Bring Back the Five Presidential Leadership Lessons
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 15, 2012
Summary: Taiwan has a huge problem. The public has lost all confidence in itself. The most common complaints among the public are that the economy is bad, salaries are falling, the quality of life is low, and the wealth gap is widening. Young people have lost hope. But let us review history. Let us examine at the global picture. Is Taiwan's situation really that bad?
Full Text below:
Taiwan has a huge problem. The public has lost all confidence in itself. The most common complaints among the public are that the economy is bad, salaries are falling, the quality of life is low, and the wealth gap is widening. Young people have lost hope. The business community complains that the government is impotent. Each says we must be more self-reliant. But let us review history. Let us examine at the global picture. Is Taiwan's situation really that bad? In the 1970s the oil crisis struck. The government initiated its ten major infrastructure projects plan. It increased domestic demand and defused the crisis. It laid the foundation for the subsequent economic take-off. Now let us take an even closer look. Our current situation is less perilous than it was during the financial tsunami. So why is there so much pessimism today compared to then? Why does the public see no hope for the future?
Taiwan today is utterly lacking in ambition. It is filled with anxiety about the future. That is its biggest problem. In an era of uncertainty, society has lost its way. This is when it most needs government leadership the most.
The first task of leadership, is to take the helm. The President is the Head of State. He must act like a leader. He must suggest a direction for the ROC's development. He must offer a vision for the nation. He must create a broad public consensus. He must inspire a willingness to participate in a collective struggle. Only then can he bring the nation together, and lead it out of the wilderness. The biggest problem now is that the helmsman lacks a clear vision of how the nation should develop. This has resulted in policy flip-flopping, chaos, and public confusion. This editorial series is devoted to this core issue. We wish to remind the ruling administration that the key issue is the ability to man the helm Only then can one restore leadership. Only then can one offer new prospects for the ROC.
The second task of leadership, is to make decisions. A good decision-making model will solicit opinions, and carefully pick its battles. It will take into account conflicts of interest and social impacts. The decisions it implements will then be equitable. The Ma administration's policy formulation process is crude. Major decisions are often made by a handful of individuals. The government does not lack talent. It has access to some of the leading talents in their fields. But tiny cliques have saddled the president with a reputation for oligarchical rule by the few. Worse, its decisions are often bad. They are often out of touch with people at the grass-roots. This leads to powerful backlashes, policy reversals, and a steady erosion of the leadership's dignity and prestige. If this hermetic, cliquish, decision-making model is not jettisoned, the government's ability to lead will forever remain in doubt.
The third task of leadership is to execute policy. Major government decisions often have far-reaching repercussions. They involve many ministries. Therefore, policy implementation must be integrated. Only then can one get past officials preoccupied with defending their own turf. Only then can one avoid each of them going their own way, and each of them getting in each others' way. When implementing policy one will inevitably encounter problems and crises. Therefore, the ability to solve problems and deal with crises is another link in the chain. The Ma administration lacks the ability to execute policy. He has failed to exploit his star power. He has often lacked resolve. He retreats at the first sign of trouble. He wavers. This encourages ministry heads to see which way the wind is blowing before acting, to evade responsibility when difficulties arise, and to do nothing in face of crises. As a result the public loses respect. How can such an administration establish any credibility? How can its leadership skills not be challenged?
The fourth task of leadership is to use and cultivate people with talent. The public on Taiwan misses Chiang Ching-kuo. He was selfless in the way he promoted people. He was close with the local populace. But even more importantly, he nurtured people with talent to govern Taiwan. Many of them are still active in the political arena. They include President Ma. Many of them he mentored personally. Times have changed. But the principle remains the same. One must have the courage to employ talent from all quarters. One must use people from different political backgrounds to govern the nation. One must not cultivate talent only for the ruling party. One must nurture talent for the entire nation. One must exhibit broadmindedness and tolerance. If one does, then one will naturally be able to nurture leaders. The nation's long-term growth will then be assured.
The fifth task of leadership is to respect the framework. The constitutional framework of the Republic of China is a dual-leadership system. The president is elected. But the premier is appointed by the president. They have different responsibilities. According to the constitution, the president is responsible for major decisions crucial to the nation's development. The premier is responsible for unifying the various government ministries and implementing policy. As long as each operates in accordance with the framework, major conflicts are unlikely. If the premier is unable to execute major policy, the president can replace him. After all, the president is the elected official responsible for the success or failure of governance. Another core issue is the need to avoid the extralegal use of power. The Chen regime was corrupt. Chen Shui-bian of course must take full responsibility. But Wu Shu-cheng's extralegal decision-making, including personnel appointments, was also a problem. President Ma has been particularly careful to avoid outside interference in government affairs. The nation's institutions, its decision-making powers and responsibilities, must be able to withstand the most rigorous scrutiny. The head of state must demonstrate genuine leadership.
Taiwan remains a place of hope. Each year an increasing number of contestants in international design competitions wins awards. They inject youthful vitality into the cultural and creative field. Younger generation Taiwanese are returning home and taking up farming, They have given farming an entirely new image. Various cultural and leisure industries are on the rise. How can such vitality have no future? Taiwan remains vibrant. The younger generation overflows with creativity. The new generation has fighting spirit. As long as the government demonstrates sufficient leadership, Taiwan will find its way out of the wilderness. There is no doubt about it.
重振總統領導力的五堂課
2012-11-15 中國時報
當前台灣有一個最大的問題是：民間有一種「失了志氣」的無力之感。民間最常抱怨的是：景氣差，薪水降，生活品質低，貧富差距擴大，青年人看不到希望；企業界則抱怨政府無能無力，互相勉勵得自立自強。然而，回顧歷史，展望世局，台灣真的有這麼差嗎？一九七○年代石油危機時期，政府以十大建設及擴大內需，化解危機，為後來的經濟起飛奠定基礎。即使更近一點看，現在的情況也不比金融海嘯時危險。為何反而有一種灰心喪志、看不到未來的氣氛呢？
觀察當前台灣，整個社會缺乏向上志氣，對未來充滿不確定感，允為最大問題。茫然的社會，徬徨的時代，此時最需要政府的「領導力」。
領導力的首要課題，即是掌舵能力。總統是國家元首，應以領導人的高度，指引台灣發展方向，提出國家願景，凝聚全民共識，激發集體奮鬥意志，才可以引領全國上下齊心合力，走出困境。現在的最大問題是，掌舵者未能指引清晰、明確的國家發展方向與願景，以致政策搖擺，亂象叢生，民間無所適從。本系列社論主要就是針對此一核心問題，提醒當局要從最關鍵的掌舵能力著手，才能重現領導力，打開台灣的嶄新局面。
領導力的第二課題，是決策能力。一個好的決策模式，應先廣徵意見，慎謀能斷，充分考量不同利益衝突與可能引發的社會效應後，最後再作出衡平的決策並付諸實行。馬政府的問題是，政策形成及擬定過程粗糙，重大決策更往往由少數人決定，所以，儘管政府首長不乏頭角崢嶸或具代表性的專才，但小圈子決策讓馬總統背負用人「小圈圈」的指責，且因決策經常和基層民意脫節，致不時遭遇強力反彈而轉彎，領導人的尊嚴與威信，即在此過程中不斷流失。這種封閉、少數甚至極少數中的少數決策模式若不改，政府領導力將受到持續不斷的挑戰。
領導力的第三課題，是執行力。政府重大決策往往牽涉層面極廣，涉及部會眾多，因此，政策執行須有統合能力，才能破除本位考量，避免各行其是、互為掣肘。而政策執行過程必然會遭遇各種問題甚至突發性危機，因此，解決問題及處理危機的能力也是執行力一環。馬政府被批缺乏執行力，主因就是領導者沒有統馭明星首長的能力，且經常意志不堅、遇事退縮、搖擺不定，讓各部會看風向行事，遇難題相互推諉逃避責任；發生危機更是因應遲緩，讓人民看笑話。這樣的政府如何能建立威信？領導能力又豈能不受質疑？
領導力的第四課題，是用人及培養人才。蔣經國先生之所以讓台灣人懷念，不僅是他的無私用人與親近本土，更重要的是他為台灣培育了無數治國的人才。現在活躍於政壇的明星，包括馬總統，很多都是當年他的手上所培養。現在時代雖然不同，但用人原則仍是：敢用各方能人，將不同政治勢力納為治國之用，而且不僅為執政黨培養人才，更要為國家培養人才；若有這樣的胸襟與氣度，自能孕育令萬方景服的領導力，國家長期發展也會走上正軌。
領導力的第五課題，是尊重體制。中華民國憲政體制為雙首長制，但總統是民選，行政院長則是總統任命，因此，在權責分工上，應依憲政運作，總統主導攸關國家發展的重大決策，行政院長則有統合各部會及執行的責任；依體制運作，就不致出大問題。若行政院長無力執行重大政策，總統大可究責換人；畢竟，總統才是擔負執政成敗責任的民選首長。另一個核心問題是須避免體制外的權力運作。扁政府的貪腐，陳水扁當然要負全責，但吳淑珍在體制外參與決策甚至決定人事，也是問題惡化的根源。面對外界繪聲繪影體制外干政的指控，馬總統尤須謹慎以對，讓國家體制及決策權責歸屬經得起最嚴格的檢驗，國家元首的領導力也才能充分彰顯。
台灣仍是充滿希望的地方。每年參加各種國際設計大賽的得獎人數不斷攀升，青春活力投入文創。台灣農村在年輕世代返鄉務農後，展現新風貌，各種結合文化休閒的產業慢慢抬頭。這樣的青春生命力，怎麼可能沒有希望？充滿活力的台灣，充滿創造力的青春世代，充滿奮鬥意志的新世代，只要政府展現足夠的領導能力，台灣要走出困境，絕對不是難題。
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
Cross-Strait Progress Requires Innovative Thinking
Cross-Strait Progress Requires Innovative Thinking
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 14, 2012
Summary: The two sides must relate to each other on the basis of peace. They can expand economic exchanges. They can increase cultural understanding. But democracy is essential. The two sides must interact. They must implement democratic reforms. Only then can they talk about how to solve the "one China" problem. Only then can they put people at ease. Only then will the people have confidence in cross-strait policy.
Full Text below:
Let us take a long term historical perspective. We have the best opportunity in over a century to promote cross-Strait interaction. Yet we have reached a bottleneck. What we need now from authorities on both sides is boldness of vision, generosity of spirit, and decisiveness of action. They must plan their moves, break the current impasse, and create new opportunities.
Since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the two sides have broken through many barriers. Direct flights, financial cooperation, opening up the island to Mainland tourism, signing ECFA, exchange visits between increasingly higher ranking officials, even talk of military cooperation. These show that cross-Strait interaction is moving in the right direction, that they are more and more far-reaching, and that non-governmental economic exchanges are thriving. But despite the optimism, dark clouds linger. The public on Taiwan remains uncertain of the Mainland, and this uncertainty is growing. The public is increasingly dubious about the government's Mainland policy.
There are several facets to these concerns. First, compare conditions on the two sides of the Strait. The Mainland economy has risen. It has become the second largest economy in the world. Its strength has increased. Mainland China's influence in the world has increased accordingly. Conversely, this has reduced Taiwan's breathing space. Taiwan businesses must rely on Mainland factories and markets. But economic reliance does not imply political confidence. The public on Taiwan has deep misgivings about the Mainland's lack of democracy and human rights. The greater the economic reliance, the greater the fear that we may lose our political sovereignty, and that our fate will be sealed. "Do not let Taiwan become the next Hong Kong" has become a political slogan. This ambivalence is often exploited by politicians. It has become a pretext to smear others as "Communists."
Secondly, consider Taiwan's predicament. The Mainland has risen. Over the past several years Taiwan has been undergoing painful economic transformation. Electronics is becoming a sunset industry. The new leading industry has yet to emerge. The government lacks direction. The people lack confidence. Unemployment is increasing. Salaries are falling instead of rising. The public watches as the Mainland rises. Under the circumstances, people cannot help but feel frightened. Add to this the opening of Taiwan to Mainland tourism. The enormous purchasing power of Mainland tourists has enabled Taiwan's tourism industry to boom. But it has also undercut the Taiwan public's self-esteem. The contrast in their economic status humiliates them. This adds to their distrust of the government.
Thirdly, the government lacks direction. Its current framework is purely negative. This includes its "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" policy, its "mutual non-recognition" stance, and its "mutual non-repudiation" stance. None of these can break the deadlock. None of these can advance cross-Strait relations or create a new way to relate. The government lacks clear policy principles. It lacks a sense of direction. No one knows where the government's current policy is headed.
Our side is in decline. The other side is in ascendancy. The public cannot help but worry that one day the Mainland will have unlimited economic power. Taiwan will then be unable to extricate itself. Such concerns are inevitable. Therefore the government's task is to be bold and resolute. It must formulate a thoughtful and principled Mainland policy. This will enable it to resist the Mainland's increasingly urgent calls for political negotiations. This will also increase cohesion among the public on Taiwan. It will persuade the people to find a way out of this dilemma together.
Consider the current cross-Strait situation. Economic exchanges began once ECFA was signed. Many provisions have been implemented. Cultural exchanges have been frequent and close. Beijing has proposed an ECFA style cultural agreement. But given the current cross-Strait situation, the cultural industry needs intellectual property rights protection for its cultural products. The issue of access can be addressed for the moment by ECFA. Therefore it is not a matter of urgency.
Hu Jintao proposed a "cross-strait peace agreement" at the 18th National Congress. He responded to issues advanced by the Ma administration during the recent presidential election. The government can give it priority. It can ease the pressure, enabling the two sides to establish a long-lasting framework for peace.
The Mainland economy has a powerful attraction. The highest priority of Cross-Strait policy must be to increase Taiwan's breathing space. We must reclaim the initiative. We must lay down certain principles for cross-Strait negotiations. Democracy is one of Taiwan's most important cornerstones. Therefore, we should posit a "democratic China" as a common goal for both sides of the Strait. Only after the Mainland adopts democracy can the two sides begin negotiations on cross-Strait reunification. This would provide Taiwan with much needed time and space. We could then wait for the Mainland to undergo democratic reforms and for its society to mature. One day the Mainland will adopt democracy and the rule of law. The people will have adequate protection for their human rights, including freedom of speech. They will enjoy economic development, humane care, and balanced development. They can then talk about cross-Strait reunification or independence. It will no longer be a problem.
The two sides must relate to each other on the basis of peace. They can expand economic exchanges. They can increase cultural understanding. But democracy is essential. The two sides must interact. They must implement democratic reforms. Only then can they talk about how to solve the "one China" problem. Only then can they put people at ease. Only then will the people have confidence in cross-strait policy.
