Bo Xilai Trial, Scripted and Unscripted
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 22, 2013
Summary: Bo Xilai, a shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
Full text below:
Seventeen months after being removed from office, Bo Xilai is being tried by the Jinan Intermediate People's Court. He faces charges of corruption, bribery, and three counts of abuse of power. The judges have already established the framework by which he will be tried. They have already written the script. The trial is unlikely to present any surprises. More interesting is how the public, which has not read the script, will react to Bo Xilai's trial. Will a stray spark set off a powderkeg?
This could be the greatest threat to former Politburo member and Chongqing party secretary Xi Jinping's succession., Inside and outside the Communist Party, opinion regarding Bo Xilai's crimes remains polarized. There appears to be clear evidence of his corruption and abuse of power. His wife Gu Kailai has already been conviced of murder. Yet many on the Mainland still see him as a hero who "waved the red flag in order to expose corruption." They consider him a victim of an upper echelon political power struggle. That is why the case is being tried in public. The government hopes to weaken the political and social influence of Bo supporters. That is why the Mainland authorities are crossing every t and dotting every i.
Over the past 17 months, Bo Xilai has been removed from office, detained, interrogated, arrested, and prosecuted. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee has been proceeding carefully, by the book. This is "criminal justice with Chinese characteristics." First establish the goal and the framework. Exclude all unwanted outcomes. Establish the offenses and charges. Then conduct a public hearing. The trial will take place in Jinan, Shandong, rather than Chongqing or Dalian, where Bo Xilai was originally charged. On the surface the change of venue ensures an objective and neutral investigation. In fact the motive is to avoid interference from Bo faction members and supporters. All these factors were carefully considered.
The trial was custom tailored to fit Bo Xilai. The CCP Central Committee made many arrangements to that end. They include the following. One. Once Xi Jinping came to power, he vigorously "fought corruption." The people of Chongqing praised Bo Xilai's "fight against corruption." Xi hitched a ride on this sentiment. At the same time, Xi used the fight against corruption to lash out against Bo. Two. Earlier this month, Xi Jinping ordered an investigation of Bo ally and former Politics and Law Committee member Zhou Yongkang. Zhou is accused of accumulating wealth by unfair means. Also under investigation is Bo party comrade and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou. He is accused of "violating party discipline." These are preliminary moves to purge Bo allies. Three. Bo is accused of taking bribes worth over than 20 million RMB, and of embezzling over five million in public monies. Actually this is nowhere near what the Bo family has accumulated through corruption. This is to avoid Bo Xilai being sentenced to death, and to deprive him of any possibility of a political comeback.
The Chinese Communist Party allegedly has an unwritten law. Once one has become a member of the inner circle, one may not be subject to the death penalty. Politburo members who have served as senior cadres, may not be sentenced to death. Those familiar with the claim have speculated about this unwritten law. Bo Xilai will be subject to long imprisonment. At most he may be spared the death penalty. This is the most the party can do to resolved any disagreements over punishment.
In fact, a full year ago, on August 20 last year, Gu Kailai's death sentence for the murder of British businessman Neil Haywood was lifted. That day Gu Kailai praised the court's verdict as an "impartial judgment." Gu said the judgment of the court reflected extraordinary respect for reality and for life. Gu said these are profoundly Chinese traits. Bo Xilai has long been ambitious and domineering. How will he comport himself during his trial? Will he remain low-keyed, confessional, and resigned to his fate?
This is a critical period. Ths judicial drama has a pre-written script. Yet it remains hard to rule out unwelcome surprises. This is why the CCP has rejected calls that the trial be broadcast live, in its entirety. Instead, the transcript will be broadcast live and direct. This is also a "Chinese characteristics" style invention. Apparently the only way to ensure that Bo Xilai "behaves himself" at the trial, is to ensure that his son Bo Guagua remains in the United States and continues to enjoy security, wealth, and freedom. This will be traded for Bo's acquiescence to the administration of justice.
The CCP has been writing the script for Bo's live broadcast trial for the past ten months. Will today present any surprises? That depends upon Bo's willpower and mindset. Bo engaged in corruption and abuse of power. He trampled over the system. That is no longer in doubt. But will he attempt to exploit the last vestiges of his prestige in court? Will he become an embarrassment to the Mainland authorities? That remains to be seen.
This is ironic. A shining hero who fought corruption, has ended up in prison as the result of a policy of fighting corruption. The case has exposed high CCP official duplicity. Also ironic is how the Mainland has become the world's factory, yet is uses such a highly politicized, Rube Goldberg system of justice. The case has exposed the soft underbelly of modernization on Mainland China. Many on Taiwan may scoff at the Bo Xilai trial. But have we recovered the money that the Chen family embezzled from us? What progress is being made on that front? What is there for us to be so proud about?
薄熙來開審：劇本內與劇本外的觀察
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.22 03:47 am
遭免職後十七個月，薄熙來今天將在濟南中級法院，公開面對貪汙、收賄、濫用職權等三項罪名的審判。根據已經畫得條條框框的官方劇本中，這次的審理，似乎不可能有什麼意外的結局；比較值得觀察的，則是劇本外的群眾反應和薄熙來的聆審態度，會不會有擦槍走火演出。
作為前政治局委員和前重慶市委書記，乃至是習近平接班的最大威脅，薄熙來所犯下的罪行，不論在中共黨內或黨外，一直有頗為兩極的爭議。儘管他貪腐、濫權的事證明確，包括其妻谷開來的謀殺案件也已定罪，中國大陸仍有不少民眾視他為「唱紅打黑」的英雄，認為他是高層政治鬥爭的犧牲品。也因此，如何將此案藉由公開審判，消除政治上和社會上的「擁薄」勢力，是中共當局處心積慮步步為營的事。
十七個月來，薄熙來從免職、雙規、被捕、起訴到開庭審訊，全是依著中共黨中央的審慎計算慢慢推進。這是「中國特色」的司法：先確立目標框架，排除各種可能的後遺症，然後設定罪行及罪名，再進行公開審訊。包括開庭地點選在山東濟南，而不是薄熙來被控犯罪地點的大連或重慶，表面的說法是「異地受審」可確保調查的客觀中立，實際也是為了避免其人馬和徒眾的干擾，都經過仔細考量。
觀察這場為薄熙來「量身打造」的大審，中共中央進行了不少周邊部署工作，諸如：其一，習近平上台後雷厲推動「打貪」，一方面承接了薄熙來受重慶人民誇讚的「打黑」，一方面又可藉反貪之名反過來「打薄」。其二，習近平本月初下令，立案調查與薄熙來交好的前政法委周永康的斂財案，包括另一朋黨中央軍委副主席徐才厚遭「雙規」，都是清理「薄黨」的預備行動。其三，指控薄熙來收賄兩千多萬元人民幣，貪汙五百多萬公帑，其實遠低於薄家貪腐所得；其目的，是要避免薄熙來在司法上被判處死刑，但又要剝奪他在政治上東山再起的一切可能。
據稱，中共黨內有一條「入局不死」的默契，凡是擔任過政治局委員的高幹，不會被判處死刑。熟知內情人士猜測，在這樣的「默契」下，薄熙來可能被判較長的有期徒刑，最多也只是「死緩」，這是最能擺平黨內不同意見的處分。
事實上，整整一年之前，也就是去年的八月廿日，谷開來因謀殺英商海伍德被判處「死緩」。當天，谷開來當庭稱揚法庭「判決公正」，說判決體現了法院對法律、對現實、對生命的「特別尊重」；這些，都深具中國特色。讓人好奇的是，一向野心勃勃、霸氣外露的薄熙來，面對這次審訊，真的會在庭上表現出溫馴、認罪、聽命安排的姿態嗎？
這關鍵的一段，就是這場司法大戲在預先寫好的劇本中，難以保證完全照本宣科的最大懸念。正因為如此，中共否決了外界呼籲這場審訊「全程轉播」的要求，改為用「文字直播」——這也是「具有中國特色」的發明。從形勢判斷，唯一能確保薄熙來在審判中「就範」的力量，就是以其子薄瓜瓜在美繼續享有現有的安全、財富和自由，來交換他對司法的臣服。
無論如何，中共這一套寫了十幾個月的「審薄」大戲腳本，今天會不會有什麼驚奇的演出，端視薄熙來的意志和心理狀態而定。他的貪瀆濫權、踐踏體制，已經是無庸置疑；但他會不會利用自己的民粹餘威，在法庭上作最後一搏，當庭給中共當局一個難堪，仍有待觀察。
諷刺的是，一個光鮮的「打黑」英雄，最後變成了「打貪」政策的階下囚，這暴露的是中共高官權力的表裡不一。同樣諷刺的是，已成為世界工廠的中國大陸，竟要用如此曲折繁複的政治手段來布置這場司法審判，這暴露的則是中國大陸現代化的軟肋。話說回來，從台灣看薄案的審理，很多人可能會嗤之以鼻；但我們把扁家貪瀆案辦到錢也沒討回、人又趴趴走的地步，又有什麼驕傲可言？
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Why Does the Public on Taiwan Feel So Lost?
Why Does the Public on Taiwan Feel So Lost?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 20, 2013
Summary: Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
Full text below:
Recently UDN TV interviewed Minister of Culture Lung Ying-tai. Lung compared today's society to society a decade ago, when she was Chief of the Taipei City Bureau of Culture. She said public trust in government has nearly evaporated. She said the public on Taiwan is much less confident than it was 15 years ago.
We hardly need Lung Ying-tai to remind us. Everyone knows public trust in government has evaporated. Everyone knows we have lost faith in ourselves. These are very real and serious problems. Chart them on a graph. Over the next few years at least, the trend lines will continue to decline. Lung Ying-tai most laments the former. She laments the fact that "Officials are finding it hard to survive." But the latter is far more troubling. The public fears that no solution can be found for its long-term feeling of loss.
The self-deprecating witticism, "Officials are finding it hard to survive" is something officials have been repeating ever since democratization. The government has lost its authority. Officials have failed to keep up with the times. They have failed to change their attitude toward those they serve. Naturally they are finding it hard to win people's trust. From the peoples' perspective, democratization has made them "masters in their own home." It has made them more self-confident. It has made them less afraid to complain to officialdom. It has provided them with more opportunities to express defiance. The result however, has not been improved government efficiency. It has not been better solutions to practical problems. Such a democracy is an illusion. How can people not be disappointed. How can they not feel a sense of loss? How can they not become cynics?
Public loss of confidence in Taiwan, involves three factors. One. A loss of pride in our democracy. In 2000, ruling party change was risky business. People had high hopes for the new political order. People were proud of the fact that the ROC was the forerunner of democracy in Chinese society. Unfortunately this vision was shattered by eight years of DPP policy chaos. Chen Shui-bian family corruption was an even greater betrayal. Together, they shattered the twin myths of democratization and nativization.
Two. The economy has declined. Taiwan had an opportunity to ride the Mainland's coat tails to new economic growth and opportunity. Lee Teng-hui's "avoid haste, exercise patience" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's Closed Door Policy caused Taiwan to miss out. A second ruling party change under Ma Ying-jeou improved cross-Strait relations, but could not make up the lost economic momentum. This includes the 12 i-Taiwan Projects and the four year 500 billion public works program. These involved huge investments of funds, but failed to increase production or employment. This year, economic growth, youth unemployment, pensions, welfare, and other fundamentals, deteriorated. Neighboring countries on the other hand, continued to prosper. People were predictably frustrated.
Three. Any social consensus or sense of shared values has been lost. Under DPP rule, struggles over reunification vs. independence intensified. They became struggles between Blue and Green. Political party struggles intensified political differences within society. People on Taiwan no longer share a common language or common values. Nothing in today's society escapes the Blue vs. Green litmus test. It determines the truth or falsity of everything. This irrational Blue vs. Green conflict has expanded into every corner of society. Taiwan once had a middle ground, in academia, in civil society, and in religion. Now neutral parties remain silent in order to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Opportunists meanwhile, jump on the bandwagon and choose sides. There is no longer any middle ground. Society has lost its sense of proportion. It has lost any respect for democracy, freedom, the rule of law, professionalism, and reason it might have once had.
People on Taiwan today feel a sense of loss. They know that the ROC is sliding downhill. They know that feel-good sentiments cannot hide the truth. They see no force that will slow the ROC's descent into oblivion. Will the Ma administration suddenly wake up and get its act together? Will the next ruling party change made any difference? Will protesters once again have to take to the streets?
Wang Chien-hsuan recently thundered, "The Control Yuan may as well close up shop!" But that was irrational. High officials cannot solve our problems. But when they vent their emotions this way, they merely deepen public cynicism. Government officials must promote public confidence. The public on Taiwan has lost confidence in itself. It is waiting for the government to offer encouragment.
Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. One cannot expect people to believe that some high official can address this feeling of impotence. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
台灣何以充斥失落感與憤世嫉俗？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.20 02:14 am
文化部長龍應台接受udn tv專訪時說，比起十幾年前她出任台北市文化局長，今天社會對政府的「信任感」幾乎「蕩然無存」。她還說，十五年前後相比，今天台灣人對自己的「信心指數」也降低很多。
不用龍應台提醒，大家也知道，人民對政府「信任感」的消失，與民眾「自信心」的下降，都是極真實而嚴重的問題。如果把兩者放在時間的向度裡觀察，至少在未來幾年，我們看不到這兩條拋物線的下墜終點。更讓龍應台慨嘆的，顯然是前者，所謂的「官不聊生」；但格外值得人們關切的，其實是後者，社會憂慮台灣長期找不到出路和解方的「失落感」。
所謂「官不聊生」，是台灣民主化以來，官員一直掛在嘴邊的自嘲。政府的權威失落，而官員未隨著時勢變化而調整服務心態，當然難以得到人民的信任。然而，對民眾而言，如果民主化的結果，給了人民更多「當家做主」的自信，更多向官員嗆聲、反脣相稽的機會，結果卻無助於提升政府效能，亦無助於實際解決問題，這樣虛幻的民主，怎不令人感到失望與失落？人們又如何不憤世嫉俗？
台灣自信心的流失，或可從三方面觀察。第一，是民主驕傲的蒙塵。公元兩千年的政黨輪替雖在艱險中締造，民眾對於政治新局的開創其實仍充滿期待，同時也以台灣作為華人社會的民主先行者感到驕傲。不幸的是，這項憧憬，卻以民進黨八年的施政混亂作收，而陳水扁家族的貪瀆無行則更是對台灣社會的一記迎頭重擊，民主化和本土化神話同遭粉碎。
第二，是經濟風光的消褪。從李登輝的戒急用忍到陳水扁的鎖國政策，台灣經濟錯失了利用大陸崛起以追求壯大及脫胎換骨的契機；但二度政黨輪替後，馬英九雖改善了兩岸關係，卻在經濟面向遲遲無法找回成長的動能。包括愛台十二項建設和四年五千億擴大公共建設方案，都投入了鉅大的經費，卻看不到帶動生產和就業的附帶效益。這兩年，經濟成長、青年失業、年金及福利負擔不支等基本面表現不斷惡化；比起鄰近國家的向榮趨盛，不免讓人喪氣。
第三，是社會共識和共同價值的散失：民進黨執政期間，台灣的「統獨之爭」進一步擴大為「藍綠之鬥」，政黨的鬥爭深化為社會大眾的顏色分化，至此，台灣就完全失去了共同語言與共同價值。今天社會上發生任何事情，都要經由「藍」或「綠」的試紙檢查，來驗證它的屬性和辯正方向。經過這種非理性的藍綠運動，原來台灣還存在的「中間地帶」，包括學術界、宗教界乃至民間社團在內，清者噤聲以求身免，濁者輕易投身選邊而站。失去中間地帶的台灣，不僅失去了調和社會平衡的力量，也失去了原先對民主、自由、法治、專業、理性等價值的認知和信仰。
今天台灣人充滿失落感，一個原因是人們認知到國家正在走下坡，這是再怎麼假裝「自我感覺良好」都掩飾不了的事實；另一個更重要的原因是，人們看不出這個「台灣往下掉」的情勢，要碰到什麼樣的力量，才能把它托住。要靠馬政府突然的覺醒和振作嗎？靠下一次政黨輪替嗎？還是靠抗爭團體不斷接力在街頭衝撞？
王建?日前發飆責罵「監察院不如關掉」，其實正是這種失落心理的反射之一。問題是，高官無力解決問題，卻採取如此非理性的暴衝手法發洩，只會加深人民的憤世嫉俗。政府官員需要民眾的信任來推動國家，但台灣失落的自信心，不也在等待政府的作為來填補與提振？
老實說，當台灣政治和社會歧見深化到這種地步，人們要期待什麼高人一出手就能化解民眾的無力感，恐怕是不可能的事。民眾可以做的，或許是從自身做起，盡量避免用負面語言引發負面對應，盡量減少用政治顏色來分別敵我，盡量還原自己對民主、自由、人道等價值的原色信仰，盡可能追求超乎藍綠的客觀價值。無論如何，要一點一滴找回中間地帶，切勿再陷入集體憤世嫉俗的悲情，那是我們在前一波民主化已經切身體驗過的一課。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 20, 2013
Summary: Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
Full text below:
Recently UDN TV interviewed Minister of Culture Lung Ying-tai. Lung compared today's society to society a decade ago, when she was Chief of the Taipei City Bureau of Culture. She said public trust in government has nearly evaporated. She said the public on Taiwan is much less confident than it was 15 years ago.
We hardly need Lung Ying-tai to remind us. Everyone knows public trust in government has evaporated. Everyone knows we have lost faith in ourselves. These are very real and serious problems. Chart them on a graph. Over the next few years at least, the trend lines will continue to decline. Lung Ying-tai most laments the former. She laments the fact that "Officials are finding it hard to survive." But the latter is far more troubling. The public fears that no solution can be found for its long-term feeling of loss.
The self-deprecating witticism, "Officials are finding it hard to survive" is something officials have been repeating ever since democratization. The government has lost its authority. Officials have failed to keep up with the times. They have failed to change their attitude toward those they serve. Naturally they are finding it hard to win people's trust. From the peoples' perspective, democratization has made them "masters in their own home." It has made them more self-confident. It has made them less afraid to complain to officialdom. It has provided them with more opportunities to express defiance. The result however, has not been improved government efficiency. It has not been better solutions to practical problems. Such a democracy is an illusion. How can people not be disappointed. How can they not feel a sense of loss? How can they not become cynics?
Public loss of confidence in Taiwan, involves three factors. One. A loss of pride in our democracy. In 2000, ruling party change was risky business. People had high hopes for the new political order. People were proud of the fact that the ROC was the forerunner of democracy in Chinese society. Unfortunately this vision was shattered by eight years of DPP policy chaos. Chen Shui-bian family corruption was an even greater betrayal. Together, they shattered the twin myths of democratization and nativization.
Two. The economy has declined. Taiwan had an opportunity to ride the Mainland's coat tails to new economic growth and opportunity. Lee Teng-hui's "avoid haste, exercise patience" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's Closed Door Policy caused Taiwan to miss out. A second ruling party change under Ma Ying-jeou improved cross-Strait relations, but could not make up the lost economic momentum. This includes the 12 i-Taiwan Projects and the four year 500 billion public works program. These involved huge investments of funds, but failed to increase production or employment. This year, economic growth, youth unemployment, pensions, welfare, and other fundamentals, deteriorated. Neighboring countries on the other hand, continued to prosper. People were predictably frustrated.
Three. Any social consensus or sense of shared values has been lost. Under DPP rule, struggles over reunification vs. independence intensified. They became struggles between Blue and Green. Political party struggles intensified political differences within society. People on Taiwan no longer share a common language or common values. Nothing in today's society escapes the Blue vs. Green litmus test. It determines the truth or falsity of everything. This irrational Blue vs. Green conflict has expanded into every corner of society. Taiwan once had a middle ground, in academia, in civil society, and in religion. Now neutral parties remain silent in order to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Opportunists meanwhile, jump on the bandwagon and choose sides. There is no longer any middle ground. Society has lost its sense of proportion. It has lost any respect for democracy, freedom, the rule of law, professionalism, and reason it might have once had.
People on Taiwan today feel a sense of loss. They know that the ROC is sliding downhill. They know that feel-good sentiments cannot hide the truth. They see no force that will slow the ROC's descent into oblivion. Will the Ma administration suddenly wake up and get its act together? Will the next ruling party change made any difference? Will protesters once again have to take to the streets?
Wang Chien-hsuan recently thundered, "The Control Yuan may as well close up shop!" But that was irrational. High officials cannot solve our problems. But when they vent their emotions this way, they merely deepen public cynicism. Government officials must promote public confidence. The public on Taiwan has lost confidence in itself. It is waiting for the government to offer encouragment.
Political and social differences on Taiwan have intensified. One cannot expect people to believe that some high official can address this feeling of impotence. Perhaps members of the public should begin with themselves. They should avoid negative language that provokes a negative response. They should minimize differences with their political enemies. They should restore such values as democracy, freedom, and humanity. They must attempt to transcend Blue vs. Green. They must attempt to recover, bit by bit, the middle ground. They must not permit themselves to become mire in collective cynicism and self-pity. That is a lesson the preceding wave of democratization taught us.
台灣何以充斥失落感與憤世嫉俗？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.20 02:14 am
文化部長龍應台接受udn tv專訪時說，比起十幾年前她出任台北市文化局長，今天社會對政府的「信任感」幾乎「蕩然無存」。她還說，十五年前後相比，今天台灣人對自己的「信心指數」也降低很多。
不用龍應台提醒，大家也知道，人民對政府「信任感」的消失，與民眾「自信心」的下降，都是極真實而嚴重的問題。如果把兩者放在時間的向度裡觀察，至少在未來幾年，我們看不到這兩條拋物線的下墜終點。更讓龍應台慨嘆的，顯然是前者，所謂的「官不聊生」；但格外值得人們關切的，其實是後者，社會憂慮台灣長期找不到出路和解方的「失落感」。
所謂「官不聊生」，是台灣民主化以來，官員一直掛在嘴邊的自嘲。政府的權威失落，而官員未隨著時勢變化而調整服務心態，當然難以得到人民的信任。然而，對民眾而言，如果民主化的結果，給了人民更多「當家做主」的自信，更多向官員嗆聲、反脣相稽的機會，結果卻無助於提升政府效能，亦無助於實際解決問題，這樣虛幻的民主，怎不令人感到失望與失落？人們又如何不憤世嫉俗？
台灣自信心的流失，或可從三方面觀察。第一，是民主驕傲的蒙塵。公元兩千年的政黨輪替雖在艱險中締造，民眾對於政治新局的開創其實仍充滿期待，同時也以台灣作為華人社會的民主先行者感到驕傲。不幸的是，這項憧憬，卻以民進黨八年的施政混亂作收，而陳水扁家族的貪瀆無行則更是對台灣社會的一記迎頭重擊，民主化和本土化神話同遭粉碎。
第二，是經濟風光的消褪。從李登輝的戒急用忍到陳水扁的鎖國政策，台灣經濟錯失了利用大陸崛起以追求壯大及脫胎換骨的契機；但二度政黨輪替後，馬英九雖改善了兩岸關係，卻在經濟面向遲遲無法找回成長的動能。包括愛台十二項建設和四年五千億擴大公共建設方案，都投入了鉅大的經費，卻看不到帶動生產和就業的附帶效益。這兩年，經濟成長、青年失業、年金及福利負擔不支等基本面表現不斷惡化；比起鄰近國家的向榮趨盛，不免讓人喪氣。
第三，是社會共識和共同價值的散失：民進黨執政期間，台灣的「統獨之爭」進一步擴大為「藍綠之鬥」，政黨的鬥爭深化為社會大眾的顏色分化，至此，台灣就完全失去了共同語言與共同價值。今天社會上發生任何事情，都要經由「藍」或「綠」的試紙檢查，來驗證它的屬性和辯正方向。經過這種非理性的藍綠運動，原來台灣還存在的「中間地帶」，包括學術界、宗教界乃至民間社團在內，清者噤聲以求身免，濁者輕易投身選邊而站。失去中間地帶的台灣，不僅失去了調和社會平衡的力量，也失去了原先對民主、自由、法治、專業、理性等價值的認知和信仰。
今天台灣人充滿失落感，一個原因是人們認知到國家正在走下坡，這是再怎麼假裝「自我感覺良好」都掩飾不了的事實；另一個更重要的原因是，人們看不出這個「台灣往下掉」的情勢，要碰到什麼樣的力量，才能把它托住。要靠馬政府突然的覺醒和振作嗎？靠下一次政黨輪替嗎？還是靠抗爭團體不斷接力在街頭衝撞？
王建?日前發飆責罵「監察院不如關掉」，其實正是這種失落心理的反射之一。問題是，高官無力解決問題，卻採取如此非理性的暴衝手法發洩，只會加深人民的憤世嫉俗。政府官員需要民眾的信任來推動國家，但台灣失落的自信心，不也在等待政府的作為來填補與提振？
老實說，當台灣政治和社會歧見深化到這種地步，人們要期待什麼高人一出手就能化解民眾的無力感，恐怕是不可能的事。民眾可以做的，或許是從自身做起，盡量避免用負面語言引發負面對應，盡量減少用政治顏色來分別敵我，盡量還原自己對民主、自由、人道等價值的原色信仰，盡可能追求超乎藍綠的客觀價值。無論如何，要一點一滴找回中間地帶，切勿再陷入集體憤世嫉俗的悲情，那是我們在前一波民主化已經切身體驗過的一課。
Sunday, August 18, 2013
End of Jasmine Revolution, Beginning of Social Conflict
End of Jasmine Revolution, Beginning of Social Conflict
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 17, 2013
Summary: Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
Full text below:
Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
The recent wave of police evictions led to the death of hundreds. The Muslim Brotherhood has joined other groups opposed to the coup. It has launched an "Angry Friday" protest march, and will engage in more large-scale counterattacks. Muslims have also attacked and set fire to over 20 Christian churches throughout Egypt. As we can see, the crackdown is out of control. Egyptian society faces long-term confrontation and polarization. This is the most worrisome development of all.
The Jasmine Revolution overthrew the Mubarak regime. Egyptian politics then underwent two consecutive changes, both for the worse. The first was the election of President Mursi, who failed to live up to the public trust. Under his regime, Islam rapidly expanded its power. It forced through many policies that frightened secular society. Democracy regressed. The economy suffered. The second was the sudden interference of the Egyptian military in domestic affairs. It forcibly ousted Mursi. It used false pretexts to win democratic elections, undermining the legitimacy of the interim government. This is why Mursi supporters persist in their protests.
Scanning the faces of the crowd enables one to better understand Egypt's problem. The Jasmine Revolution was waged by relatively young, westernized men and women, fluent in English, accustomed to the Internet and mobile phones. Pro-Islam protesters are largely middle-aged men and women wearing traditional Muslim headwear.
This is not deliberate stereotyping. This is one country in which two different peoples coexist. Their living conditions are different. Their thoughts and concerns are also different. The Western media will undoubtedly pay much more attention to the former. The international community will undoubtedly offer it much more sympathy and support. The latter will receive much less international attention. But they vastly outnumber the former. They are Mursi's main support. Lest we forget, these two peoples are all Egyptians. They all want their nation to move forward. They all want international respect. More importantly, no matter who subjects them to repression, they all bleed the same blood.
During the Jasmine Revolution, the internal contradictions were not so obvious. People were unanimous in pointing the finger at the authoritarian Mubarak. But once the Jasmine Revolution succeeded, decades of expectations for democracy were crushed. All they received was Mursi's arbitrary rule and economic decline. The elites who instigated the Jasmine Revolution naturally concluded that Mursi hijacked their revolution. Similarly, when the military forcibly ousted Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood felt equally indignant. As they saw it, the Egyptian military hijacked democratic elections. Overnight, two consecutive waves of unrest split Egypt along religious and class lines, leading to political enmity, bloody repression, and unending hatred.
Egypt's Jasmine Revolution was universally lauded as a movement of public awakening, as a refreshing example of peaceful, rational, and successful protest. Who knew that two short years later, the situation would lead into nationwide unrest, public suffering, and social enmity, to the point where people have thrown up their hands in disgust. To overthrow a tyrant or two is not difficult. The true challenge is to create a long-lasting democracy that protects all its citizens. As the example of Mursi shows, it is easy for those who have tasted power to be carried away. It is easy for them to ignore the religious beliefs and values of those who differ. The military failed to give Mursi a chance to do better before it forced his ouster. It vigorously suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. This too guaranteed that the country would descend into chaos. The masses on both sides blindly clashed, without regard for right and wrong, increasing antagonism and hatred.
