Lien Chan vs. Lee Teng-hui: Dragon Whisperer vs. Dragon Slayer
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 13, 2012
Summary: Politicians must not engage in the arrogant abuse of power. They must wisely ride the currents of history. Lee Teng-hui enjoyed momentary success. But in the end he was swept into the dustbin of history. Lien Chan suffered momentary defeat. But in the end he successfully altered the course of history. Lien Chan and Lee Teng-hui left behind very different historical legacies. One was a failed dragonslayer. The other was a successful "dragon whisperer."
Full Text below:
Lee Teng-hui has long insisted that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." Yesterday Lee commented publicly on the Japanese government's "purchase" of the Diaoyutai Islands. Lee said, "If the son of some family is marrying a beautiful bride, what concern is it of ours?"
At the same moment, Lien Chan was leading a delegation to the APEC summit in Haishengwei (aka Vladivostok). He personally met with Mainland President Hu Jintao. He also met with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Fifty-two years ago, Chiang Kai-shek met with Dwight Eisenhower. Suddenly Lien Chan was participating in the first meeting between ROC and USA leaders in 52 years. He reopened the door to TIFA negotiations. Suddenly he was participating in the first meeting between ROC and Japanese leaders in 55 years. He was negotiating fisheries issues. These events all originated with Lien Chan's 2005 "ice-breaking journey" to Beijing, when he met with met Hu Jintao.
Lien Chan's political life "owed its success to Lee Teng-hui," but also "owed its failure to Lee Teng-hui." In the end however, Lien was able to reverse his fortunes. He was able to rise from where he had fallen. Lien fell because of Lee Teng-hui. In 2000, Lee Teng-hui fully supported Lien Chan. Lien Chan was his designated successor. But the chaos brought upon by Lee Teng-hui pulled the rug out from under the KMT. Naturally it also pulled the rug out from under Lien Chan. History shows that the KMT's failure in 2000 was Lee Teng-hui's failure. Lien Chan was the fall guy who unjustly suffered the consequences.
Contrast Lien Chan and Lee Teng-hui. Lien Chan rode the currents of history and made a comeback. Lee Teng-hui misread history. He abused his power. He sowed the seeds of his own destruction. Lee Teng-hui occupied the office of president for 12 years. He expanded his powers far beyond their lawful limits. He thought he could distort history. In the end however history had the final word and Lee fell from grace. Lee Teng-hui undermined Lien Chan. He caused his failure. But when Lien Chan fell from power and hit rock bottom, he accurately read history. He wisely rode the currents of history. He became the former national leader who exerted the greatest influence on history since the lifting of martial law.
Contrast this with Lee Teng-hui's incoherent babbling and Chen Shui-bian's physical incarceration. Whether a politician is a success or a failure is not determined by how much power he might have wielded at one time. It is determined by whether he can accurately read history and successfully direct the course of history.
Lien Chan's 2005 "ice-breaking trip" was an example of directing history and making history. Hu Jintao responded to Lien Chan. The two guided the two sides toward the "five visions of peaceful development." They directed history and made history. As a result Lien Chan became the clear choice for APEC leader. At Haishengwei he and the outgoing Hu Jintao will hold their final meeting as heads of state. Lien Chan has made history. The future of cross-Strait history will be written in the language of the 2005 Lien/Hu summit.
Now look back at Lee Teng-hui. He is a headless fly, lost in the fog of history. At his height he was credited with the "National Unification Guidelines." He later demoted himself to "Godfather of Taiwan independence." He nearly destroyed the Kuomintang. Fortunately it was saved by Lien Chan. He held Chen Shui-bian hostage and destroyed the DPP. He insisted that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." He insisted that the "Republic of China no longer exists." In 2007, Lee Teng-hui watched as Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. He told the Hong Kong media that "I am not the Godfather of Taiwan independence. I never advocated Taiwan independence." When the Ma administration stumbled, he reversed himself. He clung to Tsai Ing-wen's apron strings. When Ma Ying-jeou won a second term, and the cross-Strait situation stabilized, Lee said "Shouting Taiwan independence is useless." What is this but the behavior of a fly with its head cut off?
Lee Teng-hui's political philosophy values power above all else. It assumes that if one wields enough power, one can ignore history. It assumes that any history one does not like can be cast as a fire-breathing dragon, to be slain by a self-appointed dragonslayer. Lien Chan's political philosophy is different. He had no desire to pose as dragonslayer. He chose instead to climb onto the back of the dragon. He chose to ride the dragon. He chose to ride the currents of history. Today, self-styled dragonslayer Lee Teng-hui is black and blue all over. He is hiding in a corner. He denies ever behing a dragonslayer. Lien Chan never presumed to be a dragonslayer. Instead, he turned out to be a skilled "dragon whisperer." No one can deny that he brought about cross-Strait "peaceful development."
Lee Teng-hui destroyed himself. He nearly undermined an entire generation of Blue and Green political talent, including Chen Shui-bian. Lien Chan and Ma Ying-jeou may be the only two political leaders not destroyed by Lee Teng-hui. Lien Chan escaped from the smouldering ruins left behind by Lee Teng-hui. He turned Lee Teng-hui's failure into his own success. The opportunities created by cross-Strait "peaceful development" enabled Ma Ying-jeou to stand on Lien Chan's shoulders. Lien Chan says, "My conscience is clear." Who can deny the truth of that?
Politicians must not engage in the arrogant abuse of power. They must wisely ride the currents of history. Lee Teng-hui enjoyed momentary success. But in the end he was swept into the dustbin of history. Lien Chan suffered momentary defeat. But in the end he successfully altered the course of history. Lien Chan and Lee Teng-hui left behind very different historical legacies. One was a failed dragonslayer. The other was a successful "dragon whisperer."
History is full of paradoxes. Lee Teng-hui said that Diaoyutai belongs to Japan. Will a future historian wonder whether Lee Teng-hui actually belonged to Taiwan?
連戰vs.李登輝：御龍者與屠龍者
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.13
一向夸夸其談主張「釣魚台是日本的」的李登輝，昨天露面被問及，居然說日本政府購下釣魚台，是「人家的兒子要討漂亮老婆，干我們何事？」
正在此際，連戰以領袖代表身分參加在海參崴舉行的ＡＰＥＣ，親會中國國家主席胡錦濤，又會美國的領袖代表國務卿希拉蕊、日本首相野田佳彥及新加坡總理李顯龍；一時之間，連戰參與了五十二年前蔣中正會艾森豪以來台美首次的「元首級」會晤，重啟了ＴＩＦＡ的談判大門；又完成了五十五年前蔣中正會岸信介以來首度的台日「元首級」會晤，為漁業談判鋪墊；這一切，可謂均與連戰在二○○五年赴北京首晤胡錦濤的「破冰之旅」脈絡相連。
連戰的政治人生，曾是「成也李登輝」，亦是「敗也李登輝」，但最後他又從李登輝給他造成的失敗中重新站起。李登輝曾全力提攜連戰，以連戰為二○○○年的接班人；但李登輝當時造成的亂局與頹勢已不能支撐國民黨，自然也支撐不住連戰。歷史已十分清楚地指出：二○○○年的失敗是李登輝的失敗，連戰可謂是替罪者。
以連戰與李登輝對照，連戰因騰駕歷史而再起，李登輝則因誤判歷史、玩弄權力而致自貽伊戚。李登輝在十二年的總統大位上，將自己的權力擴張至極大程度，以致自認可以扭曲歷史，最後卻抵擋不住歷史的反撲，落至一敗塗地；而連戰則在李登輝給他造成的失敗中，且在他自己跌落權力谷底之際，回應歷史，騰駕歷史，儼然成為解嚴後最能影響歷史並創造歷史的卸任政治首長。
且看此時李登輝的喃喃自語，及陳水扁的身繫囹圄，即知政治人物的終極成敗不在曾經擁有多大的權力，而在能夠洞燭歷史、騰駕歷史。
連戰的二○○五年破冰之旅，正是騰駕歷史、創造歷史；胡錦濤對連戰的回應，並將兩岸自此導向「和平發展五願景」，亦是騰駕歷史、創造歷史。連戰因而成為ＡＰＥＣ「領袖代表」的不二人選，此次在海參崴與即將卸任的胡錦濤二人舉行最後一次「元首級」會晤，這是連戰自己創造的歷史，相信未來的兩岸歷史亦將延承二○○五年連胡會的筆路語法繼續寫下去。
回頭看李登輝，此時他已如迷失在歷史重霧中的無頭蒼蠅。他從「國統綱領」，跌到「台獨教父」。他幾乎毀了國民黨（如果不是連戰救起），又挾持陳水扁而毀了民進黨。他說「釣魚台是日本的」，因為他主張「中華民國已不存在」。在二○○七年，李登輝眼看馬英九將當選總統，竟對香港媒體說：「我不是台獨教父，從來沒有主張過台獨。」接著，見到馬政府腳跟不穩，又回頭去抱蔡英文；等到馬連任，兩岸大勢已定，他又說：「喊台獨沒有用。」這正是一隻無頭蒼蠅嗡嗡嗡亂飛的景象。
在李登輝的政治哲學中，顯然認為權力可以強過一切，甚至可以勝過歷史；面對他不喜歡的歷史真貌，他將歷史視為惡龍，而自以為是可使歷史一刀斃命的屠龍者；但連戰的政治哲學顯然不同，他不會想扮演不知量力的屠龍者，而是設法攀上巨龍的脊背，騰駕巨龍，騰駕歷史。如今見到的屠龍者李登輝遍體鱗傷，甚至一再退縮牆角，否認自己是屠龍者；連戰未能屠龍，卻是身手不錯的御龍者，沒有人能否定他為兩岸帶來「和平發展」的御龍效應。
李登輝毀了自己，也幾乎毀了整整一代的台灣藍綠政治菁英，包括陳水扁在內。最後沒有毀在李登輝手下的，大概只有連戰和馬英九二人；而連戰不但從李登輝給他造成的廢墟中再起，甚至將李登輝的失敗化作自己的政治養分，因而為兩岸創造了「和平發展」的契機，馬英九亦在連戰的心血鋪墊上出發。連戰自稱「俯仰無愧」，誰曰不是？
政治人物不可狂妄地玩弄權力，而須明智地騰駕歷史。李登輝曾在現實中一時成功，卻敗於歷史之中；連戰則曾在現實中一時失敗，但成於歷史之中。這是連戰與李登輝留下的歷史對照，也是屠龍者與御龍者的對比。
歷史充滿弔詭。李登輝說：釣魚台是日本的。在未來的歷史中，有一天也許會有人問：李登輝是不是台灣的？
Thursday, September 13, 2012
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
Are Hong Kongers Chinese?
Are Hong Kongers Chinese?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2012
Summary: The Pan Democrats did not do as well as expected. Has Hong Kong's democracy "hit a wall?" Speculation is superfluous. After all, clashes in beliefs, and divisions and reconciliations are to be expected under democracy. They are a necessary learning experience for political parties within a democracy. One thing is worth watching. The student movement has inspired the current generation of students. The younger generation is likely to become the prime mover in the Hong Kong community. The Beijing authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the democrats need to be prepared. Only then will they be ready for the next wave of democratic challenges.
Full Text below:
Hong Kongers' "Oppose National Education" campaign succeeded. But it did not lead to Democratic Party victories at the Legislative Council polls. This paradox is worth pondering. Actually, it is not that difficult to explain. One. This particular student campaign was directed more at the Hong Kong government than at Beijing. Two. Radical elements within the Pan Democrat forces split off and scored victories. This was definitely a result of the student movement. This led to in a shift in the political spectrum. Three. The Legislative Council is not a product of universal suffrage. Four. The Pan Democrats failed to allocate their votes. They won votes but lost seats.
By chance, the "Oppose National Education" campaign coincided with the Legislative Council elections. It revealed Hong Kong's complex social psychology and political dynamics. Following Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997, Hong Kongers wanted assurances their interests would be preserved and that "one country, two systems" would be honored. These motivated demonstrations opposing Article 23 of the Basic Law and supporting the direct election of the Chief Executive. This time the government imposed "moral and national education." Emotionally this was an even more severe assault on Hong Kongers's feelings.
Put simply, the motive for "Moral and National Education" was the sense that Hong Kongers did not identify closely enough wtih Mainland China. Put simply, if one refuses to undergo national education, is one still Chinese? A poll conducted by the University of Hong Kong earlier this year suggests that only 17% of all Hong Kongers consider themselves "Chinese." The survey is controversial. But the Beijing authorities are unhappy with the figure. The anxiety felt by Mainland officials In Hong Kong can be imagined.
The notion that as citizens, one ought to accept National Education is superficially plausible. But Hong Kong primary and secondary schools have long included civics and social studies classes. When it comes to social order and social ethics, can anyone really argue that Hong Kongers take a back seat to Mainlanders? Hong Kong was returned to China fifteen years ago. Does anyone still doubt Hong Kongers' Chinese identity? Is it really necessary to impose outdated notions of patriotism and nationalism on the next generation? Is this progress or retrogression?
The best way to increase Hong Kongers' identification with the Chinese nation, is to enhance the prosperity of Mainland China. Democracy and progress are like the fable "The North Wind and the Sun." Hong Kongers are willing to be Chinese, identify with China, and take pride in being Chinese. But the government has adopted a "North Wind" strategy. It has called for unified teaching guidelines, standard textbooks, and school sanctions against teachers who refuse to cooperate. Such administrative high-handedness is bound to provoke a backlash.
One thing in particular angers Hong Kongers. The Hong Kong Department of Education written lesson guidelines includes numerous teaching examples. One example addresses the national flag. It reads, "When the national flag is raised, I feel truly excited. At such a moment, I feel proud to be Chinese ... My eyes tear up. What an exciting moment!" One young father who participated in the protest said, "Suppose my children read this lesson, then saw me fail to weep during the raising of the five-star flag? Would they report me to the authorities for lack of patriotism?"
Does linking "patriotism" to such details really contribute to a stronger sense of national identity or righteous patriotism? It is highly doubtful. By contrast, when Hong Kongers are asked whether they are "Hong Kongers" or "Chinese," they instinctively answer "Hong Kongers." Does this mean they do not identify with China? Hong Kong culture is different from Mainland culture. Hong Kong was colonized by Great Britain for half a century. Hong Kong is heterogeneous. These facts must be respected. This does not mean Hong Kongers should be perceived as "aliens." This does not mean they should be transformed and remoulded. Why are Hong Kongers not Chinese? Who can say that Hong Kongers are not sufficiently "Chinese?"
Only 17% of Hong Kongers consider themselves "Chinese." Following the "Oppose National Education" demonstrations, can the pro-Bejing establishment retain the upper hand in Legislative Council elections? Beijng probably ought to take a closer look. In recent years, Hong Kongers' "Hong Konger consciousness" has increased. This reflects concerns about the loss of Hong Kong's unique characteristics and autonomy. In response, Beijing ought to make concessions. It ought to give Hong Kongers more space. It should not speculate about their lack of patriotism or attempt to impose improper constraints.
The Pan Democrats did not do as well as expected. Has Hong Kong's democracy "hit a wall?" Speculation is superfluous. After all, clashes in beliefs, and divisions and reconciliations are to be expected under democracy. They are a necessary learning experience for political parties within a democracy. One thing is worth watching. The student movement has inspired the current generation of students. The younger generation is likely to become the prime mover in the Hong Kong community. The Beijing authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the democrats need to be prepared. Only then will they be ready for the next wave of democratic challenges.