開創兩岸正向發展 需要新思維
2012-11-14
中國時報
從長遠的歷史眼光來看，兩岸現在的交流與互動，應該是一百多年來最好的時光。然而，它也走到了一個瓶頸，亟需兩岸當局以大氣魄、大胸襟、大作為，規畫方向與步驟，突破當前僵局，開創全新契機。
事實上，二○○八年馬政府執政以來，兩岸已突破相當多的侷限。直航、金融合作、開放陸客觀光、簽訂ＥＣＦＡ、層級提高的官員互訪、軍事合作的討論等，種種跡象顯示，兩岸的互動不僅朝向正面開展，且日漸深化，民間的經濟交流活動也充滿活力。然而，在這一片樂觀中，仍有烏雲慢慢籠罩，那就是台灣民間對大陸的不確定感愈來愈強，對政府大陸政策的疑慮也愈來愈深。
這樣的疑慮來自於幾個方面。第一，兩岸形勢的對比。大陸經濟的崛起，已成為世界第二大經濟體，而隨著國力的增強，中國在世界的影響力日增，相對的也壓縮了台灣的生存空間，同時也迫使台灣的企業不得不倚賴中國大陸的工廠與市場。問題即在於，經濟上的倚賴，不等於政治上的態度。台灣人對大陸缺乏民主人權的種種危害，疑慮日深。經濟上愈是倚賴，政治上反而更害怕喪失獨立自主權力，成為被決定的命運。「不要讓台灣成為下一個香港」變成一個政治口號。這種矛盾心態，常常被政客利用，而成為各種抹黑抹紅的藉口。
第二，台灣的困境。相對於大陸的崛起，台灣這幾年的經濟發展出現轉型的困境。電子產業走向黃昏，新興主導產業無法出現，整個政府缺乏主導的方向，民間信心喪失，失業上升，薪水不升反降。這種情勢下，人民看見大陸的崛起，不免感到心驚。再加上此時開放陸客來台觀光，他們強大的消費力，讓台灣觀光產業一片榮景，但也讓台灣人的自尊心在對比下感到委曲。這就更增加對政府的不信任。
第三，政府缺乏方向感。現有的架構，其實都是「否定敘述」。包括「不統不獨不武」，從「互不承認」到「互不否認」，都只是解開了僵局，不能為兩岸的正向發展，開創新局。政府缺乏明確政策原則與方向，以致於無人知道現在的政策最後要走向何方？
在此種「我消彼長」的對比下，民間不免憂心有朝一日被大陸無限的經濟力吸納進去，再無脫身餘地，疑慮必然產生。因此，政府當前之要務，乃是拿出魄力，擘畫一個有思想、有理念的大陸政策，一方面是抵擋大陸愈來愈急迫的政治談判壓力，另一方面是以此凝聚台灣共識，說服民眾，共同走出困境。
考察當前兩岸情勢，經濟的交流在簽訂ＥＣＦＡ之後，許多子項目逐一展開，而文化交流方面也相當有活力，交流頻繁密切。雖然北京提出比照ＥＣＦＡ簽訂「文化協議」的倡議，但就兩岸現況來看，文化產業最主要的是智慧財產權保護及文化產品准入的課題，目前都可由ＥＣＦＡ解決，因此並無急迫性。
反而是胡錦濤在十八大中所提出的「兩岸和平協議」，呼應馬總統在今年選前拋出的議題，政府可以優先予以考慮。因為它可以緩和壓力，為兩岸設定一個可長可久的和平架構。
此時我們該思考的最重要策略是：在大陸經濟的強大吸力下，如何在政策上設定議題，為台灣爭取最大、最有利的空間。簡言之，我們必須化被動為主動，為兩岸的談判設定一些基本原則。而民主是台灣最重要的基石。因此，我們應該設定，「民主中國」是兩岸人民共同的目標，唯有在大陸達到民主之後，才可以進入兩岸統一的談判。如此一來，台灣就有足夠的時間與空間，等待大陸的民主改革與社會成熟。等到有一天，大陸已經完成了民主、法治，人民可以享有足夠的人權保障與言論自由，經濟發展與人文關懷也平衡開展，再談兩岸的統一或獨立，就不是一個困難的課題了。
以兩岸和平為原則，以經濟持續深化交流，以文化達到深度了解，但以「民主中國」為必要條件，兩岸互助，進行民主體制改革，最後才談如何解決「一中」之後的問題。唯有如此才能讓台灣人民安心，讓人民對兩岸政策有信心。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 14, 2012
Summary: The two sides must relate to each other on the basis of peace. They can expand economic exchanges. They can increase cultural understanding. But democracy is essential. The two sides must interact. They must implement democratic reforms. Only then can they talk about how to solve the "one China" problem. Only then can they put people at ease. Only then will the people have confidence in cross-strait policy.
Full Text below:
Let us take a long term historical perspective. We have the best opportunity in over a century to promote cross-Strait interaction. Yet we have reached a bottleneck. What we need now from authorities on both sides is boldness of vision, generosity of spirit, and decisiveness of action. They must plan their moves, break the current impasse, and create new opportunities.
Since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the two sides have broken through many barriers. Direct flights, financial cooperation, opening up the island to Mainland tourism, signing ECFA, exchange visits between increasingly higher ranking officials, even talk of military cooperation. These show that cross-Strait interaction is moving in the right direction, that they are more and more far-reaching, and that non-governmental economic exchanges are thriving. But despite the optimism, dark clouds linger. The public on Taiwan remains uncertain of the Mainland, and this uncertainty is growing. The public is increasingly dubious about the government's Mainland policy.
There are several facets to these concerns. First, compare conditions on the two sides of the Strait. The Mainland economy has risen. It has become the second largest economy in the world. Its strength has increased. Mainland China's influence in the world has increased accordingly. Conversely, this has reduced Taiwan's breathing space. Taiwan businesses must rely on Mainland factories and markets. But economic reliance does not imply political confidence. The public on Taiwan has deep misgivings about the Mainland's lack of democracy and human rights. The greater the economic reliance, the greater the fear that we may lose our political sovereignty, and that our fate will be sealed. "Do not let Taiwan become the next Hong Kong" has become a political slogan. This ambivalence is often exploited by politicians. It has become a pretext to smear others as "Communists."
Secondly, consider Taiwan's predicament. The Mainland has risen. Over the past several years Taiwan has been undergoing painful economic transformation. Electronics is becoming a sunset industry. The new leading industry has yet to emerge. The government lacks direction. The people lack confidence. Unemployment is increasing. Salaries are falling instead of rising. The public watches as the Mainland rises. Under the circumstances, people cannot help but feel frightened. Add to this the opening of Taiwan to Mainland tourism. The enormous purchasing power of Mainland tourists has enabled Taiwan's tourism industry to boom. But it has also undercut the Taiwan public's self-esteem. The contrast in their economic status humiliates them. This adds to their distrust of the government.
Thirdly, the government lacks direction. Its current framework is purely negative. This includes its "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" policy, its "mutual non-recognition" stance, and its "mutual non-repudiation" stance. None of these can break the deadlock. None of these can advance cross-Strait relations or create a new way to relate. The government lacks clear policy principles. It lacks a sense of direction. No one knows where the government's current policy is headed.
Our side is in decline. The other side is in ascendancy. The public cannot help but worry that one day the Mainland will have unlimited economic power. Taiwan will then be unable to extricate itself. Such concerns are inevitable. Therefore the government's task is to be bold and resolute. It must formulate a thoughtful and principled Mainland policy. This will enable it to resist the Mainland's increasingly urgent calls for political negotiations. This will also increase cohesion among the public on Taiwan. It will persuade the people to find a way out of this dilemma together.
Consider the current cross-Strait situation. Economic exchanges began once ECFA was signed. Many provisions have been implemented. Cultural exchanges have been frequent and close. Beijing has proposed an ECFA style cultural agreement. But given the current cross-Strait situation, the cultural industry needs intellectual property rights protection for its cultural products. The issue of access can be addressed for the moment by ECFA. Therefore it is not a matter of urgency.
Hu Jintao proposed a "cross-strait peace agreement" at the 18th National Congress. He responded to issues advanced by the Ma administration during the recent presidential election. The government can give it priority. It can ease the pressure, enabling the two sides to establish a long-lasting framework for peace.
The Mainland economy has a powerful attraction. The highest priority of Cross-Strait policy must be to increase Taiwan's breathing space. We must reclaim the initiative. We must lay down certain principles for cross-Strait negotiations. Democracy is one of Taiwan's most important cornerstones. Therefore, we should posit a "democratic China" as a common goal for both sides of the Strait. Only after the Mainland adopts democracy can the two sides begin negotiations on cross-Strait reunification. This would provide Taiwan with much needed time and space. We could then wait for the Mainland to undergo democratic reforms and for its society to mature. One day the Mainland will adopt democracy and the rule of law. The people will have adequate protection for their human rights, including freedom of speech. They will enjoy economic development, humane care, and balanced development. They can then talk about cross-Strait reunification or independence. It will no longer be a problem.
The two sides must relate to each other on the basis of peace. They can expand economic exchanges. They can increase cultural understanding. But democracy is essential. The two sides must interact. They must implement democratic reforms. Only then can they talk about how to solve the "one China" problem. Only then can they put people at ease. Only then will the people have confidence in cross-strait policy.
開創兩岸正向發展 需要新思維
2012-11-14
中國時報
從長遠的歷史眼光來看，兩岸現在的交流與互動，應該是一百多年來最好的時光。然而，它也走到了一個瓶頸，亟需兩岸當局以大氣魄、大胸襟、大作為，規畫方向與步驟，突破當前僵局，開創全新契機。
事實上，二○○八年馬政府執政以來，兩岸已突破相當多的侷限。直航、金融合作、開放陸客觀光、簽訂ＥＣＦＡ、層級提高的官員互訪、軍事合作的討論等，種種跡象顯示，兩岸的互動不僅朝向正面開展，且日漸深化，民間的經濟交流活動也充滿活力。然而，在這一片樂觀中，仍有烏雲慢慢籠罩，那就是台灣民間對大陸的不確定感愈來愈強，對政府大陸政策的疑慮也愈來愈深。
這樣的疑慮來自於幾個方面。第一，兩岸形勢的對比。大陸經濟的崛起，已成為世界第二大經濟體，而隨著國力的增強，中國在世界的影響力日增，相對的也壓縮了台灣的生存空間，同時也迫使台灣的企業不得不倚賴中國大陸的工廠與市場。問題即在於，經濟上的倚賴，不等於政治上的態度。台灣人對大陸缺乏民主人權的種種危害，疑慮日深。經濟上愈是倚賴，政治上反而更害怕喪失獨立自主權力，成為被決定的命運。「不要讓台灣成為下一個香港」變成一個政治口號。這種矛盾心態，常常被政客利用，而成為各種抹黑抹紅的藉口。
第二，台灣的困境。相對於大陸的崛起，台灣這幾年的經濟發展出現轉型的困境。電子產業走向黃昏，新興主導產業無法出現，整個政府缺乏主導的方向，民間信心喪失，失業上升，薪水不升反降。這種情勢下，人民看見大陸的崛起，不免感到心驚。再加上此時開放陸客來台觀光，他們強大的消費力，讓台灣觀光產業一片榮景，但也讓台灣人的自尊心在對比下感到委曲。這就更增加對政府的不信任。
第三，政府缺乏方向感。現有的架構，其實都是「否定敘述」。包括「不統不獨不武」，從「互不承認」到「互不否認」，都只是解開了僵局，不能為兩岸的正向發展，開創新局。政府缺乏明確政策原則與方向，以致於無人知道現在的政策最後要走向何方？
在此種「我消彼長」的對比下，民間不免憂心有朝一日被大陸無限的經濟力吸納進去，再無脫身餘地，疑慮必然產生。因此，政府當前之要務，乃是拿出魄力，擘畫一個有思想、有理念的大陸政策，一方面是抵擋大陸愈來愈急迫的政治談判壓力，另一方面是以此凝聚台灣共識，說服民眾，共同走出困境。
考察當前兩岸情勢，經濟的交流在簽訂ＥＣＦＡ之後，許多子項目逐一展開，而文化交流方面也相當有活力，交流頻繁密切。雖然北京提出比照ＥＣＦＡ簽訂「文化協議」的倡議，但就兩岸現況來看，文化產業最主要的是智慧財產權保護及文化產品准入的課題，目前都可由ＥＣＦＡ解決，因此並無急迫性。
反而是胡錦濤在十八大中所提出的「兩岸和平協議」，呼應馬總統在今年選前拋出的議題，政府可以優先予以考慮。因為它可以緩和壓力，為兩岸設定一個可長可久的和平架構。
此時我們該思考的最重要策略是：在大陸經濟的強大吸力下，如何在政策上設定議題，為台灣爭取最大、最有利的空間。簡言之，我們必須化被動為主動，為兩岸的談判設定一些基本原則。而民主是台灣最重要的基石。因此，我們應該設定，「民主中國」是兩岸人民共同的目標，唯有在大陸達到民主之後，才可以進入兩岸統一的談判。如此一來，台灣就有足夠的時間與空間，等待大陸的民主改革與社會成熟。等到有一天，大陸已經完成了民主、法治，人民可以享有足夠的人權保障與言論自由，經濟發展與人文關懷也平衡開展，再談兩岸的統一或獨立，就不是一個困難的課題了。
以兩岸和平為原則，以經濟持續深化交流，以文化達到深度了解，但以「民主中國」為必要條件，兩岸互助，進行民主體制改革，最後才談如何解決「一中」之後的問題。唯有如此才能讓台灣人民安心，讓人民對兩岸政策有信心。
Tuesday, November 13, 2012
Perceptible Economic Improvements Require Local Employment and Social Welfare
Perceptible Economic Improvements Require Local Employment and Social Welfare
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 13, 2012
Summary: The public on Taiwan is wracked with anxiety. Individuals and businesses have lost hope for the future. The Ma administration has become the target of public criticism. But the public does not expect much from the opposition either. The entire nation has lost its sense of direction and optimism. It has been sapped of its vitality. This newspaper plans to publish a series of editorials suggesting the direction the economy and cross-Strait interaction should take. We hope administration officials will consider them and act upon them. We hope they will enable the public on Taiwan to overcome difficulties and find a way out of their current plight.
Full Text Below:
Preface: The public on Taiwan is wracked with anxiety. Individuals and businesses have lost hope for the future. The Ma administration has become the target of public criticism. But the public does not expect much from the opposition either. The entire nation has lost its sense of direction and optimism. It has been sapped of its vitality. This newspaper plans to publish a series of editorials suggesting the direction the economy and cross-Strait interaction should take. We hope administration officials will consider them and act upon them. We hope they will enable the public on Taiwan to overcome difficulties and find a way out of their current plight.
Between 1970 and 1980, the ROC government was forced to with withdraw from the United Nations. It was forced to break off relations with the United States. These were major setbacks. It was also hit by two energy crises. Its current plight does not begin to compare. Yet it was able to negotiate these crises. It survived these difficult times. It could do so because people were willing to work together and possessed an indomitable spirit. Contrast then with now. Conditions on Taiwan now are far better than they were back then. Public enthusiasm and industry vitality have not diminished. The problem is a lack of general direction and forward momentum.
Taiwan's survival and growth are rooted in its economy and democracy. Economic development must be sustained, and democracy must be consolidated. These are the two cornerstones of ROC national growth. The government must take into account both internal and external conditions. It must establish guidelines and a direction, policy objectives and priorities. It must build consensus through the democratic process. It must make clear where individuals and businesses on Taiwan are headed. It must offer a vision for the future, and a concrete blueprint for its realization.
