Uncertainty and Instability Have Descended Upon the World

Uncertainty and Instability Have Descended Upon the World
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 10, 2016

Executive Summary: The United States has just undergone an exceedingly ugly election campaign. It has elected the highly controversial Donald Trump. For many dissatisfied Americans, Trump was not necessarily better. But voting for Hillary was definitely not better. Of the two, they chose Trump. Trump may have allowed America to experience a catharsis, replete with Internet era flame wars. But as far as the rest of the world is concerned, this marks the beginning of an era of uncertainty and instability.

Full Text Below:

Donald Trump is now the 45th president of the United States. The anxiety that gripped the United States and the world prior to the election has finally ended. But even greater anxiety lies ahead. How will the United States heal its wounds? How will the world avoid falling into disarray? The challenges facing Trump have only just begun.

Trump has gone from New York's Fifth Avenue to Washington, DC's Pennsylvania Avenue. He has gone from business tycoon to the world's most powerful political leader. A year and a half ago, before he announced his candidacy, nearly all the experts thought he was a flash in the pan. Who knew he would defeat 16 other candidates within his own party and become the Republican Party challenger to the highly-connected, highly credentialed Hillary Clinton? Before the election, his poll numbers rarely exceeded those of Hillary Clinton. Nearly 70% of all respondents believed he would lose. The US mainstream media almost unanimously predicted that the United States would elect its first female president. Instead Trump became the first president of the United States never to have held public office or served in the military.

The mainstream media and experts were staggered. Voters found not just the White House in the hands of the Republican Party, but also the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Trump Era has arrived. What's next?

Trump often shocked people with his language. He put people down, only to undermine his own image. He became a rarity in United States elections. His exchanges with opponents often ended with personal attacks. The United States has long sent observers abroad to evaluate other nations' elections. Who knew this time the United States would become the object of foreign observation and evaluation? If Trump fails to change his “enfant terrible” manner, he will continue undermining the image of the United States.

Fortunately in his victory speech, he began to use more elegant rhetoric to refer to his opponents. He stressed the need for humility, gratitude, and unity. He began to heal the nation's wounds. Nevertheless many of his policies remain chaotic and unclear. For example, he advocates the abolition of Obamacare. But tens of millions of low-income families in the United States depend on Obamacare. Can he really end it? Some of his political proposals are highly unusual. He would build a wall along the United States Mexico border to stop the inflow of illegal immigrants. He would withdraw US military protection for Japan. He would review and even terminate agreements with foreign countries. Just what the future holds has become a matter of concern.

Take the reassessment of military alliances for example. If Japan is worried about its own security, it may begin large-scale rearmament. This could lead to an arms race in Northeast Asia. Is this something the United States wants to see? If the THAAD anti-missile system is re-evaluated, how will South Korea react? Will it increase its military buildup? When faced with North Korea and Mainland China, will Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons? What will the world look like then?

The relationship between the United States and Mainland China is another concern. The Obama administration's "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy was Hillary Clinton's brainchild. This strategy would prevent trade protectionism. Therefore it proposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) to exclude Mainland China. It would reestablish the United States' role in the Western Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, to suppress PLA military action. Under Trump, the TPP would be terminated. The "Asian-Pacific rebalancing" strategy would become unsustainable. A Trump administration and Beijing might need to reach a new consensus. Are not the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and other nations adjusting their China policies?

Trump wants Japan and South Korea to spend more on their own defense. Will Taiwan have to spend more on national defense in the future? Trump opposes United States intervention in international affairs. How will he view the Taiwan Strait issue? He and Russian President Putin are buddy buddy. Syria and other Middle East problems may take a turn for the better. What kind of relationship will he develop with Xi Jinping? Will it be like the one President Nixon developed with Mao Zedong? How will this affect Taiwan? Taiwan cannot take these matters lightly.

Polls show that 85% of Europeans do not believe Trump will "do the right thing in international affairs". But election rhetoric does not necessarily reflect reality. Election rhetoric does not necessarily  represent policy direction. When Reagan ran for president, he vowed to resume diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. But once he took office, he signed the August 17 Communiqué which did great harm to Taiwan. Bush Jr. criticized Beijing during his first campaign speech on foreign policy. He called Mainland China a "strategic competitor". But once Bush became president, he visited the Mainland China more frequently than any other president. In 2008, the United States elected Barack Obama, its first black president. He garnered considerable international praise. After taking office less than a year, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But before his two terms were up, he has spread flames of war all over the globe. Refugees and terrorist attacks were everywhere. His halo as a peacemaker was thoroughly tarnished.

The United States has just undergone an exceedingly ugly election campaign. It has elected the highly controversial Donald Trump. For many dissatisfied Americans, Trump was not necessarily better. But voting for Hillary was definitely not better. Of the two, they chose Trump. Conservative voters in the United States are fed up with Hillary's liberalism. They look forward to the return to traditional values. They have pinned their hopes on Trump.

Trump may have allowed America to experience a catharsis, replete with Internet era flame wars. But as far as the rest of the world is concerned, this marks the beginning of an era of uncertainty and instability.

全球進入不確定、不安定狀態
2016/11/10 中國時報

川普當選美國第45任總統，全美乃至全世界終於結束了選前的不安等待，然而，更大的不安卻橫梗在前。美國如何療傷止痛，全球如何避免陷入秩序瓦解，川普面對的考驗才剛開始。

從紐約第五大道邁向華府賓州大道，川普已從企業鉅子轉身成為全球首強領導人。1年半前他宣布參選總統，幾乎所有專家都認為只是曇花一現，不料他硬是打敗16位黨內候選人，代表共和黨挑戰人脈、政治資歷極為深厚的希拉蕊‧柯林頓。大選投票前，他的民調支持度鮮少超過希拉蕊，近7成受訪者認為他必然敗陣，美國主流媒體也幾乎一面倒認為，美國必將出現首位女總統，但他硬是成為美國歷來第一位從未服行公職或軍職的總統。

在主流媒體與專家的錯愕聲中，選民發現，不止白宮落入共和黨之手，參議院、眾議院的多數黨地位也悉數由共和黨繼續掌控。「川普時代」就此來臨，這將是一個什麼樣的景象？

川普常作驚人之語，卻常是損人之語，往往反傷自己的形象，也成為美國選舉的異數。他與對手的相互批判，最終流於人身攻擊。從來美國派員赴外國觀察、品評選舉，沒想到這回美國成了被外國觀察、品評的對象。他放言無忌的習性若不改，勢將繼續傷害美國的形象。

還好，勝選演說中，他一開始就使用優雅詞藻讚揚對手，並強調謙卑、感恩、團結，開始彌平傷痕。然而他的若干政策走向如何卻依然混沌未明。例如他主張取消歐記健保制度，可是數千萬美國低收入戶因為歐巴馬才享有的健保，真的就此終結？尤其他某些大異於美國政治傳統的主張，例如在美、墨邊境築起高牆，以阻絕非法移民；撤除美國對日本的軍事保護；重新檢視、甚至不惜廢除與外國的協定等等，未來究竟如何發展，令人關注。

以重估軍事同盟關係一事為例，如果日本對自身安全感到疑慮，可能因此更大規模地重建軍備，勢將引起東北亞軍事競賽，這是美國樂見的嗎？如果重估「薩德」反飛彈系統，南韓會如何反應，是否也將加強建軍？獨自面對北韓及中國大陸，日、韓會不會發展核武？屆時世局又是什麼模樣？

美國與中國大陸之間的關係是另一個疑慮重點。歐巴馬政府的「亞太再平衡」戰略是希拉蕊設計的，在這個戰略下，經濟方面要預防貿易保護主義，因此推出《跨太平洋夥伴協定》（TPP），把中國大陸排除在外；在安全上要重振美國在西太平洋，尤其在南海的角色，壓制共軍的行動。如今川普當政，TPP就此結束，「亞太再平衡」難以為繼。川普新政府與北京之間可能必須找到新妥協點，君不見菲律賓、馬來西亞、泰國等國都在調整中國政策嗎？

川普主張日、韓分攤更多軍費，準此，日後台灣是否也須花更多錢於國防？川普反對美國干預國際，他會怎麼看待台海議題？他與俄羅斯總統普丁惺惺相惜，敘利亞等中東難題可能因此有轉機；他會與習近平發展出什麼樣的關係，會不會像尼克森總統與毛澤東之間那樣？這對台灣又有什麼影響？台灣不可掉以輕心。

民調顯示，85%的歐洲人不相信川普會「在國際事務方面做正確的事」。然而選戰印象未必反映真實，選戰語言更不能代表政策走向。雷根競選總統時說要與中華民國復交，豈料上台後卻簽署了對台灣傷害至大的《八一七公報》。小布希競選時的首次外交演說就批評北京政權，並說中國大陸是美國的「戰略競爭者」，然而小布希後來竟然成了訪問大陸最頻繁的美國總統。2008年，美國選出首位黑人總統歐巴馬，備受國際讚揚，上任才不到1年就獲得諾貝爾和平獎，但兩任未完，全球烽火四起，難民、恐攻事件頻傳，和平光環消磨殆盡。

美國經歷醜陋不堪的選戰，選出備受爭議的川普。然而對很多不滿現狀的美國人而言，川普也許意味著「不一定會更好」，但若投給希拉蕊，意味著「一定不會更好」，兩相權衡，還是川普吧。對美國保守派選民而言，他們厭倦了希拉蕊代表的自由派，他們企盼重歸傳統價值，川普是希望之所寄。

川普也許宣洩了網路時代美國「幹譙」的宣洩，但對世界而言，卻是不確定、不安定的開始。

Does the Tsai Government Understand the Political Signal Sent by the Hung Xi Summit?