香港人是不是中國人？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.12
香港民間「反國教」運動的成功，並未換得民主黨在立法會選舉的勝利，是個值得玩味的現象，但這其實並不難解釋：一，此次學運「反港府」的針對性大於「反北京」；二，泛民派激進勢力的分裂及勝出確受學運催化，導致政治光譜位移；三，立法會畢竟仍非全面普選產生；四，泛民派無配票機制，贏了選票，輸了席次。
反國教學運和立法會選舉的時間碰撞，雖是偶然，卻同樣反映了香港社會人心與政治的錯雜情結。九七回歸後，香港人最在乎的是香港的利益會不會被犧牲，「一國兩制」的承諾有沒有被遵守；先前反基本法廿三條及要求特首直選的大示威，皆是因此而發。而這次港府要強行實施「德育及國民教育科」，在感情上更是嚴重刺痛香港人的心。
簡單地說，「德育及國民教育科」的推動，背後隱含著的基本想像正是：香港人對中國的認同不夠。用口語敘述就成為：不接受國民教育，你還是中國人嗎？今年初，香港大學所發布的一份民調，僅有一成七的香港人自認是「中國人」；雖然調查方式不無爭議，但這個數字讓北京當局感到不快，駐港中國官員的不悅與不安更可想而知。
表面上看，「做為公民，就必須接受國民教育」，似乎是言之成理的說法。但香港中小學自來即有其公民及社會科目，要論社會的秩序井然或公民的倫理規範，誰能說香港的公民素質不如大陸？再說，香港回歸中國已十五年，若至今還在懷疑香港人的中國認同，企圖用老套的愛國主義及民族大義加諸香港的下一代，這是進步還是開倒車？
要加強港人的民族認同，最好的方式其實是提升中國的繁榮、民主與進步；就如同「北風與太陽」的寓言一樣，讓香港人甘願融入，認同以身為中國人為傲。但這次港府採取的卻是「北風」策略，規定統一課綱指引，制定標準教材，並要求學校對拒絕配合的教師祭出處分；這樣的行政高壓手段，當然引起反彈。
而最讓香港人頭皮發麻的，則是港府教育局在課綱指引中所撰寫的若干教學實例。比如，其中一例提到對國旗的感情說：「在國旗升起時，我確實是激動了。這一刻，我感受到作為中國人的自豪……，我的眼眶一下子紅了，多麼振奮人心的時刻！」對此，一個參加示威的年輕父親就難以苟同地說：「如果我的孩子念了這一課，他看到我在升五星旗時沒有流淚，他會不會檢舉我不愛國？」
在學校教育中，「愛國」的價值如果被連繫到如此微小的細節上，是不是真有助於強化民族認同或愛國大義，令人存疑。相對的，當香港民眾被問到自覺是「香港人」或「中國人」時，直覺回答是「香港人」，這難道能作為他不認同中國的反證？香港文化之所以不同於內地，是它被英國殖民一個半世紀所形成；這樣的「異質」是香港的特色，應該給予尊重，而不該視他們為「異類」，企圖用自己的模子來改造他們。為什麼香港人不是中國人？誰有資格說香港人的中國成色不足？
試想，若香港真只有一成七的民眾自認是「中國人」，那麼，歷經這次「反國教」示威，立法會選舉還可能是傾中的建制派居上風的局面嗎？其間虛實，恐怕需要北京更細心咀嚼。近年港人的「香港意識」不斷升高，這反映的是他們擔憂香港特色與自主性的失卻；對此，北京該做的是讓出位置，給港人有足夠的空間，而不是一味猜測他們愛國意識不足而企圖妄加制約。
同樣的，這次泛民主派的表現不如預期，也毋需解讀為香港民主政治已經進入了「撞牆期」。畢竟，在民主過程中，理念的衝撞、分裂與調和都是必經的起伏，也是民主黨派必要的學習經驗。最值得觀察的是，這次學運對學生世代產生了極大的激盪作用，年輕一代極可能成為香港社運動員的新主力；北京、港府或民主派都得及早準備，才可能因應下一波來勢洶洶的民主衝擊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 12, 2012
Summary: The Pan Democrats did not do as well as expected. Has Hong Kong's democracy "hit a wall?" Speculation is superfluous. After all, clashes in beliefs, and divisions and reconciliations are to be expected under democracy. They are a necessary learning experience for political parties within a democracy. One thing is worth watching. The student movement has inspired the current generation of students. The younger generation is likely to become the prime mover in the Hong Kong community. The Beijing authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the democrats need to be prepared. Only then will they be ready for the next wave of democratic challenges.
Full Text below:
Hong Kongers' "Oppose National Education" campaign succeeded. But it did not lead to Democratic Party victories at the Legislative Council polls. This paradox is worth pondering. Actually, it is not that difficult to explain. One. This particular student campaign was directed more at the Hong Kong government than at Beijing. Two. Radical elements within the Pan Democrat forces split off and scored victories. This was definitely a result of the student movement. This led to in a shift in the political spectrum. Three. The Legislative Council is not a product of universal suffrage. Four. The Pan Democrats failed to allocate their votes. They won votes but lost seats.
By chance, the "Oppose National Education" campaign coincided with the Legislative Council elections. It revealed Hong Kong's complex social psychology and political dynamics. Following Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997, Hong Kongers wanted assurances their interests would be preserved and that "one country, two systems" would be honored. These motivated demonstrations opposing Article 23 of the Basic Law and supporting the direct election of the Chief Executive. This time the government imposed "moral and national education." Emotionally this was an even more severe assault on Hong Kongers's feelings.
Put simply, the motive for "Moral and National Education" was the sense that Hong Kongers did not identify closely enough wtih Mainland China. Put simply, if one refuses to undergo national education, is one still Chinese? A poll conducted by the University of Hong Kong earlier this year suggests that only 17% of all Hong Kongers consider themselves "Chinese." The survey is controversial. But the Beijing authorities are unhappy with the figure. The anxiety felt by Mainland officials In Hong Kong can be imagined.
The notion that as citizens, one ought to accept National Education is superficially plausible. But Hong Kong primary and secondary schools have long included civics and social studies classes. When it comes to social order and social ethics, can anyone really argue that Hong Kongers take a back seat to Mainlanders? Hong Kong was returned to China fifteen years ago. Does anyone still doubt Hong Kongers' Chinese identity? Is it really necessary to impose outdated notions of patriotism and nationalism on the next generation? Is this progress or retrogression?
The best way to increase Hong Kongers' identification with the Chinese nation, is to enhance the prosperity of Mainland China. Democracy and progress are like the fable "The North Wind and the Sun." Hong Kongers are willing to be Chinese, identify with China, and take pride in being Chinese. But the government has adopted a "North Wind" strategy. It has called for unified teaching guidelines, standard textbooks, and school sanctions against teachers who refuse to cooperate. Such administrative high-handedness is bound to provoke a backlash.
One thing in particular angers Hong Kongers. The Hong Kong Department of Education written lesson guidelines includes numerous teaching examples. One example addresses the national flag. It reads, "When the national flag is raised, I feel truly excited. At such a moment, I feel proud to be Chinese ... My eyes tear up. What an exciting moment!" One young father who participated in the protest said, "Suppose my children read this lesson, then saw me fail to weep during the raising of the five-star flag? Would they report me to the authorities for lack of patriotism?"
Does linking "patriotism" to such details really contribute to a stronger sense of national identity or righteous patriotism? It is highly doubtful. By contrast, when Hong Kongers are asked whether they are "Hong Kongers" or "Chinese," they instinctively answer "Hong Kongers." Does this mean they do not identify with China? Hong Kong culture is different from Mainland culture. Hong Kong was colonized by Great Britain for half a century. Hong Kong is heterogeneous. These facts must be respected. This does not mean Hong Kongers should be perceived as "aliens." This does not mean they should be transformed and remoulded. Why are Hong Kongers not Chinese? Who can say that Hong Kongers are not sufficiently "Chinese?"
Only 17% of Hong Kongers consider themselves "Chinese." Following the "Oppose National Education" demonstrations, can the pro-Bejing establishment retain the upper hand in Legislative Council elections? Beijng probably ought to take a closer look. In recent years, Hong Kongers' "Hong Konger consciousness" has increased. This reflects concerns about the loss of Hong Kong's unique characteristics and autonomy. In response, Beijing ought to make concessions. It ought to give Hong Kongers more space. It should not speculate about their lack of patriotism or attempt to impose improper constraints.
The Pan Democrats did not do as well as expected. Has Hong Kong's democracy "hit a wall?" Speculation is superfluous. After all, clashes in beliefs, and divisions and reconciliations are to be expected under democracy. They are a necessary learning experience for political parties within a democracy. One thing is worth watching. The student movement has inspired the current generation of students. The younger generation is likely to become the prime mover in the Hong Kong community. The Beijing authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the democrats need to be prepared. Only then will they be ready for the next wave of democratic challenges.
香港人是不是中國人？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.12
香港民間「反國教」運動的成功，並未換得民主黨在立法會選舉的勝利，是個值得玩味的現象，但這其實並不難解釋：一，此次學運「反港府」的針對性大於「反北京」；二，泛民派激進勢力的分裂及勝出確受學運催化，導致政治光譜位移；三，立法會畢竟仍非全面普選產生；四，泛民派無配票機制，贏了選票，輸了席次。
反國教學運和立法會選舉的時間碰撞，雖是偶然，卻同樣反映了香港社會人心與政治的錯雜情結。九七回歸後，香港人最在乎的是香港的利益會不會被犧牲，「一國兩制」的承諾有沒有被遵守；先前反基本法廿三條及要求特首直選的大示威，皆是因此而發。而這次港府要強行實施「德育及國民教育科」，在感情上更是嚴重刺痛香港人的心。
簡單地說，「德育及國民教育科」的推動，背後隱含著的基本想像正是：香港人對中國的認同不夠。用口語敘述就成為：不接受國民教育，你還是中國人嗎？今年初，香港大學所發布的一份民調，僅有一成七的香港人自認是「中國人」；雖然調查方式不無爭議，但這個數字讓北京當局感到不快，駐港中國官員的不悅與不安更可想而知。
表面上看，「做為公民，就必須接受國民教育」，似乎是言之成理的說法。但香港中小學自來即有其公民及社會科目，要論社會的秩序井然或公民的倫理規範，誰能說香港的公民素質不如大陸？再說，香港回歸中國已十五年，若至今還在懷疑香港人的中國認同，企圖用老套的愛國主義及民族大義加諸香港的下一代，這是進步還是開倒車？
要加強港人的民族認同，最好的方式其實是提升中國的繁榮、民主與進步；就如同「北風與太陽」的寓言一樣，讓香港人甘願融入，認同以身為中國人為傲。但這次港府採取的卻是「北風」策略，規定統一課綱指引，制定標準教材，並要求學校對拒絕配合的教師祭出處分；這樣的行政高壓手段，當然引起反彈。
而最讓香港人頭皮發麻的，則是港府教育局在課綱指引中所撰寫的若干教學實例。比如，其中一例提到對國旗的感情說：「在國旗升起時，我確實是激動了。這一刻，我感受到作為中國人的自豪……，我的眼眶一下子紅了，多麼振奮人心的時刻！」對此，一個參加示威的年輕父親就難以苟同地說：「如果我的孩子念了這一課，他看到我在升五星旗時沒有流淚，他會不會檢舉我不愛國？」
在學校教育中，「愛國」的價值如果被連繫到如此微小的細節上，是不是真有助於強化民族認同或愛國大義，令人存疑。相對的，當香港民眾被問到自覺是「香港人」或「中國人」時，直覺回答是「香港人」，這難道能作為他不認同中國的反證？香港文化之所以不同於內地，是它被英國殖民一個半世紀所形成；這樣的「異質」是香港的特色，應該給予尊重，而不該視他們為「異類」，企圖用自己的模子來改造他們。為什麼香港人不是中國人？誰有資格說香港人的中國成色不足？
試想，若香港真只有一成七的民眾自認是「中國人」，那麼，歷經這次「反國教」示威，立法會選舉還可能是傾中的建制派居上風的局面嗎？其間虛實，恐怕需要北京更細心咀嚼。近年港人的「香港意識」不斷升高，這反映的是他們擔憂香港特色與自主性的失卻；對此，北京該做的是讓出位置，給港人有足夠的空間，而不是一味猜測他們愛國意識不足而企圖妄加制約。
同樣的，這次泛民主派的表現不如預期，也毋需解讀為香港民主政治已經進入了「撞牆期」。畢竟，在民主過程中，理念的衝撞、分裂與調和都是必經的起伏，也是民主黨派必要的學習經驗。最值得觀察的是，這次學運對學生世代產生了極大的激盪作用，年輕一代極可能成為香港社運動員的新主力；北京、港府或民主派都得及早準備，才可能因應下一波來勢洶洶的民主衝擊。
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
The Door is Locked from the Inside: Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP
The Door is Locked from the Inside:
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2012
Summary: The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
Full Text below:
Beginning today, the DPP will hold a four week long forum on Mainland issues. It has invited "all parties" to discuss cross-Strait issues. Rumors are today's topic will be "A Focus on the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress."
The DPP has been clamoring for months about a "Great [Mainland] China Policy Debate." If all that hoopla has come down to this, then it was a colossal joke.
The DPP boasted that the policy debate would be thoroughgoing. Outsiders expected such a debate. Yet suddenly we were told this ostensibly thoroughgoing debate would focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress? The DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. The DPP says it wants to resolve its Mainland China policy. But how does having "all parties" banging on the DPP's door from outside do any good? The DPP has fastened a lock to the door and injected superglue into the keyhole. We hope the DPP can somehow manage to open the lock. Su Tseng-chang admits he cannot unlock the door from the inside. He does not even have the guts to call for a Mainland China policy debate inside the party. Instead he went through the motions of "seeking out different parties to focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress." This was simply staggering. One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.
Every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows that the DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. Su Tseng-chang knows this as well. Su Tseng-chang may be afraid to launch either an open or closed-door policy debate on Mainland China policy within the DPP. But he should at least coordinate with Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. The trio should be able to offer a cross-Strait policy that is confident, open, and well thought out. The trio could coordinate their rhetoric and their action. They could spearhead the transformation of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They could open the door that has been locked from the inside.
The current situation is clear. Su and Tsai intend to run for president in 2016. Frank Hsieh on the other hand, wants to be the chief engineer of cross-Strait policy transition. As a result Su, Tsai, and Hsieh all want to transform the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Each of the three is a key figure who can influence the situation. But Su and Tsai will be political rivals in 2016. The two hope to benefit from the transformation. But neither wishes to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Each may want the other to take the lead in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. That way when the other offends the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, he or she can benefit from the other's troubles. As a result, these two may be reluctant to lead the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. After all, opposition from Taiwan independence fundamentalists caused Frank Hsieh's "Cross-Strait Affairs Committee" to run aground.
This is the fundamental reason for the DPP's current predicament. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh are key figures in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. They are irreplaceable. But each has a hidden agenda. They cannot work together. The door is locked from the inside. Who is going to open it?