The Ma administration has drawn up numerous policy plans, including the Golden Decade Plan and the Economic Momentum Promotion Plan. These may be well-intentioned. But they were drawn up behind closed doors. out of touch with the pulse of society. The result of its armchair strategizing has been policies whose impact remain imperceptible. They were full of sound and fury, but signified nothing. What Taiwan needs most is a change in direction, towards a more feasible way of doing things. It must start by addressing economic issues that bear on people's lives. People are suffering. Their real wages have regressed to what they were 14 years ago. Consumer prices are rising. Housing prices are soaring. The economy is declining. Their jobs are no longer secure. Young people in their twenties and thirties are having trouble finding jobs. Salaries are low. They are afraid to get married. Those already married are afraid to have children. They are afraid their pensions may dry up. They have no hope for the future. These economic circumstances can hardly be blamed exclusively on the "macroclimate."
Sustainable economic development must be consistent with public welfare and local Taiwan conditions. The economy has grown nearly 4% per annum over the past decade or so. The government must ask itself why real wages have not increased accordingly. Two years ago the economy improved. The growth rate was a record 10,88%. So why has it remained imperceptible to the public? The answer is that the economy is overly dependent on exports in the ICT and other industries. It is overly dependent upon Mainland factories, upon low-cost, low margin, OEM exports. As a result fluctuations in the economy lead to disconnects in employment, wages, and economic growth. Income disparities arise. Corporate social responsibility becomes decoupled from local Taiwan development.
The government must change its thinking about industrial development and economic growth. It must promote a new model that integrates job growth and public welfare. It must establish testable long-term and short-term goals and detailed plans for implemenation. It must supplement this with educational reform and human resources policies. It must rekindle public hope and enthusiasm. It must unite the power of change and progress. It must move toward a new economic vision. Its policies cannot be exhaustive. The ruling administration must have a clear sense of priorities. It must not muddy the waters. It must not announce today that it is doing this, then tomorrow that it is doing that. It must not change its direction from day to day. If it does, it will never reach its destination. It must establish a new direction for the economy. This is its most important task. Merely providing cheap land, tax incentives, and cheap foreign labor, cannot bring about change and hope.
Distributive justice is also essential for sustainable economic development. The gaps between rich and poor, urban and rural, North and South continue to expand. The tax system remains unfair. Housing prices are too high in the major cities. Social welfare resource allocations are inequitable. Central and local fiscal revenue and expenditure allocations are disproportionate. Closely related to these are concerns over hidden debt in national labor insurance, and pensions for military veterans, civil service employees, and public school teachers. These highlight the problem of resource allocation and generational justice. They endanger the country's fiscal health and long term economic growth. Without drastic reform, fiscal and economic crises will quickly emerge.
But the promotion of economic growth runs counter to scrimping and saving on public welfare. Tax reform and the redistribution of resources will inevitably lead to social and class antagonisms. Therefore the government must establish a direction for reform. It must establish priorities. This will enable economic revival and distributive justice to go hand in hand. It should consider convening a National Conference to deal with highly sensitive pension fund reforms and other fiscal and distributive justice issues.
Democracy is another cornerstone of Taiwan's survival and growth. Is the most effective weapon against Beijing's reunification tactics. Mainland China has risen. Taiwan must promote cross-Strait peace and development and establish cross-Strait free trade. Cross-Strait economic integration has accelerated. But the government must assure the public that it is committed to maintaining Taiwan's economic primacy. It must assure them that Taiwan will not become "Hong Kong-ized." The government must offer a clear vision of cross-Strait peace and development. This will avoid unnecessary doubts and internal opposition. Once cross-Strait policy goals are clear, a new climate will emerge. Social cohesion will be significantly enhanced.
In short, a new direction will increase forward momentum. This is the first task of the ruling administration. It is also the way out of our current policy quagmire.
有感經濟 須結合在地就業與生活福祉
2012-11-13
中國時報
前言：近來台灣社會充滿焦慮感，人民和企業對未來茫然失措，馬政府成為眾矢之的，但民眾對反對黨也沒有太多期待，整個國家失去方向與動能，元氣渙散；本報從經濟方向、兩岸互動與再現領導力，規畫系列社論提供宏觀建言，盼執政者深思並有所作為，帶領台灣突破困境，走出一條路來。
在一九七○至一九八○年代，台灣曾經歷退出聯合國、中美斷交等重大挫折，又遭遇兩次能源危機衝擊，處境危殆非今時可比，但台灣卻能履險如夷，安度難關，其關鍵就在於全民有共同努力的方向與不屈不撓的奮進精神。相較之下，今日台灣各種條件遠勝過去，人民的熱情及企業活力亦未消失，問題核心是須找回台灣發展的方向與前進動能。
台灣生存發展的根基在經濟和民主，經濟永續發展及民主不斷深化，是構築國家發展方向及台灣願景的兩大基石。政府的職責要審酌內外大環境，指引國家大方向，擬定施政目標和優先順序，並透過民主程序，凝聚共識，讓人民和企業很清楚的認知台灣要往哪裡走，未來的願景是什麼，具體實踐藍圖為何。
馬政府提出很多施政規畫例如「黃金十年」計畫、「經濟動能推升方案」等，或許立意良好，但閉門造車，和社會脈動脫節，以致流為紙上作業及形式大於實質的「無感」施政。事實上，台灣現在最需要的是找出改變的方向與具體可行的做法。從攸關民生的經濟問題切入，人民切身之痛是實質薪資退回到十四年前水準，又面對物價漲、房價飆，更擔心景氣差、工作不保；二、三十歲的年輕人找工作困難，薪水又低，不敢結婚，結婚又不敢生孩子，將來還怕沒有退休金可領，對未來沒有希望，而這樣的經濟情境豈全是外在大環境不佳所致！
經濟永續發展必須和人民福祉及台灣這塊土地結合在一起。政府須徹底反省何以十多年來平均每年近四％的經濟成長率不能反映到實質薪資增加？何以前年景氣好轉、經濟成長率創下一○.八八％佳績，但人民依然無感？問題癥結就在過於依賴資通訊等產業出口，依賴「以大陸為工廠」，依賴低成本、低毛利的代工出口模式，造成景氣波動加大，就業及薪資和經濟成長脫節，所得分配差距擴大，企業社會責任和台灣本土發展脫鉤。
政府唯有徹底改變這樣的產業發展與經濟思維，提出一套能夠結合在地就業及人民生活福祉的新成長模式，訂定可供檢驗的長短期目標及有力配套作為，並輔以教育及人才政策改革，才能重燃人民的希望和熱情，凝聚改變與進步的動力，朝向新的經濟願景邁進。施政無法同時間面面俱到，執政者必須想清楚輕重緩急、不可繼續模糊以對，今天宣布要做這個、明天又改變政策，天天轉彎，永遠也到不了目的地。尋找、確立經濟的新方向，是「重中之重」的台灣發展課題。若只是在提供廉價土地、租稅優惠、增加廉價外勞等枝節問題上打轉，絕不可能帶來改變與希望。
分配正義是維繫經濟永續發展另一重要環節。台灣貧富、城鄉、南北差距持續擴大，和稅制不公平、都會區房價過高、社福資源分配扭曲及中央和地方財政收支劃分不當等，息息相關；最近引發全國關切的勞工保險、軍公教退休金及國民年金等隱藏性債務，不僅凸顯資源分配及世代正義問題，更危及國家財政及經濟持續發展。若不大刀闊斧改革現狀，財政及經濟危機將快速浮現。
但是，推動節衣縮食的福利削減和拚經濟背道而馳，稅制改革及資源重新分配更難免引發社會及階級對立，因此，政府須確立改革大方向，並訂定優先緩急順序，讓經濟再造和分配正義能併行不悖。召開國是會議處理高度敏感的各類退休基金改革及相關財政及分配正義等課題，應是可考慮的積極作為。
民主是台灣生存發展的另一基石，也是台灣面對北京對台統戰的最有效利器。中國大陸崛起後，推動兩岸和平發展及建立兩岸自由貿易關係，是台灣必須走的正確道路，但是，在兩岸經濟加速統合的過程中，政府須讓人民知道如何致力維持台灣經濟的主體性，不會走向「香港化」；政府更須清楚地告訴人民兩岸和平發展的願景在哪裡，避免不必要疑慮與內部對立。兩岸政策方向與目標清楚明確，自會有煥然一新的氣象，社會凝聚力也會大幅增強。
總之，指引台灣發展新方向，激發前進的動能，是執政者首要之務，也是步出當前施政泥淖的關鍵一步。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 13, 2012
Summary: The public on Taiwan is wracked with anxiety. Individuals and businesses have lost hope for the future. The Ma administration has become the target of public criticism. But the public does not expect much from the opposition either. The entire nation has lost its sense of direction and optimism. It has been sapped of its vitality. This newspaper plans to publish a series of editorials suggesting the direction the economy and cross-Strait interaction should take. We hope administration officials will consider them and act upon them. We hope they will enable the public on Taiwan to overcome difficulties and find a way out of their current plight.
Full Text Below:
Preface: The public on Taiwan is wracked with anxiety. Individuals and businesses have lost hope for the future. The Ma administration has become the target of public criticism. But the public does not expect much from the opposition either. The entire nation has lost its sense of direction and optimism. It has been sapped of its vitality. This newspaper plans to publish a series of editorials suggesting the direction the economy and cross-Strait interaction should take. We hope administration officials will consider them and act upon them. We hope they will enable the public on Taiwan to overcome difficulties and find a way out of their current plight.
Between 1970 and 1980, the ROC government was forced to with withdraw from the United Nations. It was forced to break off relations with the United States. These were major setbacks. It was also hit by two energy crises. Its current plight does not begin to compare. Yet it was able to negotiate these crises. It survived these difficult times. It could do so because people were willing to work together and possessed an indomitable spirit. Contrast then with now. Conditions on Taiwan now are far better than they were back then. Public enthusiasm and industry vitality have not diminished. The problem is a lack of general direction and forward momentum.
Taiwan's survival and growth are rooted in its economy and democracy. Economic development must be sustained, and democracy must be consolidated. These are the two cornerstones of ROC national growth. The government must take into account both internal and external conditions. It must establish guidelines and a direction, policy objectives and priorities. It must build consensus through the democratic process. It must make clear where individuals and businesses on Taiwan are headed. It must offer a vision for the future, and a concrete blueprint for its realization.
The Ma administration has drawn up numerous policy plans, including the Golden Decade Plan and the Economic Momentum Promotion Plan. These may be well-intentioned. But they were drawn up behind closed doors. out of touch with the pulse of society. The result of its armchair strategizing has been policies whose impact remain imperceptible. They were full of sound and fury, but signified nothing. What Taiwan needs most is a change in direction, towards a more feasible way of doing things. It must start by addressing economic issues that bear on people's lives. People are suffering. Their real wages have regressed to what they were 14 years ago. Consumer prices are rising. Housing prices are soaring. The economy is declining. Their jobs are no longer secure. Young people in their twenties and thirties are having trouble finding jobs. Salaries are low. They are afraid to get married. Those already married are afraid to have children. They are afraid their pensions may dry up. They have no hope for the future. These economic circumstances can hardly be blamed exclusively on the "macroclimate."
Sustainable economic development must be consistent with public welfare and local Taiwan conditions. The economy has grown nearly 4% per annum over the past decade or so. The government must ask itself why real wages have not increased accordingly. Two years ago the economy improved. The growth rate was a record 10,88%. So why has it remained imperceptible to the public? The answer is that the economy is overly dependent on exports in the ICT and other industries. It is overly dependent upon Mainland factories, upon low-cost, low margin, OEM exports. As a result fluctuations in the economy lead to disconnects in employment, wages, and economic growth. Income disparities arise. Corporate social responsibility becomes decoupled from local Taiwan development.
The government must change its thinking about industrial development and economic growth. It must promote a new model that integrates job growth and public welfare. It must establish testable long-term and short-term goals and detailed plans for implemenation. It must supplement this with educational reform and human resources policies. It must rekindle public hope and enthusiasm. It must unite the power of change and progress. It must move toward a new economic vision. Its policies cannot be exhaustive. The ruling administration must have a clear sense of priorities. It must not muddy the waters. It must not announce today that it is doing this, then tomorrow that it is doing that. It must not change its direction from day to day. If it does, it will never reach its destination. It must establish a new direction for the economy. This is its most important task. Merely providing cheap land, tax incentives, and cheap foreign labor, cannot bring about change and hope.
Distributive justice is also essential for sustainable economic development. The gaps between rich and poor, urban and rural, North and South continue to expand. The tax system remains unfair. Housing prices are too high in the major cities. Social welfare resource allocations are inequitable. Central and local fiscal revenue and expenditure allocations are disproportionate. Closely related to these are concerns over hidden debt in national labor insurance, and pensions for military veterans, civil service employees, and public school teachers. These highlight the problem of resource allocation and generational justice. They endanger the country's fiscal health and long term economic growth. Without drastic reform, fiscal and economic crises will quickly emerge.
But the promotion of economic growth runs counter to scrimping and saving on public welfare. Tax reform and the redistribution of resources will inevitably lead to social and class antagonisms. Therefore the government must establish a direction for reform. It must establish priorities. This will enable economic revival and distributive justice to go hand in hand. It should consider convening a National Conference to deal with highly sensitive pension fund reforms and other fiscal and distributive justice issues.
Democracy is another cornerstone of Taiwan's survival and growth. Is the most effective weapon against Beijing's reunification tactics. Mainland China has risen. Taiwan must promote cross-Strait peace and development and establish cross-Strait free trade. Cross-Strait economic integration has accelerated. But the government must assure the public that it is committed to maintaining Taiwan's economic primacy. It must assure them that Taiwan will not become "Hong Kong-ized." The government must offer a clear vision of cross-Strait peace and development. This will avoid unnecessary doubts and internal opposition. Once cross-Strait policy goals are clear, a new climate will emerge. Social cohesion will be significantly enhanced.
In short, a new direction will increase forward momentum. This is the first task of the ruling administration. It is also the way out of our current policy quagmire.