Does the Tsai Government Understand the Political Signal Sent by the Hung Xi Summit? 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 6, 2016

Executive Summary: The DPP finds itself in an awkward position. Its suspicion of and opposition to the Mainland has bound the DPP government hand and foot. This makes it impossible to achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. The only way out of its dilemma is to break free of its ideological constraints and consider the actual interests of the people. It must change its cross-Strait policies. It must adopt new ideas, new rhetoric, and new attitudes when dealing with the Mainland. It must not cross the de jure Taiwan independence red line. .

Full Text Below:

The dispute over the KMT's political path is impacting KMT CCP relations. Cross-Strait relations face the prospect of “the earth moving and the mountains shaking”. The Hung Xi Summit is being convened under these conditions. Opinions are divided within the KMT. Meanwhile, the DPP is sharpening its swords as it looks on. Fortunately Hung Hsiu-chu has been able to withstand the pressure and successfully dialogue with Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping clearly explained his thinking on Taiwan. In short, it amounts to "strategic softness, tactical toughness". Xi hopes this will stabilize currently troubled cross-Strait relations. The strategic layout is clear. The future of cross-Strait relations depends on whether the three parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are able to a create a scenario beneficial to all.

Pundits initially assumed that once the KMT lost power, internal disputes would arise over the party's political path. Its future path would be unclear, and the Mainland would refuse to meet with the KMT at this moment. This view clearly underestimated the mutual trust established between the KMT and the CCP, and the Mainland's determination to ensure peaceful cross-Strait relations. In fact, the Mainland has repeatedly stressed that no matter how the political situation on Taiwan might change, it will continue to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping used the Hung Xi Summit to reaffirm this position. In his six-point proposal for cross-Strait relations, he reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. The other four points concerned cross-Strait cooperation and cross-Strait public welfare. Clearly the Mainland attaches great importance to cultivating goodwill among the people of Taiwan. On the occasion of the KMT CCP Forum, the Mainland announced next year's cross-Strait youth exchange project, confirming its good intentions.

Strategic softness is one thing. The Mainland has simultaneously drawn a clearer line in the sand with regards de jure Taiwan independence. It used the Hung Xi Summit to send a clear strategic signal. It is firmly opposed to de jure independence. It utterly rejects any possibility of Taiwan independence. The DPP government refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. On the matter of Taiwan's international status, the Mainland is adhering to its long established "one China" policy, and is not about to compromise. The Mainland's Taiwan strategy is clear. The Tsai government can no longer use “both sides have misunderstood each other” as an excuse. The ball is now in Tsai's court.

Hung Hsiu-chu, the other protagonist of the Hung Xi Summit, cannot be ignored. The KMT faces endless difficulties, in particular doubts about its future from within the party. Hung Hsiu-chu preserved the KMT-CPC cooperation platform, and deepend trust between the two parties. Hung Hsiu-chuh's efforts assured the Mainland that Taiwan would not move toward de jure independence, and that a glimmer of hope for peaceful reunification remains. She prevented the Mainland from adopting a harsher policy toward Taiwan. The preservation of the KMT CCP platform will enable the KMT to continue fighting on behalf of the people of Taiwan. Therefore the KMT plays a key role in cross-Strait relations. Mutual trust will help the KMT maintain its cross-Strait advantage.

Even more importantly, during her meeting with Xi Jinping, Hung issued a clear statement reaffirming the Kuomintang's opposition to Taiwan independence. This was the first time KMT and CCP leaders held successive talks. The theme of the KMT CCP Forum was changed from "trade and culture" to "peaceful development". It left the Ma Ying-jeou era slogan of "no reunification, no independence, and no use of force" behind in the dust. It showed that the KMT had updated its position and was prepared to deal with political issues together with the Mainland, in the hope of breaking through the cross-Strait political deadlock. Its ground-breaking value should not be underestimated. Whether agreement on political issues can be achieved depends upon a number of factors, including the support of the public and the support of the United States. The KMT is hanging by a thread. It must be prepared. The slightest misstep and it could lose the public trust. It would then be beyond redemption, relegated to permanent opposition party status.

Unfortunately the Hung Xi Summit did not address economic and trade issues. Economic and trade issues remain the key to Taiwan's survival and growth. They are also the focus of cross-Strait interaction. Hung Hsiu-chu should make a greater effort to win more practical benefits for the people of Taiwan.

For the KMT, the results of the Hung Xi Summit brought both opportunities and threats. The main problem is that the KMT is in the opposition. It lacks a majority in the legislature. It cannot turn party policy into public policy. This means the KMT CCP consensus cannot be put into practice. Moreover, the KMT is subject to DPP government obstructionism and intimidation. Although it is determined to benefit the people of Taiwan, the KMT faces an entire array of obstacles. Under the circumstances, the KMT is limited to acting as an intermediary in cross-Strait interactions. It can only assist private sector cross-Strait interactions. It cannot take the political lead. The DPP has mocked the KMT as "an affiliate of the CCP". This is yet another form of McCarthyite red baiting. But it is a provocation that the KMT must be wary of.

The DPP finds itself in an awkward position. Its suspicion of and opposition to the Mainland has bound the DPP government hand and foot. This makes it impossible to achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. The only way out of its dilemma is to break free of its ideological constraints and consider the actual interests of the people. It must change its cross-Strait policies. It must adopt new ideas, new rhetoric, and new attitudes when dealing with the Mainland. It must not cross the de jure Taiwan independence red line. Time is not on Taiwan's side. But Taiwan must nevertheless avoid immediate conflict. If Taiwan continues to provoke the Mainland over issues such as cultural Taiwan independence and the East Asian strategic situation, or even move toward de jure Taiwan independence, the two sides of the Strait risk a shooting war. The people will be uneasy. The economy will stagnate. And the nation will undergo yet another change in ruling parties.

蔡政府看懂洪習會政治訊號了嗎
2016年11月06日 中國時報

國共在國民黨路線之爭愈演愈烈、兩岸關係瀕臨「地動山搖」大背景下舉行洪習會，不但國民黨內部意見分歧，民進黨政府更虎視眈眈，但洪秀柱還是頂住壓力，與習近平順利舉行對話。習近平清晰說明了對台思維，簡言之就是「戰略柔軟、戰術強硬」，可望對混沌的兩岸關係定錨。今後兩岸關係發展，就看兩岸三黨如何在清晰戰略格局下，創造最有利己方的局面。

原本外界評估，國民黨失去政權後，內部陷入路線分歧，未來發展方向也不清晰，大陸不會在此刻與國民黨會晤。這種看法顯然低估了國共間深厚的互信，也未深刻體察大陸推動兩岸關係和平發展的誠意。事實上，大陸已多次強調，無論台灣政局如何變動，都會繼續推動兩岸交流與和平發展。習近平藉洪習會再度重申這一立場，在他提出的兩岸關係發展6點意見中，除重申九二共識和反台獨外，其他4點都著重在兩岸合作和增進兩岸民眾福祉，顯見大陸對此問題的高度重視，其對台灣民眾的善意也由此可見一斑。在國共論壇召開之際，大陸公布了明年的兩岸青年交流項目，可見其用心。

軟的一手以外，大陸更為法理台獨畫下紅線，利用洪習會發出清晰的戰略訊號，就是堅決反對法理台獨，完全否定了台獨的任何可能性。民進黨政府不接受九二共識，台灣的國際空間問題，大陸會堅持「一個中國」既定立場，不再妥協。大陸對台戰略清晰，蔡政府將再也沒有藉口將責任推託給「雙方誤判」，剩下的就是蔡政府的抉擇而已。

