗弱，都是更應重視的事。
對照之下，民進黨的中常會卻是另一番景象。綠營七月間改組的中常會，是在派系激烈角力下產生，各大派系攻城掠池，志在必得；比起藍營中常委的參選冷清，迥然而異。而且，綠營中常會老中青俱全，包括「天王」謝長廷、游錫?皆以派系領袖側身其間。不難想像，國民黨召開中常會時與會者以沉默居多，討論多半流於形式，主席拍板了事；而民進黨中常會則常常出現真槍實彈的場景，讓主席蘇貞昌忙於招架。
進一步看，藍綠中常會的不同景象，其實不單單是「氣氛」或「觀瞻」的問題，也與黨的思考與行動關係密切。民進黨中常委老將眾多，或易讓蘇貞昌受到掣肘，但也使中常會相當程度地成為黨內政治角力的真實平台。而國民黨中常會變成權力空殼，則可能使決策產生偏斜或出現盲點而不自知。尤其，目前國民黨的執政成績無法取得多數民眾的認同，其實正需各方的腦力激盪，來增強決策力及執行力；然而，若連該黨的中常會都無法扮演建言供輸的角色，那麼藍軍要如何贏回民眾的信賴和支持？
在蔣經國時代，國民黨中常會廣納最尖端的黨政要員，成為名實大致相副的決策平台；而如今，中常會卻淪為內部權力的雞肋，食之無味，雖年年改選，但真正有實力的黨員連角逐都提不起胃口。這種現象，雖也是政治進化、黨政分離的徵兆；但對於一個凝聚力日漸渙散的政黨而言，畢竟是值得注意的事。若黨內菁英對中常會都表現得如此意興闌珊，亦可想像基層黨員向心力的流失恐怕更甚於此。
一般皆言，國民黨中常會已是每下愈況，應當設法提振；但看一看這張新名單，這樣的陣容，能承當得起「中興」的使命嗎？許多人都在質疑為藍軍的續航力，而馬英九對此似亦拿不出對策。簡言之，把一切要求檢討的聲音都解讀為「反馬」是沒必要的，但若對這些聲音無動於衷，卻是一個政治警訊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2012
Summary: The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
Full Text below:
The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. But in recent years its importance has declined. President Ma Ying-jeou consults the Central Standing Committee less and less. Its role continues to shrink. It has become an arena for second-tier power struggles. Central Standing Committee by-elections have become pro forma rituals. Some of those unhappy with the party leadership use the Central Standing Committee by-elections to vent anti-Ma sentiment. They use it to give Ma Ying-jeou a hard time. This is not surprising.
Who is in and who is out within the Central Standing Committee? Which factions are operating behind the scenes and resorting to dirty tricks? That is not important. The KMT party machinery has become weaker under President Ma and Chairman Ma. This is the real problem. This is the most import factor in ruling vs. opposition party rivalry.
Politics on Taiwan is "winner-take-all." This is true whether the Blue camp or Green camp is in power. The levers of power end up in the hands of the ruling administration. The ruling party winds up playing the role of second fiddle, go-fer, and political machine. Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office and Ma Ying-jeou's four make this abundantly clear. Political power is real power. It calls the shots. When the party is in office, the party hierarchy is relegated to second fiddle. But it must not have the life squeezed out of it. The power of the party must be balanced against the power of the ruling administration. They must not become alienated from each other. Why not? Because rule is temporary. Ruling parties parties are eventually toppled. The party organization must endure. It must remain in operation. A political party must have a structural framework and a belief system. Otherwise its constitution will be weak. It will have a difficult time maintaining discipline. It will lacking fighting ability. That is inevitable.
Consider the weakening of the KMT Central Standing Committee. The candidates who participated in the by-election were indifferent. The roster lacked talent. This is clearly unhealthy. The reasons for this phenomenon are deep-rooted. The Blue camp has lost internal cohesion. The KMT Central Standing Committee leaders lack charisma. These are all important factors.
The DPP Central Standing Committee is a different story altogether. In July the DPP Central Standing Committee underwent reorganization. Factions engaged in bitter struggles. The major factions faced off with each other, determined to prevail. Contrast this with the KMT Central Standing Committee by-election. The difference was vast. The DPP brought together the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. Attendees included party princes and faction leaders Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun. The meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee was a far quieter affair. Discussions were for the most part mere formalities. Chairman Ma approved the proposals and got them out of the way. DPP Central Standing Committee meetings on the other hand are often live fire exercises. Chairman Su Tseng-chang often found himself overwhelmed.
Now look further ahead. Consider the differences between the Blue and Green Central Standing Committees. The problem involves more than mere atmosphere or visual impact. It is closely related to the party's thinking and action. The DPP Central Standing Committee has many grizzled veterans. They may make it difficult for Su Tseng-chang to act. But the Central Standing Committee also serves as a platform of intraparty political wrangling. By contrast the KMT Central Standing Committee is an empty shell. This may lead to blind spots in decision-making. Most people are unhappy with the KMT's performance. This shows the need for brainstorming to enhance decision-making and execution. But if the KMT Central Standing Committee is unable to function as a conduit for suggestions, how can the Blue camp regain the trust and support of the public?
During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the KMT Central Standing Committee recruited the most forward thinking party and government officials. It was a decision-making platform both in name and in fact. Today the Central Standing Committee is a hollow shell. Every year it holds by-elections. But party members with real power don't even care enough to compete. This may be political evolution. The party and the government may be going their separate ways. But for a political party lacking in cohesion it should be a matter of concern. The party elite is depressed about the Central Standing Committee's performance. One can only imagine how discouraged party members are at the grassroots.
Every KMT Central Standing Committee decline should be a call to action. But consider the new Central Standing Committee members. Are they up to the task of reinvigorating the party? Many people are questioning the staying power of the Blue camp. Ma Ying-jeou appears to have no response. He appears to have interpreted all calls for soul-searching as "anti-Ma" sentiment. But if no action is taken in response to these voices, danger awaits.