有感經濟 須結合在地就業與生活福祉
2012-11-13
中國時報
前言：近來台灣社會充滿焦慮感，人民和企業對未來茫然失措，馬政府成為眾矢之的，但民眾對反對黨也沒有太多期待，整個國家失去方向與動能，元氣渙散；本報從經濟方向、兩岸互動與再現領導力，規畫系列社論提供宏觀建言，盼執政者深思並有所作為，帶領台灣突破困境，走出一條路來。
在一九七○至一九八○年代，台灣曾經歷退出聯合國、中美斷交等重大挫折，又遭遇兩次能源危機衝擊，處境危殆非今時可比，但台灣卻能履險如夷，安度難關，其關鍵就在於全民有共同努力的方向與不屈不撓的奮進精神。相較之下，今日台灣各種條件遠勝過去，人民的熱情及企業活力亦未消失，問題核心是須找回台灣發展的方向與前進動能。
台灣生存發展的根基在經濟和民主，經濟永續發展及民主不斷深化，是構築國家發展方向及台灣願景的兩大基石。政府的職責要審酌內外大環境，指引國家大方向，擬定施政目標和優先順序，並透過民主程序，凝聚共識，讓人民和企業很清楚的認知台灣要往哪裡走，未來的願景是什麼，具體實踐藍圖為何。
馬政府提出很多施政規畫例如「黃金十年」計畫、「經濟動能推升方案」等，或許立意良好，但閉門造車，和社會脈動脫節，以致流為紙上作業及形式大於實質的「無感」施政。事實上，台灣現在最需要的是找出改變的方向與具體可行的做法。從攸關民生的經濟問題切入，人民切身之痛是實質薪資退回到十四年前水準，又面對物價漲、房價飆，更擔心景氣差、工作不保；二、三十歲的年輕人找工作困難，薪水又低，不敢結婚，結婚又不敢生孩子，將來還怕沒有退休金可領，對未來沒有希望，而這樣的經濟情境豈全是外在大環境不佳所致！
經濟永續發展必須和人民福祉及台灣這塊土地結合在一起。政府須徹底反省何以十多年來平均每年近四％的經濟成長率不能反映到實質薪資增加？何以前年景氣好轉、經濟成長率創下一○.八八％佳績，但人民依然無感？問題癥結就在過於依賴資通訊等產業出口，依賴「以大陸為工廠」，依賴低成本、低毛利的代工出口模式，造成景氣波動加大，就業及薪資和經濟成長脫節，所得分配差距擴大，企業社會責任和台灣本土發展脫鉤。
政府唯有徹底改變這樣的產業發展與經濟思維，提出一套能夠結合在地就業及人民生活福祉的新成長模式，訂定可供檢驗的長短期目標及有力配套作為，並輔以教育及人才政策改革，才能重燃人民的希望和熱情，凝聚改變與進步的動力，朝向新的經濟願景邁進。施政無法同時間面面俱到，執政者必須想清楚輕重緩急、不可繼續模糊以對，今天宣布要做這個、明天又改變政策，天天轉彎，永遠也到不了目的地。尋找、確立經濟的新方向，是「重中之重」的台灣發展課題。若只是在提供廉價土地、租稅優惠、增加廉價外勞等枝節問題上打轉，絕不可能帶來改變與希望。
分配正義是維繫經濟永續發展另一重要環節。台灣貧富、城鄉、南北差距持續擴大，和稅制不公平、都會區房價過高、社福資源分配扭曲及中央和地方財政收支劃分不當等，息息相關；最近引發全國關切的勞工保險、軍公教退休金及國民年金等隱藏性債務，不僅凸顯資源分配及世代正義問題，更危及國家財政及經濟持續發展。若不大刀闊斧改革現狀，財政及經濟危機將快速浮現。
但是，推動節衣縮食的福利削減和拚經濟背道而馳，稅制改革及資源重新分配更難免引發社會及階級對立，因此，政府須確立改革大方向，並訂定優先緩急順序，讓經濟再造和分配正義能併行不悖。召開國是會議處理高度敏感的各類退休基金改革及相關財政及分配正義等課題，應是可考慮的積極作為。
民主是台灣生存發展的另一基石，也是台灣面對北京對台統戰的最有效利器。中國大陸崛起後，推動兩岸和平發展及建立兩岸自由貿易關係，是台灣必須走的正確道路，但是，在兩岸經濟加速統合的過程中，政府須讓人民知道如何致力維持台灣經濟的主體性，不會走向「香港化」；政府更須清楚地告訴人民兩岸和平發展的願景在哪裡，避免不必要疑慮與內部對立。兩岸政策方向與目標清楚明確，自會有煥然一新的氣象，社會凝聚力也會大幅增強。
總之，指引台灣發展新方向，激發前進的動能，是執政者首要之務，也是步出當前施政泥淖的關鍵一步。
Monday, November 12, 2012
The Key to 2016 Remains the 1992 Consensus
The Key to 2016 Remains the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2012
Summary: The two sides of the Strait have suddenly decided to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. If today one asks "Is there a 1992 consensus?" The answer is "Yes there is. And this is its 20th anniversary." The year 2016 will be the 24th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. We now know what the theme of the 14th Republic of China presidential election will be. It will be "Is there a 1992 consensus?" and "Do you recognize the 1992 consensus?"
Full Text below:
The two sides of the Strait have suddenly decided to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. If today one asks "Is there a 1992 consensus?" The answer is "Yes there is. And this is its 20th anniversary."
We say "suddenly" because this is the first time we have actually commemorated the 1992 consensus. Ten years ago, in 2002, we did not commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 1992 consensus. Back then, the Chen Shui-bian regime denied the existence of any 1992 consensus. Even Beijing did not recognize it.
The 1992 consensus was affirmed as policy in 2005, during the Lien-Hu Summit. Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008. The 1992 consensus went from being KMT party policy to being Republic of China national policy. On March 26, 2008, Mainland President Hu Jintao spoke on the hotline with US President George W. Bush. He too proclaimed that the 1992 consensus was People's Republic of China "national policy." President Hu Jintao said "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan should resume consultations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. Both sides recognize only one China, but agree to define that one China differently."
Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh argue that the term "1992 consensus" was never actually used in 1992. That is true. But its intent, "one China, different interpretations," was abundantly clear. Later Lee Teng-hui proclaimed his "two states theory." The nation underwent a change in ruling parties, and the Chen administration came to power. Back then Beijing did not recognize the 1992 consensus either, and resisted it. But the Lien-Hu Summit was convened in 2005. Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election in 2008. Bush and Hu spoke on the hotline and endorsed the 1992 consensus. Flowers bloomed on a once dead branch. Today the 1992 consensus is a verdant tree that has been around for a two full decades.
To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the 1992 consensus, is to affirm its status. The KMT and CCP must be concerned about the future of the 1992 consensus. The DPP must realize that the 1992 consensus is irreplaceable.
First consider development. We previously cited the hotline conversation between Bush and Hu. Basically Beijing acknowledged the 1992 consensus, i.e., "one China, different interpretations," and committed itself to it. Over the years, the Ma administration has repeatedly stressed "one China, different interpretations." Beijing has not repudiated "one China, different interpretations." But its actions have contradicted "one China, different interpretations." It has accomplished its goals within the "one China framework." It has drawn distinctions between its position and "one China, different interpretations." The latter, "one China, different interpretations," does not make as strong a case for reunification. Therefore if one wishes to reaffirm the "one China framework," one should move toward a "big roof concept of one China, different interpretations." Such a "one China, different interpretations" concept would make a stronger case for reunification. We suggest that the two sides seek a peace agreement and long term peaceful development on the basis of the "big roof theory of one China, different interpretations."
The 1992 consensus is irreplaceable. The DPP knows perfectly well that the 1992 consensus is a pillar of cross-Strait peaceful development. But from day one, it has repudiated the 1992 consensus. Therefore it cannot recant. Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen, and Frank Hsieh have all insisted something along the lines of "There was no such thing as the term 1992 consensus." Their implication is that as long as the DPP is not forced to admit that anyone used the term "1992 consensus," then the DPP can advance a different argument. It can for example accept the "spirit of the 1992 talks." Frank Hsieh's recent visit to the Mainland tested the waters. He wanted to see whether his "constitutional consensus" could replace the "1992 consensus." He wanted to see if his "different constitutions, different interpretations" could replace "one China, different interpretations." His sole motive was to avoid the term "1992 consensus." It was an attempt to save face. But Wang Yi, Director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office responded to Frank Hsieh on the spot. He insisted on using the term "1992 consensus." Now the two sides are commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus.
This is the DPP's dilemma. Beijing does not think Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" can replace the "1992 consensus." Also, DPP party leaders say the "constitutional consensus" is in violation of the Taiwan independence party platform and the rectification of names. They even denounce it as "tribute," "surrender," and "subservience." The situation has changed. The DPP might be willing to adopt Frank Hsieh's terminology. But Beijing might not. If on the other hand, the DPP repudiates Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus," then it would essentially repudiating the Republic of China Constitution. It would be essentially be returning to the advocacy of Taiwan independence. Even its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" would no longer be viable. The DPP's cross-Strait policy is essentially sailing against the wind. It is not advancing. Instead, it is lagging behind. This is the DPP's dilemma.
Frank Hsieh want to transform the DPP. But he does not want to compel the DPP to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But the term "1992 consensus" is the product of 20 years of blood, sweat, and tears. How can the DPP simply change its name? Besides, the euphemism "constitutional consensus" has also been rejected by Taiwan independence forces. Therefore unless the DPP refuses to undergo transformation, the term "1992 consensus" remains irreplaceable. .
The year 2016 will be the 24th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. We now know what the theme of the 14th Republic of China presidential election will be. It will be "Is there a 1992 consensus?" and "Do you recognize the 1992 consensus?"
二○一六年的關鍵仍在九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.11
突如其來，兩岸皆在舉辦「紀念九二共識二十周年」的活動。此時若再問：「有沒有九二共識？」答案是：「有，而且已二十周年了。」
說它突如其來，係因這是首次出現「紀念九二共識」的活動；十年前，二○○二年，未聞「紀念九二共識十周年」，因為當年非但陳水扁政府否認「九二共識」，連北京也不承認。
「九 二共識」是在二○○五年「連胡會」中，確立了它的政策性地位；而至二○○八年，馬英九當選總統，始由國民黨的政黨政策轉為中華民國政府的「國策」；並至二 ○○八年三月廿六日，大陸胡錦濤主席在與小布希總統熱線電話中宣示了相關的理念，亦成中華人民共和國的「國策」，胡主席說：「中國大陸與台灣應在『九二共 識』的基礎上恢復協商，亦即雙方都承認只有一個中國，但同意彼此定義不同。」
正如蔡英文與謝長廷所說，一九九二當 年，確實沒有「九二共識」這「四個字」；但「一中各表」的論述與精神俱在。後來，李登輝發表「兩國論」，繼而民進黨又政黨輪替，扁政府上台，北京遂不承認 「九二共識」，以相抵制。但自二○○五年連胡會，至二○○八年馬英九勝選，再加上「布胡熱線」的背書，「九二共識」又枯木生花，如今已然是一棵枝繁葉茂的 巨木，堂堂屆滿二十周年。
「紀念九二共識二十周年」，是在深化鞏固「九二共識」的政策性地位。對國、共兩黨而言，未來應關注「九二共識」的發展性；對民進黨而言，則必須認知「九二共識」的不可替換性。
先 談發展性。前文所引「布胡熱線」的談話，應是北京對「九二共識」的基本認知與承諾，亦即「一中各表」；但多年來，北京雖向未否定馬政府再三強調的「一中各 表」，卻在自己的操作上諱言「一中各表」，而著力於「一中框架」。這是因為「一中各表」仍有切割性，而少整合力；然而，倘若要確定「一中框架」，即應朝向 「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」去演進，此即「一中各表」的發展性，也將是一種具有整合力的「一中各表」。我們建議：兩岸應在「大屋頂中國的一中各表」之 上，尋求建立《和平協議》之類的機制，並在此一基礎上和平發展，共謀遠大。
再論不可替換性。民進黨明知「九二共識」 是兩岸和平發展的支柱，卻因一路否認「九二共識」，如今弄得不知如何收拾。自陳水扁、蔡英文，到謝長廷，都說過「沒有九二共識這四個字」這類的話；言下之 意是，只要不逼民進黨承認這「四個字」，只要換個說法，就可接受「九二會談的精神」。謝長廷此行即在試探，能否用「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，用「憲法 各表」取代「一中各表」；不為別的，只在避開「九二共識」這四個字，要一個下台階。但是，國台辦主任王毅當場即回應謝長廷，還是「九二共識」這四個字，而 如今兩岸又在紀念「九二共識二十周年」。
這是民進黨的困境。謝長廷的「憲法共識」，一方面北京認為不能取代「九二共 識」，另一方面又在黨內被指為違反台獨黨綱、正名制憲，甚至被斥為「朝貢」、「投降」、「奴才」；情勢變化至此，民進黨若接受謝長廷的論述，卻未必會被北 京接受；但若否定了謝長廷的「憲法共識」，則不啻宣告根本不承認中華民國憲法，更形同又回到了台獨本位，連《台灣前途決議文》也就撐持不住了。此際，民進 黨在兩岸政策上竟如逆水行舟，不進則退，這是民進黨的困境。
謝長廷的想法是：可以轉型，但能不能不逼民進黨承認「九 二共識」這「四個字」？然而，「九二共識」這四個字，卻是經由二十年日月精華的錘煉，及心血汗淚的薰陶所成就，民進黨能叫它改名換姓嗎？何況，易名「憲法 共識」亦被獨派拒絕。因而，除非民進黨拒絕轉型，「九二共識」這「四個字」仍有其不可替換性。
如今可以預言，到了二○一六年，「九二共識」將屆二十四周年；在當年的中華民國第十四屆總統大選中，依然未改的題目是：「有沒有九二共識？承不承認九二共識？」
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2012
Summary: The two sides of the Strait have suddenly decided to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. If today one asks "Is there a 1992 consensus?" The answer is "Yes there is. And this is its 20th anniversary." The year 2016 will be the 24th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. We now know what the theme of the 14th Republic of China presidential election will be. It will be "Is there a 1992 consensus?" and "Do you recognize the 1992 consensus?"
Full Text below:
The two sides of the Strait have suddenly decided to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. If today one asks "Is there a 1992 consensus?" The answer is "Yes there is. And this is its 20th anniversary."
We say "suddenly" because this is the first time we have actually commemorated the 1992 consensus. Ten years ago, in 2002, we did not commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 1992 consensus. Back then, the Chen Shui-bian regime denied the existence of any 1992 consensus. Even Beijing did not recognize it.
The 1992 consensus was affirmed as policy in 2005, during the Lien-Hu Summit. Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008. The 1992 consensus went from being KMT party policy to being Republic of China national policy. On March 26, 2008, Mainland President Hu Jintao spoke on the hotline with US President George W. Bush. He too proclaimed that the 1992 consensus was People's Republic of China "national policy." President Hu Jintao said "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan should resume consultations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. Both sides recognize only one China, but agree to define that one China differently."
Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh argue that the term "1992 consensus" was never actually used in 1992. That is true. But its intent, "one China, different interpretations," was abundantly clear. Later Lee Teng-hui proclaimed his "two states theory." The nation underwent a change in ruling parties, and the Chen administration came to power. Back then Beijing did not recognize the 1992 consensus either, and resisted it. But the Lien-Hu Summit was convened in 2005. Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election in 2008. Bush and Hu spoke on the hotline and endorsed the 1992 consensus. Flowers bloomed on a once dead branch. Today the 1992 consensus is a verdant tree that has been around for a two full decades.
To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the 1992 consensus, is to affirm its status. The KMT and CCP must be concerned about the future of the 1992 consensus. The DPP must realize that the 1992 consensus is irreplaceable.
First consider development. We previously cited the hotline conversation between Bush and Hu. Basically Beijing acknowledged the 1992 consensus, i.e., "one China, different interpretations," and committed itself to it. Over the years, the Ma administration has repeatedly stressed "one China, different interpretations." Beijing has not repudiated "one China, different interpretations." But its actions have contradicted "one China, different interpretations." It has accomplished its goals within the "one China framework." It has drawn distinctions between its position and "one China, different interpretations." The latter, "one China, different interpretations," does not make as strong a case for reunification. Therefore if one wishes to reaffirm the "one China framework," one should move toward a "big roof concept of one China, different interpretations." Such a "one China, different interpretations" concept would make a stronger case for reunification. We suggest that the two sides seek a peace agreement and long term peaceful development on the basis of the "big roof theory of one China, different interpretations."