Egypt's interim government has declared a one-month state of emergency. It has effectively returned to Mubarak era military rule. Such changes make those who cheered the Jasmine Revolution want to hide their faces. This paradoxes and institutional complexities of democracy demand closer examination. Mass movements can tear down powerful regimes. But they can also disrupt social order. Democratic elections can reflect public opinion. But they can also elect anti-democratic strongmen. A military coup can control abuse of power by a president. But it can also irreparably divide a society. Military repression can clear the streets of mobs. But it can also drive people to engage in street battles and resort to terrorist activities.
Without self-restraint, humility, and patience, one cannot establish a truly democratic society. This is what we have learned from Egypt's Jasmine Revolution.
茉莉花革命凋零且質變為社會衝突
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.17 02:47 am
正當台灣有人把凱道「白衫軍」和埃及的「茉莉花革命」相提並論，茉莉花革命其實已經凋萎了。在軍方罷黜穆希總統時，茉莉花即已告摧折；而日昨臨時政府下令驅逐擁穆希的群眾引發激烈死傷衝突，茉莉花革命留下的和平與美好記憶，至此盡付東流。
這波軍警驅離行動造成數百人的死亡後，「穆斯林兄弟會」已聯合各個「反政變」團體，發起「憤怒星期五」的大遊行，將進行更大規模的反擊。與此同時，埃及各地發生了穆斯林攻擊廿多座基督教堂並縱火的事件。由此看來，鎮壓行動失控，將使埃及社會陷入長期分裂與兩極對峙，這才是最值得擔憂的事。
在茉莉花革命推翻穆巴拉克政權後，埃及政治發生了兩次「劣化的質變」。第一次，是民選的穆希總統未能珍惜人民的託付，他在政府中大肆擴張穆斯林勢力，強行推動讓國內世俗派心寒和恐慌的政策，導致民主倒退、經濟走樣；第二次，是埃及軍方驟然干政，強行罷黜穆希，假民意之名奪取民主選舉的果實，使得臨時政府的正當性備受挑戰。這正是「擁穆希」群眾不斷抗爭的理由。
以群眾的臉孔作為對照，大家也許更容易理解埃及今天的問題。我們在茉莉花革命中看到的，是一批相對年輕、西化、熱情、英語流利、使用網路和手機的男女；我們在「擁穆」示威中看到的，則是更多中年以上、傳統、憤怒、戴著回帽或頭巾的群眾。
這並非要故意將群眾分類或刻板印象化，但是，這就是同一個國家裡並存的兩種不同人民，他們的生活處境不同，他們的思維和關注也大不相同。在西方媒體鏡頭前，前者無疑享有更多國際社會的注目、同情與支持；後者的國際曝光度比較小，但他們在人數上卻占有絕對優勢，也是支持穆希的主力。但別忘了，這兩類人都是埃及人民，他們都渴望國家進步，渴望自己受到尊重；更重要的是，他們不論受到誰的鎮壓，流出的血都是一樣鮮紅。
在茉莉花革命期間，這樣的內部矛盾其實並不明顯，人民的箭頭都一致指向專制的穆巴拉克。但在茉莉花革命後，當數十年的民主期待，卻只換來穆希的專橫統治及經濟萎縮，掀起茉莉花革命的菁英民眾自然認為穆希豪奪了他們的革命果實。同樣的，當軍方密謀強行罷黜穆希後，穆斯林的兄弟姐妺們當然也義憤難填，認為軍方強姦了埃及的民主選舉。經過這兩次的動盪，埃及社會的宗教和階級差異一夕裂為斷層，演成政治的敵我對陣；再加上鎮壓的血腥仇恨，就更沒完沒了。
埃及的茉莉花革命，原是舉世稱揚的一場人民自覺運動，創造了清新、和平、理性抗爭而獲得勝利的先例；誰知，不過短短兩年，情勢卻演變成今天舉國動盪、人民煎熬、社會仇殺的地步，委實讓人唏噓。由此可見，要推翻一個或兩個暴君並不困難，真正艱難的是，要如何建立一套可長可久的民主制度，讓所有的國民都能受到它的保障。從穆希的例子看，大權在握的人很容易得意忘形，忘了要尊重那些宗教信仰及價值觀和自己不同的人；對軍方而言，未給穆希改善的機會即將他罷黜，並大肆打壓穆兄會，也注定國家要陷入混亂和失序狀態；對雙方群眾而言，一味爭論已經沒有黑白可言的是非，也只會增加對立和仇恨的情緒。
目前的埃及，在臨時政府宣布進入一個月的「緊急狀態」後，等於已回到一個如同穆巴拉克時代的軍事統治。對所有曾為茉莉花革命而歡呼過的人而言，面對這樣的變化，除了掩面而嘆，恐怕也必須對民主的吊詭、複雜與制度性之必要多作思考。群眾運動能推倒強權，也能破壞社會秩序；民主選舉能反映民意，也能選出反民主的強人；軍事政變能節制濫權總統，卻也能把社會帶向無法挽回的撕裂；軍事鎮壓可以驅走街頭群眾，卻可能把民眾推入巷戰衝突及恐怖活動。
沒有自我節制，沒有謙卑忍讓，不可能產生真正的民主社會。這是我們看埃及茉莉花革命的枯萎應該學到的一課。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 17, 2013
Summary: Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
Full text below:
Some on Taiwan are comparing the White Shirt protests on Ketegelan Boulevard to Egypt's Jasmine Revolution. But the Jasmine Revolution is already ebbing. The military has ousted President Mohamed Mursi. The Jasmine Revolution has crumbled. The interim government's expulsion of Mursi supporters yesterday led to violent clashes and numerous casualties. The Jasmine Revolution left us with beautiful memories of peace. But it has now drawn to a close.
The recent wave of police evictions led to the death of hundreds. The Muslim Brotherhood has joined other groups opposed to the coup. It has launched an "Angry Friday" protest march, and will engage in more large-scale counterattacks. Muslims have also attacked and set fire to over 20 Christian churches throughout Egypt. As we can see, the crackdown is out of control. Egyptian society faces long-term confrontation and polarization. This is the most worrisome development of all.
The Jasmine Revolution overthrew the Mubarak regime. Egyptian politics then underwent two consecutive changes, both for the worse. The first was the election of President Mursi, who failed to live up to the public trust. Under his regime, Islam rapidly expanded its power. It forced through many policies that frightened secular society. Democracy regressed. The economy suffered. The second was the sudden interference of the Egyptian military in domestic affairs. It forcibly ousted Mursi. It used false pretexts to win democratic elections, undermining the legitimacy of the interim government. This is why Mursi supporters persist in their protests.
Scanning the faces of the crowd enables one to better understand Egypt's problem. The Jasmine Revolution was waged by relatively young, westernized men and women, fluent in English, accustomed to the Internet and mobile phones. Pro-Islam protesters are largely middle-aged men and women wearing traditional Muslim headwear.
This is not deliberate stereotyping. This is one country in which two different peoples coexist. Their living conditions are different. Their thoughts and concerns are also different. The Western media will undoubtedly pay much more attention to the former. The international community will undoubtedly offer it much more sympathy and support. The latter will receive much less international attention. But they vastly outnumber the former. They are Mursi's main support. Lest we forget, these two peoples are all Egyptians. They all want their nation to move forward. They all want international respect. More importantly, no matter who subjects them to repression, they all bleed the same blood.
During the Jasmine Revolution, the internal contradictions were not so obvious. People were unanimous in pointing the finger at the authoritarian Mubarak. But once the Jasmine Revolution succeeded, decades of expectations for democracy were crushed. All they received was Mursi's arbitrary rule and economic decline. The elites who instigated the Jasmine Revolution naturally concluded that Mursi hijacked their revolution. Similarly, when the military forcibly ousted Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood felt equally indignant. As they saw it, the Egyptian military hijacked democratic elections. Overnight, two consecutive waves of unrest split Egypt along religious and class lines, leading to political enmity, bloody repression, and unending hatred.
Egypt's Jasmine Revolution was universally lauded as a movement of public awakening, as a refreshing example of peaceful, rational, and successful protest. Who knew that two short years later, the situation would lead into nationwide unrest, public suffering, and social enmity, to the point where people have thrown up their hands in disgust. To overthrow a tyrant or two is not difficult. The true challenge is to create a long-lasting democracy that protects all its citizens. As the example of Mursi shows, it is easy for those who have tasted power to be carried away. It is easy for them to ignore the religious beliefs and values of those who differ. The military failed to give Mursi a chance to do better before it forced his ouster. It vigorously suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. This too guaranteed that the country would descend into chaos. The masses on both sides blindly clashed, without regard for right and wrong, increasing antagonism and hatred.
Egypt's interim government has declared a one-month state of emergency. It has effectively returned to Mubarak era military rule. Such changes make those who cheered the Jasmine Revolution want to hide their faces. This paradoxes and institutional complexities of democracy demand closer examination. Mass movements can tear down powerful regimes. But they can also disrupt social order. Democratic elections can reflect public opinion. But they can also elect anti-democratic strongmen. A military coup can control abuse of power by a president. But it can also irreparably divide a society. Military repression can clear the streets of mobs. But it can also drive people to engage in street battles and resort to terrorist activities.
Without self-restraint, humility, and patience, one cannot establish a truly democratic society. This is what we have learned from Egypt's Jasmine Revolution.
茉莉花革命凋零且質變為社會衝突
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.17 02:47 am
正當台灣有人把凱道「白衫軍」和埃及的「茉莉花革命」相提並論，茉莉花革命其實已經凋萎了。在軍方罷黜穆希總統時，茉莉花即已告摧折；而日昨臨時政府下令驅逐擁穆希的群眾引發激烈死傷衝突，茉莉花革命留下的和平與美好記憶，至此盡付東流。
這波軍警驅離行動造成數百人的死亡後，「穆斯林兄弟會」已聯合各個「反政變」團體，發起「憤怒星期五」的大遊行，將進行更大規模的反擊。與此同時，埃及各地發生了穆斯林攻擊廿多座基督教堂並縱火的事件。由此看來，鎮壓行動失控，將使埃及社會陷入長期分裂與兩極對峙，這才是最值得擔憂的事。
在茉莉花革命推翻穆巴拉克政權後，埃及政治發生了兩次「劣化的質變」。第一次，是民選的穆希總統未能珍惜人民的託付，他在政府中大肆擴張穆斯林勢力，強行推動讓國內世俗派心寒和恐慌的政策，導致民主倒退、經濟走樣；第二次，是埃及軍方驟然干政，強行罷黜穆希，假民意之名奪取民主選舉的果實，使得臨時政府的正當性備受挑戰。這正是「擁穆希」群眾不斷抗爭的理由。
以群眾的臉孔作為對照，大家也許更容易理解埃及今天的問題。我們在茉莉花革命中看到的，是一批相對年輕、西化、熱情、英語流利、使用網路和手機的男女；我們在「擁穆」示威中看到的，則是更多中年以上、傳統、憤怒、戴著回帽或頭巾的群眾。
這並非要故意將群眾分類或刻板印象化，但是，這就是同一個國家裡並存的兩種不同人民，他們的生活處境不同，他們的思維和關注也大不相同。在西方媒體鏡頭前，前者無疑享有更多國際社會的注目、同情與支持；後者的國際曝光度比較小，但他們在人數上卻占有絕對優勢，也是支持穆希的主力。但別忘了，這兩類人都是埃及人民，他們都渴望國家進步，渴望自己受到尊重；更重要的是，他們不論受到誰的鎮壓，流出的血都是一樣鮮紅。
在茉莉花革命期間，這樣的內部矛盾其實並不明顯，人民的箭頭都一致指向專制的穆巴拉克。但在茉莉花革命後，當數十年的民主期待，卻只換來穆希的專橫統治及經濟萎縮，掀起茉莉花革命的菁英民眾自然認為穆希豪奪了他們的革命果實。同樣的，當軍方密謀強行罷黜穆希後，穆斯林的兄弟姐妺們當然也義憤難填，認為軍方強姦了埃及的民主選舉。經過這兩次的動盪，埃及社會的宗教和階級差異一夕裂為斷層，演成政治的敵我對陣；再加上鎮壓的血腥仇恨，就更沒完沒了。
埃及的茉莉花革命，原是舉世稱揚的一場人民自覺運動，創造了清新、和平、理性抗爭而獲得勝利的先例；誰知，不過短短兩年，情勢卻演變成今天舉國動盪、人民煎熬、社會仇殺的地步，委實讓人唏噓。由此可見，要推翻一個或兩個暴君並不困難，真正艱難的是，要如何建立一套可長可久的民主制度，讓所有的國民都能受到它的保障。從穆希的例子看，大權在握的人很容易得意忘形，忘了要尊重那些宗教信仰及價值觀和自己不同的人；對軍方而言，未給穆希改善的機會即將他罷黜，並大肆打壓穆兄會，也注定國家要陷入混亂和失序狀態；對雙方群眾而言，一味爭論已經沒有黑白可言的是非，也只會增加對立和仇恨的情緒。
目前的埃及，在臨時政府宣布進入一個月的「緊急狀態」後，等於已回到一個如同穆巴拉克時代的軍事統治。對所有曾為茉莉花革命而歡呼過的人而言，面對這樣的變化，除了掩面而嘆，恐怕也必須對民主的吊詭、複雜與制度性之必要多作思考。群眾運動能推倒強權，也能破壞社會秩序；民主選舉能反映民意，也能選出反民主的強人；軍事政變能節制濫權總統，卻也能把社會帶向無法挽回的撕裂；軍事鎮壓可以驅走街頭群眾，卻可能把民眾推入巷戰衝突及恐怖活動。
沒有自我節制，沒有謙卑忍讓，不可能產生真正的民主社會。這是我們看埃及茉莉花革命的枯萎應該學到的一課。
Thursday, August 15, 2013
Three Suns: The DPP's Twisted Triangle
Three Suns: The DPP's Twisted Triangle
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 16, 2013
Summary: Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration. Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
Full text below:
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration.
On May 28, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Twisted Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen." We wrote, "After the current All Peoples Conference, the path to power within the DPP will largely depend on triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. . Developments indicate that this is a changeable scalene triangle. It might be termed a twisted triangle." Today, that twisted triangle has become a reality.
This "three suns" or "twisted triangle" works like the twin tracks of a railroad track. One track represents an ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. The other track represents the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen fighting over the 2016 presidential election. Su is clearly more Taiwan independence oriented. Tsai is more reform oriented. Therefore the two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision.