Consider current political developments. On the one hand, the prospects for the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016 are improving. On the other hand, the DPP must establish better relations with Beijing. Voter anxiety over this matter cannot be ignored. Suppose the current situation persists. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins the presidential election in 2016. Suppose it is unable to transform its cross-Strait policy before the election. Once the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will immediately become Beijing's hostage. Beijing will demand that the DPP explicitly renounce Taiwan independence, and reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP refuses, Beijing will make life impossible for the DPP. It need only lure away one of Taipei's diplomatic allies, cut Mainland tourists to Taiwan by 20%, reduce orders for Taiwan's agricultural products, or refuse to sign an FTA. The ruling DPP regime would soon be in total chaos.
The Ma administration's record since its re-election in 2012 has been less than stellar. Fortunately the Ma administration has been able to stabilize cross-Strait relations. Otherwise the chaos would be unimagineable. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen had been elected in 2012. The DPP would still be wrangling over a "Cross-Strait Dialogue Working Group." Imagine the chaos that would have ensued.
The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more it must change is cross-Strait policy. The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more concerned voters will be about its cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012. The main reason was swing voters' deep rooted suspicions about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. The DPP will continue to face these problems in 2016. Neither Su nor Tsai can avoid them.
Su and Tsai may not like each other. But the two must work together to transform of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must not attempt to use the transformation to take political advantage of each other. If the transformation is successful, it will be beneficial to both of them during the 2016 election. It will also be beneficial to one of them in the event one or the other is elected. The two can refuse to work together. The two can watch each other from the sidelines. Each can hope that the other becomes trapped in a quagmire. But if they refuse to work together, the hoped for DPP transformation will evaporate into thin air. The result will be unfavorable to the presidential ambitions of both candidates. It will be especially unfavorable to the DPP in the event it returns to power. It may even become one of Taiwan's greatest political and economic disasters.
Frank Hsieh is a DPP insider. He is the one closest to this locked door. He holds the keys that can open the door. He says Taiwan independence is impossible. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China. His rhetoric may require closer scrutiny. But he already has three of the four numbers to a four digit combination lock. Su and Tsai may find it difficult to unlock the door on their own. But they can arrive at a tacit agreement and allow Frank Hsieh to enter the final number to the combination.
The situation is clear. Beijing intends to force the DPP to abandon Taiwan independence. Until it does, it has no intention of letting up. DPP leaders such as Frank Hsieh know that Taiwan independence is impossible. This is the last number in the combination. This is the number that every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows by heart. The problem is the DPP's door is locked from the inside. Can Su, Tsai, and Hsieh work together to open the door? If the door cannot be opened, then the DPP cannot get out. Su and Tsai of course, cannot either.
The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
門是從裡面鎖死：籲蘇蔡謝共赴民黨轉型工程
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.11
民進黨今起連續四周在周二舉辦中國問題座談會，邀約「各方人士」討論兩岸議題，據謂今日首場的主題將「聚焦中共十八大」。
這若就是民進黨喧嚷了幾個月的「中國政策大辯論」，直可令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非。
首先，民進黨內原本宣示的，及外界原本期待的，應是一場穿骨入髓的「中國政策大辯論」，怎會突然抽樑換柱成了「聚焦中共十八大」？再者，民進黨兩岸政策的大門其實是從裡面鎖死的，若要解決其中國政策的困局，找來「各方人士」從門外敲敲打打有何用？只能寄望民進黨人從門裡設法打開被三秒膠堵死的大鎖。如今，蘇貞昌擺明了沒有能力從裡面開鎖，甚至連在黨內進行中國政策大辯論的膽識都沒有，居然以「找各方人士聚焦中共十八大」來敷衍形勢，豈不令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非？
每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知，民進黨兩岸政策的大門是從裡面鎖死的，當然蘇貞昌亦不會不知。蘇貞昌如果不敢在民進黨內發動公開的或閉門的中國政策大辯論，他至少亦應設法與蔡英文及謝長廷共三人，一同就兩岸政策進行推心置腹、開誠佈公的深刻研議，然後在三人協調的論述及三人協調的行動下，共同帶動民進黨兩岸政策的大轉型，從裡面打開那扇鎖死的大門。
當下的情勢很清楚，蘇蔡皆有意競逐二○一六總統，謝長廷則以兩岸政策轉型總工程師自許；因而，蘇蔡謝三人皆願見民進黨的兩岸政策轉型，且皆是影響情勢的關鍵人物。但是，由於蘇蔡的二○一六之爭，兩人雖皆期待轉型之利，卻又不希望得罪獨派，甚至皆希望對方因主導轉型而開罪獨派以收漁翁之利，以致兩人在轉型工程上均有所顧忌，又因獨派反對而使謝長廷出掌「兩岸事務委員會」亦告觸礁。
這正是民進黨今日困局的根本原由：因為蘇蔡謝三人皆是在轉型工程上不可取代的關鍵人物，如今三人卻各懷鬼胎，不能同心協力，這扇從裡頭鎖死的大門還能盼誰來打開？
就政局發展來看，一方面民進黨在二○一六總統選舉的情勢漸趨看好，另一方面民進黨對於不能改善與北京關係的焦慮更已無法掩飾。此一局勢發展下去，民進黨倘在二○一六贏得選舉，而在選前不能做好兩岸政策的轉型工程；一旦民進黨執政，即勢將立即落入北京的挾持之中。屆時，民進黨若不接受「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」的立場，北京只消拿掉台灣一個邦交國，或減少二十％陸客來台，或抽掉幾張台灣農特產訂單，或杯葛一下ＦＴＡ，就可讓民進黨政權鬧得內外難以收拾。
國民黨馬政府贏得二○一二年連任以來的表現欠佳，但平實而言，幸好馬政府尚能穩住兩岸這一塊，否則國家亂局必更難以想像。倘若二○一二是由民進黨的蔡英文當選，現在兩岸恐怕仍在因「兩岸對話工作小組」而鬧得不可開交，那種亂局豈能想像？
民進黨愈有趨近重新執政的可能性，愈應及早調整其兩岸政策；而愈接近民進黨有執政可能之時，選民對其兩岸政策必愈加關切。蔡英文在二○一二敗選的主因，正是緣於中間選民對民進黨的兩岸政策深具疑懼。這是民進黨在二○一六總統大選時仍將面對的問題，無論蘇蔡皆無以逃避。
所以，無論蘇蔡如何不喜歡對方，二人仍應同心協力帶動民進黨兩岸政策的轉型工程；而切切不應以轉型工程來相互牽制。因為，轉型若成功，對二人之競選二○一六總統必有利，亦對倘若當選後之執政也有利；倘若不此之圖，二人相互觀望，甚至希望對方能陷溺於轉型的泥淖中，如此必終導致轉型成為泡影，這對兩人的競選之路不利，尤對倘若當選後執政大不利，甚至必會演成為台灣的政經大災禍。
謝長廷是民進黨內最接近從裡面鎖死的大門者，他手中所持鑰匙也是最有開鎖可能者。他說，台獨不可行，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到中華民國；這些論述，雖然尚多可以細究之處，但如果是要開號碼鎖的話，四個數碼可謂大概已對中了三個。蘇蔡二人皆有不能自己打一把鑰匙去開鎖的難處，但只要能形成挺謝的默契，就讓謝長廷去轉動那開鎖的最後一字密碼吧。
情勢很清楚。北京不將民進黨逼到放棄台獨的地步，不會鬆手；而民進黨人如謝長廷者亦皆知，台獨不可行。這就是開鎖的最後一字密碼，這也是每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知的密碼；只是民進黨的大門是從裡面鎖死的，但看蘇蔡謝三人能否在這一次的機遇中合力共同打開。門打不開，民進黨就走不出去，蘇蔡當然亦走不出去。
北京的兩岸政策三元素是：「反對台獨／九二共識／一中框架」；台灣的對策則應是：「一中憲法／一中各表（一個中國是中華民國）／大屋頂中國（中華民國是民主中國）」。民進黨若想迎對二○一六的新局，必須先打開從裡面鎖死的大門。
Su, Tsai, and Hsieh Must Reform the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 11, 2012
Summary: The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
Full Text below:
Beginning today, the DPP will hold a four week long forum on Mainland issues. It has invited "all parties" to discuss cross-Strait issues. Rumors are today's topic will be "A Focus on the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress."
The DPP has been clamoring for months about a "Great [Mainland] China Policy Debate." If all that hoopla has come down to this, then it was a colossal joke.
The DPP boasted that the policy debate would be thoroughgoing. Outsiders expected such a debate. Yet suddenly we were told this ostensibly thoroughgoing debate would focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress? The DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. The DPP says it wants to resolve its Mainland China policy. But how does having "all parties" banging on the DPP's door from outside do any good? The DPP has fastened a lock to the door and injected superglue into the keyhole. We hope the DPP can somehow manage to open the lock. Su Tseng-chang admits he cannot unlock the door from the inside. He does not even have the guts to call for a Mainland China policy debate inside the party. Instead he went through the motions of "seeking out different parties to focus on the CCP's 18th Party Congress." This was simply staggering. One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.
Every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows that the DPP's cross-Strait policy door is locked from the inside. Su Tseng-chang knows this as well. Su Tseng-chang may be afraid to launch either an open or closed-door policy debate on Mainland China policy within the DPP. But he should at least coordinate with Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh. The trio should be able to offer a cross-Strait policy that is confident, open, and well thought out. The trio could coordinate their rhetoric and their action. They could spearhead the transformation of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They could open the door that has been locked from the inside.
The current situation is clear. Su and Tsai intend to run for president in 2016. Frank Hsieh on the other hand, wants to be the chief engineer of cross-Strait policy transition. As a result Su, Tsai, and Hsieh all want to transform the DPP's cross-Strait policy. Each of the three is a key figure who can influence the situation. But Su and Tsai will be political rivals in 2016. The two hope to benefit from the transformation. But neither wishes to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Each may want the other to take the lead in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. That way when the other offends the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, he or she can benefit from the other's troubles. As a result, these two may be reluctant to lead the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. After all, opposition from Taiwan independence fundamentalists caused Frank Hsieh's "Cross-Strait Affairs Committee" to run aground.
This is the fundamental reason for the DPP's current predicament. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh are key figures in the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. They are irreplaceable. But each has a hidden agenda. They cannot work together. The door is locked from the inside. Who is going to open it?
Consider current political developments. On the one hand, the prospects for the Democratic Progressive Party in 2016 are improving. On the other hand, the DPP must establish better relations with Beijing. Voter anxiety over this matter cannot be ignored. Suppose the current situation persists. Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party wins the presidential election in 2016. Suppose it is unable to transform its cross-Strait policy before the election. Once the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will immediately become Beijing's hostage. Beijing will demand that the DPP explicitly renounce Taiwan independence, and reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP refuses, Beijing will make life impossible for the DPP. It need only lure away one of Taipei's diplomatic allies, cut Mainland tourists to Taiwan by 20%, reduce orders for Taiwan's agricultural products, or refuse to sign an FTA. The ruling DPP regime would soon be in total chaos.
The Ma administration's record since its re-election in 2012 has been less than stellar. Fortunately the Ma administration has been able to stabilize cross-Strait relations. Otherwise the chaos would be unimagineable. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen had been elected in 2012. The DPP would still be wrangling over a "Cross-Strait Dialogue Working Group." Imagine the chaos that would have ensued.
The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more it must change is cross-Strait policy. The closer the DPP comes to returning to power, the more concerned voters will be about its cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen lost in 2012. The main reason was swing voters' deep rooted suspicions about the DPP's cross-Strait policy. The DPP will continue to face these problems in 2016. Neither Su nor Tsai can avoid them.
Su and Tsai may not like each other. But the two must work together to transform of the DPP's cross-Strait policy. They must not attempt to use the transformation to take political advantage of each other. If the transformation is successful, it will be beneficial to both of them during the 2016 election. It will also be beneficial to one of them in the event one or the other is elected. The two can refuse to work together. The two can watch each other from the sidelines. Each can hope that the other becomes trapped in a quagmire. But if they refuse to work together, the hoped for DPP transformation will evaporate into thin air. The result will be unfavorable to the presidential ambitions of both candidates. It will be especially unfavorable to the DPP in the event it returns to power. It may even become one of Taiwan's greatest political and economic disasters.
Frank Hsieh is a DPP insider. He is the one closest to this locked door. He holds the keys that can open the door. He says Taiwan independence is impossible. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. He says the DPP must reaffirm the Republic of China. His rhetoric may require closer scrutiny. But he already has three of the four numbers to a four digit combination lock. Su and Tsai may find it difficult to unlock the door on their own. But they can arrive at a tacit agreement and allow Frank Hsieh to enter the final number to the combination.
The situation is clear. Beijing intends to force the DPP to abandon Taiwan independence. Until it does, it has no intention of letting up. DPP leaders such as Frank Hsieh know that Taiwan independence is impossible. This is the last number in the combination. This is the number that every DPP member and every person on Taiwan knows by heart. The problem is the DPP's door is locked from the inside. Can Su, Tsai, and Hsieh work together to open the door? If the door cannot be opened, then the DPP cannot get out. Su and Tsai of course, cannot either.
The three elements of Beijing's cross-Strait policy are opposition to Taiwan independence, reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and reaffirmation of the one China framework. Taipei's comeback must be the one China Constitution, one China, different interpretations, i.e., one China equals the Republic of China, the Big Roof Concept of China, i.e., the ROC is a democratic China. If the DPP wants to return to power in 2016, it must first open the locked door from the inside.