The 1992 consensus is irreplaceable. The DPP knows perfectly well that the 1992 consensus is a pillar of cross-Strait peaceful development. But from day one, it has repudiated the 1992 consensus. Therefore it cannot recant. Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen, and Frank Hsieh have all insisted something along the lines of "There was no such thing as the term 1992 consensus." Their implication is that as long as the DPP is not forced to admit that anyone used the term "1992 consensus," then the DPP can advance a different argument. It can for example accept the "spirit of the 1992 talks." Frank Hsieh's recent visit to the Mainland tested the waters. He wanted to see whether his "constitutional consensus" could replace the "1992 consensus." He wanted to see if his "different constitutions, different interpretations" could replace "one China, different interpretations." His sole motive was to avoid the term "1992 consensus." It was an attempt to save face. But Wang Yi, Director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office responded to Frank Hsieh on the spot. He insisted on using the term "1992 consensus." Now the two sides are commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1992 consensus.
This is the DPP's dilemma. Beijing does not think Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" can replace the "1992 consensus." Also, DPP party leaders say the "constitutional consensus" is in violation of the Taiwan independence party platform and the rectification of names. They even denounce it as "tribute," "surrender," and "subservience." The situation has changed. The DPP might be willing to adopt Frank Hsieh's terminology. But Beijing might not. If on the other hand, the DPP repudiates Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus," then it would essentially repudiating the Republic of China Constitution. It would be essentially be returning to the advocacy of Taiwan independence. Even its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" would no longer be viable. The DPP's cross-Strait policy is essentially sailing against the wind. It is not advancing. Instead, it is lagging behind. This is the DPP's dilemma.
Frank Hsieh want to transform the DPP. But he does not want to compel the DPP to recognize the term "1992 consensus." But the term "1992 consensus" is the product of 20 years of blood, sweat, and tears. How can the DPP simply change its name? Besides, the euphemism "constitutional consensus" has also been rejected by Taiwan independence forces. Therefore unless the DPP refuses to undergo transformation, the term "1992 consensus" remains irreplaceable. .
The year 2016 will be the 24th anniversary of the 1992 consensus. We now know what the theme of the 14th Republic of China presidential election will be. It will be "Is there a 1992 consensus?" and "Do you recognize the 1992 consensus?"
二○一六年的關鍵仍在九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.11
突如其來，兩岸皆在舉辦「紀念九二共識二十周年」的活動。此時若再問：「有沒有九二共識？」答案是：「有，而且已二十周年了。」
說它突如其來，係因這是首次出現「紀念九二共識」的活動；十年前，二○○二年，未聞「紀念九二共識十周年」，因為當年非但陳水扁政府否認「九二共識」，連北京也不承認。
「九 二共識」是在二○○五年「連胡會」中，確立了它的政策性地位；而至二○○八年，馬英九當選總統，始由國民黨的政黨政策轉為中華民國政府的「國策」；並至二 ○○八年三月廿六日，大陸胡錦濤主席在與小布希總統熱線電話中宣示了相關的理念，亦成中華人民共和國的「國策」，胡主席說：「中國大陸與台灣應在『九二共 識』的基礎上恢復協商，亦即雙方都承認只有一個中國，但同意彼此定義不同。」
正如蔡英文與謝長廷所說，一九九二當 年，確實沒有「九二共識」這「四個字」；但「一中各表」的論述與精神俱在。後來，李登輝發表「兩國論」，繼而民進黨又政黨輪替，扁政府上台，北京遂不承認 「九二共識」，以相抵制。但自二○○五年連胡會，至二○○八年馬英九勝選，再加上「布胡熱線」的背書，「九二共識」又枯木生花，如今已然是一棵枝繁葉茂的 巨木，堂堂屆滿二十周年。
「紀念九二共識二十周年」，是在深化鞏固「九二共識」的政策性地位。對國、共兩黨而言，未來應關注「九二共識」的發展性；對民進黨而言，則必須認知「九二共識」的不可替換性。
先 談發展性。前文所引「布胡熱線」的談話，應是北京對「九二共識」的基本認知與承諾，亦即「一中各表」；但多年來，北京雖向未否定馬政府再三強調的「一中各 表」，卻在自己的操作上諱言「一中各表」，而著力於「一中框架」。這是因為「一中各表」仍有切割性，而少整合力；然而，倘若要確定「一中框架」，即應朝向 「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」去演進，此即「一中各表」的發展性，也將是一種具有整合力的「一中各表」。我們建議：兩岸應在「大屋頂中國的一中各表」之 上，尋求建立《和平協議》之類的機制，並在此一基礎上和平發展，共謀遠大。
再論不可替換性。民進黨明知「九二共識」 是兩岸和平發展的支柱，卻因一路否認「九二共識」，如今弄得不知如何收拾。自陳水扁、蔡英文，到謝長廷，都說過「沒有九二共識這四個字」這類的話；言下之 意是，只要不逼民進黨承認這「四個字」，只要換個說法，就可接受「九二會談的精神」。謝長廷此行即在試探，能否用「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，用「憲法 各表」取代「一中各表」；不為別的，只在避開「九二共識」這四個字，要一個下台階。但是，國台辦主任王毅當場即回應謝長廷，還是「九二共識」這四個字，而 如今兩岸又在紀念「九二共識二十周年」。
這是民進黨的困境。謝長廷的「憲法共識」，一方面北京認為不能取代「九二共 識」，另一方面又在黨內被指為違反台獨黨綱、正名制憲，甚至被斥為「朝貢」、「投降」、「奴才」；情勢變化至此，民進黨若接受謝長廷的論述，卻未必會被北 京接受；但若否定了謝長廷的「憲法共識」，則不啻宣告根本不承認中華民國憲法，更形同又回到了台獨本位，連《台灣前途決議文》也就撐持不住了。此際，民進 黨在兩岸政策上竟如逆水行舟，不進則退，這是民進黨的困境。
謝長廷的想法是：可以轉型，但能不能不逼民進黨承認「九 二共識」這「四個字」？然而，「九二共識」這四個字，卻是經由二十年日月精華的錘煉，及心血汗淚的薰陶所成就，民進黨能叫它改名換姓嗎？何況，易名「憲法 共識」亦被獨派拒絕。因而，除非民進黨拒絕轉型，「九二共識」這「四個字」仍有其不可替換性。
如今可以預言，到了二○一六年，「九二共識」將屆二十四周年；在當年的中華民國第十四屆總統大選中，依然未改的題目是：「有沒有九二共識？承不承認九二共識？」
Thursday, November 8, 2012
Hu Six Points: Innovations and Regrets
Hu Six Points: Innovations and Regrets
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2012
Summary: Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report. Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
Full Text below:
Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report.
His oral report reiterated "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." He stressed "the promotion the peaceful reunification per Jiang Zemin's Eight Point Proposal." But the written report, which was not read out loud, used milder more rational language. "I hope the two sides [of the Strait] can work together, explore cross-strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, make reasonable arrangements, discuss the creation of a military confidence building mechanism, and negotiate a cross-Strait peace agreement." Hu wrote, "Although the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one China has never changed ... the two sides should continue to oppose Taiwan independence, and continue to affirm the 1992 consensus ... "
The oral presentation and the written report can be compared. The oral report is almost an exact copy of the report to the 17th National Congress. Most of the passages are word for word copies. The standard cited is the old 1995 Jiang Eight Points cross-Strait framework. It issued a coarse declaration. Its theme was "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." The written report showed greater subtlety. It reiterated the Hu Six Points of 2008. Its themes were "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they remain parts of one China," and "[We must] explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
For the moment it is hard to know why Hu Jintao issued two versions of the cross-Strait report, one oral, and one written. Perhaps Hu wanted to distinguish between a "rhetorical edition" and an "operational edition." Perhaps Hu wanted his Hu Six Points to defer to the Jiang Eight Points. Perhaps Hu merely wanted to save time. Perhaps it was akin to the March 26, 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, Hu Jintao spoke of "one China, different interpretations." But afterwards this statement could be found only in the English version of Xinhua News Agency news reports. It was missing from the Chinese version.
Hu Jintao played a key role in changing the cross-Strait strategic scenario. The Hu Six Points is a major innovation. Its impact on cross-Strait relations far exceeds the impact of policies advanced by past CCP leaders. It surpassed the impact of the Jiang Eight Points, never mind the Yeh Nine Articles. Hu Jintao's innovations in cross-strait policy began with "peaceful development" during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. It evolved into "one China, different interpretations"during the March 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, into the Hu Six Points on New Years Eve 2008, and into the "two sides' existing provisions (constitutions)" bottom line during the Wu-Hu meeting if March 2012. Hu's statements reveal a unique and consistent thread. They recognize that the "circumstances are special, and the nation has yet to be reunified." In the past, Beijing did not accept the idea that the nation "has yet to be reunified." They equated "yet to be reunified" with "divided." Hu acknowledged that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they still belong to one China." Hu urged the two sides to "explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," including military confidence building mechanisms and a cross-Strait peace agreement. To use the language of the previous ARATS chairman Wang Daohan, the Hu Six Points can be considered an "in progress form of one China."
The final point in the Hu Six Points is the ending of hostilities, and the signing of a peace agreement. Since 2008, we have yet to end cross-Strait hostilities. We have yet to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. There are two reasons why we have not. One. The Ma administration was hesitant. It failed to do everything it could. It was insufficiently supportive of further improvements in cross-Strait relations. Two. The Hu regime advanced the aforementioned rational perspective on cross-Strait relations. But it failed to implement them at a practical level. For example, the Bush-Hu Hotline reference to "one China, different interpretations" was reported only in English. For example, it remained taboo to refer to "the two sides' existing provisions" as "constitutions." For example, Beijing referred to "exploring cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." But if refused to name political relations under these special circumstances. These political relations were relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. For example, Beijing said "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of one China." But why did it refuse to equate this "in progress form of one China" with the "big roof concept of China?"
The Hu Six Points thought of everything. But it failed to do may of them. In March of this year, during the Wu-Hu meeting, the two sides began discussing the parameters of "current provisions," i.e., the one China constitution. Some members of the DPP even advocated "constitutional consensus." This shows that the two sides can work together and support "one China, different interpretations under a big roof concept of China." If they do, they may be able to establish "political relations under these special circumstances." They may be able to establish a military confidence building mechanism or sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. They may be able to establish an "in progress form of one China." Isn't this what the Hu Six Points were aiming for? So why can't we do it?
Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
胡六點的發明與遺憾
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.09 01:47 am
中共總書記胡錦濤昨日十八大政治報告論及兩岸關係部分，口頭報告與書面報告呈現兩個版本。
口頭報告反覆申論「和平統一，一國兩制」，又強調「推動祖國和平統一進程的八項主張」（江八點）；但在未公開宣讀出來的部分書面報告中，則以比較平緩理智的筆觸寫道：「希望（兩岸）雙方共同努力，探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排；商談建立軍事安全互信機制……協商達成兩岸和平協議。」又道：「大陸和台灣雖然尚未統一，但兩岸同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……兩岸雙方應恪守反對台獨、堅持九二識的共同立場……。」
將口頭報告與書面報告對照可見：口頭報告幾乎完全複製十七大報告的版本，甚至多處原句照抄，所標舉的是儼然「江八點」（一九九五年）以前兩岸政策的陳舊架構，呈現出粗糙的宣示性，而以「和平統一，一國兩制」為軸心；但書面報告則呈現出比較細膩的操作性，主要是在重複演繹「胡六點」（二○○八年），著重在「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」及「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等思維。
目前難悉，胡錦濤為何要將兩岸報告分做口頭及書面兩種版本，也許是「宣示面」與「操作面」的區隔，也許是表示「胡六點」對「江八點」的謙讓，或許只是為了節省時間；這有如二○○八年三月廿六日，胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中宣示了「一中各表」，但事後僅見於新華社的英文稿中，中文版則闕如。
胡錦濤是扭轉兩岸大局的關鍵角色，「胡六點」則是重大發明，對兩岸關係的影響及開展，其作用遠逾過去所有中共領導人的政策主張，勝過「江八點」，更別論「葉九條」。胡錦濤對兩岸政策的發明，由二○○五年「連胡會」的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「雙方現行規定（憲法）底線論」，其中有一獨特且一貫的脈絡，即是接受「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」（過去北京不接受「尚未統一」的事實，認為尚未統一即是分裂），且認為「兩岸雖然尚未統一」，但仍然可以「同屬一個中國」，並主張研議探討對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」作出安排，此一安排可以是《（國家尚未統一的）軍事安全互信機制》，也或許是《（國家尚未統一的）兩岸和平協議》。若以前海協會會長汪道涵的語言來說，「胡六點」的思想可以說也是一種：「現在進行式的一個中國」。
胡六點的最後一點是：結束敵對狀態，簽定和平協議。自二○○八年以來，「結束（兩岸）敵對狀態」差堪作到，但「簽定（兩岸）和平協議」則功虧一簣。原因有二：一、馬政府瞻顧猶豫的風格與未盡人意的治理政績，皆不足支持兩岸關係更進一步；二、胡政權徒有前述理智貫通的思想體系，但在操作層面未見大開大闔，例如「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」僅見英文版，又如已經論及「雙方現行規定」卻諱稱「憲法」，再如研議「國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」卻不直指這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」，即中華民國與中華人民共和國之間的「特殊政治關係」，至於說「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，卻何以不直說這個「現在進行式的一個中國」，即是「大屋頂中國」？
胡六點都想到了，但都做不到。至今年三月「吳胡會」，雙方的論述已經走到「以現行規定（一中憲法）為準則」的地步，而民進黨內亦有「憲法共識」的主張；在在顯示，兩岸若能共同支撐起「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」，即可能建構起「特殊情況下的政治關係」，就可能簽定軍事安全互信機制或兩岸和平協議，也就可能出現「現在進行式的一個中國」。胡六點難道不是這樣想的嗎？但何以做不到？
胡錦濤在卸任的最後一次政治報告中，竟將「胡六點」的重大發明留在書面報告上而未宣讀出來，難道繼任者也將使其徒留空言而成歷史遺憾？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2012
Summary: Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report. Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
Full Text below:
Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report.
His oral report reiterated "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." He stressed "the promotion the peaceful reunification per Jiang Zemin's Eight Point Proposal." But the written report, which was not read out loud, used milder more rational language. "I hope the two sides [of the Strait] can work together, explore cross-strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, make reasonable arrangements, discuss the creation of a military confidence building mechanism, and negotiate a cross-Strait peace agreement." Hu wrote, "Although the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one China has never changed ... the two sides should continue to oppose Taiwan independence, and continue to affirm the 1992 consensus ... "
The oral presentation and the written report can be compared. The oral report is almost an exact copy of the report to the 17th National Congress. Most of the passages are word for word copies. The standard cited is the old 1995 Jiang Eight Points cross-Strait framework. It issued a coarse declaration. Its theme was "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." The written report showed greater subtlety. It reiterated the Hu Six Points of 2008. Its themes were "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they remain parts of one China," and "[We must] explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."