中常會式微事小，黨凝聚力流失事大
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.05 02:27 am
國民黨中常委改選，只堪以「意興闌珊」四字形容。當選者難謂雀躍，落選者莫名所以，挺馬人士遭中南部代表集體抵制的傳聞則印證不假。真正的問題是，在這種情況下產生的新一屆中常委名單，卻也解讀不出什麼新意義。
中常會是國民黨的最高權力機構，但近年功能日漸式微，不僅馬英九主席越來越少徵詢或採納中常委的意見，中常會的角色也不斷矮化，成為二軍競逐的舞台。因而，中常會改選變得行禮如儀，乃至有些不滿黨中央的人士藉改選發洩一下「反馬」情緒，要給馬英九一個好看，也就不足為奇了。
在這種情況下，與其觀察個別中常委誰上誰下，或追究什麼派系在幕後運作搞鬼，倒不如關注國民黨機器在馬總統與馬主席黨政雙兼下的「弱化」問題如何解決，恐怕才是影響未來朝野競爭的更重要因素。
以目前台灣「贏者全拿」的政治架構，無論藍綠誰政執，執政黨的權力槓桿都會大大向「政」傾斜，「黨」變成輔佐、抬轎及選舉機器。這從陳水扁的八年和馬英九的四年，都看得極為清楚，是政治的權力現實使然。然而，在執政時，「黨」雖然退居輔位，但它的生理命脈不可過度壓抑，而必須和「政」維持一定的衡稱關係，才不致發生斷層與疏離。原因是，執政是暫時的，總會遇上輪替的時刻；而政黨組織則要追尋恆久的運作；一個缺乏政見體系及政治意志的政黨，其生理命脈脆弱，難以在戰鬥中保持隊形，更難施展戰鬥力，這是必然。
從這個角度看，國民黨中常會的弱化，由參與競逐狀況的冷清，到缺乏亮眼的名單，顯然都不是健康的發展。此一現象，所反映的深層原因，無論是藍營內部凝聚力的流失，或者黨中央領導人號召力的耗弱，都是更應重視的事。
對照之下，民進黨的中常會卻是另一番景象。綠營七月間改組的中常會，是在派系激烈角力下產生，各大派系攻城掠池，志在必得；比起藍營中常委的參選冷清，迥然而異。而且，綠營中常會老中青俱全，包括「天王」謝長廷、游錫?皆以派系領袖側身其間。不難想像，國民黨召開中常會時與會者以沉默居多，討論多半流於形式，主席拍板了事；而民進黨中常會則常常出現真槍實彈的場景，讓主席蘇貞昌忙於招架。
進一步看，藍綠中常會的不同景象，其實不單單是「氣氛」或「觀瞻」的問題，也與黨的思考與行動關係密切。民進黨中常委老將眾多，或易讓蘇貞昌受到掣肘，但也使中常會相當程度地成為黨內政治角力的真實平台。而國民黨中常會變成權力空殼，則可能使決策產生偏斜或出現盲點而不自知。尤其，目前國民黨的執政成績無法取得多數民眾的認同，其實正需各方的腦力激盪，來增強決策力及執行力；然而，若連該黨的中常會都無法扮演建言供輸的角色，那麼藍軍要如何贏回民眾的信賴和支持？
在蔣經國時代，國民黨中常會廣納最尖端的黨政要員，成為名實大致相副的決策平台；而如今，中常會卻淪為內部權力的雞肋，食之無味，雖年年改選，但真正有實力的黨員連角逐都提不起胃口。這種現象，雖也是政治進化、黨政分離的徵兆；但對於一個凝聚力日漸渙散的政黨而言，畢竟是值得注意的事。若黨內菁英對中常會都表現得如此意興闌珊，亦可想像基層黨員向心力的流失恐怕更甚於此。
一般皆言，國民黨中常會已是每下愈況，應當設法提振；但看一看這張新名單，這樣的陣容，能承當得起「中興」的使命嗎？許多人都在質疑為藍軍的續航力，而馬英九對此似亦拿不出對策。簡言之，把一切要求檢討的聲音都解讀為「反馬」是沒必要的，但若對這些聲音無動於衷，卻是一個政治警訊。
Tuesday, September 4, 2012
DPP Party Chairman Intimidates Media
DPP Party Chairman Intimidates Media
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 4, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang is the leader of the largest opposition party on Taiwan. Su bought air time and repeatedly declared that Taiwan needs more than one voice. Su then asked everyone to rise up and oppose the Want Want China Times Group's acquisition of the China Network Systems (CNS). Su is the leader of an opposition party. When he singles out a particular media organization for repeated intimidation, that worries us. We worry that if and when the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, Taiwan will be left with only one voice.
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang is the leader of the largest opposition party on Taiwan. Su bought air time and repeatedly declared that Taiwan needs more than one voice. But he immediately changed his tune. Su called on everyone to rise up and oppose the Want Want China Times Group's acquisition of the China Network Systems (CNS). We would like to remind Chairman Su that Taiwan already has many voices. That is the way it is now, and that is the way it will be in the future. You are the leader of an opposition party. When you single out a particular media organization for relentless intimidation, that concerns us. We worry that if and when the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, Taiwan will be left with only one voice.
Everyone knows that society on Taiwan today is diverse. Views diverge. Concepts differ. Who can limit Taiwan to only one voice? Does any media organization have that ability? Common sense tells us this is impossible. A media monopoly on Taiwan is at thing of the past. This was the result of three decades of struggle. There is no going back.
No media organization has this ability. But a political party does. Let us speak plainly. On today's Taiwan , the only power that can eliminate other voices is a political party, either a ruling party or an opposition party that may return to power in the future. The reason is simple. Only a political party has the executive authority, judicial authority, and intelligence gathering ability needed to suppress the media. When those in power do not like what certain voices are saying, they have a variety of methods by which they can silence them.