門是從裡面鎖死：籲蘇蔡謝共赴民黨轉型工程
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.11
民進黨今起連續四周在周二舉辦中國問題座談會，邀約「各方人士」討論兩岸議題，據謂今日首場的主題將「聚焦中共十八大」。
這若就是民進黨喧嚷了幾個月的「中國政策大辯論」，直可令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非。
首先，民進黨內原本宣示的，及外界原本期待的，應是一場穿骨入髓的「中國政策大辯論」，怎會突然抽樑換柱成了「聚焦中共十八大」？再者，民進黨兩岸政策的大門其實是從裡面鎖死的，若要解決其中國政策的困局，找來「各方人士」從門外敲敲打打有何用？只能寄望民進黨人從門裡設法打開被三秒膠堵死的大鎖。如今，蘇貞昌擺明了沒有能力從裡面開鎖，甚至連在黨內進行中國政策大辯論的膽識都沒有，居然以「找各方人士聚焦中共十八大」來敷衍形勢，豈不令人瞠目結舌，啼笑皆非？
每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知，民進黨兩岸政策的大門是從裡面鎖死的，當然蘇貞昌亦不會不知。蘇貞昌如果不敢在民進黨內發動公開的或閉門的中國政策大辯論，他至少亦應設法與蔡英文及謝長廷共三人，一同就兩岸政策進行推心置腹、開誠佈公的深刻研議，然後在三人協調的論述及三人協調的行動下，共同帶動民進黨兩岸政策的大轉型，從裡面打開那扇鎖死的大門。
當下的情勢很清楚，蘇蔡皆有意競逐二○一六總統，謝長廷則以兩岸政策轉型總工程師自許；因而，蘇蔡謝三人皆願見民進黨的兩岸政策轉型，且皆是影響情勢的關鍵人物。但是，由於蘇蔡的二○一六之爭，兩人雖皆期待轉型之利，卻又不希望得罪獨派，甚至皆希望對方因主導轉型而開罪獨派以收漁翁之利，以致兩人在轉型工程上均有所顧忌，又因獨派反對而使謝長廷出掌「兩岸事務委員會」亦告觸礁。
這正是民進黨今日困局的根本原由：因為蘇蔡謝三人皆是在轉型工程上不可取代的關鍵人物，如今三人卻各懷鬼胎，不能同心協力，這扇從裡頭鎖死的大門還能盼誰來打開？
就政局發展來看，一方面民進黨在二○一六總統選舉的情勢漸趨看好，另一方面民進黨對於不能改善與北京關係的焦慮更已無法掩飾。此一局勢發展下去，民進黨倘在二○一六贏得選舉，而在選前不能做好兩岸政策的轉型工程；一旦民進黨執政，即勢將立即落入北京的挾持之中。屆時，民進黨若不接受「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」的立場，北京只消拿掉台灣一個邦交國，或減少二十％陸客來台，或抽掉幾張台灣農特產訂單，或杯葛一下ＦＴＡ，就可讓民進黨政權鬧得內外難以收拾。
國民黨馬政府贏得二○一二年連任以來的表現欠佳，但平實而言，幸好馬政府尚能穩住兩岸這一塊，否則國家亂局必更難以想像。倘若二○一二是由民進黨的蔡英文當選，現在兩岸恐怕仍在因「兩岸對話工作小組」而鬧得不可開交，那種亂局豈能想像？
民進黨愈有趨近重新執政的可能性，愈應及早調整其兩岸政策；而愈接近民進黨有執政可能之時，選民對其兩岸政策必愈加關切。蔡英文在二○一二敗選的主因，正是緣於中間選民對民進黨的兩岸政策深具疑懼。這是民進黨在二○一六總統大選時仍將面對的問題，無論蘇蔡皆無以逃避。
所以，無論蘇蔡如何不喜歡對方，二人仍應同心協力帶動民進黨兩岸政策的轉型工程；而切切不應以轉型工程來相互牽制。因為，轉型若成功，對二人之競選二○一六總統必有利，亦對倘若當選後之執政也有利；倘若不此之圖，二人相互觀望，甚至希望對方能陷溺於轉型的泥淖中，如此必終導致轉型成為泡影，這對兩人的競選之路不利，尤對倘若當選後執政大不利，甚至必會演成為台灣的政經大災禍。
謝長廷是民進黨內最接近從裡面鎖死的大門者，他手中所持鑰匙也是最有開鎖可能者。他說，台獨不可行，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到中華民國；這些論述，雖然尚多可以細究之處，但如果是要開號碼鎖的話，四個數碼可謂大概已對中了三個。蘇蔡二人皆有不能自己打一把鑰匙去開鎖的難處，但只要能形成挺謝的默契，就讓謝長廷去轉動那開鎖的最後一字密碼吧。
情勢很清楚。北京不將民進黨逼到放棄台獨的地步，不會鬆手；而民進黨人如謝長廷者亦皆知，台獨不可行。這就是開鎖的最後一字密碼，這也是每一個民進黨人及每一個台灣人皆知的密碼；只是民進黨的大門是從裡面鎖死的，但看蘇蔡謝三人能否在這一次的機遇中合力共同打開。門打不開，民進黨就走不出去，蘇蔡當然亦走不出去。
北京的兩岸政策三元素是：「反對台獨／九二共識／一中框架」；台灣的對策則應是：「一中憲法／一中各表（一個中國是中華民國）／大屋頂中國（中華民國是民主中國）」。民進黨若想迎對二○一六的新局，必須先打開從裡面鎖死的大門。
Monday, September 10, 2012
Big Roof China: Democratic China and Socialist China
Big Roof China: Democratic China and Socialist China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 10, 2012
Summary: We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
Full Text below:
On August 15, The Chi Feng 2 departed from Hong Kong and reached the Diaoyutai Islands. The passengers carried with them red, white, and blue ROC flags and five star PRC flags. They waved these flags on the islands to dramatic effect. The next day Mainland media organizations outdid each other reporting the story. Sad to say, most of them useds PhotoShop to edit out the red, white, and blue ROC flag. This provoked a backlash from netizens on the Mainland. The two images, one with the ROC flag and one without, are worth contemplating. This is true for ROC officials and civilians alike.
Diaoyutai Island Defense Movement activists from Hong Kong took both the red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag with them to the islands. At first, people were surprised. But it did not take long before they understood. Hong Kong is located in the Pearl River estuary. It has witnessed two centuries of vicissitudes. It long ago transcended allegiance to either side. During the 50s and 60s, prior to its 1997 return to the Mainland, the streets of Hong Kong were often festooned with ROC flags on Double Ten National Day. To this day, the values held in Hong Kong are closer to those held on Taiwan than on the Mainland. The red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands by private individuals from Hong Kong. They were not using the ROC national flag to "promote Chinese reunification." Their actions merely reflect the deep affection the people of Hong Kong feel for the ROC flag.
Mainland newspapers "airbrushed" the red, white, and blue ROC flag from the photograph of the Diaoyutai Islands landing. Mainland netizens denounced the newspapers' actions as "bogus" and "shameless." Later, one newspaper published a solemn apology. It acknowledged that it "hurt the feelings of readers." It acknowledged that "as a member of the Fourth Estate, it should never have allowed this to happen. When referring to the ROC, Mainland newspapers generally add scare quotes to "president," "Executive Yuan," and "legislators." This is another form of "airbrushing." After all, these government offices and government entities do exist on Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the Global Times, a sister publication of the People's Daily, published the photograph intact. It refrained from editing out the red, white, and blue ROC flag.
We must not exaggerate the significance of these two images. We must also acknowledge that the problem is one both sides share. Do citizens of the ROC realize the importance of the ROC to people on the Mainland and Hong Kong? Do citizens of the ROC realize they must make a place for the ROC in the hearts of people on the Mainland and Hong Kong?
The ROC government should stop saying that it "has no intention of joining forces with the Mainland against Japan" on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. It should use the issue as leverage. It should use the Diaoyutai Islands issue to steer cross-Strait relations in the right direction. President Ma proposed "three bilateral talks and one trilateral talk." By doing so he avoided tying his own hands. He avoided having to deny that he was joining forces with the Mainland against Japan. He implied the possibility of a "big roof" encompassing both Taiwan and the Mainland.
During the Cold War, the Republic of China referred to itself as "Free China." Actually, under martial law, Taiwan was not all that free. But it was free compared to the Mainland, with its protracted political struggles. Compared to the Mainland, society on Taiwan was imbued with a sense of justice, honor, even mission. It championed the idea of the "Three Peoples Principles unifying China." But the world changed, and the nation with it. The very concept of "China" has become anathema on Taiwan. This happened because when it comes to cross-Strait relations, people on Taiwan have lost confidence in themselves. They may even have lost their sense of self-esteem. Now when people from Hong Kong proudly carry the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands, some people on Taiwan denounce them for "promoting Chinese reunification." Some people on Taiwan are afraid to compete with Beijing in defending the Diaoyutai Islands. Worse, they they are afraid even to accept a goodwill gesture from private citizens from Hong Kong, who proudly carried the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands from Hong Kong. Under such circumstances, how can one not despair?
Two decades of Taiwan independence indoctrination have undermined the concept of "Free China." Meanwhile however, Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore citizens of the Republic of China must attempt to establish a Chinese identity that people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland can identify with.
As mentioned before, during the 50s and 60s, the Republic of China positioned itself as "Free China." It was not quite as free as the name implied. But today's Republic of China is unquestionably a "democratic China." It has the name. It also has the game. It can gain the respect of people from Hong Kong, overseas, and the Mainland.
People from Hong Kong proudly carried the red, white, and blue ROC flag with them to the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland netizens angrily denounced Mainland newspapers for airbrushing the ROC flag out of Mainland news photos. This tells us that if citizens of the Republic of China want a solution to the cross-Strait stalemate, the answer is not to beg Uncle Sam. The answer is not to provoke Beijing. The answer is to appeal to the conscience and goodwill of Chinese people wherever they may be.
We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
On August 15, based on the "big roof" concept, two flags were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands. One represented the ROC and democracy. The other represented the PRC and socialism. Together they represent the political thinking of most Chinese.
We must continue to shout out loud, "The Republic of China is a democratic China." If we do we will eventually win most Chinese the world over. But if we lack the courage to shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China," then no one will be able to prevent us from being airbrushed out of existence.
大屋頂中國：民主中國與社會主義中國
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.10
八月十五日，香港「啟豐二號」登上釣魚台，諸人分別擎持一幅青天白日滿地紅國旗及一幅五星國旗，場面極具震撼效果；隔日，中國大陸媒體競相報導，但大都以ＰＳ（修圖）軟體將青天白日滿地紅旗遮去，引發大陸網民質疑。這兩個場景，值得台灣朝野深思。
香港保釣人士擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，令人第一眼覺得意外，但也立即就能產生會心的理解。因為，位於珠江口的香港，看盡兩岸百餘年滄桑，早有一種超越兩岸的眼光；何況，在一九九七回歸大陸以前，香港在上世紀五○、六○年代，曾是街頭巷尾在雙十節掛滿青天白日滿地紅旗的城市；一直到現在，在價值信念上，香港人民與台灣的心理距離仍近過大陸。青天白日滿地紅旗登上釣島，應非港人「利用中華民國國旗為統戰工具」，而是一定程度地反映了這面國旗在港人心中的位置。
大陸報紙將登島照片「修去」青天白日滿地紅旗，被大陸網民指為「造假，無恥」；事後，一家報紙鄭重刊出道歉啟事，自承「傷害了讀者的感情」、「做為負責任的媒體，不應發生這樣的錯誤」。網民並指出，大陸報刊將台灣的「總統」、「行政院」、「立法委員」皆加引號，這是另一種「ＰＳ」，因為這些官銜及機構在台灣皆實際存在。值得注意的是，《人民日報》的姊妹報《環球時報》，當日刊出了完整的全圖，未修掉青天白日滿地紅旗。
不宜過度放大這兩個場景的意義，但應當感知二者反映的共同問題是：中華民國是否理解自己在大陸人民或香港人民心中的地位？或者，中華民國是否知道應當努力在大陸人民或香港人民的心中尋找一個地位及建立一個地位？
以釣魚台問題而言，台灣其實不必一再宣示「無意與大陸聯手對抗日本」，而可借力使力，藉釣島問題來導正兩岸關係。直至馬總統提出台陸日「三組雙邊對話到一組三邊協商」，始跳脫了「無意兩岸聯手」的自縛手腳，導引出「大屋頂中國」的想像空間。
在上世紀五○、六○冷戰年代，中華民國曾自稱「自由中國」；其實，當時台灣處在戒嚴時期，並非真正「自由」。但與長期陷於政治鬥爭運動的大陸相比，當時的台灣社會卻有一種正義感與光榮感，甚至有一種對整個「中國」的使命感，而有「三民主義統一中國」的倡議；然而，隨著世局國情的推移變化，「中國」漸漸成為台灣避忌的對象，這反映出台灣在處理兩岸關係上已經失去了自信，甚至喪失了自尊。如今，港人擎旗上島，竟然指為「統戰」；這非但是不敢與北京爭保釣行動的地位，更簡直是連民間擎青天白日滿地紅國旗登島的善意也嚇得不敢領受了。此情此景，豈能不使人觸目神傷。
近二十年的台獨狂飆，使得台灣喪盡當年「自由中國」的志氣；然而，如今台獨已完全不可能，中華民國終究必須在台灣人、香港人、大陸人及全球華人的「中國概念」中找到頂天立地的立足之地。
如前所述，上世紀五○、六○年代，中華民國以「自由中國」在兩岸間定位，其實未必名實相副；然而，今日的中華民國難道不能也不敢以「民主中國」的旗幟在兩岸間定位？倘能如此，這不但是名副其實，應也能逐漸獲得香港人、海外華人及大陸人民的接納與珍惜。
從香港人擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，及大陸網民指責報紙ＰＳ，或許可以看出，中華民國欲在兩岸的困局中找出路，不在求美國，也未必在與北京政權角力，而可能要在全體華人的良知及善意中激發共鳴並找到位置。
但是，首先中華民國要大聲說出，「中華民國是民主中國」；唯有說得愈大聲，才愈能激發全球華人的思考與接納；而當愈多的華人能思考與接納，則「中華民國是民主中國」的地位也將愈真實也愈穩固。這才是「一中各表」戰略的真正實踐。
八月十五日，兩幅國旗，同登釣島；在「大屋頂中國」的概念下，一幅是代表「民主中國」的中華民國國旗，一幅是代表「社會主義中國」的中華人民共和國國旗，這可視為多數華人心中的政治思維之反映。
只要我們不斷大聲地說，「中華民國是民主中國」，應當終有說服多數全球華人的一天；但如果我們自己也沒有信心說、沒有膽量說「中華民國是民主中國」，就無人能助我們擺脫任意被ＰＳ的屈辱命運！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 10, 2012
Summary: We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
Full Text below:
On August 15, The Chi Feng 2 departed from Hong Kong and reached the Diaoyutai Islands. The passengers carried with them red, white, and blue ROC flags and five star PRC flags. They waved these flags on the islands to dramatic effect. The next day Mainland media organizations outdid each other reporting the story. Sad to say, most of them useds PhotoShop to edit out the red, white, and blue ROC flag. This provoked a backlash from netizens on the Mainland. The two images, one with the ROC flag and one without, are worth contemplating. This is true for ROC officials and civilians alike.
Diaoyutai Island Defense Movement activists from Hong Kong took both the red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag with them to the islands. At first, people were surprised. But it did not take long before they understood. Hong Kong is located in the Pearl River estuary. It has witnessed two centuries of vicissitudes. It long ago transcended allegiance to either side. During the 50s and 60s, prior to its 1997 return to the Mainland, the streets of Hong Kong were often festooned with ROC flags on Double Ten National Day. To this day, the values held in Hong Kong are closer to those held on Taiwan than on the Mainland. The red, white, and blue ROC flag and the five star PRC flag were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands by private individuals from Hong Kong. They were not using the ROC national flag to "promote Chinese reunification." Their actions merely reflect the deep affection the people of Hong Kong feel for the ROC flag.
Mainland newspapers "airbrushed" the red, white, and blue ROC flag from the photograph of the Diaoyutai Islands landing. Mainland netizens denounced the newspapers' actions as "bogus" and "shameless." Later, one newspaper published a solemn apology. It acknowledged that it "hurt the feelings of readers." It acknowledged that "as a member of the Fourth Estate, it should never have allowed this to happen. When referring to the ROC, Mainland newspapers generally add scare quotes to "president," "Executive Yuan," and "legislators." This is another form of "airbrushing." After all, these government offices and government entities do exist on Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the Global Times, a sister publication of the People's Daily, published the photograph intact. It refrained from editing out the red, white, and blue ROC flag.
We must not exaggerate the significance of these two images. We must also acknowledge that the problem is one both sides share. Do citizens of the ROC realize the importance of the ROC to people on the Mainland and Hong Kong? Do citizens of the ROC realize they must make a place for the ROC in the hearts of people on the Mainland and Hong Kong?
The ROC government should stop saying that it "has no intention of joining forces with the Mainland against Japan" on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. It should use the issue as leverage. It should use the Diaoyutai Islands issue to steer cross-Strait relations in the right direction. President Ma proposed "three bilateral talks and one trilateral talk." By doing so he avoided tying his own hands. He avoided having to deny that he was joining forces with the Mainland against Japan. He implied the possibility of a "big roof" encompassing both Taiwan and the Mainland.