For the moment it is hard to know why Hu Jintao issued two versions of the cross-Strait report, one oral, and one written. Perhaps Hu wanted to distinguish between a "rhetorical edition" and an "operational edition." Perhaps Hu wanted his Hu Six Points to defer to the Jiang Eight Points. Perhaps Hu merely wanted to save time. Perhaps it was akin to the March 26, 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, Hu Jintao spoke of "one China, different interpretations." But afterwards this statement could be found only in the English version of Xinhua News Agency news reports. It was missing from the Chinese version.
Hu Jintao played a key role in changing the cross-Strait strategic scenario. The Hu Six Points is a major innovation. Its impact on cross-Strait relations far exceeds the impact of policies advanced by past CCP leaders. It surpassed the impact of the Jiang Eight Points, never mind the Yeh Nine Articles. Hu Jintao's innovations in cross-strait policy began with "peaceful development" during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. It evolved into "one China, different interpretations"during the March 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, into the Hu Six Points on New Years Eve 2008, and into the "two sides' existing provisions (constitutions)" bottom line during the Wu-Hu meeting if March 2012. Hu's statements reveal a unique and consistent thread. They recognize that the "circumstances are special, and the nation has yet to be reunified." In the past, Beijing did not accept the idea that the nation "has yet to be reunified." They equated "yet to be reunified" with "divided." Hu acknowledged that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they still belong to one China." Hu urged the two sides to "explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," including military confidence building mechanisms and a cross-Strait peace agreement. To use the language of the previous ARATS chairman Wang Daohan, the Hu Six Points can be considered an "in progress form of one China."
The final point in the Hu Six Points is the ending of hostilities, and the signing of a peace agreement. Since 2008, we have yet to end cross-Strait hostilities. We have yet to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. There are two reasons why we have not. One. The Ma administration was hesitant. It failed to do everything it could. It was insufficiently supportive of further improvements in cross-Strait relations. Two. The Hu regime advanced the aforementioned rational perspective on cross-Strait relations. But it failed to implement them at a practical level. For example, the Bush-Hu Hotline reference to "one China, different interpretations" was reported only in English. For example, it remained taboo to refer to "the two sides' existing provisions" as "constitutions." For example, Beijing referred to "exploring cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." But if refused to name political relations under these special circumstances. These political relations were relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. For example, Beijing said "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of one China." But why did it refuse to equate this "in progress form of one China" with the "big roof concept of China?"
The Hu Six Points thought of everything. But it failed to do may of them. In March of this year, during the Wu-Hu meeting, the two sides began discussing the parameters of "current provisions," i.e., the one China constitution. Some members of the DPP even advocated "constitutional consensus." This shows that the two sides can work together and support "one China, different interpretations under a big roof concept of China." If they do, they may be able to establish "political relations under these special circumstances." They may be able to establish a military confidence building mechanism or sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. They may be able to establish an "in progress form of one China." Isn't this what the Hu Six Points were aiming for? So why can't we do it?
Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
胡六點的發明與遺憾
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.09 01:47 am
中共總書記胡錦濤昨日十八大政治報告論及兩岸關係部分，口頭報告與書面報告呈現兩個版本。
口頭報告反覆申論「和平統一，一國兩制」，又強調「推動祖國和平統一進程的八項主張」（江八點）；但在未公開宣讀出來的部分書面報告中，則以比較平緩理智的筆觸寫道：「希望（兩岸）雙方共同努力，探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排；商談建立軍事安全互信機制……協商達成兩岸和平協議。」又道：「大陸和台灣雖然尚未統一，但兩岸同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……兩岸雙方應恪守反對台獨、堅持九二識的共同立場……。」
將口頭報告與書面報告對照可見：口頭報告幾乎完全複製十七大報告的版本，甚至多處原句照抄，所標舉的是儼然「江八點」（一九九五年）以前兩岸政策的陳舊架構，呈現出粗糙的宣示性，而以「和平統一，一國兩制」為軸心；但書面報告則呈現出比較細膩的操作性，主要是在重複演繹「胡六點」（二○○八年），著重在「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」及「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等思維。
目前難悉，胡錦濤為何要將兩岸報告分做口頭及書面兩種版本，也許是「宣示面」與「操作面」的區隔，也許是表示「胡六點」對「江八點」的謙讓，或許只是為了節省時間；這有如二○○八年三月廿六日，胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中宣示了「一中各表」，但事後僅見於新華社的英文稿中，中文版則闕如。
胡錦濤是扭轉兩岸大局的關鍵角色，「胡六點」則是重大發明，對兩岸關係的影響及開展，其作用遠逾過去所有中共領導人的政策主張，勝過「江八點」，更別論「葉九條」。胡錦濤對兩岸政策的發明，由二○○五年「連胡會」的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「雙方現行規定（憲法）底線論」，其中有一獨特且一貫的脈絡，即是接受「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」（過去北京不接受「尚未統一」的事實，認為尚未統一即是分裂），且認為「兩岸雖然尚未統一」，但仍然可以「同屬一個中國」，並主張研議探討對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」作出安排，此一安排可以是《（國家尚未統一的）軍事安全互信機制》，也或許是《（國家尚未統一的）兩岸和平協議》。若以前海協會會長汪道涵的語言來說，「胡六點」的思想可以說也是一種：「現在進行式的一個中國」。
胡六點的最後一點是：結束敵對狀態，簽定和平協議。自二○○八年以來，「結束（兩岸）敵對狀態」差堪作到，但「簽定（兩岸）和平協議」則功虧一簣。原因有二：一、馬政府瞻顧猶豫的風格與未盡人意的治理政績，皆不足支持兩岸關係更進一步；二、胡政權徒有前述理智貫通的思想體系，但在操作層面未見大開大闔，例如「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」僅見英文版，又如已經論及「雙方現行規定」卻諱稱「憲法」，再如研議「國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」卻不直指這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」，即中華民國與中華人民共和國之間的「特殊政治關係」，至於說「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，卻何以不直說這個「現在進行式的一個中國」，即是「大屋頂中國」？
胡六點都想到了，但都做不到。至今年三月「吳胡會」，雙方的論述已經走到「以現行規定（一中憲法）為準則」的地步，而民進黨內亦有「憲法共識」的主張；在在顯示，兩岸若能共同支撐起「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」，即可能建構起「特殊情況下的政治關係」，就可能簽定軍事安全互信機制或兩岸和平協議，也就可能出現「現在進行式的一個中國」。胡六點難道不是這樣想的嗎？但何以做不到？
胡錦濤在卸任的最後一次政治報告中，竟將「胡六點」的重大發明留在書面報告上而未宣讀出來，難道繼任者也將使其徒留空言而成歷史遺憾？
Obama's Second Term Challenges: Implications for Politics on Taiwan
Obama's Second Term Challenges:
Implications for Politics on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2012
Summary: Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
Full Text below:
Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
The number of incumbent US presidents who have lost their bid for re-election can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Obama waged a hard fought campaign, not because his opponent Romney was too strong, but because he was too cavalier. The Republicans successfully incited discontent with the status quo. During the first TV debate in particular, Obama seemed as if he wasn't even there. He could not clearly outline his economic recovery plan. Many Americans saw his sloppy side. Many woke up and realized little would change over the next four years. Many entrepreneurs began looking to Romney.
High unemployment, low economic growth, and capital outflows, are Obama's worst sore points. The global economy has been a drag on the US economy. But in this respect the US is just like Taiwan. People whose standard of living is declining are not about to swallow "international factors" as an excuse. Romney was all set to issue a concession speech. But when someone intoned "economic downturn," Romney suddenly became more attractive. He suddenly posed a serious threat to Obama. Fortunately Hurricane Sandy disaster relief gave Obama the opportunity to display non-partisanship and to act presidential. This turned the American people's focus away from the economy for several days, and toward Obama's ability to lead the country. Romney meanwhile, who threatened to cut disaster relief funds from the federal budget, lost points.
This U.S. presidential election was a nail-biter. First, the campaign focused almost entirely on fewer than ten "swing states." Both parties deployed massive resources attacking each other and getting out the vote. They threw money at the problem. They fought for every vote. Secondly, people were concerned that a too close race would make it impossible to be sure who won. They feared a repeat of 2000, when Bush's narrow margin over Gore incited a major controversy. The result was a "minority president" who received fewer popular votes, who won only because he received more Electoral College votes.
These two phenomena are the result of the Electoral College's "winner-take-all" arrangement. During the last election, Obama won 53% of the vote. This time he won 68%. Three hundred sixty-five electors voted. This time he and Romney won about the same number of popular votes. But Obama won by over one hundred Electoral College votes. U.S. elections appear to be direct elections, but are in fact indirect elections. This was intended to ensure political stability. But it also reduced the size of the battlefield. During the last few days Obama concentrated his campaign efforts in the largest swing states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Sure enough, he won those states.
The composition of the House and Senate have remained the same. But the situation Obama faces today is very different from the one he faced four years ago. Four years ago, George W. Bush was rude, vulgar, and arrogant. He dispatched troops everywhere. He destroyed the image and ideals of the United States. These urgently need repair. Obama offered a fresh image and a multi-ethnic background. He had eloquence. He offered people healing and comfort. After four years in office, the international community considered Obama's foreign policy friendly and balanced. But at home, he encountered powerful Republican obstructionism. All he could do in terms of policy was to apply patches. It was hard to get anything done. Worse still, he found himself caught between the European debt crisis and the global recession. The United States resorted to quantitative easing, three times, but still could not stop the continued economic decline. In the eyes of the voters, his eloquence was now mere flash. His overseas troop withdrawal and medical reform was merely sacrificing today for the sake of tomorrow. Public attention shifted from abstract notions of national pride to concrete issues of economic livelihood.
Obama operates in an orderly manner. He seldom misspeaks. On issues of ethics and values, he has been consistent. He has not changed with the winds. But in the eyes of the electorate this was not enough. Obama was the first black president. He took an historic step for American democracy. During his second term he must revitalize the U.S. economy. He must help America become an egalitarian utopia. To achieve this, he must challenge himself.
Look at the U.S. presidential election from Taiwan. The public must have a feeling of deja vu. In January of this year, Ma Ying-jeou ran as an incumbent against Tsai Ing-wen. He too was attacked for his political record. The pre-election polls were also evenly matched. But in the end he won by six percentage points. On Taiwan and in the United States, pre-election polls are often misleading. People vote with greater deliberation than they answer telephone polls. Obama and Ma Ying-jeou's re-election reflect this phenomenon.
Leave aside personal factors. A political party's quality and style are also important considerations. During the U.S. presidential election, Romney received high marks as a presidential candidate. Voters appreciated his understanding of the economy. The media praised his non-partisanship during his term as governor. But in recent years the Republican Party has become increasingly conservative. It has become more like the Tea Party. It lacks tolerance for abortion, gays, and immigrants. It resorts to obstructionism in Congress at the drop of a hat, Voters fear that if the Republican Party take over the executive branch, it will lead to extremism. This is very similar to Taiwan. People worry that the DPP's hatred for Mainland China will cause lead to political instability.
After such a fierce battle, many fear that the United States will become even more divided, politically, economically, and socially. They hope Obama will address this problem. His re-election means greater responsibility and greater commitment. Only if one understands this point, will his victory make sense. When Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected earlier this year, he said, "One day of celebration is enough." A mere 10 months later, he was a lame duck. The economy did him in. On this point, Ma Ying-jeou surely knows how Obama feels.
看歐巴馬挑戰連任，反思台灣朝野競合
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.08 01:49 am
比起四年前橫掃全美的超級人氣，歐巴馬在這次大選中贏得艱苦，這說明無論民主的風光多麼美好，仍須在民眾善變的口味中不斷接受挑戰。作為世界的領導者，歐巴馬的表現中規中矩；但作為美國元首，許多民眾不滿意他的施政。在未來四年的第二屆任期中，他勢須在經濟上拿出更多成績，才能使他所承諾的「美國夢」，不致流失破滅。
美國歷來現任總統尋求連任失利的例子屈指可數，而歐巴馬此役打得如此艱辛，原因其實不在對手羅姆尼太強，而在他自己過於輕忽，讓共和黨成功地撩起了人民對現狀不滿的情緒。尤其在首場電視辯論，他近乎失神的表現，甚至無法清晰勾勒重振經濟的藍圖，讓許多美國人目睹其漫不經心的一面。這點，讓不少民眾驚覺未來四年改變的可能性不大，因而轉寄希望於企業家出身的羅姆尼身上。
高失業、低成長及投資外流，是歐巴馬最大的痛腳。儘管是受到全球景氣的牽累，但和台灣一樣，感受生活正在下降的民眾，很難接受「國際因素」這樣的解釋。因此，當「經濟欠佳」這個神祕咒語被啟動後，原已準備撰寫「落選聲明」的羅姆尼突然魅力大增，對歐巴馬構成嚴重威脅。所幸。珊蒂颶風的災後救援工作，讓歐巴馬有機會展現其「跨黨派」的總統高度，在最後數日將美國人民的焦點從經濟拉開，轉向整體治國能力。相形之下，曾揚言要把救災經費從聯邦預算中砍光的羅姆尼，就在此轉為失分。
這次美國大選的選情緊繃：一是選戰幾乎集中在十個不到的所謂「搖擺州」上，兩黨均部署了重兵廝殺及催票，撒下大把銀子，寸土必爭。二是擔心會導致總統難產，重演二○○○年布希對高爾因少數票差引發的爭議，並產生一個選民票得票較少、卻因選舉人團得票多而出線的「少數總統」。
這兩個現象，都是美國「選舉人團」制度中「贏者全拿」的設計造成的結果。上次選舉，歐巴馬拿到五成三的選民投票；換算成高達六成八、共三百六十五張的選舉人當選；這次他獲得的選民票和羅姆尼幾乎不相上下，但他在選舉人團票上卻多出上百張票。亦即，美國大選形式上看似直接選舉，但實質上卻是間接選舉，這是為了維持政治安定的設計，卻也造成了戰區過度集中的弊病。歐巴馬最後幾天在最大搖擺州俄亥俄州及威斯康辛州密集造勢，最後果然成功攻城掠地。
儘管參眾兩院在這次選舉基本維持平盤，但歐巴馬今天面對的形勢，和四年前已經大不相同。四年前，小布希的粗魯、庸俗、自大、四處出兵，讓美國的形象和理想破毀，亟待修補；歐巴馬則以其清新形象、多元族群背景，及雄辯滔滔的口才，提供了美國療傷止痛的安慰。四年的執政，歐巴馬在外交政策上以其友善、均衡，建立了不錯的國際評價；但在國內，他卻遇上共和黨強烈的抵制和杯葛，施政上只能縫縫補補，難有大建樹。更嚴重的是，夾在歐債風暴及世界景氣滑坡之間，美國三度採取量化寬鬆政策，仍阻止不了經濟的持續下滑。在這種情況下，他的好口才在選民眼裡變成了華而不實，他推動海外撤軍及醫療等改革則被視為捨近求遠；因為人們的關注，已經從抽象的國家驕傲轉向更現實的生計問題。
平實而論，歐巴馬的行事穩健，他甚少失言，在一些涉及道德及價值觀的問題上也都能保持一貫，不會隨風搖擺。但從選民的眼光看來，這些仍然不夠。歐巴馬當選首位黑人總統，為美國民主跨越的歷史性一步；他的第二任，則必須為振興美國經濟找到出路，讓美國成為均富而好禮的夢土。要實現這點，他必須對自己提出更嚴格的挑戰。
從台灣看美國大選，民眾一定有一種似曾相識的感覺。今年元月，馬英九以現任總統和蔡英文角逐大位時，也因政績備受攻擊，選前民調幾乎不相上下，最後選舉則以六個百分點之多勝出。不論台美，選前的民調都難稱虛偽，但人們最後的投票行為會比在電話民調上的答覆多出幾分慎思。從歐巴馬或馬英九的連任，都反映了這點。
除了個人因素外，政黨的整體素質及風格，也是選民的重要考量。以這次美國大選為例，羅姆尼作為總統候選人的評價其實不差，選民除看好他對經濟的理解，媒體對他擔任州長時期表現的「超越黨派」立場也頗表稱揚。然而，近些年共和黨的保守化、茶黨化取向，除了對墮胎、同志、移民等議題的缺乏寬容，更不時在國會作無理的杯葛，都使選民擔心共和黨掌政會將美國帶上偏激之路。這和台灣民眾憂慮民進黨的反中傾向會造成國家的不安定，似也如出一轍。
歷經激烈的一戰，很多人擔心美國在政治、經濟、社會各方面將更形分裂；這點，有待歐巴馬去修補。連任，意味著更多的責任及更大的承擔，必須看清這點，勝選才有意義。年初勝選連任時曾說過「高興一天就好」的馬英九，不到十月即瀕臨跛腳，就是敗在經濟；在這個議題上，馬英九儼然與歐巴馬同病相憐。
Implications for Politics on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2012
Summary: Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
Full Text below:
Four years ago Obama swept the nation on a wave of popularity. This time however, Obama's election victory was hard won. This shows that under democracy it does not matter how high one is riding today. The public is fickle, and one may still face challenges. As a world leader, Obama's performance has been satisfactory. But as the U.S. head of state, his policies have met with considerable dissatisfaction. During the four years of his second term, he must make progress on the economic front. Only then can he fulfill his promise to defend the "American Dream."