洪習會另一主角洪秀柱不能被忽視，在國民黨面臨重重困難、特別是黨內存在質疑的惡劣情勢下，洪秀柱確保了國共合作平台的延續，並進一步深化了國共之間的互信。洪秀柱的努力，讓大陸對台灣不走向法理分裂，仍存有一絲希望，也避免了對台政策走向極端。國共平台的延續也可以讓國民黨繼續為台灣民眾爭取利益，讓國民黨在兩岸關係扮演關鍵角色。深厚的互信基礎下，國民黨的兩岸優勢可望維繫。

更重要的是，洪秀柱在會晤習近平時，清晰陳述了國民黨反台獨立場，這是國民黨與中共領導人歷次會談的首次，國共論壇主題也由「經貿文化」改為「和平發展」，意味洪秀柱時代對馬英九時代「不統不獨不武」的超越。顯示國民黨調整定位，準備與大陸共同處理政治議題，希望突破兩岸政治僵局。其開創性價值不可低估，但政治議題的處理涉及一般民眾是否認同、美國是否支持等因素，國民黨已氣若游絲，必須做好萬全準備，若稍有閃失讓國人產生疑慮，就可能萬劫不復，長期在野。

令人遺憾的是，洪習會並未涉及經貿議題，但經貿仍是台灣生存發展癥結所在，也是兩岸互動重點，洪秀柱若要幫助台灣民眾爭取更多現實利益，還是應該多在這一領域下功夫。

對國民黨來說，洪習會成果既帶來機會也帶來威脅。主要問題在於，國民黨在野地位，立法院也不掌握多數，不能將政黨立場轉換成公共政策，這意味國共共識無法付諸實施。不僅如此，國民黨還要面臨民進黨政府的杯葛、封鎖與威脅，即便有心幫助台商和台灣民眾爭取更多利益，也要面臨重重挑戰。在不利情勢下，國民黨很可能淪於兩岸互動的中介角色，只能為兩岸民間互動提供協助，卻無法成為政治主導力量。民進黨人譏諷國民黨是「中共附隨組織」，這種論調是另類「紅帽子」，卻也是國民黨必須警覺的挑釁。

民進黨角色尷尬，「疑中抗中」政策基調讓民進黨政府作繭自縛，難在兩岸關係求得突破。唯一脫困策略，是拋下意識形態束縛，以台灣民眾實際利益為依歸，上策是調整兩岸政策思路，以新觀念、新論述、新姿態面對大陸，中策是謹守法理台獨紅線，不輕易碰觸，時間雖然不站在台灣這邊，但以拖待變起碼可以避免立即衝突。若在文化台獨與東亞戰略問題上繼續挑釁大陸，甚至走向法理台獨，兩岸兵凶戰危、民心不安、經濟困頓，政黨再度輪替勢所難免。

The DPP is a Political Party Hostile to Labor

The DPP is a Political Party Hostile to Labor
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 7, 2016

Executive Summary: During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the DPP fooled the workers once. Incredibly, it fooled them once again. But workers on Taiwan are smarter than they were 16 years ago. If the ruling DPP does not want to lose its labor base, it must completely reform itself. It must not forget its campaign promises, such as "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day". This is the antidote to labor's long term suffering.

Full Text Below:

Labor unions are unhappy with the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" bill that the Tsai Ing-wen government is ramming through the legislature. With students at their side, they have blasted the DPP for betraying labor as soon as they seized power. Seven labor union leaders have gone on hunger strikes. Contrast this with the Sunflower Student Movement 19 months ago. The opposition DPP was exploiting the “anti-China” political atmosphere to discredit the Service Trade Agreement (STA) draft bill, which would have increased employment opportunities for workers. The failure of the bill to pass reduced workers' chances for employment. Now the DPP is attempting to ram through the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" bill. It has revealed just how much it exploited students.

The Sunflower Student Movement's grievance was allegedly the government's failure to follow procedure. But as everyone knows, the DPP and other opposition forces were determined to kill the STA. The death of the STA blocked foreign investment in the service industries and reduced employment opportunities. Opening up foreign investment in the service sector may increase competition for Taiwan based companies, but it also increases demand for labor services.

Now that the DPP is the ruling party, it is promoting "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day". Over two years ago it goaded students into blocking passage of the STA. The DPP is effectively cozying up to capital. During the Sunflower Student Movement it cited procedural irregularities as pretext for its obstructionism. But the moment it seized power, it began advocating balance between the interests of labor and capital. It began spouting high-minded rhetoric about political stability and economic growth.

The "Cross-Strait Agreements Oversight Regulations" bill was the handiwork of the Sunflower Student Movement. But once the DPP became the ruling party, it lost interest in it. The ruling DPP thinks that the two sides do not need an STA to begin with. Therefore they have no need for financial cooperation. They even think that ECFA should be frozen.

The ruling DPP would like its New Southern Strategy to replace cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. But from the perspective of Taiwan's domestic economic and employment opportunities, the New Southern Strategy and the Go West policy are the same. Both policies increase GDP, business revenue, and employer dividends. But neither benefits the domestic market. Neither increases consumption and employment opportunities. First, neither will help workers receive high salaries in Southeast Asia. Second, neither will encourage employers to invest in Taiwan. Both policies are detrimental to labor.

The STA will introduce new service industries that employ local Taiwan workers. Continued financial cooperation between the two sides will enable the Mainland to purchase shares in Taiwan businesses. Taiwan has higher corporate earnings, stricter corporate governance requirements, and better equity than the Mainland. With the injection of Mainland capital, the resulting stock market boom would increase consumer demand and labor wages.

The DPP opposes cross-Strait financial cooperation for emotional reasons. It insists that Mainland capital will swallow up Taiwan businesses. Therefore it must be blocked to protect Taiwan-funded businesses. If this does not constitute pandering to capital, what does? If Mainland capital or Mainland businesses are subject to Taiwan's laws and regulations, and to Taiwan's oversight, businesses may indeed face increase competitive pressure. But will labor be affected? It will not. Instead market forces will increase Taiwan's business innovation and global competitiveness.

The ruling DPP has forced workers to sacrifice their rights and interests. It has characterized Mainland capital as “poisonous snakes and wild beasts”. It has insulted people on both sides of the Strait, and undermined mutual trust. Official economic and trade exchanges between the two sides have been shut down almost completely.

Employers have deep pockets. They can wait until the big picture changes before investing. But labor lives hand to mouth. Their children must study. They must pay off their loans. They must maintain stable incomes. The ruling DPP is dragging its feet while hoping for change. It is flagrantly indifferent to whether labor lives or dies.

Cross-Strait relations under the DPP have now entered the "hot confrontation" stage. Labor has fallen into the cracks. The DPP opposed the STA. It brought disaster down upon the heads of workers. Had the STA been passed in a reasonable manner, how many Mainland companies would have come to Taiwan and hired highly-qualified Taiwan workers? Meanwhile the long awaited champions of labor, upon seizing power, care only for themselves and for capital. Once they are elected, labor becomes nothing more than a stumbling block.

“The working hours bill has forced labor to hunger strike”. This is the slogan adopted by the "2016 Labor Struggle". The new government is pandering to the cartels, while using police to suppress public protests. Contrast this behavior with its behavior as an opposition party, when it opposed the STA. This shows people that the DPP's "opposition to China [sic]" was a pretext. What is behind the DPP's “opposition to China [sic]”, other than “opposition to labor"? What is this opposition, other than pandering to the bosses?

The DPP knows full well that cross-Strait relations must not be frozen. Years of exchanges have merged the two sides' economies and societies. Economic integration once implemented, cannot be undone. Taiwan cannot divorce itself from the Mainland. Once cross-Strait cooperation is ended, Taiwan's economy will decline, and the ruling DPP's core support will evaporate.

More importantly, labor requires more stable cross-Strait relations than capital. Commodity trade cooperation can increase the output of agricultural products, high-quality consumer goods, tourism and medical services. It can increase employment opportunities for Taiwan workers. Trade in services and finance cooperation can directly and indirectly improve labor conditions for local workers.

During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the DPP fooled the workers once. Incredibly, it fooled them once again. But workers on Taiwan are smarter than they were 16 years ago. If the ruling DPP does not want to lose its labor base, it must completely reform itself. It must not forget its campaign promises, such as "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day". This is the antidote to labor's long term suffering.