First take the ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. Chen Shui-bian will most assuredly spin his return to the party as "vindication," as proof that he was "a victim of political and judicial persecution." Therefore Chen Shui-bian's readmission to the DPP cannot be interpreted as "medical parole." His ultimate goal is to redefine his place in history. As Annette Lu noted, Ah-Bian is not seeking "better treatment as a criminal." He is seeking to rebuild his political power base.
Chen's approach is to trade his personal support for Taiwan independence for Taiwan independence support for his greed and corruption. If Chen Shui-bian fails to support Taiwan independence, political support for his greed and corruption will vanish. Chen's greed and corruption is more than a moral or PR matter for the DPP. His greed and corruption means life or death for the DPP. Chen has returned to the party. He will now be the DPP's "Taiwan independence sun." The stars in the DPP constellation are subject to the effects of gravity. The Taiwan independence tail wags the DPP dog. Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the party, that is even more assured.
When the DPP party membership review team procrastinated, Chen Shui-bian sent a message to Su Tseng-chang, If the review team's answer was no, Chen would withdraw his supporters from the DPP and form a rival political party. It would become a "party outside the party." Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the DPP, he has essentially formed a "party inside the party." If he had formed a "party outside the party," the DPP might have been able to reform itself. But now that Chen has formed a "party inside the party," reform is essentially hopeless, and the party's chances for survival are slim.
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP, The probability that the DPP will reform itself has plummeted. If Chen's return leads to a schism within the party, the DPP will find it difficult to regain public trust. This will reduce the likelihood of the DPP winning the 2016 general election. Let us take a step back. Suppose the DPP wins the 2016 general election. The president will be the DPP candidate, either Su Tseng-chang or Tsai Ing-wen. The conclusion will be that the party has been vindicated. The pressure to pardon an "innocent" Chen Shui-bian will be even greater. But if the ruling DPP pardons an unrepentant, greedy, corrupt, obdurately pro-Taiwan independence Chen Shui-bian, the nation will know no peace. It will plunge into turmoil, politically and economically. Conversely, if a DPP president fails to pardon Chen Shui-bian, who will be able to prevent Chen Shui-bian from making a comeback? Perhaps this is what observers are referring to as "long term pain."
Now take the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen over the 2016 general election. Chen Shui-bian has rejoined to the party. Su Tseng-chang supported him. Tsai Ing-wen harbored reservations. From the beginning, Su Tseng-chang spun the Chen corruption case as "political persecution." He advocated an All Peoples Conference "referendum." He wanted the party to welcome Chen back into the party with open arms. During the application process he insisted that "Everything will be by the book." He called for "a little more humanity, and a little less calculation." This shows that Su was an enabler in this case, perhaps even the instigator. Su Tseng-chang is the DPP party chairman. Is he thinking of 2016? Is he afraid of offending Taiwan independence elements? If so, he has only one choice -- welcome Ah-Bian back into the party. But Su Tseng-chang's move has sharpened the battle lines between himself and Tsai Ing-wen in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has reservations about Chen Shui-bian returning to the party. She said, "I hope he (Chen) makes more of an effort, so that the public will accept him and sympathize with him." Her implication? Most of the public has not accepted Chen Shui-bian, and not sympathized with Chen Shui-bian. She even said, "The DPP's basic values of clean government and concern for right and wrong must not be muddied." She clearly wanted Chen supporters within the party to leave well enough alone. But events have gone against her. Chen is now back in the party, and is trumpeting his lifelong devotion to the party.
The DPP is advancing towards 2016. The Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction is engaged in an ongoing struggle with the reform faction. Su and Tsai are engaged in an ongoing struggle over the 2016 general election. Two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision. It all depends on changes in the "three suns" configuration. Chen's sun is the smallest. But its gravitational field remains strong. Its field is also the most destructive. Su's sun is not attempting to outshine Tsai's sun. It is merely attempting to eclipse Tsai's sun. It may play the role of spoiler. If Tsai's sun wants to shine, it must free itself from the gravitational field of Chen's sun and Su's sun. If Chen's sun and Su's sun eclipse Tsai's sun, if the DPP becomes a political prisoner to Taiwan independence forces, the party's future will be dim. Therefore the DPP party chairmanship election in May of next year may well change the "three suns configuration."
Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
三個太陽：民進黨歪三角正式啟動
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.16 02:58 am
陳水扁重回民進黨，與蘇貞昌、蔡英文形成了「三個太陽」的態勢。
五月二十八日，本報社論〈歪三角：陳水扁、蘇貞昌、蔡英文〉指出：「經此次全代會，民進黨內部的權力與路線鬥爭，相當大部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱歪三角。」如今，這個歪三角正式啟動了。
這「三個太陽」或「歪三角」，將在猶如火車的雙軌上運動：一側軌道是台獨一邊一國派與轉型派的角力，另一側軌道則是蘇貞昌與蔡英文為二○一六年大選的角力。由於蘇顯然較傾獨派，而蔡則可能較主轉型；因此，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車，行車之安全堪虞。
先說獨派一邊一國與轉型派的角力。陳水扁將返黨定位為「對於政治及司法迫害的實質平反」；因此，不能將陳水扁的胃口看成只想要「保外就醫」，他的最終目標是重建其歷史定位。呂秀蓮即指出：扁要的不只是「受刑人處遇的問題」，而在「重建政治勢力」。
陳水扁的手法是：「我挺獨」，來換取「獨挺貪」。因為，陳水扁若不「挺獨」，「挺貪」的政治動能即失依托。其實，「挺貪」尚只是民進黨的道德風評問題而已，「挺獨」則是民進黨一決生死的路線之爭。如今，陳水扁返黨，將成民進黨內的「台獨太陽」，民進黨天空裡的星宿星辰皆將受其引力之影響。獨派在黨內尾巴搖狗的地位，在陳水扁返黨後將更形確立。
當民進黨「入黨複審小組」拖延進度時，陳水扁傳話給蘇貞昌，謂若無善了，將拉隊出走，另組新黨，是為「黨外之黨」；如今陳水扁回黨，卻不啻形成了「黨中之黨」。但若是「黨外之黨」，民進黨尚有轉型的生路；如今卻面對「黨中之黨」，若是轉型無望，恐就生機渺茫了。
陳水扁回黨，將使民進黨轉型的可能性劇降；倘因此而造成民進黨內部撕裂、社會信任難以重建，則將使民進黨二○一六年勝選的機率降低。退一步說，假設民進黨贏了二○一六大選，屆時民進黨籍的總統（蘇貞昌或蔡英文）更無理由不對「在黨內已經平反」的清白黨員陳水扁特赦。但若竟然特赦了既貪又獨、始終不認錯道歉的陳水扁，其政經治理恐就再無寧日了；但反過來說，若屆時仍不特赦陳水扁，誰又能擋得住陳水扁的反撲？這也許就是輿論所說的「長痛」。
再談蘇貞昌與蔡英文二○一六大選的角力。在陳水扁回黨一事上，蘇貞昌是支持派，蔡英文的態度則較有保留。蘇貞昌一開始即將扁案定位為「政治迫害」，並贊成在全代會「公決」此案，等於是要舉黨歡迎陳水扁回黨；又在「申請案」進行中表示，「一切按程序規定處理」，再稱「多一點人性，少一點算計」。凡此，在在顯示，蘇是此案的護航者，甚至是主導者。其實，蘇貞昌站在黨主席的立場，若心繫二○一六，又不想亦不敢開罪獨派，他也只有迎扁回黨的唯一選擇。然而，蘇貞昌的這個動作，使他與蔡英文在二○一六的角力形成更明銳的區隔。
蔡英文對陳水扁返黨較有保留。她說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會接受他、同情他。」此話可能是指，社會多數尚未接受陳水扁，也不同情陳水扁。她更說：「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉。」此話更儼然是要黨內的挺扁操作適可而止。然而，事與蔡英文之願違，陳水扁如今回黨了，並宣稱將永遠做黨的義工。
於是，民進黨通向二○一六的軌道，即是「台獨一邊一國派及轉型派的角力」，與「蘇蔡二○一六年大選的角力」，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車的態勢，一切將取決於「三個太陽」的變動關係。其中，陳太陽的體積較小，但引力最強，亦最具負作用與破壞力；蘇太陽的第一目標已非超越蔡太陽，而只在欲圖遮蔽蔡太陽，因而可能淪為「成事不足，敗事有餘」的角色；蔡太陽若想出頭天，則必須掙脫陳太陽及蘇太陽的引力，倘若最後仍被扁蘇兩顆太陽遮成蔡日蝕，或淪為獨派的政治俘虜，那也就難有前景可期了。於是，明年五月的黨主席選舉，遂成可能改變「三個太陽架構」的時點。
三個太陽，爭逐天命，競相製造相互的日蝕；這個政治天文奇觀，將一直演到二○一六年及以後。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 16, 2013
Summary: Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration. Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
Full text below:
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP. Together with Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen, the three have created a "three suns" configuration.
On May 28, this newspaper published an editorial entitled "Twisted Triangle: Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen." We wrote, "After the current All Peoples Conference, the path to power within the DPP will largely depend on triangular relationship between Chen Shui-bian, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen. . Developments indicate that this is a changeable scalene triangle. It might be termed a twisted triangle." Today, that twisted triangle has become a reality.
This "three suns" or "twisted triangle" works like the twin tracks of a railroad track. One track represents an ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. The other track represents the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen fighting over the 2016 presidential election. Su is clearly more Taiwan independence oriented. Tsai is more reform oriented. Therefore the two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision.
First take the ongoing struggle between the Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction and the reform faction. Chen Shui-bian will most assuredly spin his return to the party as "vindication," as proof that he was "a victim of political and judicial persecution." Therefore Chen Shui-bian's readmission to the DPP cannot be interpreted as "medical parole." His ultimate goal is to redefine his place in history. As Annette Lu noted, Ah-Bian is not seeking "better treatment as a criminal." He is seeking to rebuild his political power base.
Chen's approach is to trade his personal support for Taiwan independence for Taiwan independence support for his greed and corruption. If Chen Shui-bian fails to support Taiwan independence, political support for his greed and corruption will vanish. Chen's greed and corruption is more than a moral or PR matter for the DPP. His greed and corruption means life or death for the DPP. Chen has returned to the party. He will now be the DPP's "Taiwan independence sun." The stars in the DPP constellation are subject to the effects of gravity. The Taiwan independence tail wags the DPP dog. Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the party, that is even more assured.
When the DPP party membership review team procrastinated, Chen Shui-bian sent a message to Su Tseng-chang, If the review team's answer was no, Chen would withdraw his supporters from the DPP and form a rival political party. It would become a "party outside the party." Now that Chen Shui-bian has returned to the DPP, he has essentially formed a "party inside the party." If he had formed a "party outside the party," the DPP might have been able to reform itself. But now that Chen has formed a "party inside the party," reform is essentially hopeless, and the party's chances for survival are slim.
Chen Shui-bian has rejoined the DPP, The probability that the DPP will reform itself has plummeted. If Chen's return leads to a schism within the party, the DPP will find it difficult to regain public trust. This will reduce the likelihood of the DPP winning the 2016 general election. Let us take a step back. Suppose the DPP wins the 2016 general election. The president will be the DPP candidate, either Su Tseng-chang or Tsai Ing-wen. The conclusion will be that the party has been vindicated. The pressure to pardon an "innocent" Chen Shui-bian will be even greater. But if the ruling DPP pardons an unrepentant, greedy, corrupt, obdurately pro-Taiwan independence Chen Shui-bian, the nation will know no peace. It will plunge into turmoil, politically and economically. Conversely, if a DPP president fails to pardon Chen Shui-bian, who will be able to prevent Chen Shui-bian from making a comeback? Perhaps this is what observers are referring to as "long term pain."
Now take the ongoing struggle between Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen over the 2016 general election. Chen Shui-bian has rejoined to the party. Su Tseng-chang supported him. Tsai Ing-wen harbored reservations. From the beginning, Su Tseng-chang spun the Chen corruption case as "political persecution." He advocated an All Peoples Conference "referendum." He wanted the party to welcome Chen back into the party with open arms. During the application process he insisted that "Everything will be by the book." He called for "a little more humanity, and a little less calculation." This shows that Su was an enabler in this case, perhaps even the instigator. Su Tseng-chang is the DPP party chairman. Is he thinking of 2016? Is he afraid of offending Taiwan independence elements? If so, he has only one choice -- welcome Ah-Bian back into the party. But Su Tseng-chang's move has sharpened the battle lines between himself and Tsai Ing-wen in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has reservations about Chen Shui-bian returning to the party. She said, "I hope he (Chen) makes more of an effort, so that the public will accept him and sympathize with him." Her implication? Most of the public has not accepted Chen Shui-bian, and not sympathized with Chen Shui-bian. She even said, "The DPP's basic values of clean government and concern for right and wrong must not be muddied." She clearly wanted Chen supporters within the party to leave well enough alone. But events have gone against her. Chen is now back in the party, and is trumpeting his lifelong devotion to the party.
The DPP is advancing towards 2016. The Taiwan independence, one nation on each side faction is engaged in an ongoing struggle with the reform faction. Su and Tsai are engaged in an ongoing struggle over the 2016 general election. Two parallel tracks may well cross and lead to a collision. It all depends on changes in the "three suns" configuration. Chen's sun is the smallest. But its gravitational field remains strong. Its field is also the most destructive. Su's sun is not attempting to outshine Tsai's sun. It is merely attempting to eclipse Tsai's sun. It may play the role of spoiler. If Tsai's sun wants to shine, it must free itself from the gravitational field of Chen's sun and Su's sun. If Chen's sun and Su's sun eclipse Tsai's sun, if the DPP becomes a political prisoner to Taiwan independence forces, the party's future will be dim. Therefore the DPP party chairmanship election in May of next year may well change the "three suns configuration."
Three suns, all scrambling to fulfill their destinies. All competing to eclipse the other two. This wonder of political astronomy play itself out, right up to 2016 and beyond.