During the Cold War, the Republic of China referred to itself as "Free China." Actually, under martial law, Taiwan was not all that free. But it was free compared to the Mainland, with its protracted political struggles. Compared to the Mainland, society on Taiwan was imbued with a sense of justice, honor, even mission. It championed the idea of the "Three Peoples Principles unifying China." But the world changed, and the nation with it. The very concept of "China" has become anathema on Taiwan. This happened because when it comes to cross-Strait relations, people on Taiwan have lost confidence in themselves. They may even have lost their sense of self-esteem. Now when people from Hong Kong proudly carry the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands, some people on Taiwan denounce them for "promoting Chinese reunification." Some people on Taiwan are afraid to compete with Beijing in defending the Diaoyutai Islands. Worse, they they are afraid even to accept a goodwill gesture from private citizens from Hong Kong, who proudly carried the ROC flag to the Diaoyutai Islands from Hong Kong. Under such circumstances, how can one not despair?
Two decades of Taiwan independence indoctrination have undermined the concept of "Free China." Meanwhile however, Taiwan independence is impossible. Therefore citizens of the Republic of China must attempt to establish a Chinese identity that people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland can identify with.
As mentioned before, during the 50s and 60s, the Republic of China positioned itself as "Free China." It was not quite as free as the name implied. But today's Republic of China is unquestionably a "democratic China." It has the name. It also has the game. It can gain the respect of people from Hong Kong, overseas, and the Mainland.
People from Hong Kong proudly carried the red, white, and blue ROC flag with them to the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland netizens angrily denounced Mainland newspapers for airbrushing the ROC flag out of Mainland news photos. This tells us that if citizens of the Republic of China want a solution to the cross-Strait stalemate, the answer is not to beg Uncle Sam. The answer is not to provoke Beijing. The answer is to appeal to the conscience and goodwill of Chinese people wherever they may be.
We must speak up for the Republic of China. We must shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China." The more loudly we shout it, the more we will inspire Chinese the world over. The more Chinese are inspired by the idea of the Republic of China as a democratic China, the more secure our status will be. This is how we must fight the battle for "one China, different interpretations."
On August 15, based on the "big roof" concept, two flags were carried to the Diaoyutai Islands. One represented the ROC and democracy. The other represented the PRC and socialism. Together they represent the political thinking of most Chinese.
We must continue to shout out loud, "The Republic of China is a democratic China." If we do we will eventually win most Chinese the world over. But if we lack the courage to shout "The Republic of China is a democratic China," then no one will be able to prevent us from being airbrushed out of existence.
大屋頂中國：民主中國與社會主義中國
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.10
八月十五日，香港「啟豐二號」登上釣魚台，諸人分別擎持一幅青天白日滿地紅國旗及一幅五星國旗，場面極具震撼效果；隔日，中國大陸媒體競相報導，但大都以ＰＳ（修圖）軟體將青天白日滿地紅旗遮去，引發大陸網民質疑。這兩個場景，值得台灣朝野深思。
香港保釣人士擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，令人第一眼覺得意外，但也立即就能產生會心的理解。因為，位於珠江口的香港，看盡兩岸百餘年滄桑，早有一種超越兩岸的眼光；何況，在一九九七回歸大陸以前，香港在上世紀五○、六○年代，曾是街頭巷尾在雙十節掛滿青天白日滿地紅旗的城市；一直到現在，在價值信念上，香港人民與台灣的心理距離仍近過大陸。青天白日滿地紅旗登上釣島，應非港人「利用中華民國國旗為統戰工具」，而是一定程度地反映了這面國旗在港人心中的位置。
大陸報紙將登島照片「修去」青天白日滿地紅旗，被大陸網民指為「造假，無恥」；事後，一家報紙鄭重刊出道歉啟事，自承「傷害了讀者的感情」、「做為負責任的媒體，不應發生這樣的錯誤」。網民並指出，大陸報刊將台灣的「總統」、「行政院」、「立法委員」皆加引號，這是另一種「ＰＳ」，因為這些官銜及機構在台灣皆實際存在。值得注意的是，《人民日報》的姊妹報《環球時報》，當日刊出了完整的全圖，未修掉青天白日滿地紅旗。
不宜過度放大這兩個場景的意義，但應當感知二者反映的共同問題是：中華民國是否理解自己在大陸人民或香港人民心中的地位？或者，中華民國是否知道應當努力在大陸人民或香港人民的心中尋找一個地位及建立一個地位？
以釣魚台問題而言，台灣其實不必一再宣示「無意與大陸聯手對抗日本」，而可借力使力，藉釣島問題來導正兩岸關係。直至馬總統提出台陸日「三組雙邊對話到一組三邊協商」，始跳脫了「無意兩岸聯手」的自縛手腳，導引出「大屋頂中國」的想像空間。
在上世紀五○、六○冷戰年代，中華民國曾自稱「自由中國」；其實，當時台灣處在戒嚴時期，並非真正「自由」。但與長期陷於政治鬥爭運動的大陸相比，當時的台灣社會卻有一種正義感與光榮感，甚至有一種對整個「中國」的使命感，而有「三民主義統一中國」的倡議；然而，隨著世局國情的推移變化，「中國」漸漸成為台灣避忌的對象，這反映出台灣在處理兩岸關係上已經失去了自信，甚至喪失了自尊。如今，港人擎旗上島，竟然指為「統戰」；這非但是不敢與北京爭保釣行動的地位，更簡直是連民間擎青天白日滿地紅國旗登島的善意也嚇得不敢領受了。此情此景，豈能不使人觸目神傷。
近二十年的台獨狂飆，使得台灣喪盡當年「自由中國」的志氣；然而，如今台獨已完全不可能，中華民國終究必須在台灣人、香港人、大陸人及全球華人的「中國概念」中找到頂天立地的立足之地。
如前所述，上世紀五○、六○年代，中華民國以「自由中國」在兩岸間定位，其實未必名實相副；然而，今日的中華民國難道不能也不敢以「民主中國」的旗幟在兩岸間定位？倘能如此，這不但是名副其實，應也能逐漸獲得香港人、海外華人及大陸人民的接納與珍惜。
從香港人擎青天白日滿地紅旗登島，及大陸網民指責報紙ＰＳ，或許可以看出，中華民國欲在兩岸的困局中找出路，不在求美國，也未必在與北京政權角力，而可能要在全體華人的良知及善意中激發共鳴並找到位置。
但是，首先中華民國要大聲說出，「中華民國是民主中國」；唯有說得愈大聲，才愈能激發全球華人的思考與接納；而當愈多的華人能思考與接納，則「中華民國是民主中國」的地位也將愈真實也愈穩固。這才是「一中各表」戰略的真正實踐。
八月十五日，兩幅國旗，同登釣島；在「大屋頂中國」的概念下，一幅是代表「民主中國」的中華民國國旗，一幅是代表「社會主義中國」的中華人民共和國國旗，這可視為多數華人心中的政治思維之反映。
只要我們不斷大聲地說，「中華民國是民主中國」，應當終有說服多數全球華人的一天；但如果我們自己也沒有信心說、沒有膽量說「中華民國是民主中國」，就無人能助我們擺脫任意被ＰＳ的屈辱命運！
Thursday, September 6, 2012
End Miscarriages of Justice: Prosecute Cases Scientifically
End Miscarriages of Justice: Prosecute Cases Scientifically
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2012
Summary: The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
Full Text below:
The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
The course of the Su case was full of twists and turns. The impact was far-reaching. Su Chien-ho, Chuang Lin-hsun, and Liu Ping-lang were suspects in the Wu Ming-han husband and wife homicides in Xizhi. Wang Wen-hsiao's fingerprints were found at the scene. A military tribunal found him guilty and executed him. Prosecutors continued to claim that the trio were accomplices. Three times the High Court upheld the death sentence. Three times Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou supported Prosecutor General Chen Han's appeals. Three times their appeals were rejected, Eventually however they obtained a retrial.
The High Court found no evidence that the trio had ever been at the crime scene and dismissed the charges due to lack of evidence. Three times it ruled the trio not guilty. The law required a speedy trial. The third time the trio were found not guilty, the prosecution could no longer appeal. The final verdict was not guilty.
The case remained in litigation for 21 years. The three defendants are now middle-aged. The victims' families have also suffered. They have been unable to find peace of mind. This newspaper has published numerous critiques of the case. Today we are taking another look. Taiwan can learn some valuable lessons about the justice system from this case.
The victims Wu Ming-han and his wife were murdered under tragic circumstances. Suspect Wang Wen-hsiao was executed. The biggest questions remaining are whether Wang had accomplices, and whether the Su Chien-ho trio were the accomplices. The brutality of the crime, whether accomplices were involved, and who the accomplices were are separate questions. They are not necessarily related. From the start, police assumed that the murder was robbery related. The MO was brutal. The victims' bodies had nearly 80 knife wounds. From this the police concluded that there more than one murderer was involved. Confessions obtained through torture were mutually contradictory. Police concluded that the Su Chien-ho trio were Wang Wen-hsiao's accomplices.
Initially the court was not sufficiently alert. Prosecutors and police concluded that the Su trio were accomplices. But the defendants' confessions flatly contradicted each other. No traces of hair or fingerprints were found at the scene. The prosecution alleged rape. But the police did not even bother to collect any material evidence of rape. The court did not even investigate whether torture was used. Based on extremely weak evidence provided by accomplice confessions, the court sentenced three people to death. Can such a verdict be considered justice? If it can, then justice on Taiwan is crude and cheap beyond belief.
Even after a not guilty verdict was rendered, some in the media still wondered "Who can say that the three were not murderers?" The court should have asked certain questions when it concluded who the murderer was. Could the court conclude that the trio had to be guilty merely because no one could be certain they weren't? The world contains thousands of possible suspects. No one can be certain they aren't murderers. Can the court then conclude they must be guilty? Defendants do not need to prove they are innocent. Prosecutors must prove that defendants are guilty. They must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Why has this case revolved around guess work and hearsay about whether accomplices were involved and who they were?
The Su Chien-ho trio has been acquitted. Do doubts linger about whether the murderers have been brought to justice? If they do, blame the prosecutors and police who handled the case. They failed to collect and retain crime scene evidence. The material evidence was insufficient. That is why the case was reduced to guess work and confessions extracted through torture. The crime scene was contaminated. The evidence was lost. Allegations that Wang Wen-hsiao had accomplices were originally guess work. Twenty-one years ago, the police made inferences. They failed to collect evidence. Today they cannot prove that the trio was guilty. They cannot be certain whether accomplices were involved, let alone who they were.
The High Court recently determined that the police used torture. It also determined that Henry Lee's report was consistent with the science. This was enough to overthrow previous speculation. This is the key to the not-guilty verdict.
Forced confessions are hateful. They are a violation of human rights. They are also unscientific. People will confess to anything under toture. Investigators are able to close their cases this way. But they are unable to prove that the alleged murderer was really the killer. They injure the innocent. They cheat the families of the victims, as well as the families of those wrongly convicted.
The Su Chien-ho and Chiang Kuo-ching cases are the result of major blunders in criminal investigation and evidence gathering. Examples persist. Civil rights reformers have taken an active interest in the Cheng Hsing-che case. The law requires a speedy trial. Su has been acquitted three times. As a result prosecutors may no longer appeal. The evidence was insufficient from the outset, No trial procedure can make up for a lack of evidence.
The Chiang Kuo-ching case and Su Chien-ho case teach us a lesson. Confessions obtained through torture are not justice. Rough justice is not justice. They merely undermine the credibility of the justice system. We must avoid repeating our mistakes. The justice system must confront its errors. It must abandon obsolete and outdated methods of case handling. It must use rigorously scientific methods to collect evidence. It must solve cases through evidence rather than guess work. It must not force the prosecution to make repeated appeals and resort to endless procedural delays. The best way is for judges to render not-guilty verdicts. They must insist that prosecutors and police gather evidence in accordance with the law. Only then can they find the real murderers. Only then can they ensure justice and fairness for the victims' families.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.09.07
社論－杜絕冤獄 從頭貫徹科學辦案
本報訊
纏訟廿一年的蘇建和案，終於定讞了；而空軍士兵江國慶因冤獄致死案，家屬控告前空軍總司令陳肇敏等人瀆職，北檢兩度以不起訴處分，江母昨日前往北檢，提出再議聲請，後續發展值得關切。
蘇案在司法程序中歷程曲折，影響深遠。蘇建和、莊林勳、劉秉郎三人曾被疑為汐止吳銘漢夫妻命案的凶手。在現場留有指紋的凶手王文孝遭軍法判決確定執行死刑之後，檢方繼續指控三人為共犯，先是三度遭到最高法院判決死刑確定，三度由法務部長馬英九支持檢察總長陳涵提起非常上訴，雖三次均遭駁回，卻終於得到再審的機會。
嗣後則經高等法院以現場無三人之任何跡證、證據不足，三度宣判三人無罪。因為有了《速審法》，第三次判決無罪，檢方不得復為上訴，終告無罪定讞。
廿一年的纏訟，三名被告都已步入中年；被害人家屬也隨之翻騰，無法平靜。我們已不記得為了此案寫下多少次的觀察評析；今天該要回顧一下，台灣可從此案中得到什麼寶貴的司法經驗與教訓。
本案苦主吳銘漢夫婦被害情狀悲慘，除了王文孝確定涉案業已伏法之外，最大的疑問就是本案有無共犯，以及蘇建和等三人是否為其共犯。然而下手凶殘與是否有共犯，以及誰是共犯，未必有關係。警方一開始只從凶手劫財殺人、下手凶殘、被害者身上共有近八十處刀痕，推斷凶手不只一人，再以刑求的方式取得共同嫌疑人先後矛盾的自白，據之認定蘇建和等三人就是王文孝的共犯。
早期法院也未能警覺，檢警認定蘇等三人為凶案共犯，不但被告彼此的自白存有重大歧異，而且均無毛髮與指紋遺留現場。檢方指控強姦，警方卻連證據採樣也無，法院甚至不問有無刑求，即憑著證據力極其薄弱的共犯自白，判處三人死刑。若是以為這樣的判決就可以代表正義，那麼台灣的司法正義也未免過於粗糙而且廉價了！
即使在本案判決無罪確定之後，媒體上猶聞有人問道：「誰能說他們三人不是真凶？」然而，問題就出在法院判決誰是凶手時，應該問什麼問題。如果只是憑著無人敢說他們不是真凶就說他們是真凶，那麼世上還有成千上萬的張三李四，也是無人敢說他們不是真凶，誰又可以因此就被法院指為真凶呢？無辜不需要證明，有罪才需要證明，而且須要指控者提出無可置疑的證明！本案為何至今都只能憑著猜測臆說有無共犯，誰是共犯呢？
蘇建和三人被判無罪之後，如果還是懷疑真凶沒有伏法，那麼最該負責的就是當初偵辦此案的檢警人員，完全沒有盡到蒐集並保留現場證據的責任。正是因為蒐證不夠嚴謹確實、純憑推論與刑求辦案，才會破壞了現場，滅失了證據。畢竟「本案除了王文孝，還有共犯」這個說法，原本只是個推論。廿一年前的警方只做推論，不做蒐證，就是今天沒有能力認定三人有罪的原因，也是今天連有無共犯也無法確知、遑論知道共犯是誰的原因。
高等法院在近次的裁判書中，業已認定警方當年確有刑求，也認定李昌鈺的鑑定報告符合科學法則，足以推翻先前純屬臆測的推論，正是無罪判決確定的關鍵。
刑求可惡之處，不僅在於違反人權，而且在於不科學；「捶楚之下，何求不得」？其結果是辦案人員報功敘獎，但卻無法證明所控的凶手真是凶手，不但殃及無辜，而且無法對被害人的家屬以及被冤枉者的家屬交代。
蘇建和案與江國慶案都是種因於偵查犯罪蒐證的重大失誤，而這樣的例子或許仍然還有，如民間司法改革團體積極關注的鄭性澤案，也值得注意。此次蘇案是因為《速審法》要求三次判決無罪檢方不得上訴而告定讞。其實開頭蒐證不足，後面再多的審級也難以彌補證據的欠缺。
江國慶案與蘇建和案提供的教訓是，刑求不是正義，粗糙的正義不是正義，只會灼燒司法的公信力。要避免錯誤一再發生，司法必須面對錯誤，揚棄陳舊落伍的辦案觀念，用嚴謹的科學方法蒐證，用證據而不用臆測推論破案。與其任由檢方事後一再上訴為無盡的程序拖延，最好的方法就是由審判者用無罪判決要求檢警依法蒐證辦案，才能正確找到真凶，還給被害者家屬以及全體社會真正的正義與公道！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2012
Summary: The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
Full Text below:
The Su Chien-ho case was in litigation for 21 years. But a verdict has finally been rendered. Airman Chiang Kuo-ching died in prison due to a miscarriage of justice. The families sued former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Chen Chao-min and others for malfeasance. The Taipei District Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute. Yesterday Chiang's mother went to the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the case be reopened. What followed warrants concern.