社論》民進黨其實是一個反勞工政黨
2016/11/7 下午 08:13:33  主筆室

勞工團體不滿蔡英文政府「一例一休」法案強行闖關，多日來在一些學生聲援下，強烈批判民進黨取得政權後就背叛勞工，7名產業工會幹部進而絕食。對照19個月前的「太陽花學運」，在野黨為操作「反中」社會氛圍，抹黑可以增加勞工就業機會的「服貿協議」草案，實質傷害了勞工就業權，現在又意圖強行通過「一例一休」，利用學生的真面目赤裸裸攤在國人面前。

「太陽花學運」聲稱是因議事程序正當性問題而起，但路人皆知，當時民進黨及其他在野勢力的目的是封殺「服貿協議」，其結果是斷送了外人投資我服務業的管道，進而阻擋了勞工就業機會的增加。開放境外資金投入服務業，可能對台灣企業造成競爭，卻會增加對服務業勞工的需求。

今日執政黨護航「一例一休」，和2年多前鼓動學生阻擋「服貿協議」，實質上都是不折不扣向資方利益靠攏。「太陽花學運」時，尚且用程序正義予以掩蓋，掌握政權以後，卻祭出勞資利益平衡、穩定經濟發展這些冠冕堂皇的理由。

「兩岸協議監督條例」的立法是「太陽花學運」轟轟烈烈造成的成果，但是執政黨就位之後，對此法案顯然興趣缺缺。因為執政黨認為，兩岸之間根本不需要「服貿協議」，也不需要金融合作，或許連當初簽署的ECFA最好都冰凍起來。

執政黨想以「新南向」政策取代兩岸之間的經貿往來與合作，但是從台灣內需經濟及就業機會角度而言，「新南向」與「西進」本質無異，都是有利於GDP、企業營收與老闆們股利股息的政策，卻無益於內需市場、消費與就業機會提高，一來政府不可能仲介勞工去東南亞坐領高薪，二來不會讓老闆們有投資台灣的意願，這些政策對勞工有害無利。

不但「兩岸服貿協議」可能引進新的服務業僱用台灣勞工，兩岸持續的金融合作也可讓大陸人民購買台灣股票，因為台灣對企業財報和公司治理要求高，股票體質當然比大陸好很多。有了大陸資金的挹注，股市榮景可以推動各類消費需求，勞工薪資當然可望增加。

民進黨從心態上就反對兩岸金融合作，認為陸資會吃掉台灣企業，因此必須將陸資阻絕於境外，才能保護台資企業。那麼，我們要問，這種論調不是在為老闆護航，什麼才叫倒向資方？假如在國家法令監督之下，台灣多些陸資老闆或是企業，依據台灣法令運作、接受監管，企業固然會增加競爭壓力，但勞工會受到影響嗎？不但不會，市場力量反而會增加台灣企業的創新能力與世界競爭力。

執政黨強迫勞工犧牲權益，把陸資說成毒蛇猛獸，傷害了兩岸民間感情與政治互信，兩岸官方經貿交流幾乎全面停擺，民間合作也受到衝擊。

老闆們口袋有錢，可以慢慢等大局變化後再投資，但勞工要過日子、子女要升學、貸款不能拖欠，必須維持穩定的收入。執政黨「以拖待變」，顯然是置勞工死活於不顧！

兩岸關係在民進黨執政後進入「熱對抗」，勞工在夾縫中間，難道不會感嘆當初發動反對「服貿協議」的政黨真是害慘勞工了！如果「服貿協議」經由合理程序通過，有多少陸資會來台灣僱用高品質的台灣勞工？終日期待的勞工護衛者，在取得政權之後，在乎的只是酬庸自己和資本主們，在不選舉的時候，勞工不過是一群絆腳石罷了！

「硬幹砍假，工人絕食。」是「2016工鬥」的口號，新政府企圖為財團護航的同時，也動用維安警力圍堵民意。這些現象，對照當初反對「服貿協議」時在野黨的主張，更使人體會到「反中」根本是假議題。「反中」的背後，其實不就是「反勞工」嗎？不就是「護老闆」嗎？

民進黨很清楚，兩岸關係不能冷，兩岸經過多年交流，經濟與社會已開始融合，尤其經濟整合覆水難收，台灣無法脫離大陸的影響。一旦斬斷兩岸的合作，台灣經濟必將受到重挫，執政黨的統治基礎當然也就會跟著消失。

更重要的是，勞工比老闆更需要穩定的兩岸關係，商品貿易合作可以增加農產品、高品質消費財以及旅遊、醫療等服務業的輸出，增加在地台灣勞工的工作機會；服務貿易合作和金融合作，都可以直接或間接促進本地勞工的勞動條件。

民進黨在2000年政黨輪替時，已經唬弄過勞工一次，這次竟然故技重施。今日台灣的勞工，畢竟比起16年前聰明多了，執政黨如果不想喪失勞工基本盤，就要徹底自我改造，不但要在「一例一休」上誠實面對選舉承諾，也不要忘了兩岸合作才是解救勞工長久痛苦的解藥！

Who Made Wellington Koo Judge, Jury, and Executioner?

Who Made Wellington Koo Judge, Jury, and Executioner?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 7, 2016

Executive Summary: In September, the “Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee”, or CIPAS, ordered Bank SinoPac to freeze the KMT's accounts. It also froze KMT checks issued by the Bank of Taiwan, preventing the KMT from paying its employees. Now however, the Taipei High Administrative Court has ruled that CIPAS may have broken the law, and has ordered it to cease and desist. This ruling is a slap in the face for CIPAS, which has running rampant for several months.

Full Text Below:

In September, the “Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee”, or CIPAS, ordered Bank SinoPac to freeze the KMT's accounts. It also froze KMT checks issued by the Bank of Taiwan, preventing the KMT from paying its employees. Now however, the Taipei High Administrative Court has ruled that CIPAS may have broken the law, and has ordered it to cease and desist. This ruling is a slap in the face for CIPAS, which has running rampant for several months.

The High Administrative Court ruled on the following grounds: First, Bank SinoPac is a private sector entity. It lacks the authority to freeze depositors' accounts. CIPAS ordered the bank to cease “the fulfillment of its statutory obligations". Its order was ill-defined. Bank SinoPac lacks the authority to determine what constitutes "the fulfillment of statutory obligations." Second, CIPAS ordered the Bank of Taiwan to freeze nine promissory notes issued by the KMT. But according to the "Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations", the Bank of Taiwan was not a KMT debtor, and had no authority to impose such sanctions. Third, the KMT account at Bank SinoPac is for the payment of staff salaries. The freeze prevents the KMT from paying its employees. The Taipei City Labor Bureau has intervened, revealing the seriousness of the emergency.

The High Administrative Court judgment can be summed up in two sentences: CIPAS must obey the law and may not do whatever it damned well pleases. This is a clear and solemn reminder to Wellington Koo and CIPAS: Do not become a monster that abuses its power. You may not assume the role of judge, jury, and executioner.

When CIPAS was established, people hoped it would purge the remnants of party government equivalence, and establish a more equitable environment for party competition. CIPAS went into action soon after the change in ruling parties. It enjoyed some degree of public support. Even the KMT leadership felt the need for self-examination, and agreed that the party should divest itself of all its assets. Unfortunately, these conditions gave Wellington Koo the impression that he wielded unlimited power, that he was an invincible Iron Man who could attack and destroy whomever he wished. CIPAS was hastily slapped together. Its actions have been tyrannical. It has suddenly frozen accounts, suddenly prohibited the cashing of checks, and suddenly concluded that this or that business or asset was “improperly acquired", and imposed prohibitions or punishments. Its actions have clearly not been about recovering party assets, but about wiping out the KMT.

In short, under the aegis of the Executive Yuan, CIPAS has become a monster with unlimited power. It sees itself as policeman, investigator, prosecutor, and judge, all in one. Wellington Koo, being the lawyer that he is, has seized runaway power. The key factor was the Legislative Yuan's passage of the "Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations" in the middle of this year. Legislators failed to consider whether legislative means were commensurate with legislative intent. In a murderous rage, the ruling party rammed the bill through. An unsound bill fell into the hands of the ambitious Wellington Koo, and rapidly morphed into something very different.

For example, CIPAS may have the authority to declare that the KMT's deposits with Bank SinoPac were "illicit party assets”. But did it have the authority to order the bank to freeze the KMT's bank accounts? The answer is no, at least according to the Taipei High Administrative Court. In fact, according to the provisions of the Banking Act, absent a legal decision, a bank may not stop payment on deposits or remittances based on demands by third parties. The provisions of the banking law protect private property from unnecessary interference or restrictions. They maintain freedom and stability within the financial order. Can we allow this order to be destroyed by the arbitrary actions of CIFAS?

CIPAS also declared that the Central Investments Company or Xinyu-Taiwan Enterprises were KMT "affiliated organizations". But the Tsai government has a long way to go before it can classify the tens of billions of dollars of assets in these two companies as state owned. Modern enterprise investment and cross-shareholding makes it impossible to shut down the Central Investments Company without affecting other companies. When the "Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations" was formulated, these factors were overlooked. If the Tsai government fails to dot its “i”s and cross its “t”s when dealing with the party assets issue, it will be remembered as a party loots the nation's assets. It will also make many private businesses uneasy. When Changhua County forced Taiwan Chemical's Changhua plant to close, was it not inspired by CIPAS tyrannical behavior?