The KMT era needs no mention. But how about the Democratic Progressive Party era? Do we remember how it dealt with those who offended them? This is a political party that grew strong by opposing censorship. But once it assumed power, it did an about face. DPP leaders disliked what TVBS said about them. The GIO accused TVBS of being "Communists." It threatened to revoke its broadcasting license and imposed a one million dollar fine. The Evening Times also expressed dissatisfaction with the ruling DPP. It published exclusives on the Chen family money-laundering case, leaked by retired National Security Bureau officials. The GIO went so far as to order prosecutors to search the Evening Times' editorial offices. This had a chilling effect on the Taiwan media. Freedom of speech on Taiwan took a giant step backward. These are all concrete examples from the era of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Can we be sure such events will not happen again in the future?
The DPP is currently out of power. It commands few political resources. But the DPP is Taiwan's largest opposition party. An election upset could suddenly make it the ruling party. Whether it is good or evil is a matter that cannot be taken lightly. It left a disturbing record of how it dealt with the media when it was the ruling party. Today it is an opposition party. Yet it is already buying air time and openly intimidating a particular media organization. If one day it seizes power, can we really expect it to treat the media with kid gloves? Can we really expect it not to target media organizations and attempt to silence them?
If an individual legislator or former leader of the opposition DPP was making such statements or taking such actions, the problem would not be so serious. The greatest cause for concern is that Su Tseng-chang is the Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party. Yet he bought air time and targeted a particular media organization. He engaged in intimidation. He did this continuously, day after day. A political party devoted all of its energy to openly attacking a single business organization. This behavior is serious. This action is terrifying. Chairman Su expressed support for the "anti-Wang Chung" protests. His action was questionable enough. The September 1st protest march is over. Yet Chairman Su relentlessly continues his on air attacks. His attacks against a particular media organization are way out of proportion. If Chairman Su scales new heights of political power, is he likely to go easy on the media?
Taiwan must not have only one voice. Democracy on Taiwan is now more mature. It does not need Chairman Su to point this out. This has long been the shared belief of everyone on Taiwan. When the Kuomintang imposed authoritarianism, the public refused to accept a single voice. The KMT and the government exerted enormous political pressure. But this newspaper fearlessly published an exclusive on the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party. Chairman Su was present. He should remember the chilling effect. Thirty years have passed. He should remember how hard it was to get where we are today.
Chairman Su's concerns are also our concerns. But Chairman Su's concerns are phony. They simply cannot come true. Our concerns, on the other hand, could easily come true. When Chairman Su holds forth, proclaiming that Taiwan cannot have only one voice, we become concerned. We worry that if Chairman Su becomes President Su, the only voice heard on Taiwan will be the one he wants to hear.
黨主席恫嚇媒體 最負面的民主示範
2012-09-04
中國時報
民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌最近以台灣最大在野黨領袖之尊，在電台購買時段不斷呼籲台灣不能只剩一種聲音，接著語鋒一轉，召喚所有民眾一起反對旺中購併中嘉。我們想要提醒蘇主席的是，台灣本來就有許多聲音，現在如此，未來也一定如此，但當你今天以在野黨領袖的身分，一再針對單一媒體事業做出這樣的恫嚇後，我們反而真的擔心，當民進黨執政後，台灣未來恐怕真的只會剩下一種聲音。
任誰都清楚，以今天台灣社會之多元，意見之多樣，理念之分歧，誰會有本事能讓台灣變成只有一種聲音？會是任何單一媒體嗎？不諱言說，用最簡單的常識論斷都知道根本不可能，台灣老早就走過了單一媒體壟斷言論的時代，這是台灣人在過往三十年共同打拚出來的成就，不可能，也不容許再走回頭路。
然而，媒體做不到的事，並不意味政黨做不到。講再白一點，今天在台灣，有本事能讓多元的聲音退化到只剩一種聲音的，只有政治力量，特別是執政黨，或是未來有很大機會會執政的在野黨。理由也很簡單，所有能夠箝制媒體的行政、司法、情治等工具，全操在主政者手中，當主政者不喜歡某些聲音的時候，它是可以透過某些操作，讓這些聲音消失的。
遙遠的黨國體制年代就不必提了，還記得民進黨執政的年代，曾怎麼對付他們所不喜歡的聲音嗎？這個昔日靠著突破言論封鎖而壯大的政黨，在獲得執政權力後，就是因為不喜歡ＴＶＢＳ的言論，當時的新聞局是曾大張旗鼓透過惡意抹紅、撤照威脅、百萬罰鍰等手段來對付ＴＶＢＳ；同樣的，也因為執政當局不滿《中時晚報》大幅報導國安局退職官員的洩密、洗錢案，竟發動大批檢調搜索《中時晚報》的編輯部。這些能讓台灣所有媒體噤若寒蟬，甚至能讓台灣言論自由大走回頭路的舉動，可都是在民進黨執政年代所發生的具體事例。試問：這些作為，在未來都絕對不會再發生嗎？
沒錯，民進黨目前還是在野黨，並不享有太多可操作的政治資源，但民進黨可是台灣最大的在野黨，而且很可能在任何一次重大選舉中就翻轉成為執政黨，它今天的任何好惡，都不能等閒視之。更何況，它在執政的年代還有對付媒體的紀錄留存在史冊，試問，當今天還是在野之身的時候，就已經做到向電台購買時段，公開針對特定單一媒體進行抹黑、恫嚇之舉，未來一旦真的擁有執政權力，還會對這個單一媒體手軟嗎？還會不讓這個單一媒體的聲音消失嗎？
今天如果只是在野黨的某位個別立委，或者只是卸任的政黨領袖，做出這樣的聲明或舉動，都還不算嚴重。今天最值得憂慮的是，蘇貞昌以民進黨黨主席的高度，直接在電台購買時段，針對單一媒體進行直接的威脅、恫嚇，而且是連續性的天天放送，這意味，此一舉動已經是在以整個政黨的力量，直接對付一個民間的單一企業體，這個行為不嚴重嗎？這個舉動不可怕嗎？之前為了聲援「反旺中」動員，蘇主席此舉已經非常值得非議，如今在九一遊行已經落幕之際，蘇主席的聲音卻依舊在電台持續放送，如此這般頻繁的、超比例原則的針對特定單一媒體進行攻擊，未來蘇主席如果有機會更上一層樓，他還會客氣嗎？
台灣本來就不能只有一種聲音，這個信條在民主己臻成熟的今天，不待蘇主席做出召喚，早就已經是台灣人所共同享有的信仰與價值。在昔日國民黨威權的年代，我們就是不接受台灣只有一種聲音，才在當時無畏來自黨國的莫大政治壓力，獨家報導民進黨宣布組黨的新聞，蘇主席當時就在新聞現場，應當知曉那個年代是怎樣的肅殺氛圍，這三十年我們一路走過來，更當知曉這個成果如何的得來不易！
不諱言的說，蘇主席的憂慮，也正是我們的憂慮。然而，蘇主席的憂慮根本不可能發生，但我們的憂慮，卻非常有可能實現。當蘇主席發聲，謂台灣不能只剩一種聲音的時候，我們卻擔心，當蘇主席有機會成為蘇總統的時候，台灣真的只剩下他喜歡聽的聲音了！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 4, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang is the leader of the largest opposition party on Taiwan. Su bought air time and repeatedly declared that Taiwan needs more than one voice. Su then asked everyone to rise up and oppose the Want Want China Times Group's acquisition of the China Network Systems (CNS). Su is the leader of an opposition party. When he singles out a particular media organization for repeated intimidation, that worries us. We worry that if and when the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, Taiwan will be left with only one voice.