The number of incumbent US presidents who have lost their bid for re-election can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Obama waged a hard fought campaign, not because his opponent Romney was too strong, but because he was too cavalier. The Republicans successfully incited discontent with the status quo. During the first TV debate in particular, Obama seemed as if he wasn't even there. He could not clearly outline his economic recovery plan. Many Americans saw his sloppy side. Many woke up and realized little would change over the next four years. Many entrepreneurs began looking to Romney.
High unemployment, low economic growth, and capital outflows, are Obama's worst sore points. The global economy has been a drag on the US economy. But in this respect the US is just like Taiwan. People whose standard of living is declining are not about to swallow "international factors" as an excuse. Romney was all set to issue a concession speech. But when someone intoned "economic downturn," Romney suddenly became more attractive. He suddenly posed a serious threat to Obama. Fortunately Hurricane Sandy disaster relief gave Obama the opportunity to display non-partisanship and to act presidential. This turned the American people's focus away from the economy for several days, and toward Obama's ability to lead the country. Romney meanwhile, who threatened to cut disaster relief funds from the federal budget, lost points.
This U.S. presidential election was a nail-biter. First, the campaign focused almost entirely on fewer than ten "swing states." Both parties deployed massive resources attacking each other and getting out the vote. They threw money at the problem. They fought for every vote. Secondly, people were concerned that a too close race would make it impossible to be sure who won. They feared a repeat of 2000, when Bush's narrow margin over Gore incited a major controversy. The result was a "minority president" who received fewer popular votes, who won only because he received more Electoral College votes.
These two phenomena are the result of the Electoral College's "winner-take-all" arrangement. During the last election, Obama won 53% of the vote. This time he won 68%. Three hundred sixty-five electors voted. This time he and Romney won about the same number of popular votes. But Obama won by over one hundred Electoral College votes. U.S. elections appear to be direct elections, but are in fact indirect elections. This was intended to ensure political stability. But it also reduced the size of the battlefield. During the last few days Obama concentrated his campaign efforts in the largest swing states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Sure enough, he won those states.
The composition of the House and Senate have remained the same. But the situation Obama faces today is very different from the one he faced four years ago. Four years ago, George W. Bush was rude, vulgar, and arrogant. He dispatched troops everywhere. He destroyed the image and ideals of the United States. These urgently need repair. Obama offered a fresh image and a multi-ethnic background. He had eloquence. He offered people healing and comfort. After four years in office, the international community considered Obama's foreign policy friendly and balanced. But at home, he encountered powerful Republican obstructionism. All he could do in terms of policy was to apply patches. It was hard to get anything done. Worse still, he found himself caught between the European debt crisis and the global recession. The United States resorted to quantitative easing, three times, but still could not stop the continued economic decline. In the eyes of the voters, his eloquence was now mere flash. His overseas troop withdrawal and medical reform was merely sacrificing today for the sake of tomorrow. Public attention shifted from abstract notions of national pride to concrete issues of economic livelihood.
Obama operates in an orderly manner. He seldom misspeaks. On issues of ethics and values, he has been consistent. He has not changed with the winds. But in the eyes of the electorate this was not enough. Obama was the first black president. He took an historic step for American democracy. During his second term he must revitalize the U.S. economy. He must help America become an egalitarian utopia. To achieve this, he must challenge himself.
Look at the U.S. presidential election from Taiwan. The public must have a feeling of deja vu. In January of this year, Ma Ying-jeou ran as an incumbent against Tsai Ing-wen. He too was attacked for his political record. The pre-election polls were also evenly matched. But in the end he won by six percentage points. On Taiwan and in the United States, pre-election polls are often misleading. People vote with greater deliberation than they answer telephone polls. Obama and Ma Ying-jeou's re-election reflect this phenomenon.
Leave aside personal factors. A political party's quality and style are also important considerations. During the U.S. presidential election, Romney received high marks as a presidential candidate. Voters appreciated his understanding of the economy. The media praised his non-partisanship during his term as governor. But in recent years the Republican Party has become increasingly conservative. It has become more like the Tea Party. It lacks tolerance for abortion, gays, and immigrants. It resorts to obstructionism in Congress at the drop of a hat, Voters fear that if the Republican Party take over the executive branch, it will lead to extremism. This is very similar to Taiwan. People worry that the DPP's hatred for Mainland China will cause lead to political instability.
After such a fierce battle, many fear that the United States will become even more divided, politically, economically, and socially. They hope Obama will address this problem. His re-election means greater responsibility and greater commitment. Only if one understands this point, will his victory make sense. When Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected earlier this year, he said, "One day of celebration is enough." A mere 10 months later, he was a lame duck. The economy did him in. On this point, Ma Ying-jeou surely knows how Obama feels.
看歐巴馬挑戰連任，反思台灣朝野競合
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.08 01:49 am
比起四年前橫掃全美的超級人氣，歐巴馬在這次大選中贏得艱苦，這說明無論民主的風光多麼美好，仍須在民眾善變的口味中不斷接受挑戰。作為世界的領導者，歐巴馬的表現中規中矩；但作為美國元首，許多民眾不滿意他的施政。在未來四年的第二屆任期中，他勢須在經濟上拿出更多成績，才能使他所承諾的「美國夢」，不致流失破滅。
美國歷來現任總統尋求連任失利的例子屈指可數，而歐巴馬此役打得如此艱辛，原因其實不在對手羅姆尼太強，而在他自己過於輕忽，讓共和黨成功地撩起了人民對現狀不滿的情緒。尤其在首場電視辯論，他近乎失神的表現，甚至無法清晰勾勒重振經濟的藍圖，讓許多美國人目睹其漫不經心的一面。這點，讓不少民眾驚覺未來四年改變的可能性不大，因而轉寄希望於企業家出身的羅姆尼身上。
高失業、低成長及投資外流，是歐巴馬最大的痛腳。儘管是受到全球景氣的牽累，但和台灣一樣，感受生活正在下降的民眾，很難接受「國際因素」這樣的解釋。因此，當「經濟欠佳」這個神祕咒語被啟動後，原已準備撰寫「落選聲明」的羅姆尼突然魅力大增，對歐巴馬構成嚴重威脅。所幸。珊蒂颶風的災後救援工作，讓歐巴馬有機會展現其「跨黨派」的總統高度，在最後數日將美國人民的焦點從經濟拉開，轉向整體治國能力。相形之下，曾揚言要把救災經費從聯邦預算中砍光的羅姆尼，就在此轉為失分。
這次美國大選的選情緊繃：一是選戰幾乎集中在十個不到的所謂「搖擺州」上，兩黨均部署了重兵廝殺及催票，撒下大把銀子，寸土必爭。二是擔心會導致總統難產，重演二○○○年布希對高爾因少數票差引發的爭議，並產生一個選民票得票較少、卻因選舉人團得票多而出線的「少數總統」。
這兩個現象，都是美國「選舉人團」制度中「贏者全拿」的設計造成的結果。上次選舉，歐巴馬拿到五成三的選民投票；換算成高達六成八、共三百六十五張的選舉人當選；這次他獲得的選民票和羅姆尼幾乎不相上下，但他在選舉人團票上卻多出上百張票。亦即，美國大選形式上看似直接選舉，但實質上卻是間接選舉，這是為了維持政治安定的設計，卻也造成了戰區過度集中的弊病。歐巴馬最後幾天在最大搖擺州俄亥俄州及威斯康辛州密集造勢，最後果然成功攻城掠地。
儘管參眾兩院在這次選舉基本維持平盤，但歐巴馬今天面對的形勢，和四年前已經大不相同。四年前，小布希的粗魯、庸俗、自大、四處出兵，讓美國的形象和理想破毀，亟待修補；歐巴馬則以其清新形象、多元族群背景，及雄辯滔滔的口才，提供了美國療傷止痛的安慰。四年的執政，歐巴馬在外交政策上以其友善、均衡，建立了不錯的國際評價；但在國內，他卻遇上共和黨強烈的抵制和杯葛，施政上只能縫縫補補，難有大建樹。更嚴重的是，夾在歐債風暴及世界景氣滑坡之間，美國三度採取量化寬鬆政策，仍阻止不了經濟的持續下滑。在這種情況下，他的好口才在選民眼裡變成了華而不實，他推動海外撤軍及醫療等改革則被視為捨近求遠；因為人們的關注，已經從抽象的國家驕傲轉向更現實的生計問題。
平實而論，歐巴馬的行事穩健，他甚少失言，在一些涉及道德及價值觀的問題上也都能保持一貫，不會隨風搖擺。但從選民的眼光看來，這些仍然不夠。歐巴馬當選首位黑人總統，為美國民主跨越的歷史性一步；他的第二任，則必須為振興美國經濟找到出路，讓美國成為均富而好禮的夢土。要實現這點，他必須對自己提出更嚴格的挑戰。
從台灣看美國大選，民眾一定有一種似曾相識的感覺。今年元月，馬英九以現任總統和蔡英文角逐大位時，也因政績備受攻擊，選前民調幾乎不相上下，最後選舉則以六個百分點之多勝出。不論台美，選前的民調都難稱虛偽，但人們最後的投票行為會比在電話民調上的答覆多出幾分慎思。從歐巴馬或馬英九的連任，都反映了這點。
除了個人因素外，政黨的整體素質及風格，也是選民的重要考量。以這次美國大選為例，羅姆尼作為總統候選人的評價其實不差，選民除看好他對經濟的理解，媒體對他擔任州長時期表現的「超越黨派」立場也頗表稱揚。然而，近些年共和黨的保守化、茶黨化取向，除了對墮胎、同志、移民等議題的缺乏寬容，更不時在國會作無理的杯葛，都使選民擔心共和黨掌政會將美國帶上偏激之路。這和台灣民眾憂慮民進黨的反中傾向會造成國家的不安定，似也如出一轍。
歷經激烈的一戰，很多人擔心美國在政治、經濟、社會各方面將更形分裂；這點，有待歐巴馬去修補。連任，意味著更多的責任及更大的承擔，必須看清這點，勝選才有意義。年初勝選連任時曾說過「高興一天就好」的馬英九，不到十月即瀕臨跛腳，就是敗在經濟；在這個議題上，馬英九儼然與歐巴馬同病相憐。
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Hu Xi Handover: Peaceful Development Requires Democratic Validation
Hu Xi Handover: Peaceful Development Requires Democratic Validation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 7, 2012
Summary: Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch. Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
Full Text below:
Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch.
The Hu-Wen regime's banner was "peaceful development." Over the past decade, people have begun to refer to Mainland China and the United States as the G2. It has become the world's second largest economy. It is the world's market as well as the world's factory. Economic development has quadrupled. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted above the poverty line. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo freshened up Mainland China's image. Mainland China survived the 2008 global financial tsunami with little fuss. It swiftly rebuilt in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake. It successfully docked the manned Shenzhou Nine with the Tiangong One. The Liaoning aircraft carrier is now operational. These are all evidence of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's record of achievements in "peaceful development," internal and external. It was only in August of this year that the conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands replaced the atmosphere of "peaceful development." The United States and Japan have a clear impression of Mainland China's "development" over the past decade. Most of the world give high marks to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's decade of governance.
But Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have done little in the way of political reform. Economic development and political stability are to some extent mutually contradictory. On the one hand, economic development reduces political conflict. On the other hand, it stores up energy for future political conflict. The 2012 Bo Xilai incident underscores the need for political reform. In 2010 Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize. That underscored the political problems bedeviling the Mainland. Internet censorship cannot suppress awareness of tens of thousands of "mass protests" each year. These constitute a raging volcano. Hong Kong has reacted strongly to Article 23 of the Basic Law and to "national education." These and the highly anticipated direct elections of the Chief Executive in 2017 are seen as more than merely local matters. They remind the Chinese Communist Party that it must be vigilant and clear about its authoritarian rule and its democratic responsibilities. The CCP's "peaceful development" is taking place on the mouth of a volcano. Will the government's economic performance reduce political corruption and conflict? Or will it lead to increased political corruption and precipitate even greater conflict? Will the government be able to maintain a "harmonious society?" These have yet to undergo "democratic validation."
During the Hu-Wen decade, the CCP made major breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. But it also had a major blind spot. The 2005 Lien-Hu Meeting put us on the road to peaceful development in cross-Strait relations. This was a world-changing event. The Hu-Wen regime set its sights on a "cross-Strait peace agreement" to be signed during its term of office. But this was not to be, partly due to hesitation on the part of the Ma administration in Taipei. Partly due to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's failure to make timely changes to their cross-Strait rhetoric. In order to achieve a "peace agreement," the two parties must first be on an equal basis. Without a "big roof China" framework, how can that happen? Over the past decade, the Hu-Wen regime's cross-Strait framework has indeed evolved in a progressive and pragmatic manner. It has evolved from "peaceful development" in 2005, to "one China, different interpretations" during the March 2008 Bush-Hu Hotline conversation. It has evolved from the "Hu Six Points" on New Years Eve 2008, to "relevant current provisions" (constitutional) in March 2012. Sadly it stopped just short of a "cross-Strait peace agreement." If one wishes to see farther, one must ascend to a higher level. The higher level is the "big roof China" concept.