At this stage, CIPAS must first inventory assets. Only then can it limit and confiscate assets. It must carefully consider the legitimacy of its actions. It must not assume the role of judge, jury, and executioner. CIPAS does not have the authority to gobble up everything it sees. It is under the aegis of the Executive Yuan. If it arrogates to itself the authority of judges, it has vastly exceeded its authority.

聯合報社論／誰讓顧立雄當警察又扮法官？
2016-11-07 02:05:19 聯合報 社論

「不當黨產處理委員會」九月間要求永豐銀行凍結國民黨在該行的帳戶，同時凍結國民黨開出的台灣銀行支票，造成該黨發不出員工薪水。台北高等行政法院就此作出裁決，認為黨產會的處理「合法性」有疑義，要求停止執行。這項裁決，無異是對「黨產會」數月來的橫衝直撞，賞了一記耳光。

高等行政法院裁決的理由是：第一，永豐銀行是私人企業，並無扣押存款人帳戶款項的權力。黨產會要求該銀行除有合於「履行法定義務」者外均暫停提領，則欠缺明確性，永豐銀並無權力認定何謂「履行法定義務」。第二，黨產會命令台灣銀行凍結國民黨九張本票，但根據《不當黨產條例》，台銀並非國民黨的「債務人」，無權作此禁制處分，黨產會的命令「合法性」有問題。第三，國民黨在永豐銀的帳戶是發放員工薪水之用，因扣押而無法支付，台北市勞動局已介入處理，可見情況緊急。

高等行政法院這些裁決，總結可以歸納為兩句話：討黨產必須依法而行，不可恣意而為。這也是對顧立雄和他所領導的黨產會一個清晰而嚴肅的提醒：勿當權力怪獸！不可自扮警察，又要身兼檢察官和法官。

「黨產會」成立時原本甚受外界期待，認為可以趁機清理黨政不分年代的歷史遺緒，並建立更公平的政黨競爭環境。黨產會在政黨輪替後迅速展開運作，具有一定的民意支持；連國民黨中央都自我反省，宣示同意黨產歸零。遺憾的是，這樣的社會氣氛卻給了顧立雄一種「權力無限」的幻覺，以為自己是「無敵鐵金剛」，想打誰就打誰，要消滅誰就消滅誰。因此，除了組織過程草率，運作方式更是霸氣逼人，忽而下令凍結帳戶，忽而下令禁止支票兌現，甚至驟而推斷某某企業財產是「不當取得」，下令禁止處分。如此作法，似已志不在討黨產，而在置國民黨於死地。

簡言之，設在行政院底下的「黨產會」，卻自以為集警、調、檢、審四種大權於一身，實已變成一隻權力無限的怪獸。追根究柢，除了顧立雄以律師風格驟獲授權而暴走之外，最主要的因素是年中立法通過《政黨及其附隨組織不當取得財產處理條例》時，根本不曾認真思考立法的旨意和手段是否相稱，執政黨就在一片殺聲中草率過關。一部不健全的法案，落在野心勃勃的顧立雄手上，也就愈發變調走樣。

舉例而言，黨產會或許有權認定國民黨在永豐銀行的存款為「不當黨產」，但它有沒有權力要求永豐銀行凍結國民黨的帳戶呢？至少，台北高等行政法院所給的答案是否定的。事實上，根據《銀行法》的規定，除非有法律判決，銀行不得根據第三方的要求停止給付存款或匯款。銀行法的規定，一方面在保護私有財產免於無謂的干擾或限制，另一方面也在維護金融秩序的自由和安定；這樣的秩序，能因為黨產會的恣意行事，就遭到破壞嗎？

再如，黨產會定調中投或欣裕台企業為國民黨「附隨組織」，但這距離蔡政府可以將兩家公司上百億資產一舉收歸國有，恐怕仍相當遙遠。原因是，以現代企業的投資及交叉持股模式，關掉中投公司而不連帶牽扯其他企業，恐不可能；但這些在制訂黨產條例時，均未仔細思考。若處理時缺乏細緻、合法的步驟處理，蔡政府不僅將留下「強徵民產」的惡名，也會讓許多民間企業感到惴惴不安。試想，彰化縣府稍早強令台化彰化廠關閉，難道不是受黨產會霸道作風的影響所致？

我們認為，黨產會現階段最好先做好財產清查的工作，在跳到「禁」與「沒收」的步驟之前，先想清楚自己行動的合法性，搞清楚法律的競合關係，切勿再演出自扮警察兼法官的鬧劇。黨產會沒有通吃的權力，設在行政院下的機構若自扮法官，未免撈過界太遠。

Recognize Taiwan's Strategic Advantages: Pander Not to Japan

Recognize Taiwan's Strategic Advantages: Pander Not to Japan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 3, 2016

Executive Summary: The Tsai government must think long and hard about its behavior when confronted with Japan. It must not reflexively cave in every time. Instead it must understand its strategic advantages. It must negotiate with the Japanese to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. Only that counts as responsible government.

Full Text Below:

To deal with the problem of Taiwan fishing vessels fishing in the waters off "Okinotori", Japan convened a "Taiwan-Japan Conference on Ocean Affairs and Cooperation" in Tokyo. But a day of wrangling proved fruitless. Shortly after the DPP government took office, it withdrew from the waters off “Okinotori” on its own, without prompting. The Ma government insisted that “Okinotori” was merely a reef and not an island. During recent talks however, the Tsai government repudiated the Ma government position. Alas, it received nothing in return. It received neither a compromise nor a commitment on fishing rights. The Tsai government may also have undermined our bargaining position in negotiations over the sovereignty of Taiping Island. Tsai government diplomatic ineptitude has left the public frustrated. The ability of Taiwan fishermen to make a living has been severely compromised. No wonder fishermen's groups are up in arms.

Let us examine the issues discussed by the two sides. They include cooperation on fisheries, maritime search and rescue, and science and technology. The scope is broad. Maritime search and rescue cooperation is a matter of national security involving sensitive issues. Participants on our side included the Agriculture Commission Fisheries Agency, the Coast Guard, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Council. This shows that our concerns are not limited to fishing rights. The Japanese side however, downplayed the matter. It tried to minimize political sensitivity in everything from meeting procedures to seating arrangements. During the talks, the Tsai government renounced the Ma government's insistence that “Okinotoro” was a reef, not an island. The Tsai government merely asked that fishing vessels from Taiwan be permitted to operate outside the 12 nautical mile limit, and protested the seizing of fishing vessels such as the Tung Sheng Chi Number 16. Its demand that fishing vessels be returned was rejected. Instead Japan reaffirmed sovereignty over “Okinotoro” and claimed a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

The DPP took the initiative and made concessions on the island vs. reef issue. Japan accepted the concessions as their rightful due, then turned a deaf ear to our demands on fishing rights. Japan held its ground. It ignored our compromises and concessions. The Tsai government surrendered without a fight. Was this a strategic blunder? Did the Japanese have our number? Or does the DPP government have ulterior motives for allowing Japan to eat its lunch?

After taking office, President Tsai has not explicitly declared that the government was “cozying up to the US and Japan, and distancing itself from the Mainland”. But through her public statements and actual moves, President Tsai hopes to improve her government's relationship with the United States and Japan. She even hopes to become part of the US Pivot to Asia strategy. Therefore, when negotiating with Japan, she repudiated the Ma government strategy of fighting for every last square inch of land. She made strategic concessions to Japan in exchange for its support. But the real world consequences were clearly not what she expected.

Strategically speaking, Taipei and Tokyo do in fact need each other. But during negotiations, Japan puts its national interests first. It never sacrifices its substantive interests for strategic cooperation. Japan is aware of Taiwan's strategic needs. But it is not about to make concessions with regards its substantive interests. Japan has also demanded that Taiwan lift its ban on the import of foodstuffs from disaster-stricken areas. When given an inch, it takes a mile.

From this perspective, the Tsai government committed a strategic blunder. Look back at the Ma government's policy of "close to the US, friendly to Japan, and at peace with the Mainland”. The DPP airily dismissed it as "pandering to China [sic], and selling out Taiwan". In fact Ma's policy involved a shrewd strategic balance. The Ma government used improved cross-Strait relations to force the United States and Japan to fulfill Taiwan's strategic needs, often by making substantive concessions to Taiwan.