Full Text below:
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang is the leader of the largest opposition party on Taiwan. Su bought air time and repeatedly declared that Taiwan needs more than one voice. But he immediately changed his tune. Su called on everyone to rise up and oppose the Want Want China Times Group's acquisition of the China Network Systems (CNS). We would like to remind Chairman Su that Taiwan already has many voices. That is the way it is now, and that is the way it will be in the future. You are the leader of an opposition party. When you single out a particular media organization for relentless intimidation, that concerns us. We worry that if and when the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, Taiwan will be left with only one voice.
Everyone knows that society on Taiwan today is diverse. Views diverge. Concepts differ. Who can limit Taiwan to only one voice? Does any media organization have that ability? Common sense tells us this is impossible. A media monopoly on Taiwan is at thing of the past. This was the result of three decades of struggle. There is no going back.
No media organization has this ability. But a political party does. Let us speak plainly. On today's Taiwan , the only power that can eliminate other voices is a political party, either a ruling party or an opposition party that may return to power in the future. The reason is simple. Only a political party has the executive authority, judicial authority, and intelligence gathering ability needed to suppress the media. When those in power do not like what certain voices are saying, they have a variety of methods by which they can silence them.
The KMT era needs no mention. But how about the Democratic Progressive Party era? Do we remember how it dealt with those who offended them? This is a political party that grew strong by opposing censorship. But once it assumed power, it did an about face. DPP leaders disliked what TVBS said about them. The GIO accused TVBS of being "Communists." It threatened to revoke its broadcasting license and imposed a one million dollar fine. The Evening Times also expressed dissatisfaction with the ruling DPP. It published exclusives on the Chen family money-laundering case, leaked by retired National Security Bureau officials. The GIO went so far as to order prosecutors to search the Evening Times' editorial offices. This had a chilling effect on the Taiwan media. Freedom of speech on Taiwan took a giant step backward. These are all concrete examples from the era of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Can we be sure such events will not happen again in the future?
The DPP is currently out of power. It commands few political resources. But the DPP is Taiwan's largest opposition party. An election upset could suddenly make it the ruling party. Whether it is good or evil is a matter that cannot be taken lightly. It left a disturbing record of how it dealt with the media when it was the ruling party. Today it is an opposition party. Yet it is already buying air time and openly intimidating a particular media organization. If one day it seizes power, can we really expect it to treat the media with kid gloves? Can we really expect it not to target media organizations and attempt to silence them?
If an individual legislator or former leader of the opposition DPP was making such statements or taking such actions, the problem would not be so serious. The greatest cause for concern is that Su Tseng-chang is the Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party. Yet he bought air time and targeted a particular media organization. He engaged in intimidation. He did this continuously, day after day. A political party devoted all of its energy to openly attacking a single business organization. This behavior is serious. This action is terrifying. Chairman Su expressed support for the "anti-Wang Chung" protests. His action was questionable enough. The September 1st protest march is over. Yet Chairman Su relentlessly continues his on air attacks. His attacks against a particular media organization are way out of proportion. If Chairman Su scales new heights of political power, is he likely to go easy on the media?
Taiwan must not have only one voice. Democracy on Taiwan is now more mature. It does not need Chairman Su to point this out. This has long been the shared belief of everyone on Taiwan. When the Kuomintang imposed authoritarianism, the public refused to accept a single voice. The KMT and the government exerted enormous political pressure. But this newspaper fearlessly published an exclusive on the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party. Chairman Su was present. He should remember the chilling effect. Thirty years have passed. He should remember how hard it was to get where we are today.
Chairman Su's concerns are also our concerns. But Chairman Su's concerns are phony. They simply cannot come true. Our concerns, on the other hand, could easily come true. When Chairman Su holds forth, proclaiming that Taiwan cannot have only one voice, we become concerned. We worry that if Chairman Su becomes President Su, the only voice heard on Taiwan will be the one he wants to hear.