三個太陽：民進黨歪三角正式啟動
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.16 02:58 am
陳水扁重回民進黨，與蘇貞昌、蔡英文形成了「三個太陽」的態勢。
五月二十八日，本報社論〈歪三角：陳水扁、蘇貞昌、蔡英文〉指出：「經此次全代會，民進黨內部的權力與路線鬥爭，相當大部分將取決於陳水扁、蘇貞昌與蔡英文的三角關係。事態顯示，這是一個變動不居的不等邊三角形，可稱歪三角。」如今，這個歪三角正式啟動了。
這「三個太陽」或「歪三角」，將在猶如火車的雙軌上運動：一側軌道是台獨一邊一國派與轉型派的角力，另一側軌道則是蘇貞昌與蔡英文為二○一六年大選的角力。由於蘇顯然較傾獨派，而蔡則可能較主轉型；因此，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車，行車之安全堪虞。
先說獨派一邊一國與轉型派的角力。陳水扁將返黨定位為「對於政治及司法迫害的實質平反」；因此，不能將陳水扁的胃口看成只想要「保外就醫」，他的最終目標是重建其歷史定位。呂秀蓮即指出：扁要的不只是「受刑人處遇的問題」，而在「重建政治勢力」。
陳水扁的手法是：「我挺獨」，來換取「獨挺貪」。因為，陳水扁若不「挺獨」，「挺貪」的政治動能即失依托。其實，「挺貪」尚只是民進黨的道德風評問題而已，「挺獨」則是民進黨一決生死的路線之爭。如今，陳水扁返黨，將成民進黨內的「台獨太陽」，民進黨天空裡的星宿星辰皆將受其引力之影響。獨派在黨內尾巴搖狗的地位，在陳水扁返黨後將更形確立。
當民進黨「入黨複審小組」拖延進度時，陳水扁傳話給蘇貞昌，謂若無善了，將拉隊出走，另組新黨，是為「黨外之黨」；如今陳水扁回黨，卻不啻形成了「黨中之黨」。但若是「黨外之黨」，民進黨尚有轉型的生路；如今卻面對「黨中之黨」，若是轉型無望，恐就生機渺茫了。
陳水扁回黨，將使民進黨轉型的可能性劇降；倘因此而造成民進黨內部撕裂、社會信任難以重建，則將使民進黨二○一六年勝選的機率降低。退一步說，假設民進黨贏了二○一六大選，屆時民進黨籍的總統（蘇貞昌或蔡英文）更無理由不對「在黨內已經平反」的清白黨員陳水扁特赦。但若竟然特赦了既貪又獨、始終不認錯道歉的陳水扁，其政經治理恐就再無寧日了；但反過來說，若屆時仍不特赦陳水扁，誰又能擋得住陳水扁的反撲？這也許就是輿論所說的「長痛」。
再談蘇貞昌與蔡英文二○一六大選的角力。在陳水扁回黨一事上，蘇貞昌是支持派，蔡英文的態度則較有保留。蘇貞昌一開始即將扁案定位為「政治迫害」，並贊成在全代會「公決」此案，等於是要舉黨歡迎陳水扁回黨；又在「申請案」進行中表示，「一切按程序規定處理」，再稱「多一點人性，少一點算計」。凡此，在在顯示，蘇是此案的護航者，甚至是主導者。其實，蘇貞昌站在黨主席的立場，若心繫二○一六，又不想亦不敢開罪獨派，他也只有迎扁回黨的唯一選擇。然而，蘇貞昌的這個動作，使他與蔡英文在二○一六的角力形成更明銳的區隔。
蔡英文對陳水扁返黨較有保留。她說：「希望他（陳水扁）要多作努力，讓社會接受他、同情他。」此話可能是指，社會多數尚未接受陳水扁，也不同情陳水扁。她更說：「民進黨清廉的基本價值及是非判斷不要被模糊掉。」此話更儼然是要黨內的挺扁操作適可而止。然而，事與蔡英文之願違，陳水扁如今回黨了，並宣稱將永遠做黨的義工。
於是，民進黨通向二○一六的軌道，即是「台獨一邊一國派及轉型派的角力」，與「蘇蔡二○一六年大選的角力」，兩軌並行，卻又相互尬車的態勢，一切將取決於「三個太陽」的變動關係。其中，陳太陽的體積較小，但引力最強，亦最具負作用與破壞力；蘇太陽的第一目標已非超越蔡太陽，而只在欲圖遮蔽蔡太陽，因而可能淪為「成事不足，敗事有餘」的角色；蔡太陽若想出頭天，則必須掙脫陳太陽及蘇太陽的引力，倘若最後仍被扁蘇兩顆太陽遮成蔡日蝕，或淪為獨派的政治俘虜，那也就難有前景可期了。於是，明年五月的黨主席選舉，遂成可能改變「三個太陽架構」的時點。
三個太陽，爭逐天命，競相製造相互的日蝕；這個政治天文奇觀，將一直演到二○一六年及以後。
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
DPP and Ah-Bian: Lie Down with Dogs, Get Up with Fleas
DPP and Ah-Bian: Lie Down with Dogs, Get Up with Fleas
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 15, 2013
Summary: Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Full text below:
Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Ah-Bian is rejoining the party. The DPP finds itself in a bind. It is clearly guilty of gross hypocrisy. First of all, this is not rehabilitation. Chen Shui-bian was found guilty on mutiple counts of corruption. Most people do not consider Ah-Bian a "victim." More importantly, Ah-Bian has never confessed his crimes or apologized for his misdeeds. Yet the DPP has given him a free pass. The Ah-Bian corruption scandal will only bring down the DPP.
The DPP has allowed Ah-Bian to rejoin the party. But the DPP leadership was clearly ashamed. It was at a loss to defend its actions. This was clear from the two rationalizations offered by DPP Central Party Review Panel Convener Kuan Bi-ling. Rationalization One. Chen Shui-bian is sick. He is a victim of severe depression. By magnanmously allowing him to rejoin the party, the DPP is deferring to both human rights concerns and tp medical necessity. Rationalization Two. Former President Chen's application to rejoin the party was approved by the Central Standing Committee. Chief Convener Ker Chen-ming presented the application to former President Chen to fill out. Therefore the party cannot permit any internal inconsistencies.
Such sophistry can hardly rationalize the party's actions, which are utterly incomprehensible. Political parties are not hospitals. Ah-Bian may well be suffering from severe depression. But what does that have to do with rejoining the DPP? Now consider the second justification. The Central Standing Committee has resolved that Ah-Bian may rejoin the party. Therefore, as the logic goes, the Review Panel must not oppose this resolution. This sounds like plain and simple evasion of responsibility. It is true that the DPP Central Standing Committee and Central Evaluation Committee ought to have the final say regarding Ah-Bian's application to rejoin the party. The DPP Central Standing Committee deliberately passed the buck to the Review Panel. Put bluntly, DPP Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang evaded responsibility. But this is a sin of historic proportions that could very well sink the DPP. Can Su really dodge such a bullet?
In late 2006, Wu Shu-cheng was being prosecuted for corruption in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian was still president. Yet the DPP convened an emergency session of the DPP Central Executive Committee. DPP leaders engaged in heated debate. The party still included dissenting voices outspoken enough to acknowledge the First Family's wrongdoing. They demanded that the party distinguish between right and wrong. Now however, the DPP's word is final. Chief Convener Ker Chien-ming conveys the party leadership's ruling to the party faithful. Who dares to utter a word of dissent?
Ironically Su Tseng-chang contradicted himself. In 2008 Tsai Ing-wen took over as DPP Party Chairman. Confronted with the Chen corruption case, she was helpless to respond. WikiLeaks revealed that Su Tseng-chang repeatedly criticized Tsai Ing-wen during a meeting with the AIT. He said that under Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, the DPP lacked courage and determination. He said it failed to unequivocally and promptly disown Ah-Bian. It failed to distance itself from him. This he said, was a colossal blunder.
Today, looking back at Chairman Su's magniloquence, one cannot help being overwhelmed by emotion. Tsai Ing-wen's bottom line was Chen Shui-bian's right to medical treatment. She was unable to block the Taiwan independence fundamentalists. She was unable to prevent the Chen faction from extending its reach into the DPP. But contrast, Su Tseng-chang has allowed the Chen faction to march right in. Su's conduct is not even in the same ballpark as "courage." Su totally ignored right and wrong. The public finds one question most baffling of all. Why, it asks, was it necessary to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party? Yesterday during the Review Panel meeting, some said the DPP should simply bite the bullet and get it over with. Refusing to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party might lead to short-term pain, i.e., attacks from party insiders. But the DPP would continue to uphold Chen Shui-bian's right to health care. By contrast, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party would surely lead to long-term pain. The DPP would continue taking heat for the Chen corruption case. It would lose its firewall.
Long term pain vs. short term pain. Which is worse? Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows the answer to that. No wonder DPP elder Lin Cho-shui blasted Chen Shui-bian's reentry into the party. For a political party with a mission, this is shameful. Meanwhile, realpolitik has motivated the DPP to hurriedly readmit Ah-Bian. It is almost as if the DPP is rushing to the aid of President Ma Ying-jeou, who has been dogged by low approval numbers. It is almost as if the DPP is filling the role of relief pitcher.
Lin Cho-shui said that if Chen Shui-bian insists on rejoining the party, he will become a nightmare for the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Anyone with a modicum of political knowledge understands this. In other words, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party now is both morally and practically ill-advised .
It is destructive. It lacks any redeeming virtue. So why is the party leadership doing it? The answer may have to do with next year's party chairmanship election. Perhaps they are fighting each other for the Taiwan independence fundamentalist vote. But that is akin to drinking poison to quench one's thirst. Readmiting Ah-Bian means accepting what he has done. Leaders of a political party so deficient in vision may win their party's leadership. But such a party will never be able to win the presidency. Their individual struggles will be for naught. Most regrettable of all, the DPP will eventually be dragged down as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.15
社論－同流合汙 民進黨終於被看「扁」
本報訊
民進黨昨日通過陳水扁「再入黨申請案」，就一個從未嚴肅反省扁家貪腐弊案的政黨而言，現在又不明不白的將貪汙犯迎進門，此舉無異昭告天下，民進黨終於與扁同流合汙；而選民對民進黨的最後一絲期待，也終將就此破滅。
扁再入黨，讓民進黨陷於名不正言不順的困境。首先，這不是平反，陳水扁不但多案定讞，多數民意也不認為判決冤枉了扁；更重要的是，扁從未為過去的作為認錯致歉，隨隨便便就接納他，只會讓扁案重擔拖垮民進黨。
這一次民進黨同意讓扁重新入黨，顯然連民進黨中央都於心有愧，他們理不直氣不壯到什麼程度，單單從民進黨中央入黨複審小組召集人管碧玲的說法，就可以看出來，管碧玲提出同意扁入黨的兩個理由，第一、陳水扁為重度憂鬱之病人，其再入黨之情感，民進黨應給予人權暨醫療需求之必要考量。第二、陳前總統申請再入黨案，係經中常會決議，由柯建銘總召攜帶申請書，提送陳前總統填寫，黨不宜有前後不一的矛盾。
坦白說，這樣的說詞不但無法自圓其說，簡直是不知所云。試問，政黨又不是開醫院，扁有重度憂鬱症，與加入民進黨何干，至於第二點理由指稱，中常會既已決議扁入黨，複審小組不宜反對，聽起來簡直就是在迴避責任；確實，本該由民進黨中常會、中評會作最終決議的扁入黨案，黨中央卻刻意推給審查小組，說穿了，就是民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌逃避責任，只是，讓民進黨沉淪這樣一個歷史性的罪過，蘇貞昌真的逃得了嗎？
說來諷刺，民國95年底、扁嫂吳淑珍因國務機要費貪汙案遭起訴，當時陳水扁貴為總統，但民進黨仍召開臨時擴大中執會，讓民進黨菁英激辯，那時該黨還有少數諤諤之士，直言扁及第一家庭之過，要求黨中央不可無是非；相反的，現在的民進黨則是黨意先行，貴為總召的柯建銘負責送件，黨內還能有什麼異聲！
更諷刺的，還是蘇貞昌的前後不一；蔡英文於97年接任民進黨黨主席，面對扁案左支右絀，維基解密透露，蘇貞昌當時接受美國在台協會訪問時多次批評，蔡英文主持下的民進黨缺乏膽識及決斷力，未能及早和扁畫清界線，未能和扁清楚切割，這是一大錯誤。
現在回過頭來看蘇主席當初這番豪語，令人感慨萬千！蔡英文至少堅持守住保衛陳水扁醫療人權這條底線，但還是能夠力擋基本教義派，不讓扁及扁系伸手進入民進黨；相反的，蘇貞昌則是讓扁系長驅直入。這樣的作為，不但與他說的膽識相差不可以道里計，其實已經是毫無是非可言。民意最不解的是，為何非要同意扁入黨不可？昨日複審小組會議中，就有長痛、短痛之說，短痛指的是不讓扁再入黨，可能短時間內會被攻擊，但民進黨仍可持續關心陳水扁的司法和醫療人權；相對的，所謂的長痛，當然是指民進黨與扁案包袱將長相左右，痛失防火牆。
坦白說，長痛、短痛孰者為重，只要有一點常識者都很清楚，難怪民進黨大老林濁水接受訪問時痛陳，陳水扁再入黨一案，對一個理想性使命政黨而言，這是非常羞恥的紀錄。同時，就政治現實面而言，民進黨現在趕著讓扁入黨，形同是幫民調低迷的馬英九總統解圍、扮演救援投手的角色。
林濁水還說，如果陳水扁堅持入黨，對民進黨內要參選2016總統大選的人而言都是一個噩夢，這也是任何有一點政治常識者，都可以了解的道理；換句話說，民進黨中央此時安排扁重新入黨，不但正當性有問題，同時也是不智之舉。
百害而無一利，黨中央為何孤注一擲，也許只能從明年的黨主席選舉、爭奪基本教義派選票可以解釋；只是，這是飲鴆止渴，因為，既接納扁，也就是同時接納他的所作所為，一個如此沒有長遠目光的政黨領導者，即使爭得黨權，將來也不可能奪取大位，個人白忙一場無所謂，最令人遺憾的是，民進黨也終將被拖累。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 15, 2013
Summary: Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Full text below:
Yesterday the DPP approved Chen Shui-bian's application to rejoin the party. This shows that the DPP has never given the Chen family's corruption a second thought. Even worse, it now intends to invite this embezzler back into its house. The DPP is essentially telling the world it is in cahoots with Ah-Bian. The last vestige of hope that voters might have held out for the DPP is now gone.
Ah-Bian is rejoining the party. The DPP finds itself in a bind. It is clearly guilty of gross hypocrisy. First of all, this is not rehabilitation. Chen Shui-bian was found guilty on mutiple counts of corruption. Most people do not consider Ah-Bian a "victim." More importantly, Ah-Bian has never confessed his crimes or apologized for his misdeeds. Yet the DPP has given him a free pass. The Ah-Bian corruption scandal will only bring down the DPP.