In particular, during Taiwan-Japan fisheries negotiations, the Japanese were subject to relentless pressure from the Mainland regarding Diaoyutai. They were forced to cooperate with Taiwan, and make major concessions in order to dissuade Taiwan from cooperating with the Mainland in the defense of Diaoyutai. The Mainland, the US and Japan are engaged in a strategic struggle. Within the cracks Taiwan gained hard won breathing room. It also won major concessions for Taiwan fishermen.

Unfortunately the Tsai government is ideologically committed to opposing the Mainland. It does everything in its power to distance itself in order to reduce pressure from the Mainland. It must rely on outside forces to resist the Mainland. This has led to a loss of strategic footing. Worse, it has enabled the US and Japan to see through its game. Ever since President Tsai's election victory, Japan has sent one delegation after another to Taiwan to demand the lifting of the ban on food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster area. The United States has relentlessly demanded the lifting of the ban on US pork imports. These are practical examples of Taiwan's substantive interests being sacrificed as a consequence of strategic compromises.

Chiu Yi-jen is purportedly a master strategist within the DPP. He is charged with negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo. This makes one wonder just what is Tsai's strategic intent? Why does she cave in whenever she confronts Japan? Why can't she solve this problem? In fact, Taiwan has plenty of chips it can play when dealing with Japan. Since taking office, Abe has been mired in a global strategic battle with the Mainland in the Asia-Pacific region. Every square inch of land is being fought over. Japan clearly does not want the Mainland to control the East Asian region. It is determined to check it with every ounce of strength it can muster.

In other words, Japan's strategic intentions mean that Taiwan and Japan need each other. It is not simply a case of Taiwan needing Japan. As long as Taiwan is able to remain flexible and maintain a balance between the Mainland and Japan, it hold its own and force Japan to choose.

The Tsai government must think long and hard about its behavior when confronted with Japan. It must not reflexively cave in every time. Instead it must understand its strategic advantages. It must negotiate with the Japanese to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. Only that counts as responsible government.

社論》認清台灣戰略優勢 不必逢日必軟
2016/11/3 下午 07:38:22  主筆室

為處理我漁船在「沖之鳥」水域捕魚問題，東京舉行的「台日海洋事務合作對話會議」，經過一天折衝，未能達成任何具體成果。民進黨政府就任不久，隨即主動撤出沖之鳥水域海巡艦艇，這次對話又放棄馬政府「沖之鳥」是礁非島主張，卻未能換得日方對捕魚權的妥協或承諾，甚至埋下伏筆，將對我方太平島主權談判造成不利影響。蔡政府外交折衝能力不但讓民眾失望，漁民生計更深受損害，難怪漁民團體紛紛表態抗議。

攤開雙方討論議題，包括漁業合作、海上搜救合作、海洋科學合作等，議題範圍甚廣，尤其海上搜救合作屬於國安層級，事涉敏感。我方除農委會漁業署、海巡署、科技部外，外交部及國安會也加入對話，顯示我方志不僅在漁權，實另有所圖。不過，日方非常低調，由會議程序及座位安排觀察，試圖盡量降低政治敏感性。會談中，我方放棄馬政府時代「沖之鳥」為礁非島的主張，僅要求在「沖之鳥」12浬範圍外海域漁船作業，並對日方扣捕我東聖吉16號等漁船表示抗議，要求索回該漁船遭日方沒收之保釋金。日方沒有正面回應，反而重申其擁有「沖之鳥」的主權和200浬專屬經濟海域立場。

民進黨政府在島礁問題上主動讓步，日本卻將我方讓步視為理所應當，對我方要求的捕漁權則置若罔聞。日本堅持立場，不因我方妥協而讓步，蔡政府未戰先讓。這究竟是我方戰略誤判，日方鴨霸吃定台灣，還是民進黨政府另有所圖，放任日本吃定？

蔡總統上任以來，雖未明言「親美日、遠大陸」，但透過其公開發言和實際行動都可以看出，希望透過加強與美日等國的準聯盟關係，消解來自大陸的影響力，甚至希望配合美國重返亞洲戰略。因此，在與日本談判時，一改馬政府寸土必爭的作法，而以戰略上的讓步來換取日本的支持，但實際效果顯然未如預期。

從戰略上看，台日雙方確實彼此需要，但日本在談判中，仍以本國利益優先，不會因為戰略合作的需要而輕言放棄現實利益。甚至可以說，日本也意識到台灣對自己的戰略需要，反而更不願意在實際利益上作出讓步。不僅如此，日本對台灣其實是予取予求，除了漁權問題以外，日本還要求台灣解禁核災區食品進口，可謂步步進逼。

從這個角度看，蔡政府犯了戰略錯誤。回顧馬政府時代「親美友日和中」政策，民進黨簡單斥之為「親中賣台」，殊不知這是非常巧妙的戰略平衡。馬政府藉改善兩岸關係，讓美日產生對台灣的戰略需要，常能換得美日對台政策的實質利益。

特別是台日漁權談判上，日本受制於大陸在釣魚台問題上步步進逼，不得不選擇與台灣合作，終於在漁權上對台灣大幅讓步，讓台灣不與大陸合作保釣，免除腹背受敵厄運。台灣在中美日戰略博弈夾縫中，爭取到難得的生存空間，也為台灣漁民爭得實際利益。

但蔡政府出於「疑中抗中」意識形態，集中精力疏遠大陸，為了減輕來自大陸的壓力，就必須引入外力加以抗衡，這就平白無故讓自己失去了戰略縱深，更讓美日看破手腳。從蔡總統勝選以來，日方就接二連三派遣代表團推動核災區食品解禁，美國也不斷要求開放美豬進口，都是戰略妥協之下台灣實際利益遭到損害的實際事例。

號稱民進黨戰略高手的邱義仁，是台日談判主導，這不能不讓人產生疑問，蔡政府的戰略意圖到底是什麼？為何逢日必軟而找不到解套之法？事實上，台灣面對日本絕非毫無討價還價能力，安倍上任以來在全球與大陸展開戰略競逐，在亞太區域更是寸土必爭，顯然，日本不希望大陸完全掌控東亞區域主導權，希望拉攏一切可能力量加以制衡。

換句話說，日本的戰略意圖意味台日之間是相互需要，絕非單純台灣有求於日本。只要台灣在中國大陸與日本間，能保持靈活的平衡關係，就有空間提出並堅持自己的主張，日本也會識時務作出選擇。

蔡政府應該深刻反省自己面對日本時的種種表現，不要逢日必軟，反而應該在清晰認知自己戰略優勢的基礎上，對日本據理力爭，最大限度的為台灣人民爭取利益，這才是負責任的政府。

How Long Will the People of Taiwan Tolerate the DPP's Failure to Deal with Taiwan Independence?

How Long Will the People of Taiwan Tolerate the DPP's Failure to Deal with Taiwan Independence? 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 1, 2016

Executive Summary: Xi Jinping said, "If the CCP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, the Chinese people will overthrow it". The Tsai government must ask itself, "If the DPP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, will it lose the support of the people of Taiwan one day?" The Tsai government must consider the possibility that the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” are its way out of this dilemma .

Full Text Below:

The Hong Xi Summit reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus, and took another step in opposition to Taiwan independence. It left room for “one China, different interpretations", and reevaluated the possibility of a peace agreement.

First, it resolutely reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus. Hung and Xi referred to the 1992 Consensus three times during the summit. Xi said that changes in Taiwan's political situation do not change the historical facts and core implications of the 1992 Consensus. Recognizing or rejecting the 1992 Consensus is the difference between acknowledging that China is one country and alleging the existence of two countries. On this key issue the Mainland cannot possibly give way. This means that Beijing will not soften its stand on the 1992 Consensus as a concession to the Tsai government.

Second, the Hung Xi Summit took another step in opposition to Taiwan independence. Ma Ying-jeou said that "no Taiwan independence" was a declaration of his own position. He said he "would not make wild statements regarding one China”. Ma did not explicitly reject Taiwan independence. By contrast, during the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu explicitly stressed that her "peace policy platform would oppose Taiwan independence", and declared war on the DPP's Taiwan Independence Party Platform.

Xi Jinping reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus, the one China principle, and opposition to Taiwan independence. Hung Hsiu-chu openly declared war on the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. This reinforced the link between the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. The Ma government, by contrast, linked the 1992 Consensus to “one China, different interpretations”. The Tsai government has never accepted the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations”. If one day the Tsai government is subjected to increased pressure from the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, it may prevent a wolf from entering the front door, only to allow a tiger to enter through the back door.

Third, in order to leave room for "one China, different interpretations", Ma Ying-jeou mentioned “one China, different interpretations” during the Ma Xi Summit closed session. During the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu advocated "seeking common ground in the one China principle, while shelving differences regarding the definition of one China". Wu Po-hsiung first used this phraseology during his meeting with Hu Jintao in June 2012. Lien Chan used it again when he met Xi Jinping in February 2013. They never explicitly mentioned “one China, different interpretations”, but they were effectively referring to “one China, different interpretations”.