黨主席恫嚇媒體 最負面的民主示範
2012-09-04
中國時報
民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌最近以台灣最大在野黨領袖之尊，在電台購買時段不斷呼籲台灣不能只剩一種聲音，接著語鋒一轉，召喚所有民眾一起反對旺中購併中嘉。我們想要提醒蘇主席的是，台灣本來就有許多聲音，現在如此，未來也一定如此，但當你今天以在野黨領袖的身分，一再針對單一媒體事業做出這樣的恫嚇後，我們反而真的擔心，當民進黨執政後，台灣未來恐怕真的只會剩下一種聲音。
任誰都清楚，以今天台灣社會之多元，意見之多樣，理念之分歧，誰會有本事能讓台灣變成只有一種聲音？會是任何單一媒體嗎？不諱言說，用最簡單的常識論斷都知道根本不可能，台灣老早就走過了單一媒體壟斷言論的時代，這是台灣人在過往三十年共同打拚出來的成就，不可能，也不容許再走回頭路。
然而，媒體做不到的事，並不意味政黨做不到。講再白一點，今天在台灣，有本事能讓多元的聲音退化到只剩一種聲音的，只有政治力量，特別是執政黨，或是未來有很大機會會執政的在野黨。理由也很簡單，所有能夠箝制媒體的行政、司法、情治等工具，全操在主政者手中，當主政者不喜歡某些聲音的時候，它是可以透過某些操作，讓這些聲音消失的。
遙遠的黨國體制年代就不必提了，還記得民進黨執政的年代，曾怎麼對付他們所不喜歡的聲音嗎？這個昔日靠著突破言論封鎖而壯大的政黨，在獲得執政權力後，就是因為不喜歡ＴＶＢＳ的言論，當時的新聞局是曾大張旗鼓透過惡意抹紅、撤照威脅、百萬罰鍰等手段來對付ＴＶＢＳ；同樣的，也因為執政當局不滿《中時晚報》大幅報導國安局退職官員的洩密、洗錢案，竟發動大批檢調搜索《中時晚報》的編輯部。這些能讓台灣所有媒體噤若寒蟬，甚至能讓台灣言論自由大走回頭路的舉動，可都是在民進黨執政年代所發生的具體事例。試問：這些作為，在未來都絕對不會再發生嗎？
沒錯，民進黨目前還是在野黨，並不享有太多可操作的政治資源，但民進黨可是台灣最大的在野黨，而且很可能在任何一次重大選舉中就翻轉成為執政黨，它今天的任何好惡，都不能等閒視之。更何況，它在執政的年代還有對付媒體的紀錄留存在史冊，試問，當今天還是在野之身的時候，就已經做到向電台購買時段，公開針對特定單一媒體進行抹黑、恫嚇之舉，未來一旦真的擁有執政權力，還會對這個單一媒體手軟嗎？還會不讓這個單一媒體的聲音消失嗎？
今天如果只是在野黨的某位個別立委，或者只是卸任的政黨領袖，做出這樣的聲明或舉動，都還不算嚴重。今天最值得憂慮的是，蘇貞昌以民進黨黨主席的高度，直接在電台購買時段，針對單一媒體進行直接的威脅、恫嚇，而且是連續性的天天放送，這意味，此一舉動已經是在以整個政黨的力量，直接對付一個民間的單一企業體，這個行為不嚴重嗎？這個舉動不可怕嗎？之前為了聲援「反旺中」動員，蘇主席此舉已經非常值得非議，如今在九一遊行已經落幕之際，蘇主席的聲音卻依舊在電台持續放送，如此這般頻繁的、超比例原則的針對特定單一媒體進行攻擊，未來蘇主席如果有機會更上一層樓，他還會客氣嗎？
台灣本來就不能只有一種聲音，這個信條在民主己臻成熟的今天，不待蘇主席做出召喚，早就已經是台灣人所共同享有的信仰與價值。在昔日國民黨威權的年代，我們就是不接受台灣只有一種聲音，才在當時無畏來自黨國的莫大政治壓力，獨家報導民進黨宣布組黨的新聞，蘇主席當時就在新聞現場，應當知曉那個年代是怎樣的肅殺氛圍，這三十年我們一路走過來，更當知曉這個成果如何的得來不易！
不諱言的說，蘇主席的憂慮，也正是我們的憂慮。然而，蘇主席的憂慮根本不可能發生，但我們的憂慮，卻非常有可能實現。當蘇主席發聲，謂台灣不能只剩一種聲音的時候，我們卻擔心，當蘇主席有機會成為蘇總統的時候，台灣真的只剩下他喜歡聽的聲音了！
Monday, September 3, 2012
Hon Hai/Sharp Joint Venture: An Inspiration
Hon Hai/Sharp Joint Venture: An Inspiration
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 3, 2012
Summary: Terry Gou, chairman of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., aka Foxconn, was absent during a press conference in Japan. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture has undergone some sudden changes. Chairman Guo spoke from Taiwan. He said the joint venture is still being negotiated. It is not dead. We sincerely hope it will succeed, and become a landmark for industry cooperation between Taiwan and Japan.
Full Text below:
Terry Gou, chairman of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., aka Foxconn, was absent during a press conference in Japan. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture has undergone some sudden changes. Chairman Guo spoke from Taiwan. He said the joint venture is still being negotiated. It is not dead. We sincerely hope it will succeed, and become a landmark for industry cooperation between Taiwan and Japan.
Sharp is an important panel manufacturer in Japan. The company name is derived from "Ever Sharp Pencil," the mechanical retractable pencil invented by company founder Tokuji Hayakawa. Hayakawa's ambition was to "make products that others want to imitate." In addition to the mechanical pencil, the company was the first to sell radios in Japan. It is famous in Japan for its high definition TVs.
Much time has passed. Sharp has become a "old line company." In the flat panel industry the company occupies at least two important niches. One is the AMOLED technology for active matrix organic light-emitting diode. The other is 10th-generation panel plants. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture will share production facilities and these two technologies. The resulting products will help the two companies become key manufacturing partners of the Apple mobile phone series, and the soon to be launched Apple iTV.