The DPP has allowed Ah-Bian to rejoin the party. But the DPP leadership was clearly ashamed. It was at a loss to defend its actions. This was clear from the two rationalizations offered by DPP Central Party Review Panel Convener Kuan Bi-ling. Rationalization One. Chen Shui-bian is sick. He is a victim of severe depression. By magnanmously allowing him to rejoin the party, the DPP is deferring to both human rights concerns and tp medical necessity. Rationalization Two. Former President Chen's application to rejoin the party was approved by the Central Standing Committee. Chief Convener Ker Chen-ming presented the application to former President Chen to fill out. Therefore the party cannot permit any internal inconsistencies.
Such sophistry can hardly rationalize the party's actions, which are utterly incomprehensible. Political parties are not hospitals. Ah-Bian may well be suffering from severe depression. But what does that have to do with rejoining the DPP? Now consider the second justification. The Central Standing Committee has resolved that Ah-Bian may rejoin the party. Therefore, as the logic goes, the Review Panel must not oppose this resolution. This sounds like plain and simple evasion of responsibility. It is true that the DPP Central Standing Committee and Central Evaluation Committee ought to have the final say regarding Ah-Bian's application to rejoin the party. The DPP Central Standing Committee deliberately passed the buck to the Review Panel. Put bluntly, DPP Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang evaded responsibility. But this is a sin of historic proportions that could very well sink the DPP. Can Su really dodge such a bullet?
In late 2006, Wu Shu-cheng was being prosecuted for corruption in the State Affairs Fund case. Chen Shui-bian was still president. Yet the DPP convened an emergency session of the DPP Central Executive Committee. DPP leaders engaged in heated debate. The party still included dissenting voices outspoken enough to acknowledge the First Family's wrongdoing. They demanded that the party distinguish between right and wrong. Now however, the DPP's word is final. Chief Convener Ker Chien-ming conveys the party leadership's ruling to the party faithful. Who dares to utter a word of dissent?
Ironically Su Tseng-chang contradicted himself. In 2008 Tsai Ing-wen took over as DPP Party Chairman. Confronted with the Chen corruption case, she was helpless to respond. WikiLeaks revealed that Su Tseng-chang repeatedly criticized Tsai Ing-wen during a meeting with the AIT. He said that under Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, the DPP lacked courage and determination. He said it failed to unequivocally and promptly disown Ah-Bian. It failed to distance itself from him. This he said, was a colossal blunder.
Today, looking back at Chairman Su's magniloquence, one cannot help being overwhelmed by emotion. Tsai Ing-wen's bottom line was Chen Shui-bian's right to medical treatment. She was unable to block the Taiwan independence fundamentalists. She was unable to prevent the Chen faction from extending its reach into the DPP. But contrast, Su Tseng-chang has allowed the Chen faction to march right in. Su's conduct is not even in the same ballpark as "courage." Su totally ignored right and wrong. The public finds one question most baffling of all. Why, it asks, was it necessary to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party? Yesterday during the Review Panel meeting, some said the DPP should simply bite the bullet and get it over with. Refusing to allow Ah-Bian to rejoin the party might lead to short-term pain, i.e., attacks from party insiders. But the DPP would continue to uphold Chen Shui-bian's right to health care. By contrast, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party would surely lead to long-term pain. The DPP would continue taking heat for the Chen corruption case. It would lose its firewall.
Long term pain vs. short term pain. Which is worse? Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows the answer to that. No wonder DPP elder Lin Cho-shui blasted Chen Shui-bian's reentry into the party. For a political party with a mission, this is shameful. Meanwhile, realpolitik has motivated the DPP to hurriedly readmit Ah-Bian. It is almost as if the DPP is rushing to the aid of President Ma Ying-jeou, who has been dogged by low approval numbers. It is almost as if the DPP is filling the role of relief pitcher.
Lin Cho-shui said that if Chen Shui-bian insists on rejoining the party, he will become a nightmare for the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Anyone with a modicum of political knowledge understands this. In other words, allowing Ah-Bian to rejoin the party now is both morally and practically ill-advised .
It is destructive. It lacks any redeeming virtue. So why is the party leadership doing it? The answer may have to do with next year's party chairmanship election. Perhaps they are fighting each other for the Taiwan independence fundamentalist vote. But that is akin to drinking poison to quench one's thirst. Readmiting Ah-Bian means accepting what he has done. Leaders of a political party so deficient in vision may win their party's leadership. But such a party will never be able to win the presidency. Their individual struggles will be for naught. Most regrettable of all, the DPP will eventually be dragged down as well.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.15
社論－同流合汙 民進黨終於被看「扁」
本報訊
民進黨昨日通過陳水扁「再入黨申請案」，就一個從未嚴肅反省扁家貪腐弊案的政黨而言，現在又不明不白的將貪汙犯迎進門，此舉無異昭告天下，民進黨終於與扁同流合汙；而選民對民進黨的最後一絲期待，也終將就此破滅。
扁再入黨，讓民進黨陷於名不正言不順的困境。首先，這不是平反，陳水扁不但多案定讞，多數民意也不認為判決冤枉了扁；更重要的是，扁從未為過去的作為認錯致歉，隨隨便便就接納他，只會讓扁案重擔拖垮民進黨。
這一次民進黨同意讓扁重新入黨，顯然連民進黨中央都於心有愧，他們理不直氣不壯到什麼程度，單單從民進黨中央入黨複審小組召集人管碧玲的說法，就可以看出來，管碧玲提出同意扁入黨的兩個理由，第一、陳水扁為重度憂鬱之病人，其再入黨之情感，民進黨應給予人權暨醫療需求之必要考量。第二、陳前總統申請再入黨案，係經中常會決議，由柯建銘總召攜帶申請書，提送陳前總統填寫，黨不宜有前後不一的矛盾。
坦白說，這樣的說詞不但無法自圓其說，簡直是不知所云。試問，政黨又不是開醫院，扁有重度憂鬱症，與加入民進黨何干，至於第二點理由指稱，中常會既已決議扁入黨，複審小組不宜反對，聽起來簡直就是在迴避責任；確實，本該由民進黨中常會、中評會作最終決議的扁入黨案，黨中央卻刻意推給審查小組，說穿了，就是民進黨黨主席蘇貞昌逃避責任，只是，讓民進黨沉淪這樣一個歷史性的罪過，蘇貞昌真的逃得了嗎？
說來諷刺，民國95年底、扁嫂吳淑珍因國務機要費貪汙案遭起訴，當時陳水扁貴為總統，但民進黨仍召開臨時擴大中執會，讓民進黨菁英激辯，那時該黨還有少數諤諤之士，直言扁及第一家庭之過，要求黨中央不可無是非；相反的，現在的民進黨則是黨意先行，貴為總召的柯建銘負責送件，黨內還能有什麼異聲！
更諷刺的，還是蘇貞昌的前後不一；蔡英文於97年接任民進黨黨主席，面對扁案左支右絀，維基解密透露，蘇貞昌當時接受美國在台協會訪問時多次批評，蔡英文主持下的民進黨缺乏膽識及決斷力，未能及早和扁畫清界線，未能和扁清楚切割，這是一大錯誤。
現在回過頭來看蘇主席當初這番豪語，令人感慨萬千！蔡英文至少堅持守住保衛陳水扁醫療人權這條底線，但還是能夠力擋基本教義派，不讓扁及扁系伸手進入民進黨；相反的，蘇貞昌則是讓扁系長驅直入。這樣的作為，不但與他說的膽識相差不可以道里計，其實已經是毫無是非可言。民意最不解的是，為何非要同意扁入黨不可？昨日複審小組會議中，就有長痛、短痛之說，短痛指的是不讓扁再入黨，可能短時間內會被攻擊，但民進黨仍可持續關心陳水扁的司法和醫療人權；相對的，所謂的長痛，當然是指民進黨與扁案包袱將長相左右，痛失防火牆。
坦白說，長痛、短痛孰者為重，只要有一點常識者都很清楚，難怪民進黨大老林濁水接受訪問時痛陳，陳水扁再入黨一案，對一個理想性使命政黨而言，這是非常羞恥的紀錄。同時，就政治現實面而言，民進黨現在趕著讓扁入黨，形同是幫民調低迷的馬英九總統解圍、扮演救援投手的角色。
林濁水還說，如果陳水扁堅持入黨，對民進黨內要參選2016總統大選的人而言都是一個噩夢，這也是任何有一點政治常識者，都可以了解的道理；換句話說，民進黨中央此時安排扁重新入黨，不但正當性有問題，同時也是不智之舉。
百害而無一利，黨中央為何孤注一擲，也許只能從明年的黨主席選舉、爭奪基本教義派選票可以解釋；只是，這是飲鴆止渴，因為，既接納扁，也就是同時接納他的所作所為，一個如此沒有長遠目光的政黨領導者，即使爭得黨權，將來也不可能奪取大位，個人白忙一場無所謂，最令人遺憾的是，民進黨也終將被拖累。
KMT-CCP Peace Agreement Presents Limitless Possibilities
KMT-CCP Peace Agreement Presents Limitless Possibilities
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 14, 2013
Summary: On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." Tsai proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
Full text below:
On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." He urged Taipei and Beijing to sign a peace agreement. But realizing differences of opinion persisted on Taiwan, he urged the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to take the initiative of signing a peace agreement first. Only peace can build trust and create wealth. Opposition parties on Taiwan can catch up later. If such constructive and creative ideas can be implemented, the possibilities for cross-Strait relations are limitless.
Tsai made his proposal because he believes peace is an overarching value. A peace agreement would mean that the Chinese Civil War has officially ended. ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, who was present, considered it an excellent suggestion. MAC Vice Chairman Chang Hsien-yao also agreed with Tsai's proposal. The KMT said it would be happy to see the parties discuss cross-strait peace. Great achievements must begin with humility. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Achieving anything requires a process. As long as the parties are willing to listen, nothing ought to be ruled out.
As early as April 2005, during the first Lian Hu meeting, the KMT and CCP expressed the desire to sign a peace agreement. The KMT returned to power in 2008. Mainland President Hu Jintao seized the opportunity to improve bilateral relations. On December 31, he announced his six point policy for Taiwan. Once again, Beijing raised the issue of a cross-strait peace agreement. The Mainland demonstrated considerable goodwill and a willingness to cooperate.
In May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou took office. Based on the 1992 consensus, he proposed a cross-strait provisional framework. He called for no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. He unilaterally adopted a series of measures to improve relations with the Mainland. In January 2012, the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China held a presidential election. President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected. During the election campaign, President Ma reiterated his vision for a "golden decade." In it he proposed the conditional deliberation and negoatiation of a cross-strait peace agreement. His proposal attracted considerable attention.
Consider a peace agreement between the two sides, such as Tsai's proposed agreement between the the KMT and CCP. Skeptics may say that the KMT and CCP can laugh away their past difference like brothers. Relations between the two may be harmonious. Cross-strait relations may not be what they once were. But the KMT and the CCP do not have the final say. One ought not create a tangled web and make things more complicated than they need to be. Consider the matter in a more positive light. This could be a gradual solution to the problem, a way to realize peace. How can anyone object?
Scholars researching the matter say a peace agreement requires complex advance negotiations. It requires preliminary and interim agreements. It requires broad agreement over the framework. It requires attention to implementation. The peace agreement would be subdivided into structure and content. The protocol would be subdivided into procedure, substance, and structure. A peace agreement should also address past grieveances, provide security guarantees, promote reconciliation, establish trust, and normalize relations. Each process is complex. Obviously the peace agreement must include different phases and different content. It is an ongoing process. Put simply, peace cannot be achieved overnight.
The results of research show the following. One. There can be no peace without compromise. Two. Peace must be a consensus reached by a majority. They must see it as just. Three. Peace must bring benefits. Four. The benefits of peace must be socially acceptable. Five. A society must be determined to achieve peace. Six. Peace today is no guarantee of peace tomorrow. But benign interaction can help protect a fragile peace. Seven. Peace often requires third party support. This support is often merely a formality. Eight. The longer the ceasefire, the more difficult it is to persuade the disputants to enter the peace process. The temporary state has become a fact of life. Nine. The more people involved in the peace process, the more robust the peace. Ten. The more communication and cooperation between different social strata, the more enduring the peace.
This does not mean that meeting all the conditions will guarantee peace. Nor does it mean that one or two missing conditions make peace impossible. Both sides may seek peace. They may not rule out a peace agreement. But they may lack mutual trust. They may be too self-centered. They may assume they are on the right side of history. They may consider only their own case. Self-restraint may be perceived as weakness. Self-protection may be perceived as provocation. The other side's words and deeds may make a just peace impossible. One side may refuse to make concesssions to deny the other side the satisfaction of winning. One sie may demand concessions but refuse to reciprocate. Any hope for peace may be lost in the process.