The course of the Su case was full of twists and turns. The impact was far-reaching. Su Chien-ho, Chuang Lin-hsun, and Liu Ping-lang were suspects in the Wu Ming-han husband and wife homicides in Xizhi. Wang Wen-hsiao's fingerprints were found at the scene. A military tribunal found him guilty and executed him. Prosecutors continued to claim that the trio were accomplices. Three times the High Court upheld the death sentence. Three times Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou supported Prosecutor General Chen Han's appeals. Three times their appeals were rejected, Eventually however they obtained a retrial.
The High Court found no evidence that the trio had ever been at the crime scene and dismissed the charges due to lack of evidence. Three times it ruled the trio not guilty. The law required a speedy trial. The third time the trio were found not guilty, the prosecution could no longer appeal. The final verdict was not guilty.
The case remained in litigation for 21 years. The three defendants are now middle-aged. The victims' families have also suffered. They have been unable to find peace of mind. This newspaper has published numerous critiques of the case. Today we are taking another look. Taiwan can learn some valuable lessons about the justice system from this case.
The victims Wu Ming-han and his wife were murdered under tragic circumstances. Suspect Wang Wen-hsiao was executed. The biggest questions remaining are whether Wang had accomplices, and whether the Su Chien-ho trio were the accomplices. The brutality of the crime, whether accomplices were involved, and who the accomplices were are separate questions. They are not necessarily related. From the start, police assumed that the murder was robbery related. The MO was brutal. The victims' bodies had nearly 80 knife wounds. From this the police concluded that there more than one murderer was involved. Confessions obtained through torture were mutually contradictory. Police concluded that the Su Chien-ho trio were Wang Wen-hsiao's accomplices.
Initially the court was not sufficiently alert. Prosecutors and police concluded that the Su trio were accomplices. But the defendants' confessions flatly contradicted each other. No traces of hair or fingerprints were found at the scene. The prosecution alleged rape. But the police did not even bother to collect any material evidence of rape. The court did not even investigate whether torture was used. Based on extremely weak evidence provided by accomplice confessions, the court sentenced three people to death. Can such a verdict be considered justice? If it can, then justice on Taiwan is crude and cheap beyond belief.
Even after a not guilty verdict was rendered, some in the media still wondered "Who can say that the three were not murderers?" The court should have asked certain questions when it concluded who the murderer was. Could the court conclude that the trio had to be guilty merely because no one could be certain they weren't? The world contains thousands of possible suspects. No one can be certain they aren't murderers. Can the court then conclude they must be guilty? Defendants do not need to prove they are innocent. Prosecutors must prove that defendants are guilty. They must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Why has this case revolved around guess work and hearsay about whether accomplices were involved and who they were?
The Su Chien-ho trio has been acquitted. Do doubts linger about whether the murderers have been brought to justice? If they do, blame the prosecutors and police who handled the case. They failed to collect and retain crime scene evidence. The material evidence was insufficient. That is why the case was reduced to guess work and confessions extracted through torture. The crime scene was contaminated. The evidence was lost. Allegations that Wang Wen-hsiao had accomplices were originally guess work. Twenty-one years ago, the police made inferences. They failed to collect evidence. Today they cannot prove that the trio was guilty. They cannot be certain whether accomplices were involved, let alone who they were.
The High Court recently determined that the police used torture. It also determined that Henry Lee's report was consistent with the science. This was enough to overthrow previous speculation. This is the key to the not-guilty verdict.
Forced confessions are hateful. They are a violation of human rights. They are also unscientific. People will confess to anything under toture. Investigators are able to close their cases this way. But they are unable to prove that the alleged murderer was really the killer. They injure the innocent. They cheat the families of the victims, as well as the families of those wrongly convicted.
The Su Chien-ho and Chiang Kuo-ching cases are the result of major blunders in criminal investigation and evidence gathering. Examples persist. Civil rights reformers have taken an active interest in the Cheng Hsing-che case. The law requires a speedy trial. Su has been acquitted three times. As a result prosecutors may no longer appeal. The evidence was insufficient from the outset, No trial procedure can make up for a lack of evidence.
The Chiang Kuo-ching case and Su Chien-ho case teach us a lesson. Confessions obtained through torture are not justice. Rough justice is not justice. They merely undermine the credibility of the justice system. We must avoid repeating our mistakes. The justice system must confront its errors. It must abandon obsolete and outdated methods of case handling. It must use rigorously scientific methods to collect evidence. It must solve cases through evidence rather than guess work. It must not force the prosecution to make repeated appeals and resort to endless procedural delays. The best way is for judges to render not-guilty verdicts. They must insist that prosecutors and police gather evidence in accordance with the law. Only then can they find the real murderers. Only then can they ensure justice and fairness for the victims' families.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.09.07
社論－杜絕冤獄 從頭貫徹科學辦案
本報訊
纏訟廿一年的蘇建和案，終於定讞了；而空軍士兵江國慶因冤獄致死案，家屬控告前空軍總司令陳肇敏等人瀆職，北檢兩度以不起訴處分，江母昨日前往北檢，提出再議聲請，後續發展值得關切。
蘇案在司法程序中歷程曲折，影響深遠。蘇建和、莊林勳、劉秉郎三人曾被疑為汐止吳銘漢夫妻命案的凶手。在現場留有指紋的凶手王文孝遭軍法判決確定執行死刑之後，檢方繼續指控三人為共犯，先是三度遭到最高法院判決死刑確定，三度由法務部長馬英九支持檢察總長陳涵提起非常上訴，雖三次均遭駁回，卻終於得到再審的機會。
嗣後則經高等法院以現場無三人之任何跡證、證據不足，三度宣判三人無罪。因為有了《速審法》，第三次判決無罪，檢方不得復為上訴，終告無罪定讞。
廿一年的纏訟，三名被告都已步入中年；被害人家屬也隨之翻騰，無法平靜。我們已不記得為了此案寫下多少次的觀察評析；今天該要回顧一下，台灣可從此案中得到什麼寶貴的司法經驗與教訓。
本案苦主吳銘漢夫婦被害情狀悲慘，除了王文孝確定涉案業已伏法之外，最大的疑問就是本案有無共犯，以及蘇建和等三人是否為其共犯。然而下手凶殘與是否有共犯，以及誰是共犯，未必有關係。警方一開始只從凶手劫財殺人、下手凶殘、被害者身上共有近八十處刀痕，推斷凶手不只一人，再以刑求的方式取得共同嫌疑人先後矛盾的自白，據之認定蘇建和等三人就是王文孝的共犯。
早期法院也未能警覺，檢警認定蘇等三人為凶案共犯，不但被告彼此的自白存有重大歧異，而且均無毛髮與指紋遺留現場。檢方指控強姦，警方卻連證據採樣也無，法院甚至不問有無刑求，即憑著證據力極其薄弱的共犯自白，判處三人死刑。若是以為這樣的判決就可以代表正義，那麼台灣的司法正義也未免過於粗糙而且廉價了！
即使在本案判決無罪確定之後，媒體上猶聞有人問道：「誰能說他們三人不是真凶？」然而，問題就出在法院判決誰是凶手時，應該問什麼問題。如果只是憑著無人敢說他們不是真凶就說他們是真凶，那麼世上還有成千上萬的張三李四，也是無人敢說他們不是真凶，誰又可以因此就被法院指為真凶呢？無辜不需要證明，有罪才需要證明，而且須要指控者提出無可置疑的證明！本案為何至今都只能憑著猜測臆說有無共犯，誰是共犯呢？
蘇建和三人被判無罪之後，如果還是懷疑真凶沒有伏法，那麼最該負責的就是當初偵辦此案的檢警人員，完全沒有盡到蒐集並保留現場證據的責任。正是因為蒐證不夠嚴謹確實、純憑推論與刑求辦案，才會破壞了現場，滅失了證據。畢竟「本案除了王文孝，還有共犯」這個說法，原本只是個推論。廿一年前的警方只做推論，不做蒐證，就是今天沒有能力認定三人有罪的原因，也是今天連有無共犯也無法確知、遑論知道共犯是誰的原因。
高等法院在近次的裁判書中，業已認定警方當年確有刑求，也認定李昌鈺的鑑定報告符合科學法則，足以推翻先前純屬臆測的推論，正是無罪判決確定的關鍵。
刑求可惡之處，不僅在於違反人權，而且在於不科學；「捶楚之下，何求不得」？其結果是辦案人員報功敘獎，但卻無法證明所控的凶手真是凶手，不但殃及無辜，而且無法對被害人的家屬以及被冤枉者的家屬交代。
蘇建和案與江國慶案都是種因於偵查犯罪蒐證的重大失誤，而這樣的例子或許仍然還有，如民間司法改革團體積極關注的鄭性澤案，也值得注意。此次蘇案是因為《速審法》要求三次判決無罪檢方不得上訴而告定讞。其實開頭蒐證不足，後面再多的審級也難以彌補證據的欠缺。
江國慶案與蘇建和案提供的教訓是，刑求不是正義，粗糙的正義不是正義，只會灼燒司法的公信力。要避免錯誤一再發生，司法必須面對錯誤，揚棄陳舊落伍的辦案觀念，用嚴謹的科學方法蒐證，用證據而不用臆測推論破案。與其任由檢方事後一再上訴為無盡的程序拖延，最好的方法就是由審判者用無罪判決要求檢警依法蒐證辦案，才能正確找到真凶，還給被害者家屬以及全體社會真正的正義與公道！
Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation
Defense of Islands Sovereignty Awaits Ruling and Opposition Party Cooperation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty?
Full Text below:
APEC member states gathered on a large Russian island south of Haishengwei ("Vladivostok"). They discussed the establishment of closer economic cooperation between Asian-Pacific nations. The disputes between East Asian countries over the sovereignty of several islands continue to rage. The toxic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea even cast a shadow over this year's APEC summit.
Summit host Russia is attempting to become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific region and to create a "New Asia." But international attention focused on Japan, which is attempting to assert leadership over East Asia. International attention focused on Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his interaction with Mainland Chinese and South Korean leaders. These will indicate whether relations between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are running hot or cold. They will also indicate whether the disputes over islands in the East China Sea can be resolved peacefully.
Following the war, Japan periodically clashed with its neighbors. In the past, the main factor affecting Japan's relations with its neighbors was Japan's interpretation of history. But in recent years, sovereignty over numerous islands has replaced Japan's interpretation of history as the raw nerve undermining international relations in Northeast Asia. Issues of territorial sovereignty affect these nations' substantive interests. Disputes over maritime rights and geopolitical security have become the most significant variables affecting relations between Bejing, Tokyo, and Seoul.
In fact, during the Koizumi cabinet, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. Official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not really the issue. As President Bush noted, Sino-Japanese relations are much more complex than the Yasukuni Shrine issue. American Japanologist Michael Green spoke bluntly. He said that even if the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it would make no difference. The United States knows that disputes over maritime interests stand in the way of trust and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. .
But the disputes over East Asian islands are not limited to Beijing and Tokyo. Tokyo is an ally of Washington. But so are Taipei, Seoul, and Manila. Even Hanoi has attempted to improve relations with Washington. The disputes over the sovereignty of these islands are complex. To Washington's embarrassment, its "return to Asia" has precipitated these problems. The US wants to ensure unity among the first Pacific island chain that is "containing" Mainland China. Instead it finds itself robbing Peter to pay Paul. All it can do is offer platitudes. All it can do is call on the parties to sit down and talk, and to resolve disputes through dialogue. Beijing appears to be playing a waiting game. It appears to be waiting for someone else to make a mistake. It calmly sits on the sidelines, watching Washington play Big Brother in East Asia. It uses the opportunity to appeal to Taipei. It hopes cross-Strait cooperation over the Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands") and Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty conflicts.
Once President Ma came to office, ECFA gradually normalized cross-Strait economic exchanges. But this normalization has not extended to the political realm. It has not reduced the historical grievances between the KMT and CCP. In the international arena, Beijing has not changed its "One China=PRC" attitude. It continues to restrict Taipei's diplomatic space. This makes cross-Strait cooperation on sovereignty impossible. This makes it impossible for Taipei to shed its Cold War mentality vis a vis national security. Beijing wants to Taipei to rally to the larger issue of national sovereignty in the islands disputes. It wants the two sides to join in the defense of Chinese territory. But if the illusion of cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be maintained, such efforts will be futile.
Taipei still views itself as the defender of "one China," as per the Republic of China Constitution. The Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands disputes have left it trapped between international diplomacy and cross-Strait relations. It finds itself fighting a thankless battle on both fronts, Recently Taipei began live-fire exercises on Taiping Island. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet overlooking the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically Taipei finds itself in a tight spot. It is attempting to practice "balanced diplomacy." It seeks to avoid undermining security relations with Washington. It is implicitly asserting the sovereignty of the Republic of China through international diplomatic initiatives. Needless to say this attracted far less attention than South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's impassioned landing on Dokdo.
On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps hold conflicting ideological views regarding Japan. These are clearly reflected in the ruling and opposition parties' positions on the Diaoyutai Islands. There should be unity on Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement. Instead the Diaoyutai Islands conflict has become part of the ongoing internecine Blue vs. Green conflict. This has encouraged the Japanese government to cast covetous eyes on the Diaoyutai Islands.
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty? DPP officials have equated the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement with Chinese reunification and Taiwan independence, and with "cozying up to [Mainland] China." Perhaps Chairman Su will cease abetting their disinformation activities? Perhaps he will cease his attempts to confuse the public and shake their confidence in ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?
It is not easy for Taipei to cooperate with Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea islands conflicts. But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should be able to launch a coordinated attack regarding the Diaoyutai Islands. They should be able to join hands to defend our territorial sovereignty. The ruling and opposition parties must form a united front. Only then can they make their position on the East China Sea clearly heard within the international community. Amidst the dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, they must reunify the Republic of China. Only then can they win the respect of the international community.