AMOLED screens are power-saving and thin. They have high color saturation, wide viewing angles, and high contrast. This makes them suitable for use in portable electronic equipment. Tenth generation flat panel plants use 2.9 meter by 3.1 meter supersized glass substrates. These are cut into large-size TV panels. Costs are more competitive than older generation panel plants.
Hon Hai is important to Sharp. Sharp may dominate the technology niche. But it has lost market share to South Korea. An alliance with Hon Hai means becoming part of Hon Hai's electronic goods supply chain. Its revenue could improve. Sharp and most Japanese manufacturers are caught in a bitter struggle with South Korea's Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. The exchange rate is an important factor. Since the Plaza Accord of 1985, the Japanese Yen has appreciated from 239 Yen per USD to 78 Yen per USD. During the same period the Korean Won has depreciated from 870 Won per USD to 1100 Won per USD.
A successful Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture would be ideal. It would be the only good news out of Taiwan's electronics industry over the past six months. Taiwan's electronics manufacturing industry faces its biggest predicament since the financial tsunami. Mobile phone exports last year increased by 40%. The first five months of this year saw a 36% decrease compared to the same period last year. Four DRAM factories lost over 38.5 billion NT during the first half of this year, a 30% increase in losses over the same period last year.
Every business has its own problems and challenges. But Japan, followed by Taiwan and South Korea, have each been leaders of the East Asian economic miracle. The vitality of the private sector was one factor. Another important factor was that all three economies had a development-oriented government. The government set economic growth as a goal. It established industrial policy and used taxes to develop and financed all sorts of means to realize that goal. The entire country was rooted in the concept of collective action. Officials and the public cooperated. They advanced toward the goal of economic growth. This was the source of the expression "Japan, Incorporated."
During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher ruled, one after the other. The international winds began to change. The government leadership model began to decline in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. This told governments they must respect the market economy. There should be no industrial policy, there should only be a competitive environment. Once the basic infrastructure was established, the rest should be left up to the market.
Such change has the biggest impact on Taiwan and Japan. It also had an impact on South Korea. But South Korea underwent industry consolidation following the Asian financial crisis. Only a few very large companies remain in the market. These companies are extremely wealthy. They are more or less able to fulfill the role the government once did in industrial development. Taiwan businessmen find the going much harder. Their companies are much smaller in scale than the Korean companies. They are also engaged in price competition with each other.
We suggest that the competent authorities change their economic thinking and economic strategy. They should not resume their highly interventionist past policy. But neither should they sit like a fly on the wall. They should actively cooperate with important leaders of export industries. They should work with them to enhance future competitiveness, to plan and strategize. The government has the Industrial Innovation Bill, the ITR, the Institute for Information Industry and Foreign Trade Association, and excellent research resources within the universities. Why not jointly develop key technologies with Taiwan companies? Why not file patents, develop markets, and play a more active role in multinational industrial cooperation such as the Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture?
Lest we forget, the British exercised a high degree of protectionism at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. So did the United States during its rise, including the post-war economic takeoff, when it developed its infant industries. When these advanced nations began to lead the world, they advocated free trade and respect for market mechanisms, consistent with their national interests. But these are not necessarily consistent with the national interests of the Republic of China. We hope that government decision-makers break free from their ideological shackles. We hope they take the initiative to reverse the predicament of industry. We hope they actively cooperate with Taiwan and Japanese companies, and lead Taiwan's economy to new peaks.
鴻夏戀帶給我們的啟示
2012-09-03
中國時報
日前鴻海公司郭台銘董事長在日本的記者會缺席，「鴻夏戀曲」驟添變數，其後郭董事長在台灣發聲，表示本案還在談，沒有破局。我們衷心希望這個案子未來朝正面的方向發展，並能成為台灣與日本產業攜手合作的指標性案例。
夏普是日本的重要面板製造商，其商標由創始人早川德次發明「永遠保持尖銳」的活芯自動鉛筆而來。早川先生以「生產令世人爭相模仿的商品」為志向，除自動鉛筆外，率先在日本發售收音機，也在日本銷售以螢幕高顯像度著稱的電視機，戰戰成名。
往日已遠，夏普已成「老將」，但在面板方面，該公司至少還握有兩項重要的利基：主動式有機發光二極體也就是ＡＭＯＬＥＤ技術，和第十代面板廠。如果能經由談判，鴻夏雙方合作生產和使用這兩項技術衍生的產品，對於雙方成為蘋果手機系列，和未來蘋果所將推出ｉＴＶ的關鍵製造伙伴，將有極大的助益。
ＡＭＯＬＥＤ螢幕具有省電、輕薄、色彩飽和、廣視角、高對比等優點，適合用於攜帶型電子設備中。而十代面板廠使用兩米九乘三米一的超大型玻璃基板，切割成大尺寸電視面版，和其他較舊世代面板廠相比，在成本上更具競爭力。
對夏普而言，鴻海也很重要。夏普固然擁有技術利基，但在與南韓的競爭中其實已經失利；若能與鴻海結盟，穩定地加入鴻海組裝各式電子商品的供應鏈，其營收可望獲得轉機。依目前情況來看，包括夏普在內的幾乎所有日本製造廠商，面對韓國三星、ＬＧ、現代的崛起，都陷入苦戰。匯率是其中一個重要的因素：一九八五年紐約花園廣場協議以來，日圓從一美元兌二三九日圓，升值到現在的七十八日圓，同期間韓圜從八七○貶值到一千一百比一美元。
鴻夏戀若能成功是最好，因為這將是台灣電子業近半年來所發生的極少數正面訊息。整體而言，台灣電子製造業正面臨金融海嘯以來最大的困境。手機出口，去年全年增加了四十％，今年前五個月較同期減少三十六％；四家動態記憶存取ＤＲＡＭ廠，今年上半年共虧損三百八十五億元，比去年同期增加三成。
每個行業都有它個別的問題及挑戰，但整體而言，我們必須認識到，日本在先、台韓其次，均曾被視為東亞經濟奇蹟的領頭羊。除了民間企業的活力以外，當初創造出佳績的一個重要原因，在於三個經濟體都由一個「發展導向政府」在領導。政府確立經濟成長的目標，設定產業政策，並運用租稅、研發和融資各類工具來落實。整個國家是以一個集體行動的概念，官民合作，朝經濟成長的目標邁進。這就是當年日本被描述為「日本公司」的由來。