Hung made no mention of “one China, different interpretations” inside or outside the summit. Nor did she attempt to promote “one China, same interpretation”. This suggests that Hung's team knows when to advance and when to retreat. It also suggests that “one China, different interpretations” is not an arbitrary concept that can casually be dispensed with.

In fact, in November 2012, Sun Yafu, former deputy director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, also spoke of "seeking common ground in one China,  while shelving differences over the political definition of one China". This echoed the sentiments of Wu Den-yi, Lien Chan, and Hung Hsiu-chu. The Hung Xi Summit reaffirmed the meaning of one China and shelved differences. For this it deserves applause. Xi Jinping spoke of "the basis of the one-China principle". He did not slam the door shut on “one China, different interpretations”.

Fourth, Hung once again probed the possibility of a peace agreement. She hoped the two sides would consider the possibility of ending cross-Strait hostilities through a peace agreement. She spoke of the "possibility" because Taiwan remains mired in political controversy. Xi said the CCP's long held proposition is that the two sides can discuss a peace agreement on the basis of the one China principle. This shows that the two sides of the Strait have left behind the “no reunification, no independence, no use of force”, “Father and Son Ride a Donkey” mode of interaction behind. The two sides must agree on a goal. Even if the goal is not reunification, a peace agreement is still necessary. Can the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement on the basis of "one China, different interpretations”? If they can, then perhaps a peace agreement can become the leading issue during the next stage of cross-Strait relations.

The KMT is not as strong as it was during the 2005 Lien Hu Summit. But the Hung Xi Summit shows that Beijing has no intention of allowing the DPP to assume control over cross-Strait relations. This has marginalized the Tsai government, just as it once marginalized the Chen government. A spokesman for the Presidential Office said, "We hope all political parties will unite behind the government on the matter of cross-Strait relations". The comment revealed the government's frustration and impotence.

President Tsai's comments regarding the Hung Xi Summit were exceedingly moderate. She once again urged Beijing to “acknowledge the existence of the ROC". But the Taiwan Independence Party Platform refuses to acknowledge the existence of the ROC. How does she intend to explain that away? She said "leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must demonstrate wisdom and flexibility. They must transform existing differences between the two sides into a win-win future". Is she truly unaware that the 1992 Consensus embodies just such this wisdom and flexibility?

Xi Jinping departed from the script and said, "If the CCP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, the Chinese people will overthrow it". The Tsai government must ask itself, "If the DPP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, will it lose the support of the people of Taiwan one day?"

The Tsai government must consider the possibility that the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” are its way out of this dilemma .

聯合／民進黨不處理台獨 能獲台灣人民多久支持？
2016-11-03 03:15聯合報 聯合報社論

洪習會再度夯實「九二共識」，在「反對台獨」上進了一步，為「一中各表」留下空間，並重新試探「和平協議」的可能性。

一、再度夯實「九二共識」：據點計，洪與習在此會各說了三次「九二共識」。習近平說，台灣政局的變化改變不了「九二共識」的歷史事實和核心意涵，承不承認九二共識，關係認定一個國家還是兩個國家的根本問題；他說，在這個大是大非的問題上，大陸不可能有絲毫鬆動。習的這番話，可解讀為北京無可能在「九二共識」上對蔡政府退讓。

二、在「反對台獨」上更進一步：馬英九說「不獨」，是宣示自己的立場，並說「不會一中亂表」，且馬也未正面說過「反對台獨」。洪秀柱在洪習會上挑明「以和平政綱對抗台獨黨綱」，則有針對性，是直接向台獨黨綱宣戰。

習近平再次強調，以「九二共識」與「一中原則」及「反對台獨」連結，洪秀柱則挑明要對抗台獨黨綱；至此，「九二共識」與「反對台獨」的連結更加牢實（馬政府是以一中各表與九二共識連結）。蔡政府始終不接納「九二共識／一中各表」，未來若面臨內外對「台獨黨綱」的更直接壓力，儼然將成前門拒狼、後門迎虎的局面。

三、為「一中各表」留下空間：馬習會閉門會上，馬英九提到「一中各表」。洪秀柱在洪習會上則說：「求一中原則之同，存一中涵義之異」。此說首見於吳伯雄在二○一二年六月對胡錦濤說，再見於二○一三年二月連戰對習近平說。這些說法，雖未提「一中各表」，但說的都是「一中各表」。

洪在會內會外雖未說一中各表，但亦未再向一中同表推進，這或許顯示了洪團隊的知所進退，也反映了「一中各表」不是任意可以甩掉的概念。

其實，國台辦前副主任孫亞夫在二○一二年十一月也說過「求一個中國之同，存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」；此與前述吳連洪三人的論述，可謂已是異口同聲。因而，此次洪習會能維持「一中涵義／求同存異」應值肯定，而習近平也把話只說到「在一個中國原則的基礎上」為止，亦未封堵「一中各表」的發展空間。

四、重新試探「和平協議」的可能性：洪說，希望兩岸探討以和平協議結束兩岸敵對狀態的可能性，「可能性」三字是在預留台灣內部政治的爭議空間。習稱，在一個中國原則的基礎上達成和平協議，也是中共的一貫主張，國共兩黨可就此進行探討。這顯示，兩岸已然脫離了「不統／不獨／不武」的騎驢看唱本走著瞧的互動模式，而必須有一指向，目標即使不是統一，亦必須以和平協議為歸趨。倘若國共能在探討和平協議上，就「一中各表」的簽約主體獲得解決方案，或許和平協議即可成為下階段兩岸間的引領議題。

此時，國民黨的實力與條件固然不如二○○五年連胡會時；但洪習會顯示北京斷然無意由民進黨操持兩岸關係的主導權，這將使蔡政府與當年扁政府一般同處邊緣化的地位。總統府發言人稱，「希望所有政黨應對外團結一致，支持由政府主導的兩岸關係」，語意即顯露了失落。

蔡總統對洪習會的評論十分緩和，她再度呼籲「北京應正視中華民國的存在」，但她如何解釋在台獨黨綱下中華民國的存在？至於她說「兩岸領導人應共同展現智慧和彈性，一起把兩岸現存的分歧帶向雙贏的未來」，但這智慧與彈性，難道不正存在於九二共識中嗎？

習近平脫稿說出：「如果中國共產黨不處理台獨，中國人民會推翻他們。」此話說得極重。蔡政府應自問：「民進黨若再不處理台獨，有無可能有一天也會失去台灣人民的支持？」

蔡政府應慎思：「九二共識／一中各表」，也許是比較有可能選取的出路。

Hung Xi Summit: Dawn of Cross-Strait Peace

Hung Xi Summit: Dawn of Cross-Strait Peace 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 1, 2016

Executive Summary: The Hung Xi Summit offered little in the way of flash. But the two sides are currently mired in cold confrontation. Increased cross-Strait exchanges and communications are beneficial for people on both sides of the Strait. Hung Hsiu-chu proposed a path that would advance cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping expressed the desire for peace. That was his bottom line. This made Mainland strategy for Taiwan clearer, and was the greatest achievement of the Hung Xi Summit.

Full Text Below:

The Hung Xi summit will affect trilateral relations among the blue, green, and red camps. Dissent has emerged from the blue camp, and ridicule from the green camp. Public statements issued by Hung Hsiu-chu and Xi Jinping suggest that the two sides followed the anticipated script, thereby completing a routine talk between the KMT and the CCP. But the Kuomintang has lost power for the first time. Cross-Strait relations remain uncertain. As a result the very first exchange between Hung and Xi carries with it unusual significance.

The two sides are seeking stability. The Hung Xi Summit was indeed short of flash. That was no surprise. But that does not mean its impact on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's political evolution was insignificant. In fact, the public pronouncements issued by the two parties during the Hung Xi Summit contain a number of important messages.

Let us look at where Hung and Xi agree. The two sides agreed on four specific points. First, they agreed on the 1992 Consensus. Xi Jinping mentioned it three times. Hung Hsiu-chu also mentioned it three times. One time she referred to “the consensus reached in 1992". The second point of agreement concerned peace. Hung Hsiu-chu mentioned "peace" seven times. Xi Jinping mentioned peace eight times. The third point of agreement concerns opposition to Taiwan independence. Xi Jinping mentioned it two times, both after mentioning the 1992 Consensus. Hung Hsiu-chu mentioned it two times as well. The only difference was that she spoke of "opposing the Taiwan independence party platform", and "eliminating the dangerous turbulence caused by Taiwan independence separatism".