Tsai has proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.14
社論－國共和平協議 讓兩岸有無限可能
本報訊
本月8日，旺旺中時媒体集團董事長、旺報創辦人蔡衍明於「兩岸和平創富論壇」呼籲，兩岸簽署和平協議，但是由於台灣內部意見分歧，所以他率先主張，由國民黨與共產黨先行簽署，因為只有和平才能建立互信、創造財富，而將來台灣其他的在野黨也可跟進。我們認為，這種建設性的思維和創造性的構想如果能夠付諸實施，未來的兩岸關係將有更大的空間和無限的可能。
蔡創辦人之所以出此倡議，是因為篤信和平才是最高的價值，協議的簽署將象徵國共內戰的正式結束。對此，與會的大陸海協會常務副會長鄭立中表示建議很好，而陸委會副主委張顯耀也說非常認同此議，給予尊重，國民黨方面則說樂見各方討論有關兩岸和平的相關建言。當然登高自卑、行遠由邇，凡事都要有一個發展、醞釀的過程，只要相關各方願意傾聽，不排除嘗試都是好事。
其實，早在2005年4月，國共雙方就曾於第一次的連胡會中，正式表達了關於兩岸研議、簽署和平協議的願景；2008年國民黨重掌政權之後，為了把握改善雙方關係的契機，當時的大陸國家主席胡錦濤也於當年12月31日發表對台政策的六點最新主張，北京再次提到兩岸和平協議的問題，中國大陸也展現相當程度的誠意與配合。
2008年5月，在馬英九總統主政之下，台北在九二共識的基礎上，主張兩岸不統、不獨、不武，提出兩岸暫行架構的概念，主動採取一系列政策，進一步改善和中國大陸之間的關係。2012年1月，中華民國台灣地區進行總統大選，馬英九總統獲選連任。選前，馬總統曾在黃金十年願景中再次提到，在滿足某些特定條件情況下，研議未來推動洽簽兩岸和平協議一事，引發各界關注。
不過，此時大家談的還是兩岸之間的和平協議，如今蔡創辦人所主張的則是國共之間的和平協議；持懷疑態度的人或謂，國共兩黨今天已經兄弟一笑泯恩仇，彼此關係已水乳交融，而且兩岸關係也今非昔比，並非國共兩黨能夠說了就算，實無必要再治絲益棼，把事情搞得更為複雜。但若從正面的角度來看，這確實不失為一個逐步解決問題的辦法，落實和平、簽署協議總不會有人反對吧？
其實，根據相關學者的專業研究，簽署和平協議所涉事端相當複雜，其中有談判前的協議，中程或初期的協議、廣泛或架構性的協議，以及如何執行協議等等。另外，若就和平協議的本身來說，又可細分為協議的結構與內容、協議的組成，其中包括程序性、實質性和結構性部分。至於建構和平協議的步驟則還應包括對過去的不公不義的糾正、安全保證、互惠和解、互信建立及關係正常化等等，每一個過程都相當的複雜。顯然，和平協議不但有不同的階段和組成內容，而且還會是一個發展的過程，簡單的說，和平不可能一蹴而成。
研究結果還顯示出，第一，沒有和平是不經妥協的；第二，和平必須是社會大多數成員的共識，被社會各界視為公正的；第三，和平必須能夠帶來好處；第四，和平所帶來的利益必須能夠讓社會接受；第五，要達成和平必須要有決心和意願；第六，和平雖然不保證未來的互動，但良性的互動有助於維護脆弱的和平；第七，和平通常必須受到第三者所支持，即使這種支持有時只是形式上的；第八，停火期間越長，爭議雙方越難進入和平協議，因為這種暫時的狀態已經成為一種穩定的生活方式；第九，越多人參與的和平過程，這種和平越為堅固；第十，社會上不同階層越多的溝通與合作，將使得和平越為穩固。
當然，在實務上這既不意味滿足上述所有條件就能維持和平，也不表示缺乏其中的一或二項就無法實現和平。反過來看，我們也發現，過去有太多的例子證明，雖然鬥爭雙方都表示有意追求和平，不排斥和平協議，但由於缺乏互信，彼此都出於本位思考，認為自己站在歷史正確的一方，只看到有利於己的一面；而自我克制又可能被對方視為軟弱，加強自衛的結果又被對方視為挑釁，由於對方的所做所為，所以不能給對方公正的和平，為了不能讓對方有獲勝的感覺，所以堅不讓步，只要求對方讓步，而沒有適當的回饋等等，終於導致和平無望。
如今，蔡衍明創辦人正式提出國共簽署和平協議的主張，與學術研究的結果相當吻合，這正是一個由小而大、由易而難、從近到遠的漸進發展過程，值得各界進一步嚴肅加以思考。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 14, 2013
Summary: On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." Tsai proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
Full text below:
On the 8th of this month, Want Want China Times Media Group Chairman and founder Tsai Eng-meng made a proposal during the "Cross-Strait Peace Wealth Creation Forum." He urged Taipei and Beijing to sign a peace agreement. But realizing differences of opinion persisted on Taiwan, he urged the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to take the initiative of signing a peace agreement first. Only peace can build trust and create wealth. Opposition parties on Taiwan can catch up later. If such constructive and creative ideas can be implemented, the possibilities for cross-Strait relations are limitless.
Tsai made his proposal because he believes peace is an overarching value. A peace agreement would mean that the Chinese Civil War has officially ended. ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, who was present, considered it an excellent suggestion. MAC Vice Chairman Chang Hsien-yao also agreed with Tsai's proposal. The KMT said it would be happy to see the parties discuss cross-strait peace. Great achievements must begin with humility. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Achieving anything requires a process. As long as the parties are willing to listen, nothing ought to be ruled out.
As early as April 2005, during the first Lian Hu meeting, the KMT and CCP expressed the desire to sign a peace agreement. The KMT returned to power in 2008. Mainland President Hu Jintao seized the opportunity to improve bilateral relations. On December 31, he announced his six point policy for Taiwan. Once again, Beijing raised the issue of a cross-strait peace agreement. The Mainland demonstrated considerable goodwill and a willingness to cooperate.
In May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou took office. Based on the 1992 consensus, he proposed a cross-strait provisional framework. He called for no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. He unilaterally adopted a series of measures to improve relations with the Mainland. In January 2012, the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China held a presidential election. President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected. During the election campaign, President Ma reiterated his vision for a "golden decade." In it he proposed the conditional deliberation and negoatiation of a cross-strait peace agreement. His proposal attracted considerable attention.
Consider a peace agreement between the two sides, such as Tsai's proposed agreement between the the KMT and CCP. Skeptics may say that the KMT and CCP can laugh away their past difference like brothers. Relations between the two may be harmonious. Cross-strait relations may not be what they once were. But the KMT and the CCP do not have the final say. One ought not create a tangled web and make things more complicated than they need to be. Consider the matter in a more positive light. This could be a gradual solution to the problem, a way to realize peace. How can anyone object?
Scholars researching the matter say a peace agreement requires complex advance negotiations. It requires preliminary and interim agreements. It requires broad agreement over the framework. It requires attention to implementation. The peace agreement would be subdivided into structure and content. The protocol would be subdivided into procedure, substance, and structure. A peace agreement should also address past grieveances, provide security guarantees, promote reconciliation, establish trust, and normalize relations. Each process is complex. Obviously the peace agreement must include different phases and different content. It is an ongoing process. Put simply, peace cannot be achieved overnight.
The results of research show the following. One. There can be no peace without compromise. Two. Peace must be a consensus reached by a majority. They must see it as just. Three. Peace must bring benefits. Four. The benefits of peace must be socially acceptable. Five. A society must be determined to achieve peace. Six. Peace today is no guarantee of peace tomorrow. But benign interaction can help protect a fragile peace. Seven. Peace often requires third party support. This support is often merely a formality. Eight. The longer the ceasefire, the more difficult it is to persuade the disputants to enter the peace process. The temporary state has become a fact of life. Nine. The more people involved in the peace process, the more robust the peace. Ten. The more communication and cooperation between different social strata, the more enduring the peace.
This does not mean that meeting all the conditions will guarantee peace. Nor does it mean that one or two missing conditions make peace impossible. Both sides may seek peace. They may not rule out a peace agreement. But they may lack mutual trust. They may be too self-centered. They may assume they are on the right side of history. They may consider only their own case. Self-restraint may be perceived as weakness. Self-protection may be perceived as provocation. The other side's words and deeds may make a just peace impossible. One side may refuse to make concesssions to deny the other side the satisfaction of winning. One sie may demand concessions but refuse to reciprocate. Any hope for peace may be lost in the process.
Tsai has proposed that the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement. His proposal is consistent with scholarly research. Peace is a process that proceeds from small to large, from easy to difficult, from near to far. Everyone ought to give this fact serious consideration.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.14
社論－國共和平協議 讓兩岸有無限可能
本報訊
本月8日，旺旺中時媒体集團董事長、旺報創辦人蔡衍明於「兩岸和平創富論壇」呼籲，兩岸簽署和平協議，但是由於台灣內部意見分歧，所以他率先主張，由國民黨與共產黨先行簽署，因為只有和平才能建立互信、創造財富，而將來台灣其他的在野黨也可跟進。我們認為，這種建設性的思維和創造性的構想如果能夠付諸實施，未來的兩岸關係將有更大的空間和無限的可能。
蔡創辦人之所以出此倡議，是因為篤信和平才是最高的價值，協議的簽署將象徵國共內戰的正式結束。對此，與會的大陸海協會常務副會長鄭立中表示建議很好，而陸委會副主委張顯耀也說非常認同此議，給予尊重，國民黨方面則說樂見各方討論有關兩岸和平的相關建言。當然登高自卑、行遠由邇，凡事都要有一個發展、醞釀的過程，只要相關各方願意傾聽，不排除嘗試都是好事。
其實，早在2005年4月，國共雙方就曾於第一次的連胡會中，正式表達了關於兩岸研議、簽署和平協議的願景；2008年國民黨重掌政權之後，為了把握改善雙方關係的契機，當時的大陸國家主席胡錦濤也於當年12月31日發表對台政策的六點最新主張，北京再次提到兩岸和平協議的問題，中國大陸也展現相當程度的誠意與配合。
2008年5月，在馬英九總統主政之下，台北在九二共識的基礎上，主張兩岸不統、不獨、不武，提出兩岸暫行架構的概念，主動採取一系列政策，進一步改善和中國大陸之間的關係。2012年1月，中華民國台灣地區進行總統大選，馬英九總統獲選連任。選前，馬總統曾在黃金十年願景中再次提到，在滿足某些特定條件情況下，研議未來推動洽簽兩岸和平協議一事，引發各界關注。
不過，此時大家談的還是兩岸之間的和平協議，如今蔡創辦人所主張的則是國共之間的和平協議；持懷疑態度的人或謂，國共兩黨今天已經兄弟一笑泯恩仇，彼此關係已水乳交融，而且兩岸關係也今非昔比，並非國共兩黨能夠說了就算，實無必要再治絲益棼，把事情搞得更為複雜。但若從正面的角度來看，這確實不失為一個逐步解決問題的辦法，落實和平、簽署協議總不會有人反對吧？
其實，根據相關學者的專業研究，簽署和平協議所涉事端相當複雜，其中有談判前的協議，中程或初期的協議、廣泛或架構性的協議，以及如何執行協議等等。另外，若就和平協議的本身來說，又可細分為協議的結構與內容、協議的組成，其中包括程序性、實質性和結構性部分。至於建構和平協議的步驟則還應包括對過去的不公不義的糾正、安全保證、互惠和解、互信建立及關係正常化等等，每一個過程都相當的複雜。顯然，和平協議不但有不同的階段和組成內容，而且還會是一個發展的過程，簡單的說，和平不可能一蹴而成。
研究結果還顯示出，第一，沒有和平是不經妥協的；第二，和平必須是社會大多數成員的共識，被社會各界視為公正的；第三，和平必須能夠帶來好處；第四，和平所帶來的利益必須能夠讓社會接受；第五，要達成和平必須要有決心和意願；第六，和平雖然不保證未來的互動，但良性的互動有助於維護脆弱的和平；第七，和平通常必須受到第三者所支持，即使這種支持有時只是形式上的；第八，停火期間越長，爭議雙方越難進入和平協議，因為這種暫時的狀態已經成為一種穩定的生活方式；第九，越多人參與的和平過程，這種和平越為堅固；第十，社會上不同階層越多的溝通與合作，將使得和平越為穩固。
當然，在實務上這既不意味滿足上述所有條件就能維持和平，也不表示缺乏其中的一或二項就無法實現和平。反過來看，我們也發現，過去有太多的例子證明，雖然鬥爭雙方都表示有意追求和平，不排斥和平協議，但由於缺乏互信，彼此都出於本位思考，認為自己站在歷史正確的一方，只看到有利於己的一面；而自我克制又可能被對方視為軟弱，加強自衛的結果又被對方視為挑釁，由於對方的所做所為，所以不能給對方公正的和平，為了不能讓對方有獲勝的感覺，所以堅不讓步，只要求對方讓步，而沒有適當的回饋等等，終於導致和平無望。
如今，蔡衍明創辦人正式提出國共簽署和平協議的主張，與學術研究的結果相當吻合，這正是一個由小而大、由易而難、從近到遠的漸進發展過程，值得各界進一步嚴肅加以思考。
Monday, August 12, 2013
When Will Taipei and Beijing Sign a Peace Agreement?
When Will Taipei and Beijing Sign a Peace Agreement?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 13, 2013
Summary: Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.
Full text below:
The Second Huashan Conference indicates that the DPP has refused to accept the 1992 consensus. But some media organizations are urging the KMT and CCP to seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement between the two parties.
These are parallel developments. If the DPP wins the presidential election in 2016 and confrontation follows, that means political and economic disaster.
Take the 1992 consensus. If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, logically speaking it is unlikely to win in 2016. Conversely, if the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus, but wins anyway, that will spell political and economic disaster for Taiwan. The Second Huashan Conference says the 1992 consensus is synonymous with opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore the DPP can not accept the 1992 consensus. But if the DPP considers opposition to the 1992 consensus synonymous with a demand for Taiwan independence, how can Beijing possibly accept it? Therefore if the DPP wins in 2016, Taipei and Beijing could find themselves in heated controversy over whether to accept the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. Taiwan would be destabilized, politically and economically.
Take the peace agreement. The KMT and CCP could choose to sign a peace agreement. The timing may be better when the KMT is in the opposition. If the Kuomintang is in office, before 2016 or after, a party to party, KMT to CCP peace agreement will be impossible. Any agreement would have to be a government to government. Any agreement that is not government to government, would never be signed. If however, the KMT loses in 2016, it may wish to establish a framework by which it can compete against the DPP. Any KMT to CCP peace agreement would surely be signed. But it would make the political and economic situation on Taiwan even more stable.
Imagine two moving lines crossing each other. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins office but still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus? Suppose it persists in advocating Taiwan independence? Beijing will insist that without the 1992 consensus, there can be no peaceful development. Taiwan would then descend into political and economic chaos. If the KMT loses power, it might sign a party to party peace agreement with the CCP. But this would increase the political and economic pressure on Taiwan.
The ruling DPP would be caught in a dilemma. Should it recognize the 1992 Consensus, i.e., forsake Taiwan independence, or not? The opposition Kuomintang could win support by signing a KMT to CCP peace agreement. But Taiwan would be divided. Relations between Taipei and Beijng would be upset. An unimagineable political and economic catastrophe would follow.
Therefore the KMT and CCP should not sign a party to party peace agreement. Why not? Because such a peace agreement could only be signed while the KMT is in the opposition. Whether the KMT is in the opposition is not the critical issue. The critical issue is whether the DPP is in office, but still opposes the 1992 Consensus, i.e., still advocates Taiwan independence. If the KMT signs a peace agreement, Taiwan will be plunged into political and economic chaos. The DPP will find it impossible to govern.
Before one can talk about a peace agreement, one must first understand what a peace agreement is. A peace agreement is an interim solution. It points the way to potential future reunification. It is not in itself reunification. It is political relations under circumstances in whch the two sides have yet to be reunified. It moderates the pace and limits the extent of reunification. For both Taipei and Beijing, a peace agreement is not reunification. It may even delay reunification. One might even say that if Taiwan wants to delay reunification, it must seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement beneficial to Taiwan.