一九八○年代雷根、柴契爾相繼執政以後，國際的風向球開始改變，原來的政府領導模式在台、日、韓三個地方都已經式微。政府被告知：要尊重市場經濟，不應有產業政策，只應把競爭環境、基本設施弄好，其他都應當交由市場決定。
這種改變，對台灣和日本衝擊最大。對韓國而言，也有衝擊，但該國在亞洲金融風暴後，經過產業整併，市場上只剩下幾個超大型的企業；這些企業富可敵國，多少還可以替代當年國家在產業發展中所扮演的角色。相對而言，台商就很辛苦了，規模比韓商小很多，而且還互相殺價競爭。
當今之計，我們建議經濟主管當局要改變思維，改變策略。不見得要恢復以前高度干預性的政策，但絕對不應當作壁上觀，而應積極地協同各重要出口行業的領導廠商，共同為未來競爭力的提升，來謀定策略。政府有產創條例可用，有工研院、資策會和外貿協會，有各大學的優異研究資源，為什麼不能在台商關鍵性技術的共同開發、專利布局、市場拓展和類似鴻夏戀的跨國產業合作方面，扮演更積極的角色？
我們不要忘記，當年英國在工業革命崛起之初，美國在內戰後經濟起飛之時，都實行高度保護主義，發展其幼稚工業。當這些先進國家的企業競爭力領先全世界之後，改而主張自由貿易，尊重市場機制，符合其國家利益，但卻不一定符合中華民國的國家利益。希望政府決策當局能打破思想上的桎梏，主動地扭轉產業困境，配合台灣和日本在產業方面的積極合作，將台灣經濟帶往一個新的高峰。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 3, 2012
Summary: Terry Gou, chairman of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., aka Foxconn, was absent during a press conference in Japan. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture has undergone some sudden changes. Chairman Guo spoke from Taiwan. He said the joint venture is still being negotiated. It is not dead. We sincerely hope it will succeed, and become a landmark for industry cooperation between Taiwan and Japan.
Full Text below:
Terry Gou, chairman of Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., aka Foxconn, was absent during a press conference in Japan. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture has undergone some sudden changes. Chairman Guo spoke from Taiwan. He said the joint venture is still being negotiated. It is not dead. We sincerely hope it will succeed, and become a landmark for industry cooperation between Taiwan and Japan.
Sharp is an important panel manufacturer in Japan. The company name is derived from "Ever Sharp Pencil," the mechanical retractable pencil invented by company founder Tokuji Hayakawa. Hayakawa's ambition was to "make products that others want to imitate." In addition to the mechanical pencil, the company was the first to sell radios in Japan. It is famous in Japan for its high definition TVs.
Much time has passed. Sharp has become a "old line company." In the flat panel industry the company occupies at least two important niches. One is the AMOLED technology for active matrix organic light-emitting diode. The other is 10th-generation panel plants. The Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture will share production facilities and these two technologies. The resulting products will help the two companies become key manufacturing partners of the Apple mobile phone series, and the soon to be launched Apple iTV.
AMOLED screens are power-saving and thin. They have high color saturation, wide viewing angles, and high contrast. This makes them suitable for use in portable electronic equipment. Tenth generation flat panel plants use 2.9 meter by 3.1 meter supersized glass substrates. These are cut into large-size TV panels. Costs are more competitive than older generation panel plants.
Hon Hai is important to Sharp. Sharp may dominate the technology niche. But it has lost market share to South Korea. An alliance with Hon Hai means becoming part of Hon Hai's electronic goods supply chain. Its revenue could improve. Sharp and most Japanese manufacturers are caught in a bitter struggle with South Korea's Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. The exchange rate is an important factor. Since the Plaza Accord of 1985, the Japanese Yen has appreciated from 239 Yen per USD to 78 Yen per USD. During the same period the Korean Won has depreciated from 870 Won per USD to 1100 Won per USD.
A successful Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture would be ideal. It would be the only good news out of Taiwan's electronics industry over the past six months. Taiwan's electronics manufacturing industry faces its biggest predicament since the financial tsunami. Mobile phone exports last year increased by 40%. The first five months of this year saw a 36% decrease compared to the same period last year. Four DRAM factories lost over 38.5 billion NT during the first half of this year, a 30% increase in losses over the same period last year.
Every business has its own problems and challenges. But Japan, followed by Taiwan and South Korea, have each been leaders of the East Asian economic miracle. The vitality of the private sector was one factor. Another important factor was that all three economies had a development-oriented government. The government set economic growth as a goal. It established industrial policy and used taxes to develop and financed all sorts of means to realize that goal. The entire country was rooted in the concept of collective action. Officials and the public cooperated. They advanced toward the goal of economic growth. This was the source of the expression "Japan, Incorporated."
During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher ruled, one after the other. The international winds began to change. The government leadership model began to decline in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. This told governments they must respect the market economy. There should be no industrial policy, there should only be a competitive environment. Once the basic infrastructure was established, the rest should be left up to the market.
Such change has the biggest impact on Taiwan and Japan. It also had an impact on South Korea. But South Korea underwent industry consolidation following the Asian financial crisis. Only a few very large companies remain in the market. These companies are extremely wealthy. They are more or less able to fulfill the role the government once did in industrial development. Taiwan businessmen find the going much harder. Their companies are much smaller in scale than the Korean companies. They are also engaged in price competition with each other.