島嶼爭端捍衛主權 期待朝野分進合擊
2012-09-06
中國時報
APEC會員國齊聚俄國海參威南方的大俄羅斯島，討論亞太國家建立更緊密的經濟合作關係時，東亞國家間的島嶼爭端仍未見平歇，而中日韓間的詭譎氣氛更令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影。
國際注目的焦點似乎不在此次峰會的東道主俄國如何展現其融入亞太地區，實現「新亞洲」（New Asia）的決心，而是喧賓奪主的日本。國際將關注首腦會談中，野田首相如何與中、韓領袖互動，此不僅為中、日、韓關係的冷熱指標，亦可窺見東海「島嶼爭端」能否軟著陸的端倪。
戰後，日本與鄰國齟齬時有所聞，過去多屬「歷史認識問題」牽動日本與鄰國關係的良窳，但近年來，「島嶼爭端」取代「歷史認識問題」，挑動東北亞國際政治的敏感神經。因此，「歷史認識問題」對東北亞國際關係的影響將弱化，取而代之，攸關各國現實利益的領土主權問題、海洋權益之爭與地緣政治上的安保利益，將成為左右中、日、韓關係走向的主要變數。
其實，小泉內閣時期，中日關係陷入一九七二年雙方外交正常化以來的最低潮，「靖國神社參拜」問題並非主因，誠如布希總統所言，中日關係比單純的靖國神社參拜問題複雜許多。美國日本研究學者葛林（Michael Green）亦直言，「即使首相不參拜靖國神社，也無濟於事」。美國應已意識到來自於海洋利益中的糾葛所形成的不信任感始為中、日雙方溝通的障礙。
然而，東亞的「島嶼爭端」，非僅存在於中、日之間，在與日本同屬美國盟邦的台灣、韓國、菲律賓，甚至美國近年極力改善關係中的越南間，亦存有錯綜複雜的島嶼主權爭議，此為美國帶來「重返亞洲」時的尷尬。在美國欲重整太平洋第一島鏈的團結之際，美國在東亞的「島嶼爭端」中，左支右絀、顧此失彼，只能無力的喊話，呼籲各方坐下來談，透過對話解決爭議；過程中，北京似乎以逸待勞，除冷眼旁觀美國如何扮演東亞的老大哥，更伺機向台灣招手，期待兩岸在南沙群島與釣魚台列嶼主權上合作。
雖說馬總統主政後，ECFA逐步將兩岸的經濟交流制度化，但卻無法迅速向政治領域滲透，鬆動國共間的「歷史正朔」之爭。北京不改在國際間打壓台北外交空間的「一中」思維，使兩岸在主權議題上合作成為不切實際的主張，亦使台灣在安全上仍無法擺脫冷戰格局。因此，北京想在「島嶼爭端」中，對台灣曉以民族大義，爭取兩岸共同捍衛中華領土，或若有似無地製造兩岸在南海及東海問題中合作的假象，恐怕徒勞無功。
惟在憲法中，將自身定位為「一中」之正朔的台北仍須守土有責，在南沙群島及釣魚台列嶼爭議中，命定陷入外交與兩岸關係的狹縫間，兩面作戰，吃力難討好。近日，台灣實施太平島實彈演習及馬總統決定赴彭佳嶼遠眺釣魚台，皆為台北在艱困的外交空間下，嘗試以「平衡外交」的思維，在避免損及與美國間的安保關係考量中，含蓄地向國際宣示中華民國主權的外交舉措，此與韓國總統李明博「登獨島」的激情演出相較，自然在票房上冷熱有別。
此外，台灣內部帶有深淺不同之藍綠意識形態對立的「日本觀」更直接投射在朝野不同的「保釣」主張中，使本應一致對外的「保釣運動」意外成為藍綠內政戰線的延長，助長日本朝野染指釣魚台列嶼之野心。
因此，民進黨蘇貞昌主席不應一味對馬總統的「保釣」政策冷嘲熱諷。蘇主席若認為登彭佳嶼與「保釣」無關，只是「自我阿Ｑ」，那麼，蘇主席能否在釣魚台列嶼問題上更清楚的政策表態，或從黨中央的立場，支持擁有釣魚台列嶼行政管轄權的宜蘭縣長林聰賢登島宣示主權，而非放任其該黨公職人員或支持者隱諱地將「保釣」與「統獨」、「親中」掛鉤，模糊國人對釣魚台列嶼主權的認識，動搖社會的「保釣」信心。
台灣在「保釣」與「南海問題」上不容易與大陸合作，但朝野應可在台灣所處的「島嶼爭端」中分進合擊，共謀捍衛領土主權之策。相信只有朝野一致對外，始能讓國際社會清楚聽見台灣對東海、南海島嶼的主權論述，並在此「島嶼爭端」中，重新找回團結的中華民國，贏得國際的尊重。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2012
Summary: DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty?
Full Text below:
APEC member states gathered on a large Russian island south of Haishengwei ("Vladivostok"). They discussed the establishment of closer economic cooperation between Asian-Pacific nations. The disputes between East Asian countries over the sovereignty of several islands continue to rage. The toxic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea even cast a shadow over this year's APEC summit.
Summit host Russia is attempting to become an integral part of the Asian-Pacific region and to create a "New Asia." But international attention focused on Japan, which is attempting to assert leadership over East Asia. International attention focused on Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his interaction with Mainland Chinese and South Korean leaders. These will indicate whether relations between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are running hot or cold. They will also indicate whether the disputes over islands in the East China Sea can be resolved peacefully.
Following the war, Japan periodically clashed with its neighbors. In the past, the main factor affecting Japan's relations with its neighbors was Japan's interpretation of history. But in recent years, sovereignty over numerous islands has replaced Japan's interpretation of history as the raw nerve undermining international relations in Northeast Asia. Issues of territorial sovereignty affect these nations' substantive interests. Disputes over maritime rights and geopolitical security have become the most significant variables affecting relations between Bejing, Tokyo, and Seoul.
In fact, during the Koizumi cabinet, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest ebb since diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. Official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were not really the issue. As President Bush noted, Sino-Japanese relations are much more complex than the Yasukuni Shrine issue. American Japanologist Michael Green spoke bluntly. He said that even if the prime minister did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it would make no difference. The United States knows that disputes over maritime interests stand in the way of trust and communication between Beijing and Tokyo. .
But the disputes over East Asian islands are not limited to Beijing and Tokyo. Tokyo is an ally of Washington. But so are Taipei, Seoul, and Manila. Even Hanoi has attempted to improve relations with Washington. The disputes over the sovereignty of these islands are complex. To Washington's embarrassment, its "return to Asia" has precipitated these problems. The US wants to ensure unity among the first Pacific island chain that is "containing" Mainland China. Instead it finds itself robbing Peter to pay Paul. All it can do is offer platitudes. All it can do is call on the parties to sit down and talk, and to resolve disputes through dialogue. Beijing appears to be playing a waiting game. It appears to be waiting for someone else to make a mistake. It calmly sits on the sidelines, watching Washington play Big Brother in East Asia. It uses the opportunity to appeal to Taipei. It hopes cross-Strait cooperation over the Nansha Islands ("Spratly Islands") and Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty conflicts.
Once President Ma came to office, ECFA gradually normalized cross-Strait economic exchanges. But this normalization has not extended to the political realm. It has not reduced the historical grievances between the KMT and CCP. In the international arena, Beijing has not changed its "One China=PRC" attitude. It continues to restrict Taipei's diplomatic space. This makes cross-Strait cooperation on sovereignty impossible. This makes it impossible for Taipei to shed its Cold War mentality vis a vis national security. Beijing wants to Taipei to rally to the larger issue of national sovereignty in the islands disputes. It wants the two sides to join in the defense of Chinese territory. But if the illusion of cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be maintained, such efforts will be futile.
Taipei still views itself as the defender of "one China," as per the Republic of China Constitution. The Nansha Islands and Diaoyutai Islands disputes have left it trapped between international diplomacy and cross-Strait relations. It finds itself fighting a thankless battle on both fronts, Recently Taipei began live-fire exercises on Taiping Island. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet overlooking the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically Taipei finds itself in a tight spot. It is attempting to practice "balanced diplomacy." It seeks to avoid undermining security relations with Washington. It is implicitly asserting the sovereignty of the Republic of China through international diplomatic initiatives. Needless to say this attracted far less attention than South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's impassioned landing on Dokdo.
On Taiwan the Blue and Green camps hold conflicting ideological views regarding Japan. These are clearly reflected in the ruling and opposition parties' positions on the Diaoyutai Islands. There should be unity on Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement. Instead the Diaoyutai Islands conflict has become part of the ongoing internecine Blue vs. Green conflict. This has encouraged the Japanese government to cast covetous eyes on the Diaoyutai Islands.
DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang should not mock President Ma's Daioyutai Islands Defense Movement stance. Does Chairman Su consider landing on the Pengjia Islet irrelevant to the defense of the Diaoyutai Islands? Does he consider it mere evidence of an "Ah Q" mentality? Then perhaps Chairman Su would be willing to make a more explicit declaration on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands? Perhaps as a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee, he would be willing to declare his support for Ilan County Chief Lin Tsong-hsian, who landed on the island and proclaimed sovereignty? DPP officials have equated the Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement with Chinese reunification and Taiwan independence, and with "cozying up to [Mainland] China." Perhaps Chairman Su will cease abetting their disinformation activities? Perhaps he will cease his attempts to confuse the public and shake their confidence in ROC sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands?
It is not easy for Taipei to cooperate with Beijing over the Diaoyutai Islands and South China Sea islands conflicts. But the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should be able to launch a coordinated attack regarding the Diaoyutai Islands. They should be able to join hands to defend our territorial sovereignty. The ruling and opposition parties must form a united front. Only then can they make their position on the East China Sea clearly heard within the international community. Amidst the dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, they must reunify the Republic of China. Only then can they win the respect of the international community.
島嶼爭端捍衛主權 期待朝野分進合擊
2012-09-06
中國時報
APEC會員國齊聚俄國海參威南方的大俄羅斯島，討論亞太國家建立更緊密的經濟合作關係時，東亞國家間的島嶼爭端仍未見平歇，而中日韓間的詭譎氣氛更令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影。
國際注目的焦點似乎不在此次峰會的東道主俄國如何展現其融入亞太地區，實現「新亞洲」（New Asia）的決心，而是喧賓奪主的日本。國際將關注首腦會談中，野田首相如何與中、韓領袖互動，此不僅為中、日、韓關係的冷熱指標，亦可窺見東海「島嶼爭端」能否軟著陸的端倪。
戰後，日本與鄰國齟齬時有所聞，過去多屬「歷史認識問題」牽動日本與鄰國關係的良窳，但近年來，「島嶼爭端」取代「歷史認識問題」，挑動東北亞國際政治的敏感神經。因此，「歷史認識問題」對東北亞國際關係的影響將弱化，取而代之，攸關各國現實利益的領土主權問題、海洋權益之爭與地緣政治上的安保利益，將成為左右中、日、韓關係走向的主要變數。
其實，小泉內閣時期，中日關係陷入一九七二年雙方外交正常化以來的最低潮，「靖國神社參拜」問題並非主因，誠如布希總統所言，中日關係比單純的靖國神社參拜問題複雜許多。美國日本研究學者葛林（Michael Green）亦直言，「即使首相不參拜靖國神社，也無濟於事」。美國應已意識到來自於海洋利益中的糾葛所形成的不信任感始為中、日雙方溝通的障礙。
然而，東亞的「島嶼爭端」，非僅存在於中、日之間，在與日本同屬美國盟邦的台灣、韓國、菲律賓，甚至美國近年極力改善關係中的越南間，亦存有錯綜複雜的島嶼主權爭議，此為美國帶來「重返亞洲」時的尷尬。在美國欲重整太平洋第一島鏈的團結之際，美國在東亞的「島嶼爭端」中，左支右絀、顧此失彼，只能無力的喊話，呼籲各方坐下來談，透過對話解決爭議；過程中，北京似乎以逸待勞，除冷眼旁觀美國如何扮演東亞的老大哥，更伺機向台灣招手，期待兩岸在南沙群島與釣魚台列嶼主權上合作。
雖說馬總統主政後，ECFA逐步將兩岸的經濟交流制度化，但卻無法迅速向政治領域滲透，鬆動國共間的「歷史正朔」之爭。北京不改在國際間打壓台北外交空間的「一中」思維，使兩岸在主權議題上合作成為不切實際的主張，亦使台灣在安全上仍無法擺脫冷戰格局。因此，北京想在「島嶼爭端」中，對台灣曉以民族大義，爭取兩岸共同捍衛中華領土，或若有似無地製造兩岸在南海及東海問題中合作的假象，恐怕徒勞無功。
惟在憲法中，將自身定位為「一中」之正朔的台北仍須守土有責，在南沙群島及釣魚台列嶼爭議中，命定陷入外交與兩岸關係的狹縫間，兩面作戰，吃力難討好。近日，台灣實施太平島實彈演習及馬總統決定赴彭佳嶼遠眺釣魚台，皆為台北在艱困的外交空間下，嘗試以「平衡外交」的思維，在避免損及與美國間的安保關係考量中，含蓄地向國際宣示中華民國主權的外交舉措，此與韓國總統李明博「登獨島」的激情演出相較，自然在票房上冷熱有別。
此外，台灣內部帶有深淺不同之藍綠意識形態對立的「日本觀」更直接投射在朝野不同的「保釣」主張中，使本應一致對外的「保釣運動」意外成為藍綠內政戰線的延長，助長日本朝野染指釣魚台列嶼之野心。
因此，民進黨蘇貞昌主席不應一味對馬總統的「保釣」政策冷嘲熱諷。蘇主席若認為登彭佳嶼與「保釣」無關，只是「自我阿Ｑ」，那麼，蘇主席能否在釣魚台列嶼問題上更清楚的政策表態，或從黨中央的立場，支持擁有釣魚台列嶼行政管轄權的宜蘭縣長林聰賢登島宣示主權，而非放任其該黨公職人員或支持者隱諱地將「保釣」與「統獨」、「親中」掛鉤，模糊國人對釣魚台列嶼主權的認識，動搖社會的「保釣」信心。
台灣在「保釣」與「南海問題」上不容易與大陸合作，但朝野應可在台灣所處的「島嶼爭端」中分進合擊，共謀捍衛領土主權之策。相信只有朝野一致對外，始能讓國際社會清楚聽見台灣對東海、南海島嶼的主權論述，並在此「島嶼爭端」中，重新找回團結的中華民國，贏得國際的尊重。
Wednesday, September 5, 2012
Central Standing Committee Protocol Trivial, Loss of Party Cohesion Serious
Central Standing Committee Protocol Trivial, Loss of Party Cohesion Serious
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2012
Summary: The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
Full Text below:
The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. But in recent years its importance has declined. President Ma Ying-jeou consults the Central Standing Committee less and less. Its role continues to shrink. It has become an arena for second-tier power struggles. Central Standing Committee by-elections have become pro forma rituals. Some of those unhappy with the party leadership use the Central Standing Committee by-elections to vent anti-Ma sentiment. They use it to give Ma Ying-jeou a hard time. This is not surprising.
Who is in and who is out within the Central Standing Committee? Which factions are operating behind the scenes and resorting to dirty tricks? That is not important. The KMT party machinery has become weaker under President Ma and Chairman Ma. This is the real problem. This is the most import factor in ruling vs. opposition party rivalry.