Let us sum up the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao decade. It achieved "peaceful development." But it also enabled Bo Xilai and his ilk. On the one hand, cronyist corruption ran rampant. On the other hand, the "Chongqing mode" reflected the disparity between the rich and the poor, to the point where Maoist thinking almost made a comeback. Add to this the ticking bomb that is the "Wukan Village mode," and Hong Kong's aspirations toward democracy, which have become increasingly national in character. Clearly the Xi-Li regime will not be able to silence dissent the way it silenced Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. It will not be able to prevent Internet users from circumventing the Internet police and the Great Firewall of China. Still less can it detect and prevent hundreds of "mass protests" everywhere. If the Xi-Li regime wants to maintain "peaceful development," and a "harmonious society," then "democratic validation" is unavoidable. As for cross-Strait relations, the core of "peaceful development" is "democratic development." This goes without saying.
Two personality traits of the newly inaugurated General Secretary Xi Jinping are consider highly relevant. One. His father, Xi Zhongxun was purged during the "Liu Zhidan Incident." During the Cultural Revolution, at age 16, Xi Jinping was "sent down" to Yan'an County Liangjiahe Village. Two. Xi Jinping has over 20 years of cross-Strait experience in the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai regions, which were among the first to liberalize. Will his family experience make him more enlightened about political reform? Will his cross-Strait experience enable him to better understand democracy? That remains to be seen. Hu and Wen established new highs for "peaceful development." Xi and Li should be able to begin "democratic validation."
Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
胡習交接：和平發展需要民主驗證
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.07 01:46 am
中共十八大明日揭幕，黨政新舊領導班子將啟動約四個月的交接期，胡溫團隊退場，由習李體制接班。
胡溫體制的歷史標誌是「和平發展」。在過去十年中，中國開始與美國並稱Ｇ２，成為全世界第二大經濟體，以世界工廠兼為世界市場，經濟發展翻了四倍，數億人脫離貧窮線，二○○八年的京奧與二○一○年的上海世博刷新了中國的形象，又相對平順地度過二○○八年全球金融海嘯，再迅速從汶川大地震中復建，又完成神州九號與天宮一號的載人宇航對接，再有遼寧號航空母艦開始服役…；這些紀錄，皆留下了胡溫體制對內及對外「和平發展」的足印。一直到今年八月掀起釣魚台事件，「和平」的氛圍雖已被劍拔弩張所取代，但從美日的因應來看，卻也為這十年來中國的「發展」果實作了鮮明的註腳。因此，實事求是地說，舉世議論大多給了胡溫的十年治理相當正向的評價。
然而，胡溫在政治改革上卻幾乎仍是一張白卷。經濟發展與政治穩定之間存有一個弔詭：一方面經濟發展緩和了政治衝突，但另一方面也積蓄並升高了政治衝突的能量。二○一二年的薄熙來事件正是政治改革大缺口的大暴露，二○一○年劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎，則是從這個大缺口所見到的政治病灶，網路管制的捉襟見肘及全年推估逾十數萬次的「群體性事件」，更是這個大缺口裡猶如火山熔岩奔流飛濺的真實景觀。此外，香港對基本法第二十三條及「國民教育」的強烈反撲，及二○一七年特首直選的預期；皆不能視為只是香港一地之事，而是提醒中共必須對其專制統治的民主債務應有全面的警覺與清償。在這個火山口上的「和平發展」，經濟績效究竟是降低政治腐敗及衝突的因素，或反而將是累積政治腐敗及衝突的成因，以致最後還能否維持「和諧社會」，這些皆是尚待「民主驗證」的未定之數。
胡溫十年，在兩岸關係上有大突破，但亦有大盲點。二○○五年的連胡會，將兩岸關係帶上「和平發展」的道路，這是扭轉乾坤的一手；但胡溫體制原以簽成《兩岸和平協議》為任內目標卻未完成，則一方面是由於台北馬政府的猶豫，另一方面更因胡溫未能及時作出更進一步的論述調整。因為，若欲簽定《和平協議》，勢須首先建立兩造簽約主體的對等地位；則若無「大屋頂中國」的思維，何以成事？十年來，胡溫體制的兩岸思維，由二○○五年的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「現行相關規定（憲法）底線論」，其間確實出現了一種進取且務實的發展思維，惜乎卻止於尚欠臨門一腳的《兩岸和平協議》。欲窮千里目，更上一層樓；其實，樓上即在「大屋頂中國」之下。
總結胡溫十年，固有「和平發展」的成績，但如薄熙來案所反映者，一方面權貴腐敗已至不可思議的程度，另一方面「重慶模式」也反襯出貧富不均甚至已嚴重到民心希望毛式思維回潮的地步；再加上「烏坎村式」的未爆彈所在皆有，香港的民主訴求也愈來愈具全國性的示範作用；因而，舉目所見，習李體制未來不應再用對待劉曉波、陳光誠的方法來壓制異議，用網路警察去防堵翻牆的網民亦是堵不勝堵，每日各地數百起的「群體性事件」更是防不勝防；習李若欲維持「和平發展」、「和諧社會」的成果，「民主驗證」即是無可迴避的過程。至於兩岸關係，「和平發展」的核心思維是在「民主發展」，更是毋庸贅言。
新任總書記習近平的兩項人格烙印最受矚目。一、其父習仲勛因「劉志丹事件」被整肅，習近平則於文革時期在十六歲被下放到延安縣梁家河村。二、習近平在閩浙滬開放先行地區有長達二十餘年的兩岸經驗。因而，其家族經歷會不會使他在政治改革上較具開明思維，其兩岸經驗又會不會使他對民主及主體意識較能領悟省思，皆是可待觀察之處。若謂胡溫創造了「和平發展」的高峰，習李應是站在「民主驗證」的起點。
溫家寶為這十年給習李二人留下了一句話：「沒有政治體制改革的保障，經濟體制改革的成果就會得而復失。」然而，諷刺的是，溫家寶本人也正陷於嚴峻的清廉質疑。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 7, 2012
Summary: Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch. Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
Full Text below:
Tomorrow the Chinese Communist Party will convene its 18th National Congress. The old and new party and government leadership will undergo a four month long transition. The Hu-Wen team will exit the political scene. The Xi-Li team will carry the torch.
The Hu-Wen regime's banner was "peaceful development." Over the past decade, people have begun to refer to Mainland China and the United States as the G2. It has become the world's second largest economy. It is the world's market as well as the world's factory. Economic development has quadrupled. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted above the poverty line. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo freshened up Mainland China's image. Mainland China survived the 2008 global financial tsunami with little fuss. It swiftly rebuilt in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake. It successfully docked the manned Shenzhou Nine with the Tiangong One. The Liaoning aircraft carrier is now operational. These are all evidence of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's record of achievements in "peaceful development," internal and external. It was only in August of this year that the conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands replaced the atmosphere of "peaceful development." The United States and Japan have a clear impression of Mainland China's "development" over the past decade. Most of the world give high marks to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's decade of governance.
But Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have done little in the way of political reform. Economic development and political stability are to some extent mutually contradictory. On the one hand, economic development reduces political conflict. On the other hand, it stores up energy for future political conflict. The 2012 Bo Xilai incident underscores the need for political reform. In 2010 Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize. That underscored the political problems bedeviling the Mainland. Internet censorship cannot suppress awareness of tens of thousands of "mass protests" each year. These constitute a raging volcano. Hong Kong has reacted strongly to Article 23 of the Basic Law and to "national education." These and the highly anticipated direct elections of the Chief Executive in 2017 are seen as more than merely local matters. They remind the Chinese Communist Party that it must be vigilant and clear about its authoritarian rule and its democratic responsibilities. The CCP's "peaceful development" is taking place on the mouth of a volcano. Will the government's economic performance reduce political corruption and conflict? Or will it lead to increased political corruption and precipitate even greater conflict? Will the government be able to maintain a "harmonious society?" These have yet to undergo "democratic validation."
During the Hu-Wen decade, the CCP made major breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. But it also had a major blind spot. The 2005 Lien-Hu Meeting put us on the road to peaceful development in cross-Strait relations. This was a world-changing event. The Hu-Wen regime set its sights on a "cross-Strait peace agreement" to be signed during its term of office. But this was not to be, partly due to hesitation on the part of the Ma administration in Taipei. Partly due to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's failure to make timely changes to their cross-Strait rhetoric. In order to achieve a "peace agreement," the two parties must first be on an equal basis. Without a "big roof China" framework, how can that happen? Over the past decade, the Hu-Wen regime's cross-Strait framework has indeed evolved in a progressive and pragmatic manner. It has evolved from "peaceful development" in 2005, to "one China, different interpretations" during the March 2008 Bush-Hu Hotline conversation. It has evolved from the "Hu Six Points" on New Years Eve 2008, to "relevant current provisions" (constitutional) in March 2012. Sadly it stopped just short of a "cross-Strait peace agreement." If one wishes to see farther, one must ascend to a higher level. The higher level is the "big roof China" concept.
Let us sum up the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao decade. It achieved "peaceful development." But it also enabled Bo Xilai and his ilk. On the one hand, cronyist corruption ran rampant. On the other hand, the "Chongqing mode" reflected the disparity between the rich and the poor, to the point where Maoist thinking almost made a comeback. Add to this the ticking bomb that is the "Wukan Village mode," and Hong Kong's aspirations toward democracy, which have become increasingly national in character. Clearly the Xi-Li regime will not be able to silence dissent the way it silenced Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. It will not be able to prevent Internet users from circumventing the Internet police and the Great Firewall of China. Still less can it detect and prevent hundreds of "mass protests" everywhere. If the Xi-Li regime wants to maintain "peaceful development," and a "harmonious society," then "democratic validation" is unavoidable. As for cross-Strait relations, the core of "peaceful development" is "democratic development." This goes without saying.
Two personality traits of the newly inaugurated General Secretary Xi Jinping are consider highly relevant. One. His father, Xi Zhongxun was purged during the "Liu Zhidan Incident." During the Cultural Revolution, at age 16, Xi Jinping was "sent down" to Yan'an County Liangjiahe Village. Two. Xi Jinping has over 20 years of cross-Strait experience in the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai regions, which were among the first to liberalize. Will his family experience make him more enlightened about political reform? Will his cross-Strait experience enable him to better understand democracy? That remains to be seen. Hu and Wen established new highs for "peaceful development." Xi and Li should be able to begin "democratic validation."
Speaking about the past decade, Wen Jiabao told Xi and Li, "Without assurances of political reform. the fruits of economic reform will be lost." The irony is that Wen Jiabao's integrity is currently in question.
胡習交接：和平發展需要民主驗證
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.07 01:46 am
中共十八大明日揭幕，黨政新舊領導班子將啟動約四個月的交接期，胡溫團隊退場，由習李體制接班。
胡溫體制的歷史標誌是「和平發展」。在過去十年中，中國開始與美國並稱Ｇ２，成為全世界第二大經濟體，以世界工廠兼為世界市場，經濟發展翻了四倍，數億人脫離貧窮線，二○○八年的京奧與二○一○年的上海世博刷新了中國的形象，又相對平順地度過二○○八年全球金融海嘯，再迅速從汶川大地震中復建，又完成神州九號與天宮一號的載人宇航對接，再有遼寧號航空母艦開始服役…；這些紀錄，皆留下了胡溫體制對內及對外「和平發展」的足印。一直到今年八月掀起釣魚台事件，「和平」的氛圍雖已被劍拔弩張所取代，但從美日的因應來看，卻也為這十年來中國的「發展」果實作了鮮明的註腳。因此，實事求是地說，舉世議論大多給了胡溫的十年治理相當正向的評價。
然而，胡溫在政治改革上卻幾乎仍是一張白卷。經濟發展與政治穩定之間存有一個弔詭：一方面經濟發展緩和了政治衝突，但另一方面也積蓄並升高了政治衝突的能量。二○一二年的薄熙來事件正是政治改革大缺口的大暴露，二○一○年劉曉波獲得諾貝爾和平獎，則是從這個大缺口所見到的政治病灶，網路管制的捉襟見肘及全年推估逾十數萬次的「群體性事件」，更是這個大缺口裡猶如火山熔岩奔流飛濺的真實景觀。此外，香港對基本法第二十三條及「國民教育」的強烈反撲，及二○一七年特首直選的預期；皆不能視為只是香港一地之事，而是提醒中共必須對其專制統治的民主債務應有全面的警覺與清償。在這個火山口上的「和平發展」，經濟績效究竟是降低政治腐敗及衝突的因素，或反而將是累積政治腐敗及衝突的成因，以致最後還能否維持「和諧社會」，這些皆是尚待「民主驗證」的未定之數。
胡溫十年，在兩岸關係上有大突破，但亦有大盲點。二○○五年的連胡會，將兩岸關係帶上「和平發展」的道路，這是扭轉乾坤的一手；但胡溫體制原以簽成《兩岸和平協議》為任內目標卻未完成，則一方面是由於台北馬政府的猶豫，另一方面更因胡溫未能及時作出更進一步的論述調整。因為，若欲簽定《和平協議》，勢須首先建立兩造簽約主體的對等地位；則若無「大屋頂中國」的思維，何以成事？十年來，胡溫體制的兩岸思維，由二○○五年的「和平發展」，至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」，又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」，再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「現行相關規定（憲法）底線論」，其間確實出現了一種進取且務實的發展思維，惜乎卻止於尚欠臨門一腳的《兩岸和平協議》。欲窮千里目，更上一層樓；其實，樓上即在「大屋頂中國」之下。
總結胡溫十年，固有「和平發展」的成績，但如薄熙來案所反映者，一方面權貴腐敗已至不可思議的程度，另一方面「重慶模式」也反襯出貧富不均甚至已嚴重到民心希望毛式思維回潮的地步；再加上「烏坎村式」的未爆彈所在皆有，香港的民主訴求也愈來愈具全國性的示範作用；因而，舉目所見，習李體制未來不應再用對待劉曉波、陳光誠的方法來壓制異議，用網路警察去防堵翻牆的網民亦是堵不勝堵，每日各地數百起的「群體性事件」更是防不勝防；習李若欲維持「和平發展」、「和諧社會」的成果，「民主驗證」即是無可迴避的過程。至於兩岸關係，「和平發展」的核心思維是在「民主發展」，更是毋庸贅言。
新任總書記習近平的兩項人格烙印最受矚目。一、其父習仲勛因「劉志丹事件」被整肅，習近平則於文革時期在十六歲被下放到延安縣梁家河村。二、習近平在閩浙滬開放先行地區有長達二十餘年的兩岸經驗。因而，其家族經歷會不會使他在政治改革上較具開明思維，其兩岸經驗又會不會使他對民主及主體意識較能領悟省思，皆是可待觀察之處。若謂胡溫創造了「和平發展」的高峰，習李應是站在「民主驗證」的起點。
溫家寶為這十年給習李二人留下了一句話：「沒有政治體制改革的保障，經濟體制改革的成果就會得而復失。」然而，諷刺的是，溫家寶本人也正陷於嚴峻的清廉質疑。
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