We suggest that the competent authorities change their economic thinking and economic strategy. They should not resume their highly interventionist past policy. But neither should they sit like a fly on the wall. They should actively cooperate with important leaders of export industries. They should work with them to enhance future competitiveness, to plan and strategize. The government has the Industrial Innovation Bill, the ITR, the Institute for Information Industry and Foreign Trade Association, and excellent research resources within the universities. Why not jointly develop key technologies with Taiwan companies? Why not file patents, develop markets, and play a more active role in multinational industrial cooperation such as the Hon Hai/Sharp joint venture?
Lest we forget, the British exercised a high degree of protectionism at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. So did the United States during its rise, including the post-war economic takeoff, when it developed its infant industries. When these advanced nations began to lead the world, they advocated free trade and respect for market mechanisms, consistent with their national interests. But these are not necessarily consistent with the national interests of the Republic of China. We hope that government decision-makers break free from their ideological shackles. We hope they take the initiative to reverse the predicament of industry. We hope they actively cooperate with Taiwan and Japanese companies, and lead Taiwan's economy to new peaks.
鴻夏戀帶給我們的啟示
2012-09-03
中國時報
日前鴻海公司郭台銘董事長在日本的記者會缺席，「鴻夏戀曲」驟添變數，其後郭董事長在台灣發聲，表示本案還在談，沒有破局。我們衷心希望這個案子未來朝正面的方向發展，並能成為台灣與日本產業攜手合作的指標性案例。
夏普是日本的重要面板製造商，其商標由創始人早川德次發明「永遠保持尖銳」的活芯自動鉛筆而來。早川先生以「生產令世人爭相模仿的商品」為志向，除自動鉛筆外，率先在日本發售收音機，也在日本銷售以螢幕高顯像度著稱的電視機，戰戰成名。
往日已遠，夏普已成「老將」，但在面板方面，該公司至少還握有兩項重要的利基：主動式有機發光二極體也就是ＡＭＯＬＥＤ技術，和第十代面板廠。如果能經由談判，鴻夏雙方合作生產和使用這兩項技術衍生的產品，對於雙方成為蘋果手機系列，和未來蘋果所將推出ｉＴＶ的關鍵製造伙伴，將有極大的助益。
ＡＭＯＬＥＤ螢幕具有省電、輕薄、色彩飽和、廣視角、高對比等優點，適合用於攜帶型電子設備中。而十代面板廠使用兩米九乘三米一的超大型玻璃基板，切割成大尺寸電視面版，和其他較舊世代面板廠相比，在成本上更具競爭力。
對夏普而言，鴻海也很重要。夏普固然擁有技術利基，但在與南韓的競爭中其實已經失利；若能與鴻海結盟，穩定地加入鴻海組裝各式電子商品的供應鏈，其營收可望獲得轉機。依目前情況來看，包括夏普在內的幾乎所有日本製造廠商，面對韓國三星、ＬＧ、現代的崛起，都陷入苦戰。匯率是其中一個重要的因素：一九八五年紐約花園廣場協議以來，日圓從一美元兌二三九日圓，升值到現在的七十八日圓，同期間韓圜從八七○貶值到一千一百比一美元。
鴻夏戀若能成功是最好，因為這將是台灣電子業近半年來所發生的極少數正面訊息。整體而言，台灣電子製造業正面臨金融海嘯以來最大的困境。手機出口，去年全年增加了四十％，今年前五個月較同期減少三十六％；四家動態記憶存取ＤＲＡＭ廠，今年上半年共虧損三百八十五億元，比去年同期增加三成。
每個行業都有它個別的問題及挑戰，但整體而言，我們必須認識到，日本在先、台韓其次，均曾被視為東亞經濟奇蹟的領頭羊。除了民間企業的活力以外，當初創造出佳績的一個重要原因，在於三個經濟體都由一個「發展導向政府」在領導。政府確立經濟成長的目標，設定產業政策，並運用租稅、研發和融資各類工具來落實。整個國家是以一個集體行動的概念，官民合作，朝經濟成長的目標邁進。這就是當年日本被描述為「日本公司」的由來。
一九八○年代雷根、柴契爾相繼執政以後，國際的風向球開始改變，原來的政府領導模式在台、日、韓三個地方都已經式微。政府被告知：要尊重市場經濟，不應有產業政策，只應把競爭環境、基本設施弄好，其他都應當交由市場決定。
這種改變，對台灣和日本衝擊最大。對韓國而言，也有衝擊，但該國在亞洲金融風暴後，經過產業整併，市場上只剩下幾個超大型的企業；這些企業富可敵國，多少還可以替代當年國家在產業發展中所扮演的角色。相對而言，台商就很辛苦了，規模比韓商小很多，而且還互相殺價競爭。
當今之計，我們建議經濟主管當局要改變思維，改變策略。不見得要恢復以前高度干預性的政策，但絕對不應當作壁上觀，而應積極地協同各重要出口行業的領導廠商，共同為未來競爭力的提升，來謀定策略。政府有產創條例可用，有工研院、資策會和外貿協會，有各大學的優異研究資源，為什麼不能在台商關鍵性技術的共同開發、專利布局、市場拓展和類似鴻夏戀的跨國產業合作方面，扮演更積極的角色？
我們不要忘記，當年英國在工業革命崛起之初，美國在內戰後經濟起飛之時，都實行高度保護主義，發展其幼稚工業。當這些先進國家的企業競爭力領先全世界之後，改而主張自由貿易，尊重市場機制，符合其國家利益，但卻不一定符合中華民國的國家利益。希望政府決策當局能打破思想上的桎梏，主動地扭轉產業困境，配合台灣和日本在產業方面的積極合作，將台灣經濟帶往一個新的高峰。
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