Politics on Taiwan is "winner-take-all." This is true whether the Blue camp or Green camp is in power. The levers of power end up in the hands of the ruling administration. The ruling party winds up playing the role of second fiddle, go-fer, and political machine. Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office and Ma Ying-jeou's four make this abundantly clear. Political power is real power. It calls the shots. When the party is in office, the party hierarchy is relegated to second fiddle. But it must not have the life squeezed out of it. The power of the party must be balanced against the power of the ruling administration. They must not become alienated from each other. Why not? Because rule is temporary. Ruling parties parties are eventually toppled. The party organization must endure. It must remain in operation. A political party must have a structural framework and a belief system. Otherwise its constitution will be weak. It will have a difficult time maintaining discipline. It will lacking fighting ability. That is inevitable.
Consider the weakening of the KMT Central Standing Committee. The candidates who participated in the by-election were indifferent. The roster lacked talent. This is clearly unhealthy. The reasons for this phenomenon are deep-rooted. The Blue camp has lost internal cohesion. The KMT Central Standing Committee leaders lack charisma. These are all important factors.
The DPP Central Standing Committee is a different story altogether. In July the DPP Central Standing Committee underwent reorganization. Factions engaged in bitter struggles. The major factions faced off with each other, determined to prevail. Contrast this with the KMT Central Standing Committee by-election. The difference was vast. The DPP brought together the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. Attendees included party princes and faction leaders Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun. The meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee was a far quieter affair. Discussions were for the most part mere formalities. Chairman Ma approved the proposals and got them out of the way. DPP Central Standing Committee meetings on the other hand are often live fire exercises. Chairman Su Tseng-chang often found himself overwhelmed.
Now look further ahead. Consider the differences between the Blue and Green Central Standing Committees. The problem involves more than mere atmosphere or visual impact. It is closely related to the party's thinking and action. The DPP Central Standing Committee has many grizzled veterans. They may make it difficult for Su Tseng-chang to act. But the Central Standing Committee also serves as a platform of intraparty political wrangling. By contrast the KMT Central Standing Committee is an empty shell. This may lead to blind spots in decision-making. Most people are unhappy with the KMT's performance. This shows the need for brainstorming to enhance decision-making and execution. But if the KMT Central Standing Committee is unable to function as a conduit for suggestions, how can the Blue camp regain the trust and support of the public?
During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the KMT Central Standing Committee recruited the most forward thinking party and government officials. It was a decision-making platform both in name and in fact. Today the Central Standing Committee is a hollow shell. Every year it holds by-elections. But party members with real power don't even care enough to compete. This may be political evolution. The party and the government may be going their separate ways. But for a political party lacking in cohesion it should be a matter of concern. The party elite is depressed about the Central Standing Committee's performance. One can only imagine how discouraged party members are at the grassroots.
Every KMT Central Standing Committee decline should be a call to action. But consider the new Central Standing Committee members. Are they up to the task of reinvigorating the party? Many people are questioning the staying power of the Blue camp. Ma Ying-jeou appears to have no response. He appears to have interpreted all calls for soul-searching as "anti-Ma" sentiment. But if no action is taken in response to these voices, danger awaits.
中常會式微事小，黨凝聚力流失事大
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.05 02:27 am
國民黨中常委改選，只堪以「意興闌珊」四字形容。當選者難謂雀躍，落選者莫名所以，挺馬人士遭中南部代表集體抵制的傳聞則印證不假。真正的問題是，在這種情況下產生的新一屆中常委名單，卻也解讀不出什麼新意義。
中常會是國民黨的最高權力機構，但近年功能日漸式微，不僅馬英九主席越來越少徵詢或採納中常委的意見，中常會的角色也不斷矮化，成為二軍競逐的舞台。因而，中常會改選變得行禮如儀，乃至有些不滿黨中央的人士藉改選發洩一下「反馬」情緒，要給馬英九一個好看，也就不足為奇了。
在這種情況下，與其觀察個別中常委誰上誰下，或追究什麼派系在幕後運作搞鬼，倒不如關注國民黨機器在馬總統與馬主席黨政雙兼下的「弱化」問題如何解決，恐怕才是影響未來朝野競爭的更重要因素。
以目前台灣「贏者全拿」的政治架構，無論藍綠誰政執，執政黨的權力槓桿都會大大向「政」傾斜，「黨」變成輔佐、抬轎及選舉機器。這從陳水扁的八年和馬英九的四年，都看得極為清楚，是政治的權力現實使然。然而，在執政時，「黨」雖然退居輔位，但它的生理命脈不可過度壓抑，而必須和「政」維持一定的衡稱關係，才不致發生斷層與疏離。原因是，執政是暫時的，總會遇上輪替的時刻；而政黨組織則要追尋恆久的運作；一個缺乏政見體系及政治意志的政黨，其生理命脈脆弱，難以在戰鬥中保持隊形，更難施展戰鬥力，這是必然。
從這個角度看，國民黨中常會的弱化，由參與競逐狀況的冷清，到缺乏亮眼的名單，顯然都不是健康的發展。此一現象，所反映的深層原因，無論是藍營內部凝聚力的流失，或者黨中央領導人號召力的耗弱，都是更應重視的事。
對照之下，民進黨的中常會卻是另一番景象。綠營七月間改組的中常會，是在派系激烈角力下產生，各大派系攻城掠池，志在必得；比起藍營中常委的參選冷清，迥然而異。而且，綠營中常會老中青俱全，包括「天王」謝長廷、游錫?皆以派系領袖側身其間。不難想像，國民黨召開中常會時與會者以沉默居多，討論多半流於形式，主席拍板了事；而民進黨中常會則常常出現真槍實彈的場景，讓主席蘇貞昌忙於招架。
進一步看，藍綠中常會的不同景象，其實不單單是「氣氛」或「觀瞻」的問題，也與黨的思考與行動關係密切。民進黨中常委老將眾多，或易讓蘇貞昌受到掣肘，但也使中常會相當程度地成為黨內政治角力的真實平台。而國民黨中常會變成權力空殼，則可能使決策產生偏斜或出現盲點而不自知。尤其，目前國民黨的執政成績無法取得多數民眾的認同，其實正需各方的腦力激盪，來增強決策力及執行力；然而，若連該黨的中常會都無法扮演建言供輸的角色，那麼藍軍要如何贏回民眾的信賴和支持？
在蔣經國時代，國民黨中常會廣納最尖端的黨政要員，成為名實大致相副的決策平台；而如今，中常會卻淪為內部權力的雞肋，食之無味，雖年年改選，但真正有實力的黨員連角逐都提不起胃口。這種現象，雖也是政治進化、黨政分離的徵兆；但對於一個凝聚力日漸渙散的政黨而言，畢竟是值得注意的事。若黨內菁英對中常會都表現得如此意興闌珊，亦可想像基層黨員向心力的流失恐怕更甚於此。
一般皆言，國民黨中常會已是每下愈況，應當設法提振；但看一看這張新名單，這樣的陣容，能承當得起「中興」的使命嗎？許多人都在質疑為藍軍的續航力，而馬英九對此似亦拿不出對策。簡言之，把一切要求檢討的聲音都解讀為「反馬」是沒必要的，但若對這些聲音無動於衷，卻是一個政治警訊。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2012
Summary: The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
Full Text below:
The KMT Central Standing Committee is holding its by-elections. The process can only be described as depressing. Those elected are not jumping for joy. Those not elected are discouraged by their losses. Rumors that Ma supporters encountered obstruction from central and southern Taiwan officials turned out to be true. What is the significance of the new Standing Committee roster? It is difficult to tell.
The Central Standing Committee is the highest authority within the KMT. But in recent years its importance has declined. President Ma Ying-jeou consults the Central Standing Committee less and less. Its role continues to shrink. It has become an arena for second-tier power struggles. Central Standing Committee by-elections have become pro forma rituals. Some of those unhappy with the party leadership use the Central Standing Committee by-elections to vent anti-Ma sentiment. They use it to give Ma Ying-jeou a hard time. This is not surprising.
Who is in and who is out within the Central Standing Committee? Which factions are operating behind the scenes and resorting to dirty tricks? That is not important. The KMT party machinery has become weaker under President Ma and Chairman Ma. This is the real problem. This is the most import factor in ruling vs. opposition party rivalry.
Politics on Taiwan is "winner-take-all." This is true whether the Blue camp or Green camp is in power. The levers of power end up in the hands of the ruling administration. The ruling party winds up playing the role of second fiddle, go-fer, and political machine. Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office and Ma Ying-jeou's four make this abundantly clear. Political power is real power. It calls the shots. When the party is in office, the party hierarchy is relegated to second fiddle. But it must not have the life squeezed out of it. The power of the party must be balanced against the power of the ruling administration. They must not become alienated from each other. Why not? Because rule is temporary. Ruling parties parties are eventually toppled. The party organization must endure. It must remain in operation. A political party must have a structural framework and a belief system. Otherwise its constitution will be weak. It will have a difficult time maintaining discipline. It will lacking fighting ability. That is inevitable.
Consider the weakening of the KMT Central Standing Committee. The candidates who participated in the by-election were indifferent. The roster lacked talent. This is clearly unhealthy. The reasons for this phenomenon are deep-rooted. The Blue camp has lost internal cohesion. The KMT Central Standing Committee leaders lack charisma. These are all important factors.
The DPP Central Standing Committee is a different story altogether. In July the DPP Central Standing Committee underwent reorganization. Factions engaged in bitter struggles. The major factions faced off with each other, determined to prevail. Contrast this with the KMT Central Standing Committee by-election. The difference was vast. The DPP brought together the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young. Attendees included party princes and faction leaders Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun. The meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee was a far quieter affair. Discussions were for the most part mere formalities. Chairman Ma approved the proposals and got them out of the way. DPP Central Standing Committee meetings on the other hand are often live fire exercises. Chairman Su Tseng-chang often found himself overwhelmed.
Now look further ahead. Consider the differences between the Blue and Green Central Standing Committees. The problem involves more than mere atmosphere or visual impact. It is closely related to the party's thinking and action. The DPP Central Standing Committee has many grizzled veterans. They may make it difficult for Su Tseng-chang to act. But the Central Standing Committee also serves as a platform of intraparty political wrangling. By contrast the KMT Central Standing Committee is an empty shell. This may lead to blind spots in decision-making. Most people are unhappy with the KMT's performance. This shows the need for brainstorming to enhance decision-making and execution. But if the KMT Central Standing Committee is unable to function as a conduit for suggestions, how can the Blue camp regain the trust and support of the public?
During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the KMT Central Standing Committee recruited the most forward thinking party and government officials. It was a decision-making platform both in name and in fact. Today the Central Standing Committee is a hollow shell. Every year it holds by-elections. But party members with real power don't even care enough to compete. This may be political evolution. The party and the government may be going their separate ways. But for a political party lacking in cohesion it should be a matter of concern. The party elite is depressed about the Central Standing Committee's performance. One can only imagine how discouraged party members are at the grassroots.
Every KMT Central Standing Committee decline should be a call to action. But consider the new Central Standing Committee members. Are they up to the task of reinvigorating the party? Many people are questioning the staying power of the Blue camp. Ma Ying-jeou appears to have no response. He appears to have interpreted all calls for soul-searching as "anti-Ma" sentiment. But if no action is taken in response to these voices, danger awaits.
中常會式微事小，黨凝聚力流失事大
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.05 02:27 am
國民黨中常委改選，只堪以「意興闌珊」四字形容。當選者難謂雀躍，落選者莫名所以，挺馬人士遭中南部代表集體抵制的傳聞則印證不假。真正的問題是，在這種情況下產生的新一屆中常委名單，卻也解讀不出什麼新意義。
中常會是國民黨的最高權力機構，但近年功能日漸式微，不僅馬英九主席越來越少徵詢或採納中常委的意見，中常會的角色也不斷矮化，成為二軍競逐的舞台。因而，中常會改選變得行禮如儀，乃至有些不滿黨中央的人士藉改選發洩一下「反馬」情緒，要給馬英九一個好看，也就不足為奇了。
在這種情況下，與其觀察個別中常委誰上誰下，或追究什麼派系在幕後運作搞鬼，倒不如關注國民黨機器在馬總統與馬主席黨政雙兼下的「弱化」問題如何解決，恐怕才是影響未來朝野競爭的更重要因素。
以目前台灣「贏者全拿」的政治架構，無論藍綠誰政執，執政黨的權力槓桿都會大大向「政」傾斜，「黨」變成輔佐、抬轎及選舉機器。這從陳水扁的八年和馬英九的四年，都看得極為清楚，是政治的權力現實使然。然而，在執政時，「黨」雖然退居輔位，但它的生理命脈不可過度壓抑，而必須和「政」維持一定的衡稱關係，才不致發生斷層與疏離。原因是，執政是暫時的，總會遇上輪替的時刻；而政黨組織則要追尋恆久的運作；一個缺乏政見體系及政治意志的政黨，其生理命脈脆弱，難以在戰鬥中保持隊形，更難施展戰鬥力，這是必然。
從這個角度看，國民黨中常會的弱化，由參與競逐狀況的冷清，到缺乏亮眼的名單，顯然都不是健康的發展。此一現象，所反映的深層原因，無論是藍營內部凝聚力的流失，或者黨中央領導人號召力的耗弱，都是更應重視的事。
對照之下，民進黨的中常會卻是另一番景象。綠營七月間改組的中常會，是在派系激烈角力下產生，各大派系攻城掠池，志在必得；比起藍營中常委的參選冷清，迥然而異。而且，綠營中常會老中青俱全，包括「天王」謝長廷、游錫?皆以派系領袖側身其間。不難想像，國民黨召開中常會時與會者以沉默居多，討論多半流於形式，主席拍板了事；而民進黨中常會則常常出現真槍實彈的場景，讓主席蘇貞昌忙於招架。
進一步看，藍綠中常會的不同景象，其實不單單是「氣氛」或「觀瞻」的問題，也與黨的思考與行動關係密切。民進黨中常委老將眾多，或易讓蘇貞昌受到掣肘，但也使中常會相當程度地成為黨內政治角力的真實平台。而國民黨中常會變成權力空殼，則可能使決策產生偏斜或出現盲點而不自知。尤其，目前國民黨的執政成績無法取得多數民眾的認同，其實正需各方的腦力激盪，來增強決策力及執行力；然而，若連該黨的中常會都無法扮演建言供輸的角色，那麼藍軍要如何贏回民眾的信賴和支持？
在蔣經國時代，國民黨中常會廣納最尖端的黨政要員，成為名實大致相副的決策平台；而如今，中常會卻淪為內部權力的雞肋，食之無味，雖年年改選，但真正有實力的黨員連角逐都提不起胃口。這種現象，雖也是政治進化、黨政分離的徵兆；但對於一個凝聚力日漸渙散的政黨而言，畢竟是值得注意的事。若黨內菁英對中常會都表現得如此意興闌珊，亦可想像基層黨員向心力的流失恐怕更甚於此。
一般皆言，國民黨中常會已是每下愈況，應當設法提振；但看一看這張新名單，這樣的陣容，能承當得起「中興」的使命嗎？許多人都在質疑為藍軍的續航力，而馬英九對此似亦拿不出對策。簡言之，把一切要求檢討的聲音都解讀為「反馬」是沒必要的，但若對這些聲音無動於衷，卻是一個政治警訊。
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