The fourth point of agreement was rather special, and differed from the first three points of agreement. The two party leaders refrained from mentioning "reunification". This amounted to passive agreement.

These four points of agreement can be further interpreted from the perspective of the KMT, the DPP, and the CCP. Take the case of the KMT. Hung Hsiu-chu did not commit any verbal gaffes. The 1992 Consensus remained the greatest point of agreement for the two sides. The two sides' affirmations of "peace" and "opposition to Taiwan independence" echoed the “no use of force” and “no Taiwan independence” in Ma Ying-jeou's Three Noes policy. Neither side elaborated on reunification, the fourth point of agreement. They refrained from mentioning Ma Ying-jeou's “no reunification”. Therefore the 1992 Consensus and Ma's Three Noes were unaffected. The KMT, including Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Den-yih, were fearful that Hung Hsiu-chu's views on reunification would undermine the KMT's election prospects. They can now relax.

Did Hung Hsiu-chu mention “one China, different interpretations”? As this newspaper's past editorials have repeatedly noted, during past KMT CCP party leader meetings, even the Ma Xi Summit, the KMT never demanded any public affirmation of “one China, different interpretations”. Demanding that Hung Hsiu-chu make such an affirmation was clearly unfair.

In fact Hung did more to reaffirm “one China, different interpretations” than her predecessors. She spoke of "seeking agreement on the one China principle, while exercising wisdom regarding different interpretations of one China”. She was already half a step ahead.

For the DPP, Xi Jinping's message was clear. For the CCP, the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence are the bedrock foundation for cross-Strait relations. If the DPP wishes to unfreeze cross-Strait relations, it cannot evade these two issues. It must revise or improve its position on the 1992 Consensus. It must at a cross-Strait stance that the Mainland can live with, no matter how distasteful. Only that will prevent the further deterioration of cross-Strait relations. Only that can reduce friction between the DPP and the CCP. That may not be easy for Tsai Ing-wen, but it is not impossible. At least it is easier than dealing directly with the holy relic known as the Taiwan Independence Party Platform.

Alas, Tsai Wen-wen's poll numbers continue to fall. Therefore it is unlikely that she will make any breakthroughs regarding the 1992 Consensus or Taiwan Independence Party Platform, at least in the foreseeable future. This means that cross-Strait relations will continue to spiral downward. This is a concern for Tsai Ying-wen. It is also a danger to Taiwan's growth.

For the CCP, the Hung Xi Summit was a “paint by the numbers” affair. First, the Mainland made certain that the public on Taiwan knows where it stands. The Mainland has neither tightened nor loosened its cross-Strait stand. Second, the Mainland was probably reluctant to let Hung Hsiu-chu's visit add too many variables that would lead to uncertainty within her party and the rest of Taiwan. Third, the Mainland is probably aware of the covert jockeying for position leading up to next year's KMT party chairmanship election. It did not want closer or more distant relations resulting from Hung Hsiu-chu's visit to be interpreted as CCP support or opposition to Hung's candidacy.

During the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu advanced the possibility of a peace agreement. Among the five shared visions, this was the one with the highest profile. Ma Ying-jeou persistently avoided mention of it during his eight-year term of office. Hung Hsiu-chu advanced the issue of a peace agreement for the very first time during the talks. But the Mainland side downplayed the issue. That was unfortunate. The notion of a peace agreement has been severely stigmatized on Taiwan in recent years. But in fact a peace agreement is worth debating and can withstand scrutiny.

Cross-Strait peace must be formalized. But the notion of a peace agreement has long been stigmatized, mainly because the KMT is afraid to turn it into a political issue. It is afraid that it is untenahble. A positive response from the Mainland would encourage debate and discussion on Taiwan.

The Hung Xi Summit offered little in the way of flash. But the two sides are currently mired in cold confrontation. Increased cross-Strait exchanges and communications are beneficial for people on both sides of the Strait. Hung Hsiu-chu proposed a path that would advance cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping expressed the desire for peace. That was his bottom line. This made Mainland strategy for Taiwan clearer, and was the greatest achievement of the Hung Xi Summit.

洪習會維繫了兩岸和平曙光
2016/11/1 下午 10:42:03  主筆室

牽動藍、綠、紅三邊政治關係的洪習會，在藍有雜音、綠多嘲諷的波濤中登場。從洪秀柱、習近平公開談話內容來看，雙方大體按照外界預期的腳本，穩健完成國共兩黨行之有年的領導人會談，但放在國民黨首次徹底失去政權，兩岸關係陷入高度不確定狀態下，洪習首次對話還是具有重大意涵。

由於雙方力求穩健，洪習會確實少了一些驚豔，但也沒有太大的意外。但這不表示洪習會對兩岸關係與台灣政治發展的影響無足輕重。事實上，從洪習兩方的公開談話，還是可以比對出幾個重要訊息。

先看洪習談話的「交集處」，雙方大體有4個具體交集。第一，是九二共識，習近平說了3次，洪秀柱也剛好說了3次（其中一次以「1992年達成的共識」來表述）；第二是和平，在洪秀柱的談話中「和平」兩字出現7次，習近平則出現8次；第三是反對台獨，習近平提了2次，2次都是連在九二共識後說的，洪秀柱也提了2次，但分別是用「對抗台獨黨綱」與「消除因台獨分離主義引發的危險動盪」來表述。

第四個交集比較特別，與前3項積極性交集不同的是，兩人均未提到「統一」，這是消極性的交集。

這4個交集，可以分別從國民黨、民進黨與共產黨等幾個面向進一步解讀。就國民黨而言，洪秀柱並無「意外言行」，九二共識仍是雙方最大公約數，「和平」與「反對台獨」這2個交集，更積極呼應了馬英九任內「三不政策」中的「不武」與「不獨」。雙方均未表述統一的第四個交集，也保留了馬英九主張的「不統」，所以「九二共識」與「三不」均未動搖，國民黨內包括馬英九與吳敦義等人，疑慮洪秀柱主張統一將不利國民黨選舉的問題，應可安心。

至於洪秀柱要不要說出一中各表，就如同過去本報社論一再指出，在過去兩黨領導人會面乃至於馬習會，在公開會面談話中，國民黨一方從來不曾公開表述過「一中各表」，以此要求洪秀柱顯然不公道。

甚至，洪秀柱還比前人多做了一點「類一中各表」的表述，提及「求一中原則之同、存一中涵義之異的智慧」，已是多開了半步路。

在民進黨方面，習近平釋出的訊息再清楚不過，「九二共識」與「反對台獨」，是中共在應對兩岸關係的銅牆與鐵壁。兩岸關係要融冰復進，民進黨繞不開這兩道題。更正面或更進一步承認「九二共識」，至少在兩岸定位問題上，要有一個讓大陸「雖不滿意卻可以接受」的論述，才可以阻止兩岸關係繼續惡化，讓民共關係進入摩擦可控的緩衝地帶，這一點對蔡英文來說不容易，卻不是絕不可能，至少比直接處理《台獨黨綱》這塊神主牌要容易得多。

但蔡英文由於民調持續下滑，不管是九二共識這道銅牆，還是《台獨黨綱》這道鐵壁，在預見的未來要打破，機率都不高，這也意謂，兩岸關係還會盤旋下挫，這是蔡英文執政之憂，也是台灣發展之險。

在共產黨方面，洪習會的「照表操課」，一方面意謂陸方不願釋出讓台灣民眾誤解的訊息，不管是誤解陸方在兩岸立場上是多鬆了一些，還是多緊了一些；二方面，也可能是不願讓洪秀柱此行所多添的變數，造成她在黨內與台灣內部多增疑慮；三方面，也可能是意識到國民黨內部在明年黨主席的角力上仍有暗潮，不願有任何對洪秀柱的「加進或加遠」，讓外界解讀中共是較支持或較不支持洪秀柱。

洪秀柱在洪習會提出「和平協議」議題，這是連胡五項共同願景中最受矚目的訴求，但馬英九8年任期始終避談，洪秀柱第1次讓「和平協議」4個字重回會談桌，但陸方對此也採相對冷處理，這是有些可惜的。和平協議雖然這些年在台灣被嚴重汙名化，但「和平協議」議題本身，是經得起辯論也經得起檢驗的。

因為和平必須制度化，但和平協議長期被被汙名化，關鍵因素就是國民黨不敢將之放進政治議題，也不敢為站得住腳的理念辯護。陸方若能正面回應，實有助於和平協議在台灣的辯論與討論。

雖然沒太多驚豔，但在兩岸陷入冷對抗的此刻，兩岸交流與溝通能多一分，對兩岸民眾就好一分，洪秀柱提出了深化兩岸和平的路徑，習近平表達了和平的意願與底限，讓大陸對台戰略更清晰，這是洪習會最大成就。