Of course the 1992 consensus opposes Taiwan independence. But besides opposing Taiwan independence, it affirms the one China framework and one China, different interpretations. Taiwan independence is already impossible. Therefore when signing a peace agreement, we must be creative. We must seek to define and interpret the one China framework. We must be innovative and seek breakthroughs. This is not merely in Taiwan's interests. This is also in the interests of the common civilization shared by both sides of the Strait.
For Taiwan, an interim solution such as a peace agreement is both natural and inevitable. Taiwan must go with the flow. It must take advantage of the trend. Both the KMT and DPP should champion the 1992 consensus, the one China framework, one China, different interpretations, and the Big Roof Concept of China. Both should champion an equitable government to government peace agreement. It would stabilize political relations under circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. It would enable the two sides to continue to benefit from peaceful development.
As we can all see, the problem lies with the DPP. Will the DPP refuse to recognize even the 1992 consensus? Will it oppose Taiwan independence and support one China, different interpretations? Will it refuse to sign a peace agreement? Suppose the DPP wins in 2016, but still opposes the 1992 consensus? Suppose the KMT signs a party to party peace agreement? That would surely tear Taiwan in two and lead to chaos. That would allow Beijing to take advantage of both the Blue and Green camps. That would lead to political and economic catastrophe.
Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.
兩岸何時簽訂和平協議
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.13 03:00 am
一方面，第二次華山會議顯示，民進黨似乎不可能接受「九二共識」；另一方面，有媒體主張，可由國共兩黨先行簽訂《和平協議》。
這兩條發展動線，若是在二○一六年民進黨贏得總統大選後出現剪刀交叉，那將是台灣的政經大災難。
先談「九二共識」。民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，照理說，即不易在二○一六勝選；但反過來說，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」卻仍能在二○一六勝選，即是台灣政經災難的預告。民進黨二次華山會議的說法是：因為「九二共識」就是「反對台獨」的同義語，所以民進黨不可能接受「九二共識」；但相對而言，若民進黨將「反對九二共識」與「堅持台獨」視為同義語，北京又怎能接受？因而，民進黨若在二○一六勝選，兩岸可能仍將陷於「是否接受九二共識」（是否反對台獨）的激烈爭議之中，台灣的政經治理必失穩定。
再談和平協議。國共若要簽和平協議，較有可能的時機當於國民黨在野之際。因為，國民黨若是執政黨，不論在二○一六之前，或二○一六以後，皆無可能以「黨對黨」簽訂國共和平協議；若要簽，必然要爭取「政府對政府」，若非「政府對政府」，必簽不成。但是，倘若國民黨在二○一六年敗選而失去政權，則為了建立與民進黨相互抗衡的架構，國共兩黨議簽和平協議即可能成為必然的結果；如此，又將使台灣的政經情勢更難穩定。
不妨想像這兩條動線交叉的景象：一方面，民進黨若執政而仍不接受「九二共識」（主張台獨），北京必然以「無九二共識即無和平發展」為操作主軸，台灣政經情勢必立即陷於混亂；另一方面，失去政權的國民黨為與民進黨抗衡，即可能與北京簽定黨對黨的《和平協議》，這又必然為台灣的政經情勢添加壓力。
屆時，主政的民進黨陷於「是否接受九二共識（是否放棄台獨）」的進退失據之勢，在野的國民黨則以《國共和平協議》爭取話語權，台灣撕裂、兩岸失衡，勢將引爆不堪設想的政經浩劫。
因此，最好不要出現國共兩黨簽訂和平協議的場景，因為那可能就是國民黨在野之時。但國民黨下野並非關鍵，問題在於民進黨若主政卻仍反對九二共識（主張台獨），則國共若簽和平協議，台灣的政經大局即必陷撕裂及敗亂，民進黨亦絕無平順主政的可能。
談和平協議，應先理解和平協議的性質。和平協議是一種「中程方案」；它指向未來可能統一，但其本身卻不是「統一」，而是在規劃兩岸「尚未統一」的「政治關係」，所以亦有節制統一之時程及內涵的效能。因而，對兩岸而言，和平協議不但不是「統一」，且可能是「統一」的緩衝器與節制器。甚至可說，台灣若要對統一作出緩衝與節制，即應當主動爭取簽訂對台灣有利的和平協議。
至於九二共識，自然是「反對台獨」。但在「反對台獨」以外，尚有「一中框架」及「一中各表」等義。其實，對台灣而言，「台獨」至今已絕無可能；因此，台灣應當爭取在和平協議的議簽過程中，對「一中架構」的定義權及對「一中各表」的運作權，尋求創新及突破。這不僅是為台灣的利益所必爭，也是為了兩岸共同的文明成就所必爭。
對台灣而言，類如《和平協議》這樣的「中程方案」，已是理所當趨，亦是勢所必至；因此，台灣非但應順勢而為，更應因勢利導。因而，不論是國民黨或民進黨執政，均應努力爭取在「九二共識」、「一中框架／各自表述」下，以「大屋頂中國」的思維，在「政府對政府」的對等地位下，簽定《和平協議》，來穩定「尚未統一的政治關係」，以持續並延伸兩岸的「和平發展」。
然而，有目共睹，問題主要在民進黨。民進黨如果連「九二共識」（反對台獨／一中各表）都不接受，遑言議簽《和平協議》。如前所述，倘若民進黨在二○一六勝選，卻仍「反對九二共識」，而國共則簽定了《和平協議》；那必將釀成台灣撕裂敗亂，而北京藍綠通吃的政經浩劫。
兩岸即將進入「無和平協議，即無和平發展」的階段。因此，直白而言，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，即無重返執政的資格，除非想要葬送台灣。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 13, 2013
Summary: Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.
Full text below:
The Second Huashan Conference indicates that the DPP has refused to accept the 1992 consensus. But some media organizations are urging the KMT and CCP to seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement between the two parties.
These are parallel developments. If the DPP wins the presidential election in 2016 and confrontation follows, that means political and economic disaster.
Take the 1992 consensus. If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, logically speaking it is unlikely to win in 2016. Conversely, if the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus, but wins anyway, that will spell political and economic disaster for Taiwan. The Second Huashan Conference says the 1992 consensus is synonymous with opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore the DPP can not accept the 1992 consensus. But if the DPP considers opposition to the 1992 consensus synonymous with a demand for Taiwan independence, how can Beijing possibly accept it? Therefore if the DPP wins in 2016, Taipei and Beijing could find themselves in heated controversy over whether to accept the 1992 consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. Taiwan would be destabilized, politically and economically.
Take the peace agreement. The KMT and CCP could choose to sign a peace agreement. The timing may be better when the KMT is in the opposition. If the Kuomintang is in office, before 2016 or after, a party to party, KMT to CCP peace agreement will be impossible. Any agreement would have to be a government to government. Any agreement that is not government to government, would never be signed. If however, the KMT loses in 2016, it may wish to establish a framework by which it can compete against the DPP. Any KMT to CCP peace agreement would surely be signed. But it would make the political and economic situation on Taiwan even more stable.
Imagine two moving lines crossing each other. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins office but still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus? Suppose it persists in advocating Taiwan independence? Beijing will insist that without the 1992 consensus, there can be no peaceful development. Taiwan would then descend into political and economic chaos. If the KMT loses power, it might sign a party to party peace agreement with the CCP. But this would increase the political and economic pressure on Taiwan.
The ruling DPP would be caught in a dilemma. Should it recognize the 1992 Consensus, i.e., forsake Taiwan independence, or not? The opposition Kuomintang could win support by signing a KMT to CCP peace agreement. But Taiwan would be divided. Relations between Taipei and Beijng would be upset. An unimagineable political and economic catastrophe would follow.
Therefore the KMT and CCP should not sign a party to party peace agreement. Why not? Because such a peace agreement could only be signed while the KMT is in the opposition. Whether the KMT is in the opposition is not the critical issue. The critical issue is whether the DPP is in office, but still opposes the 1992 Consensus, i.e., still advocates Taiwan independence. If the KMT signs a peace agreement, Taiwan will be plunged into political and economic chaos. The DPP will find it impossible to govern.
Before one can talk about a peace agreement, one must first understand what a peace agreement is. A peace agreement is an interim solution. It points the way to potential future reunification. It is not in itself reunification. It is political relations under circumstances in whch the two sides have yet to be reunified. It moderates the pace and limits the extent of reunification. For both Taipei and Beijing, a peace agreement is not reunification. It may even delay reunification. One might even say that if Taiwan wants to delay reunification, it must seize the initiative and sign a peace agreement beneficial to Taiwan.
Of course the 1992 consensus opposes Taiwan independence. But besides opposing Taiwan independence, it affirms the one China framework and one China, different interpretations. Taiwan independence is already impossible. Therefore when signing a peace agreement, we must be creative. We must seek to define and interpret the one China framework. We must be innovative and seek breakthroughs. This is not merely in Taiwan's interests. This is also in the interests of the common civilization shared by both sides of the Strait.
For Taiwan, an interim solution such as a peace agreement is both natural and inevitable. Taiwan must go with the flow. It must take advantage of the trend. Both the KMT and DPP should champion the 1992 consensus, the one China framework, one China, different interpretations, and the Big Roof Concept of China. Both should champion an equitable government to government peace agreement. It would stabilize political relations under circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. It would enable the two sides to continue to benefit from peaceful development.
As we can all see, the problem lies with the DPP. Will the DPP refuse to recognize even the 1992 consensus? Will it oppose Taiwan independence and support one China, different interpretations? Will it refuse to sign a peace agreement? Suppose the DPP wins in 2016, but still opposes the 1992 consensus? Suppose the KMT signs a party to party peace agreement? That would surely tear Taiwan in two and lead to chaos. That would allow Beijing to take advantage of both the Blue and Green camps. That would lead to political and economic catastrophe.
Taipei and Beijing are about to enter a phase in which no peace agreement equals no peaceful development. Therefore, to put it bluntly, if the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, it will be unqualified to return to power. If it does return to power under such conditions, it will only destroy Taiwan.
兩岸何時簽訂和平協議
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.13 03:00 am
一方面，第二次華山會議顯示，民進黨似乎不可能接受「九二共識」；另一方面，有媒體主張，可由國共兩黨先行簽訂《和平協議》。
這兩條發展動線，若是在二○一六年民進黨贏得總統大選後出現剪刀交叉，那將是台灣的政經大災難。
先談「九二共識」。民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，照理說，即不易在二○一六勝選；但反過來說，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」卻仍能在二○一六勝選，即是台灣政經災難的預告。民進黨二次華山會議的說法是：因為「九二共識」就是「反對台獨」的同義語，所以民進黨不可能接受「九二共識」；但相對而言，若民進黨將「反對九二共識」與「堅持台獨」視為同義語，北京又怎能接受？因而，民進黨若在二○一六勝選，兩岸可能仍將陷於「是否接受九二共識」（是否反對台獨）的激烈爭議之中，台灣的政經治理必失穩定。
再談和平協議。國共若要簽和平協議，較有可能的時機當於國民黨在野之際。因為，國民黨若是執政黨，不論在二○一六之前，或二○一六以後，皆無可能以「黨對黨」簽訂國共和平協議；若要簽，必然要爭取「政府對政府」，若非「政府對政府」，必簽不成。但是，倘若國民黨在二○一六年敗選而失去政權，則為了建立與民進黨相互抗衡的架構，國共兩黨議簽和平協議即可能成為必然的結果；如此，又將使台灣的政經情勢更難穩定。
不妨想像這兩條動線交叉的景象：一方面，民進黨若執政而仍不接受「九二共識」（主張台獨），北京必然以「無九二共識即無和平發展」為操作主軸，台灣政經情勢必立即陷於混亂；另一方面，失去政權的國民黨為與民進黨抗衡，即可能與北京簽定黨對黨的《和平協議》，這又必然為台灣的政經情勢添加壓力。
屆時，主政的民進黨陷於「是否接受九二共識（是否放棄台獨）」的進退失據之勢，在野的國民黨則以《國共和平協議》爭取話語權，台灣撕裂、兩岸失衡，勢將引爆不堪設想的政經浩劫。
因此，最好不要出現國共兩黨簽訂和平協議的場景，因為那可能就是國民黨在野之時。但國民黨下野並非關鍵，問題在於民進黨若主政卻仍反對九二共識（主張台獨），則國共若簽和平協議，台灣的政經大局即必陷撕裂及敗亂，民進黨亦絕無平順主政的可能。
談和平協議，應先理解和平協議的性質。和平協議是一種「中程方案」；它指向未來可能統一，但其本身卻不是「統一」，而是在規劃兩岸「尚未統一」的「政治關係」，所以亦有節制統一之時程及內涵的效能。因而，對兩岸而言，和平協議不但不是「統一」，且可能是「統一」的緩衝器與節制器。甚至可說，台灣若要對統一作出緩衝與節制，即應當主動爭取簽訂對台灣有利的和平協議。
至於九二共識，自然是「反對台獨」。但在「反對台獨」以外，尚有「一中框架」及「一中各表」等義。其實，對台灣而言，「台獨」至今已絕無可能；因此，台灣應當爭取在和平協議的議簽過程中，對「一中架構」的定義權及對「一中各表」的運作權，尋求創新及突破。這不僅是為台灣的利益所必爭，也是為了兩岸共同的文明成就所必爭。
對台灣而言，類如《和平協議》這樣的「中程方案」，已是理所當趨，亦是勢所必至；因此，台灣非但應順勢而為，更應因勢利導。因而，不論是國民黨或民進黨執政，均應努力爭取在「九二共識」、「一中框架／各自表述」下，以「大屋頂中國」的思維，在「政府對政府」的對等地位下，簽定《和平協議》，來穩定「尚未統一的政治關係」，以持續並延伸兩岸的「和平發展」。
然而，有目共睹，問題主要在民進黨。民進黨如果連「九二共識」（反對台獨／一中各表）都不接受，遑言議簽《和平協議》。如前所述，倘若民進黨在二○一六勝選，卻仍「反對九二共識」，而國共則簽定了《和平協議》；那必將釀成台灣撕裂敗亂，而北京藍綠通吃的政經浩劫。
兩岸即將進入「無和平協議，即無和平發展」的階段。因此，直白而言，民進黨若不接受「九二共識」，即無重返執政的資格，除非想要葬送台灣。
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